

**SOCIAL TRUST IN BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
“SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” 1890-2016**

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Synopsis

A gap exists in our understanding of how trust functions between states. Given their size and complexity, studying trust at the collective level without minimising interpersonal relations has proven a difficult task. Scholarship in this space has focused on the relationships between leaders, and in particular leaders of adversarial states. In relationships where trust is more expansive, it becomes clear that analysis needs to be broadened. This thesis aims to create a multidimensional trust framework which can capture the state in a more expansive manner, through applying the framework using a flat ontology of the state. The multidimensional trust framework is built on insights from trust research conducted both within and outside the discipline of international relations, and organised around the core understanding drawn from literature in the business space that the formation of trust in alliances between organisations requires a multidimensional approach that sees trust as existing in different forms. This thesis posits three dimensions of trust, each of which provides a different basis of the expectation of no harm required for trust: calculative, affective, and normative. The calculative dimension comprises the role of socially determined interests, the affective dimension the role of perceptions of goodwill and emotional connections between actors, and the normative dimension the role of shared identity factors.

Applying the multidimensional trust framework to the state as a collective in a way which does not minimise interpersonal relations requires conceptualising the state using a flat ontology. A flat ontology sees power structures flattened, thus conceiving of the state in a way which does not prioritise leadership or even government relations over other aspects of a bilateral relationship. This allows for an analysis which captures how interactions from across the breadth of a bilateral relationship shape the complex and dynamic flows of trust and power between states, from members of society to intelligence personnel to leaders. Flattening power structures also allows for an approach which captures sources of agency not often considered to be significant in the examination of relationships between states.

This theoretical approach is applied to the relationship between Britain and America from 1890-2016, which is valuable on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The Anglo-American relationship provides a rich case study in which the development of trust can be analysed over time, providing valuable insights into what trust looks like in its limited and expansive forms across all three dimensions, how the dimensions interact, how and where trust develops, and what impact each dimension of trust has when it is present. Applying the theoretical approach

to the Anglo-American relationship also provides a secondary contribution to the empirical literature through arguing that the relationship is not “special,” it is trusting, and providing an alternative method to analyse the relationship and manage the various factors considered to make the relationship “special.” The primary contribution of this thesis is the multidimensional trust framework and the application of the framework using a flat ontology of the state, which comprise an original contribution to trust research in international relations.

Declaration

I certify that this thesis:

1. does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and
2. to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

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Acronyms

AWWRF – American Women’s War Relief Fund
BLI – British Library of Information
BRUSA – Britain-United States of America Agreement
BSC – British Security Coordination
CBMs – Confidence Building Measures
CCS – Combined Chiefs of Staff
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CIDT – Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
COI – Office of the Coordinator of Information
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights
EEC – European Economic Community
EU – European Union
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GCHQ – Government Communications Headquarters
GFC – Global Financial Crisis
GRIT – Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction
HCSEC – Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICSE – International Committee for Sexual Equality
IRA – Irish Republican Army
JSM – Joint Staff Mission
MCBM – Maritime Confidence Building Measure
MOI – Ministry of Information
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCSC – National Cyber Security Centre
NSA – National Security Agency
OSINT – Open Source Intelligence
OSS – Office of Strategic Services

RAF – Royal Air Force

SIGINT – Signals Intelligence

SIS – Secret Intelligence Service

SNP – Scottish National Party

SOE – Special Operations Executive

UK - United Kingdom

U.S. – United States

U.S.S.R. – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UKUSA – United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement

USAF – United States Air Force

WMDs – Weapons of Mass Destruction

WWI – World War One

WWII – World War Two

Introduction

In a world of increasing uncertainty, geopolitical tension, and transnational challenges, it is important to understand how and why states trust each other and as a consequence seek to engage in cooperation rather than conflict. As outlined by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres in 2018:

Our world is suffering from a bad case of “Trust Deficit Disorder”. People are feeling troubled and insecure. Trust is at a breaking point. Trust in national institutions. Trust among states. Trust in the rules-based global order. Within countries, people are losing faith in political establishments, polarization is on the rise and populism is on the march. Among countries, cooperation is less certain and more difficult. Divisions in our Security Council are stark. Trust in global governance is also fragile, as 21st-century challenges outpace 20th-century institutions and mindsets.¹

Trust has long been recognised to be an invaluable ingredient in social life. This is true in the day-to-day life of an individual, in the processes of democracy and the nature of the social contract underpinning society, and in the relationships between states in the international system.

Trust provides a fundamental social function through allowing individuals to navigate day-to-day life in an environment of uncertainty. It does so through reducing social complexity,² and allowing people to suspend their sense of uncertainty.³ Uncertainty is always present in daily life, driven in particular by two key factors: the fact that the intentions of others can never truly be known, and potential future changes can never be predicted with certainty. Sociologist Piotr Sztompka has outlined that everyday uncertainty has increased owing to a number of societal changes including increased interdependency, unpredictability, opacity, and availability of choices.⁴ These changes have been driven by the pace and scope of technological change, the increased complexity of institutions, and the increased anonymity of people on whom we rely on for our existence such as employers, suppliers of goods, and providers of services.⁵ They are also changes which have continued to grow since Sztompka identified them in 1999, and they are accompanied by further changes relating to the loss of trust in centralised institutions and

¹ Antonio Guterres, “Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly,” United Nations Secretary-General, September 25, 2018, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-09-25/secretary-generals-address-general-assembly-delivered-trilingual>.

² For an account of the role of trust in reducing social complexity, see Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1979).

³ For an account of the role of trust in allowing a person to suspend their sense of uncertainty, see Guido Möllering, “The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension,” *Sociology* 35, no. 2 (2001): 403–20.

⁴ P. Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11–14.

⁵ Sztompka, 11-14.

changing digital technologies. In conjunction with factors such as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and rising wealth inequality, rapid changes in technology have contributed to shifting flows of trust from existing primarily in vertical hierarchies centred on trusted, centralised institutions, to flowing horizontally through peer-to-peer networks. This can be seen in the concurrent decrease in trust in centralised institutions such as governments and banks, and the growth of the sharing economy in which trust is placed in strangers mediated by digital platforms such as Uber and Airbnb.⁶ In an environment of greater complexity and uncertainty, trust only becomes more important.

States, too, need to navigate an environment of greater complexity and uncertainty. In addition to the impact of societal changes, states face an environment of greater geopolitical tension. The disruptive presidency of Donald Trump in the United States and fears regarding the nature of China's rise have caused considerable consternation. At the same time, technological developments have changed the nature of warfare, making it more complex and diffuse.⁷ As social actors, states also need trust in order to reduce social complexity and function in conditions of uncertainty. International relations as a discipline has tended to be sceptical of the possibility of trust, and preferred to consider states as rational rather than social actors. The surprise and alarm caused by the distinctly transactional foreign policy of Donald Trump, however, has highlighted that international relations had not previously been conducted on a solely transactional and rational basis. As Booth and Wheeler highlight in their seminal 2008 text *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, not only can trust exist in the intense conditions of uncertainty which exist in the anarchic international system, but trust necessarily exists in conditions of uncertainty – this is what makes it trust. Trust also allows for deeper and more sustained forms of cooperation than would otherwise be possible. An increasingly interconnected world and the salience of transnational issues further adds to the need for trust and cooperation, and exacerbates the consequences of conflict and competition. Environmental issues, climate change, migration, and nuclear non-proliferation are all transnational issues which require international cooperation. Yet, analysis at the international level is the most significant challenge for trust studies, given the degree of complexity and uncertainty, and the difficulties of building

⁶ For an outline of the relationship between trust and technology in the context of the sharing economy, see Rachel Botsman, *Who Can You Trust? How Technology Brought Us Together - and Why It Could Drive Us Apart* (Milton Keynes: Portfolio Penguin, 2017).

⁷ See, for example, Emily Bienvenue and Zac Rogers, "Strategic Army: Developing Trust within the Cognitive Battlespace," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (forthcoming October 2019); Emily Bienvenue, Zac Rogers, and Sian Troath, "Cognitive Warfare: The Fight We've Got," *The Cove*, September 19, 2018, <https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/article-cognitive-warfare-the-fight-weve-got/>; Emily Bienvenue, Zac Rogers, and Sian Troath, "Trust as a Strategic Resource for the Defence of Australia," *The Cove*, October 29, 2018, <https://www.cove.org.au/war-room/article-trust-as-a-strategic-resource-for-the-defence-of-australia/>.

and maintaining trust between such large and complex collectives.⁸ The uncertainty wrought by changes to both societies and the international system only makes it more important to further understanding of how trust operates between states.

A particular area of concern driving current uncertainty in the international system is the belief that America is a declining hegemon, and China is a rising hegemon. Such a combination has often produced intense conflict. America and Britain, however, managed a peaceful transition of hegemonic status in the early twentieth century. At the same time, the relationship between Britain and America has generated intense academic debate over whether or not the relationship can be considered “special,” as many claim, and what precisely constitutes specialness.⁹ Consequently, this thesis develops a theoretical framework centred on trust to analyse bilateral relationships, using the history of the relationship between Britain and America from 1890 to 2016 as a case study. Following their peaceful hegemonic transition, Britain and America proceeded to develop a relationship of unparalleled cooperation, notably in the fields of defence, intelligence, and nuclear cooperation from World War II onwards. The *rapprochement* in the 1890s followed a history more dominated by conflict than cooperation, and yielded only limited forms of cooperation itself. Thus, tracing the relationship from 1890 onwards allows for an understanding of the development of trust over an extended period of time, providing insight into how two states which once fought each other came to share the most sensitive of defence related secrets. It also paints a picture of what trust looks like at opposing ends of the spectrum, in both

⁸ Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, “Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations,” *Journal of Trust Research* 5, no. 1 (2015): 8.

⁹ For some key works which debate the concept of “specialness”, see Alex Danchev, “The Cold War ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 1 (2006): 579–95; Max Beloff, “The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth?,” in *A Century of Conflict 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor*, ed. Martin Gilbert (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1996), 151–72; Jérôme B. Élie, “Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no. S1 (2005): 63+83; David Reynolds, “Churchill’s War Memoirs and the Invention of the ‘Special Relationship,’” in *The ‘Special Relationship,’* ed. Antoine Capet and Aïssatou Sy-Wonyu (Rouen: Publications de l’université de Rouen, 2003), 43–54; Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” *International Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1996): 737–50; Kristin Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018); H. C. Allen, “A Special Relationship?,” *Journal of American Studies* 19, no. 1 (1985): 403–13; John Baylis, “The ‘Special Relationship’: A Diverting British Myth?,” in *Haunted By History: Myths in International Relations*, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence and Oxford: Berhahn Books, 1998), 117–34; Duncan Andrew Campbell, *Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship* (London: Hambledon Continuum, A Continuum Imprint, 2007); John Charmley, *Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995); Christopher Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s,” *International Affairs* 68, no. 3 (1992): 407–21; John Dickie, “‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality” (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, n.d.); Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?,” *The International History Review* 36, no. 4 (2014): 673–97; John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2nd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds., *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013).

its limited and expansive forms.

Trust in International Relations

International relations has long been concerned with when and why states cooperate. Bringing trust into this equation, however, is a more recent endeavour. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler were the first to extensively outline why this has been the case, in their 2008 work *The Security Dilemma; Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*.¹⁰ They argued that it is the way in which international relations theorists have understood the nature of the uncertainty which exists as a consequence of the anarchic international system which has shaped how theorists view cooperation and trust. Offensive realists view anarchy and uncertainty as so overwhelming that states are driven by distrust, mutual suspicion, and competition.¹¹ As a consequence, opportunities for cooperation are rare, and trust is inconceivable. Defensive realists see greater opportunities for cooperation, arguing that in these conditions it is sometimes rational for states to be security seekers who will cooperate to maintain the status quo.¹² Neoliberal internationalists are more optimistic again, examining how the existence of international institutions, democracies, and economic interdependence promote greater levels of cooperation through reducing transaction costs.¹³ These theorists do not go so far as to make an explicit study of trust, or the relationship between trust and cooperation. It was the constructivist turn in international relations which prompted a more significant focus on trust, through labelling anarchy a social construction,¹⁴ and facilitating work on state identity, strategic culture,¹⁵ and security communities.¹⁶ Work in these

¹⁰ K. Booth and N. J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

¹¹ See, for example, John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition)* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth (New York: Knopf, 1973).

¹² See, for example, C. L. Glaser, "Realists As Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (May 1994): 50–90; Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 357–78; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Interview with Robert Jervis," *International Relations* 28, no. 4 (2014): 479–504; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 185–205.

¹³ See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989); Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 226–54; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (USA: BasicBooks, 1984).

¹⁴ Nicholas Onuf was the first to coin the term constructivism in international relations. Alexander Wendt popularised it through using it to construct a social theory of the international system. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (London and New York): Routledge, 1989); Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); P. Schouten, "Theory Talk #70: Nicholas Onuf on the Evolution of Social Constructivism, Turns in IR, and a Discipline of Our Making," *Theory Talks*, February 7, 2015, <http://www.theory-talks.org/2015/07/theory-talk-70.html>.

¹⁵ Most notably presented in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

¹⁶ Most notably explored in Karl Wolfgang Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North American Area:*

areas tends to imply the importance of trust, with some examining the role of trust more overtly.¹⁷ Owing to the predominance of socially grounded understandings of trust, as compared to rationalist understandings of trust, the majority of work on trust in international relations has taken place in this space.

As trust is a relatively recent addition to international relations, work on trust has drawn on insights from outside the discipline, including from economics, business studies, political science, philosophy, social psychology, and sociology. These insights can be categorised into three broad approaches: rationalist, psychological, and social.¹⁸ Rationalist approaches are drawn primarily from economics and political science, and view trust as a cost-benefit analysis of the risks and opportunities associated with a particular instance of cooperation, made by states who are rational actors.¹⁹ In international relations, Andrew Kydd has been the key proponent of a rationalist approach, using game theory to model trust.²⁰ Psychological approaches are, of course, drawn from psychology, and tend to examine trust as an individual attitude, trait, or belief.²¹ Brian Rathbun has used theories of social psychology in international relations to study how trust shapes an individual's approach to foreign policy.²² Social approaches have been inspired predominantly by sociology, where trust is seen to be a sociological phenomenon rather than a psychological

International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 17 Most notably Adler and Barnett, although Wheeler criticises their approach to trust as lacking specificity regarding the role of trust in the development of security communities. See Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*; Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 121.

¹⁷ Most notably Adler and Barnett, although Wheeler criticises their approach to trust as lacking specificity regarding the role of trust in the development of security communities. See Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*; Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 121.

¹⁸ A categorisation used by Keating and Ruzicka in their 2015 review of the state of trust literature in international relations. See Keating and Ruzicka, "Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations."

¹⁹ See, for example, Oliver E. Williamson, "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," *Journal of Law and Economics* 36, no. 1 (1993): 453–86; Russell. Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," *Analyse Und Kritik* 14, no. 2 (1992): 505–29; Russell. Hardin, *Trust* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).

²⁰ See Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation" 54, no. 2 (2014): 325–357; A. H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).

²¹ See, for example, Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); R. Holton, "Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 72, no. 1 (1994): 63–76; Bernd Lahno, "On the Emotional Character of Trust," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 4 (2001): 171–189.

²² See Brian C. Rathbun, "Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations," *International Organization* 65, no. 02 (2011): 243–273; Brian C. Rathbun, *Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.); Brian C. Rathbun, "It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our Minds," *International Theory* 1, no. 3 (2009): 345–80; Brian C. Rathbun, "The 'Magnificent Fraud': Trust, International Cooperation, and the Hidden Domestic Politics of American Multilateralism after World War II," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (2011): 1–21; Brian C. Rathbun and Joshua D. Kertzer, "Fair Is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity in International Politics," *World Politics* 67, no. 4 (2015): 613–55; Brian C. Rathbun et al., "Taking Foreign Policy Values Personally: Personal Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (2016): 124–37.

phenomenon.²³ Proponents of such approaches situate trust within its broader sociological context, and take account of how both interpersonal and collective interactions shape the development of trust within the social structures they take place in.

It is within the social perspective on trust that this thesis is situated. In social approaches, trust is understood to be performing a vital social function. It is something which allows people to continue to function and interact with one another, through facilitating the suspension of uncertainty and the reduction of complexity.²⁴ No person can ever have perfect information about either current or future events. These are the problems discussed in international relations in the form of the other minds' problem, the security dilemma, and the shadow of the future. States, too, must function in an environment of imperfect information. To some extent, this can be alleviated by reducing transaction costs through such mechanisms as international institutions, or verification and monitoring regimes.²⁵ Transaction costs, however, can never be entirely removed. Once states are understood as being social actors, it must be accepted that they require the invaluable social function of trust to navigate their way through uncertainty and complexity. Trust enables cooperation on longer term issues of greater sensitivity where the pay-off is not necessarily immediate. Such cooperation is increasingly necessary in an interconnected environment of increasing uncertainty and the ever-growing salience of transnational issues.

The leading scholars of social approaches to trust in international relations have been Ken Booth, Nicholas Wheeler, Jan Ruzicka, and Vincent Keating.²⁶ Booth and Wheeler combine insights from outside international relations with insights from international relations theory to examine

²³ See, for example, Arvind Parkhe, "Understanding Trust in International Alliances," *Journal of World Business* 33, no. 3 (1998): 219–40; David J. Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, "The Social Dynamics of Trust: Theoretical and Empirical Research, 1985–2012," *Social Forces* 91, no. 1 (2012): 25–31; David J. Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, "Trust as a Social Reality," *Social Forces* 63, no. 4 (1985): 967–85; Möllering, "The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension"; J. M. Barbalet, "Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust and Loyalty," *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 16, no. 9/10 (1996): 75–96; Luhmann, *Trust and Power*.

²⁴ Möllering is the most notable scholar to understand trust as a suspension of uncertainty. See Möllering, "The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension."

²⁵ For an investigation of the relationship between trust and verification, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine, "Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty," in *Trust, But Verify: The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991*, ed. Martin Klimke, Reinhold Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann (Washington D.C.: Stanford University Press, 2016), 121–39.

²⁶ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*; Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*; Wheeler, Baker, and Considine, "Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty"; Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Investigating Diplomatic Transformations," *International Affairs* 89, no. 2 (2013): 477–496; Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *International Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2010): 69–85; Keating and Ruzicka, "Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations"; Ruzicka and Wheeler, "The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"; Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, "Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge," *Review of International Studies* FirstView Article (2014): 1–18; Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, "Trust, Obligation, and Reciprocity in NATO," *Défense et Sécurité Internationale* 57, no. 1 (2017): 1–7.

the role between trust and uncertainty. Rather than uncertainty precluding trust, they point out that trust theory informs us that trust necessarily exists in conditions of uncertainty: this is what makes it trust. They explore the relationship between trust and cooperation, arguing that for deeper and more sustained forms of cooperation to take place, trust must exist not only between governments but also between societies.²⁷ Booth and Wheeler term this embedded trust. Keating and Ruzicka use a socially grounded approach to trust to explore what constitutes a trusting relationship and how to identify one.²⁸ They also explore trust in alliances, pointing to the importance of including both rational and social elements in a conceptualisation of trust in an alliance context.²⁹ In a subsequent work, Wheeler analyses the nature of trust in interpersonal relationships between leaders, and how it can help leaders of enemy states build trust to ensure the accurate interpretation of costly signals.³⁰ His contribution is invaluable to the study of trust between leaders, which provides a theory on how the interpersonal dimension of state behaviour shapes the potential for the development of trust between adversarial leaders in the form of bonding trust. Bonding trust, he argues, develops via face-to-face interaction.³¹ There are two preconditions for a process of bonding to begin: security dilemma sensibility and the acquisition of an index of trustworthiness.³² There are two further conditions required to ensure a process of bonding is operationalised: the positive identification of interests, and humanization.³³

He also highlights a gap in trust research: the gap left by the fact that approaches to trust which focus on collective trust ‘marginalize or ignore the interpersonal dimension of state behaviour, especially processes of face-to-face interaction and the potential for trust to emerge from social interaction of this kind’.³⁴ This gap exists across social trust research which aims to study the state as a collective entity. While Wheeler addresses this gap by considering leaders to be referents of their collective state,³⁵ particularly when one is studying trust between non- adversarial states it is clear that leaders are insufficient on their own, even when considered as representatives of their state. Booth and Wheeler argue that trust must be embedded in society for it to be enduring, that ‘it is necessary for positive relationships between leaders to be replicated at the intersocietal level’.³⁶ This thesis seeks to further operationalise this concept of embedded trust and analyse

²⁷ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 197.

²⁸ Keating and Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge”; Keating and Ruzicka, “Trust, Obligation, and Reciprocity in NATO.”

²⁹ Keating and Ruzicka, “Trust, Obligation, and Reciprocity in NATO.”

³⁰ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

³¹ Wheeler, 7–9.

³² Wheeler, 51.

³³ Wheeler, 51.

³⁴ Wheeler, 118.

³⁵ Wheeler, 17–20.

³⁶ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 197.

trust beyond leadership relations. Trust is clearly formed amongst a wide range of actors, and it is therefore necessary to explore ways to conceptualise how trust develops across the breadth of a bilateral relationship, and what the evolution of trust among different actors means for the nature of trust in the relationship as a whole. It is necessary to do this in a way which does not fall into the trap Wheeler points to regarding minimising interpersonal relations when studying states as collectives. This thesis aims to further contribute to this gap in the study of social trust. It will do so by analysing trust between collectives without minimising interpersonal relations, and incorporating a broader expanse of sites of trust-building and sources of agency in the development of trust.

A Multidimensional Trust Framework

In order to contribute to the gap identified by Wheeler in capturing the collective nature of trust between states without losing the salience of interpersonal trust, this thesis turns to multidimensional approaches to trust in the sociological literature on trust between organisations. Where international relations has struggled to capture the interplay between factors considered either rationalist or social in nature, and the way in which they interact across different domains of the state, the literature on trust between organisations has covered more ground in tackling both these difficulties. Organisations are in some ways similar to states, in terms of the complexity of their structure. Both have leaders who represent the entity, a range of people in different positions within that entity, and some kind of collective culture and identity. Organisational literature has explored the complex ways in which trust flows across these different areas of the relationship between organisations, and thus provides valuable insights into how trust might flow between the complex layers of states.³⁷ Differences lie in the greater structural complexity of states; the fact that no two states begin interactions with a clean slate; and in the structural conditions of states versus organisations, with the anarchic international system providing much higher levels of uncertainty and more significant consequences for breaches of trust. Organisational literature remains useful despite these differences, however, owing to its core utility in providing new ways of thinking about how trust in different areas interacts to shape the trust between two collectives

³⁷ See, for example, Parkhe, “Understanding Trust in International Alliances”; Lewis and Weigert, “The Social Dynamics of Trust: Theoretical and Empirical Research, 1985-2012”; Lewis and Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality”; Matthias Meier et al., “How Managers Can Build Trust in Strategic Alliances: A Meta-Analysis on the Central Trust-Building Mechanisms,” *Journal of Business Economics* 86, no. 3 (2016): 229–57; Dale E. Zand, “Reflections on Trust and Trust Research: Then and Now,” *Journal of Trust Research* 6, no. 1 (2016): 63–73; Bo Bernhard Nielsen, “Trust in Strategic Alliances: Toward a Co-Evolutionary Research Model,” *Journal of Trust Research* 1, no. 2 (2011): 159–76; D. Shapiro, B. H. Sheppard, and L. Cheraskin, “Business on a Handshake,” *Negotiation Journal* 8, no. 4 (1992): 365–77; Roy J. Lewicki and Barbara Benedict Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” in *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1996), 114–39.

as wholes. The way in which the dimensions of trust in this framework are conceptualised draws on trust literature from both within and outside international relations, using the international relations literature to aid in adjusting the approaches found in the organisational literature so that they can adequately take account of the key differences between organisations and states. At the broadest level, trust will be understood to be ‘*the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility*’.³⁸

To apply this to relationships between large and complex collectives requires breaking it down further to ensure greater precision. The core contribution of organisational literature in providing new ways to think about how trust moves between the different spaces or domains found in collective entities is the argument that trust is multidimensional. Using a multidimensional approach means that the *source* of the expectation of no harm central to trust can be more clearly identified. Multidimensional approaches to trust recognise the need to include rational, psychological, and social elements within an understanding of trust. They view trust as existing in different forms, or resulting from different sources or bases. Where some multidimensional approaches see these different forms as happening sequentially, one taking place after the other, this thesis makes use of approaches which conceptualise the different dimensions as interacting dynamically. This is particularly useful given the fact that states, unlike organisations, will never interact with a clean slate. States have already interacted with one another in some capacity, and hold pre-existing perceptions. Understanding trust in this way means that ‘the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of trust’ can be included within analysis.³⁹ Analysis can capture the ‘multi-faceted character’ of trust,⁴⁰ and its ‘dynamic evolution’ over time.⁴¹

Inspired by multidimensional approaches to trust, this thesis constructs a framework which considers trust as having three dimensions. The three dimensions are heavily inspired by the work of Lewicki and Bunker, who outlined three forms of trust they termed calculative-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust.⁴² In the framework created in this thesis, the three dimensions are updated and adapted based on insights from both within and outside international relations, with particular attention paid to ensuring the different structural conditions between organisations and states are reflected in their construction. The dimensions are termed the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions of trust. Each of these contributes in a different way to the source of the expectation of no harm present in a situation of trust. The

³⁸ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 2.

³⁹ Nielsen, “Trust in Strategic Alliances: Toward a Co-Evolutionary Research Model,” 159.

⁴⁰ Lewis and Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” 969.

⁴¹ Nielsen, “Trust in Strategic Alliances: Toward a Co-Evolutionary Research Model,” 160.

⁴² Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships.”

dynamic interaction between the dimensions drives the development of trust in a bilateral relationship as a whole. The calculative dimension of trust contributes to an expectation of no harm through capturing the role of interests, where interests are understood not in a solely rationalist sense in which interests are divorced from their social context, but rather as being shaped by perceptions and identity-based considerations. This is to ensure interests are understood in a manner which is congruent with the social ontology of the thesis, and the social tradition of trust research. Key concepts which feed into the calculative dimension of trust include strategic culture,⁴³ the constructivist argument that repeated interactions between states shape state identity,⁴⁴ and Wheeler's argument that repeated interpersonal interactions leads to the individuals involved acquiring an index of trustworthiness.⁴⁵ An index of trustworthiness is 'a signal of inherent credibility as to another's trustworthiness' which is acquired by leaders in face-to-face interactions.⁴⁶ The affective dimension of trust contributes to an expectation of no harm through exploring the role of emotions in the development of trust, particularly in interpersonal relations. It is important to consider not only what actors learn about each other and their interests during interactions, but also how they feel about and perceive the knowledge they acquire. Key concepts included in the affective dimension of trust include the development of shared expectations of trustworthiness through a process of social learning; Holton's participant stance which explains trust as requiring each actor's emotions to be an inherent part of the interactions between them,⁴⁷ rather than trust being a solely rationalist or calculative experience; and Wheeler's conceptualisation of bonded trust.⁴⁸

Wheeler's understanding of bonded trust covers both the affective and normative dimensions, describing how a process of bonding shifts a relationship from being based predominantly on calculative trust to one of a 'mental state of suspension' as identity transformation takes place through repeated face-to-face interactions.⁴⁹ This thesis finds it more useful to separate the affective and normative dimensions, in order to better understand the role of shared identity factors. Separating the affective and normative dimensions is of particular value with regard to the Anglo-American relationship, given the extent to which shared identity factors are known to exist. A better understanding of the impact of shared identity factors on the development of trust, as compared to perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness and the role of emotions in interactions,

⁴³ As in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*.

⁴⁴ As described by Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics."

⁴⁵ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

⁴⁶ Wheeler, 52.

⁴⁷ Holton, "Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe."

⁴⁸ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

⁴⁹ Wheeler, 8.

will provide a more solid basis for further research on cases where shared identity factors are not present. The normative dimension of trust therefore contributes to an expectation of no harm through capturing the role of common identity bonds, and the way in which trust strengthens the closer actors move toward having a shared identity which allows them to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another.⁵⁰ The key concepts used to identify the presence of normative trust come from the work of Lewicki and Bunker: the development of a collective identity, collocation, the creation of joint products or goals, and shared values.⁵¹

These dimensions are not distinct, but rather interact in dynamic ways over time and across the breadth of a bilateral relationship. When the affective and normative dimensions are limited, shared interests are required to catalyse cooperation and promote the repeated interaction required for the further development of trust. This cooperation will likely be restricted to small- scale and non-sensitive issues, where the cost of potential betrayal is low. The affective dimension of trust, particularly between key individuals such as leaders, will often help to facilitate cooperation on shared interests as perceptions of goodwill and an emotional connection aid actors in developing shared expectations of trustworthiness. The normative dimension will incline such individuals to share a similar view on shared interests. The normative dimension can also help to facilitate ongoing good relations even when other dimensions are struggling, notably when the affective dimension between leaders is weak. All dimensions of trust require repeated interactions to strengthen. As the affective dimension strengthens, perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness will strengthen. Over time, the normative dimension of trust may also strengthen, should common identity bonds begin to form. The actors will less often view their interests as being distinct, and more often view their interests as inherently shared when the line between self and other blurs, and two “I’s” become “we”. Therein lies the key distinction between the affective and normative dimensions of trust: when the normative dimension is weak the affective dimension will aid the development of shared expectations of trustworthiness and actors will expect no betrayal, however when the normative dimension is strong there will be no conscious thought about whether or not betrayal is expected. Through a process of identity transformation actors suspend their sense of uncertainty and “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another. The most enduring form of trust exists when all three dimensions of trust are strongly present across all areas of the bilateral relationship, in an expansion of the concept of embedded trust. This is the kind of trust which allows for sustained cooperation on sensitive issues, as we can see in the post-war Anglo-American relationship.

⁵⁰ Terminology drawn from Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 123.

⁵¹ Lewicki and Bunker, 123.

It is important to capture the way in which the dimensions of trust interact dynamically across the breadth of a bilateral relationship in order to effectively apply this expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust and understand where and how trust gets embedded. Doing so requires conceptualising the state in a way which can capture the complex and dynamic way in which the trust which is formed in one area of a bilateral relationship shapes trust in other areas, and trust in the relationship as a whole. For instance, what is the relationship between the trust formed between leaders and the trust formed between society? It is not sufficient to study only leaders. This thesis first sought to use a levels of analysis approach,⁵² however this proved too rigid and insufficient to capture the way in which the different levels interact and influence one another. As Keating and Ruzicka highlight in their 2015 review of trust literature in international relations, the ‘perennial problem of the levels of analysis [is] something that trust researchers ought to take seriously’.⁵³ Wheeler, too, eschews the levels of analysis, arguing that they imply ‘that the behaviour of states at a collective level is not influenced by the beliefs and values of individual decision-makers’.⁵⁴ He instead uses the language ‘dimensions of state behaviour’, of which his theory of bonding trust comprises a new dimension he terms the ‘interpersonal dimension of state behaviour’.⁵⁵ Wheeler, however, focuses on leaders as ‘referents’ for signalling, trust, and trustworthiness.⁵⁶ Leaders are not treated solely as individuals, but rather as representatives of the collective entity that is their state.⁵⁷ Factors such as domestic politics and the strategic narratives which influence state behaviour are incorporated in terms of how they shape the leader.⁵⁸ When one shifts from studying enemy relationships to studying relationships with greater trust present, it becomes clear that trust exists in a wider, more complex tapestry which must take account of a broader range of actors.

To capture this more complex tapestry of trust, this thesis conceptualises the state using a flat ontology. A flat ontology of the state is an approach which is most well known in the areas of

⁵² For an overview of how the levels of analysis have been understood in IR, see Owen Temby, “What Are Levels of Analysis and What Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 28, no. 4 (2015): 721–42; The idea behind the levels of analysis first appeared in Waltz, although Singer coined the term in a review of his work. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics* 14, no. 01 (1961): 77–92.

⁵³ Keating and Ruzicka, “Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations,” 18.

⁵⁴ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 20.

⁵⁵ Wheeler, 20.

⁵⁶ Wheeler, 17–20.

⁵⁷ Wheeler, 18.

⁵⁸ Wheeler, 18.

assemblage theory⁵⁹ and actor-network theory.⁶⁰ This thesis does not use either of these theories in their entirety, but rather draws solely on the flat ontology as a means to conceptualise the state. The aim of a flat ontology in such approaches is to reconceptualise the state in a way which flattens structures and eschews vertical hierarchies such as those epitomised by the levels of analysis. For political geographers using assemblage approaches such as Jason Dittmer, this project has in part focused on how to understand the state as a political entity without ignoring everyday practices, through examining ‘the everyday crafting of the state’.⁶¹ Using this approach allows for an analysis which captures the everyday crafting of *trust*. While not using the term flat ontology, a related project has been ongoing in the study of emotions in international relations.⁶² Work on emotions has focused heavily on how individual emotions become both collective and political, thereby challenging levels of analysis approaches to the state through interrogating the relationship between the micro and the macro.⁶³ The most recent manifestation of work on emotions in international relations is a special issue focused on the ‘everyday politics of

⁵⁹ For example, see Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis, eds., *Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Jason Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017); Jason Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 105, no. 3 (2015): 604–19; Christian Bueger, “Territory, Authority, Expertise: Global Governance and the Counter-Piracy Assemblage,” *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 3 (2018): 614–37.

⁶⁰ For a notable example, see Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁶¹ Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy*, 6; For some other important approaches to the “everyday” in international relations, see Cynthia Enloe, “The Mundane Matters,” *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 4 (December 2011): 447–50; Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, “What Would You Do? Everyday Conceptions and Constructions of Counter-Terrorism,” *Politics* 36, no. 3 (2016): 277–91; Roger Mac Ginty, “Everyday Peace: Bottom-Up and Local Agency in Conflict-Affected Societies,” *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 6 (2014): 548–64; Liam Stanley and Richard Jackson, “Introduction: Everyday Narratives in World Politics,” *Politics* 36, no. 3 (2016): 223–35; Nick Vaughan-Williams and Daniel Stevens, “Vernacular Theories of Everyday (In)Security: The Disruptive Potential of Non-Elite Knowledge,” *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016): 40–58.

⁶² Although work in emotions had been growing prior, the project was most notably kickstarted by the special forum headlined by Bleiker and Hutchinson which brought previously disparate work on emotions together. See Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchinson, “Introduction: Emotions and World Politics,” *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 490–594; Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Theorizing Emotions in World Politics,” *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 491–514.

⁶³ For an overview, see Hutchison and Bleiker, “Theorizing Emotions in World Politics,” 499–500; Neta C. Crawford, “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 535–57; Rose McDermott, “The Body Doesn’t Lie: A Somatic Approach to the Study of Emotions in World Politics,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 557–62; K.M. Fierke, “Emotion and Intentionality,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 563–67; Christian Reus-Smit, “Emotions and the Social,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 568–74; Andrew Linklater, “Anger and World Politics: How Collective Emotions Shift Over Time,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 574–78; L.H.M. Ling, “Decolonizing the International: Towards Multiple Emotional Worlds,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 579–83; Renée Jeffery, “The Promise and Problems of the Neuroscientific Approach to Emotions,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 584–89; Janice Bially Mattern, “On Being Convinced: An Emotional Epistemology of International Relations,” *International Theory* 6, no. 03 (November 2014): 589–94; For specific approaches and debates on how to manage the relationship between macro and micro, see Jonathan Mercer, “Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity,” *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 515–35.

emotions’.⁶⁴ As described in the introduction to this special issue, ‘emotions provide insight into hegemonic emotional knowledge, revealing dynamics of power shaping everyday micro and macro interactions’.⁶⁵ This reinforces the value of studying the everyday construction of trust, through the use of a flat ontology and a multidimensional trust framework which can capture the interplay of the micro and the macro.

A flat ontology furthermore encourages a more inclusive approach to the state which can capture how trust is shaped by people whose voices would normally go unheard in examinations of trust in inter-state relations. This will be most clearly demonstrated in Chapter Three in the example of how transatlantic marriages shaped *rapprochement* through building trust, and in Chapter Five with regards to the relationship between special relationship of homophile activists and the “special relationship” itself in the 1950s. A more inclusive approach to the state is naturally also inspired by feminist literature which examines emotions through emphasising ‘the politics of emotions and their interaction with dynamics and structures of power’.⁶⁶ Feminist literature in international relations reveals the value of understanding the personal as being not only political but geopolitical, and that understanding the dynamics and structures of power, and therefore also trust, requires challenging traditional conceptualisations of the state. It is only when structures are flattened that the impact of the everyday crafting of trust and the role of non-traditional actors in shaping trust can truly be appreciated.

It is obviously not possible to cover the whole of the rich variety of interactions that take place across the breadth of inter-state relations. Analysis needs to be focused in some way, albeit in a way which holds onto a flat ontology and speaks to the development of trust. To achieve this, three domains of the Anglo-American bilateral relationship will be explored: government and leaders, military and defence, and society. These areas were chosen as they provide the most significant opportunities for interaction, which is a necessary albeit not sufficient condition for the development of trust. They are not understood as being hierarchical. Given the breadth and depth of the Anglo-American relationship, there were other options for possible domains to analyse. The most significant of these is the financial relationship between the two countries, which certainly provides opportunities for interaction. It was not possible to include the financial

⁶⁴ Amanda Russell Beattie, Clara Eroukhmanoff, and Naomi Head, “Introduction: Interrogating the ‘Everyday’ Politics of Emotions in International Relations,” *Journal of International Political Theory*, 2019, 1–12.

⁶³ Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head, 2.

⁶⁵ Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head, 2.

⁶⁶ Kate Schick, “Emotions and the Everyday: Ambivalence, Power and Resistance,” *Journal of International Political Theory*, 2019, 1–2; This was a project most notably taken up and explored by Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

domain, or any other possible domains, due to space limitations. The three domains chosen were prioritised for different reasons. First, it was not possible to ignore the role of government, including leaders, members of government, ambassadors, and informal diplomats representing the government in some capacity. Their role is too significant, and the relationship would make little sense without their inclusion. Second, given the fact that the relationship is a military, security, intelligence, and nuclear alliance, the military and defence domain was too empirically rich to pass over. This is particularly the case given that much of the empirical literature focuses on the creation of the WWII military alliance, and how that alliance adapts to different strategic circumstances over time. Failing to explain this would greatly inhibit the capacity of the thesis to make a contribution to the empirical literature, and also prevent the opportunity for understanding the role of social trust in defence and security cooperation. Third, the thesis could not succeed in its aim of applying an expanded version of embedded trust through the use of a flat ontology of the state without examining the relationship between societies. Society is a broad term, and is used here to mean any person or group of people not officially or closely (on an informal basis) tied to government or defence. This is so broad and complex that it can never be presented in its entirety, but only sliced into in the form of examples that vary in their degree of representativeness of society as a whole. Despite this limitations, these slices are important to include, as how societies interact, and how trust is formed between people outside the structures and institutions of government and defence, is invaluable to the study of social trust in bilateral relationships.

Government and leaders are not elevated over society, but rather exist horizontally alongside each other as conceptualised by a flat ontology of the state. The domains are also not discrete, but rather interact in dynamic ways. The development of trust in one domain has implications for the development of trust in another. The government and leaders domain focuses on the relationships between governments, diplomats, ambassadors, and political leaders. The military and defence domain concentrates on the relationship between militaries on defence matters, and from World War II onwards also on cooperation relating to intelligence and nuclear matters. The society domain explores the relationship between societies, from the American women who married British men in the late 19th century to the impact of the fallout from the 2003 Iraq War on British perceptions of America and Americans.

[Applying the Trust Framework to the Anglo-American Relationship](#)

Using the Anglo-American relationship 1890-2016 as a case study is valuable both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, it provides a case study in which the development of trust over an extended period of time can be analysed. It allows the multidimensional trust framework to demonstrate what trust looks like in its nascent stages, what trust looks like when all

dimensions are strongly present and sustained cooperation is taking place on sensitive issues, and what conditions in between these two ends of the spectrum can look like. It allows for a demonstration of how the dimensions interact with one another over time, and what happens when one or more dimensions weaken while one or more remain stronger. What happens, for example, when the calculative and normative dimensions of trust are strong, but the affective dimension is weak? The Anglo-American relationship provides a rich case study in which to analyse the various relationships between the dimensions of trust and how their presence or absence shape one another.

In order to reach these important analytical insights into the development of trust across the dimensions and domains, this thesis will study four periods of the relationship across four chapters: first examining the nascent stages of trust development from the *rapprochement* of the 1890s through to the onset of WWII; second the expansion of trust during the formation of the wartime alliance; third the deep and sustained trust present across dimensions and domains during the Cold War; and fourth the ongoing strengths and development of weaknesses in trust during the post-Cold War era. Of course, the Anglo-American relationship is not a universal model for trusting relationships. Context and particularities matter. The Anglo-American relationship can, however, offer insights into how and where trust develops, and what impact trust has when it is present, which will be helpful when considering other case studies.

Using a multidimensional trust framework to analyse the Anglo-American relationship also reveals new empirical insights about the relationship. The Anglo-American relationship is frequently referred to as the “special relationship”.⁶⁷ The inverted commas around “special relationship” are used in the spirit of much of the literature, which uses them to interrogate either the mythicity surrounding the relationship or the difficulty in defining what comprises a special relationship generally, or the Anglo-American “special relationship” in particular.⁶⁸ The term “special relationship” has been used as, among other things, the two have expansive levels of cooperation on sensitive matters such as intelligence and nuclear weapons, they have fought together multiple times in military coalitions, and political leaders and scholars frequently use the language of trust in describing their relationship. Trust has not, however, previously been used as a comprehensive theoretical approach to examine the nature of the relationship between Britain

⁶⁷ A term which famously originates with Winston Churchill. Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’),” WinstonChurchill.org, March 5, 1946, <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>.

⁶⁸ See, for example, Danchev, “On Specialness”; John Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2004): 437–50; Steve Marsh and John Baylis, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: The Lazarus of International Relations,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 1 (2006): 173–211.

and America. The fact that no one has thought to comprehensively examine trust in a relationship where trust is so clearly apparent demonstrates the dominance of approaches in international relations which view the state as a rational actor, rather than a social actor.

Instead, scholars have turned to various reasons to explain Anglo-American relations: shared interests and a common enemy; shared values, history, culture, language, race, literature and law; institutionalisation, path dependence, and the formation of everyday habits of cooperation from World War II onwards;⁶⁹ mythologising the “special” nature of the relationship through a constructed narrative;⁷⁰ the close relationships formed between nuclear, diplomatic, defence, and intelligence personnel; and the relationship between political leaders. The literature on Anglo-American relations has developed its own terminology and schools of thought,⁷¹ which has resulted in a divide between those who view the primary basis of the relationship as interests, and those who view the primary basis of the relationship as sentiments.⁷² The two approaches have also been described as the Functional and Evangelical modes of scholarship.⁷³ Over time, many scholars have come to agree that both play a role. This is evidenced by Ruike Xu’s argument that scholarship on the relationship can now be categorised as two broad groups existing under the Functional school.⁷⁴ Both agree that sentiments and interests are important, but differ on the significance of each.⁷⁵ There is, however, an ongoing struggle in the attempt to capture the interplay of the two and how they relate to other factors such as institutionalisation and personal relationships.⁷⁶ Dobson and Marsh argue that to treat interests and sentiments as distinct and fail to

⁶⁹ The most extensive examination of institutionalisation can be found in Ruike Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Ruike Xu, “Institutionalization, Path Dependence and the Persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,”

International Affairs 92, no. 5 (2016): 1207–28

⁷⁰ See, for example, Danchev, “The Cold War ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited,” 579–80; Reynolds, “Churchill’s War Memoirs and the Invention of the ‘Special Relationship’”; Anna Marchi, Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, and Steve Marsh, “Churchill’s Inter-Subjective Special Relationship: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Approach,” in *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 171–201; Sam Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship, c. 1919–69,” in *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 202–22; Robert Boyce, “In Search of the Anglo-American Special Relationship in the Economic and Financial Spheres,” in *The “Special Relationship,”* ed. Antoine Capet and Aïssatou Sy-Wonyu (Rouen: Publications de l’université de Rouen, 2003), 67; Élie, “Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship,” 77; Beloff, “The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth?”

⁷¹ Danchev notably outlined three schools of thought: the evangelical, functional, and terminal school. See Danchev, “On Specialness.”

⁷² Dobson and Marsh argued that “something of a Manichean division has opened between what might be called the schools of sentiment and interests”. See Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Introduction,” in *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 3.

⁷³ Danchev, “On Specialness.”

⁷⁴ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 23.

⁷⁵ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 23.

⁷⁶ Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 3–4.

appreciate their interrelationships is ‘a serious error’.⁷⁷ Trust research has also struggled to reconcile the “harder” and “softer” factors in international relations, to understand the relationship between psychological or social processes of trust on the one hand, and state interests and power on the other. It has been a core challenge to international relations research more broadly, in terms of understanding the intersubjectivity between the material and the non-material elements of international affairs. This struggle is further mirrored in the gap highlighted by Wheeler in examining trust at the collective level without losing the saliency of interpersonal relationships. These challenges mean that trust literature is of significant value to the Anglo-American relationship.

In light of the above, the empirical contribution of this thesis complements two recent works which examine the Anglo-American relationship: *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era* by Ruike Xu, and *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War* by Kristin Haugevik.⁷⁸ Xu argues that the persistence of the Anglo-American relationship can be explained through institutionalisation, path-dependence, and the everyday habits of cooperation which have formed as a result. Haugevik develops a theory of special relationships as ‘relational identity constructions’,⁷⁹ using it to examine the relationships between Britain and America, and Britain and Norway. Both make an invaluable contribution to the literature on the Anglo-American relationship, and both consider trust to be an important factor in their explanations. Xu goes so far as to dedicate three pages of his book to an exploration of Booth and Wheeler’s concept of embedded trust, as it relates to the presence of a strong collective identity between Britain and America which contributes to alliance persistence.⁸⁰ As part of her framework, Haugevik identifies two broad mechanisms which maintain relational identities between states over time. The first is front-stage practices of recognition, such as the use of the “special relationship” language, and the second is back-stage practices of trust, which covers the everyday interactions that comprise the relationship such as those found in working-level diplomacy.⁸¹ Trust is used frequently throughout her work, described as a factor which contributes to specialness. She does not, however, explore trust analytically nor use it as a theoretical tool. Thus, the use of trust as a theoretical framework and the analytical exploration of trust in this thesis complements the

⁷⁷ Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 16-17.

⁷⁸ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*; Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War*.

⁷⁹ Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War*, 2.

⁸⁰ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 107-9.

⁸¹ Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War*, 39-40.

contributions of Xu and Haugevik in order to add to our understanding of the Anglo-American relationship.

Methodology

Ontology and Epistemology

This thesis will create a theoretical framework of multidimensional trust and apply it using a flat ontology of the state to the history of the Anglo-American relationship from 1890 to 2016. These approaches will be expanded upon in Chapter One, in which the theoretical framework will be developed in detail following a literature review of trust theory. The approach taken in this thesis sits firmly within social approaches to both trust and the study of international relations more generally.

In terms of international relations, this thesis sits within the constructivist tradition, holding with the core ontological assumptions of the mutual constitution of agents and structures, the socially determined nature of interests, the social nature of the state, and the importance of state identity. Within constructivism, it sits epistemologically toward the interpretivist rather than empiricist end of the spectrum, though it is not wedded to any specific approach, turning its attention instead to trust methodologies. Constructivism certainly opened the door for the study of social approaches to trust in international relations, but the study of trust is an inherently multidisciplinary endeavour, and as such the spirit of analytic eclecticism is the most productive way to conduct social trust research. Where social trust research outside IR tends to draw on ideas from across different approaches to trust, the same needs to be done for the study of social trust within IR. This means eschewing strict paradigmatic boundaries, and embracing the analytic eclecticism espoused by Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil.⁸² Further than this, Jackson and Nexon argued in 2013 that IR had entered a post-paradigmatic era, and that ‘attempts to constitute the field as a three-cornered fight among liberals, realists, and constructivist’ have been beset by ‘significant intellectual problems’.⁸³ They argue instead for a way of mapping the discipline through ‘a focus on the scientific ontologies of explanatory theory’, as it will allow for a refocusing on the similarities and differences which intersect traditional disciplinary divisions.⁸⁴ In seeking to map the discipline in this manner, they define three ‘major families of theories’: choice-theoretic, experience-near, and social-relational.⁸⁵ Which family one’s work most neatly

⁸² Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁸³ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “International Theory in a Post-Paradigmatic Era: From Substantive Wagers to Scientific Ontologies,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 552.

⁸⁴ Jackson and Nexon, 553.

⁸⁵ Jackson and Nexon, 553.

fits within centres on ‘two major axes of contention’: whether and to what extent actors are understood to be ‘*autonomous from their social, cultural, and material environments*’; and ‘the degree of *thick contextualism*’, along with the implications regarding the possibility of generalising from specific contexts.⁸⁶ Choice-theoretic approaches conceptualise actors as autonomous and the degree of thick contextualism is low, experience-near theories do not see actors as autonomous but have a high degree of thick contextualism, and social-relational theories do not see actors as autonomous and have a low degree of thick contextualism.⁸⁷

This thesis falls into the social-relational camp:

... relationalists position themselves as rejecting actor-centric and traditional structuralist ontologies. They differ from experience-near theorists in that they are strongly committed to theoretical frameworks that may begin with but then abstract from thick contextual settings.⁸⁸

Peter Howard describes relational as a third ‘cohesive methodological camp’, alongside positivists/neopositivists and interpretivists.⁸⁹ He describes ‘a relational research design’ as one which ‘seeks to identify either the constitution of inter-subjective understandings and social networks or the causal processes and mechanisms that create, maintain, and change those items’.⁹⁰ This thesis seeks to explore the latter, analysing the role of trust in social relations. A relational methodology may initially seem contradictory, given the focus on relationships between states. States are understood through a relational ontology, however, in which it is the connections, relations, and interactions between states which constitute the states themselves. States are not autonomous actors, divorced from context, structure, nor their interactions with other states. Indeed, this thesis goes further and seeks, to some extent, to challenge and deconstruct the state as it relates to relations between states take place, and the development of trust. States are not conceived of as anthropomorphised actors, nor as billiard balls. They are also not merely the interaction of leaders, governments, and elites. This is where the flat ontology of the state described above fits in. Through flattening power structures, the relational processes taking place between states can be understood in a way which includes a variety of actors, and diverse sources of agency. When trust methodologies are incorporated, it is the role trust plays in these relational processes that is focus of this thesis.

The social approach to trust and relationalism underpinning this thesis are significant in defining

⁸⁶ Jackson and Nexon, 553.

⁸⁷ Jackson and Nexon, 553–54.

⁸⁸ Jackson and Nexon, 554.

⁸⁹ Peter Howard, “Triangulating Debates Within the Field: Teaching International Relations Research Methodology: Triangulating Debates Within the Field,” *International Studies Perspectives* 11, no. 4 (2010): 401.

⁹⁰ Howard, 401.

the distinctiveness of the theoretical framework of trust, in combination with its application using a flat ontology of the state. To draw on an example used in an earlier work by Jackson and Nexon, someone studying the spread of a rumour with a non-relational ontology would focus on how interactions between individuals changed the content and spread of the rumour.⁹¹ On the other hand, someone using a relational ontology would study how the spread of the rumour ‘alters the *relations* which constitute the group’.⁹² Thus the study of trust in bilateral relationships using a relational ontology will focus on how trust alters the relations between two states. A flat ontology of the state sees these two states conceptualised as being comprised of horizontal assemblages, rather than vertical hierarchies, in which a variety of actors matter in shaping trust in relations between those two states. A multidimensional approach to social trust understands trust as existing in different but interacting dimensions, each providing a different source for the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is possible that forms the core definition of trust. While analytic eclecticism is embraced in drawing insights from across various approaches to trust, these insights are filtered through a social approach to trust which sees trust as being predominantly social in nature, rather than psychological or rational. Trust is social and relational, and cannot be fully understood divorced from these contexts. It is the use of multidimensional approaches to social trust drawn from organisational trust research, in combination with a social constructivist relational ontology, and a flat ontology of the state that makes the theoretical contribution of this thesis original.

Case Study Selection

This thesis initially sought to pursue two comparative case studies focused on Indonesia’s bilateral relationships: the relationship between Indonesia and China, and Indonesia and the US. The justification for this was that Indonesia’s *bebas aktif* (free and active) foreign policy would be a uniquely interesting feature to analyse in relation to the development of trust. A change in case study became necessary for two reasons. First, limited English language source availability, which was particularly challenging for the Indonesia-China relationship. Second, through the development of the theoretical framework and the writing of Chapter One it became clear that the best type of case study in seeking to understand how trust develops over time would be one with high levels of trust present. A high trust case study allows for analysis of the development of trust from its most minimal to its most expansive. Potential high trust relationships were identified based on core assumptions of the social trust literature: that deep and sustained cooperation on

⁹¹ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 302.

⁹² Jackson and Nexon, 302.

sensitive issues with high levels of vulnerability between states cannot happen without a significant degree of trust in place. Therefore, any relationship which has been characterised by deep and sustained cooperation over time on sensitive issues with high levels of vulnerability can reasonably be assumed to be a high trust relationship. Initially, whichever high-trust relationship was chosen was to remain a comparative with the Indonesia-US relationship. Once the Anglo-American relationship was chosen, however, the breadth and depth of the relationship required an in-depth examination to reveal the most valuable insights relating to the development of trust in a bilateral relationship.

Choosing the Anglo-American relationship as a case study arose from the necessity of needing a high trust relationship with English language sources available. Once these two elements formed the core requirements of case study selection, an examination of possible options quickly revealed the Anglo-American relationship as the best candidate. The Australia-US relationship was also considered as a possible option, however several factors made the Anglo-American relationship a more compelling choice. First, the fact that trust in the relationship emerged after a conflictual and challenging history meant that it would provide insight into how two states can move from conflict, to antipathy, to cooperative, to trusting. Second, the degree of interaction between the two states – including between leaders, governments, various transnational groups, defence personnel, and people from across society, is far more extensive. More interaction provides more opportunities for the development of trust, and more potential examples of analytical value. Third, the existing scholarship on the Anglo-American relationship made it clear that in addition to it being a valuable case study for the study of trust in international relations, the theoretical framework would also be able to provide a contribution to the study of the Anglo-American relationship itself. The theoretical debates regarding the nature of the relationship mirrored many of the debates taking place in the trust literature. Bringing the two together opened up the possibility of rich intellectual inquiry, and the capacity to contribute to both sets of literature.

Case study methods are useful and important to the study of international relations, as they ‘have considerable advantages in studying complex phenomena’, and much of IR is ‘difficult to model formally and to test statistically’.⁹³ Theorising, however, is messy. It is common that the theory informs the case study, and the case study in turn informs the theory. There is no neat divide between the two. To quote Eckstein:

Theories do not come from a vacuum, or fully and directly from data. In the final analysis

⁹³ Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007): 171.

they come from the theorist's imagination, logical ability and ability to discern general problems and patterns in particular observations.⁹⁴

In the case of this thesis, the trust theory has been shaped by the author's previous work on trust in different forms, combined with reading new literature, and older existing literature but from outside the discipline. While previous work had resulted in the knowledge that trust outside of elite relationships was important, it was engaging with the empirical literature that began the formulation of the flat ontology of the state. The way in which this process works is aided by loosely locating this thesis within the literature on types of case studies. First, there are different understandings of the point of case studies in political science and international relations. As the focus of this thesis is theoretical rather than empirical,⁹⁵ case studies are assumed to be 'the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events';⁹⁶ 'the intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a large class of (similar) units';⁹⁷ and the 'detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which *the analyst believes* exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified theoretical principle'.⁹⁸ Second, Eckstein's now infamous typology of case studies includes the configurative-idiographic, disciplined-configurative, heuristic, plausibility probe, and crucial-case studies.⁹⁹ From left to right, the types begin as case-dominant rather than theory dominant, and more specific than generalisable.¹⁰⁰ These are ideal types and as such this thesis doesn't fit perfectly into any one type. The best that can be said is that it is a theory-dominant heuristic case, which begins with a strong theoretical grounding but in compatibility with the heuristic case study approach seeks to 'learn more about the complexity of the problem studied, to develop further the existing explanatory framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory employed by the investigator' to better explain the case under analysis.¹⁰¹

There are benefits and limitations to the use of a single case study. Single case studies are

⁹⁴ Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 144–45.

⁹⁵ Christopher Lamont, *Research Methods in International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015), 148–49.

⁹⁶ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004), 5.

⁹⁷ John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (2004): 342.

⁹⁸ Clyde J. Mitchell, "Case and Situation Analysis," in *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, ed. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 170.

⁹⁹ Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change*, 134.

¹⁰⁰ Christopher M. Brown, "Case-Driven Theory-Building in Comparative Democratization: The Heuristics of Venezuela's 'Democratic Purgatory,'" in *Doing Qualitative Research in Politics: Integrating Theory Building and Policy Relevance*, ed. Angela Kachuyevski and Lisa M. Samuel (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 19.

¹⁰¹ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 51–52.

particularly useful for theoretical approaches which are new, underdeveloped, or drawn from other disciplines.¹⁰² Trust is relatively new to IR, although work in the area has been growing. It does remain underdeveloped, particularly considering the resistance of much of the discipline to the very possibility of trust. Social trust remains yet more resisted, owing to the dominance of theoretical schools which assume the state to be a rational rather than a social actor. Much of the theoretical framework developed in this thesis is reliant on insights drawn from outside the discipline, in particular from the sociological literature on trust between organisations. A single case study is therefore a justified choice. The main limitation of a single case study is the restrictions it places on generalisability. Given the advantages, however, this is a necessary and justifiable limitation, and further, a reasonable degree of generalisability does remain possible. First, while case studies are ‘particular in content’, they also ‘establish the basic elements that lend themselves to facilitating a wider social understanding’.¹⁰³ Second, ‘because case studies achieve a greater degree of intimacy with the subject ... relations that are discovered have a higher probability of being critical and a lower possibility of superficiality’.¹⁰⁴ Third, ‘single case studies contribute to strengthening our theoretical understandings of causal explanations as well as deepening our knowledge of specific cases’.¹⁰⁵ Fourth, on an empirical note, the Anglo-American relationship is such a rich and deep relationship, and the timeframe of analysis so long, that further sacrifices to the space available to analyse the relationship would have greatly limited its utility as a case.

Timeframe, Examples, and Source Selection

The timeframe under analysis, from 1890-2016, is long, but was chosen for good reason. The aim in choosing the Anglo-American relationship was to have a case in which the development of trust could be studied over time, from a time in which it is quite limited, to a time in which it is quite expansive. The 1890’s are the commonly accepted period of *rapprochement* in Anglo-American relations, during which the two states begin to interact more frequently and more positively than they had before. Thus it makes a sensible and useful starting point for analysis when one is seeking to understand the development of trust. The long time frame is necessary in seeking to understand the development of trust over time. It also aids in contributing to the

¹⁰² Audie Klotz, “Case Selection,” in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 52–53.

¹⁰³ Brown, “Case-Driven Theory-Building in Comparative Democratization: The Heuristics of Venezuela’s ‘Democratic Purgatory,’” 19.

¹⁰⁴ Brown, 24.

¹⁰⁵ Marianne S. Ulriksen and Nina Dadalauri, “Single Case Studies and Theory-Testing: The Knots and Dots of the Process-Tracing Method,” *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 19, no. 2 (2016): 237.

empirical literature, as it can explore some of the key empirical puzzles that have caused great debate regarding the Anglo-American relationship: how *rapprochement* came about, how the WWII alliance was formed, and then how that alliance adapted to the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, and the onset of the war on terror. Analysis ends in 2016 with the end of the Obama administration owing to space limitations, as the significance of the changes from that point onwards would require their own chapter. A coda has been added to the thesis, however, to provide a brief exploration of the combination of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump from a perspective of trust.

To study the relationship, the empirical part of the thesis has been split into four chapters, each studying a distinct time period in the relationship: from *rapprochement* to the onset of WWII, WWII, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War period. These are uneven in time, which means some chapters, notably the WWII chapter, are able to achieve more detail than the others. This sacrifice is justified on the grounds of matching the key empirical and historiographical debates in the literature, to ensure clarity on what this thesis offers compared to existing approaches. It is also due to space limitations, as ideally the first and third empirical chapters would have each been split in two: the first into a *rapprochement*, and a WWI and interwar years chapter, and the third into a pre and post British withdrawal from east of Suez chapter. Given the extensive time period, a detailed examination of the whole of the relationship was not possible. Rather, each of the four case study chapters begins by providing a more general overview of the state of the relationship in the time period under examination through the lens of the dimensions of trust, before analysing key examples drawn from the domains of the relationship. The examples were chosen with the aim of exploring the interplay of the dimensions of trust in a particular domain in more detail. The process of choosing examples is unavoidably subjective and somewhat arbitrary:

Admittedly there can be a bit of arbitrariness to the selection of historical moments, but one should acquire a certain level of background knowledge on the subject in order to identify empirically rich moments.¹⁰⁶

The main focus in selecting examples was that they provided insight into the interplay of the dimensions of trust and the development of trust in the relationship. This could have been because all three dimensions were particularly strong, or because one or two were noticeably absent, or because one or two or all were particularly strong in an unexpected place. The examples are not representative of the relationship as a whole during the time period, but rather provide specific

¹⁰⁶ Klotz, "Case Selection," 86.

insights into the nature and impact of trust on the relationship in a particular area, and often also how trust in that domain impacts on trust elsewhere.

In order to trace the history of the Anglo-American relationship, this thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include archival documents, statements and speeches from key individuals, newspaper articles, public surveys, official government and defence documents, memoirs, propaganda radio and film, political writings from the time period in question, and correspondence. Limited archival time was possible, so while some archival sources from the British National Archives have been used in the Cold War chapter, this thesis has predominantly relied on the sources that are available in a digitised format. This of course creates limitations, however so too would, for example, a focus only on archival documents, which have been archived by a person or organisation for a particular purpose.¹⁰⁷ Historical methods are common in IR, and it is important to remember that ‘all empirical observations are filtered through a priori mental frameworks, that all facts are ‘theory laden’’.¹⁰⁸ Sources are approached in this thesis with the pre-existing mental framework of social trust, and are used for what they reveal about trust. Thus there is often significant use of sources such as personal memoirs to aid in understanding the outlook of leaders and the relationships between leaders. While important cautions have been made regarding the use of personal accounts in the study of trust, given that they are naturally crafted toward specific audiences with a particular set of aims in mind, as both Hoffman and Wheeler outline they are a ‘valuable source of evidence regarding trusting relationships’ as long as one is mindful of the personal and political motivations.¹⁰⁹ Personal accounts have been used in conjunction with other primary sources and with secondary sources, which helps to understand the validity of particular primary sources through an appreciation of the personal and political motivations of individuals, and the historiographical debates present surrounding various individuals and events. Sources such as newspaper sources are often used not only for what they reveal about how events took place, but also for the interpretation they provide of those events, in seeking to understand prevalent perceptions British and American people had of one another. To focus on social trust between societies sometimes required using sources such as propaganda, magazines, and polling of perceptions on particular issues. Where if contemporary trust were being studied and interviews could be conducted,

¹⁰⁷ Cameron G. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no. 4 (2002): 356.

¹⁰⁸ J. S. Levy, “Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis of International Relations,” in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 51.

¹⁰⁹ Aaron M. Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict* (New York: SUNY Press, 2006), 27; See also Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 68.

studying trust historically comes with certain limitations on source availability. A combination of a variety of primary sources in conjunction with secondary sources can, however, provide sound insights into the development of trust.

Contribution of This Thesis

Given the context outlined above, the primary original contribution of this thesis is a theoretical framework for studying the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships. This framework adds to the pre-existing work done on trust in international relations through the use of a multidimensional approach applied using a flat ontology, which analyses the state as a whole without marginalising the role of interpersonal relationships. Regarding international relations more broadly, this thesis contributes to further understanding the state as a social actor, and what this means for relationships between states. This theoretical and conceptual approach also means it is possible to understand the way in which the interplay of the dimensions of trust takes place across the breadth of the bilateral relationship, how the everyday crafting of trust takes place, and how the different domains of the relationship influence one another in conjunction shape the nature of trust in the relationship as a whole.

The secondary contribution of this thesis is the empirical contribution. This thesis contributes to the literature on the Anglo-American relationship through arguing that the relationship is not “special,” it is trusting. The tools provided by trust allow for a different understanding of what “special” means, and a way to incorporate the dynamic interplay of the various factors ascribed to “specialness” within analysis. These factors include: shared sentiments, history, values, culture, religion, language, law, and literature; shared interests and common external threats; relationships between leaders and between military, nuclear technology, and intelligence personnel; and the role of mythology, symbolism, and narrative. It also removes the either/or factor in considering if the relationship is “special” or not. Trust exists in terms of degree. The theoretical framework developed in this thesis enables greater precision in determining what that degree of trust is present and where specifically it is located through the disaggregation of the dimensions of trust.

In order to make these contributions, this thesis is guided by the following research questions. Question One refers to the primary theoretical problem at hand, with the two sub-questions a) and b) asking whether the approach developed in this thesis can contribute to that research problem. Question Two relates to the secondary empirical contribution of the thesis.

Question One: How can social trust in bilateral relationships be analysed in a way which

incorporates a variety of actors, and the role of interpersonal relations?

- a) Can a multidimensional approach to trust enhance our understanding of social trust in bilateral relationships?
- b) Can applying a multidimensional trust framework using a flat ontology of the state enhance our understanding of social trust in bilateral relationships?

Question Two: What does a theoretical framework for analysing the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships reveal about the Anglo-American relationship from 1890 to 2016?

Thesis Structure

This thesis responds to the above research questions over the course of six chapters. Chapter One outlines the theoretical approach of the thesis, through exploring why trust has historically been absent from the study of international relations, and how trust has been introduced to international relations in the three broad categories of rationalist, psychological, and social. The chapter then proceeds to highlight the new insights which can be found in organisational literature, and constructs a multidimensional framework for the study of trust in bilateral relationships.

Chapter Two explores the literature on the Anglo-American relationship, examining how scholars have sought to explain the “special relationship” and what factors they have considered to be important in their analyses. It investigates the theoretical debates which have arisen in the literature regarding the differing roles of sentiments and interests in explaining the relationship, and the common themes which have emerged in these discussions: the role of shared interests and common threats; shared values, history, culture, language, race, religion, literature, and law; institutionalisation, path dependence, and everyday habits of cooperation; the narrative construction of the myth of “specialness”; the relationship between defence, intelligence, and nuclear technology personnel; and the role of the relationship between the president and prime minister.

Chapters Three through Six apply the theoretical framework to the case study of the Anglo-American relationships. Each chapter focuses on a different time period: Chapter Three studies the *rapprochement* of the 1890s through to the beginning of World War II; Chapter Four examines the development of the wartime alliance during World War II; Chapter Five explores the relationship during the Cold War; and Chapter Six analyses the adaptation of the relationship to the changes brought by the end of the Cold War and the onset of the war on terror in the post-Cold War period.

It must be noted that this thesis does not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Anglo-

American relationship 1890-2016. The expanded time frame is required in order to analyse the development of trust over time, but it limits space for comprehensive analysis of each aspect of the relationship. Therefore each chapter will focus on changes in broad themes as they relate to the dimensions of trust, and examples of the interplay of the dimensions of trust drawn from each of the different domains of the relationship. Each chapter will be structured into two broad sections, the first of which examines generally the presence of each dimension of trust during the given time period, and the second of which analyses the interplay of the dimensions of trust in the domains of government and leaders, military and defence, and society. From Chapter Four onwards, military and defence will be further broken down into three focus areas of military, intelligence, and nuclear, given the expansive nature of cooperation in these areas.

To summarise, Chapter One will develop a theoretical framework for analysing the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships; Chapter Two will situate a theoretical approach of trust within the existing literature on the Anglo-American relationship; and Chapters Three through Six will apply the theoretical framework to the history of the relationship between Britain and America from 1890 to 2016. In doing so, this thesis will demonstrate the value of a multidimensional approach to trust applied using a flat ontology, which is able to analyse trust between states at a collective level without minimising the vital component of interpersonal relationships, add to our understanding of states as social actors, and reveal new empirical insights regarding the nature of the “special relationship.”

Chapter One

Trust and Cooperation in International Relations: Developing a Multidimensional Framework for the Study of Trust in Bilateral Relationships

Introduction

The question of “trust me or trust me not?” is a perennial problem in the realm of international relations, where the structural conditions of anarchy, the complexity of the state, the security dilemma, and the other minds’ problem often make the possibility of trust seem unreachable. At the same time, however, the degree of uncertainty involved in inter-state relations is what makes trust possible. Somewhat paradoxically, trust necessarily exists in conditions of uncertainty. An environment with no uncertainty would make trust redundant. As Booth and Wheeler argue, ‘trust and uncertainty are mutually implicated’ because ‘trust always develops under conditions of uncertainty and never entirely escapes it’.¹¹⁰ This is why the role that trust plays in allowing actors to suspend their sense of uncertainty and therefore continue to function in conditions of uncertainty is invaluable.¹¹¹ Scholars have long studied the nature of cooperation in international relations from various theoretical perspectives.¹¹² It is only relatively recently, however, that some scholars, most notably Nicholas Wheeler, Ken Booth, Andrew Kydd, Deborah Welch Larson, Aaron Hoffman, Brian Rathbun, Jan Ruzicka, and Vincent Keating, have begun to introduce an explicit study of trust in relation to cooperation.¹¹³ The way in which trust has been understood or neglected can be explained by the way in which theorists have understood the concept of uncertainty, which will be examined in detail in the first section of this chapter. The end of the Cold War led to a promulgation of new, socially-grounded theoretical approaches in international

¹¹⁰ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 230.

¹¹¹ The conceptualisation of trust as a social function which allows actors to suspend their sense of uncertainty is explored in Möllering, “The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension.”

¹¹² Including Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*; Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”; Glaser, “Realists As Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help”; Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 42–63; Jervis, “Security Regimes.”

¹¹³ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*; Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); Keating and Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge”; Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*; Rathbun, “It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our Minds”; Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*; Wheeler, Baker, and Considine, “Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty”; Ruzicka and Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”; Aaron M. Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (2002): 375–401.

relations, and it is predominantly, although not exclusively, in this space that work on trust has taken place.

The explicit study of trust in international relations has relied on insights drawn from outside the discipline, which can be grouped according to three broad approaches: rationalist, psychological, and social.¹¹⁴ Work on trust outside the discipline has been long ongoing, and insights from disciplines as varied as economics, political science, philosophy, psychology, and sociology have found their way into international relations. These insights have been drawn into international relations over time, however Booth and Wheeler were the first to clearly and extensively highlight that the treatment of trust in international relations has been largely a product of different interpretations of uncertainty and anarchy.¹¹⁵ They also drew attention to the need to study not only trust between leaders, but also trust between societies.¹¹⁶ Wheeler has provided a recent addition to the literature in which he examines the value of interpersonal relations between adversarial state leaders.¹¹⁷ Indeed, Wheeler's work highlights the gap in international relations approaches to trust which this thesis seeks to contribute to: that identity-based approaches which examine trust at a collective level lose the value of the interpersonal in their attempt to focus on the state as the primary unit in international relations. This chapter seeks to lay out a framework which will capture the way in which trust operates across the breadth of a bilateral relationship, without minimising the importance of interpersonal relationships. The second section of this chapter will explore how trust has been introduced to the study of international relations in detail, through examining how trust theorising has taken place outside the discipline before analysing how it has been adapted into the context of international relations. Rationalist, psychological, and social approaches all provide valuable insights for the study of trust in international relations, however this process will also highlight the gaps which remain when seeking to understand how trust functions between states, and the insights from each approach which will be integral to the development of a multidimensional framework for analysing trust in bilateral relationships which conceptualises trust as existing in three dimensions: calculative, affective, and normative.

A key point that this process will highlight is that there are key ideas in sociological literature, particularly as regards the study of trust in alliances between organisations, which can help to further trust research in international relations through providing greater detail on how to incorporate the multidimensional nature of trust within analysis. Scholars of trust in

¹¹⁴ As evidence by the categorisation used in Hiski Haukkala, Carina van der Wetering, and Johanna Vuorelma, eds., *Trust in International Relations: Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches* (Oxon: Routledge, 2018); Keating and Ruzicka, "Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations."

¹¹⁵ See Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*.

¹¹⁶ Booth and Wheeler, 197.

¹¹⁷ See Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

organisational alliances have turned to a multidimensional approach to explain how trust operates in relationships between organisations during the process of forming and establishing alliance relations.¹¹⁸ Multidimensional approaches to trust view the way in which trust operates as consisting of different dimensions, types, or forms of trust which interact dynamically over time. Rather than forming a specific and particularised definition of trust, multidimensional approaches capture the complex way in which different perceptions and manifestations of trust exist across the breadth of inter-group relations where not only individuals matter, but also broader group identities and perceptions, and the structures and institutions which shape them. They also capture the way in which the rational, emotional, and social elements of trust interact across and within this breadth of inter-group relations. The complexities of large inter-group relations make organisational alliance literature uniquely suited to the study of international relations where similar, if more intricate, complexities exist. The third section of this chapter will examine the need for turning to organisational literature, and how organisational literature has conceptualised trust as a multidimensional phenomenon. An examination of the organisational literature will enable the fourth section of the chapter to create a multidimensional framework for the study of trust in bilateral relationships, grounded in a definition of trust as ‘*the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility*’.¹¹⁹

This section will firstly determine that there are three dimensions of trust: calculative, affective, and normative.¹²⁰ Each of these dimensions provides further specificity into what, precisely, is driving the expectation of no harm required for trust. The calculative dimension describes the role of shared interests and interests-based calculations, however being careful to highlight that interests are socially determined through the use of strategic culture¹²¹ and examining how an index of trustworthiness is developed between actors.¹²² The affective dimension describes the role of emotions and bonding in trust, capturing what happens when the participant stance is taken by actors and emotions become an inherent part of their interactions.¹²³ The presence of the

¹¹⁸ Including Parkhe, “Understanding Trust in International Alliances”; Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships”; Guido Möllering and John Child, “Contextual Confidence and Active Trust Development in the Chinese Business Environment,” *Organization Science* 14, no. 1 (2003): 69– 80; Meier et al., “How Managers Can Build Trust in Strategic Alliances: A Meta-Analysis on the Central Trust- Building Mechanisms”; Zand, “Reflections on Trust and Trust Research: Then and Now”; Nielsen, “Trust in Strategic Alliances: Toward a Co-Evolutionary Research Model.”

¹¹⁹ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 2.

¹²⁰ Drawn from the three forms of trust identified in Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships.”

¹²¹ As most notably presented in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*.

¹²² The role of an index of trustworthiness is presented in Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

¹²³ The concept of bonding is drawn from Wheeler; the participant stance is a concept discussed by Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe”; Lahno, “On the Emotional Character of Trust.”

affective dimension allows actors to bond over repeated encounters through a process of social learning, acquire knowledge about one another, and based on how they feel about this knowledge develop expectations of trustworthiness.¹²⁴ The normative dimension captures the role of shared identity factors, when actors move beyond feeling positively toward one another to being able to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” each other.¹²⁵ The normative dimension is driven by four main factors: colocation, collective identity, the creation of joint products or goals, and commonly shared values.¹²⁶ This section will then determine that the best way to apply an approach which studies the state as a whole without minimising the value of interpersonal relations is through the use of a flat ontology of the state.¹²⁷ A flat ontology of the state allows for that breadth of inter-group relationships to be captured, including relationships and interactions that would not often be considered to be important in the study of international relations. In deploying a flat ontology of the state, this thesis will focus its analysis on trust in particular domains of bilateral relations. The domains used will be government, military and defence, and society. These have been chosen owing to their utility in capturing the interplay of the dimensions of trust, given that they are hubs of interaction opportunities between both individuals and groups – and above all else trust requires interaction. Through the creation of a multidimensional framework and the use of a flat ontology to apply an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust, this chapter makes an original contribution to trust research in international relations.

Where Has Trust Been in International Relations?

Introduction

The explicit study of trust has only emerged in international relations scholarship in recent decades, making it fundamental to understand why this has been the case. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue that it is international relations theorists’ comprehension of the nature of uncertainty which lies at the heart of how they understand the possibility of trust between states. They outline clearly in their 2008 work on *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* that belief in the overwhelming nature of uncertainty in an anarchic international system has either prevented or limited theorists from examining the existence of trust.¹²⁸ This is an invaluable explanation which is key to understanding how trust has and has not been understood in international relations. The literature review presented here will therefore follow similar lines, incorporating the core point made by Booth and Wheeler that uncertainty has driven

¹²⁴ As described by Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships.”

¹²⁵ Lewicki and Bunker, 123.

¹²⁶ Lewicki and Bunker, 124.

¹²⁷ An approach drawn from Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy*.

¹²⁸ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*.

IR's approach to trust over time. This section will therefore examine how trust has been situated in international relations theory, whether by its absence or its presence. This will be achieved firstly by presenting theories which leave no room for trust, then theories which see varying degrees of space for cooperation and often implied trust in state interactions, and finally theories which open up space for a discussion of trust through their socially-grounded approaches to the study of international relations. This is somewhat different to Booth and Wheeler's review of the literature, which they categorise according to what they term the three logics of insecurity: fatalist, mitigator, and transcendor.¹²⁹ They focus on how 'the meaning, significance and implications of the security dilemma' are shaped by these three logical stances about how to respond to insecurity.¹³⁰ Booth and Wheeler also avoid categorising the theoretical paradigms of IR, or any particular scholar as a whole, and rather focus on the specific ideas generating by particular scholars.¹³¹ As this review holds onto the core role of uncertainty, however, the review will be similar, as the body of literature under review is more or less the same. The focus will be, however, on how scholars view the possibilities for trust and cooperation. The literature review will be broken into three sections: no trust and limited cooperation, limited cooperation and implicit trust, and opening the door to trust. It is necessary to first understand the reasons why trust has spent so long absent from the study of international relations, before it is possible to examine the ways in which trust has been brought into international relations in recent decades and the gaps in this process which still remain.

No Trust, Limited Cooperation: Offensive Realists

As outlined by Booth and Wheeler, the concept of the security dilemma provides clear insights into how various theorists of international relations approach the concept of uncertainty, and what this means for how they consider the prospects for trust.¹³² The security dilemma is generally thought of as an inherently realist concept, created by realists and inherited by realists.¹³³ The term was originally coined by John Herz, first mentioned in his 1950 article *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*¹³⁴ and then expanded upon in his 1951 book *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories*.¹³⁵ Herz came to the idea through an examination of groups throughout history, arguing that wherever groups have existed alongside one another without having any kind of overarching ruling body the security dilemma has arisen:

¹²⁹ Booth and Wheeler, 10.

¹³⁰ Booth and Wheeler, 10.

¹³¹ Booth and Wheeler, 10-11.

¹³² See Booth and Wheeler.

¹³³ Booth and Wheeler, 35.

¹³⁴ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 02 (1950): 157– 180.

¹³⁵ John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

Wherever such anarchic society has existed – and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level – there has arisen what may be called the “security dilemma” of men, or groups, or their leaders.¹³⁶

The security dilemma comes into play due to the ‘other minds problem’ - the fact that no state can ever know with certainty the thoughts, motivations, and intentions of another.¹³⁷ Yet the mere existence of others means that any one state is dependent on those others for its survival, and so a state must have some way to feel confident its security will not be breached by other states. Herz believed that it was this relationship between fear and dependence inherent to all social interaction which lies at the heart of the security dilemma.¹³⁸ As Booth and Wheeler point out,¹³⁹ although Herz devised the term, he was not the only theorist exploring how the ideas of uncertainty and fear drive interactions between states. At the same time, completely independently and on another continent, Herbert Butterfield began working on the same concept, which he named ‘the irreducible dilemma’.¹⁴⁰ Butterfield felt that the other minds’ problem was too strong to ever be overcome:

It is the peculiar characteristic of the situation I am describing – *the situation of what I should call Hobbesian fear* – that you yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you cannot enter into the other man’s counter-fear or even understand why he should be particularly nervous.¹⁴¹

These ideas regarding the security dilemma or the irreducible dilemma have come to be a central concern of the study of international relations. It is pessimistic interpretations of the difficulties of egoistic groups interacting in a system with no centralised authority which have driven realist interpretations of the world.

The structural conditions of anarchy and the overwhelming uncertainty this produces have long prevented realists from conceptualising trust and limited their belief in the possibilities of cooperation between states. The central focus of all realists is on power, and how ‘calculations about power dominate states’ thinking’.¹⁴² Mearsheimer argues that the work of Hans Morgenthau¹⁴³ and Kenneth Waltz¹⁴⁴ have been the most significant realist works, as they both

¹³⁶ Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” 157.

¹³⁷ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 7.

¹³⁸ Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, 3.

¹³⁹ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and trust in World Politics*, 21, 26-27.

¹⁴⁰ Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951), 20.

¹⁴¹ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 28.

¹⁴² Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition)*, 18.

¹⁴³ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

¹⁴⁴ Waltz, *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Philippines: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1979).

address what he describes as the ‘two foundational questions’ of realism: why states pursue power, and how much power they are likely to pursue.¹⁴⁵ Morgenthau approaches this from the ‘human nature’ perspective of classical realism in his 1948 *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, which views states as being inevitably led by humans who have an inherent “will to power” and will run their states in the same way.¹⁴⁶ In contrast, Kenneth Waltz advanced his theory of structural realism in his 1979 *Theory of International Politics*,¹⁴⁷ which saw anarchy as the driver of security competition rather than human nature.¹⁴⁸ Waltz’s perspective on international relations views security competition as a necessity of survival, rather than as an innately human trait.¹⁴⁹ His approach has since been described as that of a defensive realist, a perspective examined in greater detail below. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, describes himself as an offensive realist.¹⁵⁰ However, he is an offensive realist who, like Waltz and unlike Morgenthau, posits a structural theory. Yet where Waltz argues that anarchy drives most states to be status quo powers seeking to maintain their position in the system, Mearsheimer argues that ‘the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs’.¹⁵¹ In other words, Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz regarding why states seek power, and agrees with Morgenthau regarding how much power they seek. This makes it clear that for both variants of offensive realism power outweighs all other considerations, making cooperation unlikely and trust inconceivable.

Although the security dilemma is generally considered to be a traditionally offensive realist concept, the potential for other theoretical interpretations is already clear. As will be discussed in detail later, there are different explanations for how states can seek to alleviate the fear and uncertainty which drive the security dilemma. The traditional realist approach of seeking power and relative gains is not the only method available to combat the uncertainty inherent in the international system. Herz himself argued many years after his original creation that he no longer viewed the security dilemma in such a finitely negative and ultimately tragic way as the creation and success of the European Union (EU) had given him hope for alternative approaches.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1995): 18.

¹⁴⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition)*, 19.

¹⁴⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹⁴⁸ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition)*, 19.

¹⁴⁹ Mearsheimer, 19.

