



Politicians as Policymakers

The Interaction of Ideology, Interests, Information and Institutions in an Australian State

By

David Waterford PSM

MEdSt (Flinders), GradDipPS (ACD), BTh (Flinders)

*Thesis
Submitted to Flinders University
for the degree of*

Doctor of Philosophy

College of Business Government and Law

June 2021

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Abstract

Politicians are involved in all aspects of policymaking, being the ultimate decision-makers. While their overall role is extensively theorised, there is limited empirical research investigating how and why politicians exercise their policymaking role. This thesis examines the processes and information used by the political executive in policymaking, using Carol Weiss' 'Four I's of Policymaking' (4I's) framework. Weiss holds that policy is the outcome of negotiation based on an interplay of the actors' ideology, interests and information in an institutional arena. Using the 4I's framework brings the examination of values, court government and political approaches to the fore, challenging the dominance of rationalism, individualism and knowledge-based perspectives found in many policy paradigms and approaches.

The 4I's framework is applied to investigate policymaking by the political executive in the state of South Australia in 2002–10, in three policy areas: bioscience industry development, the management of radioactive waste and urban water supply. Primary sources collected and used in the analysis include two unique sets of material: exclusive interviews with members of the political executive from the era and previously confidential Cabinet documents, which have only recently become accessible.

Application of the 4I's framework reveals that collective leadership mattered, with the dynamics of court government playing a significant role in policymaking. Also, it suggests that none of the four elements was the primary driver. Instead, a multivariant relationship existed.


The investigation finds that the political executive sought out and relied upon information – including 'scientific' evidence – from various sources but they were generally taken up as ideas. For example, state government policy to ensure adequate urban water supply in a time of severe drought was presented first as conservation and later as water security. Such information was interpreted through a set of values (including economic rationalism, sustainability and state developmentalism) that functioned individually as policy frames and collectively as the executive's ideology. Interests operated as the motivational force that activated these ideological values; predominantly political self-interest regarding radioactive waste management, and pursuit of the public interest regarding bioscience industry development and urban water supply policy.

Further, the case study reinforces that policy decisions were constrained or enabled by the institutional arena. For instance, the legacy of Labor's state election defeat in 1992, which was blamed on economic mismanagement, generated a conservative political identity, especially in economic matters. This led to the primacy of the value of economic rationalism in many policy decisions, trumping other values such as state developmentalism and sustainability. This is seen in an initial reluctance to build a desalination plant to address the urban water supply crisis. In contrast, the executive's reluctance to sanction a national radioactive waste repository, while consistent with its value of sustainability, was motivated by (political) self-interest. Throughout, it was corporate agency – mediated through the dynamics of court government – that mattered, with the cultural aspects of institutions more relevant than their structural aspects, expressed in shared patterns of cognition and behaviour and leading to shared approaches to policy problems.

Declaration

I certify that this thesis:

1. does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and
2. to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.



David Waterford

29 /04/ 2020

Acknowledgements

This thesis has had a long gestation, and its completion was only possible with the support and encouragement of generous colleagues and good friends. As an undergraduate in the 1980s and a masters student in the 1990s, I first encountered key concepts used in this thesis; the critical realism of Bernard Lonergan and Margaret Archer as an undergraduate and Carol Weiss' models of research utilisation and decision-making as a graduate student. I still appreciate the lecturers from those days who introduced me to these substantial scholars, giving me kernels that have at long last germinated. Further, almost two decades working in the South Australian public sector, much of it in executive roles, gave me valuable experiences and insights into government that have both implicitly and explicitly influenced my analysis. During these years my colleague Liz Wilson introduced me to the notion of executive government as court politics, often using the metaphor of a court dance. Finally, as a management consultant I have engaged with a broad body of literature on organisational development theory, which has also influenced this study.

More immediately, I want to sincerely thank my principal supervisor, Gerry Redmond, for the good humoured and generous way he both challenged and encouraged me and my initial associate supervisor, Josh Newman, who gently asked hard questions that helped sharpen my analysis. Thanks also to Charlie Lees who, as associate supervisor for the final months, offered wise counsel as I honed the final product.

I acknowledge and thank members of the 'Rann court' who participated as interviewees; without their kind contribution this study would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the staff of the Freedom of Information Unit, Department of the Premier and Cabinet who processed a large volume of documents invaluable to this research. I acknowledge Shadia Ohanessian for her artistry and support with the figures and tables in this document, Kate Leeson for her assistance with copyediting and proofreading, and the Australian Government Research Training Program for fee offsets.

I cannot begin to say how much the encouragement and support of many friends, colleagues and family members has meant to me. In particular I acknowledge and thank Denise Picton. Finally, my deepest appreciation rests with my partner, Michael, without whose support, encouragement and forbearance this study would not have come to fruition.

Abbreviations

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
ALP	Australian Labor Party
CBD	Central business district
DPC	Department of the Premier and Cabinet
DTF	Department of Treasury and Finance
DWLBC	Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation
EDB	Economic Development Board
EPA	Environment Protection Authority
ESC	Essential Services Commission
ETSA	Electricity Trust of South Australia
ExComm	Executive Committee of Cabinet
GDP	Gross domestic product
GSP	Gross state product
MLC	Member of the Legislative Council (referring to upper house members)
MP	Member of Parliament (referring to lower house members)
MSA	Multiple Streams Approach
NZ	New Zealand
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	Political advisor
SA	South Australia
SAHMRI	South Australian Health and Medical Research Institute
SIB	Social Inclusion Board
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
WPA	Water Proofing Adelaide
WfG	Water for Good

1 Introduction

This thesis examines politicians as policymakers. I reject the caricatures of Jim Hacker-like dilettantes controlled by the Sir Humphreys of the world (from the BBC series *Yes Minister*), and Frank Underwood-like treacherous pursuers of self-serving power (from the MRC series *House of Cards*). Instead, I argue that a nuanced mix of statecraft and conscience are usually at play, with politicians involved in all aspects of policymaking and being the ultimate decision-makers. Drawing on Carol Weiss' Four I's of Policymaking (4I's) framework, I examine the processes and information used by the political executive in policymaking. A coalition government in South Australia (SA) in 2002–10, dominated by the Australian Labor Party and led by Premier Mike Rann, is used as a case study.

At its most basic, policymaking is whatever governments choose to do (or not to do) to solve problems; it is how politicians make a difference (Dye, 2002). Policymaking, as in governments making authoritative decisions (Althaus et al., 2018; Easton, 1953), is an inherently collective process involving multiple players. As the democratically authorised decision-makers, elected politicians are *policymakers*. In keeping with this conceptualisation, other participants in the process have different roles. Bureaucrats are *policy workers* who research, recommend and implement policy options. A myriad of other *policy actors* seeks to influence the direction of policy in the pursuit of their values and interests. However, as necessary as these other participants are, policy workers and policy actors are not policymakers (Botterill & Fenna, 2019).

In parliamentary democracies, the collective character of policymaking extends to the political executive's role. The government is a body corporate and even the most powerful premier, or competent minister, is ultimately dependent on the consent and cooperation of her/his fellow Cabinet ministers to make policy. How politicians exercise such collective decision-making is the focus of this thesis.

In assuming a central role for the political executive in policymaking, I explore the kinds of processes and information the SA executive of 2002–10 used to this end, and how in the course of doing so it exercised value judgements on behalf of the citizens of SA. The approach calls into question some widely held instrumentalist assumptions about immutable 'objectivity' and strict 'rationality'. As already noted, it also challenges the characterisations of the political executive either as having a

limited role in policymaking in the face of powerful institutions and entrenched permanent bureaucracies (Farazmand, 2010; Niskanen, 1971), or as vote maximisers who ignore or manipulate evidence to advance a partisan position so as to be elected or re-elected to a public office (Downs, 1957; Iversen, 1994).

However, despite this elevated policymaking function, cynicism about politicians and the role of politics in policymaking is rampant in many western democracies. Almost sixty years ago, Bernard Crick addressed this concern in his classic book *In defence of politics* (1962). Since then, in the face of political scandal, broken promises and the seeming impotence of governments in the face of economic globalisation, cynicism about politics has only grown in these 'disaffected democracies' (Flinders, 2010), which include Australia and its constituent states and territories (Stoker et al., 2018). Nonetheless, I will argue that politics remains central to policymaking.

Against this backdrop of importance and apparent failure, there is a surprisingly significant gap in our understanding of the political executive's role *in policymaking*, as in the authoritative decisions concerning the actions to solve community problems. A related outcome is that most frameworks for the analysis of policymaking do not adequately account for the role of politics and politicians. More specifically, the role of the political executive is characterisable as under-researched even though heavily theorised ('t Hart & Rhodes, 2014; Hartley & Benington, 2011). In response, this thesis investigates policymaking by a political executive, identifying and analysing the processes and information used by such an executive. The investigation does so by using – and through this testing – a modified version of Weiss' 4I's framework, which positions policymaking as the result of negotiation shaped by interests, ideology, information and the institutional arena (1983, 1995, 2001) I apply this 4I's framework through a qualitative case study of the SA political executive of 2002–10. In so doing, I concentrate on three areas of policymaking: bioscience industry development, radioactive waste disposal and urban water supply.

The investigation examines four hypotheses generated from Weiss' framework:

- 1 The political executive was often more motivated by other-regarding public interests than by (political) self-interest.
- 2 The political executive's values or beliefs (i.e., its ideology) determined its policymaking more than either its interests or the information available to the executive, with the caveat that prior ideational

processes shaped the construction and operation of the other three elements.

- 3 These three determinants – ideology, interests and information – were influenced by the institutional arena within which the political executive operated.
- 4 Corporate agency was more important than individual agency, with corporate agency being essential to cause change.

In conjunction, the first three hypotheses imply a less important role for information than for ideology and interests. The fourth hypothesis suggests that conceptualising the political executive's policymaking requires a clear understanding of group dynamics. I adopt the notion of court government or court politics as the way to model (in a generic sense) the operation of group processes within the political executive.

In addition, I identify that causation moves in both directions. That is, there is no linear causation where a single factor or variable is the motor of change. The institutional arena, ideology, interests and information influence and shape one another and the thinking and behaviour of agents, who in turn go on to influence the shape of further iterations of the 4I's.

Rather than despair that politics gets in the way of policymaking, my aspiration is to find ways to identify and understand better the essential components of policymaking and the role of politicians concerning them. I contend that incorporating the world of politics (rather than rejecting it) provides a basis for improving how policymaking works as a political process. This thesis focuses on an initial step in this direction: understanding how (and to some extent why) politicians make the kinds of policy decisions they do. I seek to arrive at this understanding by asking: what kinds of processes and information did the SA political executive in 2002-10 use in policymaking?

1.1 Politics and Policymaking

In the literature on policymaking roles, there is a longstanding tension concerning political and bureaucratic leadership (Kane & Patapan, 2014; Weber, 1978b). While some see the role of the political executive as limited to agenda setting and legitimising policy, in this thesis I assume that the influence of the political executive is necessarily pervasive. Even in circumstances where time, interests or institutional

divisions of labour prevent their detailed attention, the political executive sets powerful steering norms (Page, 2012).

Recognising that politicians are *the* policymakers does not deny that bureaucrats exercise significant delegated authority (Page, 2012), that implementation adjusts and changes policy objectives (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984), nor that the resources of policy actors influence the shape of policy (Rhodes, 1997). However, recognising politicians as the policymakers situates policy as intrinsically political. Policymakers articulate and adjudicate values, sometimes negotiating trade-offs between multiple and competing interests or goods (Dahl, 1985; 't Hart, 1997; Parkhurst, 2016), and other times cycling between them (Thacher & Rein, 2004). As such, policymaking is an integrated system of activity (Capano et al., 2015) to steer the economy and society through some means of collective choice (Peters, 2016a; Pierre & Peters, 2000). Collectivity necessarily implies an interactive process variously involving cooperation and contest among numerous conflicting wants and demands from society to arrive at a set of priorities (Daviter, 2015; McConnell, 2010; Raadschelders, 2013; Wilder & Howlett, 2014). Accordingly, politicking is central to policymaking, and values are ubiquitous (Botterill & Fenna, 2019).

This is 'the art of the possible, the attainable – the art of the next best' (Otto von Bismarck, quote from Green, 2013, p. 27). Such circumstances make policymaking an art or craft (Allison, 1971, p. vi; Berlin, 1996; Raadschelders, 2013) or *bricolage* (Carstensen, 2011; Levi-Strauss, 1972) rather than a science. This conceptualisation challenges us to think of policymaking in terms of 'political judgement' (Berlin, 1996) and 'ways of knowing', rather than just 'types of knowledge' (Head, 2010). This is something more than, and different to, the application of technical knowledge. It is inclusive of the trial-and-error learning of 'casual empiricism' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) and 'practical reasoning' (Thacher & Rein, 2004) and 'a kind of tacit hermeneutic insight permitting the ostentatious recognition of the language, markers, sacred cows and shibboleths of each [constituency], as well as of the construction of their political demands' (French, 2011, p. 225). Here problems are understood iteratively via tentative solutions generated using imagination to make 'a little knowledge go a long way' (Wildavsky, 1979, pp. 15-16). As such, policymaking is always partial and subject to review and alteration. Nonetheless, it involves using ideas *and* values to fashion an 'artefact' that temporarily suspends or 'resolves the tension between resources and objectives, planning and politics, scepticism and dogma' (Wildavsky, 1979, p. 17).

1.2 Research Gap

Despite the centrality of politicians and politics just argued for, the knowledge gap asserted at the beginning of this chapter exists, in part, because much of the relevant theorising implicitly discourages research into the policymaking role of politicians. On the one hand, beginning with Harold Lasswell (Lerner & Lasswell, 1951), a significant body of theorising about policymaking is built on rationalist, apolitical and technocratic assumptions. On the other, this and other traditions of scholarship tend to position politicians as either unimportant or venal. This theorising, in turn, influences numerous empirical studies, covering a broad terrain, which consider policymaking without explicit reference to the political executive. Examples include investigations by Desmarais and Hird (2014) on the role of regulatory impact analysis in the USA; Talbot and Talbot (2015) on institutional reforms in Whitehall; Blewden et al. (2010) on immigration policy in New Zealand; Jacobson et al. (2005) on knowledge transfer in the health sector in Canada; and Hyde et al. (2016) on the intersection of mental health and child welfare policy in the USA.

In a similar vein, many historical institutionalists, especially those focusing upon the state, negate or downplay any ongoing and agential policymaking role for politicians (Peters et al., 2005). Other scholars (like Bulpitt, 1986; Downs, 1957; and Iversen, 1994), recognise politicians as resourceful actors but see their contribution as motivated almost entirely by self-interest. These scholars portray politicians as vote maximisers who ignore or manipulate evidence to advance a partisan position and to be elected or re-elected to a public office. According to this view, politicians contribute little of substance to policy. In a different way, Lasswell's 'rationalistic dream' (Botterill & Fenna, 2019, p. 50) first positioned politicians as venal by dichotomising the 'noble' undertaking of *policy* and the 'partisanship' and 'corruption' of *politics* (Lasswell, 1951, p. 8). Then, within the 'rational' and 'scientific' policy process, politicians were assigned the limited role of goal selection, which Lasswell saw as an activity of 'nonobjectivity' (1951, p. 11). The evidence-based policy movement presents a more intense belief that sound policymaking can and ought to arrive at an objective decision as to what will produce the desired policy effect, not just free of politics but (contra Lasswell) also values (Botterill & Fenna, 2019; Parkhurst, 2016; Parsons, 2002).

Even among scholars who recognise a more significant role for politicians in policymaking, there is a tendency to focus their investigations on bureaucrats,

overlooking politicians. This outcome derives, first, from a recognition that the two groups have different contexts, motivations and ways of working and, second, from the subsequent analytical decision to separately examine the bureaucratic and political elements of policymaking (Newman et al., 2016; Newman & Head, 2015; Page, 2012). Having made this distinction and choice, many scholars decide to consider the bureaucratic role first without returning to study the political. Pollitt (2014) and Raadschelders (2013) point to institutional factors exacerbating this lack of attention to the policymaking role of politicians. These include the disciplinary and sub-disciplinary divisions of labour within public administration and the faculty separation of political science and public administration in Anglophone universities.

Therefore, I propose to use the inherently political nature of policymaking as a basis for undertaking an empirical, descriptive study. My aspiration is not to improve the rationality of policymaking but, as already indicated, to find better ways to illuminate its essential components. A parsimonious way to highlight these components and their operation is to use some form of explanatory framework. I considered several alternatives before selecting the 4I's framework. I will now discuss this process of selection.

1.3 Policy Frameworks

Clearly, the policy process is marked by 'staggering complexity' (Sabatier, 2009, p. 4), often appearing messy if not unpredictable (Cairney, 2011; Hoppe & Colebatch, 2016). Numerous theories and frameworks attempt to make sense of this jumble. Being necessarily simplifications, no framework will meet all needs. However, a well-constructed framework has utility for particular purposes. In comparing several frameworks below, I am not engaging in a 'disciplinary debate' (Shore, 2007, p. 183) about their relative merits, but seeking to identify which model has the most utility in the quest to address this study's research question (Howlett et al., 2017).