¹⁵⁰ Mearsheimer, 21.

¹⁵¹ Mearsheimer, 21.

¹⁵² See John H. Herz, “The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems,” *International Relations* 17, no. 4 (2003): 411–416.

Additionally, even Mearsheimer admits that ‘although realism envisions a world that is fundamentally competitive, cooperation between states does occur’, even though ‘it is sometimes difficult to achieve . . . and always difficult to sustain’ due to fears of cheating and the predominance of the focus on relative gains.¹⁵³ While Booth and Wheeler argue that ‘offensive realism is the true inheritor of the original version of the concept (the combination of ‘Hobbesian fear’ and ‘kill or perish)’¹⁵⁴ it is through examining the different international relations theoretical perspectives’ approaches to uncertainty that it is possible to reveal how they understand the possibility of trust in international relations.

Limited Cooperation and Implicit Trust: Defensive Realists & Neoliberal Internationalists

The difference between the theorists working in these areas comes down to the extent to which they believe the mitigation of uncertainty to achieve cooperation in conditions of anarchy is possible. Proponents of defensive realism hold that there are some possibilities for mitigating the excesses of anarchy and achieving cooperation. As compared to offensive realism, according to defensive realism the primary goal of states is survival, defined in terms of maintaining and protecting their current position rather than actively seeking to maximize their power. Consequently, for defensive realists it is sometimes rational for states to cooperate in circumstances where it does not improve their power relative to others in the system, but does maintain their existing levels of power and security. This is due to the fear that seeking or achieving hegemony within the international system will prompt other states to balance rather than bandwagon, ultimately harming the state’s interests. Charles Glaser is commonly associated with the defensive realist school of thought, although he himself referred to his approach as ‘contingent realism’, which sought to re-evaluate the primary assumptions of the theoretical approach proposed by Waltz in order to improve the perceived weaknesses of the theory, and challenge neoliberal institutionalism through providing a structural realist account for cooperation which was not reliant on the existence of institutions¹⁵⁵ Glaser argues that the core assumptions of structural realism can lead to different conclusions through a reassessment of their implications, resulting in a structural realist theory in which cooperation is viewed more favourably:

Under a wide range of conditions, cooperation should be a country’s preferred option; significantly, two or more countries could simultaneously reach this conclusion, thereby making security cooperation feasible.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 12.

¹⁵⁴ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 35.

¹⁵⁵ Glaser, “Realists As Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” 52.

¹⁵⁶ Glaser, 58.

This focus on the possibilities for cooperation led to defensive realists examining the possibilities of states signalling to other states that they are security seekers rather than expansionists. In other words, states are able to mitigate the other minds' problem and the security dilemma through correctly signalling their intentions. Charles Glaser discussed this in terms of arms control, which is the idea of his Booth and Wheeler focus on in their work,¹⁵⁷ arguing that the best way for states to signal their type is to 'communicate information about their motives by manipulating their military policies'.¹⁵⁸ Booth and Wheeler also point to Charles E. Osgood's work in the arms control space.¹⁵⁹ He devised the Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy, arguing with regards to the relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that a series of 'significant unilateral concessions' made by one state could trigger reciprocation on the part of the other state.¹⁶⁰ This would lead to a gradual reduction in tension and a growth in confidence. However critics of signalling theory, such as Wheeler, point out that without some trust in place it is difficult to understand when and how costly signals are correctly interpreted.¹⁶¹ It is only if there is trust in place that a costly signal will be seen as a trustworthy indication of good intentions, rather than a potential trap. This critique points to the limitations of rationalist approaches to cooperation and the need to introduce trust into the equation.

Regime theorists have also opened up new avenues for analysing the prospects for cooperation in international relations through their approaches to uncertainty and security dilemma dynamics. Regime theory was most notably applied to international security studies by Robert Jervis, who sought to describe the way in which states cooperated based on shared long-term interests, as was the case in the Concert of Europe.¹⁶² A security regime, he argues, is 'those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate'.¹⁶³ As he points out, the implication of this is that there exists the possibility for 'a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest'.¹⁶⁴ Although Jervis did not stray into the realm of trust, he did argue that cooperation over time could create some form of rules and norms which could govern the behaviour of the participants to an extent which meant all states within the regime felt secure that their cooperation would be reciprocated.¹⁶⁵ He also pointed out the role of uncertainty and security dilemma thinking, arguing that 'in several

¹⁵⁷ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 90.

¹⁵⁸ Glaser, 68.

¹⁵⁹ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 90.

¹⁶⁰ See Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 90 for a discussion of Osgood.

¹⁶¹ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

¹⁶² See Jervis, "Security Regimes."

¹⁶³ Jervis, 357.

¹⁶⁴ Jervis, 357.

¹⁶⁵ Jervis, 357.

cases security regimes may have been ruled out not by the fact that a major power was an aggressor but by the fact that others incorrectly perceived it as an aggressor'.¹⁶⁶ He argued that there were four required conditions for a security regime to arise: a desire of the great powers to establish one in order to maintain the status quo through restraining the behaviour of the states involved; the belief of each actor that all actors involved value 'mutual security and cooperation'; that no actor believes expansion is their best opportunity for security; and the need for war to be perceived as too costly.¹⁶⁷ Stephen Krasner also explored regimes from a defensive realist perspective, arguing that 'international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area'.¹⁶⁸ Despite this explicit focus on the potential for yielding cooperation through the establishment of international regimes or security regimes, it is important not to overstate the optimism of defensive realists on this matter. Jervis described the role of security regimes as being limited, given that 'the security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated'.¹⁶⁹ This is a claim he stands by in a 2011 interview, arguing that although he believes the security dilemma no longer operates in Europe it could 'come back to life' as 'nothing is permanent'.¹⁷⁰ Given the limitations placed on cooperation owing to the anarchic nature of the international system, the role of trust in building regimes or promoting cooperation is not discussed.

There have, however, been more optimistic examinations of both regimes and cooperation. The most well-known form of analysing the potential for cooperation between states from a rationalist point of view is the Prisoner's Dilemma, a form of game theory. The standard form of the prisoners' dilemma is a one-off run-through, in which two prisoners arrested for the same crime with no way to communicate with each other are given three options: if only one prisoner confesses then the confessor will get a shorter sentence while the other prisoner gets a longer sentence; if both prisoners confess both will receive shorter sentences; or if neither confesses both prisoners go free. This version of game theory illustrates the other minds' problem and the role it plays in impeding the possibility of trust perfectly. Although many realists have taken the results of these one-off game examples to argue that trust and cooperation are difficult, if not impossible, in the international system, beginning with Robert Axelrod different analyses began to emerge. Axelrod sought to examine the question: 'under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?'¹⁷¹ He argues that the most significant challenge for

¹⁶⁶ Jervis, 361.

¹⁶⁷ Jervis, 360-62.

¹⁶⁸ Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," 185.

¹⁶⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 82.

¹⁷⁰ Wheeler, "Interview with Robert Jervis," 499.

¹⁷¹ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 3.

states to cooperate in the anarchic international system is the security dilemma.¹⁷² In order to examine when states are able to cooperate in conditions of anarchy, Axelrod turns to the Prisoner's Dilemma game. He examines the differences in responses which occur when an iterated version of the game, instead of a one-off version, is used. He argues that if the prisoner's dilemma is played over multiple continuous rounds, the prospects for cooperation improve.¹⁷³ Once individuals have cooperated and it has been proven to be a successful strategy, Axelrod argues that evolutionary theory kicks in and cooperation will be seen as the most effective strategy for survival.¹⁷⁴ Cooperation will be viewed as a successful strategy provided that the cooperation has been based on reciprocity and that the actors are likely to meet again in a situation where 'the shadow of the future is important enough to make this reciprocity stable'.¹⁷⁵ Although rationalists would argue that this is due to greater access to information improving the rational, incentives-based likelihood for a positive outcome, more normative, constructivist, and trust-based explanations can also be applied, as will be seen later.

Neoliberal internationalists notably focus on the prospects of institutions in promoting cooperation between states. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are considered to be the progenitors of the neoliberal approach to international relations, owing to their 1977 contribution *Power and Interdependence*.¹⁷⁶ Keohane and Nye argued that the world had entered an 'era of interdependence' which would have profound impacts on how state behaviour and the international system would function.¹⁷⁷ They sought to examine 'the characteristics of world politics under conditions of extensive interdependence'.¹⁷⁸ They saw the new world of interdependence as existing within and being affected by regimes, defined as 'networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects'.¹⁷⁹ In this new world, the potential for international organisations to yield cooperation is greatly enhanced.¹⁸⁰ Neoliberal internationalists believe that conflict has been so prevalent because international institutions have not been deployed, and consequently states have found themselves unable to cooperate.¹⁸¹ As Jervis outlines, a comparison of defensive realism and neoliberalism on the question of cooperation highlights that the primary difference between the two perspectives is regarding 'what

¹⁷² Axelrod, 4.

¹⁷³ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 10.

¹⁷⁴ Axelrod, 169-175.

¹⁷⁵ Axelrod, 173.

¹⁷⁶ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

¹⁷⁷ Keohane and Nye, 3.

¹⁷⁸ Keohane and Nye, 19.

¹⁷⁹ Keohane and Nye, 19.

¹⁸⁰ Keohane and Nye, 35.

¹⁸¹ Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," 50.

would have to change to increase cooperation in a particular situation'.¹⁸² Neoliberal internationalists are more optimistic regarding the prospects for cooperation because they believe that 'institutions alter the payoff structures facing actors' and 'may lengthen the shadow of the future'.¹⁸³ Neoliberal internationalists are more optimistic both regarding the likelihood of states having cooperative rather than expansionist preferences, and the capacity for achieving cooperation when cooperative preferences are at play.¹⁸⁴ In contrast, while defensive realists believe that when institutions exist levels of cooperation will be seen to be high, they believe that this is not because of the institution, but rather because the states who established the institution were interested in cooperation in the first place.¹⁸⁵ Neoliberal internationalists are clearly optimistic regarding the prospects for cooperation between states in the anarchic international system, however their failure to entertain conceptualisations of trust within their analysis has meant that they miss key factors regarding the relationship between trust and cooperation, and what this relationship means for the creation and function of international institutions.

Opening the Door to Trust: Constructivism and State Identity

Work on social and psychological trust in international relations builds on spaces which have been opened by the constructivist turn in international relations theory. Constructivism is a term coined by Nicholas Onuf,¹⁸⁶ and most widely popularised in international relations by Alexander Wendt owing to his attempt to create a systemic constructivist theory.¹⁸⁷ Wendt paved the way for the possibility of Booth and Wheeler's work through his development of a constructivist explanation of international relations and his argument that "anarchy is what states make of it".¹⁸⁸ If anarchy is not finite and inevitable, if state's interests and identities are constructed and changeable through interaction,¹⁸⁹ then surely it is possible to mitigate anarchy to such an extent that it is possible for states to construct a trusting relationship, whether bilaterally or multilaterally. Analysing any relationship between states will quickly paint a picture that moves far beyond mere *realpolitik* considerations. The culture and history of a state, the way in which a state understands its place in the world, and the domestic political situation within a state all impact the foreign relations of that state. State interests are not derived from purely rational assessments of the world and how best to navigate it to yield the greatest benefit, but rather are

¹⁸² Jervis, 50.

¹⁸³ Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," 238.

¹⁸⁴ Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," 50–51.

¹⁸⁵ Jervis, 54.

¹⁸⁶ Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*.

¹⁸⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics"; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

¹⁸⁸ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 394–95.

¹⁸⁹ See Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics."

necessarily shaped by state identities and perceptions:

Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a “portfolio” of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.¹⁹⁰

Booth and Wheeler argue that Wendt’s most useful contribution ‘has been to show how there is nothing natural or inevitable about states practicing self-help and power politics’.¹⁹¹ Highlighting the important and changeable role of social and ideational structures, and the mutual constitution of structures and agents, opens the door for something other than eternal security competition to the exclusion of all else.¹⁹² Constructivism provides a valuable open door for the possibility of trust in international relations.

Although Wendt paved the way, the criticisms and discussions which have arisen because of his work provide some of the most useful ideas for studying trust. In fact, although Wendt discusses the role of state identities, he has been criticised for assuming the *a priori* existence of some form of state identity prior to interaction. This is why Maja Zehfuss argues that ‘constructivism and identity are in a dangerous liaison’.¹⁹³ Wendt’s attempts to construct a systemic approach to international relations based on constructivism meant that he needed to ‘take states as given’, and consequently he also needed ‘identity to be constructed but at the same time in some ways given’.¹⁹⁴ Wendt assumes that there is some form of state identity which exists prior to interaction, but brackets this off in order to focus on how state interaction shapes the international system. However, this becomes problematic when studying foreign policy, given the strong role domestic politics often plays in shaping foreign policy and relationships between states. Mattern has also critiqued constructivism’s approach to identity, specifically the way in which identity is treated when considering it a source of international order.¹⁹⁵ She points out that in these conditions, constructivism ‘adopts an assumption of stability as a necessary condition of the environment in which identities are formed and maintained’.¹⁹⁶ This means, she argues, constructivism has no way to analyse ‘how international identities may form or persist during international crises’.¹⁹⁷ The other main critique of Wendt’s work has been his failure to take the role of future uncertainty

¹⁹⁰ A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ cited, p. 398.

¹⁹¹ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 93–94.

¹⁹² Booth and Wheeler, 94.

¹⁹³ Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001): 316.

¹⁹⁴ Zehfuss, 316.

¹⁹⁵ Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis and Representational Force* (Routledge: Oxon, 2005): 7.

¹⁹⁶ Mattern, 7.

¹⁹⁷ Mattern, 7.

into account by Dale Copeland,¹⁹⁸ an argument Booth and Wheeler agree with.¹⁹⁹ Copeland argues that Wendt's attempt at a systemic constructivist theory fails to tackle the problem of structural uncertainty enthusiastically enough, given that his primary target of critique is structural realism.²⁰⁰

Structural realists believe that trust is impossible due to concerns not only regarding the current intentions of states, but also regarding the future intentions of states.²⁰¹ Wendt's failure to take future intentions and future uncertainty into account, Copeland argues, is only exacerbated by his attempt to bracket off domestic politics and assume some form of *a priori* state identity.²⁰² It is the non-static nature of domestic-level processes which means that, even if a state currently has good intentions, this could easily change due to domestic political developments at any point in the future.²⁰³ These critiques provide fertile ground for both evolutionary approaches to building trust gradually over time, and Booth and Wheeler's argument that embedded trust is required to ensure a relationship strong enough to weather concerns over future uncertainty. However, questions remain over how embedded trust can be gradually built over time even while conditions of uncertainty remain prominent and both domestic and international changes are taking place. An evolutionary and multidimensional approach to trust will help to begin answering these questions.

The weaknesses of constructivism highlight that insights from other theoretical approaches, as well as insights from trust literature outside the discipline of international relations, are required in order to build an evolutionary and multidimensional approach to trust which is capable of capturing both the social nature of trust, and the intensity of power politics in an anarchic international system. Constructivism has been critiqued as being more a method than a theory or paradigm,²⁰⁴ in large part owing to the fragmentation and diversity of approaches.²⁰⁵ While the importance of bringing the social back into the study of international relations cannot be overstated, there are concerns that constructivism has come to be 'based on an increasingly 'ambiguous' conceptual apparatus'.²⁰⁶ Onuf has expressed concerns that constructivism has been caught up in the false binary between materialism and idealism, and lost the intersubjectivity of

¹⁹⁸ Dale Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay Social Theory of International Politics by Alexander Wendt," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 188.

¹⁹⁹ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 95.

²⁰⁰ Copeland, 188.

²⁰¹ Copeland, 188.

²⁰² Copeland, 188.

²⁰³ Copeland, 188.

²⁰⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 325.

²⁰⁵ Oliver Kessler, "The Contingency of Constructivism: On Norms, the Social, and the Third," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 45, no. 1 (2016): 44; E. Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319-363.

²⁰⁶ Kessler, "The Contingency of Constructivism"

the approach he advocated:

But there's another issue that troubles me: the continued power of the materialist-idealist binary. In IR, we call realists materialists and liberal institutionalists/soft constructivists idealists when it should be obvious that whatever separates them (in my view, not as much as they think) has nothing to do with idealism and materialism as philosophical stances. Security dilemmas, arms races and terrorist plots are not ideationally informed? Norm diffusion, identity crises and human rights are not materially expressed? Get serious.²⁰⁷

The materialist-idealist binary is a problem which not only continues to plague international relations theory, but also one that poses difficulties for trust theory. One of the key difficulties in adapting theories of trust to international relations has been the question of how to apply social theories of trust while taking into account questions of power and the anarchic structure of the international system.

A key method to ensure that questions of both identity and power are taken into account is through using the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture is the most notable attempt to examine how state interests are socially constructed. Early examinations of strategic culture began in the 1970s²⁰⁸ and continued to proliferate,²⁰⁹ building off earlier work in the 1940s which took place under the umbrella of national character studies.²¹⁰ The concept was then popularised from a constructivist standpoint in 1996 by Peter J. Katzenstein's noteworthy *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*.²¹¹ Katzenstein and the contributors of his edited collection sought to challenge the non-social conceptualisations of state interests through applying a sociological perspective to security interests.²¹² This sociological perspective centred on the social factors of norms, identity, and culture to illustrate some of the ways in which 'social factors shape different aspects of national security policy, at times in ways that contradict the expectations derived from other theoretical orientations'.²¹³ Katzenstein's book focused on a narrow definition

²⁰⁷ Schouten, "Theory Talk #70: Nicholas Onuf on the Evolution of Social Constructivism, Turns in IR, and a Discipline of Our Making."

²⁰⁸ Most notably by Jack L. Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations," A Project AIR FORCE report prepared for the United States Air Force (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1977).

²⁰⁹ For an overview of the development of different approaches to strategic culture, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64.

²¹⁰ Two key works in this space are Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946); Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948).

²¹¹ Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Another key constructivist account of strategic culture is Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

²¹² Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternate Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–2.

²¹³ Katzenstein, 5.

of national security in order to more clearly challenge traditional theoretical perspectives.²¹⁴ Now that the challenge to traditional theoretical perspectives has been made and strategic culture and associated ideas regarding norms and identity are well-established approaches in international relations²¹⁵ this thesis is able to focus on how social factors shape state interests more broadly. Additionally, much of the literature on strategic culture focuses on the role of elites,²¹⁶ where this thesis views elites as part of a broader whole. Conceptualisations of strategic culture provide valuable insights into the importance of how social factors such as norms, identity, and culture shape state interests. These insights regarding the ways in which the interests of states are socially determined, combined with insights from work on trust both within and outside the study of international relations, will feed into the creation of a multidimensional and evolutionary framework for studying trust in bilateral relationships.

Social approaches to identity and norms have also notably been applied in the form of security communities.²¹⁷ The idea of political communities at the international level was first proposed by Deutsch et. al. in 1957.²¹⁸ They described the development of a security community as involving ‘a matter of sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration; or partial identification in terms of self-images and interests’.²¹⁹ Since that publication, the idea has most notably been taken up by Adler and Barnett in their 1998 work *Security Communities*. Booth and Wheeler claim in their book that the work by Adler and Barnett has been ‘the key work on trust for [their] purposes’.²²⁰ This is because Adler and Barnett view trust as a key component of a security community:

Dependable expectations of peaceful change, the confidence that disputes will be settled without war, is unarguably the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena (particularly so if one assumes that states exist in a formal anarchy and thus in the brooding

²¹⁴ Katzenstein, 11.

²¹⁵ The broad acceptance of strategic culture within international relations is demonstrated by the diversity of its application in recent years. See, for example, Paolo Rosa, “Patterns of Strategic Culture and the Italian Case,” *International Politics* 55, no. 1 (2018): 316–33; Malena Britz, ed., *European Participation in International Operations: The Role of Strategic Culture* (Unknown: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, “Strategic Culture Reconceptualized: The Case of India and the BJP,” *International Politics* 2, no. 1 (2018): 1–16; Dmitry Adamsky, “From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 1–2 (2018): 33–60; Muhamad Arif and Yandry Kurniawan, “Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security,” *Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 1 (2018): 77–89.

²¹⁶ As is the case in all examples above, excepting Arif and Kurniawan who examine the strategic culture of the Indonesian Navy.

²¹⁷ An idea first explored by Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*; However, the study of security communities in international relations was not popularised until Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*; See also Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London: Routledge, 2001).

²¹⁸ See Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*.

²¹⁹ Deutsch et al., 36.

²²⁰ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 252.

shadow of violence). Trust does not develop overnight but rather is accomplished after a lifetime of common experiences and through sustained interactions and reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered by organizations, trial-and-error, and a historical legacy of actions and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude notwithstanding the uncertainty that accompanies social life.²²¹

This work on security communities has thus, as Booth and Wheeler suggest, been the most significant contribution to trust in international relations outside of explicitly trust-focused scholarship. Adler and Barnett's description of trust as something which develops over time through repeated interactions, and the role 'mutual identification' plays in the development of closer relations between states resonates clearly with trust research, as will be seen below.²²² The focus they place on identity will also aid in the conceptualisation of the dimensions of trust. They argue that while a degree of trust must exist before collective identity can develop, 'once a measure of trust develops ... a collective identity is likely to reinforce and increase the depth of trust'.²²³ Hemmer and Katzenstein also explore these ideas in order to understand why the U.S. operates multilaterally with Europe in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but bilaterally with Southeast Asian partners.²²⁴ This discussion highlights the need to further understanding of the relationship between trust and shared identity, which will be achieved through the development of a trust framework that considers trust as existing in three dimensions: calculative, affective, and normative. Notably, separating the role of emotions in trust in the form of the affective dimension, and the role of shared identity factors in the form of the normative dimension, will help to attain greater precision in understanding the relationship between identity and trust.

Trust Outside and Within the Discipline: The Adoption of Rationalist, Psychological, and Social Approaches to Trust in International Relations

Introduction

Work on trust has been long ongoing outside the discipline of international relations, particularly in the disciplines of economics, political science, philosophy, sociology, and social psychology. Ideas regarding trust have been drawn into international relations in recent decades along the lines of three main types of conceptualisation: rationalist, psychological, and social.²²⁵ All these

²²¹ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 414.

²²² For a discussion of the relationship between mutual identification and trust, see Adler and Barnett, 45–46.

²²³ Adler and Barnett, 45–46.

²²⁴ Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 575–607.

²²⁵ As evidenced by the structure of Haukkala, van der Wetering, and Vuorelma, *Trust in International Relations: Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches*; and the structure of the literature review of trust in international relations in Keating and Ruzicka, "Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations."

approaches provide key ideas which will shape the creation of the multidimensional trust framework. Rationalist approaches, drawn predominantly from economics and political science, view trust as a rational, cost-benefit analysis on the potential benefits of cooperation. Such approaches are naturally more easily wedded to rationalist approaches in international relations and have been most notably used in a top-down fashion by Andrew Kydd in the realm of costly signals, and in a bottom-up fashion in the realm of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Psychological approaches focus on individual dispositions and examine whether individuals are likely to have a trusting disposition, and how this affects their conduct of foreign policy. Psychological approaches have been most notably applied in the realm of international relations by Brian Rathbun. These approaches provide some insights into the importance of interpersonal relations, but interpersonal relations themselves are considered to be important across rational, psychological, and social approaches. Social approaches are many and varied, and are drawn primarily from sociology. They aim to situate trust within its broader sociological context, highlighting how interpersonal and collective relations shape trust when understood in the context of the social structures they take place within. Hoffman and then Booth and Wheeler notably began this process, which has been continued in the work of Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka, and by Wheeler himself. This section will examine the rationalist, psychological, and social approaches to trust. Each section under these three headings will first explore how theorising has taken place outside international relations, before examining how it has been adapted into the context of international relations. These categorisations are ideal types and therefore many works span categories, but have been put in the section they most closely align with. As trust research is multidisciplinary, many works discussed in this section are multidisciplinary. There are valuable insights to be found across all approaches, however, this process will also highlight the gaps which remain when seeking to understand how trust functions in a bilateral context and which insights will be most useful in the development of a multidimensional approach to trust.

Rationalist

At their heart, rationalist approaches see trust as an incentives-based, cost-benefit analysis of potential gains based on a rational assessment of the available information. Unsurprisingly, these approaches have their origins in economics. There are several debates on the nature of trust within this tradition of thinking which differ over such questions as the source of trust, the outcome of trust, the function of trust, the role of individual differences, and whether or not trust is a useful analytical concept at all. Williamson, for example, went so far as to argue against including any conception of trust in rational economic behaviour. He argued that 'calculative trust is a

contradiction in terms',²²⁶ because rational economic behaviour, which is calculative in nature, is already described best in calculative terms and trust offers nothing new to the equation.²²⁷ He recognises that personal trust exists, but inherently cannot be part of calculative relations because 'calculativeness is inimical to personal trust'.²²⁸ He critiques rationalist scholars from across sociology and economics who treat trust as risk, and use the two terms interchangeably, because risk is already covered by calculative relations and trust has no place there.²²⁹ Hardin, on the other hand, accepts the usefulness of a calculative approach to trust, which he terms the 'encapsulated interest' approach, but argues that individual difference is important. Hardin, as a moral and political philosopher, argues that 'might be fully explicable as a capability or as a product of rational expectation without any moral residue'.²³⁰ In contrast to rationalists who treat all actors as identical trustors who respond in the same way to the same incentives, he claims that individuals 'have different capacities for trust'.²³¹ Different capacities are not determined by psychological factors, which he dismisses as inherently irrational, but rather by epistemological factors.²³² Different lived experiences in relation to trust create different capacities for trust in individuals which are 'pragmatically rational' because 'what it is sensible for a given individual to expect depends heavily on what that individual knows'.²³³ The dual problem with both Williamson's and Hardin's works is that calculation and social factors cannot be divorced from one another, and neither can psychology and rationality be neatly partitioned. As accounted for by theorists of social trust, interests can never be purely rational, they will always be defined and influenced by social context, social interaction between states, and state identities. Mercer critiques the common practice in the study of politics and international relations of partitioning rationality and psychology.²³⁴ He argues this practice occurs due to the widespread belief in international relations that only rational political behaviour should be studied, and that deviation from rational political behaviour leads only to mistakes.²³⁵ Rationalist approaches to trust are many and varied across disciplines, and while they provide some useful ideas which have been drawn into international relations it is only when these ideas are combined with non-rationalist insights that they become truly applicable to the study of relationships between states.

²²⁶ Williamson, "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," 463.

²²⁷ Williamson, 469.

²²⁸ Williamson, 483.

²²⁹ Williamson, 4685.

²³⁰ Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," 512.

²³¹ Hardin, 525.

²³² Hardin, 525.

²³³ Hardin, 525.

²³⁴ See J Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 77–106.

²³⁵ Mercer, 78.

Naturally, rationalist approaches to trust have been drawn into international relations by scholars of a rationalist theoretical persuasion. These scholars draw both on rationalist work on trust from outside the discipline, but also on a long history of rationalist approaches to international relations and state behaviour. Kendall W. Stiles uses a rationalist definition of trust as ‘an expectation on the part of a vulnerable actor [call it the “trustor”] that allowing a more powerful actor [the “trustee”] to take actions in its behalf will produce beneficial results’.²³⁶ They use this definition to argue that ‘trust is difficult to find, even in the places where one would most expect to find it’.²³⁷ From a top-down perspective, the work of Andrew Kydd is the most notable and comprehensive example of a rationalist study of trust in international relations, and his work simultaneously illustrates the usefulness and the limitations of a rationalist approach. Kydd employs game theoretic models to explain his understanding of trust in international relations, applying them to understand European cooperation post-WWII and the end of the Cold War.²³⁸ Like many defensive realists, he argues that one-shot games are insufficient and simplistic, as they do not provide any explanation of how trust may be built or eroded over time.²³⁹ Consequently, he develops what he calls the Reassurance Game, which runs for two rounds instead of one. The game functions on the premise that there are two different prior levels of trust, one which drives the actor to be a security seeker, and one which drives the actor to be an expansionist.²⁴⁰ Each actor is given their own type prior to the game but they do not know the other’s.²⁴¹ Having two rounds rather than one, however, changes the nature of the game, and subsequently ‘provides grounds for optimism about the possibility of overcoming mistrust under anarchy’.²⁴² This is because the knowledge that there will be two rounds in the game reduces the risk of costly signalling a security seeking preference in the first round, as should the other state display expansionist tendencies in the initial round then the state who risked a costly signal still has time to adjust their approach in the second round to ensure they are not risking exploitation by an expansionist state.²⁴³ However, Kydd does not explain how the social process of learning influences these interactions. This makes his approach insufficient for the study of social trust in bilateral relationships. Kydd himself admits that there are gaps in his work which might be filled by insights from other theoretical approaches, claiming that ‘liberalism and constructivism offer insights into the preferences and prior beliefs’ that are examined in rationalist perspectives on

²³⁶ Kendall W. Stiles, *Trust and Hedging in International Relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018): 2.

²³⁷ Stiles, 2.

²³⁸ See Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*.

²³⁹ Kydd, 44.

²⁴⁰ Kydd, 35.

²⁴¹ Kydd, 188.

²⁴² Kydd, 197.

²⁴³ Kydd, 197.

trust.²⁴⁴ The only explanation he provides himself regarding where prior levels of trust come from is that ‘past expectations is one answer’.²⁴⁵ These gaps in his work further reiterate that through failing to include an emotional or social component to their work on trust, rationalists are limited in their understanding of what drives different actors to build or break trust.

From a bottom-up perspective, the rationalist approach notably appears in the area of Maritime Confidence Building Measures (MCBMs). At their heart, confidence building measures seek to reduce uncertainty and build confidence in order to promote cooperation, and ideally trust.²⁴⁶ Scholars including Schofield, Townsend-Gault, and Djalal have examined the application of confidence building measures in the maritime sphere, and found that a regional emphasis, informal process, step-by-step focus, and initial cooperation in technical areas such as environmental monitoring and biodiversity exploration, are most effective at reducing uncertainty and promoting cooperation.²⁴⁷ Unlike Kydd who is a clear and overt rationalist, it must be qualified that whether MCBMs fall under a rationalist approach or not is dependent upon how the practitioner defines and uses them. Bateman outlines the differences in the two approaches, one in which small-scale MCBMs are trust building measures in and of themselves, and one in which the functional cooperation characterised by MCBMs requires trust in place prior to enactment.²⁴⁸ The latter falls into the same trap as Kydd regarding how preferences change and what precisely facilitates cooperation, while the former clearly understands the necessity for social learning over time in order to build trust. It is not sufficient to know that trust develops over time, but also crucially to incorporate the process of social learning required for this to take place within analysis.

Psychological

One place theorists have turned to in seeking ideas to fill the gaps formed by critiques of rationalist approaches to trust is psychology. Psychological approaches to trust view trust as something more than mere rational, incentives-based calculations, insisting that trust contains some kind of social and/or emotional aspect. As with rationalist approaches, there is a wide variety of variation among psychological approaches to trust. For some, trust is a moral

²⁴⁴ Kydd, 22.

²⁴⁵ Kydd, 35.

²⁴⁶ Sam Bateman, “Maritime Confidence Building Measures - An Overview,” *Maritime Confidence Building Measures in the South China Sea* ASPI Special Report (September 2013): 7.

²⁴⁷ Hasjim Djalal, “Conflict Management Experiences in Southeast Asia: Lessons and Implications for the South China Sea Disputes,” *Asian Politics and Policy* 3, no. 4 (2011): 635–37; By Clive Schofield et al., “From Disputed Waters To Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia,” *The National Bureau of Asian Research* NBR Special Report, no. 30 (2011): 18.

²⁴⁸ Sam Bateman, “Cooperation or Trust: What Comes First in the South China Sea?,” *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* RSIS Commentaries, no. 152 (2013): 19.

obligation, which is why trust along these lines is sometimes referred to as moralistic trust.²⁴⁹ This moral understanding tends to be mixed in with ‘the expectation of goodwill and benign intent’.²⁵⁰ No longer is trust merely about risk versus reward. This approach is critiqued as collapsing trust into a mere reliance on goodwill which, though it involves morality, fails to capture the emotive nature of trust.²⁵¹ Holton discusses the participant stance as a way to appreciate the difference between trust and reliance.²⁵² Lahno explains further, arguing that the participant stance, or participant attitude, is at play because trust is an ‘emotional attitude’,²⁵³ meaning that emotions are inherently and inseparably part of any trust-based interaction.²⁵⁴ The description of trust as an emotional attitude highlights the individualist nature of these approaches. While these ideas provide valuable insights into interpersonal relations, it is imperative not to assume that study of interpersonal relations requires an individualist ontology. Parkhe critiques these approaches, arguing that ‘the primary function of trust is sociological rather than psychological, because individuals would have no occasion or need to trust apart from social relations’.²⁵⁵ Both the ideas provided by psychological insights into trust, and the ideas drawn from critiques of this approach from a sociological standpoint, are beneficial to the creation of a multidimensional trust framework which takes into account individual preferences and attitudes and how they are transformed in the context of social relations.

The introduction of psychological approaches to trust to international relations has necessarily taken place in the context of a rebuttal to purely rationalist conceptions of trust. Rationalist approaches to trust in international relations have been critiqued by those who believe that the emotional nature of trust and international relations cannot be neglected. In fact, many theorists of both social and psychological trust go so far as to say that purely rationalist approaches to trust are not truly talking about trust at all. Ruzicka and Keating define rationalist approaches such as Kydd’s, as “trust-as-confidence”.²⁵⁶ Mercer argues that the focus on making trust a rational, incentives-based phenomenon, serves only to eliminate ‘both the need for trust and the opportunity to trust’.²⁵⁷ Rathbun claims that ‘it takes all types of trust to understand international relations theory’.²⁵⁸ Michel argues that without social psychology, there is no way to understand

²⁴⁹ See Uslaner, terms brought into IR by Rathbun

²⁵⁰ Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi, “Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan,” *Motivation and Emotion* 18, no. 2 (1994): 132.

²⁵¹ Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” 65.

²⁵² Holton, 66–67.

²⁵³ Lahno, “On the Emotional Character of Trust,” 173.

²⁵⁴ Lahno, 181.

²⁵⁵ Parkhe, “Understanding Trust in International Alliances,” 223.

²⁵⁶ Keating and Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge,” 4–5.

²⁵⁷ Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics,” 78.

²⁵⁸ Rathbun, “It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our Minds,” 347.

how individuals display ‘variations in behaviour in the same structural circumstances’.²⁵⁹ Those who believe trust contains an emotive or psychological element generally do not dismiss the insights that can be drawn from rationalist work on trust, but rather argue that it has a limited capacity for explaining inter-state relations. However, many theorists would relegate rationalist insights to the realm of confidence or cooperation building, as they are not considered to consist of any element of trust. Many rationalist conceptions of trust provide useful starting points for thinking about trust in international relations, but need to be filled out with insights drawn from constructivist discussions of state identity and state preferences, and insights from psychology and sociology. Tang argues for an approach that combines rationalist and psychological approaches, which is required because trust and fear are ‘inseparably but inversely linked’.²⁶⁰ As it is clearly impossible to remove the emotional component of fear, so too is it impossible to remove the emotional component of trust.²⁶¹ At the same time, he explains that trust is not pure emotion either, ‘because fear is a primary emotion, only some rational control over fear can overcome fear somewhat and lead to some trust’.²⁶² Kydd, for example, provides a valuable analysis on trust building, in particular the role of costly signalling and reassurance, but he fails to investigate how the state preferences which drive state interactions come into being or analyse the role of the inherent social nature of interactions between states. This highlights the need for a multidimensional approach to trust when studying bilateral relationships, which includes ideas drawn from rationalist approaches to trust but also takes into account insights from psychological and social approaches.

The limitations and benefits of psychological approaches can be seen in how they have been applied to international relations. Deborah Welch Larson was the first international relations scholar to bring a social psychological approach to trust into international relations, focusing on how social psychology helps to explain the underlying trust and distrust which either limited or facilitated cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.²⁶³ Brian Rathbun provides a more recent examination of trust in international relations through the lens of social psychology.²⁶⁴ As with Larson, he struggles to take into account the role of the social

²⁵⁹ T. Michel, “Time to Get Emotional. Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 4 (2012): 875.

²⁶⁰ S. Tang, “The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): Or Why Is International Cooperation Difficult?,” in *Bridging Multiple Divides* (49th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, Hilton San Francisco, 2008), 42, <http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/picture/article/56/88/ac/7c64a8d340368df7c344a544924c/f3108590-9a73-4b62-8cac-4b87e93b30f0.pdf>.

²⁶¹ Tang, 41.

²⁶² Tang, 42.

²⁶³ Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).

²⁶⁴ See, for example, Rathbun, “It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations

structures in which interpersonal relations take place. Rathbun argues that there are two forms of trust:

Strategic trust is based on the accumulation of information about specific others' intentions.

Moralistic trust is an assessment of trustworthiness of others based on a conclusion about the overall integrity and character of the potential partner.²⁶⁵

He goes on to argue that moralistic trust can exist in either generalized or particularized form, where generalized trust is 'a general belief that most others can be trusted' and particularized trust 'is the belief that a specific other is inherently trustworthy'.²⁶⁶ Further, he claims that conceptualisations of trust provided by social psychology provide new conceptual tools to understand the logic behind the major international relations theoretical paradigms.²⁶⁷ Waltz's structural realism is driven by a lack of generalised trust; Keohane's belief in the potential of cooperation is made possible by the introduction of strategic trust; and particularized moralistic trust is possible in a Wendtian constructivist view of the international system.²⁶⁸ The limitations of the psychological approach as outlined by Parkhe become clear in Rathbun's application of this approach to international relations. Rathbun focuses on the 'social orientation' of individuals, arguing that there are 'different types of trusters who act very differently in similar structural settings on the basis of beliefs about the trustworthiness of others'.²⁶⁹ The ways in which individuals act map onto the logics of the international relations paradigms, leading Rathbun to argue that 'individuals seem to carry around one of the international relations paradigms in their mind'.²⁷⁰ Further, he argues that because of this scholars 'might be mistaking structure for disposition'.²⁷¹ This can be seen in an examination of the differing social orientations of Democrats compared with Republicans, where Democrats are more likely to be generalised trusters and thus favour multilateralism and cooperation, while Republicans are less likely to be generalised trusters and consequently prefer unilateralism and competition as foreign policy strategies.²⁷² These psychological approaches, however, have clear limitations. If trust is solely down to the social orientations actors bring with them to any given interaction, then what options remain for building trust among those lacking a predisposition for generalised trust? As with rationalist approaches, psychological approaches such as these which pay little or no attention to

Paradigm in Our Minds."

²⁶⁵ Rathbun, 346.

²⁶⁶ Rathbun, 347.

²⁶⁷ Rathbun, 347.

²⁶⁸ Rathbun, 347.

²⁶⁹ Rathbun, 356.

²⁷⁰ Rathbun, 360.

²⁷¹ Rathbun, 347.

²⁷² See Rathbun, "The 'Magnificent Fraud': Trust, International Cooperation, and the Hidden Domestic Politics of American Multilateralism after World War II."

social structures are incapable of taking account of the role of social interaction and the processes of social learning, and are therefore insufficient for analysing social trust in relationships between states. Clearly social approaches must also be examined, in order to better understand the role of social interaction and context in building trust.

Social

Approaches which are psychological in nature, and treat trust as an individual trait or attitude or belief, have limitations for the study of international relations. Even from outside the discipline, Lewis and Weigert caution against these approaches, claiming that they are ‘theoretically unintegrated and incomplete from the standpoint of a sociology of trust’.²⁷³ Weber argues that trust ‘is inherently a social phenomenon’.²⁷⁴ Lewis and Weigert aim to move beyond the limits of psychological and political science conceptualisations of trust through creating a sociological conception of trust.²⁷⁵ One way to do this is to consider the social function of trust, as a phenomenon which enables the possibility of interacting with others through the reduction of complexity.²⁷⁶ Möllering also explores the role of trust as a social function, building, as Lewis and Weigert do, on the work of Georg Simmel.²⁷⁷ Trust plays such a vital role because it allows people to function in circumstances where it is impossible to have perfect information regarding all possible outcomes of a social interaction, whether because of lapses in current information or because of unknowable potential future events, or both:

What makes trust a meaningful and important concept in the first place is that it stands for a process in which we reach a point where our interpretations are *accepted* and our awareness of the unknown, unknowable and unresolved is *suspended*.²⁷⁸

Barbalet claims that this inherent relationship between trust and future uncertainty, or in other words the temporality of trust, means that ‘the basis of trust, then, cannot be knowledge or calculation . . . Rather, it includes an affective or emotional acceptance of dependence on others’.²⁷⁹ It involves willingly increasing one’s vulnerability to the other. The role of the social context in which trust takes place, the social function of trust as a process which reduces

²⁷³ Lewis and Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” 967.

²⁷⁴ Linda R. Weber, “Self at the Heart of Trust: The Global Relevance of an Interactionist Understanding of Trust as a Form of Association,” in *Trust: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Masamichi Sasaki and Robert M. Marsh (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), 276.

²⁷⁵ Lewis and Weigert, “The Social Dynamics of Trust: Theoretical and Empirical Research, 1985-2012,” 967–68.

²⁷⁶ Lewis and Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” 968.

²⁷⁷ Möllering and Lewicki and Bunker draw on Georg Simmel, *Philosophie Des Geldes*, ed. D. P. Frisby and K. C. Köhnke (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989); Georg Simmel, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen Über Die Formen Der Vergesellschaftung*, ed. O. Rammstedt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992); Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. and trans. K. H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, n.d.).

²⁷⁸ Möllering, “The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension,” 414.

²⁷⁹ Barbalet, “Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust and Loyalty,” 77–78.

complexity, and the inherent emotional nature of any interaction which involves trust, are all vital to a full understanding of trust required for the multidimensional framework developed in this thesis.

While social trust is a relatively recent area of study in international relations, there have been several attempts to apply such approaches to trust to the study of inter-state relations. Hoffman made a significant contribution through highlighting that when studying trust in international relations it is not sufficient to conceptualise trust as a willingness to take risks, but to define trust as the willingness to take risks on the basis of a belief that ‘others will honor particular obligations’.²⁸⁰ Booth and Wheeler notably sought to combine insights drawn from work on trust outside international relations with ideas drawn from constructivism. They examine the ways in which a trust-based approach opens up avenues for more extensive forms of cooperation. For deeper and more sustained forms of cooperation to take place Booth and Wheeler argue that it is necessary to have embedded trust in place.²⁸¹ They argue that ‘for trust to become *embedded*, it is necessary for positive relationships between leaders to be replicated at the intersocietal level’.²⁸² This indicates the need for an approach to bilateral relations which goes beyond an examination of only leaders or elites, however an approach which at the same time does not fall into the trap Wheeler warns of regarding neglecting interpersonal relations when analysing collective trust. The most significant example of embedded trust is, of course, the European Union. The European Union is often argued to be a preeminent example of a security community, with Jervis arguing that the security dilemma no longer operates in Europe.²⁸³

Keating and Ruzicka also view trust in international relations from a social standpoint, building on the work of Niklas Luhmann.²⁸⁴ Luhmann focuses on the role of trust in allowing an individual to reduce social complexity.²⁸⁵ Along these lines, Keating and Ruzicka define ‘trust as the ideational structure that *cognitively reduces or eliminates the residual risk and uncertainty* that is part of any decision’.²⁸⁶ Their later argument that scholars studying trust as a ‘leap of faith’ would be better served using Möllering’s concept of suspension also fits into this type of thinking about trust as providing a vital social function in international relations. They highlight the need to include both rational and social understandings of trust in an analysis of trust in alliances, pointing to the importance of social factors such as ‘group membership, common values, pre-existing

²⁸⁰ Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” 376.

²⁸¹ Booth and Wheeler, 197.

²⁸² Booth and Wheeler, 197.

²⁸³ Wheeler, “Interview with Robert Jervis,” 499.

²⁸⁴ Luhmann, *Trust and Power*.

²⁸⁵ Luhmann.

²⁸⁶ Keating and Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge,” 3.

social norms, and working towards common goals'.²⁸⁷ A big focus in their work is on how to identify a trusting relationship, arguing that analysing whether or not a state is pursuing hedging strategies is a key way to do so.²⁸⁸ Stiles also explores the relationship between trust and hedging, albeit from a rationalist perspective.²⁸⁹ Keating and Ruzicka also point out in their 2015 review of trust literature in international relations that there were clear limitations associated with the social approach to trust.²⁹⁰ They notably highlight the flaw in Booth and Wheeler's work regarding 'how trust can be transformed from an expectation to a personal bond'.²⁹¹ Booth and Wheeler themselves attempt to link these because they believe trust is more than mere rationality or calculation. This is evidenced by their critique of Kydd's use of his reassurance game to explain the end of the Cold War, arguing that it 'fails to capture the cognitive and emotional dynamics that led to the development of trust in US-Soviet relations in the second half of the 1980s'.²⁹² Their difficulties in doing so left a clear gap for the study of the role of interpersonal relations in trust in international relations.

In seeking to fill this gap, Nicholas Wheeler introduces a theory of interpersonal relations from a standpoint of social trust into international relations in his 2018 *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.²⁹³ While his focus is on how interpersonal trust can emerge through a process of bonding between state leaders in an adversarial context, enabling them to correctly read signals of peaceful intent, he also provides a number of insights for the broader study of trust. He argues that there is a significant gap in trust literature regarding interpersonal relations between leaders, as rationalist approaches to trust miss the social and psychological processes involved, and identity-based approaches focus on the state and minimise the interpersonal space.²⁹⁴ Although interpersonal trust is often mentioned, particularly with regards to Reagan and Gorbachev, 'the concept of interpersonal trust has not previously been applied systematically to trust research in IR'.²⁹⁵ Wheeler describes interpersonal trust as existing in two forms: calculative and bonding. Calculative trust covers the rationalist conceptualisations of trust which view trust as risk calculation.²⁹⁶ He proposes bonding trust as an alternative approach to trust in interpersonal relations, in which a process of bonding emerges from face-to-face interactions. Wheeler is not alone in stressing the importance of face-to-face interactions.

²⁸⁷ Keating and Ruzicka, "Trust, Obligation, and Reciprocity in NATO," 3.

²⁸⁸ Keating and Ruzicka, "Trust Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge."

²⁸⁹ Kendall W. Stiles, *Trust and Hedging in International Relations*.

²⁹⁰ Keating and Ruzicka, "Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations," 18.

²⁹¹ Keating and Ruzicka, 18.

²⁹² Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 91.

²⁹³ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

²⁹⁴ Wheeler, 100–140.

²⁹⁵ Wheeler, 42.

²⁹⁶ Wheeler, 4–5.

Marcus Holmes emphasises the way in which leaders themselves have often sought out face-to-face interactions and the importance they have placed on being able to meet a counterpart in person.²⁹⁷ Rather than trust theory, Holmes focuses on insights from social neuroscience, some of which have also been used by Wheeler in his work on bonding trust.²⁹⁸ A process of bonding is one in which two state leaders change ‘their understanding of their own and the other’s identity and interests through a process of positive and mutual identification’.²⁹⁹ When ‘this process of bonding reaches the point of identity transformation, the actors’ mental states have altered to trust as suspension’.³⁰⁰ Wheeler identifies an additional gap in trust literature: the fact that approaches to trust which focus on the state as a whole ‘marginalize or ignore the interpersonal dimension of state behaviour, especially processes of face-to-face interaction and the potential for trust to emerge from social interaction of this kind’.³⁰¹ While Wheeler contributes to this gap by focusing on interpersonal relations between leaders and conceptualising them as ‘referents’ for the collective entity of the state, this thesis seeks to contribute to this gap in social trust research through using a multidimensional trust framework applied using a flat ontology, in an expansion of the concept of embedded trust. This thesis will focus on the state as a whole, but with a keen eye to the primary role of interaction in facilitating opportunities for the growth of trust.

Wheeler examines how both calculative and bonding trust emerge from face-to-face interactions between leaders. The emergence of bonding trust is clearly understood as a process which takes place over time, and one which is not always distinctly separate from calculative trust:

... a process of bonding and trust emergence can develop through face-to-face interaction that does not lead to a full-blown identity transformation. At this point ... trust depends on a mix of calculation and bonding.³⁰²

He begins by analysing how ‘an index – a signal of inherent credibility as to another’s trustworthiness – can be acquired, even between two rational egoists’.³⁰³ Two rational egoists can acquire an index of trustworthiness, regarding each other’s peaceful intent and integrity.³⁰⁴ To be able and willing to do this actors must exercise security dilemma sensibility, which is ‘an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the

²⁹⁷ Marcus Holmes, *Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Social Neuroscience and International Relations* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2018): 5.

²⁹⁸ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 54-55.

²⁹⁹ Wheeler, 1.

³⁰⁰ Wheeler, 52.

³⁰¹ Wheeler, 118.

³⁰² Wheeler, 8

³⁰³ Wheeler, 51.

³⁰⁴ Wheeler, 52-53.

potential complexity of the military intentions of others'.³⁰⁵ Security dilemma sensibility is a key prerequisite for trust, as an ability to empathise and view another's actions as driven by fear rather than aggression 'generates a predisposition to trust'.³⁰⁶ A predisposition to trust means that actors will enter into face-to-face interactions with a willingness to test their intuition regarding the other's trustworthiness, through the development of an index.³⁰⁷ An index, however, is fragile, as without a mental state of suspension owing to bonded trust future uncertainty will continue to be an overwhelming problem.³⁰⁸ Wheeler turns, then, to bonding trust, arguing that there are 'two components that are essential for a process of bonding, once started, to develop into a fully formed relationship of bonded trust'.³⁰⁹ These components are the positive identification of interests, and humanization. The process of bonding requires that states begin to 'see the other's interests as their interests, and the other's security and well-being as their security and well-being'.³¹⁰ As Wheeler points out, this process builds on the Wendtian constructivist argument that a transformation of identity takes place as a consequence of social interaction and processes of social learning.³¹¹ The second key component of bonding is the need for humanization, where a process of social interaction leads individuals to view one another as human, 'rather than just a representative of cold state interests'.³¹² Humanization is a form of empathy which goes beyond the empathy involved in security dilemma sensibility, as in addition to understanding that actions may be a result of fear rather than aggression, humanization also involves positive identification of interests.³¹³ The distinction between the calculative trust of an index of trustworthiness and the bonding trust which grows and strengthens on the basis of positive identification of interests and humanization is one Wheeler defines in terms of scope. An index of trustworthiness is seen as being an index of *general* trustworthiness, whereas bonding trust will initially evolve around a specific area of focus, and broaden across different areas as trust deepens over time through repeated face-to-face interactions.³¹⁴ This process of bonding will be fundamental to understanding the role of trust in interpersonal relations, and will be vital to the creation of the affective dimension of trust in the framework developed below for analysing trust across the whole of a bilateral relationship.

³⁰⁵ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 7.

³⁰⁶ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 54.

³⁰⁷ Wheeler, 54.

³⁰⁸ Wheeler, 51.

³⁰⁹ Wheeler, 60-61.

³¹⁰ Wheeler, 61.

³¹¹ Wheeler, 62.

³¹² Wheeler, 62.

³¹³ Wheeler, 62-63.

³¹⁴ Wheeler, 66.

Responding to the Challenges of Applying Trust to International Relations

Introduction

While much work has been done on introducing theoretical approaches to trust into the study of international relations, debates regarding how to conceptualise trust are ongoing, and clear gaps remain where further study is required. This thesis seeks to contribute to this ongoing project through the development of a multidimensional framework centred on areas of intensive interaction between individuals and groups across the breadth of a bilateral relationship. That this gap has remained is a testament to the difficulties of applying theoretical approaches from outside the discipline to the context of international relations. Most notably, the international relations context differs from others with regards to the overwhelming nature of uncertainty in an anarchic international system, the subsequently higher costs and risks associated with exposing oneself to vulnerability, and the multiplicity of actors which make up a state. The dimensions of trust are conceptualised in the framework in a way which takes these differences seriously, most notably through the significance which is placed on state interests in the calculative dimension of trust. This section will first discuss the value of a multidimensional approach, before examining the need to use literature on trust between organisations to create a multidimensional approach owing to the similarities which exist between organisations and states regarding their complexity as social entities.

The Utility of a Multidimensional Approach

Accepting that trust is not simply absent or present, but rather is a multidimensional and evolutionary process which fluctuates over time, means that although trusting relationships may be rare, trust in relationships is not. The complexities and uncertainties of international relations make it difficult to achieve something that looks like a perfect trusting relationship, and they certainly make it difficult to build trust between states, but they do not make it impossible. The evolutionary and non-static process of trust indicates that we need a way to track how trust in relationships changes over time, and what factors are driving those changes. Multidimensional approaches offer a more precise approach to tracking trust over time, as they provide a way to more clearly pin down the role of socially determined interests and cooperation on these interests, affective relationships between individuals and groups, and normative expectations of shared futures and joint interests. They also provide a way of addressing some of the key challenges in trust research at the international level regarding how to understand and incorporate the relationship between the collective and the interpersonal, and how to integrate different conceptualisations of trust as existing in different forms or resulting from different sources. A multidimensional approach, combined with a flat ontology of the state, tackles these issues

through conceptualising trust as existing in multiple, coexisting, and interwoven forms which interact dynamically across the breadth of a bilateral relationship.

Considering the utility of a multidimensional approach in tackling some of the key questions in trust research at the international level, this thesis will propose a multidimensional approach in which the dimensions of trust are calculative, affective, and normative. Each dimension contributes toward ‘*the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility*’³¹⁵ that forms the basis of trust. This expectation is respectively based on: calculations of costs, risks, and benefits; emotive-based perceptions of the goodwill of others; and shared values, norms, and elements of collective identity. Vulnerability will be assumed to be a necessary precondition for trust to come into play because, as with uncertainty, trust also necessarily exists in conditions of vulnerability. The relationship between trust and cooperation will be treated as being complex and dynamic in nature, where either can come first, but for sustained cooperation on sensitive and complex issues either a broad dispersal of normative trust, or the presence of affective trust between key individuals such as leaders, will be required. This multidimensional approach will be based on the ideas drawn from the study of trust discussed above and organised around the multidimensional approaches to trust found in organisational literature discussed below.

The Need to Draw on Literature on Trust between Organisations

Organisational literature provides a number of examples of how a multidimensional approach to trust may be used, and one which has not yet been examined in detail in the field of international relations. Brugger, Hasenclever, and Kasten have used organisational literature in their work on trust between international organisations,³¹⁶ however the multidimensional approach to trust found in much of the organisational literature has not been applied to trust between states. Lewis and Weigert call for an analysis of trust which incorporates ‘its multi-faceted character’, and their general recognition of trust as containing a combination of rational, emotional, and social elements indicates the need for a more complex approach.³¹⁷ This is something which has been most fully realised in the realm of organisational trust, in particular the role of trust in organisational alliances. The applicability of organisational alliances is clear in the following description of the role of trust by Parkhe, which could easily be directly translated to the world of international relations:

³¹⁵ Wheeler, 2.

³¹⁶ Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever, and Lukas Kasten, “Trust Among International Organizations,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics*, ed. Rafael Biermann and Joachim A. Koops (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 407-26.

³¹⁷ Lewis and Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” 969.

There are thus two types of uncertainty in alliances: Uncertainty regarding unknown future events, and uncertainty regarding partner's responses to those future events. It is in this environment of double uncertainty that trust emerges as a central organizing principle in alliances. Trust reduces complex and uncertain realities far more quickly and economically than prediction, authority, or bargaining, and thus improves performance.³¹⁸

Similarly, his recommendations for how to reduce uncertainty to manageable levels are also directly applicable to international relations, and mirror approaches taken by international relations scholars. He argues that the 'potential for misperception can be reduced by installing mechanisms for recognition, verification, and signaling, which together improve behaviour transparency'.³¹⁹ Although Meier does not call his approach multidimensional, he does focus on three different bases for trust: process-based, characteristic-based, and institutional based.³²⁰ Zand focuses on trust as containing four elements: '(1) Openness with relevant information, (2) Mutual influence on important goals and methods, (3) Reliably abiding by agreements, and (4) Protecting the other's vulnerability from exploitation'.³²¹ Nielsen explicitly develops an approach to analyse 'the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of trust'.³²² Nielsen, in a critique of the focus on individual psychology and rationalism which is equally pertinent to the study of relationships between states, argues that it is not useful in the context of alliances to treat trust as 'uni-dimensional concept with universal properties'; or to neglect the 'dynamic evolution of trust' over time, nor the 'important interdependencies between alliance management processes and trust'.³²³ This is why in an alliance context, trust will influence how monitoring and verification mechanisms work and when they are used, as they both influence and are influenced by trust.³²⁴ Nielsen's model of treating trust as three distinct 'temporal constructs'³²⁵ is not as useful in international relations where the idea of an alliance as a fixed outcome is rarer and more diffuse than in an organisational context, however his multidimensional and evolutionary understanding of trust remains key to analysing trust between states. It is unsurprising that literature focusing on organisational alliances provides the most useful ideas for studying trust in international relations. Both states and organisations are complex entities with external identities which are shaped by individuals across different levels, as well as structural conditions. Although some changes need to be made for an international relations context to account for the overwhelming nature of the

³¹⁸ Parkhe, "Understanding Trust in International Alliances," 220.

³¹⁹ Parkhe, 227.

³²⁰ Meier et al., "How Managers Can Build Trust in Strategic Alliances: A Meta-Analysis on the Central Trust-Building Mechanisms," 233.

³²¹ Zand, "Reflections on Trust and Trust Research: Then and Now," 66.

³²² Nielsen, "Trust in Strategic Alliances: Toward a Co-Evolutionary Research Model," 159.

³²³ Nielsen, 160.

³²⁴ Nielsen, 160.

³²⁵ Nielsen, 161.

uncertainty which exists in the anarchic international system, the complexity of the state as an entity, and the fact that no two states ever have a clean slate with which to begin new interactions, clearly a multidimensional approach is uniquely suited to tackling the complexities of trust in international relations.

A Multidimensional Framework for Trust

Introduction

A multidimensional framework for the study of trust will draw on all of the ideas presented above, but will be organised around Roy Lewicki and Barbara Bunker's treatment of trust as existing in three forms. They argue that there are three primary bases of trust, drawing themselves from the work of Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin.³²⁶ Lewicki and Bunker term their three types of trust as calculative-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust.³²⁷ This conceptualisation of trust as existing in three different forms will be used in a multidimensional approach, as found in the work of Nielsen, which ensures that the three forms are effectively captured as dimensions which are inherently interwoven, rather than discrete and easily separable forms. The dimensions will be determined by the combination of Lewicki and Bunker's three types of trust, as well as ideas drawn from the breadth of both trust research and international relations theory, to examine trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship. To distinguish from Lewicki and Bunker's approach to trust in business and organisational relations and highlight the key features of trust useful to the study of international relations, the dimensions will be referred to as the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions of trust. Each dimension will have key methods of application drawn from the trust and international relations literature: the calculative dimension will involve strategic culture and the development of an index of trustworthiness; the affective dimension will embrace the participant stance, bonding, and the development of expectations of trustworthiness through a process of social learning; and the normative dimension will centre on colocation, collective identity, the creation of joint products or goals, and commonly shared values. Although trust is a notoriously difficult concept to define, and there have been arguments made that such attempts are ill-advised,³²⁸ trust can be defined for a specific purpose. The purpose here is to analyse the nature of bilateral relationships, in order to understand what degree of trust exists across the breadth of a bilateral relationship and how it develops across the three dimensions over time. Doing so will contribute to the gap highlighted by Wheeler regarding the difficulties of analysing trust at the collective level without losing the

³²⁶ Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin, "Business on a Handshake."

³²⁷ Lewicki and Bunker, "Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships," 118–19.

³²⁸ See Laura Considine, "'Back to the Rough Ground!' A Grammatical Approach to Trust and International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44, no. 1 (2015): 109–27.

salience of interpersonal relations, and operationalise an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust. To do so, at the broadest level trust will be defined as ‘*the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility*’.³²⁹ The dimensions of trust provide more specificity under the auspices of this definition through delineating the *sources* of the expectation of no harm.

Dimensions of Trust

Calculative

The calculative dimension of trust illustrates the role of interests and incentives-based trust. Whereas Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin refer to the first type as deterrence-based trust and argue that it is the fear of punishment following a violation that drives this form of trust, Lewicki and Bunker argue that this form of trust is equally driven by ‘the rewards to be derived from preserving it’.³³⁰ Lewicki and Bunker thus term their concept calculus-based trust and describe it as ‘an ongoing . . . calculation whose value is derived by determining the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it’.³³¹ This type of trust is clearly driven by the kind of thinking found in the rationalist approaches to trust described above, where trust is driven by cost-benefit calculations. To avoid separating such calculations from the social world in which they take place, this thesis will assume this form of trust takes into account that interests, costs, risks, and benefits are not determined by pure rational calculations, but rather are socially determined and shaped by perceptions and identity-based considerations. It is vital not to lose the salience of power politics in international relations. To ensure these dynamics are analysed in a way which captures the socially determined nature of interests and preferences, the calculative dimension will be inspired by the concept of strategic culture in seeking to incorporate state interests with regard to power politics. Without high degrees of affective or normative trust in place, some form of shared interests are required to catalyse cooperation, speaking to social approaches to MCBMs. This cooperation will most commonly be functional, small-scale cooperation on non-sensitive issues, where the costs and risks of potential betrayal are low. In other words, there will be low levels of material vulnerability for each cooperative participant. The calculative dimension does not exist in distinct isolation from the other dimensions. Often, the presence of the affective or normative dimensions, particularly in relationships between key individuals, will help facilitate cooperation based predominantly on the calculative dimension of trust.

³²⁹ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 2.

³³⁰ Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 120.

³³¹ Lewicki and Bunker, 120.

As argued by both rationalists and constructivists, repeated interactions over time affect the views each state holds of the other and will shape the nature of trust, and the extent and success of cooperative endeavours. Rationalists, such as Kydd, argue this point using iterated versions of the prisoners' dilemma, in which the knowledge of repeated interactions enables states to take greater risks in the initial interaction, and use costly signalling to signal their intentions to a prospective cooperative partner.³³² Constructivists, most notably Wendt, argue that repeated interactions shape state identity, potentially leading to such significant shifts that common identity bonds form.³³³ Wheeler argues that both acquiring an index of trustworthiness and beginning a process of bonding require face-to-face interactions.³³⁴ Shared interests and incentives-based calculations will always remain part of a bilateral relationship, even should more enduring forms of trust develop over time. Likewise, other dimensions of trust can shape how the calculative dimension influences the potential for cooperation. In situations where material vulnerability may be higher, but the need to cooperate is strong, institutional monitoring and verification measures can be put in place. This will reduce perceived vulnerability to acceptable levels and enable cooperation between states. Some degree of trust, however, needs to be in place prior to institutionalisation.³³⁵ Affective trust commonly plays a role here, most particularly between key individuals such as leaders, foreign and defence ministers, and diplomats. The affective relationships which develop between key individuals can play vital roles in shaping relationships between states. The most notable example of this is the relationship which developed between Reagan and Gorbachev during the Cold War. The affective trust between the two leaders encouraged the acceptance of strict verification and monitoring mechanisms on Gorbachev's part, which subsequently allowed the INF Treaty to come into fruition.³³⁶ Already it is clear that the dimensions of trust are not static nor separate, they are mutually constitutive across the breadth of a bilateral relationship.

Affective

The affective dimension illustrates the role of emotions in trust, particularly on an interpersonal level. Lewicki and Bunker call their second form of trust knowledge-based trust. They describe it as something which is based on knowledge, and 'develops over time, largely as a function of the parties having a history of interaction that allows them to develop a generalized expectancy that

³³² See Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*.

³³³ See Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics."

³³⁴ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

³³⁵ See, for example, Rathbun, "Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations."

³³⁶ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 151–52.

the other's behaviour is predictable and that he or she will act trustworthily'.³³⁷ Instead, this thesis will refer to knowledge-based trust as the affective dimension to highlight the importance of not only knowledge on its own, but how actors feel about and perceive this knowledge. This makes it clear that what is important is not a rational assessment of the knowledge acquired through repeated interactions, but rather the role of emotions in such interactions and how they shape the interpretation of the knowledge acquired. Lewicki and Bunker themselves discuss knowledge-based trust in a way which makes it clear that rational assessment of knowledge alone is not sufficient. They detail the importance of 'regular communication and courtship' which 'puts a party in constant contact with the other, exchanging information about wants, preferences, and approaches to problems'.³³⁸ This process necessarily 'develops over repeated interactions in multidimensional relationships' which allows each actor to learn about each other, including learning about each other's behaviour in different social and emotional conditions.³³⁹ This is how actors learn what their expectations of trustworthiness are with regards to each other, and what they would consider a breach of trust. Lewicki and Bunker describe this process in the context of individuals where, if you know a friend is always late to dinner you are unlikely to consider lateness a breach of trust, but if you have the expectation that they are always on time you may, pending extreme circumstances, experience a breakdown of trust in that relationship.³⁴⁰ This is a reminder that each bilateral relationship needs to be considered contextually over time, to determine how trust operates within that relationship and what would be considered an improvement or a decline of trust.

In addition to developing expectations of trustworthiness through a process of social learning, a combination of Holton's participant stance and Wheeler's bonding trust are required for a conceptualisation of the affective dimension. The role of emotions in trust is encapsulated by Holton's use of the participant stance to explain trust, where the actor's emotions are inherently and inseparably part of the interactions between them.³⁴¹ As discussed above, affective trust can drive the ability of states to capitalise on shared interests when material vulnerability is too high, through a willingness to accept verification measures to reduce perceived and material vulnerability. Affective trust can also develop as a result of repeated cooperative interactions. Successful repeated cooperative interactions will promote the development of mutual perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness. The actors involved will take on the participant stance, and begin

³³⁷ Lewicki and Bunker, "Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships," 121.

³³⁸ Lewicki and Bunker, 121.

³³⁹ Lewicki and Bunker, 121.

³⁴⁰ Lewicki and Bunker, 122.

³⁴¹ See Holton, "Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe."

to believe that being trustworthy is not only in their material interests, but is also now a moral obligation. Wheeler's approach to bonding trust is also clearly of utility in the affective dimension. While his approach to bonding covers both affective and normative dimensions, this thesis prefers to cover this concept across two dimensions, given the context of shifting from an approach focused purely on interpersonal relationships between adversarial state leaders, to broader interpersonal and inter-group relations across the breadth of a bilateral relationship ranging from adversarial to trusting. Additionally, the treatment of affective and normative as two dimensions should allow for a clearer picture to be painted regarding the role of shared identity factors. Given the clear presence of such factors in Anglo-American relations, it will be highly useful to be able to identify their role in the development of trust over time, both to understand their role and to have a better idea of how the framework might later be applied to relationships where shared identity factors are missing.

As the affective dimension becomes more dominant in a relationship, perceptions of trustworthiness will strengthen. As with all dimensions of trust, the affective dimension takes place across the breadth of a relationship. While individual leaders are often key drivers of cooperative endeavours following their determination to yield benefits from shared interests, and/or their ability to develop affective bonds with each other, the whole of a bilateral relationship cannot be dependent on individual leaders. Eventually, these leaders will change, particularly in democratic contexts, and if the affective dimension has not developed beyond this level then new relationships will have to be developed between new leaders, or cooperation will have to be predicated on the calculative dimension. Conversely, if the affective or normative dimensions of trust are present across other domains a bilateral relationship can weather the lack of such trust at the leadership level. This further reinforces the complex tangled web of relationship between the dimensions of trust and way in which they interact across the breadth of a bilateral relationship, and the absolute necessity of understanding trust to be a multidimensional and evolutionary process.

Normative

Over time, if the affective dimension remains strong and shared interests remain in place, the normative dimension of trust may come into play as common identity bonds form between states. Lewicki and Bunker discusses this aspect of trust in terms of being identification-based trust:

. . . identification-based trust develops as one both knows and predicts the other's needs, choices, and preferences and also shares some of those same needs, choices, and preferences as one's own. Increased identification enables one to "think like" the other, "feel like" the other, and "respond" like the other. People may in fact empathize strongly with the other and

incorporate parts of his or her psyche into their own “identity” (needs, preferences, thoughts, and behaviour patterns) as a collective identity develops.³⁴²

They add that there are four key activities which can strengthen this form of trust: ‘developing a *collective identity* (a joint name, title, logo, etc.); *colocation* in the same building or neighbourhood; *creating joint products or goals*, such as a new product line or a new set of objectives; and committing to *commonly shared values*’.³⁴³ In the context of international relations, developing a collective identity would look like a formal creation of an alliance structure, multilateral institution, or the development of a security community; colocation could refer either to being geographical neighbours, or to the frequent colocation of individuals with regards to cultural and educational exchange, ministerial meetings, leader-to-leader meetings, joint task forces, shared bases, joint fighting structures, interaction between officials at multilateral summits, and trade-based interactions; creating joint products or goals would refer to joint outcomes or goals; and commonly shared values would be the commonly shared values held between states, such as a commitment to a particular set of normative values or a shared strategic vision. These are all indicative of the normative dimension of trust as they indicate the presence of the shared identity factors required for the normative dimension to develop.

Broadly speaking, relationships will move beyond perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness that each will uphold the trust placed in them, and interests will begin to be seen and planned jointly. Whereas the affective dimension drives the early stages of bonding, expectations of trustworthiness, and begins to blur the lines between self and other, a strong normative dimension ventures further into the territory where actors are capable of thinking, feeling, and responding like the other. It is here that constructivist accounts of the mutually constitutive role of state identity and interaction between states become most salient. In an expansion of Booth and Wheeler’s argument that trust is at its strongest when it exists at the political level and has become embedded in societies, in the strongest of trusting relationships all three dimensions of trust would be embedded not only in society broadly, but across the breadth of the relationship in areas including the military, individuals, and institutions. Expanding the concept of embedded trust and applying it using a flat ontology allows for an analysis of how this works, with the three dimensions of trust providing greater specificity. This is the most enduring form of trust, and consequently facilitates deeper and more enduring forms of cooperation, as seen in security communities and trust-based alliances such as the Anglo-American relationship. Wendt discusses this in terms of collective identity, arguing that a situation could occur where the ‘Self-Other distinction becomes blurred’

³⁴² Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 123.

³⁴³ Lewicki and Bunker, 123.

and an actor will begin to ‘define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self’.³⁴⁴ Although such circumstances are rare, the normative dimension of trust can be found to some degree even when states are not in a situation of collective identity. It is also important to understand the difficulties of trust-building when the normative dimension is weak, and there are no elements of shared identity or common identity bonds in place. A consideration of the normative dimension of trust again highlights the inherently interlinked nature of the dimensions, and the role they play within and across the domains of a bilateral relationship.

Applying the Framework to a Bilateral Relationship: Domains of Interaction Opportunities in a Bilateral Relationship

Introduction: Responding to Recent Developments in International Relations

Recent developments in IR recognise that there have been changes in the international system which are impacting the capacity of the state to neatly exercise power in a traditional manner. The decline of US hegemony, the debate over the rise of China, the impact of social media and the power of technology corporations, the global impacts of climate change, and the impact of new and emerging technologies on the nature of conflict and competition, among other things, are proving significant challenges to states. They are also proving significant challenges to state-dominant thinking about international politics. While these are new challenges, they also point to the non-traditional ways in which power, trust, and influence have existed in the past. The need to continue working to develop new methods of analysing the state, international politics, and relations between states, is already justified by trust scholars arguing that how trust is embedded in societies requires examination, by the call from feminist scholars and others to examine less traditional sources of agency in the conduct of international relations, and by the work of political geographers in challenging statism. The current challenges characterising the international system only serve to emphasise the importance of doing so. The significance of the changes underway is reflected in the IR literature, as will be demonstrated through an exploration of a piece of scholarship from each of the three dominant IR paradigms: from realism, *Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order* by John J. Mearsheimer,³⁴⁵ from liberalism *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World* by Anne-Marie Slaughter,³⁴⁶ and from constructivism *Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics*, edited

³⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 229.

³⁴⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” *International Security* 43, no. 4 (2019): 7-50.

³⁴⁶ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

by Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert.³⁴⁷

That each major theoretical paradigm is recognising, in some manner, the ways in which the world has been altered, illustrates the significance of the changes underway. It also reinforces the need to find new and innovative ways to analyse them. Mearsheimer argues that the liberal international order is falling for three key reasons: that liberal international orders can only exist so long as the sole power of a unipolar system is a liberal democracy, that the liberal international order has only existed since the end of the Cold War, and that this order was ‘doomed to collapse’ as it was built on flawed policies such as the active spreading of liberal democracy.³⁴⁸ The fall of the liberal international order, however one defines it, is a significant enough change in the international system in and of itself. What is particularly notable about Mearsheimer’s argument, when reflecting on how such developments are impacting on IR as a discipline, is his focus on the impact of interconnectedness and hyperglobalisation. The implication of Mearsheimer’s argument that international orders ‘are essential for facilitating efficient and timely interactions’ in an interconnected and hyperglobalised world³⁴⁹ is a step away from the kind of state centrism that has dominated much of realist scholarship. Though Mearsheimer does take care to point out that the institutions that comprise an order ‘are simply tools of the great powers’, the emphasis put on the need for an order to manage ‘a world of multifaceted interdependence’ is striking.³⁵⁰ So, too, is the focus on the impact of hyperglobalisation on domestic populations, and the subsequent undermining of the liberal international order.³⁵¹ Fractures can now be seen in his earlier billiard ball approach to the state,³⁵² making it evident that what is inside does matter after all.

Interconnectedness is also a focus of Anne-Marie Slaughter. She explores it with considerably more sophistication, however, through the use of network theory. In ‘a deeply interconnected world’, she argues, ‘the people themselves – not just their governments – are actors on the world stage’.³⁵³ Ignoring this reality has been a fatal flaw of foreign policy makers, as they continue to see world politics as a ‘chessboard’, and an ‘endless game of strategic advantage’.³⁵⁴ It is this view of the

³⁴⁷ Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert (eds.), *Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

³⁴⁸ Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail,” 8.

³⁴⁹ Mearsheimer, 7.

³⁵⁰ Mearsheimer, 11.

³⁵¹ Mearsheimer, 31.

³⁵² In Mearsheimer’s words, “great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size,” quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, “Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things),” *The Atlantic*, 20 December 2011, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/why-john-j-mearsheimer-is-right-about-some-things/308839/>.

³⁵³ Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web*, 5.

³⁵⁴ Slaughter, 5-6.

world foreign policy makers have used to guide their thinking, Slaughter argues, leading to serious errors in a new context they have failed to appreciate.³⁵⁵ Interconnectedness means that a chessboard is no longer an appropriate way to view the world. Instead, she argues, the world should be seen as a web. A ‘web view’ sees a world not of borders, ‘but of connection, of the density and intensity of ties across boundaries’.³⁵⁶ The world is not made up of states, but rather of networks.³⁵⁷ A foundational work she draws on is Manuel Castells’ three volume series beginning with *The Rise of the Network Society*.³⁵⁸ She describes how Castells was able to see, as early as 1996, how information technology was changing society in ways which meant that ‘almost every traditionally vertically integrated domain of human activity was being reorganized along horizontal lines’.³⁵⁹ In such a world, the statecraft of old is no longer sufficient. Slaughter argues for a new toolkit for foreign policy makers, a toolkit of webcraft using ‘networked responses’ to manage ‘networked threats’.³⁶⁰ States can no longer neatly exercise power through vertical hierarchies, as they sit enmeshed in ‘a web of networks’ alongside a multitude of other actors.³⁶¹ Slaughter’s argument reinforces of the value of reassessing how scholars of IR should approach the state, and relations between states. The need to do so has been heightened by the impact of information technology and the deepening of interconnectedness. Using trust to turn attention to relations between states historically demonstrates that interconnections have always existed, and people have always been actors of analytical significance. Finding new ways to analyse and understand this has become a core necessity to the study of IR, however, given the changes Slaughter outlines.

Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert’s edited collection, like Slaughter, begins with a recognition that analysts have been making errors because of a particular way of looking at the world. The error they point to is the difficulty scholars have faced in making ‘sense of the unexpected in world politics’.³⁶² In the context of the relatively widespread assumption that uncertainty is more prominent and unexpected events are growing in frequency, Katzenstein and Seybert point out that surprises have not been infrequent in international affairs, and analysts always struggled with them.³⁶³ This is, they argue, because dominant IR approaches have conceptualised ‘unexpected change’ as occurring because of a failure to predict the ways in which

³⁵⁵ Slaughter, 5-6.

³⁵⁶ Slaughter, 7.

³⁵⁷ Slaughter, 7.

³⁵⁸ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

³⁵⁹ Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web*, 8.

³⁶⁰ Slaughter, 12.

³⁶¹ Slaughter, 10.

³⁶² Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert, “Protean Power and Control Power: Conceptual Analysis,” in *Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3.

³⁶³ Katzenstein and Seybert, 3.

the diffusion of power will take place.³⁶⁴ Inherent in this line of thought is the assumption that power does, as a general rule, diffuse in ‘a relatively orderly and predictable process’ which is rational and linear.³⁶⁵ Katzenstein and Seybert point out that power is more complex than that:

In recent years the shift from state to non-state actors and from government to governance points to power dynamics that require us to understand both the cause and the effects of power. Power is reconfigured and augmented as it reaches all corners of global and domestic politics.³⁶⁶

Like Slaughter, they point to the impact of new technologies as part of the reason for this shift.³⁶⁷ Ultimately, however, they argue that unexpected change in world politics is not the exception but rather the rule, that ‘unexpected changes or shocks are not exogenous to how power relations unfold’.³⁶⁸ Uncertainty and the unexpected may be more pressing to understand in the current context, but they have always been present. In seeking to create a theory better able to take account of unexpected change as a matter of course, they Katzenstein and Seybert focus their attention on the concept of power. A better way to capture uncertainty, they argue, is to disaggregate power into two forms: control and protean. Control power encapsulates the more traditional understanding over power as exerting control using ‘risk-based power calculations’.³⁶⁹ Protean power they define ‘as the effect of improvisational and innovative responses to uncertainty’.³⁷⁰ It arises from the way in which ‘agile actors’ respond to conditions of uncertainty.³⁷¹ The more traditional control power, however, in this conceptualisation cannot be understood properly divorced from protean power.³⁷² The relationship between the two kinds of power is fundamental as they ‘co-exist and co-evolve’.³⁷³ This reconceptualisation of power is a correction to a flaw in thinking which has dominated IR. It is also a response to the changes in the world which have made uncertainty more prevalent.

That leading scholars from each of the three dominant paradigms in IR have all recognised fundamental shifts in international affairs indicates the need to diversify our thinking. As with Katzenstein and Seybert, this process will often recognise long standing flaws in IR, as well as contributing to current salient issues. As with both Katzenstein and Seybert, and Slaughter, doing so will require multidisciplinary efforts. The flat ontology of the state used in this thesis is another

³⁶⁴ Katzenstein and Seybert, 3-4.

³⁶⁵ Katzenstein and Seybert, 4.

³⁶⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert, “Uncertainty, Risk, Power and the Limits of International Relations Theory,” in *Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 28.

³⁶⁷ Katzenstein and Seybert, 28.

³⁶⁸ Katzenstein and Seybert, “Protean Power and Control Power,” 4.

³⁶⁹ Katzenstein and Seybert, 4.

³⁷⁰ Katzenstein and Seybert, 4.

³⁷¹ Katzenstein and Seybert, 6.


³⁷² Katzenstein and Seybert, 5.

³⁷³ Katzenstein and Seybert, 5.

such approach which responds to current disciplinary changes, draws on multidisciplinary knowledge, and reflects on the longer existing challenge in IR regarding how to conceptualise the state.

The Value of a Flat Ontology of the State

In order to capture the dynamic interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship in an expanded understanding of embedded trust, the state must be conceptualised in a way which allows for an analysis of the complex flows of trust across different domains of interactions between states. To tackle the difficulties associated with looking at both collective and interpersonal trust, this thesis will deploy a flat ontology of the state in order to study the relationship through what can comparatively be described as horizontal domains. A flat ontology of the state furthermore allows for power structures to be flattened, which encourages a more inclusive approach to the state able to capture the way in which trust and power flow between people whose voices would not commonly be considered when examining relationships between states. The comparison between the traditional approach and the flat ontology approach is demonstrated in the diagram below, which indicates the shift from vertically hierarchical levels to a flat ontology in which all domains of the bilateral relationship are important both in their own right and in how they interact with one another.



The use of a flat ontology is strongly informed by Jason Dittmer's assemblage approach to geopolitics, as discussed further below.³⁷⁴ From a perspective of political geography, Dittmer seeks to add to the challenge of 'statism'³⁷⁵ which appear to have covered more ground than their international relations counterparts. While IR scholars have long explored ways to move past the billiard balls conceptualisation of the state, there remains work to do. Deutsch et. al., for instance, certainly highlight the need to look at domestic populations and sub-groups within the state as they relate to 'political community',³⁷⁶ as do Booth and Wheeler in their depiction of embedded trust. A flat ontology in the context of the multidimensional trust framework will take such work one step further, through explicitly theorising the relationship between different domains within and across states. The levels of analysis have a long and challenging history in the study of international relations.³⁷⁷ As Dittmer points out, the 'desire to locate power in a scalar hierarchy in which "the global" or "the national" dominates "the local"' has long been a general problem in the study of international affairs.³⁷⁸ There have been two primary responses seeking to address this problem: the first is to move away from the state as a unit of analysis and toward the study of the everyday, and the second has been to move towards 'macroscaled theories' such as civilizational approaches, most notably and problematically popularised by Samuel P. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*.³⁷⁹ The latter approach is not only problematic, but also not particularly helpful in seeking to understand state behaviour and relationships between states. The former has resulted in an unfortunate dichotomy where one can study either the state, or the everyday, but not both.³⁸⁰ The state has been relegated as 'a stunted site of the political', unable to capture the everyday.³⁸¹ Dittmer and other political geographers have sought to break the dichotomy and 'rehabilitate the state' through examining 'the everyday crafting of the state'.³⁸² Another key area where work on the relationship between the everyday and the state has been taking place is in the 'everyday politics of emotions'.³⁸³ Dittmer achieves this through the use of assemblage thinking. Assemblage thinking 'adopts a flat ontology that emphasizes openness, dynamism, and self- organization'.³⁸⁴ It is not a rigid theoretical approach, but rather a lens which

³⁷⁴ See Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages"; Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy*.

³⁷⁵ Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages," 606.

³⁷⁶ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*.

³⁷⁷ For an overview of how the levels of analysis have been understood in IR, see Temby, "What Are Levels of Analysis and What Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?"

³⁷⁸ Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy*, 17.

³⁷⁹ Dittmer, 6–18.

³⁸⁰ Dittmer, 6.

³⁸¹ Dittmer, 6.

³⁸² Dittmer, 6.

³⁸³ As focused on in a recent special issue, as introduced in Beattie, Eroukhmanoff, and Head, "Introduction: Interrogating the 'Everyday' Politics of Emotions in International Relations."

³⁸⁴ Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy*, 9.

can be used alongside other theoretical approaches to analyse inter-state relations. This thesis does not use the assemblage approach in its entirety, but takes and applies the idea of a flat ontology of the state in order to capture the dynamic and complex interplay between the dimensions of trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship through focusing on domains of interaction.

A flat ontology of the state will allow for an understanding of how power, connections, and trust flow between states in ways which are not determined by vertical hierarchies. Additionally, such an approach tackles the agency-structure problem of international relations, as ‘agency, in this model, can be found not only in the states but also in the wider realm of force relations’.³⁸⁵ Indeed, assemblage is an English translation of the original French term *agencement* coined by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari³⁸⁶ – where *agencement* clearly connotes ‘an arrangement that creates agency’.³⁸⁷ While the application of a flat ontology has been criticised for flattening power relations, as with agency power can be seen as having ‘multiple co-existences’, where power is not centralised nor evenly distributed but rather exists as ‘plurality in transformation’.³⁸⁸ For example, the use of a flat ontology of the state and inter-state relations provides an opportunity to capture the significance of transatlantic marriages in shifting British perceptions of Americans and shaping the *rapprochement* in Anglo-American relations; the way in which connections between militaries allowed the U.S. Secretary of Defence to provide the United Kingdom’s navy with supplies during the Falklands war without the knowledge of either government; and how the on-the-ground *ad hoc* information sharing during World War II provided the foundation for the later formation of the United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA). In these cases, as in many others, power, trust, and connections clearly did not flow according to a traditional understanding of levels of analysis, but were rather the result of ‘the nonlinear outcomes one expects from assemblages exhibiting complexity’.³⁸⁹

Domains

The domains used were chosen for the purpose of using a multidimensional trust-based framework, and are thus areas of a bilateral relationship where the interplay of the dimensions of trust is most apparent. The domains are: government and leaders; military and defence; and society. The reason why the interplay of trust is most apparent in these areas is because they are

³⁸⁵ Dittmer, 9.

³⁸⁶ See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

³⁸⁷ Martin Müller, “Assemblages and Actor-Networks: Rethinking Socio-Material Power, Politics and Space,” *Geography Compass* 9, no. 1 (2015): 28.

³⁸⁸ Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane, “Assemblage and Geography,” *Area* 43, no. 2 (2011): 125.

³⁸⁹ Dittmer, *Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy*, 15.

the areas which provide the most opportunity for people and groups of people to interact with one another, highlighting the importance of viewing trust as both an interpersonal and sociological phenomenon. These domains are also most relevant for international relations, particularly when seeking to apply an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust which values society as well as more the traditional areas of interaction more commonly associated with the study of relationships between states. These are clearly not discrete domains, and they will all contain and interact with various other spaces of a bilateral relationship including the key role of individuals outside government, economics, institutionalisation, and international and multilateral interactions. Indeed, for some cases different domains may be more useful to examine than others. For example, if this framework were to be applied to a relationship that is centred on economics and trade, then economics would be a more useful domain to focus on than military and defence.

Government

Government is an obvious domain on which to focus. As representatives of the state, interaction will generally take place between leaders and members of government even when it is not taking place in any other domain. The domain of government includes not only leaders, but all individuals involved across the breadth of government, and the diplomats and ambassadors who represent that government to others. Given the nature of the state in international relations, the importance of interaction between people who are leaders, members of government, or individuals involved in the government's foreign relations such as ambassadors, is obvious. Nicholas Wheeler examines the vital importance of interpersonal relations between leaders,³⁹⁰ and the same holds true for individuals across the scope of government. While shared interests may bring such individuals together, the development of the affective and normative dimensions of trust between such individuals greatly advances the possibilities for cooperation on those shared interests. In the *rapprochement* period of the Anglo-American relationship, relations were greatly improved by individuals such as U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan who saw British and American interests as being in alignment.³⁹¹ It was also improved by the positive personal relationships developed between key individuals, such as U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt and British Ambassador to the U.S. Cecil Spring Rice.³⁹² Additionally, the view that Britain and America were normatively connected through shared language, race, religion, and legal and political systems led many individuals, such as U.K. Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph

³⁹⁰ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

³⁹¹ Lionel Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1966), 132.

³⁹² Serge Ricard, "An Atlantic Triangle in the 1900s: Theodore Roosevelt's 'Special Relationships' with France and Britain," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 8, no. 3 (2010): 203; Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1956), 131–35.

Chamberlain,³⁹³ to prioritise improved Anglo- American relations. The importance of the views of key individuals in government and the relationships they form with one another can also be seen across the relationship, from the relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt³⁹⁴ to the relationship between Harold Macmillan and John F. Kennedy.³⁹⁵ This vital domain of a bilateral relationship must be examined, as the web of interactions which take place form the backbone of the potential development of trust between governments.

Military & Defence

The defence and security space also provides considerable opportunity for interaction between people and groups of people. This, of course, begins with shared defence and security interests. Wherever people have an opportunity to interact, however, there is also opportunity for the strengthening of the calculative dimension and the growth of the affective and normative dimensions of trust. Interactions over time can bring personnel together and shape the perceptions of high-level defence and security leaders. This can lead to, for example, cooperation being able to take place between militaries even while government relations are frayed. The high sensitivity of defence and security also makes it a good area to gauge the willingness of states to increase their vulnerability to one another, and consequently aids in determining the degree to which trust is present in the relationship. Military and defence relations include a much vaster range of activities than the obvious space of joint operations. In the context of Anglo-American relations, this particularly includes ongoing defence, intelligence, and nuclear cooperation in the spaces of research and training, secondments, joint operations, and the ongoing sharing of information. The importance of this domain has been seen in everything from on-the-ground intelligence sharing during WWII,³⁹⁶ to the willingness of U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger to supply the British during the Falklands War without the knowledge of either government.³⁹⁷ The defence and military domain provides invaluable opportunities for interactions between individuals and groups of individuals, which have significant bearing on the development of trust in the Anglo-

³⁹³ "Mr. Chamberlain in Birmingham," *The Times*, May 14, 1898.

³⁹⁴ A notable source for the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship is their expansive correspondence. See Warren F. Kimball, *Churchill & Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence: I. Alliance Emerging October 1933-November 1942* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, n.d.).

³⁹⁵ See, for example, Nick White, "Macmillan, Kennedy and the Key West Meeting: Its Significance for the Laotian Civil War and Anglo-American Relations," *Civil Wars* 2, no. 2 (1999): 35–55; Nigel John Ashton, "Harold Macmillan and the 'Golden Days' of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 4 (2005): 691–723; T. W. Fain, "John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan: Managing the 'Special Relationship' in the Persian Gulf Region, 1961-63," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 4 (2002): 95–122; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006.

³⁹⁶ Michael S. Goodman, "Evolution of a Relationship: The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing," *Studies in Intelligence* 59, no. 2 (2015): 1–12; Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages."

³⁹⁷ Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 127–28.

American relationship.

Society

Finally, people interact in all sorts of ways with people from other states and, given both the possibilities of transnational connections and the interconnected relationship between domestic and foreign policy, this too becomes a vital area where the interplay of the dimensions of trust is prominent. The importance of including society within a conceptualisation of trust has been highlighted by Booth and Wheeler's concept of embedded trust.³⁹⁸ Their argument for the importance of societal trust is one that is clearly played out in the context of Anglo-American relations. This can be seen in the role of transnational peace movements in facilitating the uptake in use of international arbitration to resolve disputes in the late 19th century,³⁹⁹ and the transatlantic marriages which shaped British and American perceptions of one another.⁴⁰⁰ Technological advances over the course of Anglo-American relations from *rapprochement* onwards have facilitated more interaction and communication between the two societies. This process has included the telegraph, improved and faster options for transatlantic travel by ship, the rise of commercial airlines, telephones, mobile phones, digital computing, and social media. Societies are able to connect through means including technology, travel, tourism, migration, marriage, and education. In other cases language learning opportunities would be key, but shared language has been a key facilitator in inter-societal Anglo-American interactions and connections. Failing to include society as a domain of study would clearly miss interaction opportunities vital to the growth and sustainability of trust between states.

Conclusion

Trust has been an elusive concept in international relations theory. Its addition to the international relations lexicon is relatively new, and has taken place along pre-existing disciplinary divides. The pre-eminence given to structural anarchy has meant that offensive realist approaches to international relations have not sought to examine trust. Trust is considered to be impossible in an anarchic international system which engenders such extreme levels of unresolvable uncertainty. Defensive realists, neoliberal institutionalists, and regime theorists hold that it is

³⁹⁸ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, 197.

³⁹⁹ Eleanor L. Lord, "International Arbitration," *Annals of the American Academy* 2, no. 4 (1892): 39–55; Daniel Hucker, "British Peace Activism and 'New' Diplomacy: Revisiting the 1899 Hague Peace Conference," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 26, no. 3 (2015): 405–23.

⁴⁰⁰ Dana Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945* (Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2014); Dana Cooper, "Country by Birth, Country by Marriage: American Women's Transnational War Efforts in Great Britain, 1895-1918," in *Women and Transnational Activism in Historical Perspective*, ed. Kimberly Jensen and Erika Kuhlman (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing BV, 2010), 37–62.

possible to mitigate uncertainty to some extent. The primary focus of such approaches, however, has been cooperation rather than trust. The constructivist turn in international relations opened the door to the potential of trust as a social and emotional phenomenon through redefining anarchy as a social construct. As a consequence of the long absence of trust from international relations theory, scholars have turned to work on trust outside the discipline to inform their work. Work on trust has been long ongoing outside the discipline in philosophy, political science, economics, social psychology, and sociology. Insights from these disciplines have been drawn into the study of international relations in three broad groupings: rationalist, psychological, and social. This process of introducing trust to international relations has left a key area which requires further exploration how to examine the state as the primary unit of analysis without losing the salience of interpersonal relations.

Contributing further to this gap requires a multidimensional and evolutionary conception of trust applied through the use of a flat ontology of the state. A multidimensional and evolutionary approach to trust can be found in the literature on trust in organisational alliances. Such approaches view trust as existing in different forms or types, which interact dynamically over time and are inherently interwoven. In a multidimensional context trust is not defined in a specific and particularised way, but rather in a broader sense. For the purposes of this thesis which seeks to apply a multidimensional framework to bilateral relationships, trust is defined as '*the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility*'.⁴⁰¹ Within this context this thesis defines three dimensions for use in a multidimensional framework, each of which contributes in a particular way to this expectation of no harm: calculative, affective, and normative. The calculative dimension covers the role of shared interests and cost-benefit calculations, where shared interests are understood as being socially determined and influenced by identity-based considerations. The combination of power and socially determined interests will be captured through the use of strategic culture and an index of trustworthiness. The affective dimension involves the emotional aspect of trust, and describes how perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness shape the nature of trust in a relationship. This will be captured through the use of the concepts of the participant stance and bonding trust. The normative dimension of trust includes the role of shared identity, when actors move beyond feeling positively toward one another to being able to "think like", "feel like", and "respond like" the other. This will be captured through examining the prevalence of collocation, collective identity, the creation of joint products or goals, and commonly shared values. To be able to apply this multidimensional framework to a bilateral relationship in a way which does not minimise the interpersonal or the way in which

⁴⁰¹ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 2.

the dimensions interact across the breadth of a bilateral relationship as understood by an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust, a flat ontology of the state must be utilised. This approach enables a move away from the vertically hierarchical levels of analysis, and toward what can be comparatively described as horizontal domains. Flattening the state in this way better highlights the interplay of the dimensions of trust, the complex and dynamic flows of trust and power, and how all aspects of a bilateral relationship shape trust between states. The horizontal domains used in the application of the framework in this thesis are: government, military and defence, and society. These have been chosen because they are hubs of interaction opportunities for both individuals and groups, have a significant impact on the development of trust in the bilateral relationship as a whole, and highlight the interplay of the dimensions of trust. Above all else, the development of trust across all dimensions requires interaction.

The framework developed in this chapter will be applied to the case study of Anglo-American relations. The Anglo-American relationship has been a pre-eminent example of a trusting relationship, providing an invaluable opportunity for tracing the development of trust over time. The two states have had a close relationship since 1940, and cooperate more closely than any other states on the highly sensitive areas of intelligence and nuclear technology.⁴⁰² While some insights will be specific to the context of Anglo-American relations, some insights regarding the development of trust over time will be broadly generalisable. This thesis will firstly look at the literature on Anglo-American relations, to see how the relationship has been understood and why trust has not been applied as a primary theoretical lens of analysis. While trust frequently gets mentioned as a relevant factor, there has been no attempt to use it in a concerted theoretical manner. While a considerable amount of post-World War II work on the Anglo-American relationship relegates the pre-war period to the shelf, this thesis will begin with the *rapprochement* period of the 1890s to understand what bases for trust were created that enabled the closeness of the wartime relationship. This analysis will then enable the development of the wartime relationship to be examined in detail, followed by the Cold War and post-Cold War relationships. Tracing the development of trust over time will provide vital insights into how the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship shapes the nature of that relationship in different structural conditions, providing an original contribution to trust research in international relations.

⁴⁰² Alan P. Dobson, "Labour or Conservative? Does It Matter in Anglo-American Relations?," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 1 (1990): 387.

Chapter Two

The Study of Anglo-American Relations: Whither Trust?

Introduction

An examination of the literature on Anglo-American relations reveals a lack of a concerted exploration of trust. Instead, the literature focuses on the concept of the “special relationship”, analysing whether the relationship can be considered special and what precisely constitutes specialness. These analyses often use the language of trust, but do not themselves use trust as an analytical or theoretical concept. In fact, explanations of the development and survival of the Anglo-American “special relationship” fall into the same difficulties both trust theory and international relations theory so often find themselves in: how to intersubjectively capture the social and the rational – or, in the language of Anglo-American relations, the sentiments and the interests. The literature on the Anglo-American relationship centres on a debate over the relative roles of sentiments and interests, where sentiments are factors such as shared history, values, and culture, and interests are shared strategic interests and common threats.⁴⁰³ While the nature of shared interests is relatively straightforward to analyse, difficulties in analysing sentiments and determining what role they play in conjunction with interests has hindered attempts to define what makes the Anglo-American relationship “special.” In a 2018 contribution to the literature, Haugevik claimed that there was still no systematic, theoretical understanding of the nature of special relationships.⁴⁰⁴ She creates one herself, which touches on the role of trust and uses the language of trust but does not use trust as an analytical concept. In combination with Xu’s 2017 work which also mentions the role of trust, but does not provide an expansive analytical exploration of the concept, it is clear that a theoretical approach of trust will complement the existing literature on the Anglo-American relationship, expand our understanding of its nature, and make an original contribution to the literature on the “special relationship”. Understanding the relationship as trusting, rather than as “special,” means that a trust framework can be utilised in order to provide more precision on how the multitude of factors considered important shape the relationship as a

⁴⁰³ See, for example, Dobson and Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*; Danchev, “On Specialness”; Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War*; Allen, “A Special Relationship?”; Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s”; John Dickie, “*Special*” No More: *Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1994); John Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2004): 437–50; WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., *The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

⁴⁰⁴ See Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War*.

whole. This will be achieved through considering how the different factors contribute to building trust across the three dimensions: calculative, affective, and normative. Consequently, applying a multidimensional trust framework to Anglo-American relations is necessary from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint.

Trust is frequently mentioned as a factor in Anglo-American relations, particularly as it relates to trust between leaders and trust between personnel, but it is not used as an analytical tool to explain the value and strengths of those relationships and how they impact on the relationship as a whole. Instead, a variety of reasons have been given to explain the strength of the relationship. This chapter will explore how the themes and factors commonly understood to play a significant role in driving the relationship between Britain and America have been used to analyse the relationship, and the ways in which trust has been absent or present in these discussions. It is necessary to first examine the schools of thought and terminology which have arisen in the Anglo-American literature. First are the schools of thought: the Evangelical, Functional, and Terminal schools, which Danchev used to categorise how scholars had approached the relationship.⁴⁰⁵ Second is the concept of specialness, which includes debates on when the relationship has been special, and what constitutes specialness. Third is the focus on what role interests and sentiments play in shaping the nature of the relationship, a debate which also drives how the schools of thought are categorised and how specialness is understood. The difficulty in defining what makes the relationship “special,” and untangling the role of sentiments and interests, is a similar struggle to the one trust theory has faced in combining both rational and social approaches. A theoretical framework for analysing the multidimensional nature of trust will contribute to furthering current attempts to understand the role of sentiments and interests, and the interplay between them.

This chapter then proceeds to discuss the role of mythology, symbolism, and narrative, and then the factors of shared culture, history, race, religion, law, and literature. Both of these categories include factors which are commonly associated with sentiments. They are widely assumed to play a role in the relationship, but understanding more precisely what that role is alongside shared interests and common threats has proven difficult. A trust-based analysis will include these factors in terms of how they shape the perceptions of actors, how those perceptions shape the interactions between actors, what that means for the development of trust, and what the development of trust looks like in the Anglo-American relationship. Next, this chapter will explore the role of personal relationships, both between leaders and defence personnel. Personal relationships are commonly assumed to have a significant influence on the nature of the relationship, and the language of trust

⁴⁰⁵ See Danchev, “On Specialness.”

is prevalent here. Explicitly using a trust-based approach will further an understanding of why and how interpersonal relationships matter, particularly when situated within the broader context of the bilateral relationship. Finally, this chapter will explore how institutionalisation, path dependence, and everyday habits of cooperation have been analysed. As with personal relationships, trust is often taken for granted in this space. Similarly, a theoretical approach of trust will allow for further understanding of how these factors shape the bilateral relationship when situated within their broader context. Trust aids in understanding why institutionalisation inclines states to cooperate, as well as how institutionalisation comes about in the first place. Through exploring the prominent schools of thought, key concepts, and themes in the literature on the Anglo-American relationship, this chapter will highlight the value of a trust-based theoretical approach. The issues faced in understanding the interplay between sentiments and interests resonates with the work done in trust literature on combining both rational and social factors within analysis, making trust a useful theoretical approach for contributing to the literature. A multidimensional trust framework which conceptualises the state using a flat ontology, will allow for a greater understanding of how the interplay of sentiments and interests across the breadth of the bilateral relationship influences the overall nature of trust in the relationship. Applying the framework to the relationship will demonstrate the value of seeing the relationship as being not “special,” but trusting.

Schools of Thought and Analytical Questions

Given its long history and its unique nature, the considerable literature on Anglo-American relations has developed its own schools of thought, terminology, and concepts. The unique history of the relationship makes it perfectly suited to the testing of a framework which seeks to analyse the development of trust in a bilateral relationship over time, and to make an original contribution to trust theory. The gaps in the literature on the Anglo-American relationship relating to the struggle to define what constitutes “special” and combine explanations based on both sentiments and interests means that the application of the multidimensional trust framework will also contribute to understanding the relationship. To understand the nature of this contribution it is necessary to first explore the literature to review how the relationship has been examined, which themes have been prominent, and how they have been compiled to explain the nature of Anglo-American relations as a whole.

Alex Danchev, a prolific historian of Anglo-American relations, classified the literature on the “special relationship” into three modes of scholarship: Evangelical, Functional, and Terminal. He argues that the earlier postwar decades were dominated by the Evangelists, inspired by the

“Evangelist-in-Chief” Winston Churchill, who drew on their wartime experiences and saw the ‘specialness’ of the relationship as being ‘like the scriptures’.⁴⁰⁶ Writing in the mid-1990s, Danchev argued that the previous two decades had seen a shift to the Functional school as the dominant school of thought on Anglo-American relations.⁴⁰⁷ Functionalists held that the relationship ‘did not arise naturally from an existential sense of community’, and ‘was not a sentimental attachment but a combination for a purpose: first a *pax anti-Germanica*, then a *pax anti-Sovietica*’.⁴⁰⁸ The third shift, the Terminal school, had its origins following the end of the Cold War. Where the Functionalists reconstructed the relationship to include power and interests as well as emotional attachment, the Terminal school has deconstructed the relationship as being pure mythicity, where ‘specialness is, and always was, self-deception,’ and the “special relationship” was ‘not so much a creation as a construct – a British construct, or, to personalize, a Churchillian one’.⁴⁰⁹ According to this line of thinking, not only is the “special relationship” near its demise, but the only thing that ever was special was the myth of specialness.⁴¹⁰ After classifying the literature on Anglo-American relations along these lines, Danchev argues that ‘none provides us with an adequate account of specialness’.⁴¹¹ Attempts to explain the specialness of Anglo-American relationships and to classify the nature of a “special relationship” have been ongoing.

Ruikun Xu has provided a recent update to Danchev’s schools of thought. He argues that the Terminal school is actually ‘a radical offshoot of the functional school’, as scholars such as Baylis⁴¹² believe the ‘terminal decline’ of the relationship is because of its decreasing utility and divergent interests.⁴¹³ Therefore, he claims that there are in reality two main schools of thought on Anglo-American relations: the Evangelical and Functional.⁴¹⁴ This division then neatly maps onto Dobson and Marsh’s categorisation of the literature as being focused on either sentiments or

⁴⁰⁶ Danchev, 738. Danchev points to H.C. Allen as the most prominent Evangelist scholar: see H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States* (London: Odhams, 1954); Allen, “A Special Relationship?”

⁴⁰⁷ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 739.

⁴⁰⁸ Danchev, 739. Danchev points to firstly Christopher Thorne, and secondly David Reynolds as the leading Functionalist scholars: see Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1978); David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981).

⁴⁰⁹ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 740.

⁴¹⁰ Danchev points to Christopher Hitchens, John Dickie, and Christopher Coker in terms of seeing the end of the “special relationship”, and John Charmley for its mythical Churchillian origins: see Christopher Hitchens, *Blood, Class and Nostalgia* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990); Dickie, “Special” No More: *Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994; Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s”; Charmley, *Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57*. See also John Baylis, *Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

⁴¹¹ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 743.

⁴¹² Baylis, *Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance*.

⁴¹³ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 22.

⁴¹⁴ Xu, 22.

interests as the basis of the relationship, where Evangelical is sentiments and Functional is interest⁴¹⁵ Xu also argues that these two broad competing perspectives map onto international relations theory, with Evangelical/sentiments being equated with idealism, and Functional/interests with realism.⁴¹⁶ Ultimately, Xu argues, the Evangelical school ‘has withered and faded into insignificance’, leaving behind two sects of the Functional school which both agree on the value of sentiments and interests but differ on the relative importance of each in maintaining the relationship.⁴¹⁷ To capture these nuances in the Functional school he argues that the terms Evangelical and Functional are ‘outdated’, and provides an updated categorisation of the schools of thought on Anglo-American relations.⁴¹⁸ He keeps the terms sentiments and interests, and adds that the other main divergence is between pessimists and optimists regarding the prospects for the ongoing “special” nature of the relationship, creating four schools: sentimental optimists, cautious optimists, pragmatic pessimists, and hasty pessimists.⁴¹⁹ Both schools of optimists believe the relationship will persist, sentimental optimists because of sentiments, and cautious optimists because of shared sentiments and interests, albeit with a caution that considerable effort needs to be put into the relationship to maintain it on these bases.⁴²⁰ In comparison, hasty pessimists believe the relationship will decline soon and may question whether it is the national interests of either country to continue, and pragmatic pessimists hold that while sentiments do help the relationship, they will not be capable of doing so without interests also in place.⁴²¹ Xu’s re-categorisation of the literature highlights two key themes which

⁴¹⁵ Xu, 22; See also Dobson and Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*.

⁴¹⁶ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 22.

⁴¹⁷ Xu, 23.

⁴¹⁸ Xu, 23.

⁴¹⁹ Xu, 23.

⁴²⁰ Xu, 24–28. Xu points to Allen as a sentimental optimist, while cautious optimists include Baylis, Dobson, and Marsh. See Allen, “A Special Relationship?”; John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984*, 2nd ed. (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984); Dobson and Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*; Steve Marsh and John Baylis, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: The Lazarus of International Relations,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 1 (2006): 173–211; Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London: Routledge, 1995); Dobson and Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?”

⁴²¹ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 24-31.; Xu points to Watt, Coker, Treverton, Dickie, and Danchev himself as hasty pessimists; and includes Reynolds, Dick, Parsons, Porter, and Dumbrell as pragmatic pessimists. See David Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo- American Relationship,” in *The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 1–16; Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s”; Gregory F. Treverton, “Britain’s Role in the 1990s: An American View,” *International Affairs* 66, no. 4 (1990): 703–10; Dickie, “Special” No More: *Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994; Danchev, “The Cold War ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited”; Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation*; Charles Dick, “The Defence Dimension of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” in *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 175–90; Michael Parsons, “The Special Relationship 1945-1990: Myth or Reality?,” *Études Anglaises* 55, no. 1 (2002): 456–71; Patrick Porter, “Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 2 (2010): 355–75; John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and*

arise in the study of Anglo-American relations: whether the basis of the relationship is sentiments or interests, and whether or not the relationship will survive and in what form it will do so. A multidimensional trust framework will aid in tackling both these questions, through analysing how the interplay of the dimensions of trust shapes the relationship over time.

Whether or not the relationship will survive is beyond the scope of this thesis, given its focus on understanding how trust explains the nature of the relationship 1890-2016. The framework cannot predict where trust will remain, decline, or form, but rather is capable of analysing the state of trust at a particular time, and providing general lessons regarding how the degree and location of trust will impact upon bilateral relations. The question of sentiments versus interests, however, is highly relevant. Most scholars now agree that both sentiments and interests play a role, and merely differ over the extent of that role. Dobson and Marsh argue that ‘something of a Manichean division has opened between what might be called the schools of sentiment and interests’.⁴²² The school of sentiments focuses on ‘shared values, culture, democratic principles, and kinship, all leading on to habits of co-operation and shared attitudes’, while the school of interests focuses on ‘overlapping national interests forming a utilitarian or functional relationship’.⁴²³ Additionally, there exists those who attempt ‘to bridge this explanatory divide’, who largely fall into the school of interests but believe sentiments are also important, however struggle to be able to ‘quantify or otherwise assess its actual contribution’.⁴²⁴ Vucetic describes the relationship as resembling ‘the double helix structure of the DNA molecule: two long and complex spirals, identity and interest, intersect at various discrete points across time, and issue-areas’.⁴²⁵ This struggle to combine the influence of factors which can be classified as sentiments or interests mirrors the struggle in both international relations and trust theory regarding how to manage factors generally considered to be either rationalist or constructivist in nature. The fact that this is an ongoing struggle in a case as intensively researched as the Anglo-American relationship indicates the importance of finding new methods and perspectives to use in analysing bilateral relationships. The examination of common themes which arise in the study of Anglo-American relations will only further highlight the difficulty of managing to combine all factors within an analysis of the bilateral relationship.

Specialness

The Anglo-American relationship is frequently referred to as the “special relationship”, which

After (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

⁴²² Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 3.

⁴²³ Dobson and Marsh, 3.

⁴²⁴ Dobson and Marsh, 3–4.

⁴²⁵ Srdjan Vucetic, “British National Identity and the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 14, no. 3 (2016): 274.

has sparked questions both regarding what is “special” about Anglo-American relations, and what precisely constitutes a special relationship generally, and the Anglo-American “special relationship” in particular. The language of trust is used frequently in explanations for what makes the relationship “special,” particularly when analysing the role of the relationships between leaders or defence personnel.⁴²⁶ Again, however, trust is not used as an analytical tool or theoretical approach to help untangle specialness. The difficulties outlined above in relation to the schools of thought emerge clearly in the debates over specialness, and further reinforce the utility of a trust-based theoretical framework. The first of these debates regards the origins of the “special relationship.” Most scholars, when discussing the relationship in terms of being special, date its origins to the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases deal.⁴²⁷ Owing to the unparalleled closeness of the wartime alliance, it is common to focus on the emergence of the alliance during WWII and its adaptation to the subsequent Cold War environment. Indeed, David Haglund argues that the *rapprochement* period prior to WWI had no impact on the later development of the “special relationship”, as the cooperation of the 1890s ceased after WWI.⁴²⁸ This viewpoint of the timeframe has been widely debated, both directly⁴²⁹ and also in terms of the existence of volumes published on the relationship which begin their analysis at an earlier date.⁴³⁰ A second key debate regards which parts of the relationship, if any, are special. Is it a consequence of the relationships between leaders?⁴³¹ Is it only the nuclear and intelligence relationships which are special?⁴³² Is it only the relationship between elites which is special,⁴³³ or can the relationship between the two

⁴²⁶ For example, on leadership relations see John Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents,” in *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steven Marsh (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 82–104; On the role of trust between personnel in the defence, nuclear, and intelligence spaces, see Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 113–43.

⁴²⁷ Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 1.

⁴²⁸ David G. Haglund, “Is There a ‘Strategic Culture’ of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations,” in *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steven Marsh (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 44.

⁴²⁹ See, for example, Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 8.

⁴³⁰ Including Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*; Kathleen Burk, “Old World, New World: Great Britain and America From the Beginning,” in *America’s “Special Relationships”: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schäfer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 24–44; Kathleen Burk, “War and Anglo-American Financial Relations in the Twentieth Century,” in *Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership*, ed. Fred M. Leventhal and Roland Quinault (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000), 243–60.

⁴³¹ As one general example, see Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents” Considerably more literature has been dedicated to specific relationships between particular leaders, as will be explored throughout the thesis.

⁴³² Reynolds, for example, refers to the nuclear and intelligence along with the diplomatic relationships the *specialités* of the relationship. See David Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” *International Affairs* 62, no. 1 (1986 1985): 10.

⁴³³ As but one example, considerable focus has been placed on the role of diplomats. See Alison R. Holmes and J. Simon Rofe, eds., *The Embassy in Grosvenor Square: American Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, 1938-2008* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly, and John W. Young, eds., *The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939-77* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,

societies also be considered special?⁴³⁴

All of this confusion has led to some derision regarding the term “special relationship”. As Dobson and Marsh describe, ‘something that at first seemed to simplify and capture a quality of the relationship, later prompted endless debate’.⁴³⁵ Kimball argues ‘the word “special” is conveniently, or annoyingly, vague’.⁴³⁶ Another issue with the term “special” is that it is used to apply to other bilateral relationships, particularly by the United States who use ‘powerful specialness frameworks’ to advance their relations with other states.⁴³⁷ This raises questions as to whether there is anything uniquely “special” about the Anglo-American “special relationship”, or whether there is something general to all relationships which are considered “special”:

Some claim specialness (Japan). Some disclaim specialness (Canada). Some are born special (Israel). Some have specialness thrust upon them (Germany). Some are special, it might be said, in spite of themselves (Russia).⁴³⁸

Kimball defines a “special relationship” as ‘the *tendency*, the *inclination*, the *desire* to work together’.⁴³⁹ Xu defines the term as requiring the following criteria: ‘a special security relationship; ‘special qualities’ such as shared language, culture, values, ethnicity, or special security cooperation; and consistent ‘positive judgement’ of each other.’⁴⁴⁰ The difficulties of defining a “special relationship” and the vagueness of attempts to do so is clear. In a recent update on “special relationships,” Haugevik argues that this is down to a focus on using them as explanations for particular foreign policy choices rather than attempting a ‘systematic, theory-informed enquiry into the dynamics of special relationships *as such*.’⁴⁴¹ She proceeds to argue that ‘special relationships are best understood as relational identity constructions, continuously renewed through a dynamic interplay between prevailing representations at the domestic level and recurrent interaction patterns at the international level’.⁴⁴² Her contribution is invaluable to

2009).

⁴³⁴ See, for example, Jorgen Rasmussen and James M. McCormick, “British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 3 (1993): 515–41; One example of where this has been a somewhat prominent argument is with regards to the role transatlantic marriages played in improving societal perceptions. See Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*.

⁴³⁵ Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 3.

⁴³⁶ Warren F. Kimball, “The Anglo-American Relationship: Still Special After All These Years,” in *The “Special Relationship,”* ed. Antoine Capet and Aïssatou Sy-Wonyu (Rouen: Publications de l’université de Rouen, 2003), 210.

⁴³⁷ John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schäfer, *America’s “Special Relationships”: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 4.

⁴³⁸ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 744.

⁴³⁹ Kimball, “The Anglo-American Relationship: Still Special After All These Years,” 213.

⁴⁴⁰ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 5–6.

⁴⁴¹ Haugevik, *Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy After the Second World War*, 1.

⁴⁴² Haugevik, 2.

the study of “special relationships”, however while she touches on the importance of trust in this process she fails to use it as an analytical concept. This is a key gap in the study of Anglo-American relations this thesis seeks to fill.

Danchev attempted in 1996 to better classify the term “special,” pointing to the key gaps in understanding what it meant:

Was the Anglo-American relationship special, therefore, in 1941? Potentially. In 1942? Emphatically. In 1943? Mostly. In 1944? Vestigially. In 1945? Hardly. That is a summary of the received wisdom. But how can we tell? On what basis can we say that the relationship was special in 1942 and not in 1945, or even that it was more special in the early 1940s than in the early 1990s?⁴⁴³

He proposes ten criteria for a special relationship,⁴⁴⁴ however he himself fails to expand on most of them, simply claiming that transparency and mythicity are the most important.⁴⁴⁵

Ultimately the closest Danchev comes to a definition is to state that ‘it is a process: a process of interaction, laced with expectation’.⁴⁴⁶ This definition certainly points to the utility of a trust- based approach to Anglo-American relations, where trust requires interactions to develop over time, and involves the creation of shared expectations of trustworthiness. Indeed, Xu does briefly take up the mantle on trust. In the context of arguing that collective identity underpins the “special relationship,” Xu argues that the relationship can be described in terms of Booth and Wheeler’s concept of embedded trust.⁴⁴⁷ He claims that ‘a strong collective identity gives rise to embedded trust between the UK and the US’.⁴⁴⁸ It is this embedded trust, he argues, which enables the two states to embark on long term security cooperation, maintain relations through periods of intense uncertainty as geopolitical shifts take place, and overcome disagreements.⁴⁴⁹ Given the clear utility of trust theory in explaining the endurance of the Anglo-American alliance, both in and of itself and as a positive baseline for examining less well developed relationships, it merits a longer and more detailed discussion than Xu’s three pages. Trust theory will help to break down the dichotomy between interests and sentiments, to determine more clearly the ways in which both have shaped Anglo-American relations.

⁴⁴³ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 743.

⁴⁴⁴ Transparency, informality, generality, reciprocity, exclusivity, clandestinity, reliability, durability, potentiality, mythicity.

⁴⁴⁵ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 743.

⁴⁴⁶ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 748.

⁴⁴⁷ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 107.

⁴⁴⁸ Xu, 107.

⁴⁴⁹ Xu, 108.

Interests and Sentiments

While shared interests and sentiments have recently been described as schools of thought on the relationship, they also have a longer standing status as key themes which have arisen across the literature. Interests and sentiments are, of course, inherently interwoven and it is the interplay of the two which influences the nature of the Anglo-American relationship. This is something which the literature on the Anglo-American relationship has struggled to account for. It is, however, something which can be analysed through using a multidimensional trust framework which conceptualises the state through the use of a flat ontology. Understanding the interplay of the dimensions of trust, and how they interact across different domains of the relationship to shape the state of trust in the relationship more broadly, will provide more precise insights into the role of sentiments and interests.

The role of shared interests has been a persistent explanation for the closeness of the relationship. The difficulty lies in ascertaining the more precise role of interests, whether or not interests alone are a sufficient basis for a “special relationship” and if not, what else is required and to what extent to catalyse cooperation on those shared interests. This is a debate which begins with attempts to explain the *rapprochement* between Britain and the United States beginning in the 1890s. Particularly given the fact that shared culture, race, religion, law, and literature had existed prior to the 1890s, and yet the relationship had been fractious, a key factor which is emphasised to explain the improvement in relations is shared threat perceptions of the continental European powers.⁴⁵⁰ This reasoning is similarly used to explain the relationship during WWII, as the shared Soviet threat and the War on Terror are used for the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods respectively. The lack of shared interests is pointed to as a key explanatory factor in the lull in relations during the interwar years. The idea of shared interests, a common external threat, and the continued utility of Britain to America have been persistent themes in the literature.

Interests, however, are never all there is to this story. Even the most avowed Functionalist does not entirely dismiss the role of sentiments in the Anglo-American relationship. It is widely viewed that there is something else at play. Those who focus on interests as the key explanatory factor of the Anglo-American relationship do not tend to dismiss sentiments entirely, but question the extent of the role they play and emphasise the role of interests in both maintaining the relationship and in driving periods of poor relations.⁴⁵¹ Considerable emphasis is placed on the need for Britain

⁴⁵⁰ For explorations of the shifting geopolitical environment at the turn of the century, see Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*; David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1991).

⁴⁵¹ See, for example, Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship”; Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War.”

to continue to be of use to the United States.⁴⁵² Dumbrell adds some nuance to the debate, through arguing that it is *perceptions* of interests which are the most important factor, and how they motivate individual leaders and policy-makers to structure policy accordingly.⁴⁵³ He has dedicated a book to exploring ‘the interplay between culture, sentiments and interests’, and how they provide ‘a practical and quotidian bolster to cooperation rooted in interests’.⁴⁵⁴ He still believes, however, that the dominant interpretation of the ‘ebbs and flows’ of the Cold War relationship are better explained by interests.⁴⁵⁵ Sentiments are seen as something additional to interests, rather than being inherently and inextricably intertwined. He also argues that the “special relationship” in the twenty-first century is primarily based on the military, nuclear, and intelligence areas.⁴⁵⁶ Dobson and Marsh make the claim that ‘it is a serious error to juxtapose interests and sentiments in such a way as to regard them as separate and distinct’, and argue that the essays in their edited collection support the fact that sentiments and interests are an ‘inextricable mix’.⁴⁵⁷ Treating interests and sentiments in this way is clearly something which scholars have struggled to achieve.

The difficulty scholars have in including factors considered to be under the umbrella of sentiments is clear. Dobson and Marsh describe sentiments as something which are too seemingly ephemeral to easily capture within analysis, and consequently something which often gets pushed to one side.⁴⁵⁸ For such scholars, sentiments are treated as ‘largely interstitial, operating between power positions and the interplay of interests that determine policy-making and its execution’.⁴⁵⁹ Sentiments are seen as something additional that occasionally influence interests, with interests remaining predominant and separate, rather than being something which have enduring effects and shape how interests are determined in the first place. This position can be seen in a 1986 edited collection which reported on the findings of a transatlantic collaboration between British and American scholars and policy-makers aiming to determine the nature of the Anglo-American relationship.⁴⁶⁰ In the introduction, David Watt makes a clear case for the predominance of interests as an explanatory factor for the “special relationship,” arguing that the essays in the

⁴⁵² Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” 4; Dickie, “*Special*” No More: *Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994.

⁴⁵³ See Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed.”

⁴⁵⁴ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2001, 2.

⁴⁵⁵ John Dumbrell, “Sentiment and the US-UK Relationship 1960-1990,” in *The “Special Relationship,”* ed. Antoine Capet and Aïssatou Sy-Wonyu (Rouen: Publications de l’université de Rouen, 2003), 127.

⁴⁵⁶ John Dumbrell, “The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st Century Temperature,” *BJPIR* 11, no. 1 (2009): 65.

⁴⁵⁷ Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 16–17.

⁴⁵⁸ Dobson and Marsh, 13.

⁴⁵⁹ Dobson and Marsh, 14.

⁴⁶⁰ See Louis and Bull, *The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*.

collection demonstrate ‘that the underlying basis of the Anglo- American relationship has always been interests and not, in the first place, emotions’.⁴⁶¹ Sentiment may have played a role, he argues, but is not a reliable basis for the relationship.⁴⁶² Danchev rightly criticises the attempts made in this collection to explore the “special relationship,” arguing that it achieves no more detail than Margaret Thatcher’s statement of: ‘It is special. It just is. And that’s that’.⁴⁶³ This is at least in part because although the introduction promises the volume will explore ‘how far sentiment has affected the logical train of events’,⁴⁶⁴ sentiments are seen as an extra or addition which sometimes helps improve relations in the context of shared interests, rather than as an integrative part of the whole of the relationship. Furthermore, the term sentiments remains vague and ill-defined. It largely functions as a catch-all for anything other than interests: feelings of affection, friendship, family; perceptions of shared culture and history; belief in a special connection between the two states. The difficulties of defining and capturing sentiments within analysis can further be seen in the various baroque phrases used to capture the factors seen as falling under the umbrella of sentiments within an analysis of the relationship: ‘the coral reef’,⁴⁶⁵ ‘the underwater cable’,⁴⁶⁶ and ‘a layer-cake’.⁴⁶⁷ The frustration is also visible in Dumbrell’s description of ‘the vague gods of culture and sentiment’.⁴⁶⁸ Clearly sentiments have an impact which is, even when it is relegated as being of secondary importance, intuitively understood. Expressing that impact analytically has proven more difficult. Using a multidimensional approach to trust will provide an analytical framework to aid in this venture. The relationship between sentiments and interests and the difficulty in defining sentiments serve to further highlight the gap in the literature on the Anglo-American which is also mirrored in the trust literature: how to analyse a bilateral relationship in a way which does not lose the salience of power and interests but is also inclusive of factors such as sentiments, and captures their inherently interwoven and mutually reinforcing nature.

Mythology, Symbolism, and Narrative

Another vague concept which has been used in analysis of the Anglo-American relationship has

⁴⁶¹ Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship,” 3.

⁴⁶² Watt, 3.

⁴⁶³ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 737–38.

⁴⁶⁴ Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship,” 4.

⁴⁶⁵ Dumbrell claims “coral reef” was a phrase used by JFK. See Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents,” 82.

⁴⁶⁶ See Warren F. Kimball, “The ‘Special’ Anglo-American Special Relationship: ‘A Fatter, Larger Underwater Cable,’” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no. S1 (2005): 1–5.

⁴⁶⁷ Where the layers are seen as comprising personal relations between leaders at the top, the interwoven bureaucracies in the middle, and cultural relations between the two societies at the bottom. See Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents,” 82.

⁴⁶⁸ John Dumbrell, “US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship,” in *The Blair Legacy: Politics, Policy, Governance, and Foreign Affairs*, ed. Terrence Casey (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 274.

been the role of the mythology of the “special relationship”. Whether the fact that the relationship is made of a significant portion of mythology means that it is stronger or weaker has been a point of contention. As with other factors generally considered to fall under the banner of sentiments, what role mythology plays and how to account for it have troubled analyses of the relationship. A multidimensional trust framework will take account of the role of mythology in terms of the ways in which it shapes the perceptions of actors, and thus the interactions between those actors which shape the development of trust.

The concept of the “special relationship” arose during WWII, and its mythology is heavily tied to this wartime emergence. The term itself, of course, has its origins in Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech.⁴⁶⁹ Over time the term became widely adopted, and also widely mythologised:

Created for a purpose, it has been invented and re-invented, imagined and re-imagined, ever since. It has achieved mythological status ... Winston Churchill’s coinage, “the natural Anglo-American special relationship,” is the hot gospel of the one true faith. It was handed down like the tablets to the prophets of the next generation, and the next . . .⁴⁷⁰

There is little doubt that many of the myths of the “special relationship” have Churchillian origins and were actively promoted by Churchill. Churchill’s memoirs made sure to paint the alliance as a natural result of the shared culture of the ‘English-speaking peoples’.⁴⁷¹ Much of the early literature following the war thus had Churchill’s memoirs as their primary source for writing on the war, and without archival sources to temper his editing of the experience to emphasise the positive and brush over difference, tended to fall into Danchev’s Evangelical school of explanation. Reynolds outlines Churchill’s aims in writing his memoirs, pointing out his desire to focus on the achievements of great men, most notably himself, and to prove the importance of the relationship at the time of writing.⁴⁷² Marchi, Lorenzo-Dus, and Marsh additionally point out that owing to both his writing and his speeches, Churchill made a key contribution in the early 1950s before “special relationship” came into common usage through creating a ‘lexicon that established Anglo-American closeness and familiarity from which the term ‘special relationship’ could later emerge’.⁴⁷³ Edwards also links acts of commemoration to the process of Churchill’s

⁴⁶⁹ Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’).”

⁴⁷⁰ Danchev, “The Cold War ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited,” 579–80.

⁴⁷¹ Reynolds, “Churchill’s War Memoirs and the Invention of the ‘Special Relationship.’”

⁴⁷² Reynolds, 54; For an extensive examination of the role of Churchill as an historian, including an exploration of how and why Churchill compiled his memoirs in the way that he did, as well as the impact it has had on the historiography of Anglo-American relations, see David Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 2005).

⁴⁷³ Reynolds, 54; For an extensive examination of the role of Churchill as an historian, including an exploration of how and why Churchill compiled his memoirs in the way that he did, as well as the impact it has had on the historiography of Anglo-American relations, see David Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 2005).

construction of the relationship as “special,” from statues of key British and American historical figures to war memorials to texts including Churchill’s own writing’.⁴⁷⁴

There has been considerable debate over the role of myth in the Anglo-American relationship. Beginning with the most cynical interpretations of the role of myth, Raymond describes how the relationship has often been dismissed as ‘rhetorical nonsense, sometimes majestic and often moving, yet nevertheless nonsense’.⁴⁷⁵ Watt argues that the Churchillian myths of common, English-speaking heritage which ‘have the patina of great antiquity’ may be powerful, but they do ‘not bear critical inspection’.⁴⁷⁶ Moving onto a different strand of cynicism, Watt claims that ‘British policy-makers have consciously constructed and manipulated a myth with the United States which they have come to believe in’.⁴⁷⁷ Boyce believes that it is the active British promotion of the myth of a “special relationship”, drawing on shared history, language, and culture, which is what caused the relationship to improve.⁴⁷⁸ This, they argue, explains why shared values did not lead to such an improvement prior to the WWII, but did afterwards when they were actively used to fuel the myth of a close and natural relationship.⁴⁷⁹ Élie also outlines the way in which Britain has used ‘an incarnation and a manipulation of the myth of the Anglo- American natural affinity’ to promote their utility to the United States.⁴⁸⁰ Marsh and Baylis add that American discomfort with an overt notion of “specialness” is what led British officials to emphasise sentimental factors to ensure the relationship at least remained “informally special”.⁴⁸¹ Marchi, Lorenzo-Dus, and Marsh use a corpus-assisted discourse approach to prove the extent of the role of Churchill in the construction of the Anglo-American relationship through language.⁴⁸² They looked at how frequently Churchill was mentioned in US press and US government data in the four weeks prior to and following three summits in 1950-1954, and found that Churchill was mentioned 2.5 times more in the press and 4.3 times more in the government data than in their British counterparts.⁴⁸³ Also revealed through this research is the fact that Churchill was more

⁴⁷⁴ Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship, c. 1919-69,” 202–3.

⁴⁷⁵ Ray Raymond, “The U.S-UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lessons From the Past,” in *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 3.

⁴⁷⁶ Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship,” 1.

⁴⁷⁷ Baylis, “The ‘Special Relationship’: A Diverting British Myth?,” 118.

⁴⁷⁸ Boyce, “In Search of the Anglo-American Special Relationship in the Economic and Financial Spheres,” 67.

⁴⁷⁹ Boyce, 67.

⁴⁸⁰ Élie, “Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship,” 77.

⁴⁸¹ Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: The Lazarus of International Relations,” 183.

⁴⁸² See Marchi, Lorenzo-Dus, and Marsh, “Churchill’s Inter-Subjective Special Relationship: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Approach.”

⁴⁸³ Marchi, Lorenzo-Dus, and Marsh, 178.

favourably viewed than Britain itself, despite the fact that he was Prime Minister of Britain during this time period, which combined with his wartime glory and Anglo-American parentage helped him to often smooth over differences of values and interests between the two states.⁴⁸⁴ A final point of interest regards the American reception of Churchill, where US reporting which drew on Churchill's narratives of 'closeness' and 'unity' made sure to link these to shared goals, thus highlighting 'the interdependency of hard and soft factors in constructing the special relationship'.⁴⁸⁵ His promotion of a shared lexicon, shared values, and shared interests aided in the construction of shared perceptions of values and interests, which would incline Britain and America to cooperate. Churchill's popularity in America, the socio-political context, and his active construction of a myth of specialness, meant that he was able to actively construct *trust* in the relationship. He did so most notably through building the normative and calculative dimensions of trust, and inclining the British and Americans to think alike with regards to shared interests.

In contrast to the cynics, many believe that the mythicality of the "special relationship" is a key feature of the enduring nature of the relationship. Hendershot argues that the ability of the relationship to sustain differences in foreign policy is because of a shared belief that the relationship is based on more than shared interests.⁴⁸⁶ In discussing the likelihood of the relationship surviving following the end of the Cold War, Danchev points out the integral role of stories as a building block of the relationship:

The transatlantic relationship continues to roll along. It has formidable assets, some of them well hidden. One of the greatest is the stories it tells to sustain itself. The real strength of shared values is in the soul of historiography. The truth lies somewhere between monumentalised past and mythical fiction.⁴⁸⁷

The narrative, constructive role myths play in Anglo-American relations are difficult to capture in analysis, but it is clear that these myths have played a role in shaping the perceptions of individuals and consequently the way they approach and understand the relationship. As Beloff describes, 'the 'special relationship' is a fact, but a fact of a rather peculiar kind; for myths are also facts'.⁴⁸⁸ Edwards adds to this strand of research, arguing 'that to dismiss the special

⁴⁸⁴ Marchi, Lorenzo-Dus, and Marsh, 189–95.

⁴⁸⁵ Marchi, Lorenzo-Dus, and Marsh, 181.

⁴⁸⁶ Alan P. Hendershot, "'Affection Is the Cement Which Binds Us': Understanding the Cultural Sinews of the Anglo-American Special Relationship," in *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steven Marsh (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 95.

⁴⁸⁷ Alex Danchev, "How Strong Are Shared Values in the Transatlantic Relationship?," *BJPIR* 7, no. 1 (2005): 434–35.

⁴⁸⁸ Beloff, "The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth?," 170.

relationship as ‘myth’ is rather to miss the point; it is indeed a ‘myth’, but not in the sense of being an untruth’.⁴⁸⁹ Danchev describes a special relationship as ‘a community of belief’.⁴⁹⁰ Not only are myths important, but the structures which have been used to commemorate them such as statues and war memorials form an actual physical ‘architecture’ of the “special relationship” myth.⁴⁹¹ These myths draw on ‘cultural Anglo-Saxonism’ which existed long before the “special relationship” of WWII was begun,⁴⁹² illustrating the need to go back further than the war in order to understand the nature of Anglo-American relations. The stories and myths actors choose to believe and to promote have clearly played a significant role in shaping Anglo-American relations. A trust-based approach will capture this in the way they have shaped the perceptions of actors, how they approach the knowledge they acquire from others through interactions, and how this impacts the development of trust in the relationship. When myths of shared identity are strong, they strengthen the normative dimension of trust through inclining actors to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another.

Culture, History, Race, Religion, Law, Literature

The role of shared culture, history, race, religion, law, and literature have been rolled up into the mythology of the “special relationship”, and face the same issues as mythology and sentiments in terms of how to include them within analysis of the Anglo-American relationship. Consequently, they are factors which can similarly be incorporated through the use of the trust framework in terms of how they shape the perceptions actors bring to interactions with one another and what this means for the development of trust. These factors have particular relevance for the normative dimension of trust, as they have been seen to facilitate the presence of shared values and collective identity, two of the four key indicators of the normative dimension of trust. This also makes it more likely that shared interests will be perceived similarly, strengthening the calculative dimension and demonstrating the value of exploring the interplay of the dimensions of trust.

Considerable attention has been paid to the role of these factors during the period of *rapprochement* and the impact it had on the subsequent development of the relationship. They have also been used as more general explanatory factors for the way in which *rapprochement* came about. For example, Serge Ricard explores the way in which President Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘ethnocentric conviction’ regarding the English-speaking peoples shaped his foreign

⁴⁸⁹ Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship, c. 1919-69,” 202.

⁴⁹⁰ Danchev, “The Cold War ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited,” 593.

⁴⁹¹ Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship, c. 1919-69,” 202.

⁴⁹² Edwards, 203.

policy.⁴⁹³ Looking at the speeches and writing of individuals during *rapprochement* reveals the way in which these factors mattered to them: noted American Reverend Josiah Strong highlighted the ‘pure *spiritual* Christianity’ of the Anglo-Saxons;⁴⁹⁴ American philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, British Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain, and US Secretary of State Richard Olney all viewed the relationship through a predominantly racial lens;⁴⁹⁵ and United States ambassador to the United Kingdom Thomas Bayard argued for the role of common language.⁴⁹⁶ Culture is a contentious category, given that it is commonly understood that there are as many cultural differences between Britain and America as there are similarities. This was particularly prominent in the 19th and early 20th centuries, given the combination of lingering resentment over the American War of Independence and Britain’s role in the American Civil War, and the limitations U.S. isolationism placed on opportunities for interaction between the two peoples. Additionally, it is often pointed out that a common culture, shared sense of Anglo-Saxon racial identity, and other similar factors certainly did not help to bring the two states into a state of friendship for decades after the American War of Independence, considering no state of friendship existed.⁴⁹⁷ Simply because such factors did not achieve an earlier closeness in relations, however, does not mean they played no role in *rapprochement* or the later formation of the WWII alliance.

Although the extent to which these factors made a difference is debated, it is clear that they did shape the perceptions of key individuals. Different participants have viewed the origins of this difference or “specialness” as being sourced from various factors. One set of factors includes the earlier Anglo-Saxonism which included beliefs based on social Darwinism, embodied by figures such as Theodore Roosevelt, Cecil Rhodes, and Alfred T. Mahan.⁴⁹⁸ While the overtly racist language of Anglo-Saxonism was dropped over time, there is little doubt that a figure such as Churchill drew on such ideas and believed in notions of the ethnic superiority of what he preferred to refer to as ‘the English-speaking peoples’.⁴⁹⁹ Shared race, culture, language, history, laws, and

⁴⁹³ See Ricard, “An Atlantic Triangle in the 1900s: Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Special Relationships’ with France and Britain.”

⁴⁹⁴ Reverend Josiah Strong, *The United States and the Future of the Anglo-Saxon Race* (London: Saxon and Co., 1889).

⁴⁹⁵ Andrew Carnegie, “Does America Hate England?,” *The Contemporary Review* 72, no. 1 (1897): 660–68; “Mr. Chamberlain in Birmingham”; Olney Collection, Chamberlain to Olney, September 28 1896, quoted in Alfred L. P. Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1928), 61.

⁴⁹⁶ Thomas Bayard, quoted in Erik Goldstein, “Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 25, no. 1 (2014): 36–37.

⁴⁹⁷ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 10–11; Haglund, “Is There a ‘Strategic Culture’ of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations,” 35.

⁴⁹⁸ Cameron D. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place 1900-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 159.

⁴⁹⁹ Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship,

literature all remained factors in the way in which they shaped the perceptions of key individuals. Reagan and Thatcher, for example, both expressed such notions, with Reagan describing the two states as being ‘bound by common language and linked in history’ and sharing ‘laws and literature, blood, and moral fiber’.⁵⁰⁰ Given that these remarks were made in a speech aimed at the public, it is also clear that Reagan perceived the message as being something the public would empathise with. These ideas do not only shape the perceptions of individuals, but also form a more concrete aspect of the relationship. Raymond argues that the myth that the relationship has ‘the patina of antiquity’ is, in fact, accurate, and that the source of this and the reason the relationship is ‘special’ is because ‘so much of the basic DNA of the infrastructure of the American political, legal, and economic system is British’.⁵⁰¹ Others make the case in different ways that one must look to the cultural factors which existed pre-1940 to understand how the “special relationship” came into being. One such example is Vucetic, who points out that Churchill’s active myth making as exemplified by his famous 1946 Fulton speech drew on the ‘myths of a shared past – a past that is passing straight from the Magna Charta [sic] in 1215 to the joint use of military bases in 1946’.⁵⁰² Edwards’ describes the way in which Churchill’s history, *The English Speaking Peoples*,⁵⁰³ can be seen as ‘Churchill’s ‘theology’ of English-speaking unity and of Anglo-American relations’, including biblical language and metaphors to not only mythologise the relationship but also to evangelise it.⁵⁰⁴ It is undeniable that cultural factors and beliefs regarding the role of shared race, religion, law, history, language, and literature have played a significant role in the Anglo-American relationship, even if they have proven complicated to analyse.

Cultural explanations may get overshadowed by interests-based explanations following the establishment of the WWII alliance, however they do not get subsumed entirely. They are generally captured under the umbrella of sentiments, although other factors such as feelings of friendship and personal relationships also get covered under that umbrella. Consequently, as with

c. 1919-69,” 203.

⁵⁰⁰ “Ronald Reagan: Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom,” February 26, 1981,

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43463&st=%5C%22United+Kingdom%5C%22&st1=Britain>.

⁵⁰¹ Raymond, “The U.S-UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lessons From the Past,” 4.

⁵⁰² Srdjan Vucetic, “The Fulton Address as Racial Discourse,” in *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 103.

⁵⁰³ Winston Churchill, *A History of the English Speaking Peoples Volume I: The Birth of Britain*, Bantam edition (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1963); Winston Churchill, *A History of the English Speaking Peoples Volume II: The New World*, Bantam edition (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1963); Winston Churchill, *A History of the English Speaking Peoples Volume III: The Age of Revolution*, Bantam edition (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1963); Winston Churchill, *A History of the English Speaking Peoples Volume IV: The Great Democracies*, Bantam edition (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1963).

⁵⁰⁴ Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship, c. 1919-69,” 209.

sentiments more broadly, scholars have had difficulty in capturing cultural factors within their analysis. Dumbrell argues that there are two levels of ‘an Anglo-American culture’; one which exists at the elite level amongst the political and diplomatic classes, and one which exists amidst popular culture.⁵⁰⁵ A flat ontology will encourage analysis which incorporates the relationship between the two. Hendershot addresses the difficulty of measuring ‘Anglo- American cultural affinity’ by arguing that what can be measured is perceptions of cultural affinity, or ‘Anglo-American sentimentality’.⁵⁰⁶ This feature of the relationship, he argues, is a key stabiliser, as proven by its role in sustaining the relationship through disagreements over interests such as the Suez crisis and the Vietnam War.⁵⁰⁷ Similar to Dumbrell’s argument that it is perceptions of sentiments which matter, Hendershot argues that the foreign policy elite perceive that the public positively view ‘the ideas of equal partnership, mutual trust, and Anglo- American interdependence’, which fuels the elite’s ‘diplomatic intimacy’.⁵⁰⁸ Watt adds that, whatever one thinks about the material realities of the relationship, it is clear that the participants have viewed the relationship as being different to any other, and therefore looking at perception should provide some explanations for the nature of the relationship.⁵⁰⁹ He points out that some historians have explored the more measurable factors of cultural impact, such as the numbers of transatlantic book sales, the frequency of transatlantic communication and travel, and the rates of emigration; but argues that these are of limited value on their own as they must be studied in conjunction with how they shaped the perceptions of policy-makers throughout their careers.⁵¹⁰ Indeed, he goes further and argues that any approach to the relationship cannot take an individual state-based approach but must be inherently transnational at its core owing to ‘the existence of a partially transnational élite in each country’.⁵¹¹ The approach taken in this thesis highlights, however, that societal relations matter on their own terms, not only in how they shape elite perceptions. Dumbrell points out that another way to view the role of sentiments, or cultural affinity, is to look for where it has been absent as was notably the case when the relationship struggled during the Prime Ministership of Edward Heath.⁵¹² As with sentiments more broadly, there have been a variety of competing approaches grappling with the question of how to include cultural factors within analysis of the Anglo- American relationship. A trust-based approach will aid in capturing

⁵⁰⁵ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 443.

⁵⁰⁶ Robert M. Hendershot, *Family Spats: Perception, Illusion and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1950-1976* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2008), 2.

⁵⁰⁷ Hendershot, 135.

⁵⁰⁸ Hendershot, 135.

⁵⁰⁹ Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place 1900-1975*, 159.

⁵¹⁰ Watt, 159.

⁵¹¹ Watt, 162.

⁵¹² Dumbrell, “Sentiment and the US-UK Relationship 1960-1990,” 127.

the inherently interwoven nature of such factors with more interests-based factors and the way in which they have shaped the nature of Anglo-American relations.

Personal Relationships

The impact of personal relationships, from leaders to elites to personnel in the defence space to marriages, are invariably considered to play a role in the development and maintenance of the “special” nature of the relationship. The term trust often gets mentioned in this area, however it has not been used as an analytical tool to explain exactly why it is that personal relationships matter to the health of bilateral relationships. Wheeler’s work on bonded trust between leaders is invaluable for shedding light on the role of interpersonal relationships between leaders. It is also necessary to look beyond leaders, in order to understand how leadership relations are situated within the broader bilateral relationship, and to examine the role of personal relationships between individuals other than leaders in an expansion of the concept of embedded trust. Leaders have been the strongest focus in this area, particularly given the central role of the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt in facilitating the WWII alliance, which is often viewed as the origins of the “special” nature of the relationship.⁵¹³ Notable attention has also been paid to the relationship between Harold Macmillan and both Eisenhower and JFK, Thatcher and Reagan, and Blair and Bush. Dumbrell pursues his claim that personal ties matter through examining two leadership transitions: from Wilson and Johnson to Heath and Nixon, and Blair and Bush to Brown and Obama, where the former of each pair managed good relations and the latter struggled.⁵¹⁴ It is important to note, however, that good leadership relations are not the be all and end all of a strong relationship. As will be examined in Chapter Six, Blair and Bush had a close interpersonal relationship, however their prosecution of the Iraq War led to a significant decline in societal trust through damaging British perceptions of America and Americans. There is no doubt that leadership relations have a significant influence over the Anglo-American relationship, but they must be situated within the broader context of the bilateral relationship to understand how they shape the development of trust.

Dumbrell warns that leadership relations are not everything, and to focus on them solely tends

⁵¹³ For some key examples of works examining the role of Roosevelt and Churchill’s relationship in detail, see David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-45: Towards a New Synthesis,” in *The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 17–42; Warren F. Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1997); Lewis E. Lehrman, *Churchill, Roosevelt & Company: Studies in Character and Statecraft* (Guilford: Stackpole Books, 2017); Keith Sainsbury, *Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War They Fought and the Peace They Hoped To Make* (New York: New York University Press, 1994).

⁵¹⁴ See Dumbrell, “Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents.”

toward oversimplification of the complexities of connections which make up the Anglo-American relationship.⁵¹⁵ Even the extent of the role of Churchill and Roosevelt has been questioned, given revelations of the difficulties which plagued their relationship following the opening of archives, when compared with Churchill's romanticised memoirs. A key point has been their focus on the war and neglect of other matters, such as the economic and imperial, which were left to various civil servants, and a closer examination of the policy-making process and bureaucratic culture in determining wartime policy.⁵¹⁶ This, among other reasons, has led historians to move away from the great men of history theory, and toward a greater appreciation for the context in which the two men operated.⁵¹⁷ Marsh illustrates that the symbolism of personal diplomacy between leaders as most effectively displayed during summits, which originated with Roosevelt and Churchill and was fervently continued by Churchill following his re-election in 1951, help to shape, deliver, and perform cooperation and provide 'private and public messages about Anglo-American relations'.⁵¹⁸ Rasmussen and McCormick are more widely critical of the focus on leadership relations, highlighting that 'accidents of leader personality compatibilities or clashes hardly are sufficiently enduring to provide a foundation for a "special relationship" between nations'.⁵¹⁹ Thus, scholars have turned their attention to other possible explanations for the enduring nature of Anglo-American relations.

While leadership relations are often the focus of analysis when it comes to interpersonal relationships, a strong case has also been made for the importance of the ties between defence personnel and policy-makers forged during WWII. Dumbrell makes the claim that it is 'sub-leader 'coral reef' connections' which maintained the relationship during a period of crisis in the 1990s when relations between Major/Blair and Clinton struggle.⁵²⁰ Reynolds argues that the most important ties were those formed between low and mid-ranking individuals during WWII who would later enter more prominent positions in the 1950s having developed a habit of consultation with one another.⁵²¹ These began informally and later became institutionalised, according to Reynolds most notably in the areas of diplomacy, intelligence, and nuclear weapons.⁵²² Dittmer describes in detail the way in which on the ground intelligence sharing during the war formed the

⁵¹⁵ Dumbrell, 82.

⁵¹⁶ Reynolds, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-45: Towards a New Synthesis," 19.

⁵¹⁷ Reynolds, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-45: Towards a New Synthesis," 19.

⁵¹⁸ Steve Marsh, "Personal Diplomacy at the Summit," in *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 116–22.

⁵¹⁹ Rasmussen and McCormick, "British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship," 517.

⁵²⁰ Rasmussen and McCormick, "British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship," 517.

⁵²¹ Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War," 4.

⁵²² Reynolds, 10.

connections and habits of cooperation which would later be institutionalised in the form of UKUSA.⁵²³ A key wartime example is the role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff who conducted the war, as well as the civil servants managing the Combined Munitions Boards which coordinated mobilisation.⁵²⁴ Xu also focuses on the role of personnel relationships, particularly between defence, intelligence, and nuclear personnel.⁵²⁵ Personnel connections such as these have certainly helped to facilitate cooperation in areas even when leadership relations are struggling. The reason such connections lead to successful cooperation is owing to the significant degree of trust built between personnel.

Institutionalisation, Path Dependence, and Everyday Habits of Cooperation

The way in which the relationship was institutionalised during and following WWII has been held as a key factor which ensured its survival and adaptation to the Cold War environment. Similar to personal relationships, this is a theme of Anglo-American relations in which trust gets frequently taken for granted amidst a broader or alternatively focused analysis, although some notable attempts have been made. A multidimensional trust framework will further understanding relating to why institutionalisation, path dependence, and every habits of cooperation incline Britain and America to cooperate, as well as how institutionalisation arises in the first place.⁵²⁶ Understanding this process through the lens of the dimensions of trust will allow us to see that institutionalisation came about due to an interplay of the dimensions. At the same time, institutionalisation provides an ongoing opportunity for personnel to develop affective relations and a feeling of community, or the normative dimension of trust, both of which incline enduring shared perceptions of interests and strengthen the calculative dimension. Haglund explores the relationship in part through the lens of path dependence, examining when path dependence was locked in and determining the 1940 Destroyers-for- Bases deal to be the answer.⁵²⁷ The cooperation during *rapprochement* and WWI were both short-lived, and thus nothing was locked in as it was following the establishment of ‘self- reinforcing sequences’ of sustained cooperation from 1940 onwards.⁵²⁸ Dumbrell points to inertia as an explanation for why the relationship

⁵²³ See Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages.”

⁵²⁴ Chris Madsen, “Limits of Generosity and Trust: The Naval Side of the Combined Munitions Assignment Board, 1942-1945,” *War & Society* 21, no. 2 (2003): 77–108; S. McKee Rosen, *The Combined Boards of the Second World War: An Experiment in International Administration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); David Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012).

⁵²⁵ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 113–43.

⁵²⁶ While neoliberal internationalists have considered institutions to be a source of trust, Rathbun points out that it is necessary to have trust in place prior to institutionalisation. See Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations.”

⁵²⁷ See Haglund, “Is There a ‘Strategic Culture’ of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations.”

⁵²⁸ Haglund, 44.

persisted following the post-9/11 period, arguing that it cannot be understated as a factor given ‘the context of institutionalised deep-seated and multi-level bureaucratic interweaving’.⁵²⁹ He also argues that inertia is not a sufficient explanation on its own, and must also include consideration of culture, interests, and above all personalities to explain how the relationship has survived ‘in a world twice transformed’.⁵³⁰ The relationship exists in ‘concrete structural form’, and thus we do not need to look to ‘the vague gods of culture and sentiment’, even if they do play a role within that structural form, and rather should focus on ‘the institutionalised structures of defence and military cooperation’.⁵³¹ Such a view further demonstrates the limitations of approaches which focus on interests and only half-heartedly concede there is also some kind of role for sentiments in addition.

Where the above examples include inertia, path dependence, and institutionalisation as factors within their analysis, Ruike Xu explores them in detail, developing a comprehensive theory of alliance persistence in which institutionalisation is a significant factor. Xu points to the problem of “sentiments” and “interests” as being ‘ill-defined and undertheorised’.⁵³² He also highlights that even if sentiments and interests were defined in a clearer manner, and they were understood to be mutually reinforcing, they only provide *motivation* for cooperation, they do not explain the *success* of cooperation.⁵³³ To ensure successful cooperation, states also need mutual reciprocity of cooperation on shared interests, effective coordination and teamwork on cooperation, and ‘a long-standing trusting relationship’.⁵³⁴ This highlights the need to understand what constitutes a trusting relationship. To determine what explains the deep and persistent success of cooperation in Anglo-American relations, Xu combines several approaches from alliance theory in international relations to determine that the relationship is ‘a four-dimensional special alliance’ based on four factors which mutually reinforce each other: the distribution of power, common external threats, institutionalisation, and collective identity.⁵³⁵ He attributes a role for trust within both institutionalisation and collective identity. Institutionalisation serves to create ‘inertia or stickiness’ and path-dependence, increases interdependence, and ‘cultivates mutual trust’ which ‘arises from the practical interactions between states which are undermined by routinised practices and norms’.⁵³⁶ Institutionalisation helps to foster trust because it means personnel interact more

⁵²⁹ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 442.

⁵³⁰ Dumbrell, 448.

⁵³¹ Dumbrell, “US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship,” 274.

⁵³² Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 36.

⁵³³ Xu, 37.

⁵³⁴ Xu, 37-38.

⁵³⁵ Xu, 34-45.

⁵³⁶ Xu, 43-44.

frequently and form strong personal relationships which ‘help to solidify mutual trust’.⁵³⁷ Xu has constructed a robust theoretical framework for understanding the persistence of the Anglo-American relationship, however his limited use of trust means that further investigation is required. A key point which has been made by Brian Rathbun is that institutions do not simply help to build or maintain trust, but they also require trust to come into being in the first place.⁵³⁸ Therefore to appreciate the role of institutionalisation in the Anglo-American relationship, it is also necessary to examine the development of trust over time. A multidimensional approach will provide more detail on how trust operates in this space and in the broader context of the relationship.

The necessities of wartime cooperation, followed by the institutionalisation of much of that cooperation, created numerous spaces in which everyday cooperation between individuals from Britain and America became necessary. As seen above, Xu has explored how institutionalisation fosters trust through the promotion of frequent interactions between personnel. In addition he explicitly mentions the value of ‘habits of cooperation’.⁵³⁹ Dobson also describes the value of ‘habits of cooperation’, claiming that there is a ‘culture of co-operation based upon a long experience of shared interests and friendly sentiments’. He argues that there are four key drivers of habits of cooperation:

... friendship at the highest political level; a desire to promote a liberal capitalist economic system; shared political values concerning the worth of the individual, free elections and civil rights (even if at specific times the political learning curve had not progressed beyond votes for adult males only or for adult whites only); and a common perception of an external threat.⁵⁴⁰

These features do not prevent conflict, but they do help to ease the relationship through conflicts.⁵⁴¹ Hathaway adds to this, pointing out that while much of the literature has focused on key crises, ‘the real story of the postwar Anglo-American alliance lies not in the crises but in the steady workaday routine functioning of what were indeed unusually close ties’.⁵⁴² Most people focus on the more sentimental value of friendships or the functional utility of institutionalised

⁵³⁷ Xu, 44.

⁵³⁸ Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations.”

⁵³⁹ Xu, “Institutionalization, Path Dependence and the Persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” 1210–11.

⁵⁴⁰ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 150.

⁵⁴¹ Dobson, 149.

⁵⁴² Robert M. Hathaway, *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations Since World War II* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), xvii.

environments where everyday interactions can occur. In a more *realpolitik* sense, however, Reynolds also points out that these connections and habits meant ‘the British were frequently able to feed their views into the US decision-making process at an early stage’ before decisions were set in stone and the potential for British influence was greatly limited.⁵⁴³ This theme of everyday cooperation is a frequent one in the literature, drawing also on the other themes of the relationship. The trust formed across all dimensions in these environments was fundamental to the overall strengths of the relationship.

The importance of everyday cooperation and consultation can be found prominently in the areas of the relationship generally considered to be its strengths: the diplomatic, intelligence, and nuclear relationships. Reynolds calls these three ‘the *specialités* of the relationship’, arguing that ‘the habit of diplomatic and bureaucratic consultation is the most fundamental’.⁵⁴⁴ This is not only due to the opportunity this provided to influence policy-making, but also because the frequency of interaction meant the diplomatic and bureaucratic personnel were more likely to think alike and have similar expectations to one another. This also becomes clear in the intelligence relationship, as evidenced by the title of a book on the formation and development of UKUSA: *The Ties That Bind*.⁵⁴⁵ Dittmer too, describes how Anglo-American cooperation in the intelligence space meant that ‘everyday materialities’ such as equipment, the treatment of intercepts, and the methods of encryption were shared and thus facilitated further cooperation.⁵⁴⁶ In addition, the way in which UKUSA came to be institutionalised was based on the trust built during the war which then ‘became “stuck” in particular, crucial bodies’, which then in turn was able to survive through institutionalised practices such as secondment.⁵⁴⁷ These examples demonstrate the value of everyday cooperation and consultation. Their greatest value lies in the facilitation of everyday interactions which in turn promote the consistent development and maintenance of trust.

Conclusion

The examination of the literature on Anglo-American relations has highlighted the key gaps which exist in seeking to combine factors which fall under the umbrellas of sentiments and interests. This is further highlighted when exploring the schools of thought in the literature and how the key themes of specialness; interests and sentiments; mythology, symbolism, and

⁵⁴³ Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” 10–11.

⁵⁴⁴ Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-45: Towards a New Synthesis,” 10.

⁵⁴⁵ See Desmond Ball and Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd, 1990).

⁵⁴⁶ Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages,” 610.

⁵⁴⁷ Dittmer, 611.

narrative; culture, history, race, religion, law, and literature; personal relationships; and institutionalisation, path dependence, and everyday habits of cooperation have been examined. Scholars have provided key insights into the way in which some of these factors coexist and shape the nature of the Anglo-American relationship. Managing to integrate sentiments and interests and take account of their inherently interwoven and mutually reinforcing relationship, however, has proven to be a challenging task. Trust theory has faced a similar challenge in seeking to combine both rational and social approaches to trust, and therefore provides new tools and theories to tackle this dilemma. A trust-based approach can also include the role of mythology, symbolism, and narrative, and shared culture, history, race, religion, law, and literature through the ways in which they shape the perceptions of actors and the interactions between those actors which influence the development of trust. The prevalence of the language of trust and the assumption of trust regarding personal relationships and institutionalisation indicates its importance in these spaces. Conceptualising the state using a flat ontology furthermore allows for an analysis which includes how these factors from across the whole of the bilateral relationship interact to shape the development of trust. This means that the relationship can be analysed in a way which focuses on states as collectives, but does not minimise the vital role of interpersonal relationships within those collectives.

This literature review has demonstrated both the utility of a trust-based approach for analysing a well-developed bilateral relationship, as well as the ways in which a multidimensional trust framework will provide analytical insights into the Anglo-American relationship. As described above, the various factors which are known to be of importance to the Anglo-American relationship can be captured by a multidimensional trust framework. Furthermore, the disaggregation of the dimensions of trust into calculative, affective, and normative, allows for greater analytical precision in understanding how and when these various factors matter. The interplay of the dimensions of trust is vital to better understanding how socially determined shared interests, perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness, and the extent to which actors are able to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another all interact to shape the overall nature of trust in a bilateral relationship. The expansive nature of Anglo-American relations and the way it has developed to form at times an unparalleled alliance makes the relationship a vitally useful case study to test the utility of a framework which aims to track the development of trust in a bilateral relationship over time. The fact that scholars have contended with the same debates as trust theory across the extensive literature which examines the history and nature of Anglo-American relations proves that this is a necessary debate to tackle. Additionally, it means that while the Anglo-American relationship is invaluable to the testing of a trust-based framework, a

trust-based framework will also help to reveal new insights into the Anglo-American relationship. Now that both the theoretical and empirical literature have been reviewed, a theoretical framework has been created, and the contributions of this thesis to both the theoretical and empirical literature are clear, this thesis will proceed to apply the framework of multidimensional trust to the history of the Anglo-American relationship from 1890 to 2016.

Chapter Three

Anglo-American Relations from *Rapprochement* to World War II

Introduction

The 1890s marked the beginning of a *rapprochement* between Britain and America, following decades of limited interaction and frictions. Although the “special relationship” is generally considered to have been born during WWII, it is also necessary to examine the underlying foundation of this now mythic entity. This helps to firstly separate the myths from the reality regarding either shared wartime need or shared Anglo-Saxon and English-speaking heritage, and secondly to shed light on how two states with a difficult and conflictual history entered a period of *rapprochement* even while a shift in power was taking place between them. Examining the early years of the Anglo-American relationship through a multidimensional trust framework will highlight the ways in which trust was present even before the existence of the “special relationship”, and allow for an understanding of the limitations and strengths of the three dimensions of trust across the domains of government, military, and society. While the mythicisation of the post-World War II “special relationship” as described in the previous chapter may imply that the affective and normative dimensions of trust would be lacking prior to World War II, significant elements of both can be found. This points to the ways in which analysing the relationship through the lens of the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions of trust allows for greater precision as to the impact of such factors.

The calculative dimension of trust certainly played the dominant role, both in terms of driving British and American strategic interests closer together owing to concerns regarding the continental European powers, and in terms of the shifting of the strategic culture of each state away from their own particular brand of isolationism. The calculative section will focus on these shifts in strategic culture; the impact of the perceptions of key British and American elites on these shifts; the way in which America and Britain came to rely on one another for their security; and how these changes played out in attempts to cooperate on China, and in preventing competing interests over the Behring Sea Dispute, the Alaskan boundary dispute, and the 1895- 1899 Venezuelan crisis from spilling over into conflict. The affective section will first examine the growth of the affective dimension of trust as a result of the uptake in arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. Arbitration provided the opportunity for increased peaceful interactions, and interactions are a necessary condition for the development of trust. Second, the importance of the affective dimension will also be explored as it relates to the creation of an institutionalised

foreign policy elite in the interwar years through connections formed between two foreign policy think tanks: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Council on Foreign Relations. The relationships formed between foreign policy elites contributed significantly to the capacity of the Anglo-American relationship to navigate the tensions of the interwar years and arrive at the outset of WWII with the capacity to form the wartime alliance. The section on normative trust will analyse how the belief of key British and American elites in the existence of a shared Anglo-Saxon or English-speaking identity based on race, religion, common language, or similar political values influenced the development of normative dimension of trust in the relationship. This will reveal that the indicators of colocation and shared values are significant, while the existence of a joint product or goal and collective identity are both weaker. All three dimensions of trust are clearly present to some extent during this period, and their development and interplay contributed to the successful *rapprochement* which enabled a peaceful hegemonic transition between Britain and America.

It is also important to understand the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the relationship, which will be achieved through examining specific examples drawn from the domains of government and leaders, military and defence, and society. There had been growing formal and informal communication and interaction across the breadth of the bilateral relationship, supporting the utility of using a flat ontology to apply an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust to the relationship. In the government domain, the close affective relations which developed between Theodore Roosevelt and the network of close friends with whom he conducted his preferred personalised diplomacy helped to strengthen the calculative dimension of trust. The perceptions of these individuals shaped strategic cultures, particularly in America. These perceptions were shaped by the affective relations of the individuals, their understanding of shared Anglo-American strategic interests, and elements of shared identity driven by a belief in shared Anglo-Saxon values and racial superiority, clearly highlighting the interplay of all three dimensions of trust. In the military and defence domain of the bilateral relationship, the primary example of military cooperation in this period is WWI. The difficulties and strengths of Anglo-American cooperation during this period, particularly with regards to their economic relationship, neutral rights at sea, and the way in which joint war planning took place following America's entrance in the war highlight both the strengths and limitations of trust. Examining the difficulties of the interwar years regarding economic competition and neutral rights at sea further illustrates the limitations of the trust which had developed in the relationship during WWI. The section on society will focus on the impact of transnational networks of women. The uptake in American women marrying British men positioned the women in influential social and political roles,

enabling them to have significant influence on the development of trust in Anglo-American relations. Perhaps most notable is Jennie, or Lady Randolph Churchill, who was one of the first American women to hop the Atlantic and wield political and social power over the course of Anglo-American relations through her transatlantic activism. The impact of these women can be seen in their purchasing of the hospital ship *Maine* during the Boer War, which was the first ship to sail under both British and American flags, and in their philanthropic work during WWI. They contributed to the development of affective trust between societies, and also worked to create shared understandings of British and American interests. The details of these examples provide valuable insights into the development of trust across all three dimensions prior to WWII. By examining the relationship through the lens of the dimensions of trust, and analysing the interplay of the dimensions of trust in key examples drawn from the domains of government and leaders, military and defence, and society, this chapter will shed light on the development of trust between Britain and America in the decades prior to the creation of the “special relationship”. In doing so, this chapter will demonstrate the value of the theoretical approach and the contribution this approach makes to trust theory, as well as the contribution this enables in the empirical literature in terms of analysing the relationship as trusting rather than “special.”

The Dimensions of Trust

Calculative

The strengthening of the calculative dimension during this period was the most significant factor contributing to *rapprochement*. By the time the turn of the nineteenth century took place, the geopolitical ambitions of continental European powers had begun pushing American and British interests into alignment. This section will explore the strengths and weaknesses of the calculative dimension, focusing on the *fin de siècle* to understand how the strengthening of the calculative dimension facilitated *rapprochement*. First, it is important to examine the strategic culture of both states at this time, to understand how each had a different kind of isolationism and how changes to each form of isolationism brought them closer together. Second, key individuals in the U.S. came to view the benefits of closer relations outweighing the costs as Britain became increasingly important to U.S. security. Third, Britain also came to rely more on the U.S., withdrawing its fleet from the Western Atlantic and no longer viewing America as a threat. Three examples are then examined to understand how these factors were shaping Britain and America’s propensity to cooperate: the informal cooperation on shared interests in China; how opposing interests existed but did not lead to conflict regarding the Behring Sea dispute and the Alaskan boundary dispute;

and how the most significant conflict of interest, the 1895-1899 Venezuelan crisis, managed to avoid war.