For this purpose, the preferred framework should align with Hecló's (1972) notion of policy as a concept placed roughly in the middle range, between individual decisions and world views. That is, the framework should focus more on the broader political context and systemic shifts in policy orientation, though with some capacity to account for individual policies. This requirement means the framework should also link with and take account of the wider theoretical debates concerning policymaking. Its intent should be more descriptive than normative, helping to narrow the gap between practitioners' experiential accounts of policymaking and the theorised

accounts found in some frameworks. It is particularly important that the chosen framework applies to politicians and takes account of politics. Finally, it will need to be epistemologically capable of accounting for multiple types of rationality and joint meaning making; ‘a “dance” of plurivocality and pluralism’ (Hoppe & Colebatch, 2016, p. 126).

Over the past half-century, there has been a proliferation of policy frameworks seeking to economically explain policymaking; Botterill and Fenna (2019) identify at least ten: the Policy Cycle, Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, stages approach, innovation and diffusion models, institutional rational choice, Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, Network Approach, and Narrative Policy Framework. The three frameworks I consider below were selected because they are widely known and used: the Policy Cycle, ACF and MSA. I discuss these frameworks while recognising that, in addition, there is a significant body of post-structuralist theoretical work (e.g. Bacchi, 2009; Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Stone, 1997) which focuses on the construction of the policy problem, as opposed to seeing it as exogenous.


Each of the three reviewed frameworks seeks to explain how and why policy changes. The Policy Cycle approach indirectly explains change through the theories operating within each of the stages of the cycle (Cairney, 2011). ACF posits two main sources of change: small and ongoing change through policy learning by coalitions and (potentially) significant change through external ‘shocks’ such as elections, economic crises or social change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993b). MSA posits that policy change occurs when three separate streams come together at the one time: a policy problem is identified and appropriately framed, a solution to that problem is available, and the political conditions are conducive to action (Kingdon, 2011). However, as I will explain below, despite their potential utility for other purposes, none of these three leading models meets the requirements of this study.

1.3.1 Policy Cycle

Having its origins in marrying a cyclical approach to Lasswell’s (1951) chain of logical steps and Easton’s (1965) notions of dynamism, the Australian Policy Cycle (Bridgman & Davis, 2004) is one of the better-known versions of a widely promoted and used approach (see Howlett et al., 2009). In summary, the framework consists of a series of sequential steps which are said to guide both the content and process of policy development. The eight steps, as shown in Figure 1-1, are: identify issues,

policy analysis, select policy instruments, consult, coordinate, decide, implement and evaluate.

Figure 1-1: Australian Policy Cycle



Source: Adapted from Bridgman and Davis (2004).

Perhaps the greatest strength of the model is it allows both for different stages of the policy process to be analysed and for the participation of various institutional actors to be recognised (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). Related to this heuristic power, it enables one to structure and make sense of the vast body of literature on theoretical concepts, analytical tools and empirical studies (Parsons, 1995).

Nonetheless, the Policy Cycle is also extensively criticised (see Jann & Wegrich, 2007, pp. 52-57). Three shortcomings in particular work against its suitability for the purpose at hand. First is its tendency to focus on single programs and decisions. As a result, symbolic or ritual activities and those related to the maintenance of power are not features of the model. Second, the Policy Cycle tends to limit the role of knowledge, ideas and learning to the evaluation stage rather than seeing them as influential independent variables affecting all stages of the policy process (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). My research question implies that ideas and knowledge influence the decision-making of political executives throughout the policy process. Third, the model emphasises analysis and evaluation in a way that focuses so strongly on

settling debates that it misses the role of values and political discourse (Fischer, 2003).

1.3.2 Advocacy Coalition Framework


ACF seeks to analyse the effect on policy outcomes of the jointly held beliefs within an advocacy coalition. Compared to the Policy Cycle, ACF provides a messier, though potentially more complex, image of policymaking. Figure 1-2 presents a simplified diagram of the framework. On the right is the policy subsystem, with two coalitions listed, noting that they have different beliefs and resources. These coalitions develop and employ various strategies to influence government decision-making, the rules of the game and, ultimately, outcomes. Outside of the policy subsystem, and presented on the left, are the relatively stable though occasionally changing parameters of context and events. In between are long-term coalition opportunity structures and short-term constraints and resources of policy subsystem actors. These are 'intermediary categories that condition the effects of factors outside of a policy subsystem in shaping internal subsystem affairs' (Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016).

ACF recommends itself because it adopts a non-linear approach to policymaking (Blewden et al., 2010). However, like most other frameworks, and unlike the Policy Cycle approach, ACF focuses on one aspect of the policy process: the authoritative decision (Cerna, 2013; Howlett et al., 2015, 2017; Howlett et al., 2009). Two relevant strengths are noteworthy. First, policy change is related to a broader system, with 'advocacy coalitions' (rather than formal organisations or free-floating actors) regarded as the key units of internal structure and, therefore, analysis. Second, it seeks to interrelate, in an ordered way, the macro, 'meso' and micro perspectives of policy change (Capano, 2009; Grin & Loeber, 2007). That is, it interrelates an understanding of change at the system level (macro), policy area level (meso), and individual policy or decision level (micro).

However, a weakness of ACF is that it undervalues the role of ideas. While they have a central place in the model, ideas are not strong drivers of change, but rather adhesives binding advocacy coalitions together. Further, while external factors are prevalent in modelling the motors of change, ACF pays insufficient attention to the internal dynamics of policymaking and their feedback effects, or the fact policy networks and advocacy coalitions try to manipulate internal and external factors to their advantage (Capano, 2009). Finally, ACF presents debate primarily as the

technical and rationalistic endeavour of experts (Fischer, 2003), leaving little space for politics. In this context, politicians are not part of advocacy coalitions. The framework seeks to analyse how advocacy coalitions seek to realise their goals ‘by influencing the behaviour of multiple governmental institutions over time’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993a, p. 212) rather than how a governmental institution like the political executive makes decisions.

Figure 1-2: Advocacy Coalition Framework




Source: Adapted from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993a).

1.3.3 Multiple Streams Approach

MSA has its origins in empirical research by John Kingdon into policy agenda setting and was inspired by the ‘garbage can model of organization choice’ (Cohen et al., 1972). As illustrated in Figure 1-3, the MSA framework is centred on the distinction between three ‘streams’, which are depicted as largely independent from one another: the problem, policy and politics streams. These streams sometimes join when ‘policy entrepreneurs’ exploit ephemeral ‘policy windows’. Stressing the central role of contingency in agenda setting and policy development, Kingdon’s framework ‘emphasizes both agency (the role of policy entrepreneurs) and timing (the elusive and short-lived policy windows these entrepreneurs must take advantage of to move their issues to the forefront)’ (Béland, 2016, p. 230).

Analysis using MSA draws our attention to the power of ideas together with the need for receptivity to them (Cairney, 2011). However, the approach is too narrow in its focus for application to policymaking by the political executive. Firstly, while Kingdon uses accessible concepts to explain *agenda setting*, they do not transfer readily to other stages of policymaking (Botterill & Fenna, 2019). Second, except for its conceptual origins in the ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making (Cohen et al., 1972), MSA makes little reference to the broader policy studies literature. This means that there is no ‘immediate prospect of turning MSA into a detailed theory or model’ (Cairney & Jones, 2016, p. 41). Third, and most importantly, while one of the streams is termed ‘politics’, Kingdon conceives of it narrowly (2011, p. 145). In MSA ‘politics’ refers to electoral and partisan issues such as those one might find discussed in the ‘politics’ section of *The Sydney Morning Herald* or *The Advertiser* (as in political self-interest), resulting in vague understandings of ideology and ideological battles (Béland, 2016; Botterill & Fenna, 2019).

Figure 1-3: Multiple Streams Approach



Source: Adapted from Mu (2018).

All three leading policy frameworks are, obviously, heuristic in nature and broadly descriptive in their approach to analysing policymaking. However, the Policy Cycle seems to be more prescriptive than either ACF or MSA. In terms of conformity with the criteria outlined above, none of these frameworks easily applies to politicians.

The Policy Cycle approach implicitly excludes politicians from some of the stages, and the focus of ACF and MSA is on the role of 'policy coalitions' and 'policy entrepreneurs' respectively at a specific stage in the policy process. In ACF, political executives are not 'policy coalitions' but are the object these coalitions seek to influence. While in MSA individual politicians can be 'policy entrepreneurs', the focus is not so much on decision-makers but on those seeking to influence the agenda taken up by decision-makers (Howlett et al., 2017). That is, the focus is on individuals who advocate new ideas, develop proposals, define problems and alternatives, broker coalitions, and mobilise public opinion to support and influence decision-makers (Kingdon, 1984, 2011). Further, values and politics (in the sense discussed here) are not a central focus for any of these frameworks. While ACF treats policy as a middle-range concept, this is not naturally the case for the Policy Cycle or MSA. Finally, the Policy Cycle does not explicitly account for joint decision-making. The conclusion drawn from this brief review is that these well-known policy frameworks do not adequately account for the role of politics and politicians. It is, therefore, necessary to look elsewhere. As already noted, I propose to use Weiss' 4I's framework.

1.4 Weiss' Framework


Weiss developed the 4I's of policymaking framework to 'explore how interests, ideologies, information, and institutional norms and culture affect the character of decisions made by people who have authority to make consequential decisions' (1983, p. 572). At its most fundamental, the framework holds that policy is the outcome of negotiation (i.e., discussions and bargaining) among actors based on their different policy positions. In Weiss' framework, decision-makers are central to the negotiation in a way not seen in the Policy Cycle, ACF and MSA. Accordingly, an actor's policy position (including the decision-maker's) is rarely static but, having been initially advanced, is modified in the course of the negotiation. The framework posits that the content of each actor's policy positions is the interplay of ideology (values and beliefs), interests (motivations), and information (knowledge) as the actor (group or individual) interprets them. It also suggests that a 'host of structural and procedural influences' (Weiss, 1983, p. 221) – the institutional arena – affects the negotiation.

Therefore, the interaction among the 4I's is constant and iterative. Further, there is potential for policymakers to continuously (re)specify their ideologies and interests in

the course of processing information in an institutional context (Weiss, 1983, 1995, 1999). Weiss presents the framework as overlapping elements, without specifying the path of interaction among the elements (Weiss, 1983, p. 229), as illustrated in Figure 1-4.

The framework draws on a wide range of decision-making and organisational literature (e.g. Allison, 1971; Bunn, 1984; Cyert & March, 1963; Lindblom, 1980; Simon, 1957; Wilensky, 1967), and Weiss' extensive empirical and theoretical work in the field of evaluation (Pollitt, 2006). It brings together several critical theoretical constructs. These include those relating to ideas, ideology, institutions, organisational learning, research utilisation and values. In some instances, Weiss was engaging with these constructs at the cutting edge of significant developments, for example, the development of ideational theory (Smith, 2013). The framework is equally capable of focusing on individual programs or decisions as on the 'mid-range', unlike, for example, the Policy Cycle. Accordingly, we can see the 4I's framework used by Connell (2016) to investigate parents' schooling choices for their children in one school district, by Weiss (1995) to evaluate the implementation of a shared decision-making program in 12 schools, and by Putansu (2020) to investigate a national education reform program.

Figure 1-4: Weiss' 4I's of Policymaking



Source: Adapted from Weiss (1995).

Congruent with the definition of policymaking articulated earlier in this chapter, democratic assumptions underpin the framework. Weiss assumes it is 'the imperative of democratic decision-making' (Weiss, 1983, p. 222) for public office holders to accommodate the interests and ideologies represented in the society. This contrasts with ACF, MSA and the Policy Cycle which, as noted above, do not give a central role to values. Further, while quality information is a critical input for deliberative democracy, for Weiss, those holding that 'scientific research' is the most valid basis of decision-making misread the nature of democracy (1983, p. 220) and inappropriately seek to shift the venue of democratic decision-making (1995). Consistent with Weiss' understanding, this tension between the perspectives and roles of experts and politicians was on vivid display in the 2020 debates about how to respond to COVID-19, especially in the USA. The 4I's framework descriptively identifies that political executives have ideological convictions and constellations of interests that mostly set the course they steer (Weiss, 1991a). The role of information (and expertise) is to help policymakers decide which policies are best suited to the realisation of the ideologies and interests they hold to be represented in the community (Weiss, 1983, 1991a).

A review of the use of the 4I's framework (discussed in Chapter 2) indicates that this thesis is its first application to a political executive. My application of the 4I's reveals the need to adjust the framework in light of more recent research. This modification is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. In summary, I propose four enhancements, one of them methodological and three theoretical. In terms of method, I use the construct of 'court government' as a device to efficiently explore issues of institutional norms and culture. I do this with particular reference to the group dynamics of the 'Rann court'. The first theoretical adjustment is to broaden the understanding of 'interests'. In keeping with scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s, Weiss positioned decision-makers as primarily motivated by political self-interest. Based on more recent scholarship, and consistent with Weiss' aside comments about altruism, I extend 'interests' to include other-regarding interests also. This is especially illustrated by the political executive seeking to address the 'public interest' in its decision to build a desalination plant, which is discussed in Chapter 6. The second theory-related adjustment relates to understanding how 'information' is constructed. Here I draw on the theorising of critical realists Margaret Archer (2003) and Bernard Lonergan (1992) about knowledge to distinguish moments of insight and judgement from the more 'rational' processes of definition and conceptualisation. Aspects of the political executive's desalination plant decision are discussed in this regard. The third relates to explaining change. Weiss recognised that the distribution of power 'determines WHOSE ideology, interests, and information will be dominant' (1983, p. 239, original emphasis) but did not go on to detail how this occurred. I have drawn on Archer's (1988, 1995) work on causation and agency as a way to do so. This approach is briefly outlined in the next section.

1.5 Causation and Agency

While the four elements of the 4I's framework – information, interests, ideology and the institutional arena – can be conceptualised as variables of policymaking, their relationship to one another is multidirectional (Andersen et al., 2013; Bryant, 2011; Hackman, 2012; Seidl & Whittington, 2014; Weiss, 1983, 1995). This relationship makes it empirically difficult to hold one as the independent variable to undertake co-variant analysis. In part, this further justifies the qualitative case study approach adopted for this thesis, as discussed in Section 1.6 and Chapter 3. This means relying on thick historical descriptions and narratives to make causal claims (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Seha & Müller-Rommel, 2016).

However, this analytical approach raises important questions about the interplay of structure and agency, and of individual agency and corporate agency. These dynamics, in turn, influence and are influenced by the interaction of the political executive's ideology and interests with the available information. To explain this interplay, I draw on Archer's theorising about continuity and change. There are three foundational distinctions to note here, which are discussed further in the next chapter. First is the distinction between the individual and the constraining/enabling/motivating social context, generally known as agency and structure, respectively. Having distinguished the two, Archer (1995) holds that 'structure necessarily predates the action(s) which transform it' (p. 138) and 'that structural elaboration necessarily postdates those actions' (p. 168). For example, the political executive always operates in a pre-existing political system, even if its election manifesto is fundamentally to reform that system; any consequent reform necessarily postdates the attempt. At the heart of Archer's explanatory model is the notion of elaboration/reproduction via a 'before, during, and after' schema. Archer's approach provides a clear theoretical explanation of how agency can sometimes shape structure/culture and, on other occasions, structure/culture can shape human agency (Newman, 2019).

Second is the distinction between the reality of our social situation and our awareness of that reality, respectively known as the material and the ideational aspects of social life. Archer makes this distinction to avoid conflating structure (the material aspects of social life) and culture (the ideational aspects of social life), thereby ensuring that the impact of structural mechanisms can be recognised beyond the cultural rules through which our behaviour is constrained, enabled and motivated (Archer, 1995). In combination, the individual–context distinction and the material–ideational distinction form a three-way split between individual, structure and culture.

The third is the distinction between 'primary agency' and 'corporate agency'. For Archer, corporate agents are those 'who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to themselves and to others, and have organised to obtain it, can engage in concerted action to reshape or retain the structural and or cultural features in question' (2000, p. 265). Primary agents are distinguished from corporate agents at any time by their lack of a say in structural or cultural elaboration/reproduction. This distinction implies that members of the political executive cannot act alone. Shared goals and coordinated action are prerequisites for both elaboration and reproduction of policy positions.

The requirement for members of the political executive to act in concert in order to bring about change brings to the fore notions of the group and group dynamics. Throughout this thesis, I will use the extended metaphor of 'court government' as a way to capture and explain the group dynamics of the political executive. That is, 'political executive' is the term used to capture 'the court', and 'court government' or 'court politics' are the terms used to describe the types of group dynamics operating within the political executive.

The executive can mean one branch of government (distinguished from the legislative and judicial branches) or, more narrowly, the political part of the executive branch. Generally, where precisely to draw the boundary between the political part and the remainder of the executive is itself a hotly contested issue (Müller, 2001). For the purposes of this thesis, I draw on 'core executive' studies (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990; Elgie, 1997) and focus on the formal and informal positions and organisations, functions, relationships and institutions which make policy decisions ('t Hart, 2014). In this approach, the executive/court is conceived more narrowly than the whole executive branch, but as including more than politicians. Practically, this means it includes the premier, the Cabinet, ministers, senior bureaucrats, partisan advisors and selected expert advisers as participants in the policy process. This kind of conceptualisation of participants, together with the notion that policymaking involves the process of articulating, mobilising and accommodating values, logically leads to the conclusion not only that policymaking decisions are a group process, but that the decision-maker is a body corporate that is more than the sum of its parts.

In a similar way, the historical literature on court government generally defines a political court as a network of intersecting and overlapping groups, functions, factions, processes and the like (Elton, 1976; Partridge, 2008; Williamson, 1974). In terms of understanding the dynamics of the political executive, I particularly draw on 't Hart's framing of a political court as: a think-tank that processes information to arrive at a shared representation of events; a sanctuary where task cohesion and *esprit de corps* provide support in the face of opposition; an arena, as in a field of contest where differences and conflicts are brought to the surface and managed; and a ritual wherein the repetition of specific conceptual and behavioural routines or patterns provides legitimacy ('t Hart, 2014; 't Hart et al., 1997).

1.6 Case Study

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the case used to examine the role of politicians as policymakers is that of the SA political executive over the period 2002–10. SA is a sub-national government; a state in a wider federation, the Commonwealth of Australia. It has a bicameral Parliament and an executive ('the Cabinet') whose members sit as members of the Parliament. At the time of the case study, the political executive was a coalition government in which the dominant member was the SA branch of the Australian Labor Party (hereafter Labor Party). The case study will investigate policymaking by the SA political executive by focusing on three areas that were the focus of considerable attention by policymakers in the first decade of this century: urban water supply, the management of radioactive waste and bioscience industry development.

A fundamental assumption is that in each of the three policy areas the political executive wielded significant direct control over policymaking. Consequently, the question for this thesis is, as already noted: *what kinds of processes and information did the political executive use in policymaking?* To adequately address this question, I consider not only the types of inputs and processes selected but also, as much as is possible, how and why this selection occurred. Based on a large body of public policy literature, I hypothesise that this selection involved the political executive articulating, mobilising and accommodating values (its ideology), information and interests to make its choices.

My exploration of how and why the political executive selected particular processes or information is based on extensive empirical analysis of the documents that record the political executive's construction of the issues at the time of the decision-making, alongside the reflections by principal actors on these issues more than a decade after the event. The construction of the issues at the time will be identified from public statements (recorded in media releases, parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, official reports and the like), as well as in the records of Cabinet decisions, which at the time were confidential and legally inaccessible material but are now obtainable. The subsequent reflections will be in the form of transcripts from elite interviews. Through a process of triangulation, the aim is to come to an understanding of the 'real' (Archer, 1995; Porpora, 2015; Sayer, 1992) meaning of the political executive's decision-making rather than accepting the subjective and qualitative interpretations that would emerge from relying on elite interviews alone.

The approach of the political executive to policymaking is, as already noted, an under-researched area. This fact, together with the need to gain more detailed insights into 'variables' that are not yet fully known and whose empirical relationship is not yet fully understood, strongly recommends a qualitative case study approach. This uncertainty means the topic requires the generation of thick descriptions to demonstrate particular causal relationships (Blatter & Blume, 2008), thereby giving greater depth to my assessment of the 4I's framework (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 2014; Rimkute, 2015).

The study of a single case – SA – is justified, in the main, by the need to build theory in an under-researched area (Blaikie & Priest, 2018; Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Campbell, 1975; Lijphart, 1971). Linked to this, SA provided a unique opportunity for easier and earlier access to previously confidential Cabinet documents than was the case for other Australian jurisdictions. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the availability of these documents ten years after their creation and the opportunity to interview Cabinet ministers from the era are critical factors that coalesced with regard to SA in a way they did not with the Commonwealth or other Australian states and territories. The need to investigate in detail variables that are not yet fully understood also forms part of the justification for focusing on a single case. In applying Weiss' 4I's framework, the most stable element is the institutional arena, inclusive of the political executive's culture, while the other three factors (ideology, interests and information) are shifting. The uniqueness of this relatively stable element means comparing the SA case with, say, that of Victoria or Queensland would require more time and space than available in this thesis process. As the within-case analysis of policymaking draws on three distinct policy areas – bioscience industry development, radioactive waste disposal and urban water supply – some robust insights from the analysis of these three policy areas will add to concept validity overall when viewed in parallel. I will now briefly overview the policymaking endeavours in each of these areas investigated in this thesis.

1.6.1 Bioscience Industry

Bioscience industry development requires the government to use a variety of policy instruments to encourage and support entrepreneurial individuals and organisations to commercialise, or otherwise generate economic value from, research findings and discoveries in the life sciences (including agriculture and environment), medicine, biotechnology, bio-analytical instruments and software (Smith, 2005; Teng, 2008). The political executive came to office with a clear position on this policy area that

was articulated in the election policies of the Labor Party. This policy position focused on supporting a transition of SA's substantial manufacturing sector from traditional to advanced manufacturing. The belief that government has a facilitating role in the economic development of the state was strongly present, as was a sense that the policy position was motivated by a sense of public interest.

The case study focuses on two aspects of policymaking in this area. One relates to attempts by the political executive to (further) develop a private sector 'bioeconomy' in SA by providing access to venture capital for promising bioscience businesses and the expansion of an already existing innovation incubator. The other is the consolidation and expansion of government-sponsored agricultural and medical science research institutes. While these policy directions had broad bipartisan support, influential elements within the bureaucracy were not necessarily as supportive. The analysis illustrates instances where, even when political considerations were the motivator for initiating policy work, the political executive's decision-making was dependent on, and indeed delayed by, the desire for quality information.

A policy focus on bioscience during this period was not unusual. In the early 2000s most OECD countries had policies articulating both a belief in bioscience industry development as integral to their economic future (Chalmers & Nicol, 2004) and the strategies to facilitate such development (Harman, 2010). The emergence of genomics (the mapping and editing of human and plant genes) and 'biopharming' (the evolution of bio-farming into the areas of biofuels, bioplastics, biofertilisers, biopesticides and bioremediation) led key opinion leaders like Alan Greenspan (2000), then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, to promote the productivity-expanding nature of the dramatic advances in biotechnology and for others to see it as the next big breakthrough after information technology (Smith, 2005).

Despite the laudatory comments from the likes of Chairman Greenspan, the scope for rapid and extensive commercialisation of complex scientific discoveries is modest (Birch, 2006; Birch & Tyfield, 2013). For example, in health care bioscience commercialisation has delivered innovative treatments, but predominantly 'for rare diseases with small markets' (Rasnick, 2003) rather than the highly profitable, population-wide breakthroughs promised (though COVID-19 vaccines present a unique exception to this analysis). Nonetheless, Labor went to the 2002 election believing that SA had a competitive advantage in bioscience and a clear policy


commitment to facilitate the expansion of this industry (ALP(SA), 2002k; 2002n). The focus of my analysis is on policy activity from the development of Labor's policy position for the 2002 election through to Cabinet's approval of the establishment of the SA Health and Medical Research Institute (SAHMRI) in December 2009.

1.6.2 Radioactive Waste

In contrast to bioscience, with radioactive waste policy we see a clear example of political self-interest as the primary motivator. There are vast uranium reserves in Australia, mainly in SA, which account for about one-third of the known global total. Australia has a somewhat contradictory relationship with radioactive products (Graetz & Manning, 2016; Manning, 2010). It mines and exports uranium but is one of the world's few wealthy, advanced industrial democracies without nuclear energy. It has no nuclear weapons but 'hosted' British atomic testing during the 1950s–60s in the remote lands of the Maralinga people in SA, 800 km north-west of Adelaide, the capital city of SA (McClelland, 1985; Michel, 2003). More recently, Australia has been a player in international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation, all the while continuing to export uranium (Clarke, 2016; Lantis, 2008).

Radioactive waste is a by-product of industrial/armaments processes often thought of as the 'nuclear fuel cycle'. Figure 1-5 presents this as a nine-stage process for power generation from exploration to final disposal as follows: 1) exploration, 2) mining, 3) milling to crush the mined ore to then extract uranium oxide, 4) enrichment of the uranium oxide to increase the naturally occurring U-235 isotope from 0.7% to 3–5% of the volume; 5) fabrication of the enriched uranium oxide into rods and the like for use in power plants; 6) nuclear activity; 7) interim storage; 8) reprocessing; and 9) final storage. It is referred to as a cycle because the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuel rods is an option, even if not universally pursued. The steps are somewhat modified in the case of radioactive material processed for other purposes, for example medical pursuits. The most important point to note is that in all cases radioactive waste is generated at each stage until final storage (Rosa et al., 2010). The 'nuclear activity' stage covers a diverse range of pursuits (Scarce, 2016), including: military, power generation, research, industrial (e.g. manufacturing of instruments), oil and gas extraction (e.g. tracking of flows in wells), and medical (e.g. treatment of cancer).

Figure 1-5: Nuclear Process – Extraction-Production-Storage



Source: simplified representation of figure created by Pennsylvania State University Radiation Science and Engineering Centre (EIA, 2018).

Apart from waste generated by the extraction and processing of uranium ore, Australia's low- and intermediate-level waste is very small in volume. The only high-level waste generated in Australia comes from a small reactor operated since 1958 by the Commonwealth Government at Lucas Heights, south of Sydney. Its primary role is the production of radioactive material for medical treatments and procedures.

At the time of the case study, nuclear policy in SA was predominantly constituted by two distinct but overlapping policy concerns: the management of radioactive waste and the expansion of uranium mining. The latter will not be a focus in analysing the SA case, but will need to be referred to at times when discussing disposal of radioactive waste given the volume of waste generated, especially in the milling phase. The precipitating 'event' for policymaking in this area was the Commonwealth Government's proposal to site a radioactive waste repository in SA, seeking to end more than two decades of political inability to determine the final storage site for spent fuel rods in interim storage at Lucas Heights.

In exploring this policy area, I consider the relevant parliamentary debates in 2000 that established Labor's position while it was still in opposition, through to Cabinet's consideration in November 2005 of a feasibility study for the longer-term storage of waste generated in SA. My investigation suggests policymaking by the SA political executive in 2002–10 was *framed* in terms of environmental protection, but that opportunistic political self-interest was the *motivator* for the executive's staunch opposition to siting a national radioactive waste repository in SA. However, application of this environmental protection policy frame to the political executive's response to radioactive waste spills in the uranium mining sector is found to be more complex. We will also see conflict between the political executive's desire to achieve its policy goal of preventing spills of radioactive waste from tailings dams and its economic development agenda for minerals exploration generally. This, in turn, sheds some light on how the political executive resolved both conflicts between different aspects of its ideology and between various of its members championing these different aspects.

1.6.3 Urban Water Supply

The third policy area considered is urban water supply. Without potable water, modern cities cannot exist (Swyngedouw, 2004) and between 2006 and 2008 there was escalating concern that severe drought would cause Adelaide's supply of potable water to run out. In SA, as with much of the developed world, a powerful paradigm (Hall, 1993) had long dominated the public understanding of urban water infrastructure networks. Water was imagined as an essential service, delivered in broadly similar ways to (virtually) everyone and at similar cost (Graham & Marvin, 2002). It was accepted wisdom that water was delivered through a publicly owned instrumentality, operated on a monopolistic basis, based on the long-term accumulation of engineering 'know-how' (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014; Graham & Marvin, 2002; Troy, 2008).

While this remained the broad public view, from the 1990s onwards public water utilities operated by state governments in Australia were caught up in wider national debates and policymaking regarding market-based microeconomic reform (Quiggin, 2006). The upshot of these debates was a focus on policy changes related to: productivity; reduction of state subsidies; user-pays pricing reforms; full cost recovery; separation of regulation, policy and provision; use of market and property rights mechanisms; and promoting community/customer participation.

My analysis of the State of SA focuses on urban water supply policy from when the Labor opposition established its policy position in late 2001 through to the second-term Labor-led government releasing a major policy statement in June 2009. The intervening period is marked by a delayed start in policymaking by the government, followed by an extensive process of community consultation, analysis and negotiation. This led to the release of the government's initial policy position, presented in the *Water Proofing Adelaide* plan in June 2005, whose core philosophy was environmental, with a focus on reducing domestic consumption of water.

However, almost as soon as the document was released, drought conditions that had been affecting SA since 2001 worsened and the political executive was forced to grapple with strongly competing views within the 'court' regarding how to respond. After significant debate, Cabinet made the controversial decision to invest significantly in constructing a desalination plant. In light of this decision, the supposed twenty-year *Water Proofing Adelaide* plan was replaced with a differently focused policy position (*Water for Good*), seeking to balance social and economic considerations with environmental ones. My overall analysis of this area of policymaking reveals a political executive repeatedly grappling to take account of new and relevant information, in part because of the power of specific interests and ideologies and, in part, because the arena-type dynamics of court government meant it took time for a consensus to emerge from among Cabinet members' competing interests and ideologies.

Across the three policy areas, and more generally, we will see that, firstly, the political executive sought out and relied upon information from a variety of sources, including 'scientific' evidence. This information was generally taken up when received as summary 'judgements' and was interpreted through the lens of a set of values (its ideology). Secondly, it will emerge that this weighing process was variously motivated by public interest and political self-interest. Finally, the case study reinforces that, for policy decisions to be realised at the program level, political action is often required to overcome institutional (and other) barriers. Together, these findings lead to the conclusion that a modified version of Weiss' Four I's (the one methodological and three theoretical enhancements discussed in Section 1.4 above) provides an economical explanation of the complex dialectical process that characterised the policymaking of the SA political executive in 2002–10.

Before providing an overview of each of the chapters in this thesis, I will mention a point concerning terminology. For consistency, throughout the thesis, whenever

discussing in the abstract 'leadership-of-Cabinet-government', I use the term premier rather than the perhaps more common 'prime minister'. This is because of the title for this role in SA and I want it to be understood, unless otherwise indicated, that any discussion of leadership is applicable to the case study. Further, across comparable polities a wide variety of titles are used, not just 'prime minister'. For example: chancellor (Germany); chief minister (Australian territories); first minister (Scotland and Wales); premier (Australian states and Canadian provinces); president of the government (Spain); and statsminister (Denmark).

1.7 Thesis Outline

In the chapters that follow, I analyse how the ideology and interests of the political executive interact with one another and with information, and all three elements within an institutional arena, to explain policymaking. This analysis will begin in Chapter 2 ('The 4I's in Context') with a review of the theoretical debates relating to the four elements of Weiss' framework. In presenting these debates I discuss Weiss' 4I's framework in more detail and give further consideration to how to conceptualise the political executive, exploring 'court government' as a useful way to understand how the dynamics of the political executive as a group influenced policymaking.

Chapter 3 (Methods) explains the case-study approach being used for this thesis. In terms of methodological choices, the chapter justifies selecting a single case and gives an explanation of how the three policy areas were chosen. The chapter then presents the process for collecting elite interviews and primary source documents, followed by an overview of how these data were analysed, as well as identifying some methodological challenges of the approach adopted.

Having set this context of theory in Chapter 2, and methodology in Chapter 3, I commence the analysis of the SA case using the 4I's framework. Starting with the 'Institutional Arena' (Chapter 4), I discuss how organisational culture and structure – though particularly culture – shaped and influenced the political executive's policymaking. For example, at the more macro level, consideration is given to the influence of SA's political and economic system. This includes the electoral system of SA, the change in its economic circumstances from a protected, manufacturing economy to an industrial rustbelt, and the blame attributed to the Labor Party for this outcome. At the meso level, the organisational culture includes the way the dominant political party within the political executive (Labor) interpreted these macro and other significant events in its (then) recent history, including the conclusions it drew

concerning why Labor lost office in 1993. This process generated a conservative political identity going into the 2002 election, which I categorise as the political executive's dominant logic (Mutch, 2009), and identify as emerging principally through the cooperative factional dynamics operating between the party's Left and Right factions. At the micro-level, the analysis includes a focus on the Premier's leadership style and the court dynamics within the Cabinet, which are shown to involve significant elements of asymmetrical power relations. The investigation of these structural and cultural aspects of the political executive underpins a discussion of whether policymaking was primarily shaped by institutions or individuals.

In Chapter 5 the discussion turns to the second element in the 4I's framework, ideology, which Weiss defines as the values or beliefs of the various participants in the policy process. Based on my analysis of primary sources, I identify five values which together constituted the political executive's ideology. These are defined in some detail, followed by a discussion of how the political executive's ideology influenced its decision-making in each of the three policy areas of bioscience industry development, radioactive waste management and urban water supply.

In Chapter 6 ('Interests') I analyse certain aspects of the political executive's policymaking in terms of public interest and then political self-interest. I identify that public interest was the stronger motivation in urban water supply policy and bioscience industry development policy, and political self-interest was the more pronounced motivation concerning crucial aspects of radioactive waste disposal policy. I suggest that the political executive confronted multiple publics (each with different interests) and that negotiation, compromise and accommodation among these competing interests ultimately led to a mixture of motives operating.