The United States and Britain both came to the 1890s with a particular strategic culture, set of interests, and view of each other. Both states have been described as having been isolationist, albeit in different ways and, as Gelber argues, they appeared to emerge from their isolation in tandem.⁵⁴⁸ Lionel Gelber argues that the United States was ‘unable to escape intimate contact with world affairs’ as their economy, trade, and national ambitions grew.⁵⁴⁹ Britain, on the other hand, may have extended itself across the world, but their avoidance of alliances has been described as ‘splendid isolation’.⁵⁵⁰ This brand of isolationist outlook came under significant challenge in the 1890s, with David Reynolds arguing that the Boer War 1899-1902 highlighted both ‘the limits of British power’⁵⁵¹ and ‘the country’s diplomatic isolation’.⁵⁵² The benefits of Britain’s policy of ‘splendid isolation’ had, however, come under attack a year prior to the onset of the Boer War, with a prominent debate taking place between then Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, and the Secretary of the State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain.⁵⁵³ Salisbury argued that ‘in spite of the jargon about isolation’ Britain was still ‘amply competent’ to protect its interests.⁵⁵⁴ Chamberlain protested that the policy of ‘strict isolation’ which had been in place since the Crimean War had been a good policy so long as the continental European powers had also been working alone, but that now the prospect of being ‘confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers’ made the policy untenable.⁵⁵⁵ Interestingly, Secretary of State John Hay claimed in a letter that he had found that political leaders were not only friendlier toward one another than he had expected, but had an ‘eager desire that “the other fellows” shall not seem the more friendly’.⁵⁵⁶ He continued on to state that ‘Chamberlain’s startling speech was partly due to a conversation I had with him’ along these very lines,⁵⁵⁷ indicating development of the affective dimension of trust as perceptions of goodwill strengthened. Chamberlain also pointed out that it was ‘rather on foreign than on domestic policy that the attention of the country is fixed’, indicating that domestic opinion of foreign policy was playing a significant role during this time period. This is seen with, for example, the domestic

⁵⁴⁸ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 4–6.

⁵⁴⁹ Gelber, 6.

⁵⁵⁰ John Charmley, “Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900-1950,” *Contemporary British History* 18, no. 3 (2004): 130–46.

⁵⁵¹ Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century*, 67.

⁵⁵² Reynolds, 73.

⁵⁵³ Charmley, “Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900-1950,” 132.

⁵⁵⁴ “The Primrose League,” *The Times*, May 5, 1898.

⁵⁵⁵ “Mr. Chamberlain in Birmingham.”

⁵⁵⁶ John Hay to Senator Lodge, May 25 1898, reproduced in William Roscoe Thayer, *John Hay*, vol. II (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1908), 168–69.

⁵⁵⁷ John Hay to Senator Lodge, May 25 1898, reproduced in Thayer, II:168–69.

British support for the United States during the Spanish- American War.⁵⁵⁸ Domestic opinion also become highly significant in the United States, where anti-British sentiments often posed difficulties for those seeking closer relations with Britain. While a formal alliance remained an inconceivable notion even for the most optimistic individuals, some form of informal alliance became increasingly desirable as interests began to align.

As is made clear above, geopolitical changes and *realpolitik* considerations certainly played a significant role in pushing America and Britain toward closer relations. As perceptions shifted to account for these changes, a number of key individuals in both states came to see the benefits of closer relations with one another outweighing the costs. As Lionel Gelber points out regarding John Hay and Joseph Chamberlain, although they believed in the power of a shared ‘English-speaking heritage’, they also understood that ‘in a world of *Realpolitik* the great imponderables required from both sides the sanction of mutual advantage if they were to be an effectual bond’.⁵⁵⁹ This can be seen in Hay’s statement with regards to British struggles in the Boer War. Hay described the fact that ‘the British have lost all skill in fighting’ as ‘a portentous fact, altogether deplorable in my opinion; for their influence on the whole made for peace and civilization’, and that ‘peace and civilization’ would be lost should Russia and Germany gain control.⁵⁶⁰ That is, even with some clearly identifiable feelings of shared identity and affective bonds in place, the cost-benefit calculation required some strong material advantages to tip it toward the balance of benefit rather than cost, particularly given the need to convince a domestic audience and those politicians holding anti-British sentiments. This further demonstrates the need for a multidimensional approach to trust applied using a flat ontology in order to capture the complex and dynamic flows of trust and power between states. Notable US naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that U.S. and British interests were such ‘that its strength will be our strength, and the weakening it injury to us’.⁵⁶¹ As Gelber points out, this indicates that ‘the chief naval authorities of the United States counted on British sea-power as one of the principal foundations of American world security’.⁵⁶² Indeed, British neutrality during the Spanish-American War helped the United States greatly,⁵⁶³ as it meant that the continental European powers were too intimidated by British naval power to interfere.⁵⁶⁴ The fact that Britain became increasingly important to U.S. security helped facilitate the growth of calculative trust between

⁵⁵⁸ G. P. Gooch, “Continental Agreements 1902-1907,” in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, vol. III (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 298.

⁵⁵⁹ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 23.

⁵⁶⁰ Letter from John Hay to Henry Adams, June 15 1900, reproduced in Thayer, *John Hay*, II:32–33.

⁵⁶¹ Letter from John Hay to Henry Adams, June 15 1900, reproduced in Thayer, *John Hay*, II:32–33.

⁵⁶² Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 135.

⁵⁶³ “Latest Intelligence,” *The Times*, April 26, 1898.

⁵⁶⁴ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 22.

the two states, with the affective and normative dimensions of trust also contributing to the likelihood of individuals having shared perceptions of shared interests.

Over this period of time, the British came to similarly count on the United States. This is seen clearly in the British willingness to expose themselves to vulnerability in 1905 and withdraw their naval fleet from the western Atlantic and eastern and western Pacific to protect the seas closer to home from German naval expansion, leaving those areas further from home under the protection of the United States.⁵⁶⁵ Although the British also had their Anglo-Japanese alliance in place as a prominent safeguard of their interests,⁵⁶⁶ this remains a clear indication that they trusted the United States not to interfere with their colonial possessions in the region. Steven Lobell argues this process was clear even earlier, claiming that ‘Britain ceded leadership over the Western Hemisphere to the United States with the signing of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty’ in 1901.⁵⁶⁷ The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty gave the United States the right to construct the Panama Canal and hold ‘the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal’.⁵⁶⁸ This had been prohibited under the earlier 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which decreed that neither state ‘will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal’.⁵⁶⁹ This treaty renegotiation process involved Britain voluntarily surrendering their rights in the region, and combined with British sympathy for the U.S. in the Spanish- American War, G. P. Gooch argues that this ‘healed the smart of the crisis of 1896, and made it possible for controversies, whether old or new, to be settled in an amicable spirit’.⁵⁷⁰ The fact that this renegotiation was opposed by the army and navy chiefs owing to strategic fears in the case of an Anglo-American War⁵⁷¹ indicates that relations still had some way to improve. Only a few years later in 1904, however, Britain ceased including preparations for war with the U.S. in their defence plans.⁵⁷² As Dobson argues, ‘for a great power to abandon war plans with regard to such a nation was contrary to the canons of *realpolitik*’.⁵⁷³ This growing trust and increased willingness to rely on each other

⁵⁶⁵ Gelber, 129–30.

⁵⁶⁶ Gelber, 130.

⁵⁶⁷ Steven E. Lobell, “Britain’s Paradox: Cooperation or Punishment Prior to World War I,” *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 1 (2001): 181.

⁵⁶⁸ Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 18 November 1901, reproduced in Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901, Document 232a* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1902), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901/d232a>.

⁵⁶⁹ Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of April 19, 1850, reproduced in Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America.

⁵⁷⁰ Gooch, “Continental Agreements 1902-1907,” 298.

⁵⁷¹ Steven E. Lobell, *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 70.

⁵⁷² Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 17.

⁵⁷³ Dobson, 17.

and accept vulnerability to each other indicates that, while the alignment of interests was at play, so too was something more than merely the calculative dimension of trust.

There was no arena in which British and American interests lined up more fortuitously than in the case of China surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century. China was being carved up by the European colonial powers, and the threat of further disintegration of Chinese territory and the potential threat to open trade in the region alarmed the British. The main concern for the British under the leadership of Salisbury and Balfour was the threat to British colonial interests in the region, with particular fears regarding the security of Persia, Tibet, and Afghanistan, and ongoing fears regarding Britain's place in China and India.⁵⁷⁴ Germany, Britain, and Russia each gained a Chinese port for themselves across the years of 1897 and 1898: Kiao-Chow, Wei-hai-Wei, and Port Arthur respectively.⁵⁷⁵ Concerns regarding the potential further break-up of China led Britain to seek an ally interested in securing Chinese territorial integrity.⁵⁷⁶ This prompted Britain to confidentially propose to the United States that they should join Britain in preventing any other foreign powers expanding in Chinese territory.⁵⁷⁷ While the United States declined this offer, likely in no small part because they were preoccupied with impending war with Spain, Gelber argues that this indicates the extent of the desire of the British government in collaborating with the United States on such a significant international issue.⁵⁷⁸ The United States had clear commercial interests in China, and desired a China which was 'an open market for the world's commerce' free from any conflict which would interfere with the potential for economic benefit.⁵⁷⁹ Although it did not come to fruition at this time, this was a desire clearly reciprocated by United States Ambassador to Britain and then Secretary of State John Hay. Hay, Gelber argues, constantly struggled 'against the yoke of domestic prejudice and tradition' that was embodied in anti-British sentiment and American isolationism.⁵⁸⁰ Hay sought advice on how to enact his desire for the United States to play a role in China without upsetting these domestic sensibilities, and settled on a policy which saw America clearly leading in China rather than appearing to work in concert with Britain.⁵⁸¹ His consultation with experts resulted in the first of his famous Open Door Notes in September of 1899 which demanded all powers respect the policy of free trade.⁵⁸² This

⁵⁷⁴ Iestyn Adams, *Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" 1900-1905* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005), 166.

⁵⁷⁵ Adams, 166.

⁵⁷⁶ Adams, 167.

⁵⁷⁷ Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906*, 170.

⁵⁷⁸ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 12-13.

⁵⁷⁹ "China," *The Times*, March 28, 1900.

⁵⁸⁰ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 75.

⁵⁸¹ Gelber, 76-77.

⁵⁸² For a reprinting of the text of the Open Door Notes, see Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 5, 1899, Documents 94-98* (Washington D.C.: United States

was not only deft international diplomacy, but managed to bypass the frequent issue in Anglo-American relations of the Senate, as the plan did not involve a treaty and as such did not have to be referred to the Senate, which had previously been referred to by *The Times* as ‘the treaty-wrecking body’ for good reason.⁵⁸³ This is referring, in particular, to the General Arbitration Treaty negotiated by Hay and Pauncefote in 1897 which was shot down in the Senate.⁵⁸⁴ The British press praised Hay’s ‘diplomatic success, won by purely diplomatic methods at nobody’s expense yet with great beneficial results to his own country’, and argued that ‘it strengthens the bonds of this Administration both in politics and in diplomacy’.⁵⁸⁵ While the lack of direct cooperation on China again highlights the impossibility of a formal alliance at this time, the indirect cooperation and increasing alignment of interests are clearly indicative of the growth of the calculative dimension of trust and the role of the affective and normative dimensions in shaping this process through influencing the perceptions of key transatlantic elites and the relationships which formed between them.

There were several significant conflicts between Britain and the United States throughout this period of *rapprochement*, however the fact that none of them led to war and that relations continued to improve indicates that something more was at play than solely the calculative dimension of trust. The most notable of these conflicts include the Behring Sea dispute, the Alaskan boundary dispute, and the 1895-99 Venezuelan crisis. Both the Alaskan boundary and Behring Sea disputes stemmed from the territorial implications of the 1867 U.S. purchase of Alaska from Russia regarding the boundary between the United States and the then British dominion of Canada.⁵⁸⁶ The Behring Sea dispute comprised a disagreement over seal fishing rights between the United States, Canada, and Britain.⁵⁸⁷ Gibb argues that the Behring Sea dispute ‘demonstrates in microcosm how the United States began to assert its power internationally, and the extent to which Britain was willing to sacrifice Canadian, and by implication, colonial interests to maintain harmonious Anglo-American relations’.⁵⁸⁸ Andrew Carnegie, arguing in 1897 that the United States did not hold a ‘deep-seated, bitter national hatred’ against Britain as many had been discussing, claimed that there were two issues which had caused a wave a resentment against Britain: the Behring Sea dispute and the Venezuelan crisis.⁵⁸⁹ In addition to

Government Printing Office, 1901), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1899/ch30>.

⁵⁸³ “China,” *The Times*, March 28, 1900.

⁵⁸⁴ A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, vol. III (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 228.

⁵⁸⁵ “The Open Door in China,” *The Times*, January 6, 1900.

⁵⁸⁶ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 38.

⁵⁸⁷ Paul Gibb, “Selling Out Canada? The Role of Sir Julian Pauncefote in the Bering Sea Dispute, 1889-1902,” *The International History Review* 24, no. 4 (2002): 817.

⁵⁸⁸ Gibb, 817.

⁵⁸⁹ Carnegie, “Does America Hate England?,” 663.

causing these resentments, the Behring Sea dispute 'was the longest- lasting and most intractable dispute of this pivotal period in Anglo-American relations', not ultimately being resolved until 1911,⁵⁹⁰ despite ongoing attempts at arbitration.⁵⁹¹ The Alaskan boundary issue was described by Theodore Roosevelt as 'the last serious trouble between the British Empire and ourselves' as all other matters could be arbitrated.⁵⁹² The Alaskan boundary dispute was, however, also ultimately successfully arbitrated.⁵⁹³ The fact that conflicts of interests in these disputes were able to be peacefully managed through arbitration is both an indicator that some degree of trust was at play and, as will be discussed in detail later, provided significant opportunities for the further growth of trust through ongoing peaceful interactions.

The difficulties in managing such issues, however, highlight the limitations of trust remaining at this time. The closest Britain and America came to war during this period was the first Venezuelan crisis of 1895-1899, which comprised a disagreement over the boundary between Venezuela and the British colony of British Guiana.⁵⁹⁴ While this issue had been a quiet thorn in Anglo-American relations for some time, it emerged as a significant issue owing to U.S. President Cleveland insisting that the Monroe Doctrine applied to Venezuela, and British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury disagreeing.⁵⁹⁵ The issue was particularly problematic given the security dilemma Britain and America found themselves in, with each struggling to understand the motivations of the other. For one, the British did not see the issue as being of any great importance prior to the dispute, and consequently their slow actions in response to U.S. despatches inflamed Anglophobic tendencies in the U.S. and further tarred the British as acting in 'a characteristically high handed – and imperialist – manner'.⁵⁹⁶ Subsequently, the British struggled to understand how the

⁵⁹⁰ Gibb, "Selling Out Canada? The Role of Sir Julian Pauncefote in the Bering Sea Dispute, 1889-1902," 817.

⁵⁹¹ For documents relating to the attempts in the early 1890s, see Mr. Fresham to Mr. Bayard, September 19 1893, and attached documents regarding the decisions of the arbitrators and governments. Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Document 113* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1895), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1894app1/d113>.

⁵⁹² President Roosevelt to Captain Mahan, June 8 1911, reproduced in Richard W. Turk, *Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 158.

⁵⁹³ The agreement to the conditions outlined in the report of the commissioners of the arbitration process was cemented by an exchange of notes between the Acting Secretary of State and the British Ambassador on March 25 1905. See Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 5, 1905, Delimitation of the Alaskan Boundary* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1905), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1905/ch84>.

⁵⁹⁴ For an outline of the historical details of this boundary dispute before 1895, see Mr. Olney to Mr. Bayard, July 20 1895, reproduced in Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895, Part I, Document 527* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1896), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1895p1/d527>.

⁵⁹⁵ "Appearances in America," *The Spectator*, January 4, 1896.

⁵⁹⁶ Paul Gibb, "Unmasterly Inactivity? Sir Julian Pauncefote, Lord Salisbury, and the Venezuela Boundary Dispute," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 1 (2005): 38.

situation had become so desperate following the demand by U.S. President Cleveland that Britain must submit to arbitration regarding the matter, and that the U.S. would be willing to go to war if Britain refused to agree to arbitration.⁵⁹⁷ The prospects of war may have been viewed with ‘horror and dismay’, and with ‘dread of the detestable necessity of bombarding great cities of our own kith and kin’,⁵⁹⁸ but they were also very real. President Cleveland had domestic backing for his position, particularly by the western and southern U.S. states where anti-British sentiments were strongest.⁵⁹⁹ The issue was ultimately managed, however, meaning that by 1896 President Cleveland could announce in his address to Congress that ‘the Venezuelan boundary question has ceased to be a matter of difference between Great Britain and the United States, their respective Governments having agreed upon the substantial provisions of a treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela submitting the whole controversy to arbitration’.⁶⁰⁰ Henry S. Fraser argues that the triumph of arbitration over war was due ‘to a genuine antipathy to war on the part of the great masses of people in both nations’.⁶⁰¹ Indeed, the transnational role of women in this successful peace effort will be outlined in detail in the below section on societal connections. The room for misperceptions during this crisis highlights the limitations of trust at an official level between the two states, while some strong anti-British sentiments clearly remained in parts of the United States. On the other hand, the successful resolution of the dispute by arbitration, in no small part due to the belief by both key political and societal figures that war between the two countries would be a form of fratricide, indicates there was a degree of affective and even normative trust at play.

Affective

The calculative dimension of trust may have been the most significant factor contributing to *rapprochement*, but it was far from the only one. As discussed in Chapter One, the affective dimension can facilitate cooperation on shared interests when the transaction costs of cooperation would otherwise be viewed to be too great. The development of the affective dimension of trust was notably aided in the lead up to *rapprochement* by the increase in the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes. This provided an opportunity for increased interactions of a peaceful nature between Britain and America, and interactions are a necessary condition for the development of trust. This section will examine the rise of international arbitration, and how this played out in the case of the *Alabama* claims arbitration. It will also analyse how the affective

⁵⁹⁷ Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*, 56.

⁵⁹⁸ “The Venezuelan Quarrel,” *The Spectator*, January 11, 1896.

⁵⁹⁹ “News of the Week,” *The Spectator*, January 4, 1896.

⁶⁰⁰ Cleveland, Grover, “Message of the President to the Congress of the United States,” December 7, 1896.

⁶⁰¹ Henry S. Fraser, “Sketch of the History of International Arbitration,” *Cornell Law Review* 11, no. 2 (1926): 201.

dimension of trust developed between foreign policy elites interacting via The Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations shaped the ability of the relationship to survive significant tensions during the interwar years.

With such a wide array of conflicting interests, it is clear that there was more than the calculative dimension holding Anglo-American relations together and enabling them to continue to improve, if unevenly, in the decades leading to WWII. The affective dimension is reliant on the opportunity for repeated interactions over time, and enables states to learn about each other and what their expectations of trustworthiness are regarding one another. The opportunity for Britain and America to undertake this process of social learning and the creation of expectations of trustworthiness regarding one another was provided, in no small part, by increased peaceful interactions owing to the uptake of international arbitration to solve conflicts of interests. This was influenced by identity-related questions regarding the ongoing entrenchment of the value of democratic rule of law. The reason for the uptake in international arbitration in the nineteenth century is debated, however Richard Langhorne claims that the international environment was likely the most important factor.⁶⁰² Langhorne argues that changing power dynamics, the prominence of the concept of the nation-state, and increased connectivity resulted in three main responses: an arms race, creation of alliances, and greater focus on the possibilities of international law.⁶⁰³ The efforts of the peace movement also appear to have played a role, with Eleanor Lord outlining in 1892 the efforts of peace societies over the course of the century.⁶⁰⁴ She recognised the importance of the changing character of warfare and the nature of the international system, but nevertheless focused on the importance of societal perspectives:

The success of arbitration in the past is due to various causes: - improvement in the condition of international law; increased educational facilities for fostering pacific sentiments in the minds of the people; progress in the art of diplomacy, and, most important of all, the growth of democratic ideas leading to the participation of the people in questions of peace and war.⁶⁰⁵

Daniel Hucker also points out that the peace campaigns leading up to the 1899 Hague Conference were primarily focused on the implementation of arbitration, something which had gained increasing support among the public, the press, and even parliaments, and something which would prove to be the ‘most enduring outcome of the Conference’.⁶⁰⁶ Whichever combination of

⁶⁰² Richard Langhorne, “Arbitration: The First Phase, 1870-1914,” in *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 47.

⁶⁰³ Langhorne, 47.

⁶⁰⁴ Lord, “International Arbitration,” 43.

⁶⁰⁵ Lord, 49.

⁶⁰⁶ Hucker, “British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting the 1899 Hague Peace Conference,” 411–13.

factors are seen to have motivated the increased uptake in the use of international arbitration, the shift to peaceful arbitration of disputes opened up space for greater interaction among the officials of both states and had a significant impact on Anglo-American relations.

The impact of the increased use of arbitration to resolve disputes is clearly visible in individual instances of the use of arbitration to resolve a dispute. The preponderance of boundary disputes between the U.S. and Britain meant that following the first arbitration in the form of the Jay Treaty of 1794 which resolved a number of post-War of Independence issues, there were thirty-two successful arbitrations leading up to 1850.⁶⁰⁷ It is widely accepted, however, that the *Alabama* claims arbitration of 1872 was a turning point in the history of international arbitration, with Henry S. Fraser describing it as ‘a landmark in the evolution of international peace’.⁶⁰⁸ This arbitration concerned the building of Confederate ships in British shipyards during the American Civil War, the most famous of which was the *CSS Alabama*, with the arbitrators finding in favour of the U.S. as ‘the British Government failed to use due diligence in the performance of its neutral obligations’.⁶⁰⁹ The interesting part of this particular arbitration was that Britain accepted and complied with the decision, despite then being the leading power of the world.⁶¹⁰ Langhorne, too, points out the novelty of this case, arguing that Britain’s desire to avoid conflict with America was a driving force behind their decision, and that America was more willing to accept referring disputes to arbitration after having seen most of them go in their favour.⁶¹¹ Likely, British willingness to accept a harsh finding against them also served as a costly signal, indicating their trustworthiness to the United States. As Benjamin Trueblood described it in 1905, the result of arbitration ‘has nearly invariably been increased mutual respect and a great willingness to cooperate in all practicable ways for the common good’.⁶¹² These examples clearly illustrate the ways in which increased peaceful interactions between the two states had begun to shape perceptions of one another, the willingness to accept vulnerability to one another, and subsequently promoted the growth of the affective dimension of trust.

The strengths of the affective dimension also aided the relationship in surviving the rocky interwar period which saw the relationship plagued by tensions over economic competition, war debts, and neutral rights at sea. While the interwar years in many ways saw the relationship set adrift, important affective connections formed between elites which helped to tether it sufficiently

⁶⁰⁷ Langhorne, “Arbitration: The First Phase, 1870-1914,” 48.

⁶⁰⁸ Fraser, “Sketch of the History of International Arbitration,” 200.

⁶⁰⁹ Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Alabama Claims* (London: T. Harrison and J. W. Harrison, Printers, 1872), 4111.

⁶¹⁰ Tom Bingham, “The Alabama Claims Arbitration,” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 54, no. 1 (2005): 24.

⁶¹¹ Langhorne, “Arbitration: The First Phase, 1870-1914,” 49.

⁶¹² Benjamin F. Trueblood, “International Arbitration at the Opening of the Twentieth Century,” *The Advocate of Peace* 67, no. 4 (1905): 83.

to ensure close Anglo-American cooperation would be possible upon the outbreak of WWII. Beginning with elites, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 presented an opportunity for the British and American experts who had travelled to the conference to interact and develop trust.⁶¹³ The British and American delegates met on a daily basis for breakfast, and through this process ‘developed a keen spirit and came to think they had more in common with one another than with the politicians who led their teams’.⁶¹⁴ This experience provided the inspiration to set up parallel bodies for researching foreign affairs and promoting Anglo- American relations: the Council on Foreign Relations in America, and The Royal Institute of International Affairs in Britain.⁶¹⁵ Both became the pre-eminent foreign policy think tanks in their own countries, and were able to make an important contribution to Anglo-American relations. Bosco argues that it institutionalised an Anglo-American foreign policy elite,⁶¹⁶ increasing their propensity to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another. A key aspect of this contribution came through the joint study groups, of which there were at least five between the late 1920s and the 1950s.⁶¹⁷ Discussion groups during the interwar years focused on the most fractious of Anglo-American tensions, looking at naval rivalry (1928- 1929), economic competition (1930), and war debts, currency stabilization, and trade (1936- 1938).⁶¹⁸ Parmar captures the impact this had on the Anglo-American relationship:

The overall effects of the joint study groups, meetings, and conferences, were to develop an elite with strong governmental connections that, when it came to war, could be utilised both to mobilise the United States to back the Allies and to prepare the way for postwar Anglo-American cooperation.⁶¹⁹

The relationship between the two think tanks provided opportunities for elites to interact, which in turn facilitated the growth of the affective dimension of trust as the two groups came to develop expectations of trustworthiness and feelings of goodwill through a process of social learning. Through collocating, working towards a joint goal, and developing shared values and elements of

⁶¹³ For details, see Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Andrea Bosco, “From Empire to Atlantic ‘System’: The Round Table, Chatham House and the Emergence of a New Paradigm in Anglo-American Relations,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 2018.

⁶¹⁴ Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 3.

⁶¹⁵ Nicholas J. Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Against American “Neutrality” in World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7–8.

⁶¹⁶ Bosco, “From Empire to Atlantic ‘System’: The Round Table, Chatham House and the Emergence of a New Paradigm in Anglo-American Relations,” 17.

⁶¹⁷ Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945*, 208.

⁶¹⁸ Parmar, 208.

⁶¹⁹ Parmar, 209.

collective identity, interactions between the two groups of elites also facilitated the growth of the normative dimension of trust. The two groups were inclined to think like each other, given that their ‘intellectual roots ... were thoroughly and inextricably interwoven’.⁶²⁰ The strengthening of trust across all three dimensions in this way, most notably driven by the affective connections forged between the two foreign policy elites, played a significant role in maintaining trust in the relationship during the difficult interwar years and allowing Britain and America to be in a position to go on and form their historic WWII alliance.

Normative

The presence of the normative dimension of trust, primarily among a small handful of elites, also aided in the growing closeness of Britain and America. Over the period of *rapprochement* it is easy to find statements from politicians and diplomats, newspaper articles, and scholarly work, which discusses the connections they felt existed between Britain and America on the basis of race, religion, shared language, and shared political and legal values. This section will first present some of the beliefs key individuals held in relation to these connections. The impact of these beliefs and the presence of the normative dimension is highlighted when examined through the lens of Lewicki and Bunker’s four key activities which they argue strengthen identity-based trust: colocation, creating joint products or goals, commonly shared values, and collective identity.⁶²¹ Using these indicators reveals increasing colocation in the form of arbitration and societal interactions; limited joint goals or products as is seen in the inability to cooperate formally on China despite the desires of key individuals and the presence of significant shared interests; prominent shared values among certain groups as can be seen in cooperation on the protection of Armenians in Turkey, but debilitating limitations regarding, for example, the U.S. Senate and the public; and a limited collective identity, given the lack of interest in formal relations.

While for some decades now the relationship between the two countries has been described predominantly as the “Anglo-American” relationship, during the period of *rapprochement* the dominant ways in which it was discussed were the “Anglo-Saxon” relationship, or the relationship of the “English-speaking peoples”. As Serge Ricard explores, Roosevelt is one example of this thinking, holding a clear ‘ethnocentric conviction’ regarding the role of the English-speaking peoples in the world.⁶²² Joseph Chamberlain, too, held similar ideals, and was highly enthusiastic about the prospect of an Anglo-Saxon alliance:

⁶²⁰ Inderjeet Parmar, “Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations,” *International Relations* 16, no. 1 (2002): 68.

⁶²¹ Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships.”

⁶²² Ricard, “An Atlantic Triangle in the 1900s: Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Special Relationships’ with France and Britain,” 203.

I go even so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance.⁶²³

In a letter to US Secretary of State Richard Olney during the height of the first Venezuelan crisis, Chamberlain argued that all British citizens were looking on with ‘horror [at] the idea of a fratricidal conflict between the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race’.⁶²⁴ In a letter from Olney to Chamberlain it can be seen that this racial view of the relationship was reciprocated, with Olney arguing that ‘if there is anything Americans are proud of, it is their right to describe themselves as of the English race’.⁶²⁵ On the other hand, in the letter Olney also warned of the difficulties of such a relationship, arguing that American feeling over the first Venezuelan crisis was so strong ‘because an injury from a friend has the intensified sting of a poisoned arrow’.⁶²⁶ The strong feeling of the role of a shared racial heritage can also be found in the work of prominent British-born, American raised philanthropist Andrew Carnegie who held a strong personal belief in the superior nature of the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’.⁶²⁷

The strongest sentiment in man, the real motive which at the crisis determines his action in international affairs, is racial. Upon this tree grow the one language, one religion, one literature, and one law which bind men together.⁶²⁸

Yet another example is that of prominent British politician Sir George Grey, who had spent time as governor of New Zealand and South Australia. He argued that ‘the evolution of the Anglo-Saxon race’ was the most significant of the ‘great driving forces behind the march of humanity’.⁶²⁹ While this belief in the importance of shared racial heritage was not universal, it was certainly prominent in a significant proportion of British and American officials, shaping the way they viewed one another and sometimes forming a normative underpinning to the trust they felt for one another.

Not all viewed race as the underpinning of the relationship. Edward Grey, for one, claimed that it was not ‘Anglo-Saxon race feeling’ that allowed Britain and America to be so ‘well disposed’ to one another:

⁶²³ “Mr. Chamberlain in Birmingham.”

⁶²⁴ Chamberlain to Olney, September 28 1896, reproduced in Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906*, 61.

⁶²⁵ Olney to Chamberlain, September 28 1896, reproduced in Dennis, 59.

⁶²⁶ Olney to Chamberlain, September 28 1896, reproduced in Dennis, 59.

⁶²⁷ Peter Weber, “The Pacifism of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn: The Emergence of a Philanthropic Internationalism,” *Global Society* 29, no. 4 (2015): 540.

⁶²⁸ Carnegie, “Does America Hate England?,” 661.

⁶²⁹ James Milne, “The Federation of the English-Speaking People: A Talk with Sir George Grey,” *The Contemporary Review* 66, no. 1 (1894): 194–95.

... common language helps to draw us together, and religion also ... But, more than all this, I should say that some generations of freedom on both sides have evolved a type of man and mind that looks at things from a kindred point of view, and a majority that has a hatred for what is not just or free.⁶³⁰

This statement aligns with the definition of normative trust which states that it allows actors to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” each other.⁶³¹ Clearly some element of normative trust existed even during these early years of *rapprochement*, albeit limited to certain individuals and often also only to certain contexts. American Reverend Josiah Strong viewed the ‘pure *spiritual* Christianity’ of the Anglo-Saxons as one of its chief pillars of success, along with civil liberty.⁶³² Despite his obvious personal bias, shared religion arises as a frequent explanation for the closeness of the English-speaking peoples and their perceived successes. At a minimum, religion was seen as something which would not prove to be a point of division between the two states. In an 1896 article examining the prospects for a British alliance with another power, *The Spectator* described the two states as being ‘not divided either by race, religion, or political ideals’, albeit ultimately concluding that a formal alliance remained infeasible.⁶³³ As seen by the frequent use of the term “English-speaking peoples”, common language has also been viewed as a key facilitator of positive relations between the two states. This can be seen in the viewpoint of American Ambassador to Britain Thomas Bayard, who argued that ‘there must be a common affinity of morals between those who speak the English language’.⁶³⁴ Contrary to Andrew Carnegie who saw all shared morals and values as extending from a core of shared racial heritage, Thomas Bayard saw them as extending from the possession of a common language. Whichever facet was viewed as the primary motivator of the links of similarity between Britain and America, it is clear that there was some degree of shared values and bonds of commonality between individuals on both sides of the Atlantic which helped to facilitate ongoing improvements to the bilateral relationship. To determine a clearer picture of the extent of influence such bonds of commonality had, it is possible to summarise the presence of the normative dimension through an examination of Lewicki and Bunker’s four key indicators. Colocation took place increasingly over this period as Britain and America came to brush up against each other more frequently in terms of territorial claims. This fed into the increasing interaction taking place in the form of arbitration. One indicator

⁶³⁰ Grey to Roosevelt, December 2, 1906, quoted in George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon: Being the Life of Sir Edward Grey Afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1937), 116.

⁶³¹ Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 123.

⁶³² Strong, *The United States and the Future of the Anglo-Saxon Race*, 33–34.

⁶³³ “The Allies and Foes of Britain,” *The Spectator*, January 18, 1896.

⁶³⁴ Thomas Bayard, quoted in Goldstein, “Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898,” 36–37.

of the successful improvement of relations over this period is the shift to having a formal ambassador rather than an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Additionally, the impact of societal contact in the form of both transatlantic marriages⁶³⁵ and connections and interactions between the educated elites⁶³⁶ meant that increasing numbers of individuals from across both states were colocating in a wide variety of contexts. R. B. Mowat, for example, touches on the importance of the ships which carried people between Britain and America which he argued were ‘spinning threads between the two countries’, facilitated by the ease of communicating through a shared language over the course of the long voyages.⁶³⁷ The creation of joint products or goals can be seen only in limited situations, predominantly due to domestic limitations. The enforcement of a shared vision regarding the open door policy and free trade in China is an example of this. While this was the product of a shared goal, it was not enacted jointly, which indicates the presence of the normative dimension had clear limits. Similarly, the two states may have shared similar goals regarding the containment of the expansionism of the continental European powers more broadly, yet little concrete cooperation took place on the issue.

Commonly shared values quite clearly exist across a variety of overlapping patchworks regarding shared “Anglo-Saxon” racial heritage, religion, language, law, and political values. Key individuals placed different importance on various facets of these overlapping shared values, however their impact has been clearly illustrated through how they influenced the views of these key individuals. One example is Joseph Chamberlain and Richard Olney, and the drive this gave them to improve relations through actively seeking to promote cooperation as seen in Chamberlain’s reply to Olney discussing the prospects for cooperation regarding Armenians in Turkey:

I am deeply sensible of the importance of such moral and incidental co-operation in the cause of humanity as is pointed at in your letter and ... I believe that it would profoundly affect the relations between the two countries and would evoke the sympathy which, even if latent, must and ought to exist between peoples with common origin, common literature, common laws and common standards of right and wrong.⁶³⁸

The presence of commonly shared values was, of course, not universal, with particularly notable lapses in the U.S. Senate and public. While democratic values are generally considered a strength

⁶³⁵ See Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*.

⁶³⁶ R. B. Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1925), 2.

⁶³⁷ Mowat, 2.

⁶³⁸ Chamberlain to Olney, September 28 1896, reproduced in Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906*, 61.

of the relationship, the plurality of democracy has often proven problematic. This made enacting the cooperation desired by key individuals difficult. Perhaps the most notable exasperation regarding this point was exhibited by John Hay. Despite the alignment of British and American interests in China, Hay could not enact joint cooperation owing to the anti-British sentiments of the Senate and the public following the Boer War. He described American sentiment as comprising ‘a mad-dog hatred of England’, complaining that ‘these idiots say I’m not American because I don’t say, “To hell with the Queen,” at every breath.’⁶³⁹ He found it highly frustrating that he had to turn down the help ‘of the greatest Power in the world, *in carrying out our own policy*’.⁶⁴⁰ Given that commonly shared values and increasing colocation struggled to yield concrete outcomes, collective identity understandably existed only in a very limited fashion. Although many people were interested in an informal alliance, it was widely accepted that such a thing were, even if desired, not possible in the climate of the time – except, perhaps, by Joseph Chamberlain. Likewise, although some individuals went so far as to propose a common citizenship of both states,⁶⁴¹ and Sir George Grey argued for a federation of all English-speaking peoples,⁶⁴² these ideas do not appear to have been widely accepted. The increasing degree of colocation and the clear existence of commonly shared values remain the strongest indicators of the presence of the normative dimension of trust during this period, with collective identity and the creation of joint outcomes or goals lagging behind. The normative dimension was clearly present to some extent during this period, and its interplay with the calculative and affective dimensions helped to facilitate increasingly positive interactions between the two states which provided a foundation for the relationship to continue improving and for difficult issues to be managed without the need to resort to conflict.

The Domains of the Relationship

Leaders and Government

Particularly in underdeveloped relationships, key individual politicians, diplomats, and leaders, and the relationships they form with one another, are pivotal in shaping the nature of trust in a bilateral relationship. One example of formal leadership relations, and one example of unofficial diplomatic relations, will be examined. American President Theodore Roosevelt’s proclivity for personalised diplomacy enhanced the role of interpersonal relationships. This took place first

⁶³⁹ John Hay to J. W. Foster, June 23 1900, reproduced in Thayer, *John Hay*, II:34–35.

⁶⁴⁰ John Hay to J. W. Foster, June 23 1900, reproduced in Thayer, II:34–35.

⁶⁴¹ See, for example, A. V. Dicey, “A Common Citizenship for the English Race,” *The Contemporary Review* 71, no. 1 (1897): 457–76.

⁶⁴² See Milne, “The Federation of the English-Speaking People: A Talk with Sir George Grey.”

within America, as the shared views Roosevelt held along with his close friends played a significant role in shaping American strategic culture to be more positively disposed toward Britain. It also took place across the Atlantic, as Roosevelt had formed close connections with key British figures in the 1880s and 1890s, including British diplomat Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, British MP Arthur Lee, and the first secretary at the U.S. embassy in London Henry White. Unofficial diplomatic channels also contributed to the development of trust in the relationship, as can be seen in the return of the Bradford *History of Plymouth Colony*⁶⁴³ from Britain to America in an important symbolic gesture of goodwill.

One prominent example of the importance of key individuals is U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, particularly given his preference for personalised diplomacy.⁶⁴⁴ Roosevelt is commonly seen as America's first truly internationalist President, with a number of historians arguing that Anglo-American *rapprochement* was solidified during his presidential tenure.⁶⁴⁵ Within the U.S. itself, Priscilla Roberts categorises his inner circle as being comprised of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge; Alfred Thayer Mahan; John Hay as Roosevelt's first Secretary of State; and Elihu Root who was first Secretary of War and then Secretary of State after Hay's death in 1903.⁶⁴⁶ The values of these individuals were important, with Roberts arguing that Lodge, Roosevelt, and Mahan were strongly interested in seeing America playing a bigger role in world affairs.⁶⁴⁷ This desire culminated in support for the annexation of Hawaii, the Spanish- American war, the retainment of the Philippines, and a number of U.S. colonial and quasi- colonial territories being administered by the army when under American control.⁶⁴⁸ The combination of these individuals, their beliefs, and their relationships, played a significant role in shaping U.S. strategic culture. The two most significant favourable views of Britain can be seen to be present among these key individuals. First, the view of Mahan regarding the importance of British naval power to the security of the U.S.,⁶⁴⁹ which shaped the response of the U.S. regarding how it would protect its expanding interests. The second favourable view of Britain was driven by shared Anglo-Saxon feeling. This, too, is clearly present among this small coterie of men. Roberts highlights how the combination of Mahan's writings on the importance of Britain to American security and the

⁶⁴³ The manuscript has been published in various editions. Originally published in 1651, it is sometimes referred to as "History of Plymouth Plantation" or "History of Plimoth Plantation". For one commonly available edition, see William Bradford, *History of Plimoth Plantation* (Carlisle: Applewood Books, 1898).

⁶⁴⁴ Ricard, "An Atlantic Triangle in the 1900s: Theodore Roosevelt's 'Special Relationships' with France and Britain," 204.

⁶⁴⁵ For an outline of these views, as well as a critique of their over-simplification, see Ricard, 203.

⁶⁴⁶ Priscilla Roberts, "The Transatlantic American Foreign Policy Elite: Its Evolution in Generational Perspective," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7, no. 2 (2009): 167.

⁶⁴⁷ Roberts, 168.

⁶⁴⁸ Roberts, 168.

⁶⁴⁹ Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906*, 132.

widespread social Darwinist beliefs regarding the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race or the English-speaking peoples among transatlantic elites together shaped the *rapprochement* between Britain and America.⁶⁵⁰ This is something particularly present in Roosevelt himself, with Beale arguing that he believed strongly ‘that in combination the Americans and the British could dominate the world – to the advantage of civilization’.⁶⁵¹ It is clear that Roosevelt and his close friends on whom he relied to conduct foreign policy held a particular set of ideas which saw America take an increasingly internationalist outlook and hold a more favourable view of Britain, which helped to pave the way for the growth of trust across the Atlantic.

Roosevelt’s tendency to rely on a handful of individuals he trusted also played a role on the other side of the Atlantic. These individuals were primarily friends he had made during the 1880s and 1890s, including English diplomat Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, who was his best man at his wedding; British MP Arthur Lee; and the first secretary at the U.S. embassy in London Henry White.⁶⁵² Indeed, Roosevelt was so attached to Spring Rice that he consistently attempted to convince the British to appoint him ambassador to the U.S. following the deaths of the previous two ambassadors Sir Julian Pauncefote and Sir Michael Herbert.⁶⁵³ While Roosevelt had been comfortable in dealing with both ambassadors, he was not pleased with their replacement of Sir Mortimer Durand, and consequently continued to work almost exclusively through informal channels with close friends.⁶⁵⁴ It is not clear why the British were so unwilling to appoint someone whom Roosevelt approved of, when the German and French governments both endeavored to have such people in place in the form of Speck von Sternburg and Jean Jules Jusserand.⁶⁵⁵ Indeed it was made clear to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that the British knew fewer intimate details of Roosevelt’s activities than Germany and France owing to their refusal to appoint Spring Rice,⁶⁵⁶ and Ricard claims that the presence of Jusserand contributed greatly to a France-U.S. *rapprochement* and subsequently argues that France was the most successful of Roosevelt’s bilateral relationships.⁶⁵⁷ Whatever the reason for the British refusal to appoint Spring Rice, Beale points out that although the lack of trust in the official diplomatic channels sometimes made things difficult, ‘the intimacy of communication resulting from negotiation outside official

⁶⁵⁰ Roberts, “The Transatlantic American Foreign Policy Elite: Its Evolution in Generational Perspective,” 168.

⁶⁵¹ Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, 81.

⁶⁵² Ricard, “An Atlantic Triangle in the 1900s: Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Special Relationships’ with France and Britain,” 203.

⁶⁵³ Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, 131–35.

⁶⁵⁴ Beale, 131–32.

⁶⁵⁵ Beale, 133.

⁶⁵⁶ Beale, 133.

⁶⁵⁷ See Ricard, “An Atlantic Triangle in the 1900s: Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Special Relationships’ with France and Britain.”

channels was perhaps one reason for the ultimate success of Anglo-American relations'.⁶⁵⁸ The importance of informal communication supports the broader picture that the development of trust in Anglo-American relations was the product of growing closeness and communication across the breadth of the bilateral relationship. The relationships between key individuals and the networks of friendship and diplomacy they were able to spin both officially and unofficially was a significant factor in the improvement of relations at the turn of the century.

The strength of unofficial diplomatic channels and the importance of the actions of key individuals and the relationships between them can also be seen at the sub-diplomatic level. The successful return of the Bradford *History of Plymouth Colony* from Britain to the United States further supports Beale's argument that intimate informal communications were a driver of the successful *rapprochement* between Britain and America, as can be explained by the theoretical approach deployed in this thesis. Erik Goldstein argues that as relations improved over the 1890s, there was an increasing number of both private and public individuals 'who sought to build upon what were seen as a common history, literature, and values' through a number of transatlantic gestures aiming to highlight and solidify such linkages.⁶⁵⁹ Benjamin Scott argued in a letter to the editor of *The Times* in 1881 that a 'deep sympathy' for the United States was evident, and argued that to ensure it was maintained Britain could consider returning an important manuscript to America, as it would be 'a practical method of giving an enduring proof of our feelings'.⁶⁶⁰ Goldstein focuses on how *The History of Plymouth Colony*, written by William Bradford to record the early settlement of Plymouth in America,⁶⁶¹ was returned to America from Britain.⁶⁶² The manuscript had been lost, with its whereabouts for some decades unclear until it resurfaced in Britain in the 1850s and begun a long campaign by Americans to see it returned to Massachusetts.⁶⁶³ The history has been described as being 'considered by many Americans as the very Book of Genesis of their nation'.⁶⁶⁴ A key individual to take up the cause of having the book returned to America was Senator George Frisbie Hoar.⁶⁶⁵ Upon meeting American ambassador Thomas Bayard, Hoar managed to capture Bayard's interest in the context of Bayard's broader passion for improving

⁶⁵⁸ Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, 134.

⁶⁵⁹ Goldstein, "Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898," 26.

⁶⁶⁰ Benjamin Scott, "Practical Sympathy With The United States," *The Times*, October 5, 1881.

⁶⁶¹ Goldstein, "Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898," 27.

⁶⁶² Goldstein, "Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898."

⁶⁶³ For an outline of these attempts, see Francis B. Dedmond, "A Forgotten Attempt to Rescue the Bradford Manuscript," *The New England Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (1985): 242–52.

⁶⁶⁴ Scott, "Practical Sympathy With The United States."

⁶⁶⁵ Goldstein, "Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898," 29–30.

relations between Britain and America, and prompted him to begin a process of public and cultural diplomacy.⁶⁶⁶ It was through a network of connections made by both Hoar and Bayard that the process for obtaining the return of the book progressed, with the appropriate experts and officials consulted on the feasibility and legality of returning the document given that it resided in possession of the Bishop of London.⁶⁶⁷ Bayard presented a petition on behalf of the citizens and President of America to seek ‘an order of the Consistory Court of London’ to enable *The History of Plymouth Colony* to be ‘transferred to the President and citizens of the United States of America’.⁶⁶⁸ The return of the manuscript took place on the 26th of May 1897, with Bayard’s handing of the manuscript to Governor Wolcott forming the final official act of his political career in which he describes his primary aim as being to ‘place the affairs of these two great nations in the atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect and good will’.⁶⁶⁹ The return of *The History of Plymouth Colony* was but one of a series of symbolic transatlantic gestures which Goldstein argues helped to change the atmosphere in the relationship and ease the remnants of historical bitterness still strongly felt by many.⁶⁷⁰ The effectiveness of these measures can be explained in terms of the development of the affective dimension of trust through improving perceptions of goodwill and demonstrating empathy. The return of *The History of Plymouth Colony* relied on key individuals, in particular Bayard and Hoar, and the transnational informal and formal networks they were able to build. This transnational sub-diplomatic process, in addition to the formal and informal personal relations of Theodore Roosevelt, are but two examples which highlight the vital importance of key individuals in shaping the nature of trust in a bilateral relationship.

Military and Defence

While the development of trust across all three dimensions during this period was significant enough to support a *rapprochement*, the difficulties which plagued Anglo-American relations during WWI and the weakening of relations following the war highlight the limitations of that trust when compared to later decades. This section will begin by examining the strengths and weaknesses of cooperation during the war, including the difficulties faced in obtaining U.S. cooperation and entry into the war; the strengths and weaknesses of the direct military cooperation during the war; and the strengths and weaknesses of economic cooperation during the war. It will then go on to explore the nature of the interwar years, including economic competition and the

⁶⁶⁶ Goldstein, 30–31.

⁶⁶⁷ Goldstein, 32–33.

⁶⁶⁸ “Consistory Court of London,” *The Times*, March 26, 1897.

⁶⁶⁹ Bayard, Thomas, *Boston Globe Daily*, 27 May 1897, p. 5., quoted in Goldstein, “Diplomacy in the Service of History: Anglo-American Relations and the Return of the Bradford History of Plymouth Colony, 1898,” 36.

⁶⁷⁰ Goldstein, 37.

postwar frictions over British war debts and the Great Depression; and the impact of conflict over neutral rights at sea, which proved to be the nadir of the relationship during this period. Examining the difficulties of the interwar years will allow for a clearer understanding of the impact of WWI on the nature of the relationship as a whole.

Owing to the isolationist nature of both states during the *rapprochement* years, compared to the variety of military cooperation during and post-WWII, the only example of explicit military cooperation which took place prior is that of WWI. Owing to the high sensitivity involved in cooperation during military conflict, the cooperation which did occur during WWI highlights how far relations had come. On the other hand, the numerous frictions both during and following the war regarding economic rivalry and neutral rights at sea signifies the limitations of trust at this time. Of course, the United States did not join the war until the later years, and considerable tension arose over neutrality in the initial years of the war. In order to combat Germany's submarine warfare, the British implemented increasingly strict measures of economic strangulation which involved contentious interpretations of neutral rights at sea and saw American goods being transported to neutral European ports seized by British authorities.⁶⁷¹ This proved incredibly frustrating to the United States. The Secretary of State sent a letter to the American Ambassador in Britain asking him to communicate American dissatisfaction to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, although the letter did come with the request that it be done 'in the most friendly spirit'.⁶⁷² Additionally, while British actions in the war frustrated the U.S., German actions caused American loss of life, which in combination with Anglo-American cultural connections and the economic importance of Britain and France eventually overcame the U.S. desire for neutrality and pushed them into war.⁶⁷³ One place the importance of cultural connections became visible was in the realm of propaganda. As Bennet and Hampton outline, despite the emphasis placed on the bonds formed in World War II, 'much groundwork was built during World War I as the American press defined Allied war aims as a natural product of Anglo-American shared values'.⁶⁷⁴ Both British and American press sought to promote the importance of shared Anglo-American values, and the threat Germany posed to such values.⁶⁷⁵ The frictions

⁶⁷¹ Bruce M. Russett, *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), 8–9.

⁶⁷² The Secretary of State (Robert Lansing) to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Walter Hines Page), December 26 1914, reproduced in Joseph V. Fuller, ed., *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War, Document 559* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1928), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914Supp/d559>.

⁶⁷³ Russett, *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*, 9.

⁶⁷⁴ Jessica Bennet and Mark Hampton, "World War I and the Anglo-American Imagined Community: Civilization vs. Barbarism in British Propaganda and American Newspapers," in *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000*, ed. Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 155.

⁶⁷⁵ Bennet and Hampton, 172.

which took place in the early years of the war highlight that there were limitations on the presence of trust in the relationship at this time, however the cooperation and communication which did take place indicates the strengths of trust during the war.

Even the nature of direct Anglo-American cooperation during the war serves to highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of trust in the relationship at this stage. America entered the war on April 6 1917.⁶⁷⁶ Although Coogan argues that it was the value U.S. President Woodrow Wilson placed on Anglo-American friendship that drove him to abandon neutrality,⁶⁷⁷ there remained limitations to direct cooperation. When compared to the depth and breadth of cooperation during WWII, the cooperation which took place during WWI appears lacking. Significantly, unlike in WWII where Roosevelt and Churchill had a summit relationship, there was seemingly no consideration of establishing such a relationship between Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George.⁶⁷⁸ There also existed a complicated relationship between ambassadors, which meant that close cooperation through the official diplomatic channels was not possible.⁶⁷⁹ The American ambassador to Britain, Walter Hines Page, had alienated himself from the U.S. administration through his outspoken sympathy for Britain and criticism of American neutrality in the early years of the war and thus was not in a good position to deal with the British on their behalf.⁶⁸⁰ The British ambassador to America, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, did not have the good relationship with Wilson that he had shared with Roosevelt, and indeed his close ties with Roosevelt and the Republicans hampered his ability to deal with Wilson and his Democratic administration.⁶⁸¹ Consequently, much of war time cooperation was directed through a series of British missions to the U.S. The first of these missions was the Balfour Mission, which was sent within weeks of the U.S. joining the war.⁶⁸² This was partly because war efforts in the U.S. appeared confused and the British felt it was necessary for them to be ‘shocked into awareness’ to begin organising their war effort.⁶⁸³ The

⁶⁷⁶ The Secretary of State (Robert Lansing) to the Diplomatic Representatives in All Countries except Russia [circular telegram], 6 April 1917, reproduced in Joseph V. Fuller, ed., *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War, Document 313* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917Supp01v01/d313>.

⁶⁷⁷ John W. Coogan, *The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights 1899-1915* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 16.

⁶⁷⁸ Seth P. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 9.

⁶⁷⁹ Tillman, 8.

⁶⁸⁰ Indeed Hines conveyed in a letter in which he was sympathetic toward Britain’s war needs that he was afraid he would “seem influenced by sympathy with England”. See The Ambassador in Great Britain (Walter Hines Page) to the Secretary of State (William Jennings Bryan), October 15 1914, reproduced in Joseph V. Fuller, ed., *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War, Document 394* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1928), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914Supp/d394>.

⁶⁸¹ Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*, 9.

⁶⁸² Tillman, 9.

⁶⁸³ Kathleen Burk, *Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1985), 99.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, A. J. Balfour, was charged with heading up the mission and he proved to be greatly successful in his position. When rumours circulated of Northcliffe being sent on a similar mission the Secretary of State wrote stating that the ‘impression made by Mr. Balfour was so favorable’ that ‘nothing can be gained by sending another commission or a commissioner’.⁶⁸⁴ Particularly useful was the relationship which developed between Balfour and Wilson, wherein Balfour was able to communicate privately with Wilson and receive prompt responses.⁶⁸⁵ The Balfour Mission was succeeded by the later Northcliffe and Reading missions, which similarly promoted greater communication and cooperation regarding joint war aims.⁶⁸⁶ Even more so than these missions, Tillman argues that ‘the nerve center’ of Anglo-American cooperation centred on the relationship which developed between Wilson’s confidant Colonel House, and British Intelligence Officer Sir William Wiseman who remained in Washington following the Balfour mission.⁶⁸⁷ These close unofficial channels of communication and cooperation which formed out of necessity appear to have been incredibly successful at maintaining cooperation despite the difficulties at the official level, however the fact that the official level was unavailable as an option during war time cooperation clearly signifies the limitations of trust during this period.

Outside direct military cooperation, it was in the realm of economics that the greatest degree of Anglo-American interaction took place, which again serves to highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of the relationship at this time. The economic relationship during the war has been described by Kathleen Burk as forming ‘the sinews of war’.⁶⁸⁸ Even prior to its entrance in the war, a wide web of financial support had been woven stretching from the U.S. to Britain. The primary role of the U.S. throughout the war was as an ‘economic powerhouse’, supplying munitions, food, and money to Britain and other allies.⁶⁸⁹ This began in the early years of the war through private means,⁶⁹⁰ and later came to also include public means.⁶⁹¹ Burk argues that the strength of shared Anglo-American values and language ‘proved to be especially strong in the Anglo-American financial community’.⁶⁹² There were also, however, consistent difficulties with

⁶⁸⁴ Secretary of State (Robert Lansing) to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Walter Hines Page), 6 June 1917, reproduced in Joseph V. Fuller, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 2, The World War, Volume I, Document 118* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1932), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917Supp02v01/d118>.

⁶⁸⁵ Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*, 12.

⁶⁸⁶ Tillman, 13.

⁶⁸⁷ Tillman, 12.

⁶⁸⁸ See Burk, *Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918*.

⁶⁸⁹ Burk, 5.

⁶⁹⁰ See Burk, 11–98.

⁶⁹¹ See Burk, 97–220.

⁶⁹² Burk, 224.

this financial relationship both during and following the war, heightened by tensions regarding the shifting nature of power between the two states. There was a continuation of frictions regarding both economic and naval competition during the interwar years. Although the interwar years are marked as a period of American isolation, this isolation did not extend to economic affairs and in this space Britain was America's primary competitor.⁶⁹³ Pre-existing economic frictions were greatly exacerbated by the issue of WWI debts, and the Great Depression of 1929 only served to fan this smouldering fire of discontentment to an open blaze.⁶⁹⁴ Indeed, Dobson argues that 'by 1934 the whole postwar economic and security system fostered by the USA was unravelling and Anglo-American relations were deteriorating'.⁶⁹⁵ While the international economy declined into a deep recession, Britain defaulted on their war debts, and the growth of totalitarianism, economic autarchy, and authoritarianism increasingly threatened the now discredited capitalism, liberalism, and the free market.⁶⁹⁶ This resulted in a lack of 'active interaction' between Britain and America, which in alignment with the importance placed on social interaction in the trust literature, Dobson argues was the most damaging impact of the difficulties of this period on the Anglo-American relationship.⁶⁹⁷ The breadth of both tensions and strengths in the economic relationship between Britain and America during, and as a consequence of, WWI highlight that while there was clearly a solid foundation of trust present, there were also significant limitations to this trust.

The limitations of trust during the post-WWI period are clearly illustrated in an examination of the true nadir of the relationship during the interwar years, which involved naval rather than economic matters. As described above, significant tensions arose during WWI regarding neutral rights at sea. These difficulties were driven in part by differing maritime strategic cultures:

The two countries had different geographical visions. The United States saw itself as a compact land-mass with certain outlying island bastions. The British saw their world in the form of a network of maritime communications threatened with possible strangulation by predatory powers on their flanks.⁶⁹⁸

American President Woodrow Wilson felt particularly strongly regarding neutral rights at sea, as can be seen by his inclusion of 'freedom of the seas' as the first of his famous Fourteen Points

⁶⁹³ B. J. C. McKercher, *Britain, America, and the Special Relationship Since 1941* (Oxon: Routledge, 2017), 18.

⁶⁹⁴ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 65.

⁶⁹⁵ Dobson, 67.

⁶⁹⁶ Dobson, 67.

⁶⁹⁷ Dobson, 67.

⁶⁹⁸ Beloff, "The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth?," 163.

following the war.⁶⁹⁹ In addition to any personal liberal ideological beliefs regarding freedom of the seas, Wilson ‘came to the unalterable conclusion’ that the naval strength of Germany, Britain, and Japan, posed a threat to US economic interests.⁷⁰⁰ In response to the perceived need to protect US interests at sea, Wilson commenced a naval buildup following the end of the war which caused resentment among the British and Japanese, however neither were able to keep pace owing to the economic devastation of the war.⁷⁰¹ In addition to economic woes, these difficulties regarding neutral rights at sea were temporarily put to bed by a naval agreement reached in the early 1920s.⁷⁰² Difficulties again arose, however, in the late 1920s, with Dobson describing the nadir of the relationship in the interwar years as being the failure of the Geneva Three Power Naval Conference in 1927.⁷⁰³ The seriousness of the naval issue, particularly the case of belligerent rights at sea, is not to be underestimated. This issue had been a significant thorn in Anglo-American relations since the War of 1812, and Dobson describes it as the one remaining issue which could potentially have been a *casus belli* for the two states.⁷⁰⁴ This was, of course, also intimately related to the shifting power relations between the two states, with the ongoing rise of the United States, and decline of Britain. The difficulties in Anglo-American relations in the inter-war years, particularly with regards to neutral rights at sea, highlights the limitations of the trust which had been built both prior and during WWI. At the same time, however, the fact that the relationship survived without conflict and went on to be capable of the extensive breadth and depth of cooperation visible during and following WWII highlights that a significant degree of trust had been built during the early years of Anglo-American relations. As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the calculative dimension was dominant in driving the development of trust, but significant development has also been witnessed across the affective and normative dimensions. Incorporating the interplay of the three dimensions of trust across the breadth of the relationship within analysis has allowed for greater precision in understanding the state of the bilateral relationship during *rapprochement*, WWI, and the interwar years.

Society

It was not only governments which saw increased levels of interaction during *rapprochement*, but also societies. Examining the societal relationship further demonstrates the need to understand

⁶⁹⁹ Woodrow Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace [“The Fourteen Points”],” The American Presidency Project, January 8, 1918, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-joint-session-congress-the-conditions-peace-the-fourteen-points>.

⁷⁰⁰ Donald J. Lisio, *British Naval Supremacy and Anglo-American Antagonisms, 1914–1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5.

⁷⁰¹ Lisio, 8.

⁷⁰² Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 43.

⁷⁰³ Dobson, 43.

⁷⁰⁴ Dobson, 44.

trust across the whole of a bilateral relationship, and also provides insight into an important factor shaping the development of trust in the Anglo-American relationship. This section will focus on the transnational societal networks which were developed by women. A vital aspect to these transnational societal networks was the uptake in transatlantic marriages, primarily between wealthy American women and British men who were either politicians or lords. Two key examples were Mary Endicott Carnegie Chamberlain, who married Joseph Chamberlain, and Jennie Jerome Churchill, who married Lord Randolph Churchill. An example of their impact is their purchasing and operating of the hospital ship *Maine* during the Boer War, which was the first ship to sail under both British and American flags. Their influence is further demonstrated through examining the role of Jennie Churchill in using preventative diplomacy to stop war breaking out over the 1895 Venezuelan crisis, the philanthropic work organised by Anglo-American women during WWI, and how these actions built trust in the Anglo-American relationship.

The connections forged across the Atlantic by women provide a valuable example of how social connections can dramatically alter the terrain of a bilateral relationship, including among those who are often overlooked as sources of agency in relationships between states. The transatlantic marriages which took place predominantly between American women and British men enabled broader societal interactions to take place between individuals of the two states, coinciding with the increased peaceful interactions of political elites owing to the uptake in international arbitration. A number of these women married key British political figures, and became what Dana Cooper refers to as ‘informal ambassadors’.⁷⁰⁵ Two prominent examples of such women include Mary Endicott Chamberlain Carnegie, the wife of Joseph Chamberlain and stepmother of Neville Chamberlain, and Jennie Jerome Churchill, the wife of Lord Randolph Churchill and mother of Winston Churchill. As Cooper outlines, Mary Chamberlain wielded considerable influence in British high society and politics.⁷⁰⁶ In fact, Mary so impressed Queen Victoria that she was one of the few non-royals presented with a Golden Jubilee Medal.⁷⁰⁷ Cooper argues that ‘following their wedding, Joseph’s political speeches took on a decidedly pro-Anglo-Saxon tone’.⁷⁰⁸ Considering the strength of Joseph Chamberlain’s enthusiasm for an Anglo-Saxon alliance, this was no small degree of influence. Jennie Jerome Churchill had a similarly profound influence on the course of

⁷⁰⁵ See Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*.

⁷⁰⁶ Cooper, 84; See also Mary Endicott Chamberlain’s political writing on nursing and the British Empire: Mary Endicott Chamberlain, “An Obligation of Empire,” *The North American Review* 170, no. 521 (1900): 493–503.

⁷⁰⁷ Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*, 84.

⁷⁰⁸ Cooper, 5.

Anglo-American relations. Lord Randolph Churchill held little interest in political office, running only owing to it being a condition of his parents in allowing him to marry, and consequently involved his wife in his career from the outset.⁷⁰⁹ Jennie initially faced greater pressure as an ambassador than Mary given that, in the 1870s, she was the sole representative of her country.⁷¹⁰ Her influence was such that she was referred to as the most ‘significant woman in English politics apart from the Queen’.⁷¹¹ Both Mary and Jennie, as but two examples among many, managed to wield considerable influence both through their politically engaged husbands and also in their own right. The extent of their influence shaped perceptions of Americans in Britain, particularly given that for many British people, the British-wed American women were the only Americans they ever met.⁷¹² Jennie in particular, as the first of the American women to marry a British elite, was the sole representative of her country in Britain.⁷¹³ Despite her frustration at how British viewed Americans as one and the same no matter which region of America they hailed from, Jennie carefully turned being the lone informal ambassador of her home country to her advantage through actively ensuring her life displayed ‘all the positive characteristics of American women specifically and all Americans in general’.⁷¹⁴ Thus American women marrying British elites shaped perceptions of America as a whole within Britain, in addition to them being socially and politically influential in their own right, and consequently contributed no small amount to building trust between the two states and stabilising relations.

The influence of American women in British society and politics only becomes more apparent in an examination of their efforts to purchase a hospital ship and provide assistance during the Boer War. Lady Churchill was the driving force behind the plan, forming a committee of her peers, including Mary Endicott Chamberlain, and immediately laying plans to seek funds and a ship.⁷¹⁵ Despite the strong anti-British and pro-Boer sentiment in the U.S., the American women living in Britain were able to procure exclusively American funds for their venture through an appeal which not only made a case on humanitarian grounds, but also on the grounds of reciprocity for prior tacit British support of America in their war efforts:

And whereas the people of Great Britain have, by their sympathy and moral support,

⁷⁰⁹ Cooper, 45.

⁷¹⁰ Cooper, 46.

⁷¹¹ Cooper, 51.

⁷¹² Cooper, “Country by Birth, Country by Marriage: American Women’s Transnational War Efforts in Great Britain, 1895-1918,” 60.

⁷¹³ Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*, 46.

⁷¹⁴ Cooper, 47.

⁷¹⁵ Mrs. George Cornwallis-West, *The Reminiscences of Lady Randolph Churchill* (New York: The Century Co., 1908), 399.

materially aided the people of the United States of America in the war in Cuba and the Philippine Islands; *it is therefore resolved*: That the American women in Great Britain, whilst deploring the necessity for war, shall endeavor to raise, among their compatriots, here and in America, a fund for the relief of the sick and wounded soldiers and refugees in South Africa.⁷¹⁶

The ship they acquired was named the *Maine*, and as the Duke of Connaught stated when presenting the ship with the Union Jack on behalf of the Queen it was the first ship to sail under both British and American flags:

Never before has a ship sailed under the combined flags of the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes; and it marks, I hope, an occasion which brings out that feeling of generosity and affection that the two countries have for each other.⁷¹⁷

Lady Churchill's significant social and political influence was fundamental to the success of this transnational venture. Not only was she instrumental in accruing funds, but she was also able to negotiate special exemptions from the War Office to give the *Maine* committee "unusual privileges".⁷¹⁸ Consequently, this committee of American women 'to a great extent controlled a British hospital ship in wartime'.⁷¹⁹ As Kahn outlines, 'her social position and personal appeal, as well as the British-American politics of the situation, allowed her to exercise a degree of authority not usually tolerated by the military'.⁷²⁰ The venture was a truly transatlantic, transnational venture, with a ship funded by American money, fundraised by American women living in Britain, staffed by both British and American personnel, to provide medical aid in a British war. Given the influence of the venture and the women involved in its creation, Thurmond argues that both should 'be included in rapprochement scholarship'.⁷²¹ This is certainly the case, given the influential role the American women living in Britain played in both improving Anglo-American relations generally, and in the success of the *Maine* venture, through the social and political connections they were able to forge, and the trust this built.

A broader range of transnational activism across the Atlantic driven by women serves to further highlight the role of societal connections in shaping trust across all three dimensions in the Anglo-American relationship. These social connections were put to use throughout various conflicts in

⁷¹⁶ Cornwallis-West, 400.

⁷¹⁷ Cornwallis-West, 413.

⁷¹⁸ Richard J. Kahn, "Women and Men at Sea: Gender Debate Aboard the Hospital Ship *Maine* during the Boer War," *Journal of the History of Medicine* 56, no. 1 (2001): 119.

⁷¹⁹ Kahn, 137.

⁷²⁰ Kahn, 127.

⁷²¹ Aubri E. Thurmond, "Under Two Flags: Rapprochement and the American Hospital Ship *Maine*" (Texas Women's University, 2014), 6.

addition to the example of the *Maine* during the Boer War. If anything, Lady Churchill appears to have had a greater influence on Anglo-American relations following the death of her husband in early 1895.⁷²² Cooper describes Lady Churchill as the leader of the Anglo-American community in London over a thirty year period, during which time the community ‘carved out a niche for themselves in Great Britain as informal diplomatists, military philanthropists, racially-motivated imperialists, and transnational activists between their two countries in preventing and supporting war efforts’.⁷²³ One such example of a preventative war effort came with the Venezuelan conflict in 1895. Lady Churchill began hosting frequent dinner parties for people influential in British politics, attempting to break through the security dilemma the two states had found themselves in through reassuring these leaders that the United States was not seriously interested in war.⁷²⁴ Her influence was such that one American newspaper claimed ‘Lady Churchill Was U.S. Best Ambassador’,⁷²⁵ while a British newspaper claimed that ‘if there should come hard war talk, Lady Randolph Churchill would set out lecturing ... and her talks would put things straight in a short time’.⁷²⁶ The Anglo- American community in Britain soon became formalized, with the Society of American Women in London being founded in May 1899 and drawing its membership from not only British-wed American women but also a broader network of transatlantic elites.⁷²⁷ While initially largely a social forum, following the outbreak of WWI the society focused its efforts on philanthropic work. Not only did the society create a sub-agency named the American Women’s War Relief Fund (AWWRF), but in 1916 the society itself changed its name to the American Women’s Club to avoid any misconception that the organisation was focused on social activities during war.⁷²⁸ Across both groups, activities undertaken included helping unaccompanied women travelling in Britain when war began, facilitating the return of 26, 000 women to the U.S., fundraising, setting up hospitals, producing military provisions such as clothing, and coordinating the employment of women needed to fill men’s jobs.⁷²⁹ American-born Consuelo Vanderbilt, the Duchess of Marlborough, who became a leading figure in the Anglo-American women’s community, was able to acquire 10, 000 volunteers with only her first plea for volunteers needed

⁷²² Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*, 55.

⁷²³ Cooper, “Country by Birth, Country by Marriage: American Women’s Transnational War Efforts in Great Britain, 1895-1918,” 52.

⁷²⁴ D. Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945*, 56-57.

⁷²⁵ “Lady Churchill Was U.S. Best ‘Ambassador,’” *Boston Post*, July 10, 1921.

⁷²⁶ New York Journal, undated clipping, quoted in Elizabeth Eliot, *They All Married Well* (London: Cassell, 1960).

⁷²⁷ Cooper, “Country by Birth, Country by Marriage: American Women’s Transnational War Efforts in Great Britain, 1895-1918,” 53.

⁷²⁸ Cooper, 55–57.

⁷²⁹ Cooper, 55–59.

to fill men's jobs only a few days after the war began.⁷³⁰ As Cooper puts it, 'the sheer scope and size of the AWWRF demonstrates the increasing complexity of the transnational work of American women in Great Britain at the turn of the century'.⁷³¹ So too does it indicate the increasing complexity of the social connections being forged across the Atlantic by women. The impact of these connections and the influence of these women on transatlantic relations as a whole was certainly not insignificant, and contributed to the growing closeness of Britain and America decades prior to the advent of the "special relationship". Trust was developed across all three dimensions, through strengthening shared perceptions of joint goals and interests, forging affective relationships in the process of driving cooperation, and causing British and Americans to be more likely to "think like," "feel like," and "respond like" one another.

Conclusion

Through an examination of the presence of the three dimensions of trust across the government, military, and societal domains during the early years of the Anglo-American relationship, this chapter has illustrated that the emergence of the "special relationship" during WWII was not inherently pre-ordained nor inevitable. A trust-based framework helps to overcome the issues of the post-WWII mythicization of the relationship, and the focus on the dichotomy of sentiments and interests as forming the basis of the relationship. This chapter has responded to the research questions posed in this thesis through demonstrating that a multidimensional trust framework applied using a flat ontology can analyse social trust in a way which incorporates the role of a variety of actors, as well as the role of interpersonal relations. By exploring the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship as conceptualised through a flat ontology, this chapter has provided analytical insights into the role trust played in Anglo-American relations during *rapprochement*, WWI, and the interwar years.

The value of a multidimensional trust framework has been demonstrated through its ability to incorporate the wide variety of factors considered to be important in Anglo-American relations and analyse how they shaped the improvements and struggles in the relationship prior to WWII. The interplay of interests and perceptions of interests, affective relations between key individuals, and the development of normative trust inclining the British and Americans to more commonly "think like", "feel like", and "respond like" one another were the driving forces behind the Anglo-American *rapprochement*. Although the development of trust in Anglo-American relations prior

⁷³⁰ Cooper, 58–59.

⁷³¹ Cooper, 59.

to WWII was clearly patchwork and uneven in nature, the trust which did develop in some form across all dimensions and levels was not insignificant and contributed to the capacity of the relationship to be able to form the WWII alliance.

The calculative dimension of trust was unquestionably evident during the early years of the Anglo-American relationship. British and American interests came increasingly into alignment, as each expanded their external interests and were subsequently required to protect them, particularly from the continental European powers. This helped to shape their respective strategic cultures, shifting each state away from their unique forms of isolation. At the same time, the two states came to commonly resolve disputes resulting from their divergent interests via the means of arbitration. This, combined with increased interactions between societies and elites, created room for social learning. As Britain and America came to understand more about one another, the affective dimension of trust grew. This was particularly prominent among key individuals whose perceptions shaped the strategic cultures of both states. Although the normative dimension of trust was clearly limited in comparison with its post-WWII counterpart, its presence still contributed to the improvements in the relationship through shaping the perceptions of key individuals and their willingness to pursue trusting relationships with each other and cooperate on shared interests. The growth of all three dimensions of trust throughout this period, but in particular the growth of the calculative dimension of trust, facilitated the considerable improvements seen in Anglo-American relations during and following the period of *rapprochement*.

The significance of trust in the context of Anglo-American relations becomes more apparent through the examination of examples drawn from across the government, military, and societal domains of the relationship. Each example was limited in its reflection of the domain as a whole across the entirety of the time period in question. The government domain focused on an example drawn from the earlier *rapprochement* period, as did the society example, while the example from the military domain focused on WWI. Despite the limitations of each example, examining these slices of the relationship in particular domains and at particular times serves to further understanding of social trust in Anglo-American relations. First, at the government level the interplay of the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions of trust was evident in Theodore Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy through a coterie of close personal friends. This group of individuals tended to view British and American interests as being increasingly aligned, had strong affective bonds with one another, and saw the relationship through the lens of shared values and Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. Second, at the military level the limitations and strengths of the presence of trust in the relationship were analysed. Given the high sensitivity of military and

defence cooperation, any joint planning and cooperation during WWI serves as a positive indicator of the strengths of trust which did exist. The difficulties in joint war planning and official communication between the two states also highlights the weaknesses which remained, as do the tensions of the interwar years. Third, in the domain of society the web of transatlantic networks built by women also illustrate the interwoven nature of the dimensions of trust and how they shaped bilateral relations. The American women who married British men had an interest in promoting good relations between their two homes, and the affective and normative bonds they were able to build across the Atlantic shaped their capacity for successful transatlantic activism, and their social and political influence. The interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of relationship is clearly evident in all of these cases. This both demonstrates the utility of a multidimensional trust framework applied using a flat ontology in analysing social trust, and enables a multidimensional trust framework to reveal valuable insights into the development of trust in the Anglo-American relationship prior to WWII.

Chapter Four

The Birth and Development of the “Special Relationship” during WWII

Introduction

The WWII alliance between Britain and America is often viewed as heralding the beginning of the “special relationship”, given the development of the close military, intelligence, and nuclear ties which would later form the heart of the institutionalised relationship.⁷³² Whether one traces this to the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases Deal,⁷³³ or Winston Churchill’s Sinews of Peace speech in 1946,⁷³⁴ it is the unparalleled cooperation which took place during the war that has been the focus of the term “special.”⁷³⁵ Additionally, many attribute the very existence of a “special relationship” to Churchill personally, not only as it relates to his wartime decisions but also his role as historian and active constructor of trust and specialness.⁷³⁶ Of course, a number of scholars do point to the importance of examining the relationship prior to WWII.⁷³⁷ This thesis confirms the need to begin analysis before the war, as the history of interactions, particularly from *rapprochement* onwards, contributed to the development of trust. It was this development of trust which meant Britain and America were willing to accept vulnerability to one another and cooperate closely when the outbreak of war brought their interests into alignment and strengthened the calculative dimension of trust. A theoretical framework of trust furthers understanding of the Anglo-American relationship through capturing how different factors broadly associated with interests and sentiments intersubjectively shaped the development of trust in the relationship. All three dimensions of trust are clearly present in this period, with the calculative dimension strengthening further, and the affective and normative dimensions expanding significantly owing to close

⁷³² For an analysis of the importance of these institutionalised relationships, see Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*.

⁷³³ As, for example, Dobson and Marsh, “Introduction,” 7; Haglund, “Is There a ‘Strategic Culture’ of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations,” 35; For a review of the historiographical positions on the origins of the “special relationship”, see Peter L. Hahn, “Discord or Accommodation? Britain and the United States in World Affairs, 1945-92,” in *Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership*, ed. Fred M. Leventhal and Roland Quinault (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000), 276–93.

⁷³⁴ As Churchill was the first to refer to the relationship as “special.” See Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’).”

⁷³⁵ Danchev, “On Specialness,” 743.

⁷³⁶ Reynolds, for example, argues that: “The wartime alliance was Winston Churchill’s creation. That is a statement about historiography as much as history.” Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-45: Towards a New Synthesis,” 17.

⁷³⁷ Edwards does so by highlighting the impact of cultural Anglo-Saxonism and Churchill and thus the role Churchill played. Kimball points to the impact of two centuries of shared values and ideologies which “inclined” Britain and America to one another. Raymond argues that the relationship has “the patina of antiquity” and what makes the relationship special is how much of the U.S. political, economic, and legal systems are British. See Edwards, “The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill’s Special Relationship, c. 1919-69”; Kimball, “The Anglo-American Relationship: Still Special After All These Years,” 213; Raymond, “The U.S-UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lessons From the Past.”

wartime interactions and cooperation. The interplay of the dimensions across the domains of the relationship reveals further insights into how the wartime alliance was created, operated, and then transformed and institutionalised following the end of the war.

A multidimensional trust-based approach highlights the need to study the development of trust over time. The alliance which emerged during the Second World War drew on personal connections which had existed prior to the war, as well as perceptions of one another which had emerged through various interactions between various people over time. The calculative dimension of trust is influenced by perceptions of shared interests, which in turn is based on identity factors and strategic cultures which were shaped by the onset of war, but emerged from prior interactions and experiences. A similar story exists for the affective and normative dimensions, both of which also drew on perceptions and identity factors which had been developed over time. This chapter will explore this process, through first providing an overview of the wartime relationship through the lens of the dimensions of trust. The calculative dimension is seen to be strong, but tensions remained regarding imperial and economic policies. These tensions required the presence of affective trust to manage. The comparison of the two American ambassadors to Britain during the war, Joseph P. Kennedy and John Gilbert Winant, will reveal the value of the affective dimension of trust. The normative dimension of trust was also valuable, and an examination of the four indicators of shared values, the presence of a joint product or goal, colocation, and collective identity will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the normative dimension during WWII. The interplay of the dimensions will then be explored through examples: the relationship between Churchill, Roosevelt, and a key group of associates; the interactions between the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and the people managing the Combined Munitions Boards which conducted the military and supply planning; the difficult emergence of a nuclear relationship; the more promising emergence and solidification of an intelligence relationship; and the way in which propaganda formed a conduit between societies which facilitated indirect interactions which shaped perceptions of one another and the development of trust. All of these examples demonstrate that the relationship cannot be viewed as having a fixed origin point in the creation of the WWII alliance, and further demonstrate the utility of using a multidimensional trust framework to analyse the development of trust over time through exploring the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship.

The Dimensions of Trust

Calculative

WWII served to bring American and British interests closer together and facilitate the formation of their now famous wartime alliance. This section will provide an overview of how this happened, and how the difficulties which remained were managed. First, the strength of U.S. isolationism meant it did not immediately enter the war, but began slowly sliding away from neutrality from the outset as Roosevelt actively encouraged the public to see their interests as tied to Britain. Second, the need for affective relationships between individuals highlights that the calculative dimension was not sufficient to manage the tensions still present in the relationship even following American entry into the war. Two key examples of such tensions will then be examined: the American distaste of British colonialism and British fears of American economic imperialism, and tensions regarding economic policies. The fact that these tensions and suspicions regarding each other's intentions remained illustrate the limitations of the calculative dimension of trust, however the way in which they were managed in the midst of an expansive wartime alliance illustrates the vital role of the other dimensions of trust in shaping understandings of shared interests.

Where during the *rapprochement* years shared concerns regarding the geopolitical ambitions of continental European powers had driven American and British interests toward a closer alignment, World War II naturally served to have the same effect. Of course, the United States did not join immediately in the war effort. American isolationism following the costs of WWI had become deeply rooted among both American politicians and the public. Even before their official entry in the war following the attack on Pearl Harbour on the 7th of December 1941, the United States had been gradually sliding away from neutrality through aiding Britain's war effort.⁷³⁸ Continuing earlier trends regarding the nature of the U.S. political system and environment, Roosevelt had to struggle against domestic opposition to the war in order to reach a place where the Neutrality Act could be revised in late 1939, enabling the arms embargo to be lifted.⁷³⁹ Even before the war began, Roosevelt responded to German aggression by stating in January 1939 that America 'must now defend themselves and that there were methods, short of war, of making their views felt'.⁷⁴⁰ Following the beginning of the war, Roosevelt understood that both American

⁷³⁸ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 72–73.

⁷³⁹ Dobson, 73.

⁷⁴⁰ "Democracy and Peace," *The Times*, January 5, 1939.

society and much of the American government did not view their interests and Britain's as being particularly shared owing in large part to American isolationism. Without this core of shared interests, the calculative dimension of trust was lacking. Therefore, he put considerable effort into convincing Americans that American interests were tied to Britain:

... the best immediate defense of the United States is the success of Great Britain in defending itself; and that, therefore, quite aside from our historic and current interest in the survival of democracy, in the world as a whole, it is equally important from a selfish point of view of American defense, that we should do everything to help the British Empire to defend itself.⁷⁴¹

Understanding the need to balance these sentiments with respect for isolationist values, Roosevelt subsequently warned in January 1940 'that, while the United States would not become involved in military participation in the war, its citizens could not hide behind the "high wall of isolation" while the rest of civilization was being shattered'.⁷⁴² The limitations of public opinion began to ease somewhat as feelings shifted following the fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war, and even more so with the bombing of Britain. While the domestic audience largely remained strongly opposed to entry in the war, they were prepared to 'send anything but men' in an effort to provide 'all possible aid to the Allies short of war'.⁷⁴³ Their willingness to aid in this way was partly a result of Roosevelt's efforts to strengthen the calculative dimension of trust through fuelling perceptions of shared interests regarding the need to protect shared democratic values, in combination with the residual affective and normative trust which existed in the Anglo-American relationship.

Following American entry into the war prompted by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, expansive cooperation on the now joint war effort commenced. The calculative dimension of trust strengthened dramatically, as the war efforts of the two states were inextricably bound together. It must also be noted that while much of wartime cooperation was close and expansive, even wartime cooperation faced difficulties, indicating the limitations of trust which remained in the relationship. Many of these difficulties were products of the need to manage U.S. domestic politics relating to isolationism. Despite the tendency until the 1970s to mythicise the special nature of the relationship based on the works of Winston Churchill, from the 1970s onwards this is a conceptualisation of the relationship which has been challenged based on the opening of wartime archives.⁷⁴⁴ Notably, interests diverged in the Pacific and the Middle East

⁷⁴¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Press Conference," The American Presidency Project, December 17, 1940, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15913>.

⁷⁴² "Mr. Roosevelt Surveys the War," *The Times*, January 4, 1940.

⁷⁴³ "Send Anything But Men," *The Times*, June 17, 1940.