The penultimate chapter (Chapter 7) considers the role of information in policymaking, finding that it was not so much scientific or research knowledge directly shaping policy but ideas, especially communicated as what I term 'public judgement', 'expert judgement' and 'bureaucratic judgement', that were of importance. Further, the nature of these ideas and their communication was shaped by the highly ritualised format for preparing, reading and considering Cabinet submissions and the political executive's action of 'puzzling', as in a process of debate and persuasion. However, we will see that the rules for preparation of Cabinet submissions, though inherited from previous administrations, were adapted to take account of the ideological concerns of the political executive. This is consistent with Weiss' theorising.

The final chapter summarises the findings and conclusions that emerged through applying the 4I's framework. After making some overarching comments about the three policy areas of bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply, I discuss five findings before highlighting my thesis' contribution to public policy scholarship, its limitations, and further research possibilities. In summary the findings are first, to broadly confirm the four hypotheses articulated at the beginning of this chapter. Second, the thesis also finds that the enhancements to the 4I's framework outlined earlier in this chapter, and discussed in Chapter 2, usefully extend it as an interactive theoretical model investigating policymaking by a political executive. They are: using 'court government' as a device to explain institutional norms and culture; extending interests to include pursuing the 'public interest'; and drawing on critical realism to provide a more structured explanation of the operation of the information element and of power across all four elements. This approach is outlined in the next chapter. The third finding is that it is possible to define each of the elements of the 4I's framework more economically and state how they operate and are applied. Further, I find that the political executive was actively involved in policymaking by plying a political craft inclusive of both statecraft and conscience leadership, and cannot be characterised simply as either dilettantes or vote maximisers. Finally, this thesis finds that the experience of opposition fundamentally influenced the political executive's policymaking approach by shaping its dominant logic and ideology before it took office.

2 The Four I's in Context

As touched on earlier, the underlying contention of this thesis is that politicians are central to policymaking, acting collectively and using a form of 'political craft' to make decisions. This chapter reviews the public policy literature relevant to the application of the 4I's framework to investigate the kinds of information and decision-making processes used for this exercise of political craft through corporate agency. Based on this literature, I propose innovative extensions of the 4I's framework drawing on Archer's critical realism and also through the notion of court government. In subsequent chapters, I use this enhanced understanding of the framework to explore how the SA political executive operated in its policymaking role.

I suggest policymaking is more than applying functional rationality. It is fundamentally an exercise in adjudicating between *competing values* (Dahl, 1985; Hart, 1997; Parkhurst, 2016). In government and public administration, the process of values adjudication, like all government decision-making, necessarily occurs through *social interaction* rather than individual cognition (Hart, 2014; Stone, 1997) and needs to arrive at the *collective expression* of a decision. Accordingly, my primary unit of analysis is the political executive as a *corporate actor* (Kingdon, 2011; Ostrom, 2009; Sabatier, 1991; Stone, 1997). In keeping with these notions of a corporate actor and policymaking through social interaction, I propose a model of 'court government'. I adopt this approach as a way to understand who was involved in policymaking and the way *collective behaviour* occurred.

Like Weiss and others, I contend policy decisions made by a political executive are shaped by the interaction of knowledge (i.e., information), values (i.e., ideology) and interests in an institutional context ('t Hart, 2014; 't Hart et al., 1997; Rhodes & Tiernan, 2016; Weiss, 1983, 1995, 2001). In this context, ideas emerge as having greater relevance than research evidence as the central content for policymaking (Béland, 2009; Smith, 2007, 2013; Weiss, 1982) and the application of 'common sense, casual empiricism, or thoughtful speculation and analysis' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979, p. 12) as more pertinent to a political executive's decision-making than scientific methods.

In this chapter, and throughout the thesis, whenever referring to the body of scholarship relevant to my research, I use the term 'public policy studies' in preference to either 'public administration' or 'political science'. This thesis studies

the practice of an aspect of government rather than the practice of public administration. The element of government being investigated is the role of a political executive in policymaking, thereby delving into the field of political science without being a study of politics per se. Using 'public policy studies' or 'policy research' indicates the interdisciplinary nature of the work, which is unified by its 'object of study', the making of public policy (cf. Pollitt, 2014; Raadschelders, 2003, 2013), and distinguishes between 'public policy' as specifying the action of government and 'public policy studies' or 'policy research' as signifying the study of those actions (Botterill & Fenna, 2019). This distinction mirrors the natural linguistic differentiation that exists between the terms 'politics' and 'political science' (Raadschelders, 2013).

This chapter has six sections plus a conclusion; each engages with an aspect of the academic debates that contextualise the 4I's framework and supports how I have chosen to address my research question. In Section 2.1, I delve more deeply into Weiss' understanding of the four elements of the framework and their interaction, as well as considering how other researchers have used the 4I's framework. Section 2.2 examines debates around institutions, especially the structure–agency debate. Section 2.3 builds on the review of institutionalism by looking more closely at the notion of corporate agency, discussing executive government as a group process and explaining how I use the concept of court government to understand and analyse the dynamics of such a group. In Section 2.4, I situate Weiss' use of ideology within broader debates about the concept and discuss how values, as a component of ideology, can be viewed and analysed as conceptual frames. This discussion is followed in Section 2.5 by an exploration of aspects of the debates concerning self-interest and other-regarding interests, leading to the conclusion that it is appropriate to extend 'interests' in the 4I's to include other-regarding interests. In Section 2.6, I discuss the implications of Weiss' definition of information and then turn to consider the debate among public policy scholars as to whether information or power is the most important variable for policymaking. A brief conclusion (Section 2.7) follows this section, wherein I draw together the implications of these contextual issues for the subsequent analysis of the SA case.

2.1 Weiss' 4I's Framework

As discussed in Chapter 1, the 4I's framework (Weiss, 1983, 1995) – consisting of ideology, interests, information and institutional arena – is a theoretical approach to explain policymaking. It proceeds descriptively and heuristically rather than

normatively. At its most fundamental, the framework holds that policy is the outcome of negotiation (i.e. discussions and bargaining, or what Hecló (1974) calls 'puzzling') among policy participants based on their different and continuously evolving policy positions. The framework posits that the content of each *participant's policy position* results from a dialectical interaction of ideology, interests and information as the actor interprets them. *Enacted policy* is the outcome of negotiation wherein there is a further dialectical interplay of the participants' competing ideologies and interests with the available information in the context of a 'host of structural and procedural influences' (Weiss, 1983, p. 221) – the institutional arena.

Therefore, the interaction among the four elements of the framework is ongoing and iterative, with policymakers repeatedly (re)specifying their ideologies and interests in the course of processing information in an institutional context (Weiss, 1983, 1995, 1999). For this reason, as already noted, Weiss presents the framework as three overlapping elements (ideology, interests and information) with these elements held together in a more stable but still changing institutional arena (see Figure 1-4). Weiss (1983, p. 229) deliberately does not indicate a specific or regular course of interaction among the overlapping elements of the framework in the development of policy positions or the enactment of policy.

Weiss is generally silent about the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning her work. However, her theory-based approach to evaluation has 'a strong "family resemblance"' (Astbury, 2013, p. 385) to critical realist approaches to evaluation (Donaldson, 2007). This connection supports looking to critical realism more generally in my effort to extend the 4I's framework. Further, Weiss saw herself firstly as a sociologist and, late in her career, reflected that Max Weber, Robert Michels, Robert Merton, and Pierre Bourdieu were critical foundations for her theorising. She identified Lee Cronbach's work on methodology, James March's work on organisations and Edward Lindblom's work on democracy, politics and the use of information as more obvious influences (Weiss, 2004). Accordingly, while recognising the contribution of neo-positivism on the one hand and interpretivism on the other, this thesis will draw, in the main, on critical realist perspectives. As a philosophical approach, critical realism is built on distinguishing between the 'real' and the 'observable' worlds. The 'real' exists independently of human perceptions. The world as we know and understand it is constructed from our perspectives and experiences, through what is 'observable'. Accordingly, unobservable structures (both material and ideal) cause observable events, but the social world can only be

comprehended by understanding the structures that generate such events (see: Archer, 1995; Donati, 2018; Fleetwood, 2014; Hay, 2002; Pawson, 2013; Porpora, 2015; Sayer, 1992; T. Walker, 2017).

2.1.1 Defining the Elements

The following are summaries of Weiss' definitions of the four elements, which form the bases for a more detailed exploration of some critical debates in public policy research regarding institutions, values (ideology), motivation (interests) and knowledge (information). For each of the four elements, Weiss discusses a broad definition but then focuses on a particular aspect based on her observations and findings as an evaluator or, in the case of interests, based on the weight of scholarly opinion at the time she developed the framework.

Institutional Arena

Weiss describes the institutional domain of her framework as involving 'the structure, culture, standard operating procedures, and decision rules of the organization within which decisions are made' (1995, p. 576). This expansive definition includes formal institutions such as: government structure (e.g. Parliament and Cabinet); legal institutions (the Constitution, statutes and case law); social structure (e.g. class, gender and race constructs); political structure (e.g. political parties and majority government); and organisational culture.

Within this definition one can distinguish institutions (e.g. the institution of schools) from organisations (e.g. the single school), as well as broader meta-institutional contexts like the economy or society (cf. Bell & Feng, 2014). Weiss' primary focus is on the culture and rules of institutions and organisations, which sees the definition extended to cover less formal elements beyond organisational structure. These include the shared cognitive patterns, or 'dominant logics' (Mutch, 2009), reflected in the symbols and systems of meaning used to intermeditate between the environment and behaviour in organisations, and the behavioural patterns flowing from the informal rules and controls that define institutions (cf. Peters, 1999).

Weiss holds that the institutional arena shapes both the decision-making process and the inputs to that process. That is, in terms of process, the form of the organisational arrangements such as hierarchy, specialisation, division of labour, information channels and standard operating procedures influence who is empowered to make decisions, when and how. In terms of inputs, the institutional

environment influences how individuals and groups interpret their interests, ideology and information, and thus significantly affects the decisions emerging from the policymaking process. As such, the institutional arena subsumes the other three elements of the framework. Weiss identifies that the power of institutions explains why 'the status quo [is] more often activated than elements that would support change' (Weiss, 1995, p. 585). In her analysis of the institutional element of the 4I's framework, Weiss focuses on institutional rules and culture.

However, Weiss is not deterministic in her views, nor does she overlook the role of agency. She identifies having a greater sense of agency, and promoting it in others, as the key to 'overcome the "drag" of the institution' (Weiss, 1995, p. 588). Yet, for Weiss, agency does not remove the influence of organisational rules and culture but replaces old with new; a 'conservative pull' displaced by a progressive push. As indicated in Chapter 1, Archer's conceptualisation of the relationship among structure, agency and culture provides a congruent explanation for the emergence of new organisational arrangements out of the old. That is, unlike most institutional approaches, Weiss does not limit her explanation to structural factors but also attempts both to integrate cultural factors and to allow for significant individual agency.

Ideology

Weiss (Weiss, 1972, 1983, 1995, 2001) recognises that ideology can refer to an actor's values but also world views, philosophies, principles and political orientation. In whichever way it is constituted, agents draw on ideology to deal with immediate, concrete issues. While ideologies can range from the general to the specific, from vague proclivities to a coherent political predisposition, most ideologies tend to be partial and fluid sets of values. As a result, in particular cases, there is competition or even conflict among the multiple values held by an individual or group (Weiss, 1983, p. 232). In a fashion similar to Berlin's (1969) universal values, Weiss supports the notion that a set of core ethical or moral values is foundational for ideology building. She illustratively names the values of the sanctity of human life, integrity and patriotism. Whether weakly or strongly integrated, core values provide a basis for position taking that is both emotionally charged and normative (Weiss, 1983, p. 224). However, while recognising these underpinning core ethical values, Weiss consistently posits more specific and utilitarian values that operate in the policymaking *mélange*. For example, this might be seen with high school teachers valuing educational attainment for their students, wanting to maintain the standards

of their chosen subject area or discipline, and viewing their 'classroom as their kingdom' wherein their professional practice is beyond observation (Weiss, 1995, p. 582). Therefore, as noted, Weiss considers that for most actors in decision-making processes ideology tends to be a partial (as in incomplete) and fluid set of values rather than the structured program of change discussed by scholars like Minogue (2017). It is in this less rigid sense that ideology is investigated in this thesis.

Interests

Weiss presents interests as motivation. The framework recognises the existence of both individual and group interests (Weiss, 1995, 2001). Policy actors can have mixed motives, being simultaneously motivated by more than one interest (Weiss, 1983, p. 224). Interests are more than egotistical or epicurean self-interest (Weiss, 1983, 1999, 2001) but include the good of others and the good of a cause. This other-regarding focus is particularly pertinent to the exercise of political power, which is a phenomenon of communities rather than individuals. Despite recognising this more complex reality, when it came to applying the framework, Weiss followed the dominant view of political science in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Kingdon, 1984) and modelled self-interest as the dominant motivator which, by implication, also shaped not just identity, but culture and norms too.

Information

Weiss defines information as the range of understandings that help people make sense of the current state of affairs, why things happen as they do, where the problems are, which potential solutions hold promise for addressing them effectively and which proposals will hinder a solution (Weiss, 1995). Using the word 'information' rather than 'knowledge' or 'evidence' is not just to support the mnemonic characteristic of the framework's name. The intention is to communicate that this policymaking element includes partial, biased and invalid understandings alongside the 'accurate', 'correct' and 'valid' ones (Weiss, 1983, p. 225). In so doing, the framework recognises the indispensability for decision-making of factual assumptions and rational processes. In making this recognition, the framework also acknowledges the bounded nature of rationality and the cognitive limitation of human actors, as widely discussed at the time Weiss developed it (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1982; Lindblom, 1980; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; Simon, 1972).

For Weiss, information does not exist, or have a bearing on policy, in discrete chunks, but is embedded in sets of ideas, explanatory frameworks and theoretical models (1983, pp. 225-226). Such ideas, frameworks and models may be supported by scholarly research but, according to Weiss, they are more likely to be supported by tacit knowledge, professional/craft knowledge (Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980a, p. 266), direct experience, folk wisdom or gut feeling (Weiss, 1983). This is political ideation, the processes through which political ideas or concepts are formed. In this context, Weiss underscores that policymakers, like all other members of a society, absorb and accrue the knowledge in 'good currency' in that society, and often rely heavily on this ordinary knowledge (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) and the beliefs and assumptions accompanying it (Weiss, 1983, p. 228). It is rare for a single, detailed big idea to influence the policy process uniquely. The more usual path is for generalised ideas from multiple sources to be 'picked up in diverse ways and percolate through to officeholders' (Weiss, 1982, p. 622).

2.1.2 Interaction of the Elements

Weiss (1995) holds that every individual decision is the product of the interplay among ideology, interests and information. When processing information, decision-makers iteratively re-specify their ideologies and interests. Both the information processing and the specification of ideology and interests are conditioned by the institutional context, especially by institutional culture and rules. Weiss characterises this interaction in a manner that could be described as dialectical, as opposed to linear, evolutionary or chaotic. That is, while goal-directed cooperation and consensus can drive the interaction, Weiss (1983) emphasises the role of power, and therefore conflict and confrontation between opposing interests and ideologies (cf. Capano, 2009) as a more frequent driver of change.

Weiss identified that the interaction of ideology and information is pervasive and plays out in both directions. An individual's firmly held values can reduce her/his openness to incoming information that is at variance with those values. However, the values of most people are usually 'general predispositions' that do not guide every situation, rather than coherent and comprehensive systems of belief. Accordingly, when confronted with disconfirming information, most people can incorporate or adapt the new information without apparent conflict by drawing on unthreatened ideological elements. For example, when confronted with information about the dangers associated with nuclear fission, a majority of Australians articulate opposition to nuclear power generation. However, when considering information

about the benefits of uranium mining, some of these same people draw on different values to articulate support for the extraction of an ore used for nuclear power generation (albeit in other parts of the world), thereby implicitly adjusting their ideology in light of new information. This adjustment involves cycling between the values constituting the ideology rather than replacing them. This issue will emerge in my analysis, particularly regarding urban water supply policy.

Foundational to Weiss' understanding of the interaction of information and interests is the notion that participants in decision-making have a 'stake' in the outcome; that is, a concern for the outcome motivates them to expend energy in the decision-making process. Participants in such processes define their interests based on how they perceive the situation and the tools at their disposal. As Weiss says, based on new information, participants can adjust 'their definitions of both where their interests lie and the most judicious course for satisfying them' (1995, p. 578). Further, interests are rarely hard and fast, single-position commitments; decision-makers specify and then re-specify their interests based on the evolving information available to them. For example, when a political executive decides between the status quo, working for incremental modifications or dramatic change to policy, the decision depends in part on how the executive estimates the consequences of these courses for the wellbeing of themselves, their faction and their party, based on the information available.

Regarding the interaction of ideology, interests and information with the institutional arena, Weiss holds the institutional arrangement (that is the structure, culture and rules) generates concrete social relationships through which values, interests and knowledge take tangible shape. Accordingly, an institution's structure and norms influence how individuals in the organisation define their interests. Likewise, the standard operating procedures of an organisation influence the kinds of information that are available, from which sources, and the relative weight attached to the different sources of information. In short, the culture and arrangements of the organisation 'strongly affect how latent predispositions and understandings are interpreted as people decide what stand to take on a pending issue' (Weiss, 1995, p. 578). By way of example, in Chapter 4 I will describe how the political executive's culture, reflected in a dominant logic shaped by conservative economic ideas and structural factors like the roles of Treasurer and Department of Treasury and Finance combined to create a constraining force.

2.1.3 Application of the Framework

Weiss developed and discussed the framework in three articles over 18 years (Weiss, 1983, 1995, 2001), and continued to promote it in a collaboration late in her career (Weiss & Birckmayer, 2006). She demonstrated its application in her evaluation work (Weiss, 1995). Appendix 1 details the method and results of a systematic search (Bettany-Saltikov, 2012; Gough et al., 2013) for works citing Weiss' three core articles on the 4I's framework, based on a series of cited reference searches. In summary, 571 references cited one or more of Weiss' core works on the 4I's framework, with 22% (n = 125) of them being published in the past five years and more than 60% in the past 15 years. Further, the search indicates my research is the first to apply the 4I's framework to a political executive. Indeed, apart from Putansu's (2020) application of the framework to major legislative decisions by the US Congress regarding student loans, the framework does not seem to have been applied to politicians *per se*.

Only 34 of the identified references citing Weiss (1983, 1995, 2001) focus in detail on using the framework, rather than just a general focus on ideas advanced by Weiss in these articles. The authors suggest that aspects of the framework are relevant to the study of research utilisation (e.g. Johnson, 1998; Milani, 2009; Pollitt, 2006), and a variety of policy areas, including: health service research (Bensing et al., 2003); site-based decision-making in schools in the context of increased accountability (Bauer & Bogotch, 2006); tracing a 'bottom-up' educational innovation from its practice-based creation to mandated implementation (Hubbard & Ottoson, 1997); and analysing and comparing the criminal justice election policies of political parties in the UK (Warburton, 2010).

Illustrative of the framework's direct use, Davoudi (2006) employs it to investigate and conceptualise evidence-based planning in urban planning policy and practice. She explores the mismatch between the use of instrumental approaches to evidence in the 'ideal' world of urban planning and enlightenment approaches in the 'real' world of this policy area. She uses the 4I's framework to conceptualise and explain the multiple contenders for influence over policy in the 'real world'.

Similarly illustrative is a mixed-methods study of principals' perceptions of effective professional development in schools. Brown and Militello (2016) used Stephenson's 'Q methodology' to statistically analyse principals' responses to a survey and then applied the 4I's framework to interpret these data regarding professional

development and how such experiences influence shared decision-making in schools. They found the framework useful in explaining the decisions principals made regarding teacher professional development.

Further, a UK Centre for Evidence & Policy research study employed the framework to analyse the origins, nature, status and relative influence of different types of evidence in UK policymaking on genetically modified crops and foods (Levitt, 2003). Similarly, Putansu systematically applied the 4I's framework in two related publications: one focuses on performance measurement in public administration (Putansu, 2012) and, as noted earlier, the other on the role of politics and policy knowledge in education reform (Putansu, 2020), in both instances in the USA.

Several doctoral theses on education (Baker, 2011; Brtek, 2016; Connell, 2016; Crary, 2007; Erb, 2004; Johnson, 1993; Ohana, 1999; Syed Anuar, 2013) apply the 4I's framework, using it diagnostically to evaluate particular situations. More recent instances illustrate the overall trend in the framework's use in these studies in this policy area: Baker (2011) to discuss the decision to departmentalise teaching and learning in elementary schools, with cases selected from a school district in Pennsylvania, USA; Brtek (2016) in evaluating instructional decisions at the campus of a state college in Florida, USA; Connell (2016) to investigate parental choice of charter schools over public schools for the education of their children in Pennsylvania, USA; and Syed Anuar (2013) to explore the difference between mandated policy and grassroots practice in a centralised and highly hierarchical educational system in Malaysia.

In summary, the framework has been effectively applied to a range of policy areas but not specifically to decision-making by a political executive. Each of the applications noted above found the 4I's framework constituted something of a mid-range theoretical position, with strong efficacy for explaining a variety of decision-making processes by a range of decision-makers. On the one hand, this mid-range positioning of the 4I's places it between political and rational models. One does not need to settle for bounded rationality as the whole answer; politics still has a role. On the other hand, this positioning places it between the status quo emphasis on incrementalism and the unbridled agency of revolutionary change without settling for punctuated equilibrium as the whole answer. That is, agency still has a role, and exogenous shocks are not the only motor of change (cf. Putansu, 2020). Further, apart from Gremillion's (1997) suggestion to add two additional 'I's ('isolation' and 'influence'), I found no other studies suggesting changes or extensions to the

framework and no critique arguing for its wholesale rejection. Further, none of the studies evaluate the 4I's framework in comparison to other frameworks or models, such as ACF or MSA, though Putansu (2020) does situate it within the debates about punctuated equilibrium and bounded rationality.

The above overview of how other researchers use the 4I's framework, and the preceding summation of the four elements and their interaction provide context, as I now turn to explore how each element of the 4I's – institutions, ideology, interests and information – is discussed in the wider public policy literature. This exploration informs the application of Weiss' framework to the SA case, as well as proposing some extensions of the 4I's framework in light of more recent scholarship.

2.2 Institutional Arena

In the decades since Weiss developed the 4I's framework, there has been significant debate across the social sciences about how to conceptualise institutions and organisational culture. The structure–agency debate is an aspect of these deliberations of particular relevance to considering how to understand and apply the notion of an institutional arena in analysing policymaking by the political executive. However, before exploring this issue, I will briefly review the broader debates about institutionalism and situate Weiss within them.

2.2.1 Approaches to Institutionalism

A range of public policy scholarship has reviewed and categorised institutionalism (e.g. Bell, 2002; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2016b) and, with minor variations, they broadly cover the same terrain. They generally focus on what is referred to as 'new' institutionalism, as opposed to 'old' institutionalism. The latter is denoted by a concern to describe and map the formal institutions of government and the state – both within specific countries and on a comparative basis – and to evaluate how they measure up to democratic norms (e.g. Friedrich, 1950). Among the new institutionalists, neither the more positivist rational choice institutionalism nor the strongly constructivist approach of discursive institutionalism aligns with Weiss' thinking and method. However, elements of both sociological and historical institutionalism are of relevance, especially those with a more ideational emphasis.

Sociological institutionalism posits that, through their membership of or participation in an organisation, individuals' preferences are shaped by that institution's values

and symbols, thereby shaping the individuals' actions. The notion that 'epistemic communities' coalesce around particular scientific or technical issues is cited as an example of how values can be shared in an institutional context (Peters, 2016b). In the SA case, an example of such an epistemic community is the technical experts on the Radiation Protection Committee, established under the *Radiation Protection and Control Act 1982* (SA), to advise the relevant minister (referenced in Chapter 7). An even more profound example is the engineers and other technical experts in the public water utility SA Water (referenced in Chapters 5 and 6). The same logic is extendable to the sharing of values among members of a political party or its factions. However, it is somewhat easier to apply the sociological institutionalist approach to micro-level decision-making than to macro-level policymaking. For example, the high-level values articulated in the policy manifesto of mass parties like Labor are less likely to result in specific shared action than the values shared by members of the parliamentary wing of the party regarding a particular policy issue.

Further, sociological institutionalism tends to neglect end conditions and institutional performance, focusing instead on processes of institutionalisation such as creating values and cognitive frames (Peters, 1999). More significantly, as with most variants of institutionalism, it does not give a strong account of human agency and is often overly deterministic (Bell, 2017). However, a sociological approach helps us to see that shared understandings and norms frame actions, shape identities, influence interests, and affect what is perceived as problems and their solution (Schmidt, 2006).

For historical institutionalism, institutions are principally defined by ideas (Béland, 2009), which are next incorporated into policies and structures. According to more theory-driven approaches to historical institutionalism, the impact of these policies and structures then persists (Sanders, 2008). That is, once created, a rule or organisation creates a 'path dependence' for decision-making. The institution then continues along the path defined in its 'formative moment' until a major 'punctuation', usually an exogenous event, forces a change in the pattern, which becomes the new equilibrium or path. There are a variety of views on how this path dependency is maintained, ranging from reinforcement from positive feedback, to avoiding the cost of change, to habit (Peters, 2016b).

The alternative approach with historical institutionalism is inductive rather than the more deductive approach described above. Here the strategy for inquiry is to search for empirical regularities through repeated observations. This empirical approach

recognises both the conditioning constraints of institutions *and* that agents are also interpreting and choice-making subjects. That is, agents are not 'hardwired' to their institutional environment but can shape their interactions with institutions and with others. There are several, not necessarily exclusive, ways of explaining this interaction. One way is through the operation of normative orientations (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) or what Schön and Rein (1994), in a different context, refer to as frame reflection. I will return to the concept of frames later in this chapter. These orientations or frames of reference may be institutionally defined or actively interpreted but, either way, the institutional and ideational environments interact. A second way to explain the interaction is as a process of working out and defining the meaning of appropriate actions or responsibilities. March and Olsen (2008) refer to this latter perspective as the 'logic of appropriateness' in institutional life. Rather than ask *homo economicus*' question 'how do I maximise my utility in this situation', agents are assumed to ask, 'what is the appropriate response to this situation given my position and responsibilities?' (Bell, 2002; Peters, 1999; Shepsle, 2008).

With both sociological and historical perspectives on institutions, we encounter agents remaking the institutional arena, but doing so in an environment marked by dominant socio-economic forces, finite resources and 'bounded rationality'. Each perspective treats the relationship between agency and structure differently, with rational choice theory giving most significant emphasis to the power of agency and theory-driven approaches to historical institutionalism giving priority to the power of structure. Clearly, public policy scholarship is 'familiar with the metatheoretical knot of structure and agency' (Legrand, 2018), a discussion I will return to shortly.

In situating Weiss within these institutionalist debates, three points of note emerge. First, there is a strong alignment with historical institutionalism. In discussing the institutional arena, Weiss draws on the notion of path dependency (1999, p. 478; 2001, p. 286) and identifies the power of institutions to explain why the status quo is more often activated than change (Weiss, 1995, p. 585). Second, at the same time, Weiss' path to institutionalism was via the literature on organisations and organisational theory (e.g. Scott, 1987; Selznick, 1957), signposting a level of affinity with sociological institutionalism. Third, the prominence given to ideology and interests in influencing change underscores a continuing and vital role for agency. That is, Weiss seeks to give attention to both structure and agency. I will now turn to consider this broader debate concerning the relationship between agency and

structure, highlighting some of the challenges it raises for theorising and indicating a way forward.

2.2.2 The Structure–Agency Problem

Generally, to say that humans are intrinsically social beings is uncontroversial. The point of controversy, as illustrated by the alternative perspectives on institutionalism, is the relative parts played by sociality and individuals in causing the constitution of our lives in the world. The contest has been between what Archer (2000) refers to as ‘Modernity’s Man’ (sic) and ‘Society’s Person’. In this debate, Modernity’s Man says that pre-formed, atomistic rational actors (such as posited by rational choice institutionalism) are the entities of society. Here autonomy is (implicitly) denied to structure, with causal power residing in agency. Contra this position, ‘Society’s Person’ says social agents are formed through lifelong socialisation. In this instance, autonomy is denied to agents, with causal power only granted to structure. One way out of this dichotomous conundrum, as proposed by Anthony Giddens (1984), is to view structure and agency as co-constitutive such that structure is reproduced through agency, which is simultaneously constrained and enabled by structure. Philosophically this is a powerful alternative. However, by conflating structure and agency into unspecified movements of co-constitution, Giddens’ approach impedes exploration of the relative influence of each aspect (Archer, 2005, 2014b).

As an alternative, Archer (1995) offers an analytical dualism that recognises the interdependence of structure and agency but argues that they operate on different timescales. Analytically structure is always antecedent. Agents then interact with structure, and this action leads to structural elaboration in the form of either the reproduction or transformation of the initial structure. The resulting structure then provides the context of action for future agents. In this sequence, while structure and agency are interdependent, it is possible to isolate them and investigate how they interact to reproduce or transform the initial context. This theorising also explains how both exogenous and endogenous factors can cause change (Archer, 1982, 1988, 1995, 2000, 2005).

Legrand (2018) notes that Archer’s work offers ‘a useful lens through which to view the policy decision-making process’ (p. 223). Indeed, Bell (2017); Bell and Feng (2014); Bell and Hindmoor (2015); Mutch (2009); Seidl and Whittington (2014); and Whittington (1989) draw on Archer’s critical realism to demonstrate the ‘multidirectional’ causal effects of institutions and individuals on each other in such

processes. Accordingly, I propose to extend Weiss' understanding of the institutional arena by drawing on Archer's critical realism. I do so, suggesting that Archer provides an explicit and detailed explanation of how to move beyond the longstanding dichotomy of agency and structural determinism (an account absent from Weiss' work) in a manner consistent with Weiss' overall approach.

Central to Archer's theorising is the concept of morphogenesis (and its inverse, morphostasis). Accordingly, Archer refers to her critical realist method as the 'morphogenetic' approach. 'Morphogenesis' refers to change (-genesis) in the shape of things (morpho) and morphostasis refers to continuity or a lack of change (stasis). The defining feature of critical realism is the belief that there is a world existing independently of our knowledge of it (Sayer, 1992). Consistent with this understanding, Archer (1995) argues that 'we are simultaneously free and constrained and we also have some awareness of it' (p. 2). This statement captures two foundational distinctions. The first, as we saw in the discussion above, is between agency and structure; the differentiation of the individual and the constraining/enabling/motivating social context. The second distinction is between the material and the ideational aspects of social life; the reality of our social situation and our awareness of that reality (Archer, 1988).

As already noted, analytically, structure necessarily predates the action(s) which transform it. Further, any structural elaboration necessarily postdates those actions (Archer, 1995). For example, a political executive will always operate in a pre-existing policy environment, and the consequences of its attempted policymaking necessarily postdate any attempted reform. This 'before, during and after' schema lies at the heart of Archer's simple three-stage model of social change: conditioning (T^1), interaction (T^2 – T^3) and elaboration (T^4).

The structure–agency distinction is only tenable in conjunction with the concept of elaboration. The critical realist conceptualisation of 'elaboration' is based on the notion that the emergent entity is something more than the sum of its parts, meaning that the emergent reality holds unique properties as a result of the parts coming together and their arrangement in relation to one another. Two examples from chemistry illustrate these resultant unique properties emerging from the interaction of entities. The first example relates to water, which emerges from the interaction of the prior entities of hydrogen and oxygen, each of which emerges from the particular arrangement of neutrons, protons and electrons, with water having unique properties that are different to those of both hydrogen and oxygen. The second example relates

to odours. Odour is a property of specific molecules. However, while molecules can have an odour, the atoms from which molecules arise cannot. This approach treats emergence as what Theiner and O'Connor (2010) would describe as a modest metaphysical concept, in that emergent properties in complex systems are taken to be real, nonidentical to the structures of the underlying properties, and to make a distinctive causal contribution to the world.

By applying this notion of emergence to social phenomena, we encounter Archer's second distinction, that between the material and ideational. Archer argues the social context emerges from human thought and action, while avoiding the suggestion that it entails the introduction of some new substance; the unique properties of social context derive from its constituent parts and their arrangement. This construct allocates a causal role to the social context without suggesting the context is a reified entity independent of agents (Archer, 2000, 2003). The material–ideational distinction leads Archer (1988) to differentiate (material) structures and (ideational) culture so as not to elide the material and the ideational aspects of social life.


In contrast, Weiss does not explicitly address the structure–agency problem. However, as discussed earlier, she does identify as an important influence on her the work of Bourdieu (Weiss, 2004), who shares with Archer an interest in trying to overcome the dualism of structure and agency, and doing so with a similar recognition of structure being produced by human agents, but with an emphasis on continuity and constraint (Bryant, 2011; Seidl & Whittington, 2014; Whittington, 1989, 2010). This is the approach implied by Weiss (1995).

Similarly, Porpora (1993) argues that material relations are an essential mechanism beyond the cultural rules which constrain, enable and motivate our behaviour. Accordingly, the individual–context distinction and the material–ideational distinction are combined by Archer and Porpora to form a three-way separation of agency, structure and culture, which form the three primary causal powers in society. Sharon Hays (1994) suggests separately specifying the characteristics of culture and structure in a manner similar to Archer, 'without any evident cross-fertilization' (Mutch, 2009, p. 165).