⁷⁴⁴ David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s*

relating to colonial policy, as well as regarding differing opinions on empire and decolonisation more broadly, and conflictual economic policies.⁷⁴⁵ Reynolds argues that one of the most significant factors in achieving and maintaining close Anglo-American cooperation was the personal connections which formed, most importantly between middle-ranking officers and bureaucrats who had more opportunities to interact and form friendships as they crossed the Atlantic more frequently.⁷⁴⁶ This highlights that the calculative dimension alone would not have been enough to sustain cooperation on such highly sensitive matters. Despite the limitations of cooperation prior to U.S. entry in the war, and the difficulties which arose in cooperation during the war, it remains a pre-eminent example of a trusting alliance relationship:

In terms of the intimacy of personal relationships, the strategic direction of forces, the allocation of war materials, the co-ordination of communications, and the cooperation between the armed forces and intelligence agencies, most writers agree that the wartime alliance between the two states was not only very close but perhaps unique in the history of war.⁷⁴⁷

In addition, collaboration on the atom bomb, shared command of each other's troops, U.S. Lend-Lease aid, joint planning of the peace, the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt, and the relationships formed from the wide-spread interactions between British and American individuals, all lend credence to the argument that 'the Anglo-American experience was broad, deep and intimate'.⁷⁴⁸

The difficulties of managing suspicions regarding imperial intentions indicates the limitations of the calculative dimension. As had been the case prior to the war and would continue to be the case following the end of the war, British colonialism proved to be a key irritant to good Anglo-American relations. These sentiments were strengthened after the fall of Singapore, which had brought into question not only British colonialism but also its capabilities.⁷⁴⁹ During WWII, however, the British also had their own suspicions regarding American colonial intentions. While they believed figures such as Hull and Acheson were sincere in their internationalism,⁷⁵⁰ it was also recognised that there remained a group of isolationists, and a group of individuals willing to 'use every advantage America possesses in a campaign of aggressive economic imperialism'.⁷⁵¹

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 69.

⁷⁴⁵ Reynolds, 69.

⁷⁴⁶ Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation*, 267.

⁷⁴⁷ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984*, 1.

⁷⁴⁸ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 73.

⁷⁴⁹ Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*, 149.

⁷⁵⁰ Thorne, 139-40.

⁷⁵¹ "The American Debate," *The Times*, March 31, 1944.

These fears of ‘economic imperialism’ were manifest in Air Marshal Tedder’s concerns of ‘blatant commercial manoeuvrings over trans-African and other air routes’,⁷⁵² and the Secretary of State for War James Grigg’s warning that the Americans ‘are busily engaged in laying the foundations for post-war commercial penetration’.⁷⁵³ Churchill in particular grew frustrated over the perceived hypocrisy of America accusing Britain of playing ‘power politics’ while engaging in ‘economic imperialism’ themselves, drafting a letter to Stettinius demanding to know what he meant by power politics:

Is having a Navy twice as strong as any other “power politics”? Is having an overwhelming Air Force, with bases all over the world, “power politics”? If not, what is “power politics”?⁷⁵⁴

The suspicions of imperial intentions on both sides during WWII reveal areas where interests were in conflict and the calculative dimension was weak. As will be discussed later, this was particularly the case in the Pacific theatre of the war, where there were fewer opportunities for interactions between individuals and therefore less room for the development of the affective and normative dimensions of trust.

The difficulty of managing conflicting interests is also apparent in relation to economic matters. The U.S. aided Britain through the provision of supplies, including munitions and armaments, and the economic aspect of such aid became increasingly important. On the 7th of December 1940, Churchill was forced to concede to Roosevelt that ‘the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies’.⁷⁵⁵ Britain had reached a state of ‘*de facto* international bankruptcy’, and Dobson argues that this ‘dictated the course of Anglo- American economic relations over the following five years’.⁷⁵⁶ The conflictual economic relationship was of course not new, but it had transformed over the course of the war. This led Reynolds, in an earlier book, to term the relationship one of ‘competitive cooperation’.⁷⁵⁷ While the British desperately wanted both financial and military help from the U.S., they also held fears that ‘U.S. intervention, if it could be achieved, would mean intervention in everything’.⁷⁵⁸ Philip Gannon argues that the cost of waging war led Britain to two primary economic responses: to pursue policies in the Sterling Area which protected the British pound, and to pursue economic aid from

⁷⁵² Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*, 140.

⁷⁵³ Grigg to Grigg [father], 9 September 1943, quoted in Thorne, 280.

⁷⁵⁴ Churchill to Halifax, 8 January 1945, quoted in Thorne, 515.

⁷⁵⁵ Churchill to Roosevelt, December 7 1940, reproduced in Kimball, *Churchill & Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence: I. Alliance Emerging October 1933-November 1942*, 102–9.

⁷⁵⁶ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 84.

⁷⁵⁷ See Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation*.

⁷⁵⁸ Reynolds, 13.

the U.S. in the form of the Lend-Lease agreement.⁷⁵⁹ These two policies in combination were problematic, given that the U.S. had long opposed the imperial preference system which had been set up in 1932, in the first significant example of peacetime protectionist policy since 1846.⁷⁶⁰ Consequently, the U.S. attempted to use Lend-Lease to shape British economic policy away from their imperial preference system of economic policies. American policy-makers struggled to accept that Britain could be struggling so badly economically given their colonial presence.⁷⁶¹ This meant that American officials, driven by the views of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, were more willing to simultaneously aid Britain and use this aid ‘as a lever to force Britain to eliminate the imperial preference system and extend the Open Door to America throughout the empire’.⁷⁶² Kimball argues that despite their coercive nature, these policies were not seeking to cause harm to their ally.⁷⁶³ Rather, U.S. coercive economic policies were driven by American perceptions of British colonial wealth, the belief in the Wilsonian argument regarding the relationship between peace and liberal economic systems, the political need to be seen as striking a good bargain in the Lend-Lease negotiations, fears of Britain renewing the economic policies which they believed had driven depression and war, and also ‘saving Great Britain from herself’.⁷⁶⁴ The fact that the conflicting interests of economic and colonial policies were able to be managed while the joint war effort continued indicates the strengths of the affective and normative dimensions of trust, however the difficulties associated with doing so also reveal their confines.

Affective

This section will focus on the impact of the U.S. ambassadors to Britain during the war, as they played a key role in building affective trust in America within British society, as well as forging trusting ties with key British officials. The limitations of the first of these ambassadors, Joseph P. Kennedy, will be contrasted with the more substantial impact of the second, John Gilbert Winant. Kennedy may have developed a close relationship with Chamberlain, and his family were effective ambassadors in their own right, however he lacked the trust of his own president and lost the trust of the British people over the course of his tenure. Comparatively, Winant contributed significantly to building the affective trust of the British people in America through his willingness to campaign for increased American aid and to walk the streets of London during the Blitz.

⁷⁵⁹ Philip Gannon, “The Special Relationship and the 1945 Anglo-American Loan,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 12, no. 1 (2014): 2.

⁷⁶⁰ Alan P. Dobson, *US Wartime Aid to Britain 1940-1946* (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 3.

⁷⁶¹ Warren F. Kimball, “Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence,” *Political Science Quarterly* 86, no. 2 (1971): 242.

⁷⁶² Kimball, 242.

⁷⁶³ Kimball, 258.

⁷⁶⁴ Kimball, 258.

Joseph P. Kennedy had a significant impact despite his short tenure and his poor relationship with his own president. Ambassador Kennedy managed to immediately develop a good relationship with Chamberlain which only deepened over time. As Rofe outlines, ‘relations between Prime Minister and Ambassador were *special* in many regards’.⁷⁶⁵ Kennedy’s family, which he brought with him to Britain, perhaps played a more significant role than he did in building trust. Kennedy and his wife, Rose, brought nine children with them to London including, notably, their second eldest John F. Kennedy.⁷⁶⁶ The Kennedys were treated like celebrities in London, aided by Joseph Kennedy’s Hollywood background and his public relations team.⁷⁶⁷ The fourth eldest Kennedy, Kathleen, was the biggest hit, having been marked down as a star of the upcoming social season before even arriving in the country.⁷⁶⁸ The effectiveness of the whole family as an ambassadorial team was recognised at the time, with *Life* magazine pointing out that Roosevelt had ‘got eleven Ambassadors for the price of one’, and that England had received them well, having been ‘amazed and delighted at the spectacle of an Ambassadorial family big enough to man a full-sized cricket team’.⁷⁶⁹ No matter how much the family endeared themselves to the British, however, Joseph Kennedy did not have the trust of his own president, and nor did he manage to strike up a good relationship with Churchill. He also lost trust among the British public and politicians as war became more likely in late 1938-early 1939, and Kennedy gave pessimistic speeches on Britain’s prospects.⁷⁷⁰ While Kennedy and his family were able to forge early elite connections, Kennedy’s failure to obtain the trust of Roosevelt or Churchill, and falling British opinion greatly harmed his capacity to contribute to building trust in the Anglo-American relationship.

Kennedy was replaced by John Gilbert Winant, who was a far more effective facilitator of trust in the relationship. His biggest contribution was the psychological effect his presence and actions had on the British people, thus serving to build the trust of the British public in America. Reynolds argues that figures such as Winant did not play a big role in the creation of the Anglo- American alliance owing to Roosevelt’s preference for personal emissaries.⁷⁷¹ What Winant did do, however, was play a key role in building societal trust. Even from the beginning, his ambassadorship was notable. In a unique breach of protocol, King George VI himself met Winant

⁷⁶⁵ J. Simon Rofe, “Joseph P. Kennedy, 1938-40,” in *The Embassy in Grosvenor Square: American Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, 1938-2008*, ed. Alison R. Holmes and J. Simon Rofe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 41.

⁷⁶⁶ Swift, Will, *The Kennedy’s Amidst the Gathering Storm: A Thousand Days In London, 1938-1940* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), xxiv.

⁷⁶⁷ Swift, Will, 35.

⁷⁶⁸ Swift, Will, 35.

⁷⁶⁹ “The Nine Kennedy Kids Delight Great Britain,” *Life*, April 11, 1938, 17.

⁷⁷⁰ Swift, Will, *The Kennedy’s Amidst the Gathering Storm: A Thousand Days In London, 1938-1940*, 130.

⁷⁷¹ Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation*, 179.

at the train station upon his arrival.⁷⁷² This, of course, underscored Britain's deep need to impress upon the Americans their desperate need for American aid in the war.⁷⁷³ Particularly when compared to his predecessor, Winant was viewed as a favourable candidate for the ambassadorship. The most significant difference between Winant and Kennedy was Winant's willingness to campaign for increased American aid to Britain. As a consequence, Lehrman argues that 'Winant's presence reassured Britain in 1941', easing their anxiety prior to America's entrance in the war in December of that year.⁷⁷⁴ While Churchill preferred Hopkins and Harriman, he did also like Winant.⁷⁷⁵ Additionally, Winant established a close relationship with Anthony Eden, who held several key posts throughout the war. Eden and Winant worked closely together, conducting most of their business in informal private conversations, and even spent time gardening together at Eden's Sussex home.⁷⁷⁶ Thus in the lead up to the war, Winant was able to build some important personal relations and demonstrate early signs of the reassurance of British society which would go on to be his key contribution to Anglo-American relations.

Winant's reassuring presence became exponentially more valuable following the onset of the London Blitz. His presence made an invaluable psychological contribution to British morale:

His main contribution resided less in the realm of tangible business than in the psychological effect of his presence. He intended to reassure Britons – across a broad spectrum of caste, party, region – of US solidarity with them, that Washington would do everything, short of illegality and to the limit of what churning public opinion could abide, to ensure British security.⁷⁷⁷

A key way in which he reassured the British people was through his courage in walking the London streets during air raids. At his farewell dinner following the end of the war, the then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin reminisced that Winant 'gave me a feeling that there were some people in the world still left who had faith in Great Britain', and argued that 'he shared our sorrows'.⁷⁷⁸ Having witnessed the struggles of Britain at war, Winant made sure to relay these to the American people whenever he was in America, where he had a good media presence across newspaper, magazine, and radio.⁷⁷⁹ Meanwhile, in Britain he made sure to reassure the British

⁷⁷² Lynne Olson, *Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour* (New York: Random House, 2010), 3–4.

⁷⁷³ Olson, 4.

⁷⁷⁴ Lehrman, *Churchill, Roosevelt & Company: Studies in Character and Statecraft*, 96.

⁷⁷⁵ See Lehrman, *Churchill, Roosevelt & Company: Studies in Character and Statecraft*.

⁷⁷⁶ David Mayers, "John Gilbert Winant, 1941-46," in *The Embassy in Grosvenor Square: American Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, 1938-2008*, ed. Alison R. Holmes and J. Simon Rofe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 51.

⁷⁷⁷ Mayers, 52.

⁷⁷⁸ "Farewell Dinner To Mr. Winant," *The Times*, April 24, 1946.

⁷⁷⁹ Mayers, "John Gilbert Winant, 1941-46," 55.

people of the heroic nature of their efforts, and maintain their faith in US assistance. In his speech to the Pilgrims society, he told the British that ‘it is your honour and destiny to man the bridgehead of humanity’s hopes’ and reassured them that ‘the American people ... will provide the tools – the ships, the planes, the guns, the ammunition and the food – for all those here and everywhere who defend with their lives freedom’s frontiers’.⁷⁸⁰ Winant’s role in reassuring British politicians and the British public that they were not alone was invaluable in developing and maintaining affective trust between Britain and America prior to America’s entrance in the war.

Normative

As affective trust helped to facilitate cooperation and the creation of the wartime alliance, so too did normative trust. An examination of Lewicki and Bunker’s indicators will provide further details on the presence and development of the normative dimension of trust. Shared values were strongly present, particularly in the way in which they were defined in opposition to the values of the autocracies as can be seen with shared democratic and religious values. Collective identity was seen in the formalisation of the alliance, and can be further seen in the distinctiveness of the way in which shared British and American values were discussed in relation to the alliance, despite the presence of other allies who did not necessarily share those values. The creation of a joint product or goal and colocation were also clearly present in the inherent nature of being at war, however limitations can be seen in the Pacific theatre of the war as the calculative dimension of trust was weaker, and the opportunities to interact and develop the affective and normative dimensions of trust fewer. Examining how difficulties in the Pacific theatre were managed, however, reveals the presence of trust even in this most problematic area of wartime cooperation.

Shared values were largely defined in opposition to the values of their autocratic foes. A considerable focus was placed on shared democratic values and religion, particularly by Roosevelt. He contrasted the Axis as ‘an unholy alliance’, aiming to create a world in which ‘there is no liberty, no religion, no hope’.⁷⁸¹ The aims of the Nazis were described as a ‘new German, pagan religion’ in which ‘the Holy Bible and the Cross of Mercy would be displaced by Mein Kampf and the swastika and the naked sword’.⁷⁸² In contrast, the Allies were described as being ‘inspired by a faith that goes back through all the years to the first chapter of the Book of Genesis’, and therefore ‘fighting ... to uphold the doctrine that all men are equal in the sight of God’.⁷⁸³ Prior

⁷⁸⁰ “U.S. Envoy Speaks to You,” *The Daily Mirror*, March 19, 1941.

⁷⁸¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat,” The American Presidency Project, December 29, 1940, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15917>.

⁷⁸² Franklin D. Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” The American Presidency Project, January 6, 1942, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16253>.

⁷⁸³ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” The American Presidency Project, January 6, 1942, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16253>.

to America's entry in the war, Roosevelt made sure to highlight the importance of shared democratic values in seeking to gain support for aid to Britain such as Lend-Lease. He described America's role as 'an arsenal of democracy', through being 'the source of the tools of defense for all democracies'.⁷⁸⁴ This line of thinking continued following American entry in the war, with Roosevelt claiming that 'victory for us means victory for the institution of democracy', which would subsequently ensure the victory of freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from want and fear.⁷⁸⁵ Churchill certainly shared Roosevelt's religious and democratic values, and also deeply believed that there were 'deep underlying unities' underpinning 'the English-speaking peoples'.⁷⁸⁶ Following the joint church service conducted at Roosevelt and Churchill's first meeting at Newfoundland in August 1941, Churchill stated that he felt 'that we had the right to feel that we were serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from on high'.⁷⁸⁷ There is no doubt that Roosevelt and Churchill at least felt a significant degree of connection via shared democratic and religious values.

These shared values were also, to some extent, forged into a conception of collective identity, although an examination of this process reveals the limitations of both shared values and collective identity as an indicator of the normative dimension of trust at this time. Although technically the formal alliance of the Allies included states other than Britain and America, it is interesting to note the extent to which shared democratic and religious values were emphasised given that not all allies were democratic or Christian. The first semi-formal representation of shared values was the declaration of common values and war aims in the Atlantic Charter, which included points such as free trade, agreement to no territorial expansion, freedom of the seas, the abandonment of the use of force, and the right to self-government.⁷⁸⁸ Cull describes the charter as being a product of 'a shared heritage of Gladstonian liberalism and the progressive internationalism of the age of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson'.⁷⁸⁹ While all Allies later confirmed their support, it was the product of Churchill and Roosevelt's first meeting and was their creation. A key limitation to be found in shared values and collective identity is, of course, the differences over the British Empire and colonialism. Where the Americans took the Atlantic Charter, and notably the right to self-government, to refer to all people, the British steadfastly insisted they believed it applied only

⁷⁸⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Request for Lend-Lease Program Appropriations," The American Presidency Project, March 12, 1941, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1608>.

⁷⁸⁵ Roosevelt, "State of the Union Address."

⁷⁸⁶ "Mr. Churchill on a Symbolic Meeting," *The Times*, August 25, 1941.

⁷⁸⁷ "Mr. Churchill on a Symbolic Meeting."

⁷⁸⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Statement on the Atlantic Charter Meeting with Prime Minister Churchill," The American Presidency Project, August 14, 1941, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16154>.

⁷⁸⁹ Nicholas J. Cull, "Selling Peace: The Origins, Promotion and Fate of the Anglo-American New Order During the Second World War," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 7, no. 1 (1996): 1.

to Europe, and therefore not to their colonial possessions.⁷⁹⁰ The agreement on a set of core shared values, and the difference over interpretation of those values, reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of shared values and subsequently the normative dimension of trust in the relationship at this time.

Similar to shared values and collective identity, both colocation and the creation of a joint product or goal are clearly present in the WWII Anglo-American relationship, albeit with some significant limitations. Once America entered the war, the two were colocated in various arenas of combat. This was the case both in terms of planning and operations, as will be seen in detail when examining the military and defence relationship. As these strengths will become clear later, the focus here will be on the weaknesses of the normative dimension and how they were managed. The Pacific theatre provides an example where all four indicators of normative trust were weaker than in other arenas of the war. While cooperation in the European theatre is commonly viewed as being at the heart of what is considered to be the “special relationship”, their relationship in the Pacific theatre has led Christopher Thorne to argue that ‘here, if nowhere else, they were only allies of a kind’.⁷⁹¹ Cooperation was fractious because the calculative dimension of trust was weaker in this theatre of the war, and the affective and normative dimensions of trust remained limited. For Britain, Hitler and Germany were the primary enemy, whereas for America their main foe was seen to be Japan. In addition to differing priorities, relations were complicated by perceived differences in overall war aims and suspicions of colonial intent on both sides. In a letter to Keynes, American journalist and commentator Walter Lippmann pointed out that ‘Americans believe that their war aims are profoundly different from those of Great Britain ... There is a strong feeling that Britain east of Suez is quite different from Britain at home, that the war in Europe is a war of liberation and the war in Asia is for the defence of archaic privilege’.⁷⁹² It is clear that the calculative dimension was significantly weaker in the Pacific theatre of the war, and opportunities for interactions between individuals, and consequently the development of trust across all dimensions, fewer.

On the other hand, the extent to which Britain and America successfully managed these differences and continued their close wartime collaboration reveals the strengths of trust during the war. Sarantakes argues that the historiography of the Anglo-American relationship in the Pacific theatre of the war has focused overwhelmingly on disputes and differences, which has consequently missed the extent to which the British did aid in the defeat of Japan and the

⁷⁹⁰ Rob Salem, “Decolonisation: The Decline of the British Empire,” *Hindsight* 20, no. 2 (2010).

⁷⁹¹ Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945*, 725.

⁷⁹² Lippmann to Keynes, undated, quoted in Thorne, 149.

comparable success of the Anglo-American coalition as opposed to the Axis powers.⁷⁹³ Indeed, the British did play an important combat role and, even more importantly, made a political and psychological contribution which let ‘their American allies know that they had friends and were not alone’.⁷⁹⁴ More importantly in the context of understanding trust in Anglo-American relations, he points out that key individuals across both the United States and Britain recognised that Britain would have to contribute to the defeat of Japan if there was to be hope of a continuing alliance following the end of the war.⁷⁹⁵ Although Churchill wanted to focus on regaining colonies, he was overruled by other British officials such as Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, who recognised the harm this would do to Anglo-American relations, particularly if Britain was seen not to be contributing in the fight against Japan.⁷⁹⁶ These facts were also recognised by Americans interested in continuing good relations with Britain, such as the US Ambassador to London John Winant. He argued that if the British were not involved in the defeat of Japan and left to their ‘selfish’ colonial endeavours, ‘we will create in the United States a hatred for Great Britain that will make for schisms in the postwar years that will defeat everything that men have died for in this war’.⁷⁹⁷ These kinds of perspectives are also seen in the American willingness to maintain their commitment to a Germany-first strategy, despite their views on Japan as the primary enemy. Thus, while the Pacific theatre highlights divergent interests, it also demonstrates a keen focus among individuals on both sides of the Atlantic to manage these differences and continue their alliance following the end of the war. The successful management of the weak calculative dimension in the Pacific theatre was made possible due to the development of trust across all three dimensions across other areas of the war.

The Domains of the Relationship

Leaders and Government

This section will focus on the relationship of Churchill and Roosevelt as an example of the process of bonding trust, in order to understand how the interplay of the dimensions of trust between leaders and supporting actors shapes the relationship as a whole. Churchill and Roosevelt began their process of bonding through their extensive correspondence, which facilitated the ease of friendship that developed at their first meeting. The trust in their relationship was supported by

⁷⁹³ Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, “One Last Crusade: The British Pacific Fleet and Its Impact on the Anglo- American Alliance,” *English Historical Review* 121, no. 491 (2006): 430.

⁷⁹⁴ Sarantakes, 454.

⁷⁹⁵ Sarantakes, 429.

⁷⁹⁶ Sarantakes, 432-33.

⁷⁹⁷ John Winant, quoted in Sarantakes, 438.

additional key individuals, particularly given Roosevelt's preference for personal special envoys rather than the traditional channels provided by ambassadors. The most notable of these was Harry Hopkins, who was close to Roosevelt and was also able to develop a close relationship with Churchill and act as their go-between to manage difficult issues. Analysing trust in the relationship between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Harry Hopkins reveals valuable insights into how the interplay of the dimensions of trust at the leadership level contributed to the creation and success of the WWII alliance between Britain and America.

The relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt developed through a process of bonding, identified in this thesis as a key component of both the affective and normative dimensions of trust. Wheeler discusses the question of whether bonded trust can be operationalised through mechanisms other than face-to-face interaction, and states that it is something that requires further investigation.⁷⁹⁸ Given their extensive correspondence, Roosevelt and Churchill provide a valuable opportunity to investigate this question. Doing so confirms the considerable supporting role non-face-to-face interactions can have in the operationalisation of a process of bonding, although, as Wheeler suggests, whether it could be sufficient on its own without then going on to experience face-to-face interaction still requires further research.⁷⁹⁹ Their correspondence was unique in terms of correspondence between leaders, both regarding its breadth and its intimacy. They collaboratively sent over 1700 messages and telegrams, with Churchill sending 1161 and Roosevelt 788.⁸⁰⁰ The first letter was sent by Roosevelt on September 11, 1939.⁸⁰¹ Interestingly, this was before Churchill had taken over from Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Roosevelt wrote to tell Churchill he was glad he was 'back again in the Admiralty',⁸⁰² given that the two of them had served in similar positions in WWI. Roosevelt invited Churchill to correspond with him, a task which Churchill took up with vigour. He kept Roosevelt abreast of developments in the war and, as the war progressed, began to firstly plead with Roosevelt for aid and later plan war strategies. Through the process of exchanging telegrams, Churchill and Roosevelt were able to begin the process of bonded trust through meeting to some extent both the preconditions for a process of bonding to begin: the exercise of security dilemma sensibility and the acquisition of an index of trustworthiness. While Wheeler argues that face-to-face interaction is required for the

⁷⁹⁸ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 63.

⁷⁹⁹ Wheeler, 63.

⁸⁰⁰ Kimball, *Churchill & Roosevelt The Complete Correspondence: I. Alliance Emerging October 1933- November 1942*, 3.

⁸⁰¹ Roosevelt to Churchill, September 11 1939, reproduced in Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, Inc., 1975), 89.

⁸⁰² Roosevelt to Churchill, September 11 1939, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 89.

latter of these conditions,⁸⁰³ it is possible to see the emergence of both in Roosevelt and Churchill's correspondence. Roosevelt being willing to send the first message, and Churchill's eagerness in response, appears to be indicative of both security dilemma sensibility and, over time, the acquisition of an index of trustworthiness. Despite frequent misunderstandings of each other's domestic politics, their correspondence demonstrates clear attempts to understand each other's political limitations and positions, and establish expectations of trustworthiness within this context. Churchill, for example, in a letter in June of 1940 makes clear that he understands the U.S. cannot enter an expeditionary force in the war, but rather hopes only for the 'tremendous moral effect' of an American statement of support.⁸⁰⁴ Roosevelt, in April of 1941, takes care to inform Churchill privately of a decision to patrol ships in the North Atlantic and relay the position of enemy ships to the British, and to explain that for domestic political reasons the action has to appear to be a unilateral U.S. decision.⁸⁰⁵ The correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt clearly provided a valuable foundation for their relationship to develop further upon a face-to-face encounter, through meeting the preconditions for a process of bonding to begin.

The role of their correspondence in developing trust becomes clearer when examining it against the conditions required for a process of bonding to become operationalized, positive identification of interests and humanization, and the impact of their first face-to-face meeting. The personal touches in their correspondence, from Roosevelt's very first message onwards, supports the claim that each leader saw the "human" nature of the other. The positive identification of interests is also evident. For example, Roosevelt refers to himself and Churchill as 'naval people' who 'appreciate the vital strength of the fleet' and believe that 'command of the seas means in the long run the saving of democracy'.⁸⁰⁶ Such a message also indicates that, at least in part, Churchill and Roosevelt were able to "think like" one another. This highlights that, even before meeting one another, the normative dimension of trust was present in their relationship to some extent. All of this evidence combined confirms that correspondence can play a vital role in establishing trust between individuals, even prior to face-to-face interaction. Indeed, Kimball argues that 'the foundation of the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship was set with the willingness of the two men to communicate from the outset of the war'.⁸⁰⁷ Loewenheim et. al. further add that their success upon meeting 'owed not a little to the groundwork, both substantive and personal, which had been laid

⁸⁰³ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 54.

⁸⁰⁴ Churchill to Roosevelt, June 15 1940, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 106.

⁸⁰⁵ Roosevelt to Churchill, April 11 1941, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 137–38.

⁸⁰⁶ Roosevelt to Churchill, June 14 1940, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 102–3.

⁸⁰⁷ Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*, 39.

in their correspondence'.⁸⁰⁸ A key sign of the trust which had been built is the success of the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal, which involved the U.S. giving Britain fifty old US Navy Destroyers in exchange for access to bases in British territory off the Atlantic coast. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that he 'had not contemplated anything in the nature of a contract, bargain, or sale between us', rather telling Roosevelt that Cabinet had decided to offer the bases regardless of the American decision on the destroyers, as 'our view is that we are two friends in danger helping each other as far as we can'.⁸⁰⁹ Roosevelt expresses his desire to meet with Churchill and 'talk things over with you in person' as early as February 1940.⁸¹⁰ They did not meet until the Atlantic Conference in Newfoundland, which took place from August 9-12, 1941. This meeting was the first of nine conferences which, overall, resulted in the two men spending roughly 120 days with one another.⁸¹¹

Although the impact of the Atlantic Conference and the Atlantic Charter it produced is often minimised when placed in the broader context of the rest of the war, the significance of the meeting between leaders was certainly felt at the time. One report referred to it as a 'rendezvous with destiny'.⁸¹² Reporters made sure to outline the historical significance of the meeting of leaders. Although leadership summits quickly became an enduring feature of the Anglo-American relationship, the only leaders to have met before Churchill and Roosevelt had been Prime Minister MacDonal and President Hoover in 1929, and MacDonal and Roosevelt in 1933.⁸¹³ The Atlantic Conference had been kept secret from both publics until it was completed, and in a show of Anglo-American unity Churchill and Roosevelt made sure the meeting was reported simultaneously in both countries, despite the time difference.⁸¹⁴ Indicating the perceived impact of the summit, *The Times* argued that Americans all viewed it as bringing 'the United States a long step nearer to actual participation in the war', whether they were in favour of this step or not.⁸¹⁵ *The Constitution* reported that 'it is probable this meeting will rank in world significance with the signing of Magna Carta at Runnymede and the adoption of the Constitution of the United States'.⁸¹⁶ The Atlantic Charter was also widely viewed as being of considerable importance. The statement of war aims was viewed as 'a necessary war weapon', both psychologically and

⁸⁰⁸ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 4.

⁸⁰⁹ Churchill to Roosevelt, August 22 1940, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 110–11.

⁸¹⁰ Roosevelt to Churchill, February 1 1940, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 102–3.

⁸¹¹ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 4.

⁸¹² "The Rendezvous With Destiny," *New York Times*, August 15, 1941.

⁸¹³ Our Parliamentary Correspondent, "Steps to Firm Friendship," *The Times*, August 15, 1941.

⁸¹⁴ Our Diplomatic Correspondent, "Mr. Roosevelt's Invitation," *The Times*, August 15, 1941.

⁸¹⁵ Our Diplomatic Correspondent, "Mr. Roosevelt's Invitation," *The Times*, August 15, 1941.

⁸¹⁶ 'Compared with Magna Carta', *The Constitution*, quoted in "Views of U.S. Press on the Parley at Sea," *New York Times*, August 15, 1941.

politically.⁸¹⁷ It was hoped that the promise not to punish the populations of the aggressor states following the war, as had been done following WWI, would inspire the opposition to Hitler within Germany and the conquered European states.⁸¹⁸ The psychological impact of the summit was widely compared to the effect of the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at Brenner Pass, with the hope that Churchill and Roosevelt's meeting would have the same effect in the name of democracy.⁸¹⁹ Some critiqued the Charter for being baseless without U.S. entry in the war,⁸²⁰ while others criticised Roosevelt for making such an agreement without consulting the senate,⁸²¹ however the majority of opinion was favourable. One reporter argued that 'the power of destiny' meant that 'the United States and Great Britain have no choice but to act together', and that 'the immense and inevitable fact of Anglo- American partnership ... overshadows even the eight-point statement of war aims made by the two leaders'.⁸²² Although the Atlantic Charter itself was clearly of importance, even Churchill himself argues that the most important feature of the meeting was its symbolic nature:

It symbolizes in a form and manner which every one can understand in every land and in every clime the deep underlying unities which stir, and at decisive moments rule, the English-speaking peoples throughout the world.⁸²³

The psychological impact and symbolism of both the meeting itself and the Atlantic Charter which was produced had a significant influence on the development of trust, both between the two leaders, their advisors, and the publics they represented.

Regarding the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill itself, reports were quick to point to signs of a friendship. One correspondent described that 'it was hard to tell which looked happier – the President or Mr. Churchill', claiming that 'they knew each other well by talking for months on the transatlantic telephone, so they were like two old friends meeting'.⁸²⁴ Churchill cabled to his Lord Privy Seal from the meeting to inform him that 'I am sure I have established warm and deep personal relations with our great friend'.⁸²⁵ Roosevelt shared similar sentiments. In particular, he described the shared church service which took place on the Sunday, and involved 'the intermingling of American and British officers and men before an altar decorated with the flags

⁸¹⁷ Hanson W. Baldwin, "Twofold Allied Program: Roosevelt-Churchill Plan Embodies Psychological and Military Attacks," *New York Times*, August 16, 1941.

⁸¹⁸ Baldwin.

⁸¹⁹ 'Possible Influence Suggested', *The Sun*, quoted in "Views of U.S. Press on the Parley at Sea."

⁸²⁰ "Finds War Aims Defined", *The News*, quoted in "Views of U.S. Press on the Parley at Sea."

⁸²¹ "Awaits Reaction in Congress", *The Post*, and "Outside His Office", *The Tribune*, quoted in "Views of U.S. Press on the Parley at Sea."

⁸²² "The Rendezvous With Destiny."

⁸²³ "Mr. Churchill on a Symbolic Meeting."

⁸²⁴ "Conference Ship Closely Guarded," *New York Times*, August 15, 1941.

⁸²⁵ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 155.

of the two nations ... and the joint conduct of worship by American and British chaplains', as 'a historic occasion'.⁸²⁶ The symbolism of the occasion, the impact of both the meeting itself and the Atlantic Charter it produced, and the fact that this meeting heralded the beginning of the summitry which has come to be an essential feature of Anglo-American relations were all possible because of the relationship of bonded trust which Roosevelt and Churchill had begun to develop through their correspondence, and cemented in their face-to-face meeting on a ship in the Atlantic Ocean.

The relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt was supported by an additional handful of key figures. Owing to his distrust of the State Department, Roosevelt preferred his own personal special envoys.⁸²⁷ Michael Fullilove points to five key helpers who were sent to Europe on special missions: Sumner Welles, Wendell Willkie, Bill Donovan, Harry Hopkins, and Averell Harriman.⁸²⁸ Harry Hopkins is the most notable figure, given that 'for most of the war Hopkins acted as a special channel between Churchill and Roosevelt'.⁸²⁹ Roosevelt and Hopkins had a close relationship, having worked closely together on Roosevelt's New Deal, with Nicholas referring to Hopkins as Roosevelt's "man Friday".⁸³⁰ Hopkins had no official position, but worked closely with the President in planning out ventures such as Lend-Lease, and helping to write the President's speeches.⁸³¹ Hopkins was 'on the same wavelength as FDR', and consequently was entrusted to go to London in January 1941 for a month long visit to ascertain 'the measure of Winston Churchill'.⁸³² He had no title or position, no salary, nor a special mission or special powers.⁸³³ Churchill was advised through a diplomatic network to view Hopkins as 'Roosevelt's alter ego' and treat him 'as if he were Roosevelt himself'.⁸³⁴

The first meeting between Churchill and Hopkins was a success, with Hopkins assuring Churchill that Roosevelt was dedicated to winning the war, and Churchill assuring Hopkins that the rumours that Churchill did not like Americans were not true but rather, he argued, the fictions of the American Ambassador to Britain Joseph Kennedy.⁸³⁵ Churchill wrote of his first meeting with Hopkins favourably in his memoirs:

Thus I met Harry Hopkins, that extraordinary man, who played, and was to play, a sometimes

⁸²⁶ Our Own Correspondent, "Mr. Roosevelt's Return," *The Times*, August 18, 1941.

⁸²⁷ Our Own Correspondent, "Mr. Roosevelt's Return," *The Times*, August 18, 1941.

⁸²⁸ See Fullilove, *Rendezvous with Destiny: How Franklin D. Roosevelt and Five Extraordinary Men Took America Into the War and Into the World*.

⁸²⁹ Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*, 79.

⁸³⁰ H. G. Nicholas, *The United States and Britain* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 100.

⁸³¹ David L. Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 75–77.

⁸³² Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*, 78.

⁸³³ Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler*, 79.

⁸³⁴ Roll, 80.

⁸³⁵ Roll, 83-84.

decisive part in the whole movement of the war. His was a soul that flamed out of a frail and failing body. He was a crumbling lighthouse from which there shone the beams that led great fleets to harbour. He had also a gift of sardonic humour. I always enjoyed his company especially when things went ill.⁸³⁶

Hopkins spent five weeks in London on his first visit, during which he spent three weekends with Churchill and his family at their weekend retreat of Chequers and helped Churchill to write a speech aimed at supporting the passing of Lend-Lease through convincing Americans that the British could hold out without American troops but did require American aid.⁸³⁷ Hopkins had clearly established a similarly warm and trusting relationship with Churchill as he had with Roosevelt. Throughout the rest of the war he thus served as a mediator between the two leaders, describing his role as ‘a catalytic agent between two prima donnas’.⁸³⁸ Despite having no formal role, key individuals from Churchill to Secretary of War Stimson to Chief of Staff Marshall recognised that Hopkins was ‘a vital link’ in bringing issues to Roosevelt’s attention.⁸³⁹ It is because of his work talking to each leader, anticipating disagreements and working to find compromises between different positions, that Roll argues the first meeting between them resulted in ‘mutual feelings of warmth, affection, and respect’.⁸⁴⁰ The relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt was greatly facilitated by the relationship of trust developed between each man and Harry Hopkins, and the invaluable role he played in establishing and maintaining the good relationship between the two men.

Churchill and Roosevelt, along with Harry Hopkins, strengthened their relationship over a series of face-to-face interactions following the first meeting at Newfoundland. Owing to space limitations only the first meeting between the two leaders held after Pearl Harbor, when both states were now full participants in the war, will be discussed. This was their second meeting. Loewenheim et. al. point out that it was owing to the closeness developed during their first meeting that Churchill immediately made plans to go to Washington upon receiving confirmation from Roosevelt of the Pearl Harbor attack.⁸⁴¹ Churchill telegraphed asking Roosevelt ‘now that we are, as you say, “in the same boat,” would it not be wise for us to have another conference’,⁸⁴² to which Roosevelt replied in agreement, stating he would be ‘delighted to have you here at the

⁸³⁶ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Abridged Edition with an Epilogue on the Years 1945 to 1957* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 389.

⁸³⁷ Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler*, 94–96.

⁸³⁸ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1950), 236.

⁸³⁹ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 26.

⁸⁴⁰ Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler*, 145.

⁸⁴¹ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 8.

⁸⁴² Churchill to Roosevelt, December 9 1941, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 169.

white house'.⁸⁴³ *The Times* described it as 'a visit without precedent', as it was the first time a British Prime Minister and American President had met while the two states were 'engaged side by side in arms against common foes'.⁸⁴⁴ The aim of the meeting was to plan allied coordination of the war, referred to as 'joint planning for unity of action'.⁸⁴⁵ It was argued that the fact that this was the second time the British Prime Minister had travelled to meet the American President within six months was symbolic of 'that "mixing up together" of British and American interests and affairs' that Churchill had so passionately described.⁸⁴⁶ Churchill stayed at the White House for almost three weeks. He was given a room across the hallway from Harry Hopkins, and along with Roosevelt they spent considerable time together, having informal lunches and dinners and talking with one another late into the night.⁸⁴⁷ Roosevelt reported that 'Mr. Churchill and I understand each other, our motives, and our purposes'.⁸⁴⁸ Churchill described that he 'formed a very strong affection, which grew with our years of comradeship, for this formidable politician'.⁸⁴⁹ Although when discussing the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship many point out the extent to which disagreements arose, both in their relationship and also more broadly between Britain and America, the fact that the relationship functioned so well in spite of these disagreements was down to the personal closeness of Churchill and Roosevelt.⁸⁵⁰ As stated by *The Times* in response to the quickness of the declaration of a Germany first strategy, 'no negotiation at long range could have rivalled either the swiftness or the efficacy of these personal exchanges'.⁸⁵¹ The trusting relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill over the course of their correspondence and their face-to-face meetings was invaluable to their ability to come together and plan the joint war effort.

Military and Defence

Military

Cooperation in the military space was naturally expansive, given the strong calculative dimension of trust relating to shared wartime needs. It was the affective relationships developed between individuals, however, which facilitated the successes of that cooperation. This is evidenced first in the intermingling of civilian administrators to guide the production effort driven by the Combined Boards, and second as a consequence of joint military planning and operation through

⁸⁴³ Roosevelt to Churchill, December 10 1941, reproduced in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 171.

⁸⁴⁴ Our Diplomatic Correspondent, "A Visit Without Precedent," *The Times*, December 23, 1941.

⁸⁴⁵ Our Diplomatic Correspondent, "A Visit Without Precedent," *The Times*, December 23, 1941.

⁸⁴⁶ "Council of War," *The Times*, December 24, 1941.

⁸⁴⁷ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 8.

⁸⁴⁸ "Mr. Roosevelt's Message," *The Times*, January 7, 1942.

⁸⁴⁹ Churchill, quoted in Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 172.

⁸⁵⁰ Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 13.

⁸⁵¹ "Mr. Churchill's Return," *The Times*, January 19, 1942.

the creation and structure of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). The structure of the CCS provided ample opportunity for the development of personal relationships. The most significant example of this was the relationship between British Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and American General George C. Marshal.

Following American entry into the war, military command and planning was uniquely combined, at least in the European theatre. One of the key aspects of the wartime relationship was the production effort, guided by the Combined Boards which were made up of representatives of both governments.⁸⁵² The civilian boards which focused on primarily economic matters included the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, the Combined Production and Resources Board, and the Combined Food Board.⁸⁵³ A key outcome of the creation of the Combined Boards was that it facilitated interactions between British and American officials, as at its peak 9, 000 British officials were located in Washington where a ‘miniature Whitehall’ was created around the British Embassy.⁸⁵⁴ A similar phenomenon took place in London, where the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square became known as ‘Eisenhower Platz’.⁸⁵⁵ The movement of officials also took place with regards to the military as well as the civilian boards, with the support staff for the Joint Staff Mission which formed the representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington including three thousand administrative support staff by the end of 1942, including planners, clerks, stenographers, secretaries, couriers, and telephone operators.⁸⁵⁶ The combination of these expanding and interwoven administrations meant ‘a much higher degree of cooperation and unforced fusion than had ever before existed between two sovereign nation states’.⁸⁵⁷ The functioning of the wartime alliance would not have been possible without the trust which developed between the civil and military administrative forces of both states.

As with the supply side of the war, the military planning and action of the war also became an integrated joint effort built on trust. Following American entry into the war, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) were set up to run the joint war effort, wherein ‘the CCS became the nerve center of the most highly integrated effort at coalition warfare in history’.⁸⁵⁸ In addition to their vital role in planning the conduct of the war, Rigby argues that ‘through its ability to resolve serious

⁸⁵² Nicholas, *The United States and Britain*, 100.

⁸⁵³ Rosen, *The Combined Boards of the Second World War: An Experiment in International Administration*, 2.

⁸⁵⁴ Nicholas, *The United States and Britain*, 101.

⁸⁵⁵ Nicholas, 101.

⁸⁵⁶ Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, 49.

⁸⁵⁷ Nicholas, *The United States and Britain*, 101.

⁸⁵⁸ Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, 1.

disputes the Combined Chiefs of Staff held the Anglo-American alliance together'.⁸⁵⁹ The way in which they were able to do so can be explained through a lens of trust. The CCS provided ample opportunity for interaction between its members, which allowed them to define shared expectations of trustworthiness and develop affective bonds. The CCS also created a forum which not only facilitated, but explicitly aimed, to define shared interests or, in other words, strengthen the calculative dimension of trust. As Nicholas describes, in the CCS 'national interests were subordinated to a common dedication to victory'.⁸⁶⁰ General Marshall also describes the cooperation and communication facilitated by the CCS:

General Marshall, at the conclusion of the conference at Casablanca, expressed his appreciation of the readiness of the British Chiefs of Staff to understand the U.S. point of view and of the fine spirit of cooperation which they had shown during the discussions. He felt sure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would greatly profit by their contacts with their colleagues and the mutual understanding of each other's problems which had been ensured.⁸⁶¹

The opportunities for interaction and the personal relationships which formed as a result were invaluable to the functioning of the wartime alliance. Baylis argues that the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt 'set the tone and pattern for the whole joint war effort', wherein 'from the highest political level down through the Chiefs of Staff and field commanders to the work of innumerable committees a degree of friendship and intimacy characterized working relationships'.⁸⁶² It was the trust and friendship which developed between individuals across the breadth of the structure of joint wartime planning and conduct which allowed for the unparalleled closeness of the alliance.

The way the Combined Chiefs structure was set up allowed plenty of opportunities for such relationships to form. As the British chiefs of staff could not be based permanently in Washington, they had representatives stationed there headed up by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, known as the Joint Staff Mission (JSM).⁸⁶³ Additionally, below the Combined Chiefs sat the commanders in the field, with a supreme commander in each theatre of the war. In an idea promoted by General George C. Marshall, in each of the theatres of war the supreme commander and his deputy were of opposing nationalities to ensure that in each level of staff throughout the wartime structure

⁸⁵⁹ Rigby, 8.

⁸⁶⁰ Nicholas, *The United States and Britain*, 101.

⁸⁶¹ Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes, January 23 1943, reproduced in Fredrick Aandahl, William M. Franklin, and William Slany, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, Document 388* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941-43/d388>.

⁸⁶² Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984*, 9.

⁸⁶³ Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, 2.

‘there was a balancing and fusion of national identities to create a genuinely unified structure’.⁸⁶⁴ This worked most effectively in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, headed up by Dwight D. Eisenhower with the British Air Chief Marshall Tedder as deputy.⁸⁶⁵ The way in which the structure of the supreme commanders contributed to building trust across all dimensions is perfectly captured by Eisenhower:

The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theatre. Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field.⁸⁶⁶

The trust built between individuals was invaluable to the conduct of the war. Danchev points out that the JSM in particular was a preeminent example of the common theme of the wartime Anglo-American relationship, in which ‘the corporeal alliance, with its elaborate system of combined committees and voracious bureaucratic appetite, was shadowed by an ethereal alliance of personal contacts, informal understandings, and unorthodox procedures’.⁸⁶⁷ The alliance could not have functioned as well as it did without the ‘ethereal alliance’ supporting the ‘corporeal alliance’.⁸⁶⁸ The key to this fundamental ‘ethereal alliance’ was the trust which was formed in personal relationships.

Nowhere is the importance of trust in personal relationships more evident in the wartime relationship than in the case of the relationship formed between British Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and American General George C. Marshall. While in some cases a poor relationship with one’s own leader has hindered a person’s ability to facilitate the growth of trust, in Dill’s case his poor relationship with Churchill worked to his advantage. It meant that he was able to present the Americans with his own views rather than Churchill’s, which earned him the trust of his American counterparts ‘who came to trust him more than any other British military officer’.⁸⁶⁹ Dill was seen in America to be ‘the personification of classical knightly virtues’.⁸⁷⁰ One of Dill’s great values was advocating greater openness between the two states, and being open and trusting toward

⁸⁶⁴ Nicholas, *The United States and Britain*, 102.

⁸⁶⁵ Nicholas, 102.

⁸⁶⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Louis Francis Albert Mountbatten, September 14 1943, reproduced in Alfred D. Chandler, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years: III* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1420–24.

⁸⁶⁷ Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941-44* (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers Ltd., 1986), 8.

⁸⁶⁸ Danchev, 8.

⁸⁶⁹ Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, 3.

⁸⁷⁰ Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941-44*, 4.

Americans generally.⁸⁷¹ The relationship he formed with Marshall was a product of this philosophy. The two men met at the first Atlantic conference, where Danchev argues ‘there can be no doubt of a mutual and immediate personal attraction’.⁸⁷² They struck up a personal correspondence after meeting, and from their second meeting in December 1941 when Marshall threw a birthday party for Dill they were in almost daily contact.⁸⁷³

Marshall and Dill formed a key conduit of information between the British and Americans, which meant that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were often provided with information Churchill had intended only for his British Chiefs of Staff, including information Churchill had acquired from Roosevelt but which Roosevelt had failed to inform his own Chiefs, and Dill was kept updated with the opinions of Roosevelt when Marshall was able to acquire them as well as other key American figures.⁸⁷⁴ After the two went to the 1943 Casablanca conference, Marshall wrote to Roosevelt to praise Dill:

His presence there [Casablanca] I believe was of vital importance ... Throughout the conference it was apparent that after each difficult meeting a great deal was done by Dill to translate the American point of view into terms understandable to the British.⁸⁷⁵

Dill also formed good relationships with other key individuals, including Donovan, Winant, and Hopkins.⁸⁷⁶ The openness Dill and Marshall were able to achieve with one another, in the highly sensitive area of war planning, is a testament to the trust they built with one another. Their relationship is a testament to the necessity of trusting relationships between individuals in the creation and continued functioning of a close wartime relationship between states. Shared need is not sufficient on its own. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were the backbone of the entire war effort, and it was the relationship between Marshall and Dill which meant that the Combined Chiefs were able to act ‘not as a mere collecting point to individual rivalries between services and nations but as an executive committee for the prosecution of global war’.⁸⁷⁷ Danchev argues that as a consequence of Dill’s relationships with the Americans, he became a ‘guarantor ... of the wartime Anglo-American alliance itself’. The trusting relationship formed between Dill and Marshall was at the core of the functioning of the wartime alliance.

Nuclear

⁸⁷¹ Danchev, 7.

⁸⁷² Danchev, 50.

⁸⁷³ Danchev, 50-51.

⁸⁷⁴ Rigby, *Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, 57.

⁸⁷⁵ Memorandum from General Marshall to President Roosevelt, February 20 1943, reproduced in Aandahl, Franklin, and Slany, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, Document 388*.

⁸⁷⁶ Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941-44*, 13.

⁸⁷⁷ Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Services in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 413–14.

The affective dimension of trust played a role in nuclear cooperation during WWII, both in its presence and its absence. The lack of affective trust in the earlier years of the nuclear relationship made cooperation exceedingly difficult given the high sensitivity of nuclear technology. This was made more problematic by Churchill's failure to grasp the value of the research and what it would mean, and thus his unwillingness to use his close relationship with Roosevelt to encourage improvements in this space. Comparatively, in the latter years of the war affective trust developed between key individuals who were able to improve cooperation on nuclear weapons research.

Nuclear cooperation is often pointed to as one of the key strengths of the Anglo-American relationship, however hesitance to cooperate at different times indicates that there were limitations to the trust in the relationship at this stage. The nuclear relationship during the war furthermore sheds light on the importance of the affective dimension of trust and trusting relationships between individuals, both through their absence and their presence at varying times. In the early years of the war the British were ahead in atomic research, which had been kickstarted with the creation of the Maud Committee.⁸⁷⁸ When the Americans sought out a collaborative partnership in 1941, however, the British declined.⁸⁷⁹ In October, Roosevelt proposed an exchange of views between the leaders, so that 'any extended efforts may be coordinated or even jointly conducted'.⁸⁸⁰ The reasons why Churchill did not take up this offer have been debated, with one possible answer being that he did not yet have a proper understanding of the atomic bomb, and therefore relied heavily on scientific advisers who were dubious about a combined Anglo-American effort.⁸⁸¹ While the impossibility of knowing Churchill's motives makes it difficult to discern what his actions mean in a context of trust, what is clear is that there was a lack of trust in America by his scientific advisers. They not only advised Churchill against cooperation, but resisted attempts by their American counterparts, Bush and Conant, to further Anglo-American nuclear cooperation.⁸⁸² In addition to Churchill's scientific advisers, his cabinet minister in charge of the British atomic energy project "Tube Alloys", Sir John Anderson, also avoided American attempts to collaborate.⁸⁸³ As Bernstein points out, it seems improbable that Churchill would have left atomic matters to these men had he understood the implications of atomic research fully, given that he was desperate to bring America and Roosevelt into the war

⁸⁷⁸ Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945* (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1964), 44-45.

⁸⁷⁹ Gowing, 124.

⁸⁸⁰ Roosevelt to Churchill, October 11 1941, reproduced in William Slany and Richardson Dougall, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Document 4* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d4>.

⁸⁸¹ Barton J. Bernstein, "The Uneasy Alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945," *The Western Political Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1976): 206.

⁸⁸² Bernstein, 206.

⁸⁸³ Bernstein, 206.

and atomic collaboration would have helped to bind America closer to Britain.⁸⁸⁴ It is a case, at this stage, of a lack of interpersonal trusting relationships between those involved in atomic research which prevented cooperation. Unfortunately for the British, within six months after Pearl Harbor the American effort had overtaken the British in terms of the amount of resources it was given.⁸⁸⁵ By mid-1942, when the British decided they were in favour of a joint atomic programme, the Americans were so far ahead of them they were self-sufficient and had little need for a British contribution.⁸⁸⁶ Miscommunication and suspicion meant that the British attempt to seek a joint atomic project were not immediately taken up by the Americans. Attempts to cooperate were complicated by British resentment that they had begun so far ahead and their efforts had been curtailed by the economic realities of the war, and the Americans remained suspicious of British motivations.⁸⁸⁷ Gowing points out that these complications were similar to other areas of wartime collaboration, however they were compounded by the intense secrecy of atomic research and ‘the wrong channels of communication were chosen’.⁸⁸⁸ This refers to Churchill’s attempts to plead with Roosevelt via Hopkins,⁸⁸⁹ when both were being swayed against cooperation with the British by Bush and Conant.⁸⁹⁰ Bush, for example, wrote to Hopkins stating that he believed the only reason the British could object to the American withholding of information was because the British saw it as ‘information which they consider might be of value in connection with their post-war situation’.⁸⁹¹ In other words, the calculative basis of trust was weak given suspicion surrounding motivations for acquiring an atomic bomb, and there were no affective relationships in place to manage these difficulties.

The impact of the lack of personal trusting relationships is evident above, and is made clearer in comparison to the later years of the war when some personal trusting relationships did come into being. Given the extremely high sensitivity of atomic research, however, even personal relationships could only achieve so much, indicating that trust overall remained limited in Anglo-American relations at this stage. It was not until the Quebec Agreement of August 1943 that ‘full

⁸⁸⁴ Bernstein, 206.

⁸⁸⁵ Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945*, 122.

⁸⁸⁶ Gowing, 123.

⁸⁸⁷ Gowing, 175.

⁸⁸⁸ Gowing, 177.

⁸⁸⁹ For Churchill asking Hopkins for an update on Tube Alloys see, for example, Churchill to Hopkins, 16 February 1943, reproduced in William Slany and Richardson Dougall, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Document 1* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d1>.

⁸⁹⁰ Bernstein, “The Uneasy Alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945,” 212–13.

⁸⁹¹ Memorandum from Bush to Hopkins, 31 March 1943, reproduced in William Slany and Richardson Dougall, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Document 7* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d7>.

and effective' atomic collaboration was agreed upon.⁸⁹² A new Combined Policy Committee was set up in Washington, and owing to personal relations the organisation was more effective than anyone had expected:

Against this background of latent suspicion, it is remarkable that Anglo-American collaboration was in general so friendly and fruitful. This was entirely due to personal relations at the day-to-day working level.⁸⁹³

The personal day-to-day relations referred to include Dill, Halifax, Campbell, Makins, and Hambro, who were all popular in Washington and had good knowledge of how policy in Washington worked.⁸⁹⁴ The most notable interpersonal relationship, however, is that between the head of the British atomic energy mission to the United States, Professor Chadwick, and the man in executive charge of the American atomic project, General Groves.⁸⁹⁵ The two developed a strong friendship 'born of mutual respect and understanding of the task the other was trying to do'.⁸⁹⁶ In comparison to the earlier years of the atomic relationship, this demonstrates the value of affective trust between individuals in facilitating cooperation, even on highly sensitive issues. This will be further demonstrated in the following chapter, where it will be seen that formal nuclear cooperation collapsed following the death of Roosevelt, and the removal of Churchill from office.

Intelligence

This section will examine how the intelligence relationship developed throughout the war to understand how it would reach the strengths where it could be institutionalised in the form of UKUSA following the war. Much of the intelligence relationship was reliant on bottom-up processes of cooperation in the field, driven by the trust developed in interpersonal relationships on the ground. Looking at the impact of the personal relationships which had emerged during WWI will further demonstrate this point. So too will the example of the most notable interpersonal relationship in the intelligence space during WWII, that of William J. Donovan and William Stephenson. Analysing the difficulties which arose in the intelligence relationship in the Pacific theatre of the war will shed light on the interplay of the dimensions of trust. As with the relationship in the Pacific theatre generally, the intelligence relationship in this area contained significant tensions. The overall robustness of the calculative dimension in the intelligence space

⁸⁹² Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the U.S.A and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys, 19 August 1943, reproduced in Slany and Dougall, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Document 4*.

⁸⁹³ Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945*, 236.

⁸⁹⁴ Gowing, 236.

⁸⁹⁵ Gowing, 236.

⁸⁹⁶ Gowing, 237.

and the strengths of the affective dimension in the relationships between key individuals, however, meant that the intelligence relationship developed significant enough for trust to be institutionalised.

While the 1946 UKUSA Agreement is pointed to as the highlight moment for Anglo-American intelligence sharing, UKUSA was a formalization of the cooperation which had been taking place during WWII, including prior to American entry in the war. Michael S. Goodman examines the early foundations of Anglo-American intelligence sharing, determining that it was in early 1940 that cooperation on intelligence sharing began with both the creation of the British Security Coordination office in New York tasked with liaising with their American counterparts, and the American decision to send several Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officers to visit London.⁸⁹⁷ By the end of the year, a meeting between the British Chiefs of Staff and the assistant chief of staff for the US Army Brigadier General George Strong, resulted in the US disseminating all relevant information to the British following Strong's proposition that 'the free exchange of intelligence' take place.⁸⁹⁸ Although the clear signs of intelligence cooperation appear in 1940, as Jason Dittmer points out 'the identification of a singular starting point for an assemblage is impossible; rather, the emergence of its collective agency is the result of a range of processes, taking place at different temporalities'.⁸⁹⁹ In other words, it is not possible to identify a single origin point of UKUSA, as it is something which emerged out of a broad range of interactions. He also points out that while UKUSA was a formalized agreement at the top levels of government, UKUSA itself emerged as much 'from the bottom- up process of collaboration in the field', where British and American forces had a tendency to share intelligence when they felt it was beneficial.⁹⁰⁰ UKUSA was also not the first formal institutionalization of the intelligence relationship, with the Britain-United States of America agreement (BRUSA) of May 17 1943 outlining the mechanisms for the collecting and sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT).⁹⁰¹ Furthermore, even the cooperation which took place during WWII had important precedents in WWI. As Bath points out with regards to naval intelligence, that is when cooperation first took place and many themes as well as personal connections re-emerged during WWII.⁹⁰² Although cooperation lessened during the interwar years and was

⁸⁹⁷ Goodman, "Evolution of a Relationship: The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing," 2.

⁸⁹⁸ Goodman, 2.

⁸⁹⁹ Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages," 609.

⁹⁰⁰ Dittmer, 609.

⁹⁰¹ The BRUSA Agreement, reproduced in John Cary Sims, "The BRUSA Agreement of May 17, 1943," *Cryptologia* 21, no. 1 (1997): 30–38.

⁹⁰² Alan Harris Bath, *Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 3–6.

conducted on a predominantly informal basis, Bath argues that despite this ‘by the start of 1938 the groundwork had been prepared for the cooperation that was to come’.⁹⁰³ Additionally, Roosevelt’s admiration of British intelligence and Churchill’s personal involvement in intelligence in WWI predisposed both to value intelligence and fuelled their desire to enable Anglo-American cooperation in the intelligence space.⁹⁰⁴ The most well-known form of cooperation on intelligence was with regards to SIGINT, in particular cracking the enciphered radio communications of the enemy. This included most notably Germany’s ULTRA and Japan’s Purple codes. America and Britain had agreed that America would be responsible for the intelligence activities relating to the Pacific War, whereas Britain would be responsible for the European War.⁹⁰⁵ Intelligence collaboration did, however, exist on a broad scale, across military services and theatres of war, and given the sensitivity of intelligence matters is illustrative of the growth of trust in the relationship.

Cooperation on intelligence matters is representative of the interplay of the dimensions of trust. One way in which this becomes clear is in the invaluable role interpersonal relationships played in establishing and expanding the intelligence relationship between Britain and America. Shedding further light on the important WWI precedents, in 1939 one British and one American naval officer were transferred to London: Rear Admiral John H. Godfrey of the Royal Navy, and Captain Alan G. Kirk of the U.S. Navy. The British Godfrey was aided in his role by Admiral Hall,⁹⁰⁶ who was one of the leading figures in charge of codebreaking during WWI.⁹⁰⁷ As an enthusiastic advocate of Anglo-American cooperation, Godfrey worked hard to develop a personal relationship with the American Kirk, and the two became key figures in cooperation on naval intelligence matters.⁹⁰⁸ It is also necessary to mention the important role of the Roosevelt-Churchill relationship in the intelligence space, which was required to kickstart formal cooperation as ‘it took Roosevelt and Churchill to break bureaucratic logjams and map out the route ahead’.⁹⁰⁹ The State Department and American isolationism made cooperation difficult prior to American entry in the war, and therefore Roosevelt’s personal intervention and belief that ‘there should be the closest

⁹⁰³ Bath, 10–16.

⁹⁰⁴ Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence Collaboration Between Britain and the United States During the Second World War,” in *The Intelligence Revolution: A History*, ed. Lt. Col. Walter T. Hitchcock (Washington D.C.: U.S. Air Force Academy, Office of Air Force History, 1991), 113.

⁹⁰⁵ Studies on Cryptology, NSA, Document SRH-05. Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency. Reproduced in Timothy Mulligan, ed., *Covert Warfare: 1. ULTRA, MAGIC, and the Allies*, vol. 1 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989).

⁹⁰⁶ Bath, *Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence*, 20.

⁹⁰⁷ Bath, 6.

⁹⁰⁸ Bath, 20–21.

⁹⁰⁹ David Stafford, “Roosevelt, Churchill and Anglo-American Intelligence: The Strange Case of Juan March,” *Intelligence and National Security* 15, no. 2 (2000): 37.

possible marriage between the FBI and British Intelligence' was fundamental to early Anglo-American intelligence cooperation.⁹¹⁰ Similarly, the British began sharing SIGINT at Churchill's behest, with the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station in New York, Sir James Paget, beginning to share information with Roosevelt's inner circle from the end of 1939.⁹¹¹ This web of personal relationships greatly facilitated the growth of trust and subsequently the capacity of the two states to cooperate on intelligence matters.

The most notable personal relationship in the intelligence field, however, was that between William J. Donovan and William Stephenson. Donovan began as a special envoy of Roosevelt who was suspicious of the State Department, sent to Britain to assess how the European war was progressing and whether it was worth the U.S. giving aid to Britain or if Britain was too close to imminent defeat for it to be worthwhile.⁹¹² Donovan had access to Churchill and most of the British intelligence chiefs, and returned to the U.S. advocating for urgent assistance.⁹¹³ Stephenson was asked to coordinate liaison between the SIS and the Americans by Churchill in 1940, which required the creation of a new organisation called British Security Coordination (BSC) that came to be an umbrella organisation coordinating British intelligence organisations such as MI5, SIS, Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Political Warfare Executive.⁹¹⁴ When Stephenson arrived he sought out Donovan to aid him, and they forged a strong personal relationship and 'quickly became "the two Bills"'.⁹¹⁵ Donovan then sought out Stephenson's aid when he was made the chief of America's first secret intelligence agency, which began as the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941, before becoming the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942 and ultimately the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947.⁹¹⁶ Stephenson and Donovan worked closely together in the creation of America's first secret intelligence agency, planning the organisation and methods of operation together.⁹¹⁷ The relationship between Stephenson and Donovan, and their relationships with Churchill and Roosevelt in conjunction with Churchill and Roosevelt's relationship with one another, proved integral to the creation of American intelligence capacity and organisations and also Anglo-American cooperation in the intelligence space.

⁹¹⁰ President Roosevelt, quoted in Nigel West, *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945* (New York: St. Ermin's Press, 1999), xxv.

⁹¹¹ Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96.

⁹¹² Aldrich, 96.

⁹¹³ Aldrich, 97-98.

⁹¹⁴ West, *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945*, ix.

⁹¹⁵ Thomas F. Troy, "REMINISCENCE: CIA's Indebtedness to Bill Stephenson," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 20, no. 4 (2007): 722.

⁹¹⁶ Troy, 722.

⁹¹⁷ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 74.

Given the high sensitivity of intelligence, the extent to which states are willing to cooperate with one another in this area is a valuable indicator of trust in the relationship. As with much of the examination of WWII, there is debate over how to balance the extent to which cooperation was unique with the frictions and conflicts of interests which arose. The interplay of the dimensions of trust helps to provide explanations for these debates, as the balancing of cooperation with frictions reveals insights into the state of trust in the relationship. The limitations of the affective and normative dimensions of trust at this time meant that navigating areas where the calculative dimension was also weak was difficult. As with the Anglo- American wartime relationship generally, this issue becomes most prominent in an examination of the Pacific War. First it bears pointing out that frictions in the intelligence relationship do not mean a good relationship was not in place. As Christopher Andrew argues, the closeness of the intelligence relationship was unique and unprecedented, and the frictions between Britain and America on intelligence matters were no greater than the frictions within each intelligence community itself.⁹¹⁸ Often, owing to the inter-service rivalry, each U.S. intelligence service would be receiving more information from the British than from each other.⁹¹⁹ As Andrew states, ‘what was unique to the transatlantic intelligence alliance were not the inevitable moments of friction but the unprecedented trust and intimacy which it generated’.⁹²⁰ This will become even more apparent in the following chapter, where it will be seen that the closeness of the intelligence relationship would lead the intelligence communities across both states to feel like a close-knit family.

There were also, however, key frictions regarding the Pacific. As these family relationships between intelligence communities were not yet fully formed, the affective and normative dimensions of trust remained limited. Consequently, weaknesses in the calculative dimension were difficult to manage. As with other aspects of the war, difficulties arose over the Pacific War and British imperialism. Indeed, Richard J. Aldrich goes so far as to argue that the intelligence relationship cannot be fully understood without taking into account ‘insoluble political differences over the future of empire’.⁹²¹ Interwar British intelligence capabilities were in many ways limited, but the focus of what did exist was on imperial matters and monitoring internal threats such as agitators, nationalists, and communists rather than external threats such as Germany.⁹²² Somewhat ironically, despite the tensions over imperial matters, shared concerns regarding ‘agitators’ and ‘radicals’ meant that the interwar years saw continuous intelligence

⁹¹⁸ For example between the SIS and SOE within Britain, and the FBI and COI/OSS/CIA in America. See Andrew, “Intelligence Collaboration Between Britain and the United States During the Second World War,” 111.

⁹¹⁹ Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service*, 243.

⁹²⁰ Andrew, “Intelligence Collaboration Between Britain and the United States During the Second World War,” 111.

⁹²¹ Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service*, 9.

⁹²² Aldrich, 377.

collaboration on these matters by Britain, the Commonwealth, European states, and America.⁹²³ This was based on domestic security collaboration between the State Department, the SIS station in New York, and the FBI, which had existed even before WWI but which had expanded following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.⁹²⁴ While this history of collaboration reveals more extensive Anglo-American cooperation than is often assumed by those who focus on its wartime origins, it also reveals a pattern which continued through the war of the concurrent focus on long-term matters of national interest.⁹²⁵ The focus may have been predominantly on winning the war, however intelligence operations were carried out on economic and commercial matters, with regards to both neutrals and allies.⁹²⁶ These differences illustrate that the normative dimension of trust was weak, as Britain and America did not, at this stage, “think like,” “feel like,” or “respond like” one another. Despite the divergences the calculative dimension had a strong foundation in the focus on winning the war and the prioritisation of the European war, and affective relationships between figures such as Roosevelt and Churchill and Donovan and Stephenson helped to manage the frictions in the relationship as the war progressed.

Society

Given the nature of total war, society was inherently involved in both the British and American war efforts, as well as in American neutrality. Compared to the Boer War and even WWI, where a group of transatlantic elites, notably including the transatlantic women, went out of their way to forge ties between the two states, during WWII the two societies were intimately connected. These interactions of course included those between the soldiers, nurses, and volunteers on the home front and at home in each state, and the civil servants running the combined war effort. This section will focus on how the two societies were linked via the medium of propaganda. Given the extent to which American participation in the war was innately tied to domestic opinion, propaganda began the war as an invaluable and necessary British tool to try and entice American aid and participation in the war. Through the example of propaganda, the inherently interwoven nature of the domains of the bilateral relationship is evident, as are the dimensions of trust. Propaganda policies were in part driven by the British government, but were also reliant on the work of individual citizens from across both states to function, and were of course aimed at members of both society and government and the relationship between society and government to alter public opinion and government policy to support military aims. To achieve these goals required the attempt to build relations across the dimensions of trust: to prove commonality of interests; to

⁹²³ Aldrich, 21.

⁹²⁴ Aldrich, 22.

⁹²⁵ Aldrich, 376.

⁹²⁶ Aldrich, 376.

build goodwill and empathy; and to stress shared values, goals, identity, and induce collocation. Three main avenues of propaganda and how they functioned across the domains of the relationship and the dimensions of trust will be analysed below: the British propaganda effort in America to combat American neutrality; the impact of American radio reporters on the ground in Britain; and the role of propaganda documentaries and Hollywood films.

In the lead up to the war and throughout the war itself, Britain was keenly aware of the need to subtly promote British interests in America in a fashion more akin to what is nowadays known as soft power rather than overt propaganda. Out of necessity, ‘the British quickly perfected the art of propaganda that did not seem to be propaganda at all’.⁹²⁷ This was the aim of the British Library of Information (BLI), first set up in November 1919. The overt British propaganda deployed in WWI had tainted propaganda as a poisoned chalice in America, as Americans resented their involvement in the war and blamed, at least in part, misleading and exaggerated British propaganda.⁹²⁸ The Foreign Office determined that ‘national publicity’ would be a subtler, yet still effective approach to promoting British interests, and that a library was sufficiently benevolent and useful for such a purpose.⁹²⁹ The BLI certainly proved its usefulness in the interwar years, using the elite connections it had forged across America, driven by the work of the director Mr. Wilberforce, to ensure favourable press on Britain during the Washington Naval Conference.⁹³⁰ Nicholas Cull cautions that the effectiveness of the BLI was limited, particularly by the time the war began.⁹³¹ While the BLI was quite good at forging elite and media connections across America, shaping American opinion to some extent, what was really needed was to build trust between societies.

A key conduit connecting American society to British society was the radio reports they received from American reporters on the ground in London during the Blitz. The reports served to build trust across all three dimensions, but most significantly they built affective trust through the promotion of empathy and goodwill. By far the most notable reporter was Ed Murrow, who had become a household name along with other American foreign correspondents owing to their reporting of the 1938 Munich crisis in which Britain agreed to Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia.⁹³² The British were aware that if they trusted wartime news to American reporters, it would greatly help to alleviate fears of British propaganda, but also promote British

⁹²⁷ Stephen Budiansky, “America, This Is London Calling,” *World War II* 25, no. 1 (2010): 52.

⁹²⁸ David A. Lincove, “The British Library of Information in New York: A Tool of British Foreign Policy, 1919-1942,” *Libraries & The Cultural Record* 46, no. 2 (2011): 159.

⁹²⁹ Lincove, 157–58.

⁹³⁰ Lincove, 162.

⁹³¹ Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Against American “Neutrality” in World War II*, 59–68.

⁹³² Cull, 24.

interests if the reporters were known to be sympathetic.⁹³³ The reporters only became more sympathetic as they personally experienced the Blitz each night in London, becoming ‘citizens of London’,⁹³⁴ and ‘Londoners under fire’.⁹³⁵ As Cull points out, the shared experience meant the reporters began to ‘think like Londoners’.⁹³⁶ Experiencing the Blitz first-hand meant that the reporters quickly began to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” native Londoners, developing the normative dimension of trust and passing that on to some extent in their reporting to Americans at home across the Atlantic. Just as the presence of ambassador Winant built trust in America within Britain, the presence of Ed Murrow and his reports built trust in Britain within America.

The web of relationships Murrow built proved invaluable. He fought to have his friend Winant made ambassador, developed close relations with Churchill after their wives, Clementine Churchill and Janet Murrow, became friends, and became the key figure Americans such as Harry Hopkins sought out when they arrived in London for information and advice on British matters.⁹³⁷ Murrow ‘humanized the Blitz for his American audience’, through presenting the everyday struggles and strengths of the British people.⁹³⁸ One of the more significant early broadcasts was the ‘London After Dark’ broadcast of 24 August 1940, which aimed to produce a sound montage from a series of British, Canadian, and American broadcasters stationed at different locations across London.⁹³⁹ Murrow began the broadcast with his report from Trafalgar Square which, owing to the immediate onset of the air-raid sirens, allowed him to diverge somewhat from the scripted dialogue without being censored.⁹⁴⁰ Murrow held out the microphone to capture the sound of the sirens, the traffic, and the footsteps of the people walking past him into the air raid shelter he was stationed in front of, allowing his American listeners an intimate glimpse into life in London during the Blitz.⁹⁴¹ American reporters faced difficulty in being allowed to broadcast unscripted, and the fact that Murrow was able to achieve permission from the British Ministry of Information (MOI) in September of 1940 was because he had ‘convinced Whitehall that he could be trusted’.⁹⁴² The result of this was his first live commentary of an air raid on September 21 1940.

⁹³³ Cull, 24.

⁹³⁴ Olson, *Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour*.

⁹³⁵ Olson, *Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour*.

⁹³⁶ Cull, 104.

⁹³⁷ Olson, *Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour*, 30–33.

⁹³⁸ Robert M. Hendershot, “Manipulating the Anglo-American Civilizational Identity in the Era of Churchill,” in *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 75.

⁹³⁹ Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Against American “Neutrality” in World War II*, 102.

⁹⁴⁰ Cull, 102.

⁹⁴¹ “The London Blitz Described by Edward R. Murrow,” YouTube, April 28, 2014,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=clKaP5YCB8k&index=2&list=PLJYC7fs1m3aowpaMJ-t7_PQB7nshG9Jc.

⁹⁴² Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Against American “Neutrality” in World War II*, 102.

He described how he was ‘standing on a rooftop looking out over London’, told listeners how ‘the lights are swinging over in this general direction now’ and warned they would ‘hear two explosions’, detailing the kinds of explosions and anti-aircraft fire.⁹⁴³ Through his reports, ‘Murrow also earned his listeners’ trust’.⁹⁴⁴

If the disembodied voices of American reporters and the haunting sounds of an air raid transmitted via radio to the American masses helped to build empathy and trust for the British, then the effect was only amplified when visuals were added into the mix. These visuals existed in documentaries and also, of course, Hollywood. Hollywood had an enormous impact on American views, given that more than three fifths of the population went to the movies each week, and films were viewed as a leading source of information about current events.⁹⁴⁵ Hendershot argues that Hollywood ‘was responsible for much of the Anglo-American civilizational identity’s cultural permeation during the war’.⁹⁴⁶ In other words, it was a key vehicle for building the elements of shared values and collective identity required for the growth of the normative dimension of trust. This was greatly aided by the fact that a significant portion of Hollywood was British, and the British actors in Hollywood had been asked to stay rather than enlist owing to their usefulness.⁹⁴⁷ Key figures had a significant impact on public opinion, with two key examples being ‘the quintessential Englishman’ Leslie Howard, and the U.S. born, British based Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., who both used their influence to promote the Anglo- American relationship.⁹⁴⁸ The Hollywood films included Alexander Korda’s *The Lion Has Wings*, Michael Powell’s *Contraband/Blackout*, William Wyler’s *Mrs. Miniver*, and Alfred Hitchcock’s *Foreign Correspondent*.⁹⁴⁹ These films and their actors served as a bridge between British and American societies, creating connections and building trust through promoting goodwill, shared values, and collective identity.

The key weakness of Hollywood was the production time of films, a space which could be filled with shorter, quicker to make documentaries. The first notable documentary was *London Can Take It!*, a short ten minute piece portraying the daily lives of Londoners in the Blitz.⁹⁵⁰ While documentaries generally did not have the reach of Hollywood films, *London Can Take It!* was

⁹⁴³ “Edward R. Murrow from a London Rooftop during the Blitz - 22 Sept. 1940,” YouTube, September 12, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W8oTLlQc_LI.

⁹⁴⁴ Olson, *Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour*, 31.

⁹⁴⁵ M. Todd Bennett, *One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, the Allies, and World War II* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 7.

⁹⁴⁶ Hendershot, “Manipulating the Anglo-American Civilizational Identity in the Era of Churchill,” 82.

⁹⁴⁷ Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Against American “Neutrality” in World War II*, 50.

⁹⁴⁸ See Fred M. Leventhal, “Leslie Howard and Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.: Promoting the Anglo-American Alliance in Wartime, 1939-1943,” in *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000*, ed. Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 108–26.

⁹⁴⁹ Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Against American “Neutrality” in World War II*, 48–50, 134.

⁹⁵⁰ “London Can Take It,” YouTube, May 9, 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLgfSDtHFt8>.

seen by an estimated sixty million Americans across 12, 000 theatres within two months of its release.⁹⁵¹ The film was created at the behest of the MOI, who wanted a film on the London Blitz for an American audience.⁹⁵² The producers of the film, Harry Watt and Humphrey Jennings, worked for the Crown Film Unit, the propaganda film arm of the MOI.⁹⁵³ The aim of the film was to show that London, ‘every morning, no matter how hard she is hit, gets up off the floor like a really tough boxer, and fights back’.⁹⁵⁴ The idea that London could take it was an important one, given the context. The making of the film took place before the Americans had been convinced London could survive the war, before Roosevelt’s envoys had investigated Britain and returned to assure him that they believed Britain could make it, with some American aid. After shooting the footage, they set about acquiring an American voice to pair with their film. Their search led them to an American journalist, the associate editor of *Colliers Weekly* Quentin Reynolds. Reynolds added to the value of the film’s message in two ways. Firstly, he was an American, and as the participation of the MOI in the film’s making was not listed upon its release, his voice reassured the American audience of his claim that ‘I am a neutral reporter’.⁹⁵⁵ Secondly, as Watt describes in his memoirs, ‘apart from Ed Murrow, Quent was the first outsider to speak up and say we would not be beaten’.⁹⁵⁶ Above all else, propaganda opened a space for indirect interactions between societies. It connected British and American people through the radio waves and film screens in a way which would otherwise have not been possible. Despite being indirect rather than face-to-face interactions, or even direct non-face-to-face interactions such as Roosevelt and Churchill’s correspondence, propaganda was able to facilitate the growth of trust. Through film and radio, Americans and Britons came to know and understand more about each other, develop empathy and goodwill, and also build and shape elements of shared values and collective identity.

Conclusion

The WWII Anglo-American alliance was built on the trust which had been developed across both the dimensions of trust and the domains of the relationship prior to its creation, and provided the basis for the ongoing development of trust throughout the Cold War. This chapter has demonstrated that trust needs time to develop across all dimensions, and that cooperation is easier when trust is stronger across all three dimensions than when it is not. Shared need alone is not sufficient for such a close alliance. While shared interests are fundamental, what is most important

⁹⁵¹ Budiansky, “America, This Is London Calling,” 52.

⁹⁵² Harry Watt, *Don’t Look At The Camera* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974), 137.

⁹⁵³ Budiansky, “America, This Is London Calling,” 52.

⁹⁵⁴ Watt, *Don’t Look At The Camera*, 138.

⁹⁵⁵ “London Can Take It.”

⁹⁵⁶ Watt, *Don’t Look At The Camera*, 143.

in the realm of interests is shared perceptions of shared interests. Managing differences in interests or differences in perceptions of shared interests requires the development of affective trust and congruent expectations of trustworthiness, which can also be further aided with aspects of normative trust. Congruent expectations of trustworthiness and empathy for the differing circumstances of one another allowed for the ongoing negotiation of an alliance based on shared expectations of trustworthiness, despite key differences and frustrations over areas such as economic and imperial policy. The affective dimension of trust was both limited and aided by the quality of American ambassadors to Britain, with Joseph Kennedy's contentious ambassadorship limiting the role he could play, and Winant's psychological impact strengthening affective trust not only between governments but also between societies. The development of trust was also aided by the shared language and the view among certain elites of some form of shared transatlantic culture, based on a variety of elements including shared history, culture, religion, and law. These ideas had been transmitted through the transatlantic interactions which had taken place over time prior to the onset of the war, as well as on an ongoing basis throughout the war itself. While there remained key limitations to the normative dimension of trust, the extent to which collocation, shared values, collective identity, and joint goals were present during the war reveal that it did play an important role in the development of the wartime relationship. The development of trust across all three dimensions provided a fundamental basis for the unparalleled closeness of wartime cooperation.

Examining the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship confirms the necessity of a flat ontology which looks beyond solely leaders or governments, or even the military in a wartime context. Particularly given the salience of isolationism in America in the early years of the war, as well as the nature of total war following American entry into the conflict, it is abundantly clear that society is inherently involved in bilateral relations. To understand the impact of this it is necessary to examine the interplay of the dimensions of trust across different domains of the relationship in an expanded application of the concept of embedded trust achieved using a flat ontology, where it is understood that the domains are not separate but are inextricably intertwined. Given the shorter time period analysed in this chapter compared to others, and the all-encompassing nature of war, the examples chosen are more representative of the domains as a whole than they were in the previous chapter. While the examples remain slices of the whole, they are rather larger slices than in the other case study chapters, and therefore better represent the relationship as a whole. Roosevelt and Churchill, key figures from government, and ambassadors all worked to build trust and empathy not only among each other, but also between their military and civilian populations. Military-to-military relations were greatly

aided by the trust which was built between the Combined Chiefs of Staff, while intelligence relations were aided by the personal relationship between both Churchill and Roosevelt, and Donovan and Stephenson, and nuclear relations struggled owing to the lack of such personal connections and limited opportunities for interaction. While societies were inherently a part of total war, they were also indirectly connected via the means of propaganda such as documentaries and Hollywood films which helped to build common perceptions and empathy and, consequently, trust. A multidimensional trust-based framework applied using a flat ontology helps to trace the impact of such interactions across the breadth of the relationship to shed light on the way in which they shaped the wartime alliance, in a way which incorporates the intersubjective relationship between factors commonly understood to fall into the categories of sentiments and interests. This further demonstrates the utility of the theoretical approach developed in this thesis, and the original contribution it makes to social trust theory through analysing social trust in a way which is inclusive of a wide variety of actors, and maintains the salience of interpersonal interactions. The theoretical approach allows this chapter to also contribute to the empirical literature through exploring how the development of trust across the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions shaped the emergence of the wartime alliance. The development of trust both drew on exchanges which had taken place prior to the war, and also provided the basis on which ongoing interactions throughout the Cold War would go on to influence the nature of trust in the Anglo-American relationship in a shifting international strategic context.

Chapter Five

Anglo-American Relations During the Cold War

Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis of the Anglo-American relationship, examining how trust developed over time through the use of a multidimensional framework applied using a flat ontology of the state. In particular, this chapter illuminates how the “special relationship” which was formed during a time of intense need owing to WWII survived and adapted to the new Cold War environment. This adaptation was possible due to the trust which had been formed during WWII. The development of trust was facilitated by the increased pace and breadth of interactions between societies, and the personal connections formed between politicians and personnel across military, nuclear, and intelligence spaces. Despite the unprecedented closeness of the wartime relationship, however, Anglo-American relations struggled in the immediate aftermath of the war. The death of Roosevelt and the changing of prime ministers in Britain from Churchill to Attlee removed the relationship of bonded trust between Roosevelt and Churchill as a key pillar of Anglo-American relations. This change had its most dramatic effect on the nuclear relationship, as trust had not developed in any significant way in this space beyond the two leaders. Consequently the U.S. Senate, unaware of the spoken agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill to continue nuclear cooperation, passed the McMahon Act prohibiting the sharing of nuclear information with any other state. The McMahon Act was not rescinded until 1958. Combined with the lack of trusting leadership relations, the calculative dimension of trust weakened without the shared war effort. Conflicts of interest arose over economics, British colonialism, American internationalism, and the British welfare state. Despite their differences, the calculative dimension of trust soon strengthened as Britain and America came to perceive the changing strategic context of the Cold War in a similar fashion, and a shared threat once again became prominent in the form of the Soviet Union and communism. This was particularly evident with the 1957 launch of Sputnik as a product of the Soviet space programme, which helped to encourage the recommencement of nuclear cooperation and, along with good leadership relations, the repair of the relationship following the 1956 Suez crisis. The fact that relations went through this lull before being firmly re-established indicates that this was not only a path dependent continuation of wartime cooperation. It was an active choice of the two states to seek each other out in the context of the emerging Cold War, owing in large part to the pre-existing levels of trust in the relationship.

Over the course of the Cold War, the affective and normative dimensions of trust played a considerable role in bolstering the strength of the Anglo-American relationship. The affective dimension comes to the fore most strongly in the management of crises. Throughout the Cold War, Anglo-American relations experienced three significant crises which have been studied and compared ever since to determine why and how they were able to take place in the context of the “special relationship”: the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1962 Skybolt crisis, and the 1982 Falklands War. Each of these crises could have resulted in a significant rupture of the Anglo-American relationship, and yet owing to the strength of affective relations between key individuals, and the backbone of the normative dimension of trust, the relationship was able to repair and bounce back each time. An examination of the normative dimension through Lewicki and Bunker’s four indicators reveals its strength. Britain and America were colocated in terms of the Cold War, as exemplified by the presence of U.S. bases in Britain; they held strong shared values regarding Western liberal democracy, capitalist economics, and the role of these as underpinning a shared Cold War strategic vision; they worked intimately together on the creation of the joint goal of a Cold War victory; and they demonstrated a collective identity through the formalisation of the Anglo-American alliance, as well as its multilateral counterparts of NATO and UKUSA. The strengthening of all three dimensions of trust over the course of the Cold War underpins the ability of the relationship to remain close and adapt to changing strategic environments, and confirms the necessity of repeated interactions over time to enable a process of social learning and the development of trust. The strong affective and normative underpinning of trust in Anglo-American relations illustrates that the relationship is not “special,” it is trusting.

The interplay of the dimensions of trust can be found across the domains of government, defence, and society. Examples across each domain reveal how the interplay of dimensions shapes the nature of trust in the bilateral relationship. The relationship between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and U.S. President John F. Kennedy, along with the interconnected relationships between them and their foreign ministers, enabled the relationship to continue rebuilding after the Suez crisis, and amenablely negotiate the Skybolt crisis. This was due to the presence and interplay of all three dimensions of trust. In the military domain, the Falklands war is illustrative both of the interplay of the dimensions of trust, and of the value of a flat ontology of the state. The differing opinions and roles of individuals, defence, various aspects of government, and society, all shaped the outcome of the war and its impact on Anglo-American relations. The difficulties of re-establishing the official nuclear relationship is evidence that the relationship was not only path dependent. The fact that informal cooperation was ongoing throughout this period, however, is illustrative of the value of the personal connections which had

formed between service personnel during WWII. The Skybolt crisis is a microcosm of the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship, shedding light on divergent interests and strategic cultures, as well as the importance of affective relationships between leaders. The intelligence relationship and the creation of UKUSA further reinforces the role of the close “family” relationships between personnel across the two states in developing and maintaining trust. The example used in the domain of society also supports the use of a flat ontology of the state in seeking to understand how the interplay of the dimensions of trust shapes the nature of bilateral relations. An examination of the Lavender Scare in the U.S., the Burgess-Maclean scandal in Britain, and the rise of transnational homophile activism provides valuable insights into the relationship between the personal and the geopolitical, and how the Cold War and transnational social movements shaped one another in the context of Anglo-American relations. All of these examples further solidify the fundamental role of social interactions over time across the breadth of the bilateral relationship in developing the trust which formed the backbone of Anglo-American relations throughout the Cold War.

The Dimensions of Trust

Calculative

The Cold War provided a strong foundation of core shared interests and ensured the calculative dimension of trust was generally a strength of the relationship during this period. This section will examine both these strengths as well as some tensions which remained. WWII had altered strategic cultures and domestic politics in both states in ways which caused frictions, for example regarding British socialism and the welfare state. Ongoing tensions regarding British colonialism were heightened in a Cold War environment, and economic tensions surrounding Britain’s need for American aid to rebuild after the war also caused problems. Despite these tensions, however, America realised it needed Britain as an ally given the Cold War strategic environment, and this environment also strengthened Britain’s desire to ensure a close relationship with America. Further tensions did arise following Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez in the 1960s, however, as it raised questions of Britain’s capacity to act on shared strategic interests. Overall, however, the strengths of shared perceptions of core strategic interests played a vital role in ensuring the wartime relationship adapted to the changes brought by the Cold War, as did important affective relationships and the development of the normative dimension of trust.

While the “special relationship” had formed during WWII, the war itself had also wrought significant changes in both countries which shaped how they viewed the post-war world. While the

British were intent on ‘entangling’ America in Europe,⁹⁵⁷ shifting American strategic culture and changed leaders limited American willingness to continue building on the trust developed with Britain during the war. The war had brought the two countries closer together than ever before, but had also served as ‘a catalyst for social change’ in each state.⁹⁵⁸ Britain’s penchant for the welfare state placed British politics generally to the left of American politics, which had a tendency to cause frictions.⁹⁵⁹ For example, following Britain’s 1968 withdrawal from east of Suez owing to economic difficulties, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that he ‘could not believe that free aspirins and false teeth were more important than Britain’s world role’.⁹⁶⁰ British socialism was particularly worrying to Americans in the early Cold War years, given that the British were more willing to trade with communists for economic gain.⁹⁶¹ American columnists explored the nature of British socialism and wondered, for example: ‘can there be freedom within a Socialist planned society or will Britain be faced sooner or later with a choice between the two?’⁹⁶² The British also refused to agree with the U.S. extreme view regarding China in 1949-1950,⁹⁶³ and while they eased American fears somewhat by participating in the Korean War, their criticisms of potential U.S. use of atomic weapons caused frictions.⁹⁶⁴ These changing domestic priorities and identities, as well as shifting strategic cultures and interests, proved difficult to navigate in the early postwar period.

An additional problem, continuing on from earlier years but heightened in the Cold War context, was American opposition to British colonialism. Dobson argues this was part of the reason Eisenhower was unwilling to develop a close Roosevelt-style relationship with Churchill, as both he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles felt it necessary to distance themselves from British and European colonialism.⁹⁶⁵ This was in part owing to the long- standing American

⁹⁵⁷ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 94.

⁹⁵⁸ Dobson, 91.

⁹⁵⁹ Dobson, 91.

⁹⁶⁰ Dean Rusk, quoted in Simon C. Smith, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ and the Middle East 1945-1973,” *Asian Affairs* 45, no. 3 (2014): 435.

⁹⁶¹ For an outline of American responses to British socialism in the early postwar years, see Caroline Anstey, “The Projection of British Socialism: Foreign Office Publicity and American Opinion, 1945-50,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 19, no. 3 (July 1984): 417–51.

⁹⁶² Francis Williams, “The Basic Question in Britain: Can Socialist Planning and Essential Individual Liberty Run in Harness or Are They Incompatible?,” *New York Times*, October 19, 1947.

⁹⁶³ The U.S. had invested a lot of energy into the relationship with the KMT, and therefore viewed the creation of the PRC as a humiliation and a rejection of decades of work building their relationship with China. The British, meanwhile, had always viewed China through a lens of commerce, and did not view Chinese communism through the same lens as Soviet communism in the same way as the U.S. did. See Roderick MacFarquhar, “The China Problem in Anglo-American Relations,” in *The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 311–19.

⁹⁶⁴ Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” 9.

⁹⁶⁵ Dobson, “Labour or Conservative? Does It Matter in Anglo-American Relations?,” 396.

distaste of European colonialism, and in part owing to the need to win over newly independent states to succeed in the Cold War. Dulles, even more so than Eisenhower, was fervently opposed to traditional imperialism on both these counts.⁹⁶⁶ Dianne Kirby adds that Dulles was willing to overplay the Soviet threat to the public, believing that America was strongest when confronting threats as had been the case during WWII.⁹⁶⁷ Eisenhower did not hold the same religious and moral convictions regarding colonialism as Dulles, but he wrote to Winston Churchill urging him to consider ‘a thoughtful speech on the subject of the rights to self-government’, as ‘we are falsely pictured as the exploiters of people, the Soviets as their champion’.⁹⁶⁸ He clearly worked to develop shared expectations of Western interests with Churchill, arguing that ‘colonialism is on the way out ... I think we should handle it so as to win adherents to Western aims’.⁹⁶⁹ At the same time, the papers of Marshall of the Royal Airforce John Slessor indicate Britain feared that ‘to give free rein to their anti-colonial sentiment is to play straight into the hands of international Communism in the uncommitted countries’.⁹⁷⁰ He also sheds light on the frustration of Europeans at America’s “holier-than thou” attitude on colonialism, pointing at America’s history of imperialism and colonialism and arguing that they should ‘remember the old saying about the pot calling the kettle black’.⁹⁷¹

The tensions between American internationalism and opposition to British colonialism, and the strategic need for Britain to be a strong state, played out most significantly in the Middle East. This was foreseen by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s special Middle East envoy, Major General Patrick Hurley, who was concerned about Roosevelt’s enthusiasm on Iran:

An effort to establish freedom among the less favoured nations, so many of which are under the shadow of imperialism, will also inevitably run counter to the policy of sustaining Britain as a first-class world power.⁹⁷²

The struggle of acting across these two aims only became heightened in the Cold War context, as each became necessary pillars of American anti-Soviet strategy. As Davis points out, however, the WWII presence of American liberal internationalism indicates that the tension between British imperialism and American liberal internationalism had a longer history in the Middle East,

⁹⁶⁶ Dobson, 397.

⁹⁶⁷ Dianne Kirby, “John Foster Dulles: Moralism and Anti-Communism,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6, no. 3 (2008): 279.

⁹⁶⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Winston Churchill, July 22, 1954, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/186549>.

⁹⁶⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Winston Churchill, July 22, 1954, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/186549>.

⁹⁷⁰ “AIR 75/107,” 1959.

⁹⁷¹ “AIR 75/107.”

⁹⁷² Major General Patrick Hurley, quoted in Simon Davis, “‘A Projected New Trusteeship’? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 1 (2006): 32.

and was therefore not wholly defined by the Cold War.⁹⁷³ This clash of views on colonialism and Cold War strategy reached its peak during the Suez crisis of 1956, but was also prominent in the Palestine question, rivalries over petroleum, and in the crises regarding Iran's nationalisation of oil.⁹⁷⁴ The differing interests and strategic cultures with regards to imperialism and internationalism proved to be a thorn in Anglo-American relations throughout the Cold War, however the growth of the affective and normative dimensions of trust and the growing Soviet threat helped to manage the difficulties and crises these differences caused.

The early Cold War environment also saw economic tensions tar Anglo-American relations. The U.S. abruptly terminated Lend-Lease, and while this was in accordance with the agreement, given that the war had ended much more suddenly than expected it came as a shock to the British. Indeed, Truman described the decision to cancel the agreement only seven days after Japan had been defeated as 'the greatest mistake of his presidency'.⁹⁷⁵ The British therefore had to set about seeking additional American support, and negotiations began on what would become the Anglo-American Loan. The British believed that this would be an easy task, given the closeness of wartime cooperation.⁹⁷⁶ Unfortunately, Roosevelt had died, Churchill had no role in the government, and the British had sent John Maynard Keynes to negotiate and his close friend Henry Morgenthau was no longer Secretary of the Treasury.⁹⁷⁷ Highlighting the importance of personal connections and the need for interactions to enable the development of expectations of trustworthiness, consequently the British did not end up getting the interest-free loan they hoped for. Rather, they received a loan with interest, for a significantly lower amount than they had expected, and with strings attached regarding reform in the Sterling Area.⁹⁷⁸ Even finalising the loan in this form proved difficult in the U.S. owing to the challenges of domestic politics, particularly given the post-WWII trend of using opinion polling to guide policy decisions.⁹⁷⁹ Will Clayton, an economic official in the State Department, consequently launched a campaign to ensure that the loan had both public support and would receive the votes it required to pass in Congress.⁹⁸⁰ He had to combat several negative perceptions of Britain in America, including public concerns regarding British socialism;⁹⁸¹ the British belief that they were owed aid as a reward for the greater burden of blood and treasure they had borne in the war; and fears that Britain

⁹⁷³ Davis, 32.

⁹⁷⁴ Davis, 33.

⁹⁷⁵ Gannon, "The Special Relationship and the 1945 Anglo-American Loan," 4.

⁹⁷⁶ Gannon, 7.

⁹⁷⁷ Kimball, "Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence," 7.

⁹⁷⁸ Kimball, 10.

⁹⁷⁹ Gannon, "The Special Relationship and the 1945 Anglo-American Loan," 12.

⁹⁸⁰ Gannon, 12.

⁹⁸¹ Anstey, "The Projection of British Socialism," 429.

would try and renege on repayment as they had done with WWI loans.⁹⁸² While Clayton was combating these concerns on the American side, Churchill set out to capitalise on his popularity in America and convince the American public and members of Congress that the Soviets posed a considerable threat to both Britain and America, and that Britain would be vulnerable to the Soviets.⁹⁸³ Indeed, Kimball argues that it was the decline in Soviet-U.S. relations, and increasing public concerns regarding the danger of the Soviets which resulted in the loan to Britain being seen as ‘the last line against communism’ and enabled it to be enacted.⁹⁸⁴ The difficulties of the immediate post-war economic relationship clearly highlight the importance of shared interests, personal connections, and ongoing social interactions.

Despite significant early post-war tensions, the United States quickly realised they could not succeed in the Cold War alone. This can be seen, for example, in the founding of NATO in 1949, and the creation of UKUSA in 1946. In 1950 the U.S. Ambassador to London Lewis Douglas outlined the importance of Britain to the U.S. owing to its vast strategic colonial and Commonwealth presence, its central economic role as the heart of the sterling area, and its position as the only other western power ‘capable of wielding substantial military strength’.⁹⁸⁵ It was these shared interests, or the calculative dimension of trust, which Douglas argued meant that the Anglo-American relationship was indeed ‘a special relationship’.⁹⁸⁶ A 1957 joint ‘Declaration of Common Purpose’ by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan highlights the shift in worldview which had taken place:

The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle.⁹⁸⁷

Eisenhower’s correspondence with Winston Churchill also illustrates how the shifting Cold War context was shaping American perceptions. His 1954 letter entreating Churchill to speak strongly in favour of the self-determination of nations recognised that, although this narrative was

⁹⁸² Clair Wilcox, “The Significance of the British Loan,” *Department of State Bulletin* XIV (1946): 96–100.

⁹⁸³ Gannon, “The Special Relationship and the 1945 Anglo-American Loan,” 13.

⁹⁸⁴ Gannon, 13.

⁹⁸⁵ Lewis Douglas to Secretary of State Acheson, Bruce, Harriman, Perkins, and Bohlen, 7 May 1950, quoted in Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 99.

⁹⁸⁶ Lewis Douglas to Secretary of State Acheson, Bruce, Harriman, Perkins, and Bohlen, 7 May 1950, quoted in Dobson, 99.

⁹⁸⁷ “Declaration of Common Purpose by the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,” October 25, 1957, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10941&st=britain&st1=>

necessary to combat the Soviet picture of the West as colonisers, the U.S. was unable to present the narrative alone ‘without seeming to put the United States into opposition to Britain’.⁹⁸⁸ It is clear that the U.S. had realised they needed the British as an ally to win the Cold War, providing the impetus for the two states to go on to develop the normative dimension of trust through the creation of a shared strategic vision based on shared values and joint goals, and the creation of a collective identity in the form of a formal alliance.

The changing Cold War context also served to further cement Britain’s desire to ensure a close relationship with the United States. The shared interests regarding the containment of communism and the Soviet Union formed the bedrock of Anglo-American relations throughout the Cold War. The importance and scale of shared interests can be easily found in British foreign policy and security planning documents created by the Foreign Office, then renamed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 1968:

Stripped of sentimental overtones, even if these are not wholly unreal, the maintenance of close relations and mutual confidence between the U.S. and Britain is a matter of strong practical concern to us.⁹⁸⁹

The documents also highlight the importance of cultural and people-to-people links, demonstrating a clear understanding of the need to promote the British point of view in America through the promotion of social contacts and the use of the media to spread awareness about British policy and combat remaining strands of U.S. isolationism.⁹⁹⁰ Regarding shared interests, they point to the military and economic power of the U.S., the ability of the U.S. to provide security from the Soviet Union, and the similar vision and objectives ‘with regard to world order and the evolution of open societies’.⁹⁹¹ It is also made clear that for the British, ‘the alliance with the United States is the most important single factor in our foreign policy’.⁹⁹² In a 1971 attempt to metricise the scale of British priorities by country, the U.S. topped the list by far, more than doubling the next highest priority of the Soviet Union according to the scoring scale developed.⁹⁹³ The British had a clear understanding of their junior partner status,⁹⁹⁴ and also believed that the U.S. could ‘go it alone’ if they so desired; and consequently saw the maintenance of U.S. interest in international cooperation and leadership as ‘a major British objective’.⁹⁹⁵ It quickly becomes clear that the relationship with the U.S. was the single most important priority to Britain

⁹⁸⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Winston Churchill, July 22, 1954, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/186549>.

⁹⁸⁹ “FCO 49/267/1,” 1969, 1.

⁹⁹⁰ “AIR 8/1651,” 1951.

⁹⁹¹ “FCO 49/267/1,” 1–2; “FCO 49/503,” 1974, 3.

⁹⁹² “FCO 49/302,” n.d., 8.

⁹⁹³ “FCO 49/354,” 1971, 7.

⁹⁹⁴ “FCO 49/302,” 8.

⁹⁹⁵ “FCO 49/503,” 3–4.

throughout the Cold War, based on a set of shared interests and values regarding the containment of communism and the Soviet Union and the maintenance of a Western-led global order.

Differing economic and strategic interests proved difficult for the Anglo-American relationship from the late 1960s. One of the most notable examples of this is Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez.⁹⁹⁶ Britain's withdrawal from its global military presence east of Suez, namely in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, took place due to a combination of economic, domestic, and strategic reasons. The economic aspect is the conventionally accepted reason, given that upon his election in 1964 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had inherited 'an uncompetitive economy, characterised by a balance of payment deficit and thereafter, habitual sterling crises'.⁹⁹⁷ This culminated in the necessity of devaluing the pound in November of 1967.⁹⁹⁸ Wilson then subsequently announced the withdrawal in January of 1968.⁹⁹⁹ Longinotti adds to this picture that domestic politics were the primary motivator for the withdrawal, as the Labour government wished to prioritise social spending and 'transfer resources from warfare to welfare'.¹⁰⁰⁰ The British attempted to ease the sting of their withdrawal from a global presence through trying to prove they would be taking on a leading role within Europe and making a second application to join the European Economic Community (EEC).¹⁰⁰¹ McCourt adds that Britain did not view this decision as a retreat from the world to Europe, but rather as the best way for them to play 'a meaningful world role'.¹⁰⁰² This did little to ease the frustration of the U.S., particularly given the ongoing war in Vietnam,¹⁰⁰³ for which Britain refused to send troops other than a small contingent of special forces.¹⁰⁰⁴ The frustration was reversed come 1971, and Nixon's unilateral decision to float the U.S. dollar. While Britain understood the U.S. anxieties which had led to this policy,¹⁰⁰⁵ they also viewed it as 'a new departure', and 'a tougher more selfish approach to external issues'

⁹⁹⁶ For the most comprehensive account of Britain's motivations for the withdrawal following the release of archival materials in accordance with the 30 year limit, see Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World?* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

⁹⁹⁷ Alex Spelling, "'A Reputation for Parsimony to Uphold': Harold Wilson, Richard Nixon and the Re-Valued 'Special Relationship' 1969-1970," *Contemporary British History* 27, no. 2 (2013): 192-93.

⁹⁹⁸ David M. McCourt, "What Was Britain's 'East of Suez Role'?" *Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964-68*," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 20, no. 3 (2009): 456.

⁹⁹⁹ McCourt, 453.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Edward Longinotti, "Britain's Withdrawal From East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice," *Contemporary British History* 29, no. 3 (2015): 335.

¹⁰⁰¹ James Ellison, *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 140.

¹⁰⁰² McCourt, "What Was Britain's 'East of Suez Role'?" *Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964-68*," 454.

¹⁰⁰³ Ellison, *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68*, 140.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Duncan Andrew Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1984), 20-21.

¹⁰⁰⁵ "In their external aspects the measures reflect US anxieties of long standing: concern over the balance of payments deficit (which the US has been strongly encouraged by her trading partners to remedy); grievances against the commercial practices of Japan and the EEC and the inequitable US contribution to Western defence; and demands for attention to domestic needs rather than external responsibilities." See "FCO 49/337," 1971, 3.

in which the U.S. would be more willing to exploit its asymmetric relations with allies.¹⁰⁰⁶

The impact of the diminishment of the calculative dimension of trust is clearly illustrated in the U.S. refusal to aid the British during a subsequent sterling crisis in 1976, which Dobson argues was due to the lack of a need to protect the British position east of Suez, or the Bretton Woods system.¹⁰⁰⁷ During the 1970-74 tenure of British Prime Minister Heath these difficulties were also exacerbated by the lack of affective or normative trust between leaders, demonstrating the value of these dimensions in managing weaknesses in the calculative dimension of trust and highlighting the need to incorporate the interplay of the dimensions within analysis. Heath placed far less weight in the mythology of the “special relationship” than any other British prime minister, and therefore while he would cooperate with the U.S. when he believed it suited British interests, he was also more than willing to side with the EEC over the U.S.¹⁰⁰⁸ Heath’s desire to be seen as a good European rather than an American lackey in order to gain entry to the EEC¹⁰⁰⁹ meant that he kept his distance from the U.S., waiting an unusually long six months to meet with President Nixon¹⁰¹⁰ and indicating an unwillingness to operationalise a process of bonding with his American counterpart. The relationship began to improve once again as the calculative dimension with regards to Cold War strategic interests became more prominent, and affective relationships between leaders developed with the election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. This demonstrates the importance of all three dimensions of trust as vital components required to facilitate a trusting bilateral relationship.

Affective

Given the complexity of bilateral relationships, state interests, and state identities, several crises took place despite the significant growth of trust and cooperation in Anglo-American relations. A number of significant crises took place in Anglo-American relations over the course of the Cold War, and have been studied in detail to determine how each crisis was able to unfold given the “special” nature of the relationship. While the conflicting interests provide insight into the calculative dimension, they will be discussed here primarily in terms of the role of the affective dimension in managing crises. Firstly, however, this section will provide a brief introduction to the three main crises often discussed in conjunction with one another: Suez, Skybolt, and the

¹⁰⁰⁶ “FCO 49/337,” 3.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 142.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Thomas Robb, “The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the ‘Year of Europe’ and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship,’” *Contemporary British History* 26, no. 1 (2012): 74.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Robb, 82.

¹⁰¹⁰ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 141.

Falklands War. Suez will be the focus, as the Skybolt crisis will be discussed as an example of the nuclear relationship, and the Falklands War as an example of the defence relationship.

The Suez crisis of 1956 was the first and most severe crisis in post-war Anglo-American relations. The crisis was prompted by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. The divergent British and American responses can be understood in terms of divergent interests in the Middle East which had been a long-standing arena of rivalry for the British and Americans,¹⁰¹¹ and perceptions of the Middle East. The British were dependent on the Suez Canal to import oil for domestic use, and U.S. policy options were limited by the existence of an influential domestic Jewish lobby.¹⁰¹² Meanwhile, the British believed that they played a lead role in the Middle East and that the U.S. would follow them and respect their role in the region;¹⁰¹³ they felt more passionately about Nasser as a being a dictator akin to Mussolini or Hitler who had to be stopped,¹⁰¹⁴ particularly given the lessons of 1930s appeasement.¹⁰¹⁵ The U.S., on the other hand, viewed Egypt through a more sympathetic lens owing to their negative views on British colonialism.¹⁰¹⁶ Additionally, talks seeking to coordinate a response to the crisis stalled as the British desired a combined high command, and the Americans independent command.¹⁰¹⁷ As Louise Richardson describes, there was a clear divergence in British and American responses to the nationalisation of the canal:

For Washington, Nasser's action was a cause for concern; for London, it was a *casus belli*.

Washington resolved to try to undo Nasser's action. London resolved to undo Nasser.¹⁰¹⁸

Why and how the Suez crisis came about has been thoroughly examined by scholars,¹⁰¹⁹ but whichever is considered the most important factor, it ultimately led to the British conspiring with

¹⁰¹¹ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 23.

¹⁰¹² Michael Cohen, "Prologue to Suez: Anglo-American Planning for Military Intervention in a Middle East War, 1955-1956," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 2 (2003): 164-66.

¹⁰¹³ Verbeek, *Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 58.

¹⁰¹⁴ See Guillaume Parmentier, "The British Press in the Suez Crisis," *The Historical Journal* 23, no. 2 (1980): 435-48.

¹⁰¹⁵ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 56. This was a particularly strong force given that the key British policymakers involved in Suez had all been in the minority of politicians who had opposed appeasement of Hitler in 1930s and been proven undoubtedly right that 'early resistances to aggressors was both more honorable and less costly than waiting'.

¹⁰¹⁶ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*.

¹⁰¹⁷ Cohen, "Prologue to Suez: Anglo-American Planning for Military Intervention in a Middle East War, 1955-1956," 175.

¹⁰¹⁸ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 34.

¹⁰¹⁹ Verbeek argues that there have been four main explanations up to now: 'the international political system; the domestic political system; the British foreign policy elite; and finally, the Prime Minister himself'. Verbeek adds a theory of crisis decision making and the impact of group think to the list, arguing that in crises decision making was situated in the hands of only a few policy-makers who consequently did not participate in 'high quality decision-making'. See Verbeek, *Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader*, 1.

Israel and France to attack Egypt without notifying the United States. While the Skybolt and Falklands crises are not considered as significant as Suez, they also serve to demonstrate the struggle of divergent interests and how such divergences can be managed in a trusting relationship. The Skybolt crisis took place when the U.S. cancelled the sale of the Skybolt missile to Britain without first organising a replacement, when Britain saw Skybolt as fundamental to their nuclear independence. The Falklands War took place when Britain and Argentina came into conflict over possession of the Falklands Islands in 1982, and the United States found itself unwillingly drawn into a conflict it wished to avoid given its relationship with Britain and the importance of Latin America to U.S. anti-communist strategy. These crises all illustrate gaps in the calculative dimension of trust, the failure to develop convergent expectations of trustworthiness across all dimensions of trust, and also the role of affective trust in managing each crisis.

While there is a tendency to point to crises in Anglo-American relations and see the decline of the “special relationship”, Lucile Eznack argues that navigating crises successfully is a sign of strength rather than weakness.¹⁰²⁰ A number of authors have compared these crises to one another in various combinations to determine why such a crisis was able to take place, and how the “special relationship” was able to survive each more or less intact. Louise Richardson compared the Suez crisis and the Falklands war, as two examples where ‘the weaker ally, Britain, took action against a third country with which the stronger ally, the United States, was developing ties, and in so doing jeopardized American interests’.¹⁰²¹ In the case of Suez, the United States succeeded in fulfilling their wishes, while in the case of the Falklands War they were drawn into the conflict they wished to avoid.¹⁰²² Richard E. Neustadt compared the Suez Crisis and the Skybolt Crisis, arguing that although they tend to be viewed ‘as different in terms of significance and impact . . . the same pattern of behaviour runs through both’.¹⁰²³ He argues that they are both built on four strands: ‘muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed expectations, paranoid reactions’.¹⁰²⁴ Neustadt argues these crises were, in many ways, a result of strength:

Acquaintance ran so deep that each American conceived himself an expert on the British, and *vice versa*. Such are the consequences of a common language, a shared history, wartime collaboration, intermarriage, all abetted by air travel and the telephone. But confidence in one's own expertise diminishes one's sense of need to probe, reduces one's incentive to ask

¹⁰²⁰ See Lucile Eznack, “Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationships,” *Security Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 238–65.

¹⁰²¹ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 2.

¹⁰²² Richardson, 2.

¹⁰²³ Richard E. Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), 56.

¹⁰²⁴ Neustadt, 56.

questions, removes from sight the specialists of whom these might be asked, and also pushes out of sight the usefulness of feedback.¹⁰²⁵

Eznack adds to this discussion by arguing that not only are crises a result of ‘affectively charged relationships’ but that such relationships are more prone to repair in the case of such crises.¹⁰²⁶ The clear feelings of betrayal, and the ability to manage the crisis following betrayal, indicates a strong affective dimension. Janice Bially Mattern’s argument points instead to the role of the normative dimension. Her argument focuses on the role of identity, claiming that in the wake of the crisis ‘Anglo-American we-ness was quickly and effectively re-produced through campaigns of representational force waged by statesmen and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic’.¹⁰²⁷ There were, she argues, direct and active attempts to use language as a ‘representational force’ to reproduce ‘the Anglo-American collective we’.¹⁰²⁸ Neustadt’s point that each considered themselves experts on the other also indicates both the limitations and presence of the normative dimension. Actors on both sides believed they were thinking like, acting like, and responding like the other, however they were mistaken on key areas where gaps in the calculative dimension existed, and social interactions had led to mismatched expectations of trustworthiness.

Rebuilding trust in the relationship following the Suez crisis was heavily dependent on the affective and normative relationship between leaders, namely between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The need to rebuild trust was evident as trust had so clearly been broken. In the words of Eznack, ‘that Britain knew it was violating a key relational norm and went ahead regardless meant that it was giving priority to its interests over its relationship with the United States’.¹⁰²⁹ She concludes that this meant the key source of U.S. anger in response to the crisis was not that Britain had acted against U.S. interest, but that they had done so behind their back.¹⁰³⁰ At the same time, in response to the UK invasion Eisenhower cared deeply about continued good relations with Britain, asking his speech writer to make sure that ‘we show clearly in here how vital we think our alliances are’, as ‘those British – they’re still my right arm’.¹⁰³¹ Britain’s response to the crisis was also clearly emotional, albeit in a different manner. Released drafts of Macmillan’s memoirs demonstrate he was told by Foreign Office officials to ‘cut down on the pejorative adjectives’, afraid his descriptions of Dulles and

¹⁰²⁵ Neustadt, 73.

¹⁰²⁶ Eznack, “Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationships,” 255.

¹⁰²⁷ Mattern, *Ordering International Politics*, 14.

¹⁰²⁸ Mattern, *Ordering International Politics*, 15.

¹⁰²⁹ Eznack, 251.

¹⁰³⁰ Eznack, 251.

¹⁰³¹ Eisenhower, quoted in Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 85.

Eisenhower as ‘inept’ and ‘emotional and vindictive’ would cause offense to their ally.¹⁰³² Rebuilding relations clearly required not only a re-examination of British and American interests, but also addressing the breach of affective relations. As Kettle outlines, Macmillan sought to rebuild relations owing to his strategic outlook regarding the importance of the U.S. alliance to Britain.¹⁰³³ Macmillan outlined the difficulties of achieving this desired rebuilding of relations in his memoirs:

How were we to treat the United States, and to re-establish that alliance which I knew to be essential in the modern world? Nor would it be worth arguing whose fault it was. Somehow, without loss of dignity and as rapidly as possibly, our relationships must be restored.¹⁰³⁴

This was aided by the fact that the two were ‘very old friends’, having fought in North Africa together during WWII.¹⁰³⁵ Even despite ongoing disagreements regarding Macmillan’s enthusiastic attempts at conducting summit diplomacy to pursue détente with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower’s willingness to perform in a scripted fireside chat with Macmillan in 1959 to aid Macmillan’s chances of re-election is an indication of the strength of their friendship.¹⁰³⁶ In the fireside chat, Macmillan stated that Anglo-American relations ‘have never been stronger and better than they are now’.¹⁰³⁷ Despite their scripted nature and electoral purposes, the remarks were a long way from the bitterness of Suez. The rebuilding of relations after Suez was possible due to the affective relationship which developed between Eisenhower and Macmillan, which enabled them to undergo a process of redefining their expectations of trustworthiness with regards to one another and mending the gaps which had existing regarding differing interests and expectations.

Normative

Greater interaction across the breadth of the relationship and the creation of a shared identity of “the West” in opposition to the Soviets meant that the normative dimension of trust grew stronger during the Cold War. Britain and America more commonly began to “think like”, “feel like”, and

¹⁰³² BBC News, “How Macmillan Shocked Officials,” BBC News, February 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4285909.stm.

¹⁰³³ Louise Kettle, “Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan’s Management of the Eisenhower Administration During the Intervention in Jordan, 1958,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27, no. 1 (2016): 46.

¹⁰³⁴ Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan London Ltd, 1971), 199.

¹⁰³⁵ “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Remarks Upon Arrival at Hamilton, Bermuda, for Conference With Prime Minister,” The American Presidency Project, March 20, 1957,

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11000&st=macmillan&st1=>.

¹⁰³⁶ Nigel John Ashton, “Review: Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957–61,” *Twentieth Century British History* 16, no. 2 (2005): 220–21.

¹⁰³⁷ “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Radio and Television Broadcast With Prime Minister in London,” The American Presidency Project, August 31, 1959, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11485&st=macmillan&st1=>.

“respond like” one another. This section will explore this process in more detail, first examining changes in the basis of the normative dimension of trust compared to earlier periods, and then examining the relationship through Lewicki and Bunker’s four indicators. Colocation will be explored through the example of the presence of U.S. bases in Britain, which reveals both strengths and weaknesses of colocation as an indicator of normative trust. The creation of a joint product or goal and the role of shared values will be examined as they relate to the creation of a Cold War alliance and ultimately victory, fuelled by shared values defined in opposition to Soviet communism. In this context, collective identity existed in a relatively expansive form in terms of the “West”, although it must be noted that there are many “Wests” and Britain and America’s relationship existed in a context of a broader transatlantic relationship. Overall, the normative dimension of trust had a strong presence during the Cold War, and greatly contributed to the expansive cooperation which took place between Britain and America in seeking to fulfil their strategic goals.

The notable divergences which took place during crises highlight both the limitations and strengths of the normative dimension of trust. Accepting Neustadt’s argument that Skybolt and Suez were able to take place because each believed they understood the other wholly and therefore did not take the time to grapple with differences indicates the presence of the normative dimension. At the same time, the fact that Britain and America were not, in fact, thinking like, feeling like, and responding like the other indicates the limitations of the normative dimension. As the normative dimension strengthened during the Cold War, the basis of its presence began to shift. The earlier reliance on shared religion, language, and race remained a factor, as outlined by President Reagan:

Great Britain and the United States are kindred nations of like-minded people and must face their tests together. We are bound by common language and linked in history. We share laws and literature, blood, and moral fiber. The responsibility for freedom is ours to share.¹⁰³⁸

Thatcher responded in kind, arguing that ‘for generations our two countries have cherished the same ideals’.¹⁰³⁹ While naturally dramatized for an audience, the fact that they both sought to highlight a longer history of relations and commonalities when ideology would have been sufficient indicates that they saw value in them. The predominant source of the normative dimension of trust, however, was an ideological opposition to communism. Ideological opposition

¹⁰³⁸ “Ronald Reagan: Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom.”

¹⁰³⁹ “Ronald Reagan: Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom.”

to communism, in conjunction with repeated interactions over time enabling a process of social learning, formed the basis of the shared values, joint goals, colocation, and collective identity which underpinned the normative dimension of trust in Anglo-American relations during the Cold War.

Working through Lewicki and Bunker's four key drivers of normative trust reveals the strength of the normative dimension. The United States and United Kingdom were clearly colocated in terms of the Cold War. This is evident in the general creation of the "West" and colocation in that created space, as well as the more concretely physical examples of the presence of US bases in the UK, the exchange of personnel across various defence and intelligence organisations back and forth across the Atlantic, and the frequency of transatlantic migration for various reasons. Focusing on the U.S. presence in Britain reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of normative trust. In addition to being an example of colocation, the way in which United States Air Force (USAF) bases came to be in Britain and how they were viewed demonstrates the interplay of the dimensions of trust. The bases were part of a broader response to the 1948 Berlin crisis, commonly viewed as 'a turning point in the postwar Anglo-American alliance'.¹⁰⁴⁰ The Berlin crisis required Western allies to airlift supplies into West Berlin following the Soviet blockade of railways, roads, and canals, and exacerbated growing fears of Soviet expansionism. This led to the U.S. stationing B-29 bombers in East Anglia.¹⁰⁴¹ The B-29s were not merely an ad hoc response to the Berlin crisis, but rather part of a broader U.S. desire to establish bases in Britain and ensure 'the realization of a well-established strategic intent'.¹⁰⁴² Given that intercontinental range missiles did not yet exist, bases in Britain would be required for the U.S. to launch an attack on the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴³ While the B-29s based in England in 1948 were not nuclear capable, this was not known for sure at the time.¹⁰⁴⁴ Additionally, Young argues that the bases were part of a long-standing strategic plan to establish forward atomic bases, given that 'one immediate legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was that the USA adopted a strategic posture of reliance on the atomic bomb' which 'spelled out dependence on forward bases'.¹⁰⁴⁵ The British, meanwhile, were eager to entangle the U.S. in Britain and Europe, to ensure ongoing protection from the economically and militarily stronger state. Therefore, it is easy to see how the role of the calculative dimension shaped the bases, which clearly responded to the strategic interests of both Britain and the U.S.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ken Young, "US 'Atomic Capability' and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 42, no. 1 (2007): 117.

¹⁰⁴¹ Jonathan Colman, "The 1950 'Ambassador's Agreement' on USAF Bases in the UK and British Fears of US Atomic Unilateralism," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 287.

¹⁰⁴² Young, "US 'Atomic Capability' and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War," 135.

¹⁰⁴³ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, 18.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Avi Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War," *International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (1984 1983): 9.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Young, "US 'Atomic Capability' and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War," 118.

Additionally, to understand how the bases were so easily and quickly accepted in 1948, it is necessary to examine the role of the affective dimension of trust in the relationship between General Carl H. Spaatz, Commanding General of USAF and Sir Arthur Tedder, Marshall of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Spaatz and Tedder had agreed in 1946 that the RAF would prepare bases for the use of the USAF.¹⁰⁴⁶ As far as can be ascertained, this agreement appears to have taken place outside the knowledge of the respective governments.¹⁰⁴⁷ Spaatz and Tedder had worked together during the war ‘and their mutual warm regard and trust continued after they each assumed command of their countries’ air forces’.¹⁰⁴⁸ They were an example of a broader phenomenon, in which the ‘US Air Force commanders were easily and informally able to capitalise on the strong ties created during the Second World War’ during the first postwar decade.¹⁰⁴⁹ This enabled them to bypass formal channels, which came to be particularly useful with regards to atomic capable bases given the limitations placed on nuclear cooperation by the 1946 McMahon Agreement. By 1952 there were 43 USAF airfields and 45, 000 U.S. forces in Britain.¹⁰⁵⁰ The establishment of U.S. bases as an example of colocation came about due to an inextricable interplay of the dimensions of trust, as strategic interests, affective bonds between individuals, and the shared identity of the “West” coalesced.

The creation of joint products or goals, commonly shared values, and collective identity are all significantly evident in the Cold War strategic context. Regarding the creation of joint products or goals, the most obvious candidate is the creation of a Cold War alliance and ultimately a Cold War victory. While elements of this project frequently came into conflict, the broad Cold War picture can certainly be considered to be a strong indicator of the creation of a joint product or goal, and consequently of the normative dimension of trust. This cooperation on achieving the joint goal of a Cold War victory was fuelled by commonly shared values and collective identity. Commonly shared values were stronger at certain times, with divergences existing at other times. For instance, as has already been discussed, the early postwar years saw differences over Britain’s adherence to the welfare state and imperialist approach to the Middle East. In contrast, under Reagan and Thatcher:

Common perception of a communist threat, championing militarism and muscular capitalism, impatience with state bureaucracy and government control, staunch advocacy of individual freedom and free enterprise, and personal friendship cemented the pan-Atlantic

¹⁰⁴⁶ Colman, “The 1950 ‘Ambassador’s Agreement’ on USAF Bases in the UK and British Fears of US Atomic Unilateralism,” 287.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Young, “US ‘Atomic Capability’ and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War,” 121.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Young, 119–20.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, 18.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Campbell, 38.

conservative alliance of the 1980s.¹⁰⁵¹

Broadly speaking, however, shared values defined in opposition to Soviet communism underpinned the Anglo-American relationship throughout the Cold War. This took the form of a commitment to the normative values of Western liberal democracy; shared capitalist economic values in the form of firstly embedded liberalism as embodied by the Bretton Woods system, and secondly neoliberalism as epitomised by Reagan and Thatcher; and a largely congruent shared strategic vision regarding the construction of the world as “West” versus “East”. It is important to note that while these shared values certainly existed and are indicative of the presence of the normative dimension itself, the construction of the “West” was a fluid and at times contradictory process. As Katzenstein outlines, the West exists ‘in the form of multiple traditions that have currency in America, Europe, the Americas, and a few outposts in the Southern hemisphere’.¹⁰⁵² There are ‘multiple Wests’, of which Anglo-America is a distinctive part.¹⁰⁵³ This does not imply homogeneity within Anglo-America; rather, ‘at its core Anglo-America is fluid, not fixed’.¹⁰⁵⁴ Of course, the “East” is no more homogenous than the “West,” but the joint Anglo-American project to construct it as being so is indicative of the normative dimension of trust. The shared values which were defined in opposition to the Soviet Union, and the joint goal of defeating the Soviet Union, are strong indicators of the presence of the normative dimension of trust in Anglo-American relations during the Cold War.

As described in Chapter One, collective identity in international relations takes on the appearance of the formal creation of an alliance structure, multilateral institutions, or the development of a security community. The Anglo-American relationship in the Cold War era created a bilateral “special relationship”, or alliance. This began with Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, and the helm was taken up enthusiastically by his fellow British prime ministers, excepting Heath. For the most part, the “special relationship” was also reciprocated by American presidents. The Anglo-American alliance during the Cold War demonstrated unparalleled military, intelligence, and nuclear cooperation, with the high sensitivity of these areas signifying a considerable degree of trust within the alliance. As discussed above, the extent to which Britain and America believed they thought like, felt like, and responded like the other was evident during the crises which took place. At the same time, the crises took place over mismatched perceptions which illustrated the

¹⁰⁵¹ Andrea Chiampan, “Running with the Hare, Hunting with the Hounds: The Special Relationship, Reagan’s Cold War and the Falklands Conflict,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 24, no. 1 (2013): 640.

¹⁰⁵² Peter J. Katzenstein, “The West as Anglo-America,” in *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities Beyond East and West*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 1.

¹⁰⁵³ Katzenstein, 1.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Katzenstein, 1.

two states did not in fact “think like”, “feel like”, and “respond like” one another, indicating the limitations of the normative dimension of trust. Britain and America were also integral to the creation of the multilateral alliance of NATO. As Hemmer and Katzenstein argue, the creation of geographical regions, such as the North Atlantic, are inherently political constructions.¹⁰⁵⁵ They examine the difference in U.S. approaches to the constructed regions of the North Atlantic and Southeast Asia, interrogating the reasons why the U.S. sought to engage bilaterally with Southeast Asian states, but multilaterally and in contradiction to the realist canon with the North Atlantic states.¹⁰⁵⁶ The reason, Hemmer and Katzenstein argue, is collective identity.¹⁰⁵⁷ They point to many of the same factors which underpin the collective identity in the Anglo-American relationship itself as also being at the heart of the broader multilateral project of NATO. These include religion, democratic values, and a still residual sense of common race, albeit one more limited than before the war given the Holocaust.¹⁰⁵⁸ Collective identity is clearly present both in an explicitly Anglo-American context, as well as in the broader North Atlantic context. Combined with shared capitalist and democratic values, the joint goal and ultimately product of a Cold War victory, and collocation as in the example of the presence of U.S. bases in Britain, the normative dimension of trust had a significant presence in Cold War Anglo-American relations.

The Domains of the Relationship

Leaders and Government

The warm personal friendship which developed between British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and U.S. President J. F. Kennedy is a prominent example of the value of trust in leader-to-leader relations and of the interplay of the dimensions of trust. The two held wide ranging shared interests, were able to develop affective bonds with one another through a process of bonding, and had normative underpinnings to their relationship in how they were able to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another. Their relationship was supported by the two ambassadors, British ambassador to America David Ormsby-Gore, and American ambassador to Britain David Bruce. This was particularly the case given the close, trusting relationship between Ormsby-Gore and Roosevelt. The value of the combination of trusting personal relationships between leaders and ambassadors can be seen in their role in the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” 587.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism.”

¹⁰⁵⁷ Hemmer and Katzenstein, 587.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Hemmer and Katzenstein, 588.

Macmillan, elected four years earlier than Kennedy in 1957, had held initial concerns over whether he would be able to establish a similarly warm relationship with Kennedy as he had held with Eisenhower. In a testament to Wheeler's prioritisation of face-to-face interactions, a friendship was soon struck up between the pair once they had met and were able to develop an index of trustworthiness with regards to one another and begin a process of bonding. As Horne outlines, when compared to the shared naval interests of Roosevelt and Churchill, 'the shared interests of Kennedy and Macmillan were both wider and deeper'.¹⁰⁵⁹ Although interests diverged in fields such as the Middle East, and of course with regards to Skybolt, there were certainly far more similarities than differences. Since Macmillan was a generation older than Kennedy,¹⁰⁶⁰ and Kennedy knew how deeply Macmillan had valued his predecessor Eisenhower,¹⁰⁶¹ they both initially approached one another with some trepidation. Their first meeting took place in Key West and, although the meeting was a failure with regards to the Laotian civil war it aimed to discuss, it has been described as 'a success on a personal level'.¹⁰⁶² The leaders went on to meet frequently and develop a close personal bond, clearly demonstrating Wheeler's conditions of humanization and positive identification of interests required for bonded trust to develop. Macmillan describes himself as having 'felt a deep sense of relief' after the initial Key West meeting, stating that 'we seemed immediately to talk as old friends'.¹⁰⁶³ Macmillan may have been overly enthusiastic and willing to mythologise his relationship with Kennedy in his memoirs, as Ashton tempers this account, claiming that the meeting 'was at best uneasy'.¹⁰⁶⁴ In an interview Ormsby-Gore provides an account which falls in the middle, arguing that he thought 'the meeting went very well', however adding that he did not think 'they got on very easily on that occasion', and 'therefore they did not speak in the frank way that they did at a later stage'.¹⁰⁶⁵

What is clear is that they had begun the process of bonding, showing clear signs of humanization and the positive identification of interests. Macmillan was able to be 'reassured ... that the President was not a brash young man who made quick decisions and certainly not somebody who

¹⁰⁵⁹ Alistair Horne, "The Macmillan Years and Afterwards," ed. WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 91.

¹⁰⁶⁰ The Prime Minister feared that "the President would think he was a funny old man who belonged to the distant past and couldn't understand the problems of the day". See William David Ormsby-Gore, Lord Harlech (William David Ormsby-Gore) Oral History Interview - JFK#1 03/12/1965, interview by Richard E. Neustadt, March 12, 1965, 27, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKOH-LWH-01.aspx>.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ormsby-Gore, 28.

¹⁰⁶² White, "Macmillan, Kennedy and the Key West Meeting: Its Significance for the Laotian Civil War and Anglo-American Relations," 36.

¹⁰⁶³ Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan London Ltd, 1972), 336.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ashton, "Harold Macmillan and the 'Golden Days' of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63," 709.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ormsby-Gore, Lord Harlech (William David Ormsby-Gore) Oral History Interview - JFK#1 03/12/1965, 27-28.

ignored the interests of his allies'.¹⁰⁶⁶ Ormsby-Gore also mentions that Kennedy told him 'he was anxious to meet with Macmillan', as Eisenhower had told him before his inauguration that 'if you want good advice you ask Harold Macmillan'.¹⁰⁶⁷ For Kennedy, Macmillan was the 'Western leader whom he saw first, liked best and saw most often'.¹⁰⁶⁸ Clark argues this relationship was very much reciprocal.¹⁰⁶⁹ In addition to the importance of their greater breadth of shared interests, Horne adds that while Thatcher and Reagan were united by a shared ideology, their relationship had 'none of the intimacy and warmth that characterized the Macmillan-Kennedy *entente*'.¹⁰⁷⁰ This highlights the strong affective trust which had developed between the two leaders. By the time they reached their third meeting in Bermuda, Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President, described it as seeming 'as if they had known each other all their lives'.¹⁰⁷¹ David Bruce, American ambassador to Britain, stated that 'the frequency and frankness of their interchanges have few parallels modern in diplomatic intercourse'.¹⁰⁷² This process was aided by technology, as the first secure scrambler telephone was installed in the summer of 1961.¹⁰⁷³ Whereas previously the leaders had only been able to communicate on an open line, they were now able to communicate securely and also, if they desired, 'bypass their respective bureaucracies' when it was convenient.¹⁰⁷⁴ As Kennedy described:

I find this new method of communication very helpful, and I am able to endure the suspicion it arouses among Ambassadors and State Department officials with equanimity and even pleasure.¹⁰⁷⁵

The secure line provided a valuable supplement to their face-to-face interactions. In addition to affective trust, it is possible to make the case for the presence of normative trust in the Kennedy-Macmillan relationship. Horne argues they had a similar outlook with regards to their 'profound sense of history and a similar, rare kind of Celtic humour, often bordering on black'.¹⁰⁷⁶ Additionally, Ormsby-Gore's interview with Richard Neustadt highlights the way in which the two leaders were able to "think like," "feel like," and "respond like" the other. With regards to the

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ormsby-Gore, 28.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ormsby-Gore, 28–29.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ted Sorensen (Kennedy's key aide), quoted in Ian Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 12.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Clark, 12.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Horne, "The Macmillan Years and Afterwards," 101.

¹⁰⁷¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 377.

¹⁰⁷² David K. E. Bruce, David K.E. Bruce Oral History Interview - JFK #1, interview by Richard E. Neustadt, n/a, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKOH-DKB-01.aspx>.

¹⁰⁷³ Ashton, "Harold Macmillan and the 'Golden Days' of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63," 711.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Ashton, 711.

¹⁰⁷⁵ President Kennedy, quoted in Ashton, 712.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Horne, "The Macmillan Years and Afterwards," 91.

perils of nuclear weapons, Neustadt and Ormsby-Gore agree that the two leaders ‘found their minds meeting’.¹⁰⁷⁷ Ormsby-Gore highlights the way Kennedy discussed the issue in shorthand, claiming that he always discussed it ‘in very much the same terms of Macmillan’, and wondering ‘how that whole perspective evolved in his mind’.¹⁰⁷⁸ It is evident that the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions of trust were all present in the relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan, and that the interplay of the dimensions in their relationship had considerable impact on the overall nature of trust in Anglo-American relations.

As a partial consequence of the Kennedy-Macmillan relationship, these years have been referred to as the “golden days” of the Cold War Anglo-American relationship. This phrase tends to refer to the whole of Macmillan’s tenure in office, as his strong relationship with Eisenhower and his personal diplomacy meant that the relationship was able to rebuild after Suez. This was aided by changes in the strategic environment, most notably Sputnik in 1957, which contributed to the renewal of nuclear cooperation with the rescindment of the McMahon Act, and the creation of the 1958 Agreement on Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.¹⁰⁷⁹ Although Macmillan’s tenure as a whole is generally held in high regard, considerable emphasis gets placed on the Kennedy years. Dumbrell highlights the role of the Kennedy-Macmillan relationship specifically, describing it as ‘the house that Jack and Mac built’ and arguing that it was during this period of 1961-1963 that ‘the post-Suez rebuilding of Anglo-American relations achieved solidity’.¹⁰⁸⁰ He argues that Macmillan and Kennedy’s greatest achievement ‘was to rebuild the relationship, on the basis of post-Suez realities, but without sacrificing what was advantageous to Washington and to London in their special alliance’.¹⁰⁸¹ Similarly, Dickie refers to this period as ‘the golden days of Mac and Jack’.¹⁰⁸² Revisionist scholarship has sought to question the extent to which the “golden days” thesis holds up, or whether it is simply a case of standing out compared to the troubles which surrounded the period at either end:

Sandwiched between the disastrous Anglo-American breach over the 1956 Suez crisis and the deterioration in relations during the mid-1960s prompted by a combination of the Vietnam War, the British financial crisis, and London’s abandonment of its defense role east of Suez, the Macmillan era was almost bound to appear rosy in comparison.¹⁰⁸³

Ashton, for example, argues that Macmillan was actually rather disillusioned with the Anglo-

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ormsby-Gore, Lord Harlech (William David Ormsby-Gore) Oral History Interview - JFK#1 03/12/1965, 35.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ormsby-Gore, 35.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957-1962*, 3.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 56.

¹⁰⁸¹ Dumbrell, 49.

¹⁰⁸² See Dickie, “*Special*” *No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 105–32.

¹⁰⁸³ Ashton, “Harold Macmillan and the ‘Golden Days’ of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63,” 691.

American relationship, and sought to hedge with Europe through attempting to acquire EEC membership.¹⁰⁸⁴ The “golden days” thesis has also been disputed with the claim that Macmillan was rather Machiavellian in his politics, particularly with regards to his belief in the “Greeks and Romans” mythology of Anglo-American relations.¹⁰⁸⁵ In this mythology, the British were seen to be the ‘culturally and intellectually more sophisticated’ “Greeks” and ‘this superiority would allow them to manipulate the Americans in a Machiavellian fashion, turning American power to British ends’.¹⁰⁸⁶ While it may not be strictly accurate to mythologise the Kennedy- Macmillan years as the “golden days” of Anglo-American relations, what is clear is that all three dimensions of trust were present in their relationship. They shared a significant breadth of common interests, although some significant divergences were evident; they developed a close personal bond; and on a number of matters they were able to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another.

The relationship between Macmillan and Kennedy was supplemented by the role of the two ambassadors, American ambassador to Britain David Bruce and British ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore, and in particular the relationship between Ormsby-Gore and Kennedy. Indeed, Horne refers to the Kennedy-Macmillan relationship as a “special relationship within the special relationship”,¹⁰⁸⁷ while Nunnerly uses the same terminology to describe the relationship between Ormsby-Gore and Kennedy.¹⁰⁸⁸ Horne describes the Kennedy-Macmillan relationship as having been ‘reflected, indeed intensified, by the brilliant supporting cast of the ‘two Davids’’.¹⁰⁸⁹ The relationships between these individuals, in various combinations, has been referred to as something of “a family affair”:

The web of friendships and family relationships that connected The White House and Whitehall ensured that communications between the Kennedy administration and the Macmillan government were excellent and that diplomacy at the highest levels between Britain and the United States was conducted on the warmest of terms.¹⁰⁹⁰

Ormsby-Gore describes it as being ‘almost like a family discussion when we all met’.¹⁰⁹¹ He had ‘unique access to the president’, as not only were they long-time friends, but Kennedy had personally advocated for Ormsby-Gore’s appointment to Macmillan during their Key West

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ashton, 695.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ashton, 697–98; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 61; Danchev, “On Specialness,” 740; Kettle, “Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan’s Management of the Eisenhower Administration During the Intervention in Jordan, 1958,” 49.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ashton, “Harold Macmillan and the ‘Golden Days’ of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63,” 697– 98.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Horne, “The Macmillan Years and Afterwards,” 91.

¹⁰⁸⁸ D. Nunnerly, *President Kennedy and Britain* (London: The Bodley Head, 1972), 39.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Horne, “The Macmillan Years and Afterwards,” 91.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Fain, “John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan: Managing the ‘Special Relationship’ in the Persian Gulf Region, 1961-63,” 97.

¹⁰⁹¹ Horne, “The Macmillan Years and Afterwards,” 91.

meeting.¹⁰⁹² Macmillan describes Ormsby-Gore as having ‘had access to the White House such as no Ambassador has had before or since’.¹⁰⁹³ David Bruce did not have the relationship with Macmillan that Ormsby-Gore had with Kennedy, however ‘the trust between US ambassador and prime minister became absolute’.¹⁰⁹⁴ Of particular value was his broad social network, both with policy makers in the U.S., and across British society.¹⁰⁹⁵ As Young points out, Bruce’s ‘career, friendships and marriage reflected the fact that Britain and America are bound together culturally and socially’.¹⁰⁹⁶ His career had seen him serve in London during WWII, and his second wife Evangeline Bell was the granddaughter of a conservative British MP.¹⁰⁹⁷ Similarly to the transatlantic wives during *rapprochement*, Evangeline Bell played an invaluable social role through her family connections and her penchant for entertaining high society dinners at the ambassador’s residence.¹⁰⁹⁸ The interplay of the dimensions of trust among this family affair of leaders and diplomats proved invaluable to the strengthening of the Anglo-American relationship. The combination of relationships between leaders and ambassadors came to the fore during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the Crisis, ‘Macmillan and Ormsby-Gore became de facto members of Kennedy’s Executive Committee’, which made the key crisis decisions.¹⁰⁹⁹ Dickie argues that ‘Macmillan was closer to the evolution of policy than the American Congress’.¹¹⁰⁰ Ormsby-Gore was consulted by Kennedy on the crisis twenty-four hours before the President revealed the crisis to the world, where they discussed the merits of proceeding with a blockade rather than an air-strike.¹¹⁰¹ Ormsby-Gore was vital to the British role in the crisis, with Hopkins arguing that ‘any British influence centred on the continual presence of Ormsby Gore at crisis meetings’.¹¹⁰² Ormsby-Gore is credited for convincing Kennedy to reduce the blockade area in order to allow Khrushchev more time and flexibility in deciding how to proceed.¹¹⁰³ British influence is also considered to have had an impact on Kennedy’s decision to publish photographs of the Cuban missile sites, and Dumbrell argues more generally that Kennedy’s interactions with both

¹⁰⁹² Ashton, “Harold Macmillan and the ‘Golden Days’ of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957-63,” 712.

¹⁰⁹³ Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961*, 339.

¹⁰⁹⁴ David Mayers, “JFK’s Ambassadors and the Cold War,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 3 (2000): 201.

¹⁰⁹⁵ See John W. Young, “David K. E. Bruce, 1961-69,” in *The Embassy in Grosvenor Square: American Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, 1938-2008*, ed. Alison R. Holmes and J. Simon Rofe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 153–70.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Young, 153.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Young, 153.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Young, 153–54.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 63.

¹¹⁰⁰ Dickie, “Special” No More: *Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 120.

¹¹⁰¹ Dickie, 111–12.

¹¹⁰² Michael F. Hopkins, “Focus of a Changing Relationship: The Washington Embassy and Britain’s World Role Since 1945,” *Contemporary British History* 12, no. 3 (1998): 110.

¹¹⁰³ Hopkins, 110; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 63.

Macmillan and Ormsby-Gore in the second week of the crisis ‘seems to have strengthened his determination to find a peaceful solution’.¹¹⁰⁴ While Macmillan himself appears to have had less influence in shaping American policy compared to Ormsby-Gore, Kennedy made sure to update him regularly on the situation, and Horne argues the crisis ‘brought the intimacy and trust between Macmillan and Kennedy to a new high-point’.¹¹⁰⁵ This was, of course, facilitated by the new secure line telephone. Kennedy made sure to reassure Macmillan with regards to the importance of the Anglo-American relationship:

We must together be prepared for a time of testing. It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that you and I can keep in close touch with each other by rapid and secure means at a time like this, and I intend to keep you fully informed of my thinking as the situation evolves.¹¹⁰⁶

Additionally, Macmillan’s influence can be seen in ‘Kennedy’s eagerness to discuss the problems of the blockade and his readiness to have Macmillan’s views’.¹¹⁰⁷ The web of personal connections which tied the British and American governments together throughout the Cuban crisis were facilitated by the growth of trust, and also ensured the further solidification of trust during the crisis. As will be seen below, this trust became invaluable to the management of the Skybolt crisis.

Military and Defence

Military

This section will focus on the example of the 1982 Falklands War, as it is a valuable illustration of military and defence cooperation which provides evidence for the value of a flat ontology of the state owing to the differing roles and opinions of individuals, defence, varying aspects of government, and society. The Falklands Islands had been the source of a long-standing sovereignty dispute between Britain and Argentina.¹¹⁰⁸ British intelligence found evidence that Argentina was planning to invade the Falklands Islands, and immediately asked President Reagan to intervene in the situation and convince Argentine President Galtieri to abort the plan.¹¹⁰⁹ This did not work, and on April 2 1982, Argentina proceeded to invade the Falklands Islands.¹¹¹⁰ The U.S. and Britain shared an interest in avoiding conflict, and between the discovery of the

¹¹⁰⁴ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 63.

¹¹⁰⁵ Horne, “The Macmillan Years and Afterwards,” 92.

¹¹⁰⁶ Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day 1961-1963* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan London Ltd, 1973), 186.

¹¹⁰⁷ Dickie, “*Special*” *No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 120.

¹¹⁰⁸ See Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume I: The Origins of the Falklands War* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 3–13 for a brief overview of the history of the competing sovereignty claims to the Falklands Islands.

¹¹⁰⁹ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 117.

¹¹¹⁰ Richardson, 117.

intelligence and the invasion worked closely across the levels of the relationship to avoid such an outcome.¹¹¹¹ Interests diverged following the invasion. Britain immediately responded by sending a task force out to the South Atlantic, without consulting the U.S., and the U.S. declared itself neutral despite British requests to condemn Argentina's actions.¹¹¹² Although the U.S. later tilted to support Britain militarily, the difficulties in reaching this point serves to illustrate the complex interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of the Anglo-American relationship. This section will now explore some of the ways in which this complex interplay of the dimensions of trust took place by first examining how these processes occurred within the U.S., and second how Britain viewed the conflict through a lens of identity rather than through the Cold War.

The intersection of the dimensions of trust and the domains of the relationship are particularly clear with regards to the U.S. As Chiampan states, 'the Reagan Administration saw the crisis through a Cold War lens; Thatcher did not'.¹¹¹³ The U.S. was particularly invested in the fight against communism in Latin America, which 'had emerged as the most obsessive priority to the Republican Administration'.¹¹¹⁴ As the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs pointed out, 'the real problem for the U.S. is to maintain its commitment to the U.K. special relationship; not alienate the Argentines; and find a peaceful way for all concerned out of this mess'.¹¹¹⁵ Adding to the complexity of divergent interests and strategic cultures, there was considerable diversity within the U.S. itself regarding how to respond to the unfolding crisis. A debate took place in the State Department over whether supporting Britain or Argentina would be best for United States interests, given America's priorities in Latin America.¹¹¹⁶ Interests within America itself were conflicted, with the State Department split, the Pentagon concerned about an ally losing a war, and the White House not particularly interested in the situation at all.¹¹¹⁷ The U.S. public clearly supported the British.¹¹¹⁸

As a consequence of pressure by the press, the public, and Congress as well, the United States ultimately shifted its position and began to aid Britain against Argentina.¹¹¹⁹ The U.S. Navy was

¹¹¹¹ Richardson, 117.

¹¹¹² Richardson, 118.

¹¹¹³ Chiampan, "Running with the Hare, Hunting with the Hounds: The Special Relationship, Reagan's Cold War and the Falklands Conflict," 655.

¹¹¹⁴ Chiampan, 654.

¹¹¹⁵ Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan, undated, reproduced in Alexander R. Wieland, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984. Document 47* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2015), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d47>.

¹¹¹⁶ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 118.

¹¹¹⁷ Richardson, 120.

¹¹¹⁸ Richardson, 138.

¹¹¹⁹ Richardson, 148.

also very supportive of the British, including in particular the Secretary for the Navy John F. Lehman.¹¹²⁰ Lehman highlighted the role of the intimate relationship and ongoing cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the British Royal Navy in the crisis:

One has to understand the relationship of the United States Navy to the Royal Navy – there’s no other relationship, I think, like it in the world between two military services ... There was no need to establish a new relationship ... it was really just turning up the volume... almost a case of not being told to stop rather than crossing a threshold to start ... There are not those channels with other countries that are operating day to day where you pick up the phone to call somebody at the other end and he’s been at your home and you’ve been at his home, and you know him by his first name and you know his children’s names and that kind of thing.¹¹²¹

Dobson argues that this kind of ‘automatic support’ went not only beyond the two naval forces, but beyond solely Britain and America, also being facilitated by multilateral cooperation in NATO and UKUSA.¹¹²² This phenomenon of ‘automatic support’ is illustrated in the ongoing intelligence sharing throughout the crisis, even throughout America’s avowed neutrality, during which the U.S. continued to provide SIGINT, photographic intelligence, and oceans surveillance intelligence.¹¹²³ ‘Automatic support’ is also illustrated by the role of Secretary for Defence Caspar Weinberger. Although the United States did not join the Falklands War initially, military aid was provided to the United Kingdom.¹¹²⁴ This was done covertly enough that to begin with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was unaware of the extent of the assistance, and ‘raged at the treachery of her erstwhile ally’ while ‘the servicemen and intelligence operatives carried on working smoothly and effectively together’.¹¹²⁵ Louise Richardson points out that much of this was due to personal connections, what the First Sea Lord referred to as “the old boy system at work”.¹¹²⁶ This system of personal connections was transferred into quick outcomes in no small part due to the personal intervention of Secretary Weinberger, who personally saw to the dispensation of fifteen stages of the usual process of authorizing supplies and had such requests instead sent directly to his office in a process he described as a type of “federal express”

¹¹²⁰ Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume II: War and Diplomacy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 327.

¹¹²¹ John Lehman, quoted in Hopkins, “Focus of a Changing Relationship: The Washington Embassy and Britain’s World Role Since 1945,” 112.

¹¹²² Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 155.

¹¹²³ Ball and Richelson, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*, 304.

¹¹²⁴ Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises*, 127.

¹¹²⁵ Richardson, 127.

¹¹²⁶ Richardson, 128.

system.¹¹²⁷ The ‘automatic support’ that took place throughout the Falklands crisis was made possible by the depth and breadth of trust in the relationship.

Britain, on the other hand, viewed the situation more through a lens of identity than one of the Cold War. As Freedman outlines, there had been a long history of Britain viewing the Falklands Islands through an identity lens:

In Britain for most of the time the Islands were off the political agenda. Yet whenever they did achieve some salience, issues of identity were soon to the fore.¹¹²⁸

The Islands were not economically or strategically important, rather the issue was the people who lived on the Islands, who ‘were undeniably British in culture, character and allegiance’.¹¹²⁹ McCourt adds to this line of argument, stating that Britain’s reinvasion of the Falklands Islands was because ‘Britain’s principled sense of Self was at stake, not its strategic position; its ontological security was threatened, not its direct physical security nor its economic interests’.¹¹³⁰ The Deputy Chief of Mission of the American Embassy in Britain certainly agreed, questioning during the early stages of the crisis ‘how much to put at risk militarily for reasons of politics and prestige’.¹¹³¹ McCourt discusses Britain’s approach to the Falklands crisis as one of ‘identity-affirmation through role-playing’.¹¹³² He argues that Britain saw itself in the role of a *status quo* power, where the *status quo* is understood to be the American led West.¹¹³³ Their role as *status quo* power was inherently linked to British identity, particularly with regards to Britain still being able to act as a significant power in the world and to ‘hold its head high’, something widely believed to have been lost following Suez.¹¹³⁴ Although it has been argued that Britain did not view the crisis through a Cold War lens as enthusiastically as the U.S., it certainly still coloured their view of the situation. In a fractious phone call to Reagan in which he was trying to persuade her to agree to a ceasefire, Thatcher argued ‘this is a democracy and our island – and the worst thing for democracy would be if we failed now’.¹¹³⁵ Despite difficulties, the trusting relationship

¹¹²⁷ Richardson, 128–29.

¹¹²⁸ Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume I: The Origins of the Falklands War*, 14.

¹¹²⁹ Freedman, 15.

¹¹³⁰ David M. McCourt, “Role-Playing and Identity Affirmation in International Politics: Britain’s Reinvasion of the Falklands, 1982,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (2011): 1599–1600.

¹¹³¹ Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, 3 April 1982, reproduced in Alexander R. Wieland, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984, Document 58* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2015), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d58>.

¹¹³² McCourt, “Role-Playing and Identity Affirmation in International Politics: Britain’s Reinvasion of the Falklands, 1982,” 1601.

¹¹³³ McCourt, 1616.

¹¹³⁴ McCourt, 1617–18.

¹¹³⁵ Margaret Thatcher, quoted in Dickie, “*Special*” *No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 182.

between Reagan and Thatcher clearly helped facilitate American support for the British position. The British Embassy, under the helm of Ambassador to the U.S. Nicholas Henderson, played an invaluable role influencing the opinion of the American public and Congress.¹¹³⁶ As McCourt point out, the U.S. could have alter-cast Britain in the role of colonial aggressor, as they had in the case of Suez; however the diversity of responses to the situation across the U.S. domains gave Britain room to carve out a role as *status quo* power instead.¹¹³⁷ This ultimately put the U.S. in a position where it was more in their interests to ensure a quick and decisive British victory, which could then have benefits with regards to demonstrating to the Soviets that the Western alliance could deploy ‘both political will and professional competence’.¹¹³⁸ The complexity of interests and opinions highlights the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of the relationship.

Nuclear

The way in which the nuclear relationship was suspended in the early postwar years, and renewed from 1958 onwards, was greatly shaped by the interplay of the dimensions of trust. Roosevelt’s death and the lack of trusting leadership relations meant the nuclear relationship was not institutionalised following the war as the intelligence relationship was, but rather put on hold. A strong calculative dimension of trust played a significant role in the renewal of cooperation in 1958, and the development of habits of cooperation and trust between personnel from that point on helped to sustain cooperation. This section will then analyse the Skybolt crisis and its resolution. The crisis occurred because of divergences in the calculative dimension of trust relating to differing interests, strategic cultures, and domestic needs; and was resolved in large part owing to the relationship between Macmillan and Kennedy.

Although nuclear cooperation is often pointed to as the shining jewel of Anglo-American relations, in the early post-war years it was one of the most problematic aspects of the relationship. While Roosevelt and Churchill concluded a secret agreement in 1944 on continued collaboration, others in Washington were unaware of the deal and consequently following Roosevelt’s death the McMahon Act was passed which prohibited transferring any information about atomic matters to a foreign government.¹¹³⁹ Thus, the nuclear relationship came to be the odd one out in an

¹¹³⁶ Hopkins, “Focus of a Changing Relationship: The Washington Embassy and Britain’s World Role Since 1945,” 112.

¹¹³⁷ McCourt, “Role-Playing and Identity Affirmation in International Politics: Britain’s Reinvasion of the Falklands, 1982,” 1614.

¹¹³⁸ Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume II: War and Diplomacy*, 327.

¹¹³⁹ Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” 11.

otherwise close Anglo-American relationship throughout the beginning years of the Cold War.¹¹⁴⁰ Highlighting the importance of shared strategic interests, nuclear cooperation was catalysed by Sputnik in 1957 which demonstrated the Soviet Union had an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of directly threatening the United States.¹¹⁴¹ It was the pre-existing trusting relationship which meant that it was Britain with whom America sought to cooperate on the matter. As John Baylis outlines, both ongoing cooperation throughout the period of ‘formal non-cooperation’ and the argument that Anglo- American nuclear cooperation was mutually beneficial to the security of both states was in no small part driven by what he terms a transatlantic ‘advocacy coalition’ or ‘epistemic community’ of service personnel, intelligence officers, government officials, and nuclear scientists.¹¹⁴² The informal collaboration between Spaatz and Tedder on establishing U.S. bases in Britain is certainly an example of this. The process was also aided by the wartime friendship of Macmillan and Eisenhower, as well as Eisenhower’s determination to repair the relationship following Suez.¹¹⁴³ Indeed both of these last two factors were discussed by Macmillan and Eisenhower at a summit meeting held in Bermuda earlier in the same year of Sputnik, a meeting which Eisenhower declared ‘by far the most successful I have attended since the close of World War 2’.¹¹⁴⁴ The two produced a joint statement from the meeting, outlining the discussions they had ‘conducted ... with the freedom and frankness permitted to old friends’.¹¹⁴⁵ Dobson argues this served to lay considerable groundwork for how the two governments responded to Sputnik by seeking closer nuclear cooperation.¹¹⁴⁶ Anglo-American nuclear cooperation is demonstrable of a trusting relationship, given the incredibly high sensitivity of the issue. Additionally, the fact that U.S. and British cooperation diverged and was then reinstated indicates that this was not simply a path-dependent continuation of wartime cooperation, it was an active choice which was made possible owing to the pre-existing levels of trust in the relationship and the increasingly shared Cold War strategic interests which strengthened the calculative dimension of trust.

It is important to look at the ways in which nuclear cooperation developed across the rest of the

¹¹⁴⁰ Reynolds, 12.

¹¹⁴¹ Reynolds, 12.

¹¹⁴² John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (2008): 426.

¹¹⁴³ Baylis, 433.

¹¹⁴⁴ Eisenhower, quoted in Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 120.

¹¹⁴⁵ Joint Statement With Prime Minister Macmillan Following the Bermuda Conference, March 24 1957, reproduced in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Washington D.C.: Federal Register Division of the National Archives and Records Service General Services Administration, 1957), 210–12.

¹¹⁴⁶ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 120.

Cold War following its renewal in 1958. Once nuclear cooperation had been kickstarted, it became a case of both ‘active collaboration based on trust’ and ‘a competitive urge that burst into the open in 1969’.¹¹⁴⁷ Notably, in these earlier years of nuclear cooperation, Kemp argues that the United States benefited more from cooperation than Britain, as they tended to be a few months behind the British in the first half of the 1960s.¹¹⁴⁸ Given the extent of uncertainty surrounding Soviet intentions and capabilities, there were some points where Britain did have to accept the asymmetry in the relationship, and willingly increase their vulnerability to the United States in an indication of trust. Following an early Cold War scare in which the U.S. believed that the Soviets had sent nuclear bombers towards them, which were not in fact nuclear bombers but rather a flock of geese, the U.S. ruled out agreeing to consult the British before using an atom bomb.¹¹⁴⁹ As Dobson points out, owing to the nature of nuclear weapons, the British ‘had to accept a situation governed, in the end, by trust’.¹¹⁵⁰ The high sensitivity of nuclear weapons means that any degree of cooperation indicates some trust is present, as it involves a significant acceptance of vulnerability. This was demonstrated again in the Nassau Agreement which resolved the Skybolt crisis through the U.S. agreement to provide the British with Polaris missiles. As with the U.S. agreement that U.S. nuclear bases in Britain would only be used in an emergency, the provision of Polaris came with an agreement from the British that they would only be used in ‘a crisis of supreme national importance’, clear indications of mutual trust.¹¹⁵¹ Throughout Cold War cooperation on nuclear matters, Xu argues that mutual trust was also strengthened by the institutionalisation of the nuclear relationship.¹¹⁵² This process of institutionalisation resulted in ‘regularized and routinized interactions’ through the creation of Joint Working Groups, mechanisms for visits of nuclear sites, management and administrative arrangements which reviewed how to implement existing agreements and plan for the future of nuclear cooperation, planned ongoing exchanges of atomic information, and channels to exchange knowledge between those working on a specific nuclear project.¹¹⁵³ Xu argues that it was ‘habits of cooperation’ which became embedded in these institutionalised ‘working arrangements and cooperative

¹¹⁴⁷ John Krige, “Hybrid Knowledge: The Transnational Co-Production of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment in the 1960s,” *British Society for the History of Sciences* 45, no. 3 (2012): 352.

¹¹⁴⁸ This specifically refers to a new technique to enrich uranium which they believed would be 25 per cent cheaper than the technique which had been developed initially in the Manhattan Project. See Krige, “Hybrid Knowledge: The Transnational Co-Production of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment in the 1960s” for details.

¹¹⁴⁹ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 107.

¹¹⁵⁰ Dobson, 107.

¹¹⁵¹ Dobson, 130.

¹¹⁵² Xu, “Institutionalization, Path Dependence and the Persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” 1222.

¹¹⁵³ Xu, 1217.

mechanisms',¹¹⁵⁴ which in turn promoted frequent interactions and facilitated the creation of a web of personal relationships between British and American personnel.¹¹⁵⁵ The nuclear space provided invaluable opportunities for interactions between individuals and groups of personnel which allowed trust to develop. The web of personal relationships, shared strategic interests, and the clear presence of all three dimensions of trust enabled such close, intimate cooperation on the most sensitive of defence and security matters to take place, endure, and adapt throughout the Cold War.

The Skybolt crisis and its resolution provide a valuable microcosm of the interplay of the dimensions of trust in the context of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. The Skybolt crisis came about when the U.S. decided to end the project of supplying Britain with Skybolt missiles. The reasons this crisis was able to take place have been examined extensively by scholars,¹¹⁵⁶ however the focus in this section will be on the role of the interplay of the dimensions of trust, particularly as they pertain to the resolution of the crisis. Skybolt can be viewed in terms of divergent interests, strategic cultures, and domestic needs, highlighting the difficulties a divide in calculative trust can cause. Baylis and Stoddart argue that all British nuclear decision-making can be best understood through a constructivist approach which examines ideational factors, beliefs, culture, identity, and strategic culture.¹¹⁵⁷ This can be seen in the British belief in the necessity of "nuclear independence", both for reasons of diplomacy and internal politics.¹¹⁵⁸ As Neustadt outlines, 'a nuclear strike force "made in Britain" and controlled there symbolized the British role in nuclear development, a comforting reminder of past greatness and a hint of future services to Europe'.¹¹⁵⁹ It also gave Britain diplomatic leverage through keeping them in the group

¹¹⁵⁴ Xu, 1217.

¹¹⁵⁵ Xu, 1222.

¹¹⁵⁶ The "muddle" thesis was established by Neustadt, and numerous scholars have built on his initial explanation. These lines of argument focus on the role of misperception and miscommunication between various officials across both states. See Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*; Richard E. Neustadt, *Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999); Ken Young has proposed a revisionist "mischief" stance based on then newly opened archival materials, whereby the Skybolt crisis can largely be put down to the British overplaying the cancellation of Skybolt and obscuring any notifications or signs they had received of its forthcoming cancellation, in order to ensure they acquired Polaris missiles. See Ken Young, "The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or Mischief?," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, no. 4 (2004): 614–35.

¹¹⁵⁷ See John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, *The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

¹¹⁵⁸ A report prepared for the Ditchley Conference on Nuclear Disarmament in Anglo-American Relations pointed to five reasons: "(a) the need to avoid being subjected to nuclear blackmail in carrying out our world-wide commitments; (b) the possibility that we might one day find ourselves without the support of Allies (i. e. the answer to the European doubts); (c) the obligation to maintain our nuclear capability as a contribution to Western defence; (d) as a card of entry to East-West negotiations on disarmament and nuclear tests; (e) the fact that, once we had dropped out, it would be impossible to get back in the game." Also added is the point that the UK "could not contemplate entering the European Community on a basis of military inferiority to the French". See "FO 371/173335," 1963.

¹¹⁵⁹ Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, 112.

of nuclear states and making sure they would be given a seat at key talks on matters of security and the international system.¹¹⁶⁰ As Moore argues, for Macmillan ‘the *political* target of Britain’s nuclear force was not the Soviet Union at all, but the United States’.¹¹⁶¹ Finally, it was a matter of domestic politics, with the Tories finding it politically expedient to maintain Britain’s nuclear force, particularly given Macmillan’s efforts to present the relationship with the U.S. as special.¹¹⁶² The American strategic interests involved in Skybolt were largely owing to the budgetary and technical issues with the missile.¹¹⁶³ The issue was with how the situation was handled, which in large part has been put down to a lack of appreciation for how important Skybolt was to Britain, and the value the British placed on its role as a necessary part of Britain being an independent nuclear power. On the other hand, Secretary of Defence McNamara and the State Department were both keen to limit or remove Britain’s independent nuclear capability in order to convince them to combine their capabilities in a multilateral Western nuclear force which would operate under U.S. command.¹¹⁶⁴ Yet another perspective came from USAF, who were committed to the Skybolt missile, and lobbied not only their own government but also their RAF counterparts.¹¹⁶⁵ The competing strategic visions within and between states caused a breach of the calculative dimension of trust which could have been highly damaging to the relationship. As will be illustrated below, however, the relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan, grounded to some degree in all dimensions of trust, meant that not only was the crisis easily resolved but its resolution cemented the special nature of Anglo-American nuclear relations.

In seeking to resolve the crisis, the two leaders met at Nassau, where Macmillan sought to convince Kennedy to replace Skybolt with Polaris.¹¹⁶⁶ The resolution of the Skybolt crisis must be understood in the broader context of Macmillan-Kennedy relations. Indeed, Dobson argues that ‘if Kennedy and Macmillan had not been such close friends it [Skybolt] could have caused long-term damage’.¹¹⁶⁷ As has been established above, Macmillan was a believer in the myths of the Anglo-American relationship. Baylis takes this idea further, arguing that Macmillan also used the mythicised history of the “special relationship” to seduce Kennedy into giving Britain Polaris missiles.¹¹⁶⁸ Along similar lines, Young argues that the entire ‘British response to Skybolt’s

¹¹⁶⁰ “FO 371/173335.”

¹¹⁶¹ Richard Moore, *Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958- 64* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 28.

¹¹⁶² Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 128.

¹¹⁶³ Dobson, 127.

¹¹⁶⁴ Dobson, 128–29.

¹¹⁶⁵ Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957-1962*, 169– 70.

¹¹⁶⁶ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 129.

¹¹⁶⁷ Dobson, 127.

¹¹⁶⁸ Baylis, “The ‘Special Relationship’: A Diverting British Myth?,” 129.

cancellation was skilfully contrived', using posturing to heighten the U.S. sense of obligation to rectify what the British presented as a wholly American mistake in order to obtain the Polaris missile.¹¹⁶⁹ No matter how contrived the response, it was the trusting relationship which had developed between Macmillan and Kennedy which allowed the British response to the crisis to result in the acquisition of Polaris missiles. Kennedy's apparent shared belief in the myths of Anglo-American relations and his close personal relationship with Macmillan drove him to a deal which was deeply unpopular amongst other U.S. officials. Neustadt argues that Kennedy 'knew the British had got more from him than he had wished to give'.¹¹⁷⁰ Neustadt, who was commissioned by Kennedy himself to write a report on how the Skybolt crisis had been able to take place, points out that upon commissioning the report

Kennedy indicated that he had felt the need to assist Macmillan.¹¹⁷¹ Kennedy cared deeply about Macmillan's political needs, realising that there were 'grave political risks for Mr Macmillan if we should not help him'.¹¹⁷² Kennedy clearly placed great importance on his relationship with Macmillan, and America's relationship with Britain. The Nassau Agreement itself is also illustrative of the trust present in Anglo-American relations at this time. As Dobson outlines, the clause in the agreement which meant that 'the missiles could only be used independently by Britain in a crisis of supreme national importance' meant that the agreement was rooted in a 'reliance on mutual trust'.¹¹⁷³ While Britain had not retained total nuclear independence, they did achieve what Neustadt describes as a marriage between integration and 'a form of independence'.¹¹⁷⁴ It was also, importantly, something which could be sold domestically as nuclear independence, even if the press remained dubious of this claim.¹¹⁷⁵ It remains an indication of Britain's willingness to accept vulnerability in a highly sensitive area, as the Nassau Agreement ensured that while Britain enjoyed an unparalleled special nuclear relationship with the United States, they were also now 'the only nuclear power without a delivery system of its own', and therefore reliant on American technology and ongoing positive relations with America.¹¹⁷⁶ Baylis describes the agreement as a result 'which greatly reinforced, and indeed extended further, the special defence relationship between the two countries'.¹¹⁷⁷ The trust which

¹¹⁶⁹ Young, "The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or Mischief?," 615.