Having distinguished the structural and cultural dimensions of the social context, there are two parallel cycles, one between structure and agency, and one between culture and agency. As Figure 2-1 demonstrates, culture/structure exerts a causal influence on agents (conditioning T^1); agents interact (interaction T^2 to T^3); and this

interaction changes or maintains the structure/culture (elaboration T^4). This outline of the morphogenetic model shows how the three core causal concepts of structure, culture and agency are mobilised in a temporal sequence to form the basis of the morphogenetic sequence. This sequence in one domain (cultural or structural) becomes a cycle when it catalyses change in the other domain, remembering that Archer separates culture and structure to avoid the problem of conflation, contra Giddens. As we will see in Chapter 4, the impact of the institutional arena on the political executive was different in the structural and cultural domains. The cultural domain was more amenable to change or 'transformation' (especially early in the political term), while the structural domain appeared more prone to stasis or 'reproduction'. In this thesis, I apply Archer's morphogenetic approach to understand not just the emergence of the political executive's dominant logic and group dynamics (Chapter 4), but also how this in turn influenced the emergence of the executive's ideological values.

Figure 2-1: The Morphogenic Approach



Source: Adapted from Archer (1995).

An important point to reiterate both theoretically and methodologically for later discussion is that, in Archer's conception of reality, ideation functions in the cultural domain. In fact, for Archer (Archer, 1988, 2005), culture consists of the ideas expressed in the corpus of artefacts or 'intelligibilia' from which we can extract cultural meaning. While structure is constituted by the relationship of 'things' (objects, events, relationships) to one another, culture is constituted by the relationship of

ideas to one another (Archer, 2014a). As with Karl Popper (1979), the objective moment of culture is embedded not in a collective consciousness but a collective 'archive' of artefacts, that is, real, accessible objects (Elder-Vass, 2010). This approach is similar to that which Schein and Schein (2017) apply to understanding organisational culture. For Schein and Schein, an organisation's culture operates at three distinct levels: artefacts, espoused values and shared assumptions. Artefacts are typically the things even an outsider can see, such as furniture and office layout, dress norms, inside jokes, and mantras. Espoused values are the organisation's declared set of values and norms, in essence, the official statement of the organisation's purpose. Shared assumptions are the fundamental beliefs and behaviours of the groups, which are often so deeply embedded that they can go unnoticed. These assumptions subconsciously influence how members create or experience artefacts and how they assess and officially articulate values.

Like Archer, Bourdieu and Giddens (Bryant, 2011; Seidl & Whittington, 2014), Weiss' 4I's framework is an interactive or dialectical model. My proposition is that Archer's morphogenic approach, as outlined and discussed above, adds to the 4I's by providing an explicit explanation for both institutional elaboration and the interaction of the four elements of Weiss' framework. That is, Archer's approach adds specificity to considerations that are only implied in the 4I's framework but does so in a way that is broadly consistent with Weiss' overall theorising.

Finally, as can be seen from the above, any transformative action is always the product of the interaction among agents in the form of either socio-cultural interaction (in the cultural domain) or social interaction (in the structural domain). However, Archer maintains that change does not occur through a single morphogenic cycle. Rather, several cycles of action and interaction are necessary to generate real change (Mutch, 2009). This intrinsically social understanding of human action and the above debate about structure and agency brings us to the question of how to understand the agency of groups alongside that of individuals. I will consider this by looking at executive government as a group process.

2.3 Executive Government as a Group Process

By focusing on the political executive, implicitly, my primary unit of analysis is a corporate actor. Kingdon's (2011) notion of 'policy communities' reinforces this conclusion, as does the contention by Sabatier, Heclo and others that the policy subsystem (composed of bureaucrats, legislative personnel, interest group leaders,

researchers and specialist reporters within a substantive policy area) is a basic unit of study (Heclo, 1978; Ostrom, 2009; Sabatier, 1991). Deborah Stone (1997) makes a substantial contribution to theorising about this concept in concluding that political power is a phenomenon of communities rather than individuals.

However, as important as the work of these scholars is, developing a coherent theory of collective action and, by implication, corporate agency remains challenging (Ostrom, 2005). Indeed, much public policy scholarship favours simplified models of groups, and asking questions implicitly attributing responsibility to a single actor, or a unified actor behaving in much the same way as an individual (Duch et al., 2015; Feiock, 2013; Ostrom, 2009, 2010). Simplified models of groups study them as static entities, isolated from their institutional and historical contexts, presenting only inputs and outputs, and therefore composed by 'chain-like, unidirectional cause and effect reactions' (McGrath et al., 2000, p. 97). Scholarship adopting this approach tends to neglect essential issues such as interaction, interdependence, cooperation and other group characteristics. The western emphasis on individualism probably helps explain the relative neglect, highlighted by: the focus of folklore on 'great men' (and very occasionally great women); the focus of the social sciences (especially psychology and economics) on the individual (Epstein, 2015; Stone, 1997); the attention of popular literature on the 'rugged individual'; and the emphasis of political history on great leaders (Lukes, 1973; Spector, 2016; Tjosvold, 1986). My aim is to focus on group dynamics explicitly, that is, on the ways groups, and the individuals in them, act and react to changing circumstances (Forsyth, 2006; Lewin, 1951).

In this section, I will first consider some insights provided by organisational theory and then discuss relevant aspects of critical realist social theorising as a basis for better understanding how the political executive, as a group, acts. The emerging picture is of groups as complex, adaptive and dynamic systems, which adds to Weiss' conceptualisation of the 'institutional arena'.

2.3.1 Organisational Theory

Within the relevant literature, behaviour pertinent to policymaking is embedded in the broader arena of social relationships (Archer, 1995; Giddens, 1984; Hays, 1994; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009). Agents can and do have an effect, not so much as individuals but in the context of groups. Over the past 20–30 years, some of the most productive research and theorising concerning groups as complex and dynamic systems has been in organisational studies. In a significant body of organisational

research, group behaviour is an emergent property of the collective, not through the group having a single thought or feeling but through shared cognitive and behavioural patterns (Forsyth, 2006; Hackman, 2012; Larson & Christensen, 1993; Levi, 2015). These patterns are observable routines that are necessarily recurring and collective. In the theoretical literature on organisations, the notion of behaviour patterns generally refers to recurrent routines of *interaction*. In contrast, cognitive patterns are seen as *rules*, such as standard operating procedures, group norms and division of labour. While conceptually distinct, these two kinds of patterns are related, with the behavioural patterns flowing from the informal rules and controls that define institutions (Becker, 2004; McGrath et al., 2000; Peters, 1999).

In a widely cited review of how such routines operate, Becker (2004) concludes that cognitive and behavioural patterns allow organisations and groups to do four things. First, they enable coordination on the basis that they represent a balance between the competing interests of the participants in the routine. That is, they become 'the way things are' (Schein & Schein, 2017) in a group or organisation. Second, in balancing competing interests, such routines provide some degree of stability to behaviour, though the agency of participants means that there is always the potential for change that is endogenous to the routine. Third, when tasks become routine, behaviour and cognition are often executed in the realm of the subconscious, thereby introducing economy into the use of personal resources. Fourth, routines bind and package knowledge in ways that both shape and facilitate its future use, as is the case with tacit knowledge. By enabling coordination of thinking and action, stability of behaviour, economical use of cognitive resources and the activation of tacit knowledge, behavioural and cognitive patterns become 'the building blocks of organisational capabilities' (Becker, 2004, p. 662) but also create the potential for groupthink ('t Hart, 2014; 't Hart et al., 1997).

Therefore, the cognitive and behavioural patterns of groups are the emergent properties of complex social interactions, yet nonidentical to the thoughts and actions of the individuals who make up the group or the organisation from which they have emerged. They make a distinctive causal contribution to the world, especially to the capabilities of groups and organisations. However, within these routines, agents can always initiate change. This points to the presence of both individual and corporate agency and raises the question of how they relate, an under-explored issue in public policy studies generally (Ostrom, 2009), but especially regarding political executives. To address this question, I return to Archer's critical realism.

2.3.2 Corporate Agency

As presented in Figure 2-1 above, Archer's morphogenic sequence (conditioning, interaction and elaboration) requires interaction among agents to bring about either social elaboration or socio-cultural elaboration. A key contribution of organisational theory is that this sequence can often be framed by cognitive or behavioural patterns, which Archer would identify as situated in the cultural domain as an example of cultural conditioning. The notion of interaction implies a person actively engages with one or more other persons to bring about change. Archer identifies that agency can be either active or passive.

Active agency, which Archer terms 'corporate agency', requires an agent to engage with at least one other agent and for this engagement to result in action. Archer describes such interactions as 'strategic', in that they occur in a manner generating something more than the summation of individuals' self-interest. Corporate agents 'are social subjects with reasons for attempting to bring about certain outcomes' (Archer, 2000, p. 266). Archer rejects the 'individuals plus resources' formula for active or corporate agency. Having identified the typical powers of such agency as the capacities to articulate shared interests, organise for collective action, generate social movements and exercise corporate influence in decision-making, Archer concludes that corporate agency is an emergent stratum with powers proper to itself (Archer, 1995, 2002, 2003, 2005). In subsequent chapters, we will see how corporate agency (articulated goals and joint action) was critical in driving policy change in SA in the period under consideration.

In contrast, passive agency involves engaging with and acting in the group, organisation or society while lacking collective organisation and/or joint objectives. Archer terms this 'primary agency', describing primary agents as 'objects to whom things happen' (2000, p. 266). Citing Steven Lukes' (1974) work on power, Archer notes that primary agents are not just individuals; there can also be collectives of primary agents who can be 'denied' a say in how things are. Coercion, manipulation and the like shape the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of some people such that they accept their role in the existing order of things (cf. Dowding, 2006). In my analysis of the SA political executive, instances of asymmetrical power highlight this issue (see Chapter 4).


In summation, corporate agency is constituted by coordinated action *and* explicitly stated aims or shared purposes. While corporate agency is always plural, both

individuals and groups can be primary agents. Further, both social and cultural elaboration require an exercise of corporate agency. The actions of an individual, or primary agency, are insufficient. This distinction and the need for corporate agency to drive change provide powerful theoretical premises that I draw on consistently in analysing the political executive's decision-making.

A useful refinement of Archer's conceptualisation of agency is suggested by Karlsson (2020), who points out that, whenever a theory contains two dimensions (in this case 'coordinated action' and 'shared purposes'), these defining concepts can be related in a fourfold table through the properties 'presence' and 'absence'. Following this idea, and as set out in Figure 2-2, Karlsson suggests the following fourfold conceptual pattern in Archer's theory. First, when both shared purpose/stated aims and coordinated action are present, formal corporate agency is at play. Second, when shared purpose/stated aims are absent, but coordinated action is present, informal corporate agency is operating. Third, when shared purpose/stated aims are present but coordinated action is absent, withdrawn agency is at play. Fourth, when both shared purpose/stated aims and coordinated action are absent, primary agency is at play.

In the main, Karlsson links each of these types of agency to particular types of social organisation (e.g. informal agency with informal organisations) or the lack of organisation (e.g. withdrawn agency with a hermit's life). My suggestion is that these types can be applied to the same organisation or group at different times in the context of different events, constituting something of a temporal pattern over the group's lifecycle. This differentiation will prove valuable in subsequent analysis, explaining instances of inaction despite articulation of shared purposes and action despite the absence of jointly stated aims. For example, informal corporate agency (stated aims absent but coordinated action present) can be seen in situations where the members of a political executive do not agree with a particular policy position, but support its implementation to curry favour or because of particular power relations. Withdrawn agency (stated aims present but coordinated action absent) can be found in situations where the political executive articulates a commitment to a particular idea or initiative but does nothing to achieve it. These kinds of situations will be discussed both in considering aspects of court government in Chapter 4 and the formation or selection of ideological values in Chapter 5.

Figure 2-2: Types and Characteristics of Agency



Source: Adapted from Karlsson (2020).

2.3.3 Court Government

Having accepted the notion of corporate agency, exploring the kinds of processes and information used by the political executive in policymaking requires delving deeper into conceptualising group dynamics. This statement implicitly claims that the political executive is a group, defined by Hackman (2012) as 'an intact social system, complete with boundaries, interdependence for some shared purpose, and differentiated member roles' (p. 33). As indicated at the beginning of this thesis and reinforced earlier in this chapter, I use the construct of 'court government' as a device to efficiently explore issues of institutional norms and culture. I will now discuss how I will use this construct.

In a modern democracy, policymaking is subject to the regulating and institutionalising functions of argument, discussion and bargaining (Albæk, 1995; Majone, 1989). Heclo describes this in terms of 'puzzling'. Consistent with Weiss' theorising, Heclo assumes that the policy positions of agents are rarely static but evolve throughout the negotiation. Agents are seldom equal in the process of 'puzzling' because there are always differences in power. The bargaining may or may not involve coercion, and the discussions might be cooperative or competitive.

However, policymaking is essentially a process of 'collective puzzling', built on argument and persuasion, to change actors' behaviour by operating on their minds and perceptions (Hecllo, 1974; Stone, 1997).

There is a significant range of models and typologies for considering executive government (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990; Elgie, 1997, 2011; Heffernan, 2003; Laver & Shepsle, 1994; Marsh et al., 2003; Rhodes & Wanna, 2009; Shaw, 2015). However, few of these explicitly incorporate 'collective puzzling'. Two exceptions are neo-statecraft and court government.

Neo-statecraft theorising has interesting connections with the notions explored so far, giving analytical primacy to the 'political court' and seeking to focus on 'collective leadership' (Buller & James, 2008, 2012, 2015; Stacey, 2013). The contribution of this model is the way it illuminates how *realpolitik* underpins the decision-making of a political executive, especially its emphasis on the need for a political court to align its objects to complement the prevailing structural conditions (Byrne et al., 2017). Subsequently, this is termed 'cunning leadership' (James, 2018). The criteria by which the model determines cunning leadership are: having a winning electoral strategy, demonstrating governing competence; effective party management; winning the battle of ideas; and being able to bend the 'rules of the game' to one's own advantage. In addition to these five substantive criteria of assessment, the model also identifies that exogenous events are factors that can inhibit or support successful executive leadership (Buller & James, 2008).

Despite the model's strength in bringing 'court politics' to the fore, it has two main shortcomings for the purposes of this thesis. First, with its primary focus on *realpolitik*, neo-statecraft does not take account of the altruistic and more normative (and to some degree ideological) goals pursued by leaders and political courts, something James (2018) now terms 'conscience leadership'. Second, the criteria for assessing the capacity to win government do not extend to assessing the capacity to govern. In essence, winning elections is not the same as policymaking/change/reform, and they each require different skills and approaches; but a political party is unable to achieve the latter without repeatedly accomplishing the former (James, 2018; Karlson, 2018). Nonetheless, the notion of statecraft will be useful in subsequent explorations of political self-interest in Chapter 6.

In contrast, 'court government' as presented by Paul 't Hart (1997, 2014) is an efficient and effective device for exploring the dynamics of policymaking by political

executives, taking into account the impact of politicking, ideology and ideation. Based on historical studies, when considering court government, the court should be viewed as a relatively large phenomenon; as something more significant than the group of Cabinet ministers in a political executive. While the Cabinet is at the centre, the political court consists of intersecting and overlapping groups, functions, factions and processes, which often include elaborate engagement and consultative procedures. There are soft and rigid boundaries between these segments that are variously accepted, stretched and breached (Elton, 1976; Partridge, 2008; Williamson, 1974). This definition implies relationships and the importance of group dynamics, wherein major policy decisions 'arise through social interaction between the holders of high office and those around them' ('t Hart, 1997, p. 311).

In the public policy literature, the notion of court government is used in a wide variety of ways, including: generically (Richards & Mathers, 2010); polemically (Dexter, 1977; Osborne, 2007; Savoie, 1999, 2008); narratively (Rhodes, 2013; Rhodes & Tiernan, 2013, 2016; Walter, 2010); and psychologically ('t Hart, 2014). That public policy scholars keep returning to the concept, albeit in varied ways, is hardly surprising. Leaders of large corporations, regions, nations and realms have always been surrounded by men and women who assist them in fulfilling their leadership task: a 'court'. Nonetheless, public policy scholars experience challenges in defining the status, significance and function of courts and their members. Putting aside the caricatured, one-dimensional images of scheming courtiers, and instead seeking to describe a more nuanced reality, makes this task easier (Henshall, 2014; Partridge, 2008).

In practical terms, in most western democracies, the intersecting and overlapping groups, functions, factions and processes include at least the following configurations of actors. First is the political party or parties of the government, including both parliamentary members and non-parliamentary members *and* factions within those parties, whether formal or informal. Second is the court of the premier, which includes partisan advisors, senior bureaucrats, trusted external advisors and, very importantly, key ministers. Next is the court of each Cabinet minister, which will again include partisan advisors, senior bureaucrats and trusted external advisors. Then there is the Cabinet itself, which is likely to have a degree of overlapping segmentation based on factors such as portfolio allocation, factional standing, individual style and personal relationships to create an in group and an out group.

This kind of multidimensional approach is evident in several studies using the metaphor of court government. These include investigations of executives led by Tony Blair in the UK (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006b; Richards & Mathers, 2010), Anna Bligh in Queensland (Rhodes & Tiernan, 2016), and John Howard and Kevin Rudd in Australia (Walter, 2010). In contrast, both Dexter (1977) and Savoie (2008) tend to present ideal courtiers operating solely to carry out the purposes and wishes of the master/mistress, without any sense of responsibility to their careers or any professionally defined task. Implicitly, such theorising situates 'courtiers' as drones without individual agency. However, the most relevant work on court government is the psychological approach developed by 't Hart (1997, 2014), who highlights that values plurality is not just a part of a court's group dynamics; it is a fact of life in institutional design. I propose to use 't Hart's notion of court government, and especially his 'logics' of court government, as the basis for understanding the nature and dynamics of policymaking as a group process that involves argumentation, discussion and bargaining.