¹¹⁷⁰ Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, 54.

¹¹⁷¹ Neustadt, *Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective*, 3.

¹¹⁷² Kennedy, quoted in Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962*, 411.

¹¹⁷³ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 130.

¹¹⁷⁴ Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, 53.

¹¹⁷⁵ Neustadt, 53-54.

¹¹⁷⁶ Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War," 13.

¹¹⁷⁷ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984*, 88.

had developed between Kennedy and Macmillan through a process of bonding meant that the Skybolt crisis was not only resolved, but ensured that cooperation on the most highly sensitive of defence areas continued throughout the Cold War and beyond.

Intelligence

The multidimensional trust framework aids in understanding how the institutionalisation of the intelligence relationship in the form of UKUSA took place, and how institutionalisation facilitated trust between intelligence personnel who came to view themselves as being part of a family, a community, or a network. The intelligence relationship was centred on shared interests, however the way in which institutionalisation took place facilitated the development of close affective and normative bonds between British and American intelligence communities. Examining the intelligence relationship reveals the value of the interplay of the dimensions of trust, and how they facilitate the willingness to accept vulnerability and thus cooperate on highly sensitive matters.

The creation of the UKUSA agreement highlights the necessity to avoid treating sentiments and interests as discrete categories and reinforces the necessity of a flat ontology of the state to understand the complex interplay between the dimensions of trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship. The intelligence relationship during the Cold War was predicated on the UKUSA Agreement, which itself was created in no small part due to increased fears regarding ‘Soviet behavior in the war’s endgame’.¹¹⁷⁸ It was also aided by the complementary needs of Britain and America, given that America needed British expertise and staff, and Britain needed America’s financial support.¹¹⁷⁹ UKUSA was built on the cooperation which took place during WWII as described in the previous chapter, and was a result of personal connections and information sharing between military personnel during the field, as well as high level government connections. Both of these, in turn, came about due to shared needs, as well as the shared language which provided ‘an affective predisposition to communication’.¹¹⁸⁰ UKUSA itself was thus formulated upon an inextricably interwoven web of shared need and affective connections between individuals, and provided the institutional backbone for the continuation of this web of cooperation throughout the Cold War.

The number of scholars who have described the US-UK intelligence relationship in terms of trust and identity related concepts indicates its salience as an example of trust in Anglo- American

¹¹⁷⁸ Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages,” 609.

¹¹⁷⁹ Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” 11.

¹¹⁸⁰ Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages,” 609.

relations. Dittmer describes it as trust having become “stuck” in particular, crucial bodies’ as a result of the trust built between British and Americans across all levels of the war effort.¹¹⁸¹ That is, the trust which had developed informally throughout the war was then reinforced and maintained through a process of institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of UKUSA was required, Dittmer argues, because while individuals played such a valuable role ‘trust could not depend on such individuals for long, and UKUSA procedures were used to maintain this transnational intimacy through the organization of space’.¹¹⁸² Further to that, once UKUSA was formalized and institutionalised, it became part of a ‘transformational process.’¹¹⁸³ The creation of a new institutionalised space in which intelligence cooperation took place involved personnel exchanges, which ‘one retired UK senior intelligence official described . . . as a process of “growing up together,” resulting in “life-long friendships that extend into families”’.¹¹⁸⁴ Xu defines this process as one of institutionalisation and path dependence, which fostered ‘habits of cooperation’.¹¹⁸⁵ He points out that it is SIGINT which is ‘the jewel in the crown of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation’.¹¹⁸⁶ He points to a statement by a former head of MI5 Stephen Lander to illustrate the intertwined relationship fostered by personnel exchanges between the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and America’s National Security Agency (NSA), in which Lander argues that ‘the institutional integration that has flowed from the 1946 UKUSA Agreement is so widespread that SIGINT customers in both capitals seldom know which country generated either the access or the product itself’.¹¹⁸⁷ Such a structure inclines British and American intelligence personnel to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another, demonstrating a significant presence of the normative dimension of trust. Svendsen argues that ‘the UK-US intelligence community has become an increasingly fused entity, boasting exceptional ‘networked’ as well as quasi-epistemic qualities’.¹¹⁸⁸ He goes on to claim that the two intelligence communities are closely intertwined, both culturally and structurally.¹¹⁸⁹ Richelson and Ball describe UKUSA as ‘a truly multinational community, with its numerous organizations and agencies bound together by an extraordinary network of written and unwritten agreements,

¹¹⁸¹ Dittmer, 611.

¹¹⁸² Dittmer, 611.

¹¹⁸³ Dittmer, 611.

¹¹⁸⁴ Dittmer, 612.

¹¹⁸⁵ Xu, “Institutionalization, Path Dependence and the Persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” 1213.

¹¹⁸⁶ Xu, 1212.

¹¹⁸⁷ Stephen Lander, quoted in Xu, 1213.

¹¹⁸⁸ Adam D. M. Svendsen, “‘Strained’ Relations? Evaluating Contemporary Anglo-American Intelligence and Security Co-Operation,” in *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Alan P. Dobson and Steven Marsh (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 210.

¹¹⁸⁹ Svendsen, 212.

working practices and personal relationships'.¹¹⁹⁰ The extent to which UKUSA, and the relationship between Britain and America in particular, is described as a family, a community, or a network, points toward the affective and normative underpinnings of intelligence cooperation. It is the strength of the affective and normative dimensions, in addition to the calculative dimension, which has enabled sustained cooperation on such sensitive matters between Britain and America.

Society

Connections between societies can be forged not only outside of the traditional conceptualisation of the state, but also in opposition to the state. This was the case with the 19th century peace movement which shaped the use of arbitration as a means to peacefully resolve conflicts, and it was also the case for the 20th century homophile movement. While this may seem antithetical to building trust between states, such sites of transnational activism provided invaluable spaces of interaction opportunities for individuals across both societies which allowed them to build connections and trust with one another. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the transnational turn in Cold War history in recent decades. In the study of the Cold War, 'transnational approaches highlight human agency in a conflict that too often is written in terms of superpower rivalry'.¹¹⁹¹ Studying transnational interactions, Snyder argues, allows us to study attitude changes, new forms and paths of influence, and how these factors impacted upon changes in government policy.¹¹⁹² While much of the transnational turn in Cold War history has focused on bringing in international perspectives beyond those of Britain and America,¹¹⁹³ it is also valuable to examine non-traditional transnational perspectives within the Anglo-American context. Similar aims can also be found in the project of queering, which seeks to reconceptualise power relations from the personal to the geopolitical:

Structures of national and international power produce and reproduce themselves by suppressing and reorienting deviant ways of being and modes of affiliation - often with the help of state actors who enact laws and policies, police, wage war, influence media representations, etc. At the same time, queer subjects have created identities and solidarities that have disrupted channels and patterns of influence and power. Thus, centering historical moments of disorientation and people who become non-normatively oriented (in sexuality, in race, in space), or policed, or killed, because of their orientations, offers the possibility of seeing power itself - a critical subject of inquiry undergirding our field - in the process of

¹¹⁹⁰ Ball and Richelson, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*, 301.

¹¹⁹¹ Sarah B. Snyder, "Bringing the Transnational In: Writing Human Rights into the International History of the Cold War," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 24, no. 1 (2013): 102.

¹¹⁹² Snyder, 102.

¹¹⁹³ Snyder, 101.

being constructed and contested at many levels.¹¹⁹⁴

This section will therefore focus on the transnational aspects of the treatment of gay men and women during the 1950s in the context of the Lavender Scare in America and the Burgess-Maclean scandal in Britain, followed by the influence of transnational homophile activism which expanded significantly as a result. These transnational interactions highlight the interplay of the dimensions of trust, as Cold War calculative interests and normative identity related factors continuously intertwined, and the spaces which opened up opportunities for interactions between societies facilitated affective connections between individuals and between homophile communities.

The Lavender Scare provides the context in which concerted homophile activism emerged and provides insights into the relationships between Foreign Office and State Department, and the geopolitics of sexual politics in the Anglo-American relationship. Homophile activism became inextricably intertwined with the geopolitics of the Cold War as both the Lavender Scare and McCarthyism came into full swing concurrently in the 1950s. As David K. Johnson outlines in his seminal text which coined the phrase ‘The Lavender Scare’, February of 1950 saw two statements given by U.S. government officials regarding security risks within the State Department capture the national imagination.¹¹⁹⁵ The first of these statements was by Senator McCarthy, who claimed there were 205 communists working for the State Department.¹¹⁹⁶ The second was by Deputy Undersecretary John Peurifoy, who denied the presence of actual communists, but revealed ‘a number of persons considered to be security risks had been forced out, and that among these were ninety-one homosexuals’.¹¹⁹⁷ While Charles warns that the FBI itself treated communists and homosexuals differently, as illustrated by their failure to link their investigation into Harry Hay’s communism to his role in creating the homophile Mattachine Society which was under a separate FBI investigation, stereotypes meant that the two became publicly linked.¹¹⁹⁸ The similarities between communists and homosexuals with regards to the use of pseudonyms, secretiveness, a separate literature, and the recruitment of members to their societies and organisations, were popularised and stereotyped, often to be taken advantage of by politicians and bureaucrats for their own political agendas.¹¹⁹⁹ This conflation of communism and homosexuality as security

¹¹⁹⁴ Laura A. Belmonte et al., “Colloquy: Queering American and the World,” *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 1 (2016): 21.

¹¹⁹⁵ David K. Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1.

¹¹⁹⁶ Johnson, 1.

¹¹⁹⁷ Johnson, 1.

¹¹⁹⁸ See Douglas M. Charles, “Communist and Homosexual: The FBI, Harry Hay, and the Secret Side of the Lavender Scare, 1943-1961,” *American Communist History* 11, no. 1 (2012): 101–24.

¹¹⁹⁹ Charles, 122–24.

threats to America caused widespread moral panic, and marked the onset of the Lavender Scare which ultimately saw thousands of government employees fired or forced to resign from their jobs.¹²⁰⁰ It also quickly moved into the geopolitical space, as the U.S. sought to convince both international organisations and its allies to similarly treat homosexual individuals as security threats.¹²⁰¹ Britain was a particular target of these U.S. concerns, given the closeness of the relationship, the potential harm to U.S. security interests should such a perceived security risk exist, and ‘a series of homosexual scandals among British government officials’.¹²⁰² The most notable of these scandals was the disappearance of two British Foreign Office diplomats in 1951, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. Their disappearance served to confirm suspicions that they were suspected Soviet agents, and was particularly concerning to the U.S. given that both men had spent time posted at the British Embassy in Washington and had access to U.S. secrets.¹²⁰³ It was also quickly reported that both men were known to have been homosexual.¹²⁰⁴ The Burgess-Maclean scandal serves as a microcosm of the relationship between the personal and the geopolitical, identity, and trust in the context of Anglo-American relations.

Given that the Lavender Scare was already underway in the U.S., the fact that the two British men had been privy to U.S. secrets, and that Britain had kept their disappearance secret for two weeks before informing the U.S., the incident placed considerable strain on Anglo-American relations. According to Vargo, it ‘carried damaging repercussions for decades to come’, and ‘cast a long shadow over the intimacy and trust between British and American intelligence operations’.¹²⁰⁵ Minto adds that ‘the case of the missing diplomats strained relationships on every level, from the most intimate to the geopolitical’.¹²⁰⁶ This further reinforces the need for a flat ontology of the state, which allows for everything from the intimate to the geopolitical to be included within analyses of bilateral relationships. In addition to creating an environment of suspicion between the Foreign Office and the State Department, the scandal also served to highlight the cultural differences between the two organisations and, even more broadly, between Britain and America. The Foreign Office operated on ‘a culture of absolute class loyalty bound together by the intimacies of open secrets’, where they felt like they were members of a tight knit community in which personal secrets were accepted rather than examined.¹²⁰⁷ The Foreign Office,

¹²⁰⁰ Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government*, 2.

¹²⁰¹ Johnson, 131–33.

¹²⁰² Johnson, 133.

¹²⁰³ Minto, “Special Relationships: Transnational Homophile Activism and Anglo-American Sexual Politics,” 113.

¹²⁰⁴ Marc E. Vargo, “A Case of Espionage: Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and the ‘Ring of Five,’” in *Scandal: Infamous Gay Controversies of the Twentieth Century* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011), 102.

¹²⁰⁵ Vargo, 102–3.

¹²⁰⁶ Minto, “Special Relationships: Transnational Homophile Activism and Anglo-American Sexual Politics,” 126.

¹²⁰⁷ Minto, 133–34.

the British press, and British academics were all keen to paint Britain in opposition to the U.S., arguing that the McCarthy style U.S. witch hunts and intrusions on private lives were antithetical to the British way of life.¹²⁰⁸ The press attention across both states meant that the British and American public were inherently involved in the politics and perceptions of the scandal. The broader context of McCarthyism steeped American intrusions on the private lives of individuals within the Foreign Office also came to impact on British individuals and societal perceptions of America. The British press came to increasingly refer to American infringements on personal liberty, such as the removal of passports on the basis of political views, as McCarthyism.¹²⁰⁹ As Minto outlines, while the press only occasionally mentioned homosexuality directly, the fact that the release of the second Kinsey report was ongoing through this period, and the reporting on Burgess and Maclean, meant that examination of political views in line with McCarthyism and homosexuality were linked in the minds of the British public.¹²¹⁰ The travel restrictions of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act inspired by McCarthyism affected not only the elite, but also British merchant seamen who now had to subject their political views and personal lives to be checked by U.S. officials.¹²¹¹ This naturally stirred up resentment against the Americans. Minto argues that British resistance to toeing the U.S. line on views of homosexuality as a security risk and embarking upon their own Lavender Scare illustrates the strength of British institutional culture.¹²¹² The fact that the Cadogan Committee set up to examine the impact of the Burgess and Maclean scandal came to the conclusion that ‘suspected homosexuals in the Foreign Service should be carefully watched’ owing to the danger of scandal and blackmail,¹²¹³ indicates that changes to British institutional culture were underway. The simultaneous attempts to construct the separateness of British identity as superior to American with regards to its prioritisation of individual liberty, along with the difficulties of achieving this in a Cold War context where security cooperation with America was fundamental to British security interests, and the culture of suspicion it fostered between the Foreign Office and the State Department, are illustrative of the interplay of the dimensions of trust. The Lavender Scare and the Burgess-Maclean scandal paint a picture of the interwoven nature of society and politics across Britain and America, from the personal to the geopolitical, and the way in which these connections shaped questions of British and American identity and impacted on trust in the Anglo-American relationship.

¹²⁰⁸ Minto, 127.

¹²⁰⁹ Minto, 137–38.

¹²¹⁰ Minto, 138–39.

¹²¹¹ Minto, 140–41.

¹²¹² Minto, 136.

¹²¹³ “FCO 158/24,” n.d.

The Burgess and Maclean geopolitical spy scandal, and the broader Lavender Scare context, had widespread ramifications for gay men and women across British and even more so American society. While the U.S. intrusion on the private lives of British individuals and the reporting of the Burgess-Maclean scandal in newspapers had already involved society in the geopolitical attempt to have homosexuals marked as security threats among all U.S. allies, it naturally had the most prominent effects on gay men and women. In the U.S., the scene was set for a witch hunt which saw thousands removed from government jobs, and a pervasive atmosphere of fear. While Britain did not undergo its own Lavender Scare in the same fashion as the U.S., the following years saw increased enthusiasm for the prosecution of homosexuality as a crime, with an increase of 50 per cent in the number of gay men arrested between 1950 and 1955.¹²¹⁴ While homophile activism had taken place before, the Lavender Scare in the U.S. contributed to its increased pace from the 1950s. Scholars have studied this phenomenon mainly through the periodicals which were published in America by homophile societies: in particular *ONE*, published by ONE Inc. 1953-1967; the *Ladder*, published by the Daughters of Bilitis 1956-1972; and the *Mattachine Review*, published by the Mattachine Society 1955- 1967.¹²¹⁵ These were the first widely distributed homophile publications in America, and ‘their appearance in the very shadow of McCarthyism speaks to their significance as pioneers in an important social movement press’.¹²¹⁶ At the same time, significant transnational contact was taking place across continental Europe, driven by the International Committee for Sexual Equality (ICSE), formed out of the first International Congress for Sexual Equality held in Amsterdam in 1951.¹²¹⁷ ICSE, Rupp argues, ‘constructed a minority group with a collective identity based on sexuality’.¹²¹⁸ This illustrates the power of transnational activism in facilitating the growth of normative trust, through providing opportunities for interaction in which people can interact on the basis of shared values, the desire to produce a joint outcome, or the desire to colocate, which in turn creates a space in which a collective identity can form. In this space the transnational flows of trust and power can be seen in ways which built trust between a segment of British and American society, and also harmed trust in both governments. This highlights the complexity of the nature of trust between states, and the need to approach trust with a flat ontology of the state to better understand how trust was shaped by people not often considered to be key players in the power politics of bilateral

¹²¹⁴ Vargo, “A Case of Espionage: Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and the ‘Ring of Five,’” 104.

¹²¹⁵ Marc Stein, “Canonizing Homophile Sexual Respectability: Archives, History, and Memory,” *Radical History Review* 120, no. 1 (2014): 53.

¹²¹⁶ Rodger Streitmatter, “Creating a Venue for the ‘Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name’: Origins of the Gay and Lesbian Press,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 72, no. 2 (1995): 436.

¹²¹⁷ Leila J. Rupp, “The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement,” *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 4 (2011): 1014.

¹²¹⁸ Rupp, 1029.

relationships.

While Britain did not yet have such an organisation or publication of its own, transnational connections with European and American counterparts and the clear divisions made on the basis of “Anglo-Saxon” identity provide valuable insights into the normative relationship between British and American societies. The Americans, for example, were interested in the British. *ONE Magazine* published on the state of homophile matters in Britain, discussing their politics, police actions, press coverage, trials, and the Burgess-Maclean scandal.¹²¹⁹ Stein argues that the focus on Western Europe in U.S. homophile periodicals is reflective of a combination of longstanding links to Western Europe, Western European influences on the U.S., the Cold War based alliances between the U.S. and Western European states, and additionally in the case of Britain shared language.¹²²⁰ Again shedding light on the geopolitics of sexual politics, Stein argues that the limitations of the transnational reach of the U.S. homophile press are indicative of political factors, alongside the more obvious economic, educational, and linguistic factors.¹²²¹ There were few contributions from communist countries, and the way in which the periodicals presented other parts of the world were highly influenced by factors such as colonialism, racism, Orientalism, and Cold War geopolitics.¹²²² While African, Caribbean, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and Asian societies were presented as varyingly more open or harsher than Anglo-American societies with regards to homosexuality, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were portrayed almost universally negatively.¹²²³ Such was the impact of the geopolitics of the Cold War in combination with the Lavender Scare, that although the Mattachine Society had originally been founded by communists in 1950, by 1953 it, and its publication, were avowedly anti-communist.¹²²⁴ Even within the broader transatlantic community including Western Europe, Anglo-Saxon culture was noted as distinct, with the editor of the magazine of Dutch organisation Cultuur- en Ontspannings Centrum (Cultural and Recreational Centre, or COC) warning that ‘articles that easily could be

¹²¹⁹ Minto, “Special Relationships: Transnational Homophile Activism and Anglo-American Sexual Politics,” 153.

¹²²⁰ Marc Stein, “Introduction: U.S. Homophile Internationalism,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 64, no. 7 (2017): 845.

¹²²¹ Stein, 847.

¹²²² Stein, 847.

¹²²³ See Healy Thompson, “‘Some Africans Gave Full Approval of Homosexuality’: Representations of Africa in the U.S. Homophile Press, 1953-1964,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 64, no. 7 (2017): 945–62; Shlomo Gleibman, “‘The Madness of the Carnival’: Representations of Latin America and the Caribbean in the U.S. Homophile Press,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 64, no. 7 (2017): 870–88; Marva Milo, “‘But Oh! What Tales’: Portraying the Middle East in U.S. Homophile Periodicals of the 1950s and 1960s,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 64, no. 7 (2017): 889–907; Carly Simpson, “Imperial Queerness: The U.S. Homophile Press and Constructions of Sexualities in Asia and the Pacific, 1953-1964,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 64, no. 7 (2017): 928–44; Dasha Serykh, “Homonationalism Before Homonationalism: Representations of Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union in the U.S. Homophile Press, 1953-1964,” *Journal of Homosexuality* 64, no. 7 (2017): 908–27.

¹²²⁴ Serykh, “Homonationalism Before Homonationalism: Representations of Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union in the U.S. Homophile Press, 1953-1964,” 913.

accepted in some countries on the continent could cause a scandal in Anglo-Saxon countries'.¹²²⁵ The Anglo- American homophile network is also evident in the U.S. interest in the British partial decriminalisation of gay sex in 1967, and the travels of the leading British lobbyist and secretary of Britain's Homosexual Law Reform Society, Sir Antony Grey, to America. His tour of the U.S. was aimed at fostering discussions and solidarities, as well as advancing public support for the cause in the U.S. through 'throwing a spotlight on law reform efforts in the two English speaking nations'.¹²²⁶ It is the transnational transmission of people and ideas in this way which has led Minto to argue that 'it opens up a whole "Intimate Atlantic" across which ideas, texts, and people – marginalized in their home cultures – insistently circulated'.¹²²⁷ The "Intimate Atlantic" of transnational homophile activism is demonstrative of the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship, from the personal to the geopolitical.

Conclusion

The Anglo-American relationship was able to survive and adapt to the new strategic context following WWII owing to the pre-existing levels of trust in the relationship and the trust which continued to develop throughout the Cold War. A multidimensional trust framework which conceptualises the state through the use of a flat ontology captures in more precise detail how these pre-existing levels of trust were transformed in the Cold War context. When the calculative dimension strengthened as strategic outlooks regarding the Soviet threat came into alignment, Britain and America sought to partner with one another, as trust was already present to some extent across all three dimensions. Interests were never purely aligned, and conflicts of interest were frequent, notably with regards to economic tensions surrounding aid and British socialism, colonialism, and questions over British capacity to be an effective ally following its withdrawal east of Suez. The affective and normative dimensions of trust, however, enabled the management of such conflicts. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the three big crises in Anglo-American relations during the Cold War: the Suez crisis, the Skybolt crisis, and the Falklands War. The relationship was able to be managed and then repaired owing to the existence of personal connections across the breadth of the relationship, and in particular the development of affective and normative trust between key individuals. This notably included the relationships between Kennedy and Eisenhower, Kennedy and Macmillan, and ambassadors Ormsby-Gore and

¹²²⁵ Rupp, "The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement," 1023.

¹²²⁶ David Minto, "Mr Grey Goes to Washington: The Homophile Internationalism of Britain's Homosexual Law Reform Society," in *British Queer History: New Approaches and Perspectives*, ed. Brian Lewis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2013), 219.

¹²²⁷ Minto, "Special Relationships: Transnational Homophile Activism and Anglo-American Sexual Politics," 4.

Bruce. The normative dimension strengthened as the British and Americans increasingly came to “think like,” “feel like,” and “respond like” one another. They had found themselves colocated in terms of the “West”, as well as in more concrete terms such as the presence of American bases in Britain; they increasingly defined shared values in terms of shared Western values constructed in stark opposition to Soviet communist values; they worked together intimately on the joint goal of a Cold War victory; and they created a collective identity through the formal creation of an alliance. All three dimensions of trust had a strong presence throughout the Cold War, and help to explain why the relationship survived and adapted to its changing strategic environment.

More detail on how the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship affects the overall nature of trust in the relationship has been ascertained through an examination of examples across the domains of government, defence, and society. Given the long time period which forms the focus of this chapter, the examples are but small slices of the larger picture. They are therefore significantly limited in their representativeness of each domain as a whole, as they existed across the entirety of the Cold War. The relationship saw considerable fluctuations over the course of the Cold War, and these examples fall far short of capturing them all. In conjunction with the broader overview of the relationship provided in the first half of the chapter, however, they still reveal important empirical insights. More importantly, they provide the core theoretical insights fundamental to the primary research aim of this thesis. Each example allowed an important opportunity to analyse the interplay of the dimension of trust in a particular domain at a particular time, and understand how they shaped one another to influence that case, and the broader relationship.

The relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan, as well as their foreign ministers, helped the relationship to continue mending following the Suez crisis, and manage the Skybolt crisis to ensure minimal disruption to Anglo-American relations. The Falklands War saw Britain receive ‘automatic support’ from the U.S. Secretary of Defence, and at the same time illustrated the intertwined relationship between conflicting aspects of the U.S. government, conflicting U.S. and British interests and identities, and societal perceptions of the unfolding crisis. The informal cooperation which continued in the nuclear relationship during the period of barred formal cooperation further demonstrates the power of the relationships between service personnel, while the intelligence relationship and the formation of UKUSA sheds light on how intelligence personnel function as a family or community. The closeness of these relationships across various areas of the bilateral relationship means that there are multiple pillars of trust capable of promoting trusting relations between Britain and America. The inherent

interconnectedness of the different domains of the relationship is also evident when examining the Lavender Scare in the U.S., the Burgess-Maclean scandal in Britain, and the rise of transnational homophile activism in the 1950s. These examples demonstrate the utility of a flat ontology of the state for understanding how trust is shaped by the relationship between the personal and the geopolitical. Analysing the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of the relationship reveals the extent to which the three dimensions of trust were present across the breadth of the relationship, and how their presence shaped the overall nature of trust in Anglo-American relations. This demonstrates that the theoretical approach developed in this thesis responds effectively to the challenge of analysing social trust in a way which incorporates a wide variety of actors in its study of the state as a collective, and captures the role of interpersonal interactions. The breadth and depth of all three dimensions of trust explains how the Anglo-American relationship was able to survive and adapt to changes in the strategic environment, manage conflicts of interest in the name of an overarching shared strategic objective, and rebuild trust in the relationship following crises. This analysis has included the key themes commonly understood to play a role in the relationship, and intersubjectively incorporated factors associated with sentiments and interests. What makes the Anglo-American relationship “special” during the Cold War period is the strong presence of the three dimensions of trust, and their interplay across the domains of the relationship which facilitates expansive cooperation on sensitive matters.

Chapter Six

The Post-Cold War Reconfigurations of the “Special Relationship”

Introduction

The end of the Cold War provided a theoretical challenge not only to the discipline of international relations broadly, but also to scholars of the Anglo-American relationship in particular. The Terminal school of thought abounded with predictions of the imminent demise of the “special relationship”.¹²²⁸ The relationship, however, proved able to adapt to not only one global transformation but two, as both the end of the Cold War and 9/11 proved to be significant changes to the international system. Following these changes, some turned to the traditional discussions on sentiments and interests,¹²²⁹ while others sought new explanations. In two prominent examples, Xu turned to institutionalisation and path-dependence as cornerstones of a theory of alliance persistence, while Haugevik developed a theory of special relationships. Both used the language of trust prominently, and considered trust to be a key component of their approaches. Yet neither explored or theorised trust in great detail. This leaves trust as an important aspect of post-Cold War Anglo-American relations which needs to be explored in order to broaden understanding of how the relationship was able to adapt to two major structural shifts in the international system. While the end of the Cold War is most commonly dated to the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, this chapter will begin with the fall of the Berlin wall in order to capture the 1990-1991 Gulf War, as it was the first example of ‘post-Vietnam, post-Cold War military decision making’.¹²³⁰ With the Berlin Wall having fallen in November 1989, the dynamics of the international system had already begun to shift. As such, the Gulf War ‘occurred in a “new world” context’, in which ‘the old post-World War II framework of Soviet-American confrontation had been supplanted’.¹²³¹ This chapter will trace the development of the three dimensions of trust and their interplay in the defence, government, and society spaces throughout the post-Cold War period.

While the broad overarching shared strategic goals associated with the Cold War largely disappeared, America and Britain still shared a number of interests in the early post-Cold War years. The Gulf War was clear evidence of this, as it saw Britain and America cooperating

¹²²⁸ For a notable example, see Dickie, *“Special” No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994.

¹²²⁹ For example, see Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: The Lazarus of International Relations”; Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed.”

¹²³⁰ Bob Woodward, *The Commanders: The Pentagon and the First Gulf War, 1989-1991* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1991), 32.

¹²³¹ Richard Moody Swain, *Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 1.

extensively within a military coalition to force Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait. 9/11 sparked a second major shift in the international system, which prompted close Anglo- American cooperation in the global war on terror. Difficulties throughout both periods centred on differing strategic cultures, which were prominent in debates over how best to conduct international interventions, including in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The importance of the affective dimension of trust between leaders becomes prominent in a comparison of the difficulties John Major and Bill Clinton faced in managing policy differences, and the greater success achieved by Clinton and Tony Blair owing to their close personal relationship. The normative dimension of trust can be seen in both its strengths and weaknesses through an examination of colocation, collective identity, shared values, and joint products or goals. The strengths and weaknesses of collective identity will be explored in the context of British attempts to be an ‘Atlantic bridge’ between Europe and America. Colocation, joint products or goals, and shared values will all be explored in the context of the war on terror, which saw Britain and America on the one hand physically colocated with the aim to enact broad shared values and achieve a joint goal of victory, but on the other hand facing divergences over differing strategic cultures, priorities, and how to achieve the overarching shared values of freedom and democracy. The interplay of the three dimensions of trust is seen when examining the domains of government and leaders, defence and military, and society. The government and leaders section focuses on Tony Blair and George W. Bush, who developed a close personal relationship in spite of expectations that their different politics would prevent it. This took place as 9/11 brought them together, strengthening the calculative dimension, enabling the development of bonding trust, and highlighting the similarities in their outlooks. The strength of the calculative dimension of trust, in conjunction with institutionalised frequent interactions between personnel capable of promoting trusting personal relationships, can also be seen in the defence, nuclear, and intelligence relationships. Britain and America cooperated closely on the Gulf War campaign, which was driven initially by political leaders Margaret Thatcher and George H. Bush, and then also by the military personnel and leaders as military action began, notably American General Schwarzkopf, and British General Billière. The mid-2000s onwards have seen a series of decisions taken to ensure Britain maintained its nuclear capability, a move which cannot be explained by strategic interests alone but only by accounting for identity-based considerations regarding the Anglo- American “special relationship”. The intelligence relationship was driven by a strong calculative dimension of trust, initially because of the need to cooperate to keep up with rapid changes in communications technology and to combat the budget cuts which took place following the end

of the Cold War, and subsequently also to conduct counterterrorism and support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the publics of both states lost trust in their intelligence services following the failures of intelligence and policy relating to Iraq's proposed weapons of mass destruction and the U.S. use of extraordinary rendition and enhanced interrogation, long-standing affective and normative bonds meant that the intelligence communities themselves retained strong relations. Where the relationship between Blair and Bush demonstrated that the calculative dimension of trust can be a vital facilitator of the development of affective and normative trust between leaders, it also raises interesting questions for the study of trust between societies. The relationship between Blair and Bush, and their association with the decision to go to war in Iraq, meant that both societies lost trust in their own leaders, and British society in particular lost trust in not only Bush, but also America more generally. All of these examples demonstrate the interplay of the dimensions of trust, and contribute to a greater understanding of how the Anglo-American relationship adapted to two significant structural shifts in the international system.

The Dimensions of Trust

Calculative

The calculative dimension of trust was vital to the ability of the Anglo-American relationship to adapt to the immediate post-Cold War period, the changes brought by 9/11, and the winding down of the war on terror as a central pillar of cooperation. A number of examples demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the relationship which defined the post-Cold War period. First, the end of the Cold War may have removed the major shared strategic concerns associated with the Cold War, but it did not remove all shared interests. Britain and America continued to cooperate, notably on the Gulf War and on matters in Europe. Second, key differences regarding interventionism will be examined. Blair in particular was a strong proponent of international intervention, which shaped his approach to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where Britain tended to focus more on nation-building and peacekeeping and America on tactical victories. Third, 9/11 served to bring back a central shared strategic interest. This brought America and Britain together in many ways, but also shaped the identity-driven strategic considerations of each in divergent ways with America tending towards unilateralism under the Bush doctrine, and Britain seeking to counter this through attempting to influence American policy. Fourth, under Obama the role of the war on terror as a central shared strategic concern dwindled. Obama was more focused on the Asia-Pacific, and less interested in the sentimentality and language traditionally associated with the "special relationship". He was, however, more popular with the British public and helped to rebuild America's image in Britain following the fallout from the Iraq War. Clearly, despite

significant shifts, the calculative dimension of trust continued to play a vital role in assisting the Anglo-American relationship in adapting to a changing strategic environment.

The end of the Cold War naturally had a significant effect on British and American perceptions of their strategic environment and their interests, both separately and in relation to one another. It was at this point that the Terminal perspective on the relationship peaked, with a significant number of commentators assuming that the loss of the core shared strategic interests regarding the Cold War would mean a sharp decline in Anglo-American relations.¹²³² On the other hand, to great surprise the relationship ‘survived not one, but two, global transformations’ in the post- Cold War period.¹²³³ One aspect of the reason the relationship survived the initial structural shift in the international system centres on the ongoing shared strategic interests of the two states. This included the 1991 Gulf War, the conflicts associated with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and shared interests in Europe.¹²³⁴ The Gulf War helped to reset relations between both Britain and America, and their leaders Thatcher and H.W. Bush following Bush distancing himself from Thatcher owing to his desire to distance himself from his predecessor, Reagan.¹²³⁵ They also had differences over German reunification where Thatcher attempted to stall reunification as she feared what a strong united Germany would mean for Britain,¹²³⁶ while Bush preferred a speedy process in order to ‘heal the divisions of Europe’ and ensure a united Germany was Western in orientation.¹²³⁷ By the sheer coincidence of Thatcher being in America when news was received of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the two states were able to take a quick shared stand on the matter, as will be explored in the military and defence section.¹²³⁸ Despite the loss of the cornerstone of shared interests and strategic outlook which had remained at the heart of Anglo-American relations in the post-war period, the calculative dimension remained strong enough to remain a key supporting pillar of the relationship in the shifting strategic landscape of the post-Cold War period. This was down to not only shared interests, but the trust across all dimensions which had been developed over time and served to facilitate shared perceptions of strategic changes and incline the two states to continue cooperating on matters of shared interest.

Despite these commonalities, as always difficulties remained. This is evidenced by the differences

¹²³² For example, Dickie, *“Special” No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994.

¹²³³ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 438.

¹²³⁴ David Hasting Dunn, “UK-US Relations After the Three Bs - Blair, Brown and Bush,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 27, no. 1 (2011): 10.

¹²³⁵ Dickie, *“Special” No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 222.

¹²³⁶ Her unease can be seen in her remarks following the fall of the Berlin Wall: Margaret Thatcher, “Remarks on the Berlin Wall (Fall Thereof) [“a Great Day for Freedom”],” Margaret Thatcher Foundation, November 10, 1989, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/107819>.

¹²³⁷ Dickie, *“Special” No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 208–9.

¹²³⁸ Dickie, 222–23.

in strategic culture apparent when examining the divergence in views on international intervention. Britain itself shifted on interventionism under Blair who, following the failures of Bosnia and Rwanda, led Britain to develop ‘a more interventionist strategy than it had since the Boer war’.¹²³⁹ While it is often perceived that America is the more militant interventionist of the two, as Freedman points out in the period prior to 9/11 the British were the more militant interventionists.¹²⁴⁰ The Blair government, notably influenced by Blair’s personal motivations and beliefs in addition to British imperial history, was a strong proponent of ‘interventionist internationalism’.¹²⁴¹ This was most notably espoused during Blair’s speech given to the Chicago Economic Club on April 22 1999 which outlined his views on Kosovo, the changed global context provided by global interdependence and globalisation, and the conditions under which one should conduct an intervention.¹²⁴² Britain’s interventionism under New Labour viewed the need for intervention through the lens of globalisation, which they believed required a more proactive foreign policy to try and prevent local crises from having more widespread impact owing to the nature of interdependence and globalisation.¹²⁴³ For Blair, Kosovo proved this viewpoint, and ‘transformed the world’s view of Blair, and transformed his view of the world’.¹²⁴⁴ There were also differences in perspectives on how to conduct interventions and the priorities of interventions. In Kosovo, for example, the American priority was the protection of their own forces, whereas the British priority was the protection of the local people.¹²⁴⁵ Similar kinds of differences played out in Afghanistan, where the British were more focused on nation-building and America on tactical victories and the capture of Osama bin Laden.¹²⁴⁶ Stephens describes the post-9/11 period as ‘a clash of strategic cultures’ between the United States and its enthusiasm for hard power on the one hand, and Europe and its passion for soft power on the other; with Britain caught in the middle.¹²⁴⁷ The US also demonstrated a distinct preference for coalitions of the willing, as opposed to using pre-existing coalitions such as NATO.¹²⁴⁸ The differences regarding interventionism

¹²³⁹ Philip Towle, *Going to War: British Debates From Wilberforce to Blair* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 142.

¹²⁴⁰ Lawrence Freedman, “Britain at War,” *The RUSI Journal* 151, no. 1 (2006): 13.

¹²⁴¹ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 152.

¹²⁴² Tony Blair, “The Blair Doctrine,” Global Policy Forum, April 22, 1999,

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26026.html>.

¹²⁴³ Yee-Kuang Heng, “‘What Did New Labour Ever Do For Us?’ Evaluating Tony Blair’s Imprint on British Strategic Culture,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2012): 562.

¹²⁴⁴ John Kampfner, *Blair’s Wars* (London: Free Press, 2004), 36.

¹²⁴⁵ Freedman, “Britain at War,” 13.

¹²⁴⁶ Freedman, 14.

¹²⁴⁷ Philip Stephens, “The Special Relationship and Foreign Policy: Panel Chairman’s Report,” in *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 140–41.

¹²⁴⁸ Jeffrey D. McCausland, “When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - Defense Policy and the Special Relationship: Panel Chairman’s Report,” in *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 455.

played out across the post-Cold War period. This indicates the limitations of the calculative dimension of trust, however ongoing cooperation on matters of shared interests indicates that these divergences in the calculative dimension of trust were able to be managed owing to the presence of the affective and normative dimensions of trust.

Of course, the end of the Cold War was not the only significant shift in the strategic context to take place during the post-Cold War era. The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent war on terror dramatically altered the strategic landscape and the strategic perceptions of Britain and America. For America, their global priority shifted from foreign economic policy to questions of national security.¹²⁴⁹ 9/11 also brought ‘Americanism’ to the fore, with a greater enthusiasm for advancing strong national positions without taking account of multilateral agreements or consensus.¹²⁵⁰ This particular outlook had existed even in the later years of the Clinton administration, as evident by the rejection of the Kyoto protocol, however following the onset of the war on terror ‘Americanist’ principles manifested as the ‘primacist, militarist and unilateralist implications of the Bush Doctrine’.¹²⁵¹ It was in this context that questions of identity emerged for Britain regarding the need to believe they were the superior peace-keepers, drawing on the old Greeks and Romans myth to reassert their role as former hegemon tutoring the new hegemon:

With its empire lost, its armed forces shrunk, and its post-imperial strategic role ambiguous, the complex business of policing foreign lands became a site through which Britons articulated a relationship between the old hegemon and the new.¹²⁵²

Even Americans sometimes engaged with these myths, believing the claims that the British were inherently better suited and more experienced in small wars and nation-building.¹²⁵³ Similar difficulties arose regarding the belief that a key foundation of the relationship was British public support for American policies in exchange for a reasonable degree of British influence over American policies.¹²⁵⁴ Blair did not achieve any of his key aims such as greater multilateralism, a serious focus on the reconstruction of Iraq and including the UN in that process, and a focus on the question of Israel-Palestine.¹²⁵⁵ It also, to at least some extent, shattered the belief that Britain could be the bridge between Europe and America as ‘Britain lost the trust of its European allies in foreign policy, both in its relations with them and as an interlocutor between the US and Europe’.¹²⁵⁶ Thus while 9/11 in many ways brought Britain and America together through a

¹²⁴⁹ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 440.

¹²⁵⁰ Dumbrell, 441.

¹²⁵¹ Dumbrell, 441.

¹²⁵² Porter, “Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship,” 364–65.

¹²⁵³ Porter, 365.

¹²⁵⁴ Dunn, “UK-US Relations After the Three Bs - Blair, Brown and Bush,” 7.

¹²⁵⁵ Dunn, 7.

¹²⁵⁶ Dunn, 7.

shared threat which prompted joint military operations and counter-terrorism cooperation, it also presented the two states with difficulties relating to differing identity-driven strategic perceptions of what role each state should play.

It is perhaps arguable that a third shift is underway in the strategic environment as it relates to the Anglo-American relationship, as while conflict has been ongoing in the Middle East, the war on terror is not a core binding element of the relationship as it was in the early twenty-first century. The shift to the Obama presidency also marked some distinct changes in America's strategic outlook. Obama was America's 'first self-styled 'Pacific President'.¹²⁵⁷ This was most notably evidenced by his pivot to Asia. In this context, growing asymmetry in the relationship also proved problematic. This became particularly clear with the British defence budget cuts which were announced in 2010 as a consequence of the GFC,¹²⁵⁸ as they were severe enough to raise questions of whether Britain would be able to maintain credible interoperability with US forces.¹²⁵⁹ With these weaknesses in the calculative dimension apparent, the early Obama years also saw a decrease in the traditionally expected sentimentality of the relationship, with a series of 'snubgates' and an unwillingness to use the language of 'special' with regards to Britain.¹²⁶⁰ Instead of the "special relationship", Obama preferred the term the "essential relationship".¹²⁶¹ The impact of this on Britain can be seen in the example of one columnist, who questioned why 'the Obama administration can barely conceal its disdain for [Britain]'.¹²⁶² These trends were further reinforced with Obama's re-election in 2012, with Europe assuming that the US would continue to shift towards the Asia-Pacific, demand greater burden-sharing from allies, and have a strong domestic focus.¹²⁶³ At the same time, demonstrating the need to look at all dimensions of trust across the entirety of the bilateral relationship in an expanded application of embedded trust, Obama helped to reset the British public's perceptions of America. Even before his election while campaigning was still underway, a Guardian/ICM poll found him five times more popular than his Republican opponent John McCain.¹²⁶⁴ Polling on how much confidence the British have in the U.S. president saw a jump from 16 per cent in 2008 to 86 per cent per cent in 2009, accompanied by a more modest but still significant jump in favourable views on the U.S. from 53

¹²⁵⁷ Dumbrell, "US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship," 673.

¹²⁵⁸ See Dunn, "UK-US Relations After the Three Bs - Blair, Brown and Bush," 11.

¹²⁵⁹ Dobson and Marsh, "Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?," 674-75.

¹²⁶⁰ Dobson and Marsh, 673-75.

¹²⁶¹ Barack Obama and David Cameron, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference in London, United Kingdom," The White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 25, 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint->

¹²⁶² Con Coughlin, "Obama Gives Britain the Cold Shoulder," *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 2009.

¹²⁶³ Dobson and Marsh, "Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?," 673.

¹²⁶⁴ Melissa Benn, "Why Britain Loves Barack," *Public Finance*, July 18, 2008.

per cent to 69 per cent.¹²⁶⁵ This presents a complicated picture regarding the presence of favourable societal relations and unfavourable government relations, which will be examined in its reverse in the society section as regards Bush, Blair, and Iraq. The complexity highlights the necessity of examining all dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship in order to have a more complete understanding of the nature of trust in Anglo-American relations.

Affective

The calculative dimension of trust may have remained an essential part of the Anglo-American relationship, however managing weaknesses in the calculative dimension and divergences of interests and policy preferences is greatly assisted by the presence of affective trust. This can be seen when examining the differences in success at managing such difficulties during the Clinton-Major relationship when compared to the Clinton-Blair relationship. Clinton and Major did not have a good personal relationship, and this made managing the two key issues which emerged while their leaderships overlapped, the conflict in Bosnia and the Irish peace process, particularly difficult. As a consequence, the relationship languished. Comparatively, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair shared similar “third way” politics, and developed a strong personal relationship grounded in affective trust, demonstrating the importance of personalities, personal relationships, and the political context in which personal relationships form. Blair supported Clinton on both policy and personal matters. The difference a strong relationship of affective trust makes can be seen in the progress made on Irish peace, and the handling of the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict compared to the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict.

A lack of affective trust between Bill Clinton and John Major made managing the changing geopolitical landscape in the early post-Cold War years difficult. The relationship began on a difficult footing, given the fact that British Conservative Party advisers had provided support to George Bush’s 1992 election campaign.¹²⁶⁶ Consequently, U.S. Ambassador to Britain Raymond Seitz described the Clinton-Major relationship as one which existed on a ‘grin-and- bear-it basis’.¹²⁶⁷ As Dobson describes it, during Clinton’s first two years as president ‘there was hardly a single incident or event that one could point to as indicative of close relations’.¹²⁶⁸ One journalist described Clinton and Major as ‘an ocean apart’ and ‘close in age but half a generation apart’.¹²⁶⁹

¹²⁶⁵ See “Global Indicators Database: Opinion of the United States: Do You Have a Favorable or Unfavorable View of the U.S.?,” Pew Research Centre, accessed October 1, 2019, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/231/>.

¹²⁶⁶ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 136.

¹²⁶⁷ Raymond Seitz, *Over Here* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1998), 322.

¹²⁶⁸ Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 164.

¹²⁶⁹ “Bagehot: Major and Clinton, An Ocean Apart,” *The Economist* 325, no. 7789 (December 12, 1992): 66.

There was, without a doubt, a lack of affective trust between the two men. This made it difficult to manage the two most significant issues which emerged during their shared time in office: the conflict in Bosnia, and the Irish peace process. Bosnia was widely viewed as a failure of both U.S. and European policy.¹²⁷⁰ Under Bush, the U.S. had remained of the opinion that it was a European problem, while Europe struggled to mount a cohesive response to the crisis.¹²⁷¹ When America became more involved under Clinton, the policy differences on how to proceed¹²⁷² led John Major to describe Bosnia as a ‘running sore’ in Anglo-American relations.¹²⁷³ Managing the issue proved difficult, and as such attempts at cooperation ‘yielded little evidence of any special understandings between London and Washington’.¹²⁷⁴ Irish issues emerged in the early 1990s ‘as the most public source of tension between London and Washington’.¹²⁷⁵ Clinton took an active role in intervening in the politics of the Irish peace process, which Dumbrell describes as indicating ‘a degree of American insouciance about disturbing the norms of US-UK relations’,¹²⁷⁶ or in other words, breaching previous expectations of trustworthiness. The most prominent instance of this was Clinton granting an American visa to the leader of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams.¹²⁷⁷ This move was publicly opposed by both the British Ambassador to the United States, Robin Renwick, and the American Ambassador to Britain, Raymond Seitz.¹²⁷⁸ The decision upset John Major so significantly that he spent several days ignoring Clinton’s phone calls.¹²⁷⁹ Those who thought the visa was a good idea believed Adams was working for peace, and that a visa would give him the leverage to move the Irish Republican Army (IRA) into the peace process and away from violence.¹²⁸⁰ Those who opposed it did so because Adams had refused to renounce violence and as such it would make the U.S. ‘look soft on terrorism’.¹²⁸¹ Clinton was also warned by the State Department that ‘it could do irreparable damage to our vaunted “special relationship” with Great Britain, including our ability to secure British cooperation on Bosnia and other important matters’.¹²⁸² The fact that Clinton went ahead with what he clearly knew was a breach of expectations, and showed no sensitivity to the desires of Major, is indicative of the lack of trust

¹²⁷⁰ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 129.

¹²⁷¹ Dumbrell, 128–29, 137–39.

¹²⁷² Britain prioritized a peacekeeping approach, while America preferred to condemn Serbian aggression and protect Bosnian Muslims through the use of air strikes and lifting the arms embargo, but refused to commit ground troops to the cause themselves. See Freedman, “Britain at War,” 13.

¹²⁷³ John Major, *John Major: The Autobiography* (London: Harper Collins, 1999), 497.

¹²⁷⁴ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 138.

¹²⁷⁵ Dumbrell, 242.

¹²⁷⁶ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 439.

¹²⁷⁷ For an analysis of this instance, see Timothy J. Lynch, “The Gerry Adams Visa in Anglo-American Relations,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2003): 33–44.

¹²⁷⁸ Webster Fletcher and Philip Martin, “Anglo-US Bid to Avoid Rift over Adams,” *The Times*, February 3, 1994.

¹²⁷⁹ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 580.

¹²⁸⁰ Clinton, 579.

¹²⁸¹ Clinton, 579.

¹²⁸² Clinton, 579.

between them. The lack of affective trust in the relationship between Clinton and Major made it particularly difficult for them to manage crises and negotiate policy differences.

In comparison, the trust which developed between Clinton and Blair aided in keeping the relationship afloat as the two states adjusted to the changed strategic environment. There had been an expectation that Britain would shift away from America following the election of Labor and Tony Blair in 1997, given both the negative perceptions of the enthusiastic Atlanticism of Thatcher and Blair's pro-European stance.¹²⁸³ While Dumbrell argues it was Blair's response to 9/11 which was the main reason the relationship remained important, he also points out that even by the end of Clinton's presidency the relationship was much stronger than had been expected at the beginning of the 1990s.¹²⁸⁴ Blair and Clinton shared a similar political outlook, and were 'joined at the hip as energetic practitioners of 'Third Way' politics'.¹²⁸⁵ In his memoir, Blair describes them as 'political soul-mates'.¹²⁸⁶ Clinton played a significant role in beginning the creation of the 'Third Way' during his chairmanship of the Democratic Leadership Council in the early 1990s, and went on to carry out related policies during his presidency.¹²⁸⁷ Third Way practitioners sought to 'bring about a rebirth of a "radical center" through combining elements of left and right'.¹²⁸⁸ Clinton's policies had inspired Blair in his effort to create a 'New Labour' based on policy centrism.¹²⁸⁹ They developed a warm personal relationship. Clinton describes how after the first meeting between himself and Blair 'we felt like old friends from the start'.¹²⁹⁰ Blair supported Clinton on both a policy level, as with policies regarding the enlargement of NATO, unilateral US bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, and Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998;¹²⁹¹ and on a personal level, as seen with his support during the Monica Lewinsky scandal.¹²⁹² In a notable difference to the tensions in the Clinton-Major period regarding the Irish peace process, 'following Tony Blair's election in 1997, conspicuous tension was transformed into conspicuous cooperation'.¹²⁹³ Another notable difference is the cooperation which took place

¹²⁸³ Norrie MacQueen, "Introduction: The Dimensions of European Security: From Iraq to ... Iraq," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 5, no. 3 (2004): 388.

¹²⁸⁴ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 131.

¹²⁸⁵ Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, "Third Way Leadership, Old Way Government: Blair, Clinton and the Power to Govern," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2001): 36.

¹²⁸⁶ Tony Blair, *A Journey* (London: Hutchinson, 2010), 231.

¹²⁸⁷ Donley T. Studlar, "The Anglo-American Origins and International Diffusion of the 'Third Way,'" *Politics & Policy* 31, no. 1 (2003): 32.

¹²⁸⁸ Studlar, 29.

¹²⁸⁹ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 141; Dobson and Marsh, "Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?," 680.

¹²⁹⁰ Clinton, *My Life*, 756.

¹²⁹¹ Dobson and Marsh, "Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?," 680.

¹²⁹² Clinton, *My Life*, 778.

¹²⁹³ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 242.

during the Kosovo campaign compared to the tensions over handling the conflict in Bosnia.¹²⁹⁴ While there were some differences and tensions over how to handle the conflict, ‘despite difficulties along the way, war had again brought London and Washington closer’.¹²⁹⁵ The enhanced capacity to manage both crises and policy differences over how to manage crises was provided by the trusting relationship which developed between Blair and Clinton, and which helped to ensure that the relationship adapted to the post-Cold War environment and would be able to adapt again to the changes brought by 9/11.

Normative

An examination of the relationship through Lewicki and Bunker’s four indicators reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the normative dimension in the post-Cold War period. The strengths and weaknesses of collective identity will be explored through the tensions which existed in Britain’s attempts to be an ‘Atlantic bridge’ between Europe and America, and how the failure of those attempts led to it landing more on the Atlanticist side of identity rather than the European. The indicators of colocation and joint product or goal will both be examined in the context of the war on terror, which of course saw physical colocation on the battlefield but also saw limitations driven by different strategic cultures and priorities. These differences draw on themes discussed in the calculative section relating to intervention, as the war on terror saw an American prioritisation of military victory while the British remained focused on the peacekeeping aspect of the conflict. Shared values were also clearly present in the war on terror, notably between the two leaders Tony Blair and George W. Bush who viewed it as a war for freedom, democracy, and civilisation. On the other hand, differences over the means to achieve these overarching values did exist. Despite weaknesses, the normative dimension of trust is clearly present in the post-Cold War Anglo-American relationship to a significant degree, and along with the strengths of the calculative and affective dimensions helped the relationship to adapt to strategic changes and challenges.

The extent to which collective identity was present in the post-Cold War period can be understood through an examination of the tensions in Britain’s attempts to balance its relationships with Europe and America, and style itself as an ‘Atlantic bridge’ between them. Just as the end of the Cold War heralded commentary concerning the future of Anglo-American relations, it also prompted existential fears regarding NATO and transatlantic relations broadly which, in turn, also shaped Anglo-American relations. Britain has often understood itself to be the ‘Atlantic bridge’ between Europe and America, and the Cold War had significant consequences for how this

¹²⁹⁴ Gideon Rachman, “Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?,” *Washington Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2001): 9.

¹²⁹⁵ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 147.

concept would shape British strategic culture. John Major stated in his autobiography that ‘we straddled the divide between the United States and Europe’.¹²⁹⁶ Gordon Brown stated that where America is seen as enterprising but not fair, and Europe *vice versa*, Britain could combine the two and ‘be more than a bridge between Europe and America’, becoming a ‘beacon’ for both.¹²⁹⁷ It was seen by both Britain and America that Britain having an influential role in Europe aids the ongoing existence of the “special relationship” and heightens Britain’s influence in Washington.¹²⁹⁸ A British diplomat, Mariot Leslie, described it as ‘Britain will only be heard in Washington if it is heard in Paris and Bonn’.¹²⁹⁹ Both Britain and America also viewed NATO favourably in the 1990s, despite assumptions of pending collapse, with NATO being used as ‘a vector for the extension of western values by the integration of former adversaries into the European security architecture’.¹³⁰⁰ The difficulties of waging ‘war by committee’ in Kosovo contributed to the US rejection of the full extent of NATO’s offer of aid following 9/11.¹³⁰¹ Svendsen refers to British policy prior to Iraq as ‘dual-track’ with Europe and America each forming a track, however the Iraq War pushed Britain toward having to choose between the European or American policies and greatly limited Britain’s capacity to continue its ‘dual-track’ foreign policy.¹³⁰² While the initial 9/11 attacks and commencement of the war on terror in Afghanistan initially aided in bringing Europe and America together against ‘attacks which were perceived as ‘anti-western’ rather than specifically ‘anti- American’’, blurring the line between Europeanist and Atlanticist, Iraq re-established that line.¹³⁰³ This is seen in the rejection of Blair as the Atlantic Bridge by France and Germany in particular following the onset of the Iraq War.¹³⁰⁴ Flockhart adds to this description of difference in European and American outlooks in the post-9/11 period, arguing that America viewed its foreign policy as a return to ‘normal politics’, where Europe viewed America’s actions as a departure from ‘normal politics’.¹³⁰⁵ Britain was caught in the middle of these two perspectives, favouring interventionism but not unilateralism. In other words, ‘willing to act when

¹²⁹⁶ Major, *John Major: The Autobiography*, 578.

¹²⁹⁷ Gordon Brown, “Full Text: Gordon Brown’s Speech,” *The Guardian*, September 29, 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/sep/29/labourconference.labour1>; Gordon Brown was more effective as an Atlantic Bridge than Tony Blair, partly because he was not trying to market himself as a bridge as Blair had, and partly because of the personal relationships he developed with American Democrats. See Philip Gannon, “The Bridge That Blair Built: David Cameron and the Transatlantic Relationship,” *British Politics* 9, no. 2 (2014): 215.

¹²⁹⁸ Rachman, “Is the Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?,” 11.

¹²⁹⁹ Gillian Staerck, “The Role of the British Embassy in Washington,” *Contemporary British History* 12, no. 3 (1998): 128.

¹³⁰⁰ Trine Flockhart, “Trans-Atlantic Relations After the War in Iraq: Returning to - or Departing from - ‘Normal Politics’?,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 5, no. 3 (2004): 398.

¹³⁰¹ Flockhart, 401–2.

¹³⁰² Adam D. M. Svendsen, “Exemplary ‘Friends and Allies’? Unpacking UK-US Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 4 (2011): 354.

¹³⁰³ MacQueen, “Introduction: The Dimensions of European Security: From Iraq to ... Iraq,” 389.

¹³⁰⁴ Gannon, “The Bridge That Blair Built: David Cameron and the Transatlantic Relationship,” 214.

¹³⁰⁵ Flockhart, “Trans-Atlantic Relations After the War in Iraq: Returning to - or Departing from - ‘Normal Politics’?,” 396.

necessary, but anxious that intervention carry international legitimacy'.¹³⁰⁶ Britain's propensity to lean toward the American side of the equation led Dunne to describe 'the fault-line' of Atlanticism as running 'through the English Channel, not the Atlantic'.¹³⁰⁷ While the tensions and difficulties Britain faced in being in the middle of Europe and America indicate limitations, their tendency to fall on the American side of the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide demonstrates the strengths of collective identity as an indicator of normative trust in the post-Cold War period.

While Britain and America cooperated on a number of matters throughout the post-Cold War period which saw them colocated in pursuit of a joint product or goal, this paragraph will focus on both collocation and the creation of a joint product or goal as they relate to the war on terror. Britain and America were, of course, once more colocated on the battlefield. They were also colocated in the social construction of the "west", although this had limits as seen above in the discussion on transatlantic relations. The speed and scope of Britain's support for the United States and the military cooperation on the ground are a significant indicator of collocation, and the shared aims of succeeding in the "war on terror" and achieving military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen as joint goals. There are, however, limits to both indicators. This has been seen in the description of the differing strategic cultures with regards to intervention described in the calculative section. These differences played out again in Afghanistan. The U.S. was overtly focused on the military response to 9/11, and they had overwhelming control over the decisions made regarding how military action would proceed in Afghanistan.¹³⁰⁸ As Dumbrell describes, 'near-public rows broke out between London and Washington over post-war reconstruction'.¹³⁰⁹ Blair was committed to the idea of humanitarian-based intervention, while the Americans were more focused on military victory and finding Osama bin Laden.¹³¹⁰ When the British proposed a peacekeeping force of 25,000 troops across all major cities in Afghanistan in 2002, the Americans feared that peacekeepers deployed across the country would interfere with their counterterrorist operations and the British were forced to compromise on 5000 peacekeepers located in Kabul only.¹³¹¹ As the conflict continued, the primary British focus shifted from peacekeeping to protecting their troops which caused a different set of frictions in the relationship with America. This followed the deployment of British troops to Helmand province in 2006,

¹³⁰⁶ Stephens, "The Special Relationship and Foreign Policy: Panel Chairman's Report," 40.

¹³⁰⁷ Tim Dunne, "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy," *International Affairs* 80, no. 5 (2004): 909.

¹³⁰⁸ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 153.

¹³⁰⁹ Dumbrell, 153.

¹³¹⁰ Warren Chin, "Anglo American Military Cooperation in Afghanistan 2001-2014," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 15, no. 2 (2017): 128.

¹³¹¹ Chin, 128-29.

which saw an increase in deaths from only five between 2001 and 2005 to thirty-seven in 2006, forty-two in 2007, fifty-one in 2008, and in the worst year of the conflict one hundred and eight deaths in 2009.¹³¹² This led to the British focusing solely on tactical issues in Helmand province with their primary concern being to avoid casualties, while the U.S. focused more on the wider strategic and operational landscape of the conflict.¹³¹³ Another key difference in priorities emerged with regards to counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, which at times ‘led to something approaching diplomatic warfare between London and Washington’.¹³¹⁴ The British preferred a strategy of compensating opium farmers for eradicating their crops rather than the aerial eradication tactics promoted by parts of the U.S. administration which the British feared would upset rural Afghans and damage their ‘hearts and minds’ campaign.¹³¹⁵ Thus while indicators for colocation and a joint goal or product are clearly present in the military cooperation and broad strategic goals in Afghanistan, there are significant limitations driven by differences in strategic culture and priorities.

These differences in strategic culture and priorities were also, in part, driven by differences in shared values. Thus, shared values, too, provide insight into both the strengths and weaknesses of the normative dimension of trust in the post-Cold War period, and contribute to the explanation for why it was so common for Britain and America to agree on an end goal in a situation but differ on the best means to achieve that goal. This has been seen above with regards to differences over handling Afghanistan, and can also be seen in differing approaches to terrorism and the war on terror more generally. Both Blair and Bush viewed the war as a global war for democracy and freedom.¹³¹⁶ These are values they clearly shared and which were, at least at the outset of the war on terror, supported by a majority of the two societies and governments. Shared values also existed relating to the need to avoid appeasing dictators lest the 1930s repeat themselves.¹³¹⁷ This

¹³¹² “UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events,” BBC News, December 22, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35159951>.

¹³¹³ Chin, “Anglo American Military Cooperation in Afghanistan 2001-2014,” 130.

¹³¹⁴ Philip A. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan: Anglo-American Friction over Aerial Poppy Eradication, 2004-2007,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 29, no. 2 (2018): 275.

¹³¹⁵ For details of tensions over the aerial eradication of poppies. see Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan: Anglo-American Friction over Aerial Poppy Eradication, 2004-2007.”

¹³¹⁶ Blair described it as ‘a struggle that concerns us all, the whole of the democratic and civilized and free world’. Bush described it as: ‘This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom’. See George W. Bush and Tony Blair, “Remarks With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom and an Exchange With Reporters,” The American Presidency Project, September 20, 2001, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-with-prime-minister-tony-blair-the-united-kingdom-and-exchange-with-reporters>; George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” The American Presidency Project, September 20, 2001, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-united-states-response-the-terrorist-attacks>.

¹³¹⁷ For example, Blair talking about Kosovo stated that “we have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work”. Blair, “The Blair Doctrine”; For how the 1930s shaped George Bush and Margaret

contributed to the swift Anglo-American cooperation in the Gulf War and in the war on terror. The strength of shared values can be seen in the extent to which Britain found itself isolated from Europe,¹³¹⁸ having strayed from its tendency to share more values with Europe than with America.¹³¹⁹ Of course, strong public and parliamentary opposition to the Iraq War demonstrates that this was not true for all. Differences became particularly acute during the Iraq War, following revelations that the U.S. was using extraordinary renditions and intensive interrogation techniques.¹³²⁰ These techniques, along with the differing prioritisations of peacekeeping and counterterrorism in Afghanistan, are reflective of the different value placed on the war on terror. Namely, that for the U.S. it was a war, whereas for the British it touched on a longer history of managing terrorism and peacekeeping operations.¹³²¹ Not only shared values, but compatible values helped to maintain trust in the relationship following the end of the Cold War. Britain valued the need to be a global actor and ‘punch above its weight’, which was perceived to require a “special relationship” with America through which to influence the world.¹³²² America valued the political and military support it received from Britain as a result these values. As with collective identity, creation of a joint product or goal, and colocation, an examination of shared values in post-Cold War Anglo-American relations reveals both strengths and weaknesses. These strengths and weaknesses are apparent in the cooperation and tension in the relationship across the leadership, defence, intelligence, nuclear, and societal relationships as will be examined below.

The Domains of the Relationship

Leaders and Government

The relationship between Blair and Bush demonstrates that the calculative dimension of trust can bring leaders unexpected to have a good relationship together, and enable them to forge bonds of trust. To understand their relationship, this section will first examine the perceptions of each man separately, focusing on Blair’s interventionism and Bush’s belief in ensuring American primacy and using it to spread democracy. Their relationship began on a relatively good footing even prior to 9/11, despite expectations that it would struggle owing to Blair’s closeness with Clinton. It was, however, 9/11 which truly brought them together. Blair’s support for Bush and for America was swift and large in scope. He became America’s unofficial second secretary of state, using

Thatcher in deciding on military action in the Gulf War see Scot Macdonald, “Hitler’s Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 13, no. 4 (2002): 29–59.

¹³¹⁸ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 154.

¹³¹⁹ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 443.

¹³²⁰ Adam D. M. Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 72.

¹³²¹ See, for example, Svendsen, 63.

¹³²² See, for example, Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: The Lazarus of International Relations.”

shuttle diplomacy to build a coalition for the war on terror to be launched in Afghanistan. An examination of these men and their relationship demonstrates the significant impact that individuals can have on a relationship, and that the calculative dimension of trust can bring unlikely individuals together and facilitate the development of an unexpected trusting relationship.

To understand the relationship between Blair and Bush in the context of the war on terror, it is first necessary to understand the perceptions and motivations of each man. The literature widely contends that as an individual Blair, in particular, played a significant role even in the context of the historical roles of British prime ministers and American presidents.¹³²³ A key element in understanding Blair is his view on interventionism outlined earlier. This is a view which was clearly present prior to 9/11, although there were key changes to that initial doctrine: the tone of interventionism changed from being morally uplifting and positive to a darker, pessimistic need to fight against “mortal danger”; the need to adapt his language to a more good versus evil style to fit in with Bush compared to Clinton; and a move away from outlining the positive opportunities of interdependence to the need for interdependence given the new risks of a post 9/11 world.¹³²⁴ These changes can be seen in his statement that the war on terror was a ‘clash of civilisations’,¹³²⁵ and the fact that ‘no European leader of his generation speaks so unblushingly of good and evil’.¹³²⁶ His beliefs were shaped in part by his religious conviction, ‘derived from an Anglo-Catholic muscular, Christian reforming outlook’.¹³²⁷ Combined with his belief in the need to intervene in the context of globalisation and interdependence, his moral perspective on human rights violations and intervention, his view of 9/11 as a turning point in history, and his belief that Britain could best exercise influence via its relationship with the U.S., this resulted in what has been referred to as ‘liberal hawkism’.¹³²⁸ Danchev neatly sums up these factors in his statement that ‘doing good in the world is for Blair an ethical imperative and a practical necessity’.¹³²⁹ This

¹³²³ For example, Dumbrell argues that ‘Blair’s personal Atlanticist vision constitutes the central and necessary component of the contemporary “Special Relationship”’, Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 445; He also argues that because of ‘Blair’s own beliefs about international politics and about the obligations and opportunities of the Special Relationship’, agency trumps structure regarding the British response to 9/11. Dumbrell, “US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship,” 275; Dyson argues that that ‘a convincing explanation of British foreign policy from 1997 to 2007 must take full account of the personality of Tony Blair’. Stephen Benedict Dyson, *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 2.

¹³²⁴ David Runciman, *The Politics of Good Intentions: History, Fear and Hypocrisy in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 14–18.

¹³²⁵ Dumbrell, “US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship,” 276.

¹³²⁶ Alex Danchev, “Tony Blair’s Vietnam: The Iraq War and the ‘Special Relationship’ in Historical Perspective,” *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 191.

¹³²⁷ Dumbrell, “US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship,” 276.

¹³²⁸ Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” 445–46.

¹³²⁹ Danchev, “Tony Blair’s Vietnam: The Iraq War and the ‘Special Relationship’ in Historical Perspective,” 192.

is something clearly echoed in Blair's speeches:

... tension exists in the two views of international affairs. One is utilitarian: each nation maximises its own self-interest. The other is utopian: we try to create a better world. Today I want to suggest that more than ever before those two views are merging. I advocate an enlightened self-interest that puts fighting for our values right at the heart of the politics necessary to protect our nations. Engagement in the world on the basis of these values, not isolation from it, is the hard-headed pragmatism for the 21st century ...¹³³⁰

Dyson outlines two distinctive cognitive features of Blair which drove these trends: a high belief in his personal ability to have control over events, and low conceptual complexity geared towards viewing the world in dichotomous black-and-white terms.¹³³¹ His approach to policy was also shaped by his "sofa style" of leadership, describing his preference for working outside the traditional lines of influence of the FCO.¹³³² All of these factors contribute to explaining the significant individual role Blair played in shaping Anglo-American relations during his tenure as prime minister, particularly following 9/11.

Much as Blair had his Blair doctrine, so too did Bush have his Bush doctrine. The Bush doctrine has variably been described as 'democratic realism, democratic imperialism, Republican realism, expansive internationalism, conservative internationalism, liberal internationalism, and crusading realism.'¹³³³ The Bush doctrine is underwritten by a belief in American primacy, both in terms of power and in terms of morality:

The belief that America should come first, both in its own interests and in the world's – because America has a special vocation to be the world's beacon of liberty and opportunity – has come swelling to the fore in a new surge of patriotism and unilateralism.¹³³⁴

As with Blair, views on globalisation fed into the Bush doctrine. Both espoused a clear link between free trade, the pinnacle of globalisation, and the essence of human freedom more broadly.¹³³⁵ Bush viewed free trade and openness not only in economic terms, but also as 'moral concepts that guaranteed freedom'.¹³³⁶ This is outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy

¹³³⁰ Tony Blair, "Full Text of Tony Blair's Speech in Texas," *The Guardian*, April 8, 2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/apr/08/foreignpolicy.iraq>.

¹³³¹ Stephen Benedict Dyson, "What Difference Did He Make? Tony Blair and British Foreign Policy from 1997-2007," in *The Blair Legacy: Politics, Policy, Governance, and Foreign Affairs*, ed. Terrence Casey (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 237.

¹³³² McCausland, "When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - Defense Policy and the Special Relationship: Panel Chairman's Report," 463.

¹³³³ Lamont Colucci, "The Bush Doctrine and the Anglo-American Special Relationship," *Defence & Security Analysis* 25, no. 2 (2009): 195.

¹³³⁴ Will Hutton, *The World We're In* (London: Little, Brown, 2002), 352.

¹³³⁵ Jeremy Moses, "Liberal Internationalist Discourse and the Use of Force: Blair, Bush and Beyond," *International Politics* 47, no. 1 (2010): 34.

¹³³⁶ Moses, 34.

which pointed out that free trade began as a moral principle and remained a moral principle.¹³³⁷ A key thread running through the Bush doctrine is the belief in the universalism of these values, the belief that ‘moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place’.¹³³⁸ This is reflected again in the National Security Strategy which states that ‘the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere’.¹³³⁹ As a consequence, providing free trade, free and open societies, democracy, liberty, and freedom, even by force, would create a ‘just peace’ and ensure that ‘the American flag will stand not only for our power, but for freedom’.¹³⁴⁰ As with Blair, the Bush doctrine has origins prior to 9/11. Patricia Dunmire, for example, argues that 9/11 served to stabilise and legitimise pre-existing post-Cold War ideas regarding the promotion of US economic, political, and military supremacy.¹³⁴¹ 9/11 certainly changed the structural context, however, with the most noticeable change being the extent to which the U.S. was prepared to take unilateral pre-emptive action and preventative war.¹³⁴² The individual outlooks of Blair and Bush had a significant impact on their responses to 9/11, and the relationship that would develop between them as a consequence.

Despite Bush’s attempts to distance himself from Blair and Clinton’s legacy, the relationship between Blair and Bush began on a reasonable footing. While Bush initially made it clear he was going to focus on the Western hemisphere first, Blair was the first European leader to visit and in a sign he meant to ensure the relationship went smoothly Bush made sure to take him to Camp David.¹³⁴³ While both sides were eager to prove their relationship would be able to stand up to the Clinton-Blair relationship, it appears that the informality of the meeting and the time spent together helped to establish a solid foundation.¹³⁴⁴ Knowing they would have differences over the New Europe Force, the two showed sensitivity toward each other’s domestic needs and released a statement halfway in between their two positions.¹³⁴⁵ Although it may be apocryphal, if true

¹³³⁷ “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” 2002, 18.

¹³³⁸ George W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” The White House, June 1, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

¹³³⁹ “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” 3.

¹³⁴⁰ Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point.”

¹³⁴¹ See Patricia L. Dunmire, “‘9/11 Changed Everything’: An Intertextual Analysis of the Bush Doctrine,” *Discourse & Society* 20, no. 2 (2009): 195–222.

¹³⁴² Alexander Wolf, “US Interventions Abroad: A Renaissance of the Powell Doctrine?,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 4 (2009): 130–33; For an outline of how the pre-existing elements of these ideologies in both states came together following 9/11, see Stuart Elden, “Blair, Neo-Conservatism and the War on Territorial Integrity,” *International Politics* 44, no. 1 (2007): 37–57.

¹³⁴³ David E. Sanger, “Bush Goes Global With Campaign Style,” *New York Times*, January 30, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/30/world/bush-goes-global-with-campaign-style.html>.

¹³⁴⁴ David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Blair He Doesn’t Oppose New Europe Force,” *New York Times*, February 24, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/24/world/bush-tells-blair-he-doesn-t-oppose-new-europe-force.html>.

¹³⁴⁵ David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Blair He Doesn’t Oppose New Europe Force,” *New York Times*, February 24, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/24/world/bush-tells-blair-he-doesn-t-oppose-new-europe-force.html>.

further empathy was demonstrated later by Bush when he gave Blair the chance to opt out of military action in Iraq, as he understood the political cost to Blair in pursuing such action.¹³⁴⁶ It was, however, 9/11 and the onset of the war on terror which truly brought the two leaders together, demonstrating the impact of structural shifts and the calculative dimension of trust in facilitating opportunities for the further development of trust.

A good relationship between Blair and Bush was not expected, given both their significant political differences and Blair's close relationship with Bush's predecessor, highlighting the fact that sometimes structural shifts in the strategic environment can be a driving force in the creation of strong interpersonal relations between leaders. At the same time, agency comes strongly back into the equation, given Blair's personal role as outlined above, as well as a significant degree of compatibility in the way in which the two leaders viewed the world and their place in it. Prior to 9/11, Bush and Blair had not possessed a particularly close relationship given that Bush sought to distinguish himself from Clinton, in part through distancing himself from Blair.¹³⁴⁷ While even under Clinton the US had been dismissive of multilateralism, this was amplified under Bush with the rise of unilateralism, increased focus on economic rivalries, and suspicion of European integration.¹³⁴⁸ While the approaches of the two leaders coincided to justify military intervention, significant tensions existed between the two approaches.¹³⁴⁹ Where the source of Blair's interventionism was internationalist, the source of Bush's was nationalist in nature.¹³⁵⁰ As Dumbrell points out, however, although British liberal hawkism and American neoconservatism are not the same, there are some areas of convergence.¹³⁵¹ Jeremy Moses argues that the two shared a group of core liberal principles centred on globalisation, humanitarianism, and democracy as justifications for war.¹³⁵² Additionally, just as Blair saw the need for a reconfiguration of the traditional understanding of Westphalian state sovereignty, the Bush doctrine promoted the need to 'stand firmly for ... limits on the absolute power of the state'.¹³⁵³ Furthermore, Inderjeet Parmar outlines a range of shared outlooks and similarities in backgrounds: a belief that the 1990s had been a period of drift and missed opportunities which resulted in 9/11; a similar privileged, private school education in religious schools; the role of their religiosity in both their personal and political lives; a shared 'sense of historical mission and duty';

¹³⁴⁶ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 338.

¹³⁴⁷ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 148.

¹³⁴⁸ Dumbrell, 149.

¹³⁴⁹ Peter Riddell, "Tony Blair Needs a Hug," *Foreign Policy* Nov/Dec (2003): 90.

¹³⁵⁰ Riddell, 90.

¹³⁵¹ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 152.

¹³⁵² Moses, "Liberal Internationalist Discourse and the Use of Force: Blair, Bush and Beyond," 30.

¹³⁵³ "The National Security Strategy of the United States," 3.

a desire to create a new world order driven by neo-imperial beliefs; and a shared ‘evangelical vigour, missionary zeal, and an almost Manichean division of the world into friends and enemies, good and evil’.¹³⁵⁴ The compatibility of these perspectives, combined with Blair’s view on the need to exert British influence on the global stage via the “special relationship”, inclined both the two men and the two states toward a similar response to 9/11.

9/11 had a dramatic impact on the international system and on the interests and strategic perceptions of Britain and America. Blair was the most prominent international leader in his diplomatic response to 9/11:

Blair’s diplomatic skills in this immediate post-attack period were extraordinary. Within days, the personal diplomacy side of the ‘special relationship’ was revitalized. Blair became favourite foreign leader in Washington, rivalled only by cooperative leaders of ‘front line’ Moslem states.¹³⁵⁵

While, as Azabuike highlights, the architecture of the “special relationship” played a significant role in inclining Britain towards supporting America, the greatest support came from Blair personally with his ‘impressive shuttle diplomacy and function as America’s super-ambassador’.¹³⁵⁶ Indeed, senior American officials expected Britain to contribute troops even before Britain had committed to do so.¹³⁵⁷ This was partly because he had ‘become the most forceful advocate of bold action by the West, the most vocal cheerleader in Europe for standing firmly with the United States’.¹³⁵⁸ Bush’s aides reported that he found Blair more accessible than other European leaders.¹³⁵⁹ Blair’s role as ‘almost a second secretary of state of the United States’¹³⁶⁰ continued following the beginning of military action in Afghanistan, being referred to as ‘face of [the] Coalition’ as he met with Arab leaders in an attempt to reassure them that the war was against terrorism rather than Islam.¹³⁶¹ Blair gained the trust of America and Bush

¹³⁵⁴ Inderjeet Parmar, “‘I’m Proud of the British Empire’: Why Tony Blair Backs George W. Bush,” *Political Quarterly* 76, no. 2 (2005): 228–30.

¹³⁵⁵ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 151.

¹³⁵⁶ Samuel Azabuike, “Sugar Coating Interest with Morality - From 9/11 to the Gates of Baghdad: The Anglo-American Special Relationship and Continual British Support for US Foreign Policy,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 3, no. 10 (2006): 90.

¹³⁵⁷ Jane Perlez, “A Nation Challenged: Europeans,” *New York Times*, September 18, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/18/world/nation-challenged-europeans-blair-chirac-head-us-for-talks-show-unity.html>.

¹³⁵⁸ Warren Hoge, “Blair as Statesman Outshines Politician,” *New York Times*, September 20, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/20/world/blair-as-statesman-outshines-politician.html>.

¹³⁵⁹ Warren Hoge, “Blair as Statesman Outshines Politician,” *New York Times*, September 20, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/20/world/blair-as-statesman-outshines-politician.html>.

¹³⁶⁰ Andrew Sullivan, “The Way We Live Now: 11-4-01; United Nations,” *New York Times*, November 4, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-11-4-01-united-nations.html>.

¹³⁶¹ Susan Sachs, “A Nation Challenged: Diplomacy,” *New York Times*, October 12, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/12/world/a-nation-challenged-diplomacy-blair-as-face-of-coalition-ends-tour-of-arab-world.html>.

through his ‘willingness to be a shadow ambassador trusted by the United States to outline its goals to governments that don’t trust Washington’.¹³⁶² By November 8 Bush and Blair ‘stood side by side at the White House as unwavering allies joined by war, national self-interests and ... a growing personal chemistry’.¹³⁶³ Whereas other leaders were brought together by their personal chemistry and relationship, this is a case where the calculative dimension of trust was the core which facilitated the further growth of trust in their relationship over time.

Military and Defence

Military

The need to cooperate on a sudden crisis of shared interests when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 brought Britain and America together. Due to sheer happenstance, Thatcher was in America when the invasion occurred, and this gave her and Bush the opportunity to reset a relationship which had been rocky. This section will begin by discussing their interactions in the early days of the crisis, and how their relationship and decisions were shaped by similarities in their strategic perceptions. Their cooperation was an important component of the creation of a military coalition, aided greatly by Bush’s personal telephone diplomacy,¹³⁶⁴ which led to firstly the Desert Shield operation to prevent Iraqi forces continuing on to Saudi Arabia, and secondly the Desert Storm military action to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Once military action began, it gave military leaders and personnel the opportunity to develop trust with one another and shape political and strategic decisions. The most notable individual on the ground was the American General Norman Schwarzkopf, and the most notable relationship between military leaders was between him and British General Peter de la Billière. The interrelated ways in which trusting relationships at the leadership level and trusting relationships at the military level interact demonstrates the interplay of the dimensions of trust across bilateral relationships.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait sparked a joint military response from America and its allies, which saw the strengthening of the Anglo-American relationship. The sudden need for military action on a matter of shared interests, combined with the fact that Thatcher was with Bush when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred, prompted close cooperation. Bush himself remarked at a National Security Council meeting that: ‘It’s fortunate Mrs. Thatcher is at Aspen. I am glad we are seeing

¹³⁶² Warren Hoge, “A Nation Challenged: London,” *New York Times*, October 28, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/28/world/nation-challenged-london-though-praise-may-be-muted-home-blair-shines-brightly.html>.

¹³⁶³ Elisabeth Bumiller, “A Nation Challenged: Britain,” *New York Times*, November 8, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/08/world/a-nation-challenged-britain-bush-and-blair-trade-praise-at-white-house-love-fest.html>.