2.3.4 The 'Logics' of Court Government

Focusing on a political executive conceived of as a court implicitly rejects key features of policymaking promoted by the 'governance turn' in public administration, which claims there has been a shift towards (more) participatory and inclusive policymaking (Hill, 1998; Lodge & Wegrich, 2012; Rhodes, 1994, 1997, 2007), attributing significant power to networks of non-elite actors. Even if there has been a governance turn, it is now more common to see earlier conceptualisations of the 'hollowing out' of the state as exaggerated (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Pierre & Peters, 2000), which supports the continued relevance of investigating elite decision-making. In fact, the evidence suggests a resilient rather than hollowed-out state wherein the governance turn is often symbolic (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Kerr & Kettell, 2006; Marsh et al., 2003). Further, more recently, Rhodes and colleagues contend that investigating the combination of political élites, strategic policy and *realpolitik* holds the prospect of a theoretical and methodological reinvigoration of executive studies (Rhodes, 2013, 2014; Rhodes & Tiernan, 2013). This view finds support in other scholarship (Müller-Rommel & Vercesi, 2020; Vercesi, 2020).

't Hart draws on earlier work regarding foreign policy to distinguish four 'logics' or 'interpretive frames' for understanding court government and its essential feature as a group process. These frames are of the court as a sanctuary, think-tank, arena (or field of contest) and ritual.

Sanctuary

The court as sanctuary highlights the comfort and support provided in the face of difficulties for a group of people whose bonds are otherwise more loosely based on role, task, shared purpose or common fate. The higher the level of cohesion in the political court, the more it can function as a place of sanctuary. Teamwork, as in task cohesion and *esprit de corps*, strongly influences cohesion. The same applies regarding attraction (meaning attraction to, or pride in, the group, and bonds of friendship among group members) and unity (as in the sense of seeing the group as a unit and something to which one belongs) (Forsyth, 2006). A meta-analysis by Mullen and Copper (1994) suggests that, while performance and cohesion each impact on the other, group performance has a more significant effect on group cohesion than cohesion on performance. For a political executive, the court as a sanctuary can give confidence and safety. Still, its risks include underestimating the abilities of rivals and the vulnerabilities associated with the group's preferred course of action ('t Hart, 2014).

Think-Tank

The court as think-tank focuses attention on the dynamics of group information processing. Here the court seeks to develop a composite picture; a common or shared representation of events. Contandriopoulos et al. (2010) suggest this kind of information processing is sufficiently different at the collective level to warrant a different approach to individual information processing. Arriving at a common or shared understanding requires a degree of collective sense making (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka & Von Krogh, 2009), coalition building (Salisbury et al., 1987), and rhetoric and persuasion (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Majone, 1989; Stone, 1997). Understanding by individuals involves far greater autonomy. The individual is usually 'sovereign' in their capacity to mobilise information, and the knowledge they generate is a confluence of individual and process factors, though contextual factors are also involved (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). For a political executive, arriving at a joint or shared understanding can ensure policy coherence across a government and political support within it, but the process carries the risk of groupthink ('t Hart, 2014).

The risk of groupthink is heightened when the antecedent condition of a moderately or highly cohesive group interacts with structural deficits and/or a provocative event or context (Hassan, 2013). These group faults include group insularity (as a potential

negative consequence of court as sanctuary), a mobilising kind of leadership that lacks impartiality, a lack of norms requiring rigour in decision-making processes ('t Hart, 1998), and a lack of diversity in the group's formation (Lees, 2020). This creates a groupthink tendency, heightening the risk of overestimating the capability of the group, close-mindedness and pressure to conform (Allison, 1971; Lencioni, 2006), and ultimately defective decision-making ('t Hart, 1998; Hassan, 2013).

Arena

In contrast to the court as sanctuary and think-tank stands the court as an arena. For Weiss (1983) the contest for power and influence is central to policymaking. The court as a field of contest is shaped by how the group forms, and how agency and power are exercised. As discussed earlier in this chapter when considering the institutional arena, I suggest the court is a social structure that emerges from (material) relations among social roles (Dépelteau, 2018; Donati, 2010; Porpora, 1993, 2015). Accordingly, each position or role (premier, minister, advisor, bureaucrat, etc.) has an accepted status that confers a social identity within the court. The received, stratified power and privilege of these positions vis-à-vis one another often impinges upon how members of the court engage in contest without their compliance, consent or complicity (Archer, 2000, 2003; Lukes, 2005). The monarch and the courtier enter the world, not just the court, with differently distributed power and powerlessness, privilege and under-privilege; so too those entering the political executive. In subsequent chapters, the asymmetrical power relations among ministers in the Rann court reinforce this interpretation.

My approach works on the assumption that decision-making by a political executive occurs through *social interaction* rather than individual cognition ('t Hart, 2014; 't Hart et al., 1997; Scharpf, 1994; Stone, 1997) and that this social interaction arrives at a *collective expression* of these decisions (Kay, 2006). To understand this phenomenon, the primary unit of analysis is the political executive as a *corporate actor* (Kingdon, 2011; Ostrom, 2009; Sabatier, 1991; Stone, 1997) whose deeply embedded material relations (inclusive of its social-psychological dynamics) contribute to the construction of its collective action (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Swidler, 1986). It is in this sense that I will use the notion of the political court as an arena. However, to avoid confusion between Weiss' concept of the 'institutional arena' and 't Hart's idea of court government as an arena, I will refer to the latter as a 'field of contest'.

Ritual

Finally, the idea of the court as ritual is a reminder that the discernible court can reinforce organisational norms and constitutional myths to provide legitimacy to the executive. When discussing the case study in Chapter 4, we will see how the Cabinet, as one element of the court environment, is surrounded by significant paper ritual in the context of other informalities. It also has a mystique about it. Cabinet is a substantial sign of success for politicians; it is the target of their ambitions (Searing, 1994; Weller, 2003). And Cabinet decisions are the currency of government, with predominant weight and legitimacy within the bureaucracy.

The degree to which each of these interpretive frames applies to a given court varies. So too does the role played by the leaders as a variable affecting the characteristics of the group process. In Chapter 4, we will see how they apply to the SA case. But as an overall model, 't Hart's approach to court government has several advantages, which I will now discuss.

The advantage of using a court government model such as 't Hart's to understand the nature of group dynamics in a political executive is that it builds bridges within the study of political executives; court government well describes the informal structure and dynamics underpinning the exercise of power and the decision-making processes in an executive government and does so in a way that points to the themes one finds in public policy literature. As such, it is more than a metaphor ('t Hart, 2014; Rhodes, 2014). Further, court government provides an organising concept for a systematic analysis of elite actors. It shows how, once identified, the beliefs, practices, traditions and dilemmas of elite actors are tools for analysing how they govern (Rhodes, 2014).

Finally, there is a small but emerging body of literature (Flynn, 2011, 2017; Lavelle, 2003, 2018; Taflaga, 2016, 2017) on the importance of a party's time in opposition for the trajectory of policymaking once the party is in government. As we saw in the discussion of neo-statecraft, the notion of a court can also be used to understand the group dynamics of an opposition working to make itself the alternative government ('t Hart & Uhr, 2011; Zussman, 2013). As the case study unfolds in subsequent chapters, I will highlight the importance of the transition from opposition to government for the political executive's policymaking.

2.4 Ideology

In this section, I will discuss some of the challenges involved in using the term ideology and situate Weiss' use within broader debates about the concept. I will then consider how to view implicit values as conceptual frames that shape political thinking so as to set the parameters for policymaking. That is, I situate values as the lenses through which the political executive juggles multiple and competing (or sometimes conflicting) goals.

Some public policy scholars implicitly pit 'values' and 'facts' against one another. This approach is most notable among adherents to the evidence-based policy movement. However, a more common approach is to acknowledge the role of values but place them outside of any theoretical model that is developed, following very much the path set by Lerner and Lasswell (1951) and Simon (1957). In contrast, Weiss, like Dahl and Lindblom (1953) before her, not only acknowledges the role of values but seeks to place them at the core of her framework.

As already discussed, under the label of 'ideology', Weiss subsumes a broad range of concepts: world views, explicit ideology (as described by (Minogue, 2017)), political ideology (as in left–right, liberal–conservative), beliefs and values. While allowing for this broad range of concepts, Weiss tends to focus on implicit beliefs and values and ideology as political thinking rather than as 'isms. For the purposes of this thesis, it is possible to think of ideology as 'the way values are expressed and debated in political life' (Botterill & Fenna, 2019, p. 118). However, ideologies are not just lists of values, but rather,

systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding. (Freedon, 1996, p. 3)

Following Weiss' lead, and focusing on ideology as political thinking based on implicit beliefs and values, raises questions about how to treat various 'isms and traditional left–right and liberal–conservative characterisations. Analytically, I propose treating them as conceptual patterns operating within the cultural dimension of the institutional arena. This is done in part to align with Weiss but also in recognition of the complexities involved in making left–right or conservative–liberal political assessments, categories which are increasingly recognised as of varying value and often highly relative in terms of time and country (Benoit & Laver, 2006, 2012; Beramendi et al., 2015; Jahn, 2011).

2.4.1 Ideology as a Concept

The term ideology is not without challenges, in part because of the word's close association with Marxism and, in part, because it is a highly flexible conceptual tool (Plamenatz, 1971) characterised by a certain 'semantic promiscuity' (Gerring, 1997, p. 957). However, Weiss does not use the term in any Marxist sense and explicitly excludes using it to denote the longstanding notion (cf. Mannheim, 1954) that ideology represents a distortion of true needs and implies 'false consciousness' (Weiss, 1995, p. 574).

It is useful to consider Weiss' conceptualisation of ideology by drawing on Leader Maynard's (2013) 'map of the field' of ideological analysis, which posits the existence of three approaches to studying and understanding ideology. Each approach seeks to explain how agents' beliefs (about politics) affect their (political) behaviour (Leader Maynard, 2013, p. 313). The first is the quantitative approach, which takes a narrow view of ideology as a set of tightly coherent ideas that are mutually exclusive from competing views of the world. Here, ideology is not necessary and is limited to elites. However, when present, it has the power to shape personal commitment, socialisation and unconscious psychological processes.

The second is the discursive approach which, in contrast, sees ideology as ubiquitous, though cast in a semi-pejorative light. The negative assessment flows from the association of ideology with domination. However, whereas post-structuralists tend to view such dominance as unavoidable, and therefore ideology as necessary (Leonardo, 2003), those taking a critical discourse analysis approach tend to see domination as able to be overcome and consequently believe that ideology is ultimately unnecessary (Leader Maynard & Mildemberger, 2018). Discursive approaches see ideology's power as flowing from its role in socialisation and unconscious psychological processes.

The third approach is the conceptual. Fundamentally concerned with the ideational content of a phenomenon, it sees ideology as necessary and ubiquitous. This approach views ideology positively (or at least non-pejoratively) and sees it as multidimensional. This perspective means there are multiple, competing ideologies which, while not mutually exclusive, are subject to a process of contest whereby the components of the ideology are 'de-contested' through the imposition of particular meanings. Here, ideology's source of power resides in its ability to capture political language and 'sense-making' utility.

In terms of Leader Maynard's map, Weiss' understanding of ideology aligns with the conceptual approach, in that she sees ideology as ubiquitous, necessary, non-pejorative, multidimensional and fluid. Weiss' understanding of the source of power for an ideology likewise aligns with the conceptual approach's emphasis on ideology's 'sense-making' utility and generation of 'affective commitments' (Leader Maynard, 2013, p. 314). However, when it comes to an understanding of the main agents of ideological change and the principal data for analysing ideology Weiss is eclectic, aligning with elements of all three approaches.

In summary, Weiss locates ideology in the human mind as a set of values or beliefs rather than in behavioural patterns or the linguistic symbols of discourse. Behaviour and debate will, of course, reflect these values, but they are constituted in the shared cognitive patterns of the group. In terms of subject matter, for Weiss, ideology has obvious political and power implications, but its content is more everyday and does not need explicit political subject matter. In terms of who has an ideology, Weiss does not limit the subject to a social class nor a group but considers that individuals can have ideologies as much as groups, though ideologies are often shared. As such, Weiss does not limit ideology to being the hallmark of a specific strategic position within society, as in that of a powerful elite or an excluded minority. An approach that supports the discovery of such an 'everyday' set of beliefs is necessary for my analysis to identify the SA political executive's ideology. Frame analysis is one such approach, which I will discuss in the next section.

2.4.2 Values and Framing

As a system of values and beliefs expressed and debated in political life, the elements of an ideology can be viewed as conceptual frames. Gregory Bateson originally coined the notion of frames and framing in the 1950s in the context of scholarship on cognition and learning (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). The concept became established in public policy studies based mainly on the work of Martin Rein and Donald Schön (Rein & Schön, 1991, 1996; Schön & Rein, 1994). More recent examples of the application of their approach include research regarding agenda setting in the European Union (Daviter, 2007), biotechnology policy in the EU (Daviter, 2011), and an infrastructure project in Belgium (Wolf & Van Dooren, 2017).

A conceptual frame is a 'schema of interpretation', which provides an easily discernible storyline that renders events meaningful and functions to organise experience and guide action. While the narrative is easily discernible, Rein and

Schön (1996) contend that the structure, boundaries and schema of interpretation tend to form a less visible foundation; an 'assumptional basis'. Policy frames reflect particular interests and become the tools or 'weapons' deployed by policy actors to achieve their goal (Smith, 2013). As such, they function in much the same way that Weiss suggests for ideological values.

In his own work, Rein used the terms 'frame-reflective analysis' and 'value critical analysis' interchangeably (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). In their collaboration, Rein and Schön viewed assumptional bases and values as intertwined if not interchangeable. For example, frame analysis is a way to bring 'assumptions, views of the world, and values' into the open and 'the assumptional and value structures that underlie the policy design' (Rein & Schön, 1996, p. 96) were considered the focus of their approach. However, in her work on the dynamics of organisational culture, Hatch (1993) usefully distinguishes between (prior) assumptions and (subsequent) values and explains that they are connected or interrelating through 'manifestation'. This distinction also assists in identifying the interaction and cross-over between the institutional arena and ideology in the 4I's framework. Assumptions and values are both categories of culture in the widest sense of the concept (Archer, 1995) but, in terms of the 4I's, assumptions sit with culture (in the narrower sense) in the institutional arena and values are part of ideology.

The literature I have reviewed here suggests that ideology is political thinking that shapes behaviour. However, it is not unique to politicians or elites; it is ubiquitous, though often hidden or disguised. Frame analysis emerges as one way to bring ideology out into the open. In so doing, conceptual approaches to understanding ideology predict that ideology will often consist of clusters of values that are not entirely compatible and sometimes even competing. For example, in Chapter 5 we will see that the SA political executive simultaneously embraced as values the significance of market forces and the importance of government intervention.

Further, consistent with the conceptual approach, these competing values do not need to be harmonised but are instead 'de-contested'. This occurs through the meaning and hierarchy assigned to them in relation to one another. In Chapter 5 on ideology, I will present the values constituting the SA political executive's ideology, noting the absence of coherence among them though, consistent with the above, there was a definite hierarchy among the identified values. Further, as the discussion in this chapter highlights, the hierarchy among values can change in response to changing circumstances and not all values that make up the ideology need to be

activated in all events. That is, agents can cycle between the values as needed, something also explicitly explored in Chapter 5. Interests, the third element of the 4I's framework, goes some way to explaining what activates this cycling between values and I will now turn to explore aspects of the academic debates relevant to this element.

2.5 Interests

In this section, I situate Weiss' approach to interests within the broader discussion of interest theory. This contextualising includes exploring some of the debates concerning self-interest and other-regarding interests. Drawing on Max Weber's approach to interests, I conclude at the end of this section that it is possible and appropriate to move beyond Weiss' methodological choice to focus on self-interest as the primary motivator to also consider the role of 'public interest'.

The most crucial point to note is that, in speaking about interests, we are considering motivation. Consistent with the general thrust of interest theory in the social sciences, motivation can be understood as 'what people want' (Swidler, 1986, p. 274; Vaisey, 2010). Further, linking the discussion of interest with the previous consideration of ideology, in a range of disciplines, interests are seen as a mechanism for activating and transacting the balancing of competing goals and values (Stone, 1997). That is, changes in interests can motivate an alteration in the ideology's hierarchy of values or cycling from one value to another. This activating role for interests is the position adopted by Weiss (1983, 1995).