¹³⁶⁴ See Jeffrey Crean, “War on the Line: Telephone Diplomacy in the Making and Maintenance of the Desert Storm Coalition,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 26, no. 1 (2015): 124–38.

eye-to-eye. Important that she plans. She shared her views 100 percent with me'.¹³⁶⁵ The decision to take military action in response was significantly shaped by the strategic perceptions of Bush and Thatcher. While Thatcher was replaced with John Major before military action began, her decision to support Bush initially makes her strategic outlook the one to focus on. MacDonald demonstrates how the perceptions of both in planning how to proceed were informed by lessons of the 1930s, with Bush additionally drawing on lessons from Vietnam and Thatcher from the Falklands.¹³⁶⁶ Both framed the invasion through the lens of the lessons of appeasement from the 1930s, and compared Hussein to Hitler.¹³⁶⁷ The lessons of Vietnam drove Bush to use overwhelming force in fear of becoming stuck in a drawn out, expensive conflict.¹³⁶⁸ Falklands meant that Thatcher and the British were less concerned as they viewed the Iraq army as being more on par with Argentina's forces in 1982 which were defeated with relative ease.¹³⁶⁹ Thatcher recalls in her memoirs that when Bush first asked her opinion at Aspen she told him that 'aggressors must never be appeased' owing to the lessons of the 1930s, and warned of the consequences of Saddam Hussein continuing into Saudi Arabia and subsequently having control of 65 per cent of the world's oil reserves.¹³⁷⁰ She also made clear Britain's utility to the United States, both owing to her experience in the Falklands War and the 'bonds of trust' she had established with many Gulf state rulers.¹³⁷¹ The British Ambassador to the United States, Antony Acland, reflected in an interview that Bush 'derived enormous encouragement and support from the fact that she agreed with his policy', and that she made it clear that if negotiations to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait failed and America had to commit troops, so too would Britain.¹³⁷² Acland goes further and argues that the British role meant that the Americans 'realised again that, when the chips were down, there was only one wholly reliable ally, and that was Britain – both reliable politically and competent militarily'.¹³⁷³ The similarities in the strategic perceptions of Bush and Thatcher, and the trust they were able to develop through consulting on the matter, set the scene for ongoing diplomatic, political, and military cooperation throughout the Gulf War.

While Britain was far from being the only member of the military coalition which took part in

¹³⁶⁵ "Meeting of the NSC Meeting: NSC Meeting on the Persian Gulf," August 3, 1990, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110701>.

¹³⁶⁶ See Macdonald, "Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait."

¹³⁶⁷ Macdonald, 31–32.

¹³⁶⁸ Macdonald, 30–35.

¹³⁶⁹ Macdonald, 30–35.

¹³⁷⁰ Margaret Thatcher, "Gulf War: Visiting Aspen [Memoirs Extract]," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed April 26, 2019, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110709>.

¹³⁷¹ Margaret Thatcher, "Gulf War: Visiting Aspen [Memoirs Extract]," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed April 26, 2019, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/110709>.

¹³⁷² Staerck, "The Role of the British Embassy in Washington," 118–19.

¹³⁷³ Staerck, 120.

the Gulf War, its role had a significant impact on Anglo-American relations. The British force totalled roughly 40,000, which meant that almost a quarter of the British army was involved.¹³⁷⁴ This ‘ensured that the Americans recognized the reality behind the rhetoric of the Special Relationship’.¹³⁷⁵ It was the largest European contribution, and Britain’s largest foreign deployment of troops since the Second World War.¹³⁷⁶ This meant they formed the fourth largest military contribution out of the thirty-one members of the coalition, after the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.¹³⁷⁷ In a demonstration of the interwoven nature of the bilateral relationship, where first political leaders influenced military action, once military action had commenced the military began to influence political and military decisions. While the actions of individual military personnel and the relationships developed between personnel and commanders are always important, they were given more room here as politicians knew that political micro-management of military decisions had been a significant impediment in Vietnam and therefore ‘the military commanders would not have their hands tied’.¹³⁷⁸ The British Air Vice Marshal Andrew Wilson, for example, was able to convince his government to send an additional offensive strike aircraft, and convince the British Chief of Defence staff to pressure the Americans to tighten their rules of engagement.¹³⁷⁹ Similarly, when the British government showed reluctance to commit ground troops, army leader Field Marshal John Chapple lobbied to ensure army participation owing to fears of budget cuts if they did not prove their worth.¹³⁸⁰ It is also notable that while initial cooperation had been government driven, service-level cooperation was also facilitated on the ground. Andrew Wilson committed the armoured brigade to collaboration with the U.S. Marines, and the commander of the brigade, Brigadier Patrick Cordingly, was given control to determine how to integrate them into the American command structure and decided to place them under the command of the American Brigadier General Myatt.¹³⁸¹ The interwoven relationship between the role of political leaders and the role of military leaders in deciding how the conflict would proceed demonstrates the need to understand the ways in which trust was flowing across the breadth of the bilateral relationship.

The on-the-ground collaboration between militaries is particularly apparent in the relationship

¹³⁷⁴ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 347.

¹³⁷⁵ Dickie, “Special” No More: *Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*, 1994, 225.

¹³⁷⁶ Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leggold, and Danny Unger, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 53.

¹³⁷⁷ Clive Jones and John Stone, “Britain and the Arabian Gulf: New Perspectives on Strategic Influence,” *International Relations* 13, no. 4 (1997): 7.

¹³⁷⁸ Woodward, *The Commanders: The Pentagon and the First Gulf War, 1989-1991*, 347.

¹³⁷⁹ Marc R. DeVore, “Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and the British and French Responses to the 1991 Gulf War,” *Comparative Strategy* 31, no. 1 (2012): 63.

¹³⁸⁰ DeVore, 63.

¹³⁸¹ DeVore, 64.

between the British General Peter de la Billière and American General Norman Schwarzkopf, who developed a close working relationship.¹³⁸² De la Billière describes in his memoirs how ‘from the moment I walked into his [Schwarzkopf’s] office, everything came right between us’.¹³⁸³ Most notably, they negotiated an accord which allowed for them to exchange information that neither could pass on to their political superiors:

I quickly decided that the only thing to do was to establish a frank and open relationship with Schwarzkopf. He and I were going to have to trust each other completely and tell each other what was going on, even if it meant, on occasion, sharing information which our own governments might have preferred to keep to themselves. Without such an understanding ... we would never have built up the trust necessary for taking major decisions.¹³⁸⁴

There was significant asymmetry in the relationship, given the asymmetry in the American and British roles in the conflict. As the American Commander-in-Chief and the one responsible for drawing up the operational plans for Desert Storm, Schwarzkopf was the leading military figure in the conflict.¹³⁸⁵ As with the political leaders, Schwarzkopf too was heavily influenced by the lessons of Vietnam, particularly considering he had been involved in the Vietnam War. This manifested most significantly in his concern of military planning and freedom of action being overly impeded by political pressures which then harmed the success of the mission.¹³⁸⁶ Piercey outlines how this fear led him to shape the political context to minimise political interference, through efforts to maintain the strengths of the military coalition and frequent personal interaction with the press to ensure politicians did not mispresent matters to the press and cause public opinion to become problematic.¹³⁸⁷ Public information management was particularly important, given the status of the Gulf War as ‘the first information war’¹³⁸⁸ owing to its extensive reporting which meant that ‘public communications consumed twice as much communications satellite band width reporting the war as the military did in fighting it’.¹³⁸⁹ While his most significant coalition work related to managing cultural tensions between British and Saudi troops,¹³⁹⁰ he also showed sensitivity to British political needs. This was aided by the relationship between him and Billière.

¹³⁸² Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 208.

¹³⁸³ General Peter de la Billière, *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War* (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 39.

¹³⁸⁴ de la Billière, 39–40.

¹³⁸⁵ For an outline of Schwarzkopf’s plan, see Woodward, *The Commanders: The Pentagon and the First Gulf War, 1989-1991*, 345–49.

¹³⁸⁶ John N. L. Morrison, “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq,” *Intelligence and National Security* 26, no. 4 (2011): 6.

¹³⁸⁷ Morrison, 10–11.

¹³⁸⁸ Alan D. Campen, *The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War* (Fairfax: AFCEA International Press, 1992).

¹³⁸⁹ Swain, *Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm*, xxxi.

¹³⁹⁰ Morrison, “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq,” 8–9.

In an interview Billière describes his close interaction with Schwarzkopf:

... I saw Norman Schwarzkopf every day of the week, at least once a day for an hour and possibly more. And we were always working in harmony because we were regularly talking, communicating with each other and I understood his problems. He understood my problems.¹³⁹¹

The trust they developed over repeated interactions, allowing them to think similarly to one another, combined with Schwarzkopf's personal drive to maintain coalition cohesion, meant that when Billière informed Schwarzkopf that Britain could not be seen to be in a 'supporting role', Schwarzkopf reassigned British troops so that they would participate in the major attack with the VII Corps fighting the Republican Guard with the US Army, rather than being used for limited operations in conjunction with the US marines.¹³⁹² It also meant that Billière was able to convince Schwarzkopf of the value of British SAS forces, despite Schwarzkopf's personal dislike of using special forces.¹³⁹³ The trust which developed between these two men greatly aided in the Anglo-American military cooperation taking place on the ground, mirroring the trust between Thatcher and Bush which facilitated political cooperation on the Gulf War.

Nuclear

Nuclear cooperation, perhaps more so than any other, was explicitly aimed at the Cold War context where it was believed that a credible nuclear deterrent was required to counter the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union. Its survival through the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and the aftermath of Iraq is thus particularly interesting. To understand its survival, this section will focus on how Britain understands its nuclear status in relation to the relationship with the United States in the post-Cold War period, given that it was during this period that Britain decided to maintain its nuclear arsenal despite significant questions regarding the strategic necessity of doing so and ongoing reliance on the U.S. to be able to do so. In the post-Cold War context, the nuclear relationship has shifted to focus on nuclear proliferation and terrorism.¹³⁹⁴ Nuclear deterrence has remained the primary rationale for maintaining a nuclear arsenal,¹³⁹⁵ even though faith in deterrence for combating rogue nuclear states was severely shaken following 9/11.¹³⁹⁶ These are

¹³⁹¹ General Sir Peter de la Billière, Interview for the PBS Frontline Documentary 'Desert Storm: An In-Depth Analysis of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, January 1996, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/billiere/1.html>.

¹³⁹² Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, 348.

¹³⁹³ Freedman and Karsh, 308.

¹³⁹⁴ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 131.

¹³⁹⁵ As outlined in the 2006 White Paper, see Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent" (London, December 2006); See also Nick Ritchie, "Replacing Trident: Britain, America and Nuclear Weapons," *Contemporary Security Policy* 28, no. 2 (2007): 387–88.

¹³⁹⁶ Nick Ritchie, "Deterrence Dogma? Challenging the Relevance of British Nuclear Weapons," *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2009): 84.

threat perceptions clearly shared by the United States, as indicated by their 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, thus providing fertile ground for cooperation.¹³⁹⁷ The similarity in perceptions of interests regarding nuclear policy and the strategic environment indicates that the calculative dimension of trust is strong in the Anglo- American nuclear relationship in the post-Cold War period, however Britain's decision to maintain its nuclear arsenal cannot be understood without also considering identity driven motivations.

The shared threat perceptions shaped a series of British decisions which ensured their ongoing nuclear capacity. Given that the operational life of the Vanguard class of nuclear submarines was due to begin expiring around 2024, and building replacements would take at least fifteen years, Blair argued that a decision to begin this process would need to be taken by 2009.¹³⁹⁸ This initially resulted in a 2006 White Paper, *The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent*, which outlined their reasoning for maintaining a British nuclear deterrent and committed to the creation of 'an effective and operationally independent nuclear deterrent until the early 2040s'.¹³⁹⁹ Parliament voted in March of 2007 to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent based around the pre-existing Trident missile delivery system, and the reasons given in the 2006 White Paper were reaffirmed in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review,¹⁴⁰⁰ and again in the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.¹⁴⁰¹ At the same time, the Mutual Defence Agreement originally created in 1958 to underpin Anglo-American nuclear cooperation was extended in 2014 for a further ten years, ensuring ongoing exchange of nuclear information, cooperation on nuclear technology, and the transfer of materials related to nuclear warheads.¹⁴⁰² Britain has clearly perceived it to be within its interests to maintain a nuclear deterrent, a perception which has been significantly shaped by both its nuclear relationship and broader alliance with the United States.

Britain's decision to maintain its nuclear status and renew its Trident programme cannot,

¹³⁹⁷ See United States of America Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 2010.

¹³⁹⁸ David Allen, "The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent and the 2010 Strategic and Defence Review," *The Political Quarterly* 81, no. 3 (2010): 387.

¹³⁹⁹ Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent," 30.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Although some differences are notable, including the decision to extend the life of the Vanguard class of submarines through to the late 2020s/early 2030s and subsequently delay the final decision on future submarine acquisition to 2016, and the decision to reduce the number of warheads on each submarine from 48 to 40. See Great Britain: Cabinet Office, "Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review," 2010, 37–39.

¹⁴⁰¹ Which included a commitment to replacing the four Vanguard Class nuclear submarines with a new class of four submarines, temporarily known as Successor but ultimately named Dreadnought. See Great Britain: Cabinet Office, "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom," 2015, 34–36.

¹⁴⁰² Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 124.

however, be explained solely on strategic grounds. The fact that it is commonly believed Britain would not seek to acquire nuclear weapons if it did not already have them makes this clear.¹⁴⁰³ Additionally, the strategic rationale for retaining a nuclear deterrent is, at best, questionable.¹⁴⁰⁴ Ritchie argues that Britain's nuclear identity is wrapped up in its identity as a global power, its "special relationship" with the United States, and its need to be able to compete with France to be the pre-eminent military power in Europe.¹⁴⁰⁵ He highlights that with regards to the "special relationship" identity there are three core components: being the Atlantic bridge, believing in and defending American values, and requiring the capability and willingness to fight and achieve interoperability with American forces.¹⁴⁰⁶ Nuclear weapons aid Britain's capacity for interoperability, and both symbolically and practically increase Britain's credibility and usefulness to the United States.¹⁴⁰⁷ Dunne adds to this argument, pointing out that there are many cases 'where the British government has calculated interests in a manner intelligible only in the context of a dominant Atlanticist identity'.¹⁴⁰⁸ The fact that the decision to maintain a nuclear deterrent was so heavily influenced by questions of identity, particularly questions of identity relating to the "special relationship", indicates that the presence of normative trust played a significant role in the maintenance of the nuclear relationship in the post-Cold War period. At the same time, the relationship has been facilitated by the trust developed as a result of 'regular and routinised interactions' between personnel through site visits and joint working groups.¹⁴⁰⁹ Thus, all three dimensions of trust are clearly present in the nuclear relationship, and their interplay has contributed to the capacity of the nuclear relationship to survive the shifting strategic environment of the post-Cold War period.

Intelligence

As with other highly institutionalised aspects of the relationship, the intelligence relationship survived and adapted to new strategic contexts throughout the post-Cold War period. This section will focus on how rapid technological change and the war on terror strengthened the calculative dimension of trust and facilitated ongoing cooperation, the difficulties which emerged regarding legal systems and extraordinary renditions, and the impact of the fallout of the failure of

¹⁴⁰³ Michael MccGwire, "Comfort Blanket or Weapon of War: What Is Trident For?," *International Affairs* 82, no. 4 (2006): 639–50; Nick Ritchie, "Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb," *International Affairs* 86, no. 2 (2010): 465–87; Ritchie, "Deterrence Dogma? Challenging the Relevance of British Nuclear Weapons."

¹⁴⁰⁴ For a critique of the strategic rationale presented in the 2006 White Paper, see Hugh Beach, "Trident: White Elephant or Black Hole?," *The RUSI Journal* 154, no. 1 (2009): 36–43.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Ritchie, "Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb," 469–74.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Ritchie, 471–72.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Ritchie, 472.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Dunne, "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy," 909.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 133.

intelligence and intelligence policy with regards to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction which damaged public trust in their own intelligence services, the nature of Anglo- American intelligence collaboration, and in governments. Despite the loss of trust in intelligence services and the intelligence relationship by the British and American publics, the relationships between the intelligence agencies themselves remained strong.

The calculative dimension of the intelligence relationship has remained strong in the post-Cold War era, with a set of key shared interests and dependencies, as well as a similarity of strategic outlooks, facilitating ongoing close cooperation. As Xu points out, the habits of cooperation which had developed throughout the history of the intelligence relationship enabled the intelligence agencies ‘to maintain common perception on a variety of new threats in the post-Cold War era’.¹⁴¹⁰ The NSA was inclined to ‘use GCHQ as a kind of ‘default’ facility for its own signals intelligence’ even prior to 9/11,¹⁴¹¹ given the ‘the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ cuts’ in the U.S. which limited their capacity to collect information.¹⁴¹² Their history also meant that when crisis struck, the intelligence agencies were inherently inclined to turn to one another, as evidenced by the heads of the British intelligence agencies flying to Washington to meet with their American counterparts the day after the 9/11 attacks.¹⁴¹³ 9/11 served to further reinforce a shared strategic outlook, as ‘the experience of 9/11 now provided an effective prism through which to jointly view and evaluate security issues’.¹⁴¹⁴ Consequently, Dumbrell argues that ‘the 9/11 attacks unquestionably reinforced special intelligence relations’.¹⁴¹⁵ Intelligence cooperation now largely focused on Islamic terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁴¹⁶ While the core of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation remains SIGINT and thus cooperation between NSA and GCHQ who have teams colocated at one another’s facilities,¹⁴¹⁷ the increased risk of terrorism saw a greater need to focus on domestic material and subsequently an expansion of cooperation between MI5 and the CIA, FBI, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security.¹⁴¹⁸ Another factor which served to strengthen the calculative dimension of trust through creating a

¹⁴¹⁰ Xu, 122.

¹⁴¹¹ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 170.

¹⁴¹² Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11*, 49.

¹⁴¹³ This included the head of MI6, Richard Dearlove, the head of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, and the head of GCHQ, Francis Richards. See Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 171.

¹⁴¹⁴ Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11*, 51–52.

¹⁴¹⁵ Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After*, 2006, 171.

¹⁴¹⁶ Xu, *Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era*, 122.

¹⁴¹⁷ James K. Wither, “Special Relationships: Brexit and the Anglo-American Security and Defense Partnership,” *Parameters* 48, no. 1 (n.d.): 78.

¹⁴¹⁸ Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11*, 22–23.

shared need to cooperate is rapid technological development. A former Director General of MI5, Stella Rimington, captures the dual impact of technological development and globalisation:

Secret services are not usually associated with cooperation and sharing. It sounds like a contradiction. But in a world where the threats get more sophisticated and more global, the intelligence task gets more difficult, and cooperation between intelligence allies is vital and grows ever closer.¹⁴¹⁹

The British and American intelligence services have both struggled to keep up with changing communications technology, particularly in the context of the ongoing fragmentary effects of globalisation and the need to keep track of a growing multiplicity of actors.¹⁴²⁰ Part of this has been the rapid expansion of open source intelligence (OSINT), which now forms a significant majority of British and American intelligence information.¹⁴²¹ Thus shared needs and dependencies have encouraged ongoing intelligence cooperation.

Despite ongoing close cooperation, key differences have arisen in the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, notably with regards to differing legal systems, strategic cultures, and values. This has been particularly the case in relation to extraordinary rendition and torture. The different legal and human rights obligations of the two states often frustrated cooperation, as the UK was required to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).¹⁴²² There were fears that British intelligence officers could become incriminated through aspects of their cooperation with their American counterparts who possessed a greater level of legal protection.¹⁴²³ Another problematic aspect of the intelligence relationship centred on the U.S. use of extraordinary rendition and torture. A 2007 British report on rendition conducted by the Intelligence and Security Committee highlighted British concerns:

The rendition programme has revealed aspects of the usually close UK/U.S. relationship that are surprising and concerning. It has highlighted that the UK and U.S. work under very different legal guidelines and ethical approaches.¹⁴²⁴

The report outlines British fears following news of the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib in

¹⁴¹⁹ Stella Rimington, *Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director General of MI5* (London: Hutchinson, 2001), 205.

¹⁴²⁰ Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11*, 13–14.

¹⁴²¹ Svendsen, 19.

¹⁴²² The impact of this experience can be seen in the fact that British adherence to the ECHR was still being debated in 2016. See “Wrong Turn on Rights; Suspending the European Convention on Human Rights Will Do Little to Protect Our Troops But Will Damage Britain’s Standing as a Champion of International Law,” *The Times*, October 5, 2016.

¹⁴²³ Svendsen, *Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11*, 62.

¹⁴²⁴ Intelligence and Security Committee, “Rendition,” July 2007, 48.

2004 regarding the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT).¹⁴²⁵ CIDT is in breach of British domestic law, specifically section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, as well as Britain's obligations under international and European law, including Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 3 of the ECHR.¹⁴²⁶ The British report found that 'although the U.S. may take note of UK protests and concerns, this does not appear materially to affect its strategy on rendition'.¹⁴²⁷ The unwillingness of the U.S. to take British concerns into account is reflected in a U.S. report on the effect of extraordinary rendition on transatlantic relations, with the former chief of the Bin Laden Unit in the CIA, Michael F. Scheuer, justifying rendition as 'the single most effective counterterrorism operation ever conducted by the United States Government'.¹⁴²⁸ He furthermore disparages Europe, stating that America will cooperate with allies only if they are 'willing to cooperate', but that cooperation will be limited as long as Europe opposes rendition and the death penalty.¹⁴²⁹ These difficulties caused tensions in intelligence relations, but the most significant harm was done to public trust in intelligence services and the relationship between British and American intelligence services.

These concerns about U.S. extraordinary rendition and torture, in conjunction with questions regarding the validity of the intelligence on the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq used to justify military intervention, shook the public's trust in intelligence and impacted negatively on the Anglo-American relationship as a whole. Interestingly, it must be noted that the British report on rendition found that despite this the intelligence relationship itself remained strong, as outlined by the Director General of the Security Service:

We do a lot of exchange of highly sensitive intelligence in a very trusting way, but we now all of us, including the Americans, have a clear understanding of the legal constraints on that exchange ... we still trust them, but we have a better recognition that their standards, their laws, their approaches are different, and therefore we still have to work with them, but we work with them in a rather different fashion.¹⁴³⁰

This speaks to the strengths of the calculative dimension of trust, the history of close

¹⁴²⁵ For the report's conclusions regarding the impact on the relationship with America, see Intelligence and Security Committee, 47–49.

¹⁴²⁶ For an outline of Britain's domestic and international legal obligations with regards to rendition and torture, see Intelligence and Security Committee, 7–8.

¹⁴²⁷ Intelligence and Security Committee, 49.

¹⁴²⁸ Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress, "Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations," April 17, 2007, 14.

¹⁴²⁹ Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress, 25.

¹⁴³⁰ Intelligence and Security Committee, "Rendition," 49.

institutionalised partnership, and the affective and normative trust developed between personnel. While the intelligence relationship remained strong, other areas of the relationship suffered. Both the British and American reports noted the impact on public opinion, with the British making sure their concerns about parliamentary, press, and public opinion were raised with U.S. State Department officials.¹⁴³¹ It is clear on the American side that there were concerns regarding the impact on relations with Europe, with the Director and Senior Fellow of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Julianne Smith, stating that American interests are harmed when European leaders ‘start to feel that standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States is a political liability’.¹⁴³² Childs argues that while intelligence remains ‘the jewel in the crown of the special relationship’, owing to the fallout from matters associated with Iraq it ‘is surely the most tarnished element of all’.¹⁴³³ This meant a loss of trust of the U.S. and British people in their own intelligence services and governments, but also a loss of trust regarding the relationship between their intelligence services and their governments. The broader loss of public trust in the Anglo-American relationship as a result of Iraq and its impact will be explored further in the society section below.

Society

Looking at the impact of the Iraq War on British society and its relationship with America reveals some interesting contradictions and questions regarding how trust between states circulates in complicated ways across different domains of interstate relations. In particular, the case of Iraq reveals insights into the connections between leadership relations and societal relations. Where in the past good leadership relations have generally been considered a positive for the relationship as a whole, in this case the relationship between Bush and Blair served to damage the relationship between societies. In a demonstration of the interwoven nature of bilateral relationships, Dunn argues that ‘the most significant legacy of this period was that a British Prime Minister was driven from office because of dissatisfaction with his government’s relationship with Washington’.¹⁴³⁴ This section will begin by examining the trust present in the relationship following 9/11, but prior to the war on Iraq to understand the impact the Iraq War had on societal relations. It will then explore the Iraq War as a breach of the expectations of trustworthiness the British had in their

¹⁴³¹ Intelligence and Security Committee, 48–49.

¹⁴³² Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress, “Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations,” 6–7.

¹⁴³³ Nicholas Childs, “Past, Present, and Future Foreign Policy: The British Perspective,” in *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 128.

¹⁴³⁴ Dunn, “UK-US Relations After the Three Bs - Blair, Brown and Bush,” 6.

own government, as well as in the U.S. alliance itself. Anti-war activism, aided by changes in communications technology, provides evidence of societal discontent and falling trust in the government and in relations between governments. Societal discontent and changes to the trust held in governments and in the Anglo-American relationship can also be seen through polling. Polling sheds light on the growing unpopularity of Blair and his handling of the war and the U.S. alliance, as does the prominence of commentary on him being ‘Bush’s poodle’. All of this together highlights the complexity of the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the relationship, given that a strong relationship between leaders harmed the relationship between societies.

To begin with, it is important to understand the trust present prior to the beginning of the Iraq War, particularly following 9/11 and British support for America and for the beginnings of the war on terror. Andrew Sullivan, for example, outlines how he felt that the moments of silence held to honour those who died in the 9/11 attacks ‘blurred nationalisms’.¹⁴³⁵ Reminiscent of the Anglo-American symbolism associated with the launching of the hospital ship *Maine* during the Boer War, the Star-Spangled Banner was played at the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham Palace for the first time at the behest of the Queen.¹⁴³⁶ Sullivan argues that the British response to 9/11 and the American feeling of ‘relief’ at receiving British support was the result of ‘something primal’, and that Churchill’s belief in the union of English-speaking peoples was ‘finally coming to pass’.¹⁴³⁷ Such a perspective speaks to the presence of a sense of shared identity and subsequently an element of normative trust, although this was of course not a perspective shared by all. This initial response was also driven by the fact that British citizens died in the 9/11 attacks.¹⁴³⁸ It is also interesting to note that even following the beginning of the Iraq War, American perceptions of Britain remained positive even though the reverse did not hold true. In actual fact, American public opinion of Britain became more positive following 9/11, and was further reinforced during Iraq¹⁴³⁹ as ‘Britain reinforced its reputation as America’s closest ally’.¹⁴⁴⁰ Oppermann investigates both the valence and salience of American public opinion, discovering that when compared to France and Germany Britain has both a more positive valence with higher favourability ratings in polls, and a higher salience as measured by the extent of coverage in

¹⁴³⁵ Sullivan, “The Way We Live Now: 11-4-01; United Nations.”

¹⁴³⁶ Sullivan, “The Way We Live Now: 11-4-01; United Nations.”

¹⁴³⁷ Sullivan, “The Way We Live Now: 11-4-01; United Nations.”

¹⁴³⁸ Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11.”

¹⁴³⁹ For data on American public perceptions of Britain 1989-present see Gallup, “Country Ratings,” accessed December 24, 2018, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1624/Perceptions-Foreign-Countries.aspx>.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Kai Oppermann, “The Public Images of Britain, Germany, and France in the United States,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 4 (2011): 313.

newspapers.¹⁴⁴¹ These relatively positive societal perceptions of one another following 9/11 can be contrasted dramatically with societal perceptions following the beginning of the war in Iraq.

Blair's decision to take Britain to war in Iraq and America's leading role in the conflict can be viewed as a breach of the expectations of trustworthiness the British people had, both as regards their own government and their alliance with the United States. As war with Iraq became increasingly likely the extent of British societal support for the war on terror decreased. The final polls before the war began indicated that a majority of British people would only support the war if UN inspectors found proof of weapons of mass destruction and the UN Security Council supported military action.¹⁴⁴² Polls conducted on the 14th-16th of March found that if that were the case 74 per cent would be in favour of joining American led military action, compared to only 26 per cent if neither condition was fulfilled.¹⁴⁴³ One area in which the difference in response to Afghanistan and Iraq is clear is the significantly larger presence of the Stop the War Coalition with regards to Iraq. Although following 9/11 there was majority support for war, there had always been a strand of anti-war thinking and activism.¹⁴⁴⁴ As Lindsey German outlines, the rejection of the arguments in favour of war and the willingness to protest 'demonstrated ... a lack of trust in what the government and media were saying'.¹⁴⁴⁵ At the same time one specific media source, the *Daily Mirror*, played a significant role in aiding the Stop the War Coalition through campaigning for the protest and spreading the message of the protestors.¹⁴⁴⁶ The movement had begun, however, as an ad hoc grassroots project, drawing on a history of socialist and anti-globalisation activism, the experience of the women involved in Greenham common, a significant portion of the Muslim community, and conservatives who thought war an inadequate response to terrorism.¹⁴⁴⁷ While Americans were largely supportive of the war throughout late 2002 as they assumed they would receive support from the UN and from European allies, American anti-war activism expanded in the early months of 2003 as it became clear this would not be the case.¹⁴⁴⁸ The high point of the movement was the demonstrations on the 15th of February 2003, which had begun being organised following the European Social Forum in Florence in November 2002.¹⁴⁴⁹ Globally, the result was

¹⁴⁴¹ See Oppermann, "The Public Images of Britain, Germany, and France in the United States."

¹⁴⁴² Ipsos MORI, "Iraq, The Last Pre-War Polls," March 21, 2003, <https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/iraq-last-pre-war-polls>.

¹⁴⁴³ Ipsos MORI.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Lindsey German, *How a Century of War Changed the Lives of Women: Work, Family and Liberation* (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 136.

¹⁴⁴⁵ German, 145.

¹⁴⁴⁶ German, 155.

¹⁴⁴⁷ German, 139–40.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Alexander Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen, *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3.

¹⁴⁴⁹ For details of the organisation process, see Joris Verhulst, "February 15, 2003: The World Says No To War,"

millions of protesters across more than six hundred cities,¹⁴⁵⁰ in ‘the largest and momentous transnational antiwar protests in human history’.¹⁴⁵¹ It was also the largest ever demonstration to take place in Britain with over one million participants in London alone.¹⁴⁵² The subsequent protests on the 22nd of March following the beginning of military action on the 20th were smaller, at an estimated 100, 000-200, 000 participants in London, but still took the record for the largest demonstration held during wartime.¹⁴⁵³ In America, the protests were the largest since Vietnam.¹⁴⁵⁴ This process of global anti-war protests served to bring protestors together, however it also highlights the lack of trust that the British in particular had in their government and their government’s relationship with the U.S.

Again touching on themes revealed in previous chapters, changes in communications technology assisted in the formation of transnational connections. Digital communications media played a fundamental role in the organisation of both national and transnational anti-war activism. Of course, transnational connections were not solely flowing between Britain and America, but existed as a much wider coalition, as evidence by the scale of the global February 23 protests. As part of this broader transnational web of connections, those between Britain and America were a key part. As one example, Gillan and Pickerill reveal that in an interview an activist claimed that historically the British and American lefts had been separated, but that the internet had changed that and brought about stronger connections between the two lefts.¹⁴⁵⁵ The connections were both formal and informal, and existed across different national and international groups:

Within the British and American national coalitions, resources – including money, personnel, trust and political backing – were negotiated and shared. Nonetheless, beyond such formal and relatively stable arrangements there existed an uneven web of connections between a wider range of international, national and local groups that planned protests together and often had overlapping memberships.¹⁴⁵⁶

Resonating with key insights of trust literature, Verhulst argues that it was the combination of the face-to-face meetings associated with the organising forums and the use of the internet and email

in *World Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War on Iraq*, ed. Stefaan Walgrave, Dieter Rucht, and Sidney Tarrow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 8–13.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht, “Introduction,” in *World Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War on Iraq*, ed. Stefaan Walgrave, Dieter Rucht, and Sidney Tarrow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xiii.

¹⁴⁵¹ Verhulst, “February 15, 2003: The World Says No To War,” 1.

¹⁴⁵² Craig Murray et al., “Reporting Dissent in Wartime: British Press, the Anti-War Movement and the 2003 Iraq War,” *European Journal of Communication* 23, no. 1 (2008): 8.

¹⁴⁵³ Murray et al., 8.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Verhulst, “February 15, 2003: The World Says No To War,” 1.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Kevin Gillan and Jenny Pickerill, “Transnational Anti-War Activism: Solidary, Diversity and the Internet in Australia, Britain and the United States After 9/11,” *Australasian Political Studies Association* 43, no. 1 (2008): 61.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Gillan and Pickerill, 64.

circuits.¹⁴⁵⁷ Face-to-face meetings have been proven to be invaluable to the development of trust,¹⁴⁵⁸ however the addition of digital communications media enabled greater spread and speed of information sharing. The internet and email enabled all national peace movements and coalitions to be able to remain linked to each other through mailing lists and linking to each other on each group's website.¹⁴⁵⁹ As Gillan outlines, even in spaces where more substantial transnational connections were impractical or impossible to sustain, at the very least information was passing transnationally.¹⁴⁶⁰ It allowed local and national groups to 'locate their action within much broader movements', and allowed for 'the construction of imagined solidarity'.¹⁴⁶¹ Digital communications media also greatly helped each national coalition of activists to connect and mobilize, primarily through increasing the efficiency with which traditional tasks of social movements could be carried out, such as the speed of online versus physical mailing lists.¹⁴⁶² It meant that mobilization was able to take place quickly, which was particularly useful in the United States where the movement reached its full strength later in the game.¹⁴⁶³ An examination of the role of communications media in building transnational connections centred on anti-war protest indicates that trust can be built without face-to-face interaction, and highlights the connections which can form between societies even when they are organising in opposition to their own governments and the policies the two governments in conjunction are pursuing.

British public opinion polls further demonstrate the breach of trust with regards to Blair himself, and also illustrate the breach of expectations of trustworthiness held in relation to the alliance with the United States. Most notably, the British government and the British people expected that they would have a degree of influence over the course of joint war efforts. The expectation that Blair would have influence in Washington and the perception that these expectations had been breached becomes clear in the satirical mockery of Blair as 'Bush's poodle'.¹⁴⁶⁴ A quick google search will reveal seemingly endless political cartoons on the subject. The extent of influence Blair had in Washington has been debated,¹⁴⁶⁵ but what matters in this context is the perceptions of the British

¹⁴⁵⁷ Verhulst, "February 15, 2003: The World Says No To War," 13.

¹⁴⁵⁸ See Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Verhulst, "February 15, 2003: The World Says No To War," 13.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Kevin Gillan, "The UK Anti-War Movement Online," *Information, Communication & Society* 12, no. 1 (2009): 41.

¹⁴⁶¹ Gillan and Pickerill, "Transnational Anti-War Activism: Solidary, Diversity and the Internet in Australia, Britain and the United States After 9/11," 76.

¹⁴⁶² Gillan, "The UK Anti-War Movement Online," 41.

¹⁴⁶³ Verhulst, "February 15, 2003: The World Says No To War," 13.

¹⁴⁶⁴ For how Blair as poodle has been examined in the literature, see for example Samuel Azubuike, "The 'Poodle Theory' and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship,'" *International Studies* 42, no. 2 (2005): 123–39; James K. Wither, "British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War," *Parameters* 33, no. 4 (2003): 67–82.

¹⁴⁶⁵ See, for example, Azubuike, "The 'Poodle Theory' and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship'"; Wither, "British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War."

people. Dumbrell's description of the impact of Iraq on the British people captures these perceptions:

Rather than a 'partnership not just of governments but of peoples', the US-UK special relationship resembled rather a shotgun marriage, with much of the British population apparently forced into union with a country whose leader they hated and despised.¹⁴⁶⁶

Looking at polling of British perceptions of Blair, it can be seen that 9/11 initially improved his ratings compared to his previous unpopularity owing to issues of domestic policy.¹⁴⁶⁷ A November 2001 poll reveals that 71 per cent of respondents approved of the way Tony Blair was handling the British response to 9/11, while 66 per cent approved of George W. Bush's response, and 70 per cent supported military action in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁶⁸ Blair's satisfaction ratings, however, began to drop. Even in December of 2002 when anti-war activism had expanded in scale as it became clear that war in Iraq was increasingly likely,¹⁴⁶⁹ with the trend holding in December of 2003 after war had begun.¹⁴⁷⁰ Ipsos MORI also ran polls asking participants whether they would describe Blair as trustworthy, with a similar trend being seen of an initial increase in positive responses following 9/11, and a subsequent decrease following the onset of war in Iraq.¹⁴⁷¹ It is clear that Blair had breached the expectations of trustworthiness the British people had in him through his decision to participate in the Iraq War.

A further examination of polling reveals more insights regarding how the British felt about the relationship with America in this context. A poll conducted on British involvement in Iraq in 2013, a decade following the beginning of military action, found that 51 per cent both opposed the invasion at the time and remained convinced that Britain had been wrong to get involved, with 19

¹⁴⁶⁶ John Dumbrell, "Hating Bush, Supporting Washington: George W. Bush, Anti-Americanism and the US-UK Special Relationship," in *America's "Special Relationships": Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schäfer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 48.

¹⁴⁶⁷ In a December 2000 poll Blair received a 34 per cent satisfaction and 54 per cent dissatisfaction rating, compared to 42 per cent satisfaction and 28 per cent dissatisfaction in November 2001. Notably I 2001 Blair's personal ratings were higher than those of the government. See Ipsos MORI, "Political Attitudes in Great Britain for December 2000," December 15, 2000, <https://ems.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/1678/Political-Attitudes-in-Great-Britain-for-December-2000.aspx>; Ipsos MORI, "MORI Political Monitor, November 2001," November 29, 2001, <https://ems.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/1419/MORI-Political-Monitor-November-2001.aspx>.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Ipsos MORI, "MORI Political Monitor, November 2001."

¹⁴⁶⁹ December 2002 saw Blair with 38 per cent satisfaction and 54 per cent dissatisfaction. See Ipsos MORI, "MORI Political Monitor, December 2002," December 27, 2002, <https://ems.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/1101/MORI-Political-Monitor-December-2002.aspx>.

¹⁴⁷⁰ 36 per cent satisfaction and 55 per cent dissatisfaction. See Ipsos MORI, "MORI Political Monitor, December 2003," December 19, 2003, <https://ems.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/877/MORI-Political-Monitor-December-2003.aspx>.

¹⁴⁷¹ For example, the percentage who considered him trustworthy ranged from 29-41 per cent between July 2003 and June 2007, with a consistent majority finding him untrustworthy from October 2003 onwards. See Ipsos MORI, "Trustworthiness of Politicians - Trends," May 31, 2012, <https://ems.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/97/Trustworthiness-of-Politicians-Trends.aspx?view=wide>.

per cent of people reported that they supported it initially, but in 2013 then believed Britain had been wrong to get involved.¹⁴⁷² When asked why it had been wrong, the top answer at 23 per cent was that it was none of Britain's business, the second at 22 per cent that Tony Blair had lied about the war, and the fourth at 14 per cent that the British should not have supported the U.S. and George W. Bush.¹⁴⁷³ 52 per cent felt that the Iraq War had harmed Britain's reputation in the world.¹⁴⁷⁴ While the harm all of this had on the relationship as a whole is impossible to quantify, what is clear is that expectations of trustworthiness both with regards to Blair's lack of popular mandate for his decision to participate in military action in Iraq and expectations regarding the relationship with the United States were breached. Iraq had a deep impact on the relationship between the British people and their government and their perceptions of the relationship with the U.S., and even though American public opinion of Britain remained high and the relationship between Blair and Bush was strong this clearly had a negative impact on the relationship as a whole. The complicated combination of relationships between societies and governments in this case raises questions about how to consider trust in a context where leadership relations are strong but societal trust is weak, in part because of a lack of trust in a people's own government.

Conclusion

The adaptation of the Anglo-American relationship to the structural shifts in the strategic environment which took place provides fertile ground for the application of a multidimensional trust framework. Despite expectations that the relationship would decline following the end of the Cold War, it survived and adapted to two significant structural shifts in the international system. An examination of the dimensions of trust through this period reveals that significant shared interests remained, and managing differences and tensions was aided by the presence of affective and normative trust. While the early post-Cold War years saw the removal of a shared central grand strategic imperative, a number of ongoing smaller shared interests meant there was an continuing need for cooperation. When tensions emerged regarding either differences over interests or policy differences on how to manage shared interests, the presence of affective and normative trust helped the two states to manage these tensions. The value of affective trust was seen in a comparison of the successes of Clinton and Blair in managing difficulties, compared to the failures of Clinton and Major to do the same. The strengths and weaknesses of the normative dimension of trust were

¹⁴⁷² Ipsos MORI, "Ipsos MORI Political Monitor - Iraq - March 2013," March 19, 2013, 3, <https://ems.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/iraq-war-10-anniversary-poll-tables.pdf>.

¹⁴⁷³ Ipsos MORI, 9.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Ipsos MORI, 17.

seen through Britain leaning toward America in terms of collective identity in the midst of tensions between Europeanist and Atlanticist identities and policy approaches; their collocation and shared goals in Afghanistan, but differences over policy; and their broadly shared values relating to democracy and freedom in the war on terror, but differing values over how to achieve these larger goals.

Understanding the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the government, military, and society domains of the relationship adds to pre-existing explanations of the survival of the Anglo-American relationship. It highlights first that the three dimensions of trust were all present, and all played a significant role in managing the uncertainty and changes brought by the end of the Cold War and 9/11. Second, it reveals that it is necessary to examine the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the bilateral relationship to understand why each area struggled or thrived in the post-Cold War environment. This was seen first in the unexpected relationship of trust which developed between Bush and Blair when 9/11 brought them together, and shared interests in a time of crisis prompted a strong personal relationship which shaped ongoing Anglo-American cooperation in the war on terror. Second, the interplay of the dimensions of trust was seen in the political and military cooperation which took place as part of the British and American response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Trust between political leaders as well as military leaders facilitated the political and military cooperation which helped the relationship to survive the end of the Cold War. Third, the British decisions taken from the mid-2000s onwards to maintain its nuclear arsenal were the result of a strong calculative dimension of trust in the form of shared strategic perceptions, as well as the presence of the normative dimension of trust in the form of the identity-based considerations relating both to Britain generally and to the "special relationship" specifically which shaped Britain's strategic outlook. Fourth, the intelligence relationship was also shaped by a strong calculative dimension of trust, owing to interdependencies, the need to keep up with rapidly changing technologies, and the shared interests provided by 9/11 relating to counterterrorism and supporting military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the affective and normative relationships between intelligence communities helped them to maintain strong relations despite the loss of public trust in intelligence services. Fifth, the societal backlash to the Iraq War presented a particularly complex picture of the interplay of the dimensions of trust within a bilateral relationship. Strong leadership relations actively harmed the relationship between societies, as the British found their expectations of trustworthiness in relation to their leader and the relationship with America both breached. These examples are limited in their representativeness of the domains over the entirety of the post-Cold War period. Despite the shorter time span, the significance of the structural

changes that took place mean that no one example can be representative of everything from the 1990s, to the years following 9/11, through to 2016. Taken as a whole in collaboration with the first half of the chapter, however, they supply important theoretical and empirical revelations.

The complexity of this picture cannot be explained solely through sentiments and interests, nor the Evangelical, Functional, and Terminal schools of Anglo-American relations. Xu's use of institutionalisation and path dependence provides valuable insights into how institutionalisation in the military, nuclear, and intelligence spaces inclined Britain and America to continue cooperating. Haugevik's theorisation of special relationships as relational identity constructions makes a similarly valuable contribution through outlining how the front-stage practices of recognition performed by leaders and the back-stage practices of trust which underpin defence and diplomatic relations contribute to the ongoing closeness of the relationship. This chapter has complemented their contributions through an exploration of the "special relationship" through the use of a multidimensional trust framework. Understanding the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the breadth of the relationship provides additional explanations for the adaptation of the Anglo-American relationship to the post-Cold War environment, and demonstrates the utility of a trust-based theoretical framework applied using a flat ontology in an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust.

Conclusion

This thesis has made an original contribution to the study of international relations through devising a theoretical framework capable of analysing social trust in bilateral relationships in a way which incorporates a variety of actors, and the role of interpersonal relations. To do so, this thesis determined that two particular approaches applied in conjunction were able to effectively respond to this challenge of social trust research. First, it created a theoretical framework to analyse the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships. Trust was defined as ‘*the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility*’,¹⁴⁷⁵ with the creation of the three dimensions of calculative, affective, and normative providing greater specificity as to the source of the expectation of no harm. Second, it conceptualised the state through the use of a flat ontology in order to apply the theoretical framework in a way which captured the development of trust across the breadth of the relationship, in an expansion of the concept of embedded trust. In the process of doing so, this thesis also aimed to include within its analysis voices often not considered to play a prominent role in the relationships between states. This thesis also sought to make an empirical contribution to the study of Anglo-American relations, using a multidimensional trust framework applied using a flat ontology of the state. Doing so enabled an analysis of Anglo-American relations which could better manage the intersubjectivity of ‘interests’ and ‘sentiments’ and provide more precise insights into the development of the relationship over time as related to trust. Chapter One reviewed the literature on trust both within and outside international relations, and developed a theoretical framework to explore the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships. Chapter Two explored the literature on the Anglo-American relationship to highlight the ways in which a multidimensional trust framework could better manage the various factors involved and provide new empirical insights into the development of the relationship over time. Chapters Three through Six applied the framework to the history of Anglo-American relations 1890- 2016. This conclusion will summarise the ways in which the thesis made contributions to the literature in relation to each of the three research questions, provide a summary of what has been learned and what gaps still remain, and investigate the implications for future trust research.

Question One: How can social trust in bilateral relationships be analysed in a way which incorporates a variety of actors, and the role of interpersonal relations?

¹⁴⁷⁵ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, 2.

How to study the state as a collective without minimising the salience of interpersonal relations is a key issue in social trust research, as pointed out by Nicholas Wheeler in his 2018 contribution to the literature, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*. While he responded to this challenge through conceptualising leaders as representatives of the collective entity that is the state, that approach held limitations when seeking to analyse high trust relationships rather than adversarial ones. This thesis has expanded on Wheeler's contribution in two main ways. First, it drew on multidimensional approaches to trust found in organisational trust literature. Wheeler conceptualises trust as existing on a scale from calculative to bonding, where calculative comprises trust as risk calculation, and bonding in its fullest form an identity transformation which results in a suspension of uncertainty.¹⁴⁷⁶ Drawing on the organisational literature, this thesis found it more helpful to conceptualise trust as existing in three dimensions, notably distinguishing the affective from the normative. The aim of doing so is to enable more precision in being able to determine when the source of trust is the emotional connection between actors, and when the source of trust is some form of shared identity. The second key way this thesis has expanded on Wheeler's contribution is in its conceptualisation of the state using a flat ontology. A flat ontology of the state ensures that a variety of actors can be incorporated in analysis in an expansion of Booth and Wheeler's concept of embedded trust. Rather than view these actors as they are reflected in the decisions and outlooks of leaders, they are treated as important sources of agency in their own right.

a) Can a multidimensional approach to trust enhance our understanding of trust in bilateral relationships?

An exploration of the trust literature both within and outside the discipline of international relations revealed important insights on factors which should be included within an analysis of trust in bilateral relationships. The insights found during the review of trust literature were then organized into a multidimensional framework in which the dimensions of trust were conceptualised as the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions. A multidimensional approach was inspired by literature on trust between organisations. The framework was organized around the three types of trust outlined by Lewicki and Bunker, with adjustments made to incorporate subsequent advancements made in trust research across disciplines, including the different structural pressures presented for trust in relationships between states. Each dimension provides greater specificity as to the basis of the expectation of no harm required for trust, whether it be shared perceptions of interests, emotional connections between actors, or elements of shared identity.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

The calculative dimension of trust focuses on the role of socially-determined interests in the development of trust between states. Contrary to rationalist approaches, interests are not viewed as being determined by a rational cost-benefit analysis, but rather are understood as being social in nature and inherently shaped by the perceptions of the actors involved and questions of identity. Strategic culture and the development of an index of trustworthiness both contribute to the conceptualisation of the calculative dimension. The affective dimension of trust centres on the role of emotions in trust, particularly but not exclusively at an interpersonal level. This dimension highlights the way in which perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness develop over time and change the way in which actors feel about and perceive one another, shaping their expectations of trustworthiness. Holton's participant stance and Wheeler's theory of bonded trust are key insights from the trust literature incorporated within the affective dimension. The participant stance refers to the way in which the actor's emotions will be an inherent and inseparable part of the interactions between them when trust is involved. Wheeler's approach to bonded trust covers both affective and normative dimensions, however this thesis sought to make a distinction between the role of emotions and the impact of shared identity factors in order to better understand the role of each. When the affective dimension is strong, an actor will expect that their goodwill will be reciprocated, based on what they have learned and felt about the other through interactions. When the normative dimension exists in its most expansive form, uncertainty is fully suspended and an actor does not stop to consider whether their trust will be reciprocated as the actors understand that they "think like," "feel like," and "respond like" one another. In terms of the affective dimension, bonded trust provides insight into the way in which face-to-face interactions build trust through a process of social learning. In terms of the normative dimension, Wheeler's work on bonded trust explores how identity transformation takes place as a result of a process of bonding having taken place over repeated face-to-face interactions. The normative dimension of trust also seeks to understand how identity factors more broadly impact upon the development of trust. To do so, the normative dimension relies heavily on Lewicki and Bunker's description of identification-based trust, which they argue allows actors to "think like," "feel like," and "respond like" one another. They further argue that there are four key activities which strengthen this kind of trust: collective identity, colocation, the creation of joint products or goals, and shared values.

The three dimensions of trust are not distinct or separate, but rather can co-exist and interact in dynamic and multidimensional ways. This has been demonstrated, for example, in the ways in which shared identity factors and affective relationships inclined American President Theodore Roosevelt and his coterie of transatlantic elites toward being able to "think like," "feel like," and

“respond like” one another. The presence of the affective and normative dimensions strengthened the calculative dimension of trust, as it meant shared interests were more likely to be viewed in a similar fashion. During WWII, shared wartime needs and interests brought British and Americans together in various areas of colocation and cooperation. They were inclined to cooperate to begin with owing to pre-existing levels of trust, and the strengthening of the calculative dimension owing to the war provided various opportunities for interactions between individuals which facilitated the further growth of the affective and normative dimensions of trust. This was seen in the capacity of American ambassador John Gilbert Winant to build the affective trust the British people had in America through his willingness to campaign for increased American aid and to walk the streets of London during the Blitz. The trust built across multiple pillars during the wartime relationship gave the relationship the capacity to survive the end of the war and adjust to the changing strategic context created as the Cold War was cemented. On the one hand, the loss of the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt as a core pillar of Anglo-American relations meant that nuclear cooperation floundered. Also contributing to the difficulties of the nuclear relationship was the lack of a nuclear personnel community bound by affective and normative connections, as was the case between military communities during the Falklands War who were able to cooperate outside the knowledge of their respective leaders. On the other hand, the relationships of trust across all dimensions in the intelligence space during WWII allowed the relationship to be institutionalised. Trust flourished through a strong calculative dimension relating to shared Cold War interests; affective relationships formed between personnel who interacted frequently within this institutionalised relationship; and the normative sense of community and family which was created amongst the Anglo-American intelligence community.

Once again, the trust which developed across the breadth of Anglo-American relations allowed the relationship to survive two structural shifts in the post-Cold War period, as the Cold War ended and the events of 9/11 both shocked the international system. The interplay of the dimensions of trust can be seen in the relationship between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U. S. President George W. Bush. The events of 9/11 brought the two men together, strengthening the calculative dimension of trust. This was aided by the identity-driven outlooks of both men as epitomised by the Blair and Bush doctrines. Upon a strengthening of the calculative dimension of trust and greater opportunities for interaction these two outlooks proved to be compatible, and the two men developed a relationship of trust across all three dimensions. These examples drawn from across the four empirical chapters are but a few instances within the thesis where the importance of analysing the interplay of the dimensions is clear. They demonstrate the value in disaggregating trust into three dimensions, in order to more clearly

pinpoint whether the source of trust is shared perceptions of interests, emotional connections between actors, or elements of shared identity. It is the dynamic interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of the relationship which have shaped the development of trust in Anglo-American relations over time, demonstrating that the relationship is not “special,” but trusting. The application of the multidimensional trust framework to the Anglo-American relationship has demonstrated that it can enhance our understanding of social trust in bilateral relationships, and constitutes an original contribution to the study of social trust in international relations.

b) Can applying a multidimensional trust framework using a flat ontology of the state enhance our understanding of social trust in bilateral relationships?

The use of a flat ontology to apply the multidimensional trust framework in an expanded conceptualisation of embedded trust provides a unique value-add to the study of social trust in bilateral relationships. In the context of the gap in trust research outlined by Wheeler, a flat ontology allows for an approach which captures the role of interpersonal relationships across the entirety of the relationship in the development of trust across all three dimensions. This approach ontologically de-prioritises the importance of leadership relations and examines the ways in which trust has been developed elsewhere. In many cases, this has meant expanding the focus of leadership relations into government more broadly, exploring both informal and formal diplomacy and the networks of relationships formed by elites. As outlined above, this was seen in the transatlantic networks centred on Theodore Roosevelt. It was also seen, for example, in the relationships formed between leaders Kennedy and Macmillan and ambassadors Ormsby-Gore and Bruce, and the role these relationships played in helping Anglo-American relations cement the post-Suez rebuilding process, and navigate both the Skybolt Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The unofficial role of Harry Hopkins during WWII as a key conduit in the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship, too, falls into this grouping. Informal diplomacy has also played a vital role, as was illustrated in the return of the Bradford *History of Plymouth Colony* from Britain to America.

In other cases, the flattening of power structures has enabled light to be shed on perspectives and people not often considered when studying relationships between states. A flat ontology demonstrates that both power and trust flow in broader and more complex flows that traditional state-based international relations perspectives may allow for. Considering both key individuals and society more broadly in their own right, rather than solely in how they influence the perceptions and actions of leaders and governments, allows for a broader and deeper theoretical approach to trust in bilateral relations. One key area which has been explored in this context is the complex ways in which trust flows between societies and governments. Chapter Six was the most

prominent example of these complexities. On the one hand, the trusting relationship formed between Bush and Blair enabled close military cooperation, and the adjustment of the relationship to the post-9/11 strategic context. On the other hand, as a consequence of the war the trust of both publics in their governments fell. This was most significant in Britain, where a majority of the public opposed the war. Not only did trust in Blair decline, but trust in America also declined, given the role of America and the Blair-Bush relationship in the pursuit of military action. Analysing trust in Anglo-American relations at this time would not be possible without incorporating the complex combination of relationships between societies and governments at this time.

This approach has also highlighted key empirical contributions to the study of Anglo-American relations through emphasising the agency of a more expansive range of actors not often accorded a significant amount of agency in international relations.¹⁴⁷⁷ The importance of a flat ontology and its utility in encouraging a more inclusive approach to the study of the state and bilateral relationships between states has been seen most notably in two examples: that of the transatlantic marriages in Chapter Three, and the Lavender Scare and homophile activism in Chapter Five. The American women who married British men in the late nineteenth century were key influencers of the flows of trust in the Anglo-American relationship. To begin with, they built the affective trust of the British people in America, through being public faces of America and Americans and improving perceptions of goodwill and trustworthiness. More specifically, a group of American women living in Britain purchased and operated the hospital ship *Maine* during the Boer war, which was the first ship to sail under both British and American flags. Examining Jennie Jerome Churchill in particular demonstrated her role in using preventative diplomacy to stop war breaking out during the 1895 Venezuelan crisis. Considerable philanthropic work was also organised by a group of Anglo-American women during WWI. Through such ventures, these women wielded considerable political influence and were key drivers in the development of trust in Anglo-American relations.

Chapter Five explored the impact of the Lavender Scare, the Burgess-Maclean scandal, and homophile activism in the 1950s in shaping trust. Doing so complements work done on the transnational turn in Cold War history which seeks to highlight human agency in the context of conflict between superpowers, and the project of queering which aims to reconceptualise power relations from the personal to the geopolitical. The Lavender Scare saw communism and

¹⁴⁷⁷ As is the case with, for example, women. This was notably highlighted in Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

homosexuality conflated as threats to national security in the U.S., prompting the U.S. to work toward convincing Britain to also treat homosexuals as security threats. This was particularly true following the notable Burgess-Maclean scandal in which two British Foreign Office diplomats suspected to be both Soviet agents and homosexual disappeared and took both British and U.S. secrets with them. These events contributed to an expansion of transnational homophile activism. The combination of the Lavender Scare, the Burgess-Maclean scandal, and homophile activism demonstrates the need for a flat ontology capable of considering everything from the personal to the geopolitical and the interaction of these forces across the breadth of the bilateral relationship. Trust was affected in every sphere from personal relationships to the relationship between different segments of societies, governments, officials, and intelligence communities. This case and the case of the transatlantic marriages both demonstrate the value of not only considering trust between societies, but also considering how trust is shaped by the agency and actions of individuals and groups not often accorded a significant amount of agency in the study of relationships between states. Thus, a flat ontology provides a unique contribution to knowledge in the study of trust between states through flattening power structures and capturing some of the non-traditional ways in which trust and power flow between states which would otherwise be pushed to one side.

Question Two: What does a theoretical framework for analysing the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships reveal about the Anglo-American relationship from 1890 to 2016?

The use of a multidimensional trust framework applied using a flat ontology has provided an alternative method with which to analyse the history of the Anglo-American relationship. This method has allowed for progression on the difficult task of managing the interplay of ‘sentiments’ and ‘interests’. Tracking the interplay of the dimensions of trust over time provides a new lens through which to understand the development of the Anglo-American relationship. Arguing that the relationship is not “special,” but rather is trusting, means that the dimensions of trust are able to provide a more precise way to track the various factors considered important in Anglo-American relations. These factors include: shared sentiments, history, values, culture, religion, language, law, and literature; shared interests and common external threats; relationships between leaders and between military, nuclear technology, and intelligence personnel; and the role of mythology, symbolism, and narrative.

This approach also removes the either/or question of whether or not the relationship is “special” or not, through instead focusing on the degree to which each of the dimensions of trust is present at different points in time and across various domains of the bilateral relationship. Thus, the

relationship is not viewed as emerging suddenly from the WWII alliance. Using a trust- based approach to examine the relationship from 1890 onwards demonstrated in Chapter Three that, despite the relative lull in the interwar years, trust did develop to some degree across all dimensions prior to the wartime alliance. Chapter Four illustrated the ways in which these pre-existing levels of trust contributed to Britain and America seeking one another out for an alliance following the outbreak of war, and how the dimensions of trust grew as a consequence of frequent and repeated interactions across all domains. Chapter Five showed the areas in which this trust was strongest and able to be institutionalised, and the areas in which trust had developed across the dimensions to a lesser extent and made ongoing cooperation and trust- building slower and more difficult as the relationship adapted to the Cold War strategic environment. Chapter Six explored how the dimensions of trust explained the strengths and weaknesses of the ability of the relationship to adapt to the two significant strategic shifts heralded by the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11 and the war on terror. Through examining the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of the relationship throughout these four chapters, this thesis was able to provide more precise detail on how trust was developing within the relationship 1890-2016.

Significance for the Discipline of International Relations

This thesis has contributed more broadly to the discipline of international relations outside of solely trust research. Of course, furthering social trust research is an important contribution to international relations in and of itself. The literature review in Chapter One explored the relative absence of trust in international relations, and also highlighted its importance. Better understanding trust improves our capacity to analyse some of the key concepts driving the study of international relations: power, relationships between states, the formation of alliances, peace, and war, to name but a few. It aids us in understanding how relationships between states function, and why and when deep and sustained cooperation on sensitive issues is possible. Why, when, and how cooperation between states takes place is only becoming more important to understand in a world of growing transnational and global challenges. This thesis has generated new methods for studying social trust in international relations which will be useful in analysing how policies can be devised which promote the development of trust when it is desired, with the aim of allowing for more expansive levels of cooperation.

Outside the realm of trust, this thesis has contributed toward our understanding of states as social rather than rational actors. It has reinforced the value of reconceptualising the state, and exploring non-traditional sources of agency. These are projects which have been underway for some time in

international relations, and this thesis has contributed towards understanding their value in the context of relationships between states. The endeavour of better understanding trust is only going to become more important in a world of growing uncertainty and increasing complexity which will no doubt provide new challenges to our theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. As trust provides a key social function for actors in allowing them to suspend their sense of uncertainty, trust only becomes more important in conditions of significant uncertainty. When the state is conceptualised using a flat ontology, we can see that there is a confluence of trends which impact individuals, societies, and states relating to the relationship between trust and uncertainty. From declining trust in traditional centralised institutions such as governments, to increasingly fractured societies, to the nature of the “post-truth” world, trust will provide a valuable analytical tool for untangling both why events are playing out as they are, as well as providing possible policy options in response.

That the world has changed in important ways is reflected in recent IR literature. As explored in Chapter One, recent work from across the three main theoretical paradigms of international relations reflects both the changing world, and the way in which the discipline is responding to these new challenges. From Mearsheimer’s recognition regarding the impact of interconnectedness, to Slaughter using network theory to explore that interconnectedness, to Katzenstein and Seybert analysing the role of protean power and its growing prominence – these contributions are responsive to transformations in the international system. The core theoretical contribution of this thesis, the provision of new methods to study social trust in bilateral relationships, is also responsive to these transformations, and has significant implications for the study of international relations in a changed world. This is true in terms of furthering social trust research through the multidimensional approach to trust which disaggregates trust into the three dimensions of calculative, affective, and normative in order to be able to better identify whether the source of trust is shared perceptions of interests, emotional connections between actors, or elements of shared identity. It is also true in terms of the reconceptualisation of the state using a flat ontology, which allows for an appreciation of a wide range of actors and sources of agency. In an interconnected digital environment of growing uncertainty in which the need to cooperate is great, it only becomes more important to understand how the interactions, relationships, and networks formed between actors within and across state boundaries inhibit or promote trust.

The research conducted in this thesis highlights a variety of fruitful areas for future research on trust in international relations. First, this thesis has provided a baseline for further study of the multidimensional nature of social trust in bilateral relationships. While the Anglo-American relationship is not a universal model for trusting relationships, it provides insights into how and where trust develops, and notably the impact of the normative dimension of trust in shaping the nature of a bilateral relationship. Not all of these lessons are generalisable, given the particularities of the context of the Anglo-American relationship. Notably, factors of shared identity were, at least to some extent, present in the relationship from the beginning. How the normative dimension functions in examples where this is not the case will require further research. The impact the normative dimension of trust has on the capacity for an enduring trust-based relationship to exist is generalisable. The Anglo-American case study has demonstrated how the normative dimension of trust shapes the development of trust overall, how it influences the perceptions of actors, the complex and dynamic interactions it has with the calculative and affective dimensions of trust, and the ways in which this complex and dynamic relationship between the dimensions encourages cooperation.

This thesis has demonstrated that conceptualising trust as existing in three dimensions which are applied using a flat ontology is a valuable and useful way to conceptualise trust. The dynamic interplay of the dimensions of trust, with each dimension having been conceptualised using key concepts drawn from work on trust, provides a more precise way to track the development of trust. It does so through the capacity to better determine the source of trust, whether it be shared perceptions of shared interests, emotional connections between actors, or elements of shared identity. The use of a flat ontology allows for trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship to be explored in an expanded application of the concept of embedded trust, and an examination of the ways in which trust in different domains interacts to shape the relationship as a whole. Thus, this framework can be taken and applied to other bilateral relationships in order to understand the development of trust, though some changes may need to be made for different contexts, most notably with regards to which domains are the focus of analysis. Future research could also consider how these theoretical insights play out in relationships other than bilateral relationships, examining whether the theoretical framework would be of use in multilateral relationships.

Given the breadth this thesis sought to cover, further research could also explore a number of the examples raised in this thesis in greater depth, in order to achieve a more precise understanding of how trust functioned in each case. Of particular note is the complex relationship between societies and governments, and whether there are any generalisable principles to be drawn from how this complex relationship impacts upon the broader development of trust in relationships

between states. It would also be worth examining whether it is possible to achieve more precise indicators of trust under the auspices of the three dimensions, in order to better ascertain their presence and absence. This will be particularly important when it comes to analysing relationships where trust is less expansive, and in which more precise indicators will be invaluable in gaining a clearer picture of the state of trust in such a relationship. Space limitations meant that this thesis was necessarily limited in the domains it sought to cover. Of note in the Anglo-American relationship in particular is the economic relationship, and the relationship between the financial communities of the two states. Incorporating this domain within analysis could provide further insights into the development of trust in Anglo-American relations.

With regards to the Anglo-American relationship itself, this thesis naturally has implications for understanding how the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President and the Brexit decision in Britain to leave the EU will impact on Anglo-American relations. While the framework is not predictive, it can be used to assess the current state of trust, and important generalisable lessons have been learned in the thesis regarding how the nature and location of trust impacts upon bilateral relations. These implications will be explored briefly in a short coda following the conclusion. The findings can be summarised as: trust in leadership, government, and societal relations has suffered, and while institutionalisation and path dependency remain features of defence, intelligence, and nuclear relations, these areas also face challenges. In this context, it will be important for future research to explore in detail the current state of trust among those defence, intelligence, and nuclear relations, to see if trust is still strongly present across all three dimensions and if those personnel retain their feelings of community and family. Other important areas of exploration required to better understand the state of trust in relations will be in informal diplomatic spaces, among elites outside government, and transnational societal connections.

As will be explored to some extent in the coda, rapidly changing technology also poses significant challenges for trust research. Trust research will need to tackle these questions moving forward on a number of fronts. This thesis has demonstrated that changing technologies have often been an aid to trust. The telegraph allowed Roosevelt and Churchill to exchange letters rapidly, and begin a process of bonding prior to their face-to-face interactions. The telephone supplemented Kennedy and Macmillan's interactions. The internet has provided a conduit for transnational connections to form with greater ease, as was seen with the organisation of anti-war activism in opposition to the 2003 Iraq War. There has been a considerable focus on the role of digital diplomacy in a networked world, which would be a rich area for future trust research to explore. Questions of trust in AI have also been raised, and require ongoing examination. The changing

nature of warfare is another significant area for trust research to tackle, as strategies of socio-cognitive warfare actively target trust.¹⁴⁷⁸ Given the extent to which trust has been pursued in the context of arms control, how to conduct arms control with relation to cyber and information warfare also provides challenges and opportunities for future trust research.

Final Thoughts

This thesis has created a theoretical framework for analysing the multidimensional nature of trust in bilateral relationships applied using a flat ontology of the state, and used it to analyse the history of Anglo-American relations 1890-2016. This process has demonstrated the utility of a multidimensional approach to trust which conceptualises trust as existing in three dimensions which interact in dynamic ways: the calculative, affective, and normative dimensions of trust. Using three dimensions of trust allows for a more precise approach to tracking the development of trust over time, particularly as it relates to the role of the identity-based considerations captured by the normative dimension of trust. In applying this framework, the state was conceptualised using a flat ontology. This demonstrated the need to expand analysis beyond leadership or even government relations, in order to understand the way in which trust between states is shaped by a wide variety of individuals and groups, including those not often considered to be significant sources of agency in international relations. This thesis has demonstrated that this two-pronged theoretical approach provides an original contribution to social trust theory and international relations theory more broadly. Most specifically, it comprises new methods to study social trust which respond to the challenges associated with analysing social trust in bilateral relationships in a way which incorporates a variety of actors, and the role of interpersonal relations. Applying this framework to the Anglo-American relationship not only meant that the utility of the theoretical approach was confirmed, but also presented a contribution to the empirical literature on the Anglo-American “special relationship”. When analysed through a lens of trust, it is revealed that the relationship is not “special,” it is trusting. The nature of this trusting relationship can be more precisely ascertained through analysing the interplay of the dimensions of trust across the domains of the relationship. Doing so provides a way to capture the various factors understood to play a role in Anglo-American relations within analysis through how they relate to the development of the three dimensions of trust. In responding to the research questions posed in the introduction, this thesis has made an original contribution to knowledge regarding how to study social trust in bilateral relationships between states.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Bienvenue, Rogers, and Troath, “Trust as a Strategic Resource for the Defence of Australia”; Stanley J. Wiechnik, “Why the Military Is the Wrong Tool for Defending Western Society,” *The Strategy Bridge*, May 20, 2019, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/5/20/why-the-military-is-the-wrong-tool-for-defending-western-society>.

This thesis has demonstrated the importance of continuing to further the project of studying trust at the international level. The necessity of understanding when and why states cooperate, and the role trust plays in this process, was already clear. Coming back to Luhmann, trust only becomes more important as the changes wrought as a consequence of new technological developments create greater uncertainty.¹⁴⁷⁹ Greater uncertainty and complexity mean that the role of trust in providing a social function which allows people to suspend their sense of uncertainty and reduce social complexity is invaluable. This is true for people navigating their day-to-day lives and the societies they live within, and states and non-state actors navigating strategic challenges in the international system. Trust will only become a more important phenomenon to study in international relations in coming years, as technological change, a decrease in social trust, the changing nature of warfare, and growing strategic challenges and geopolitical rivalries continue to shape the international system.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Luhmann, *Trust and Power*.

Coda: Brexit & Trump

Given the questions raised about the impact of Brexit and Trump's presidency on the Anglo-American relationship, it is necessary to provide a brief comment in the context of the lessons learned about the relationship in this thesis. While both have commonly been treated as shocking, unexpected events, they are also symptoms of a series of broader trends. Brabazon, Redhead, and Chivaura, for example, argue that both Trump and Brexit were predictable events.¹⁴⁸⁰ While this was referring predominantly to social changes, we can also explore the role of technological changes and use trust to understand the implications of the interplay of social and technological developments, and what it means for Anglo-American relations moving forward. These implications resonate within each state, particularly given the broader context of societal changes outlined by Sztompka¹⁴⁸¹ and the further changes taking place amidst the digital landscape. They also have implications for the relationship between the two states, and implications for the study of trust more broadly.

Trust in a Post-Truth World?

Before moving into applying the theoretical framework, there are some key trends and challenges for trust in a post-truth world which merit discussion. It is necessary to consider what this changed context means for trust and how trust helps us to understand the changed context. This is a discussion which draws on the points raised in the thesis introduction with regards to the way in which society has changed. These changes are both broader trends, as outlined by Sztompka, and newer trends driven by the rapidity of technological change, including the role of social media in daily life and political discourse, and the changing nature of warfare. Bienvenue and Rogers point to four key interlocking features of the operating environment which are emblematic of the changes to the strategic landscape: the shift from vertical to horizontal networks of power, the expansion of the cognitive battlespace, the constant and unrestricted nature of warfare, and the erosion of trust in centralised institutions.¹⁴⁸²

We have seen in this thesis that the development of trust requires a process of social learning, facilitated through effective and repeated communication. This is something which requires trustworthy information. In the digital age, information is now easily manipulatable as the proliferation of "fake news" demonstrates. It may have been expected that changing technology would have brought with it greater opportunities for trust-building, following on from Churchill

¹⁴⁸⁰ Tara Brabazon, Steve Redhead, and Runyararo S. Chivaura, *Trump Studies: An Intellectual Guide to Why Citizens Vote Against Their Interests* (Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2019), 41.

¹⁴⁸¹ Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory*.

¹⁴⁸² Bienvenue and Rogers, "Strategic Army: Developing Trust within the Cognitive Battlespace."

and Roosevelt's use of the telegram and Kennedy and Macmillan's use of the telephone to supplement face-to-face interactions. On the other hand, people are more connected than ever, yet the information obtained through these means has proven to be untrustworthy. Concurrently, social trust and trust in democracy have declined. Malicious actors both within and outside states have sought to use misinformation and manipulation to actively target trust and break down social cohesion for political ends. This can be seen to be representative of a change in the nature of warfare, where information warfare takes place across and between whole societies in what could be termed society-centric warfare.¹⁴⁸³ Such strategies were involved in both the Brexit vote and Trump's election. As the name society-centric warfare suggests, these changes and threats will have a significant impact on societal relations, which a flat ontology demonstrates will also inherently impact the whole of the bilateral relationship.

These changes clearly represent challenges for the development of trust and the study of trust, however they also make trust even more important. When trust is understood as something which provides a social function that allows people to reduce social complexity and suspend their sense of uncertainty,¹⁴⁸⁴ it becomes obvious that trust only becomes more important in an increasingly complex and uncertain world. Although it is easy to assume that technology will provide some kind of magic bullet to increasing complexity and uncertainty, as Luhmann argued in the 1970s it is, in fact, the opposite: 'one should expect trust to be increasingly in demand as a means of enduring the complexity of the future which technology will generate'.¹⁴⁸⁵ At the same time, concerns have been raised about the impact of technology on opportunities for trust development. The impact of technology on trust can first be seen in the role it has played in facilitating the shifting flows of trust from existing in vertical hierarchies to existing in horizontal networks, as outlined by Rachael Botsman.¹⁴⁸⁶ Another challenge to trust in this space is what Shoshana Zuboff has termed surveillance capitalism.¹⁴⁸⁷ She outlines how technologies have been designed with the intent to impose conditions of certainty, which remove space for humanity and human experiences such as trust to develop.

There are, therefore, key questions to be tackled regarding the relationship between societies and technology, and between people and technology. The interplay of these factors will influence not

¹⁴⁸³ For an outline of these changes see, for example, Bienvenue, Rogers, and Troath, "Cognitive Warfare: The Fight We've Got"; Bienvenue, Rogers, and Troath, "Trust as a Strategic Resource for the Defence of Australia"; Bienvenue and Rogers, "Strategic Army: Developing Trust within the Cognitive Battlespace."

¹⁴⁸⁴ Luhmann, *Trust and Power*; Möllering, "The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension."

¹⁴⁸⁵ Luhmann, *Trust and Power*, 16.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Botsman, *Who Can You Trust? How Technology Brought Us Together - and Why It Could Drive Us Apart*.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Shoshana Zuboff, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power* (London: Profile Books, 2019).

only the likelihood of trust development, but the possibility for trust development. This is the new context in which trust in bilateral relationships must be examined. It is likely that the challenges posed by trust in the digital space will reinforce Wheeler's argument of the importance of face-to-face interactions¹⁴⁸⁸ – however, face-to-face interactions not only between leaders but between individuals across the breadth of the relationship. For now, the challenges described above raise more questions than answers, however it is an important context to consider when analysing post-Trump, post-Brexit Anglo-American relations. Primarily, the relationship between societal and technological changes provide a rich area for future trust research across all relevant disciplines to tackle.

Trump & Brexit

Changes relating to the interplay between technology and society may make trust harder, but they also make trust more important. The lessons from this thesis regarding the dimensions of trust, and the value of a flat ontology to understand trust across the breadth of a bilateral relationship, still stand. This section will briefly explore Anglo-American relations through the lens of the framework developed in this thesis, so the next section can then question the impact of the changed context of trust on the relationship after Trump's election and the beginning of the Brexit process.

What, then, is the state of play of trust across the dimensions and the domains in the Anglo-American relationship in conditions of Trump and Brexit? Trust has weakened to some extent across all three dimensions, as is evident in the tensions between 'America First' and 'Global Britain'. In calculative terms, it represents a divergence in shared interests as May's 'Global Britain' relies on belief in free trade, the rules-based international order, and inherently needs international support, whereas Trump's 'America First' involves distancing America from international support through disengaging from international treaties and obligations and showing little regard for alliances, and demonstrates disdain for multilateralism and international organisations.¹⁴⁸⁹ This automatically reduces the usefulness of Britain to America in terms of cooperating on shared values and joint goals, and the economic consequences of Brexit and their potential to impact upon military spending and capacity further weakens this. The affective and normative dimension do little to help relieve these difficulties. Trump and key figures in his administration have strong affective and normative connections to May's enemies, and to a very specific idea of Britain – the kind of Britain which requires a hard Brexit, a Britain in the image of

¹⁴⁸⁸ Wheeler, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Steve Marsh, "The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American Relations," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 16, no. 3 (2018): 285; Paul J. J. Welfens, *An Accidental Brexit* (New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017), 209–12; Lawrence Freedman, "Trump and Brexit," *Survival* 60, no. 6 (2018): 14.

Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, the kind of Britain which follows American ideas on how to “make America great again” and applies them to Britain.¹⁴⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the British ambassador to America Kim Darroch has proven relatively ineffective,¹⁴⁹¹ and the American ambassador to Britain Woody Johnson has actively harmed trust, particularly the trust of British society in America.¹⁴⁹² Relations between societies have also weakened, with Americans having lower confidence in allies across the board in a context of ‘America First’,¹⁴⁹³ and British people taking a generally unfavourable view toward Trump’s presidency.¹⁴⁹⁴ A degree of defence cooperation remains institutionalised and locked in, however weaknesses are also appearing on that front. Significant tensions exist surrounding the Huawei 5G issue,¹⁴⁹⁵ the decreased confidence Britain

¹⁴⁹⁰ Edward Luce, “Why Donald Trump Wants Theresa May to Fail on Brexit,” *Financial Times*, November 29, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/e57ef0d2-f381-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f>; See also Trump’s views on immigration in Europe and Britain: “US President Donald Trump Talks Candidly to The Sun in Exclusive Interview,” *The Sun*, July 12, 2018, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/video/news/us-president-donald-trump-talks-candidly-to-the-sun-in-exclusive-interview/>.

¹⁴⁹¹ Trump has little affection for him, having announced on twitter that he would prefer Nigel Farage as ambassador. Darroch reportedly has good access to senior Trump officials, however he has also been involved in failed lobbying attempts such as trying to convince the U.S. to stay in the Iran nuclear deal. See Edward Luce, “Our Man in the Swamp: Sir Kim Darroch,” *Financial Times*, October 24, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/59f1f874-d226-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5>; 1:04 Pm, “Transcript: Sir Kim Darroch on ‘Face the Nation,’ May 6, 2018,” *CBS News*, May 6, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-sir-kim-darroch-on-face-the-nation-may-6-2018/>.

¹⁴⁹² This has related in particular to his promotion of a US-UK free trade deal which sees British food standards lowered in order to allow for American agricultural imports. See “Ambassador Hits Back Over US Meat Standards,” *BBC News*, March 6, 2019, sec. Business, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47466812>; Jamie Doward, “US Ambassador to UK Under Fire Over Defence of Chlorinated Chicken,” *The Guardian*, March 2, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/02/us-ambassador-to-uk-woody-johnson-under-fire-over-defence-of-chlorinated-chicken-post-brex-it-jay-rayner>; “Public Willing to Sacrifice US Trade Deal to Protect Food Safety,” *IPPR*, April 7, 2018, <https://www.ippr.org/news-and-media/press-releases/public-willing-to-sacrifice-us-trade-deal-to-protect-food-safety>.

¹⁴⁹³ While May began with high US popularity, positive views of the leaders of US allies have decreased across the board. See RJ Reinhart, “British Prime Minister Theresa May Popular With Americans,” *Gallup*, February 23, 2017, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/204260/british-prime-minister-theresa-may-popular-americans.aspx>; Lydia Saad, “Americans Lukewarm Toward Leaders of U.S. Allies,” *Gallup*, August 21, 2018, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/241121/americans-lukewarm-toward-leaders-allies.aspx>.

¹⁴⁹⁴ “Global Indicators Database: Opinion of the United States: How Much Confidence Do You Have in the U.S. President (Trump ’17, Obama ’09-’16, Bush ’03-’08)?,” *Pew Research Centre*, accessed October 1, 2019, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/6/country/231/>; “British Perceptions on Donald Trump 2018,” *Statista*, 2019, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/879835/british-perceptions-on-donald-trump/>; Chris Curtis, “A Plurality of Britons Support Trump Visiting - But They Don’t Think He Should Meet the Queen,” *YouGov*, July 12, 2018, <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/07/12/plurality-britons-support-trump-visiting-they-dont>; “YouGov/ITV Tonight Survey Results,” *YouGov*, July 2018, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/n7o9ucu4o2/TonightResults_180710_Trump_w.pdf.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Gordon Corera, “Could Huawei Threaten the Five Eyes?,” February 20, 2019, sec. Technology, <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47305420>; Bill Bishop, “The U.S. Struggles to Prevent Allies from Using Huawei Equipment in 5G Networks,” *Axios*, February 23, 2019, <https://www.axios.com/allies-question-us-hardline-huawei-b77fc336-9f38-4876-a7e7-acf42e6dfdd8.html>; David Bond, “Huawei Threat Uncovers Enemy Within UK Spy Agencies,” *Financial Times*, March 1, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/1e2089a0-3ab8-11e9-b72b-2c7f526ca5d0>; Michael Shoebridge, “Why Is the UK Jeopardising Its Five Eyes Partnership Over 5G?,” *The Strategist*, March 25, 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-is-the-uk-jeopardising-its-five-eyes-partnership-over-5g/>; Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre Oversight Board, “Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) Oversight Board Annual Report 2019,” March 2019.

has in America as a reliable ally,¹⁴⁹⁶ and the decreased confidence America has in Britain's reliability, capacity, and willingness to be a military partner.¹⁴⁹⁷ Thus, to varying extents, all three dimensions of trust have weakened across all domains of the relationship.

Trump & Brexit in the Changed Context

While the lessons of this thesis stand, there will need to be further research conducted on what precisely needs to be taken into account owing to the changed context in which relationships between states now take place. Existing analyses of the impact of Brexit and Trump on the Anglo-American relationship have not taken these fundamental changes in the strategic landscape into account,¹⁴⁹⁸ and thus it will be an important factor to analyse in future research. The relationship between society and technology is of particular note here, in terms of the changes to the nature of society and the relationship between societies and governments, and the changing nature of warfare. What impact will these changes have on the dimensions of trust and the domains of the bilateral relationship? One key insight of this thesis has been the impact that the complicated relationship between societies and governments can have on the nature of trust between two states. Technology, societal changes, and society-centric warfare will further complicate this. Governments and leaders will need to think more carefully about the value of building trust, both in terms of the trust their populations have in government and governance, and the trust in the relationships they have with other states.

As highlighted by Luhmann, trust will become more important in this environment, not less. Technology will not provide a magic bullet to issues of distrust or mistrust. Given that trust reduces social complexity and allows people to suspend their sense of uncertainty, trust only becomes more important in a world of greater uncertainty and complexity. The effects of deterritorialisation and disintermediation produced by technological change further the need for an approach to the state which flattens power structures and can take account of the way trust has shifted from existing in vertical hierarchies to horizontal networks. This reinforces the utility of a flat ontology of the state, which will aid in seeking to understand trust in an era of society-centric

¹⁴⁹⁶ A 2018 report on UK foreign policy concluded that, particularly should Trump win a second term, "the Government will need to place less reliance on reaching a common US/UK approach to the main issues of the day than has often been the case in the past". See House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, "UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order," 5th Report of Session 2017-2019, 2018, 14.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Both because of the refusal to participate in military action in Syria in 2013, and ongoing fallout from the cuts to defence spending announced in 2010. See House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, "UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order"; Dunn, "UK-US Relations After the Three Bs - Blair, Brown and Bush," 674-75.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Marsh, "The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American Relations"; Welfens, *An Accidental Brexit*; Freedman, "Trump and Brexit"; Graham K Wilson, "Brexit, Trump and the Special Relationship," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no. 3 (August 2017): 543-57; Wither, "Special Relationships: Brexit and the Anglo-American Security and Defense Partnership."

warfare.

This thesis has demonstrated the importance of trust. It has also demonstrated the value of understanding trust to be multidimensional, and conceptualising the state using a flat ontology when seeking to analyse how trust and power flow in complex ways between states. These lessons will be valuable in seeking to understand how trust operates in the changed strategic landscape.

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