Weiss refers to individual interests being more than a commitment to self; they could include a commitment to 'organisations' and 'public service' (1983, p. 238), as well as to 'a cause' (1999, p. 477). Also, Weiss (1995) remarks on the differentiation in organisational theory of self-interest and organisational interest, and that the two often conflict. However, as already noted, observing the difficulty in disentangling 'self-serving motives from altruistic ones' (1983, p. 238), Weiss (1983, 1995) made the *methodological* decision to define interests primarily in terms of self-interest. This decision is consistent with the dominant thinking in political science in the 1980s and 1990s (Mansbridge, 1990). Weiss saw herself following the lead of 'almost all political scientists [who] take for granted that self-interest is the core of politics, including organizational politics' (1995, p. 574).

More recent scholarship has focused on motivations beyond self-interest, often on altruistic notions such as public service but also loyalty to groups, such as family, company, organisation or state. However, empirical research on 'public service' in policymaking has focused almost exclusively on bureaucrats and has neglected politicians (Ritz, 2011). Recent studies have begun to address this gap, including those by van der Wal (2013) and James (2018). In his analysis of the differences between the work motivations of administrative and political elites, van der Wal (2013) included politicians from the Netherlands, the European Union and the USA. Based on qualitative interviews, he found that politicians wanted to contribute to, serve or improve society. He also found that political ideals were crucial motivators. The finding was that these conclusions apply across institutional settings.

James (2018) undertook qualitative interviews with British political leaders and similarly found interviewees expressed sensitivity to the context of their times and a desire to bring about positive social change. He called this motivation 'conscience leadership' and contrasted it with a co-existing 'cunning leadership' focused on success in winning power, office and influence. These findings accord with broader social research showing people often strive to achieve social and ideological goals which may or may not support them in maximising personal self-interest (Camerer, 2003; Fischer, 2003; Mansbridge, 1990), and that they justify their cooperative or prosocial behaviour as seeking to 'do the right thing' (Dawes & Thaler, 1988) or the 'moral thing' (Capraro & Rand, 2018).

2.5.1 Self Interest

The long-hypothesised notion that human beings are motivated overwhelmingly by self-interest remains resilient. It is evident in the seventeenth-century contract theory of Hobbes (2018, Ch XIII) and going back to the ancient Athenian sophists. The strength and persistence of this notion in political science rests in the pervasiveness of rational choice theory within the discipline, and the predominance within that school of thought of approaches restricting their modelling to self-interest (Mansbridge, 1990), as well as the dominance of economic goals and economic theory not just in policymaking but all aspects of social life in western democracies (Le Grand, 2003; Pusey, 1991; Woolderton et al., 2015). Extremists in the self-interest school concluded, 'as a result of empirical research ... that the average human being is about 95 per cent selfish in the narrow meaning of the term' (Tullock, 1976, p. 38). Others, like Downs (1957), slid from modelling the world according to the narrowest form of self-interest into assuming that self-interest is usually the end

towards which political actors strive. The narrowest form generally means the interests of individuals as privately apprehended, unmediated by participation in the process of group or community discourse (deLeon & Denhardt, 2000).

These views persist in political science (e.g. Buller & James, 2012; Mueller, 2011), despite significant empirical evidence pointing in the opposite direction (see Berman, 2011; Fischer, 2003; Lewin, 1991) and the fact that the rational choice model came under severe sustained attack in almost every other social science discipline from the mid-1970s onwards. Notable critiques of rational choice have been made by, *inter alia*, Amartya Sen (1977) in economics, Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman et al., 1986) in psychology, Amatai Etzioni (1988) in sociology and Charles Taylor (1989) in political philosophy. Contemporary scholars of public policy are less likely than before to adhere to the view that self-interest always and everywhere predominates. Nevertheless, despite the developments outlined above, variants of rational choice theory remain influential in political science, especially in the form of public choice theory (e.g. Mueller, 1989, 2003; Munger, 2011), and in political economy. Though, instead of claiming empirical support for this approach, the tendency is to now present self-interest as an ideal type and theoretical modelling based on it as useful in creating and understanding the rules and institutions of a well-functioning democracy. According to this view, the rival public-interest hypothesis 'is neither a comprehensive explanation of political behaviour nor a sound basis for institutional design' (Munger, 2011, p. 339).

Examples of the rational choice approach are found in research in areas of relevance to my case study, including in water resources management (e.g. Deane & Hamman, 2017; Grafton & Williams, 2020), regulation of utilities (e.g. Mountain, 2019), and environmental regulation (e.g. Aydos & Rudolph, 2018a, 2018b). The problem with the approach of defining and measuring the public sphere with individualised outcome indicators is that it 'promotes models and predictions of action that increasingly become defined by what they can measure' (Archer & Tritter, 2001, p. 15).

The purpose of this brief excursus into the history of the conceptual use of 'self-interest' is threefold. First, it underscores that popular caricatures of politicians as self-interested vote maximisers and rent seekers do have some continuing support among academic researchers. Second, it highlights that, nonetheless, there is not the same unanimity of opinion about self-interest that existed when Weiss developed the 4I's framework. Indeed, one authority Weiss (1995) cited in support of her

methodological choice was Kingdon (1984), who subsequently modified his view to hold that motives are varied and multiple, with policymakers being simultaneously motivated by more than one interest (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 122-123). Accordingly, it is arguably possible and indeed appropriate to make a different methodological decision to Weiss'. Third, the discussion reinforces the argument that this thesis' purpose is not to model the effect of interests but to describe their operation in the policymaking of the political executive. This will be done in Chapter 6, when I consider the operation of political self-interest in policymaking regarding radioactive waste management policy.

2.5.2 Other-Regarding Interests

Conceptually, self-interest, discussed above, is based on the logic of consequences. That is, individuals consider the costs and benefits of a situation and make decisions to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs to themselves. In contrast to this rational, economic model of human motivation, the notion of public interest is built on the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2008), that is the view that individuals are influenced in their decision-making by moral pushes and pulls (Dubnick, 1998). Further, the logic of appropriateness introduces not just altruistic motivations such as being other-regarding, but also socio-cultural motivations such as loyalty (Karsten, 2015). As noted in the earlier discussion of historical institutionalism, rather than ask 'how do I maximise my utility in this situation', agents are assumed to ask, 'what is the appropriate response to this situation given my position and responsibilities?' (Bell, 2002; Peters, 1999; Shepsle, 2008).

This kind of conceptualisation broadly aligns with Weber's (2009) categories of interests as either material or ideal. For Weber, material interests are wants generated by attempts to relieve those 'basic' human sufferings of 'distress, hunger, drought, sickness, and ultimately ... suffering and death' (2009, p. 280); to satisfy the 'appetites' in Spinoza's terms. These material interests are only equated with economic interests because the accumulation of economic resources is typically associated with meeting such basic needs (Lizardo & Stoltz, 2018). In contrast, ideal interests are the motivations to strive for more 'psychological premiums' such as the experience of enlightenment, the achievement of social honour, being held in high esteem by peers, or the assurance of otherworldly (religious) rewards. For Weber, also included among ideal interests are altruistic motives or an interest in the fate of one's family, clan or neighbourhood, or the success and permanence of an organisation that will outlive the person (Weber, 1978a).

Overall, Weber's theorising provides an understanding of motivation not reducible to crass economic interests and of ideal interests as different to and separate from ideas (Eastwood, 2005; Jackson, 2002; Lizardo & Stoltz, 2018; Swidler, 1986). Further, like Archer, Giddens, Weiss and so many others after him, Weber charted a middle course in the structure–agency debate. Jackson summarises this as follows:

[Weber's] methodological individualism needs to be understood in context, as an effort to distinguish his argument from both a reductionist biology and an organic holism of society which would assimilate the individual completely. (2002, p. 445)

Such considerations of interest theory beyond self-interest draw our attention to four points of salience for this thesis. First, while some theorising suggests that three kinds of interests operate in policymaking – public interests, which is other-regarding; loyalty to people, places, roles, organisations and ideas; and political self-interest, which is self-regarding (Mansbridge, 2003; Stone, 1997) – it seems better to stick with the dual categories of (political) self-interest and other-regarding (public) interest. The latter would be inclusive of loyalty in most instances, but with a strong emphasis on either being 'public-spirited' or interested in the 'general welfare' (Bozeman, 2007; Goodin, 1996; Stone, 1997). This aligns more closely to the idea of being committed to organisations, causes and public service as referenced by Weiss.

Second, these two kinds of interest are determined through processes of negotiation, compromise and accommodation among competing interests (Bozeman, 2007; Johnston, 2016; Wheeler, 2006), rather than being in any way normative. Foundational to this process of accommodation is the recognition that there are many publics, rather than a single public, and similarly many interests that cannot be simply aggregated.

Third, agents are assumed, in most instances, to operate out of both self and other-regarding interests at the same time, though with one dominating at any one time. That is, agents are assumed to generally have mixed motives, with these interests being overlapping descriptive categories, rather than ideal types; motives are varied and multiple (Kingdon, 2011; Lewin, 1991), with policymakers being simultaneously motivated by more than one interest (Weiss, 1983, p. 224).

Fourth, these two kinds of interest are considered the mechanism – or as Stone (1997) puts it, the 'language' – for transacting the balancing of competing values and goals. This situation reinforces the second adjustment suggested above that agents determine the kind of interest that dominates circumstances through negotiation. In

the context of this case study, these negotiations occur through the dynamics of court government. This approach assumes that, in the process of compromise and accommodation, policymakers often subordinate self-interest to notions of 'public interest' and loyalty to people, places, organisations and products, and a desire to make a difference (Stone, 1997).

In conclusion, drawing on Weber's theorising, I propose to undertake my analysis of the political executive on the basis that there are two kinds of interest-based transactions relevant to policymaking: an ideal, other-regarding public interest and a material, self-regarding political self-interest. By 'public interest' I mean a motivation focused on the 'general welfare', as in those things that are good for the community as a community (Bozeman, 2007), and by 'political self-interest' a motivation focused on winning power, office and influence.

As discussed previously, this approach differs from that adopted by Weiss (1983, 1995), who for methodological reasons emphasises self-interest, and does not consider public interest in her framework. I contend that this modification enhances the operation of the framework and is not inconsistent with Weiss' overall approach. Aligning the 4I's framework with both historical institutionalism and, to a lesser degree, to sociological institutionalism allows for the inclusion of other-regarding interests, correcting the framework's misalignment with rational institutionalism with its exclusive focus on self-interests. In the case of historical intuitionism, the focus on other-regarding interests is via the logic of appropriateness. In sociological institutionalism, *shared* understandings, norms, identities and culture generate or constitute interests. Therefore, interests are not just endogenous or individual but are also communal, because they flow from culture (Schmidt, 2006).

2.6 Information

While the 4I's framework positions high-quality information as a critical input for deliberative democracy, for Weiss, information is less influential than ideology and interests. Information enters the decision-making venue as ideas via an everyday, 'casual empiricism' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979), rather than according to any kind of rational, scientific model. Indeed, those holding that academic or scientific research is the most valid basis of decision-making misread the nature of democracy (Weiss, 1983). In a similar fashion to scholars like 't Hart (2014) and Stone (1997), Weiss promotes an interactive model of policymaking wherein decisions necessarily occur through *social interaction* rather than individual cognition to arrive at the *collective*

expression of a decision. Consistent with this approach, competition, opposition and conflict are important metaphors for Weiss. Decision-making occurs in a pluralistic world where events, forces and contradictory values and interests compete with each other for domination and control. Conflict between opposing values and interests drives change, with stability and change explained by the balance of power between opposing entities, which can be either internal or external to the group (Bryant, 2011; Capano, 2009; van de Ven & Poole, 1995).

Weiss' emphasis on social interaction, 'casual empiricism' and democracy links with three important debates among public policy scholars. The first, related to policymaking occurring through social interaction, is whether information or power is the most important variable for policymaking (Radaelli, 1995). The second relates to the configuration of and engagement with information in the face of Weiss de-emphasising the linear, rational, scientific model and instead focusing on everyday empiricism. Here, the issue debated is whether information processing is a structured process amenable to treatment as a sequence of programmed steps or is anarchical with no apparent structure or sequence. This debate concerns whether the decision-making process progresses steadily, albeit bounded by people's limited cerebral rationality, towards a solution or emerges inconsistently from a vortex (Hickson et al., 1986) or garbage can (Cohen et al., 1972). The third debate concerns the relative importance of democracy and evidence. This debate considers whether reliance on technocratic and technological solutions is an elite and undemocratic approach to policymaking (Bevir, 2010; Fischer, 1990; Schneider & Ingram, 2007; Stone, 1997; Weiss, 1991a) or whether those who push facts, logic, reason and rational analysis to one side in defence of values, politics and democracy fail to address the real problems and concerns of society (Hawkins & Parkhurst, 2016; Parkhurst, 2016; Schneider, 2020).

2.6.1 Defining Information

Fundamentally, information is knowledge, as in meaningful, well-formed data that are either true (Floridi, 2011) or, following Weiss (1983), at least assumed to be true. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, for Weiss, information is the range of understandings that help people make sense of the current state of affairs. Information helps answer questions such as: why things happen as they do, where the problems are, which potential solutions hold promise for addressing them effectively and which proposals will hinder a solution (Weiss, 1995).

On the one hand, this means information is more than signals, natural patterns, nomic regularities, instructions, power and economic resources at the disposal of a decision-maker. It involves the processes to collect, prioritise and synthesise data and arrive at a judgement as to their meaning. Such processes can be 'logical' and 'rational' or intuitive and gestalt-like moments of insight. However, in order to undertake any such process, we do not first, as some suggest, 'independently of logic, obtain reliable information' (e.g. Immanuel Kant, 2007, pp. 98-99); there is no 'data in the wild' (Floridi, 2011, p. 85). Instead, a political executive, like any decision-maker, is continuously assessing and interpreting data as they are collected or received. Any disaggregation of data from their formation and meaning making, or ideas from ideation, is purely an analytical device.

On the other hand, these processes are generally seeking to arrive at what is 'true', noting that we 'won't attain complete objectivity, but we can try for it' (Weiss, 2004, p. 155). Regarding 'truth' judgements, when confronted with the question 'is it so?', an affirmative answer can be 'certainly', or qualified as 'probably' or 'possibly'. However, in policymaking, it is rare to answer with a sense of certainty such that there are no further questions. At the same time, policymakers very often decisively act based on information that is probably so (or even possibly so) by assuming it to be certainly so. This assumed certainty is usually based on 'social epistemology' (Quinton, 2004), which is the range of connected judgements by other persons that explain or qualify and clarify the current judgement, which is accepted as truth without being subjected to rigorous assessment (T. Walker, 2017).

Drawing on the critical realism of Bernard Lonergan, I contend that it is still useful to focus on cognitive or semantic information. In this sense, information emerges when 1) data are experienced, 2) reflection on this experience generates insight, 3) these insights are conceptualised with a level of abstraction, and 4) the data are affirmed as 'true' (Adams, 2016; Lonergan, 1992). Figure 2-3 presents Lonergan's (1990, 1992) information or ideational process broken down, for analytical purposes, into the four stages of experience, insight, conceptualisation and judgement. The approach underscores that humans are active creators of information, not passive receivers of sense data. Active, human engagement is present at the first stage, with the contention that data are experienced through introspective reflection. The second stage, insight, is nearly always based on a kind of gestalt, even though notionally based on the questions 'what is it?' and 'why is it so?' The example of insight given by Lonergan is the 'Eureka!' moment of Archimedes while in the baths of Syracuse.

This thesis documents such a moment with the political executive's decision to build a desalination plant.

The conception stage in the information/knowledge process involves answering the 'what is it?' and 'why is it so?' questions in greater detail and with a higher degree of abstraction. Lonergan, like Archer, places significant emphasis on reflection on the 'internal conversation', and in doing so presents knowledge creation that is neither wholly the product of scientific rationality (agency) nor completely determined by social context (structure). As Archer says, the internal conversation is:


never suspended, it rarely sleeps, and what it is doing throughout the endless contingent circumstances it encounters is continuously monitoring its concerns. Inwardly, the subject is living a rich unseen life which is evaluative (rather than calculative, as is the case for Modernity's Man) and which is meditative (rather than appropriative, as is the lot of Society's Being). (Archer, 2002, p. 19)

However, while the internal conversation is never suspended, the kind of reflection that involves abstraction and detailed conceptualisation is often fractured or suspended for extended periods. When this is the case agents will move from the moment of insight directly to judgement, without giving much time or attention to conceptualisation and abstraction. In Lonergan's structure, feelings have an essential function in such rapid movements to judgement. For Lonergan, feelings are either operators or integrators. As operators, they represent our initial response, moving us to pose value questions. As integrators 'they settle us in our value judgements as our psyches link our affects to an image of the valued object' (Dunne, 2019). Lonergan calls the linking of affect and image a symbol, and suggests the human mind is saturated with symbols that make it easy for us to respond smoothly without having to reassess everything at every moment. This aligns with the way Daniel Kahneman (2011) and others theorise about cognitive shortcuts such as fast (or system 1) and slow (or system 2) thinking. It also aligns notions of tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 1958), craft knowledge (Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980a), and gut feeling (Weiss, 1983). However, these cognitive simplifications and shortcuts are not only about remembering. They are also forgetting, and therefore include strategies to deny, dismiss, divert or displace 'uncomfortable knowledge' (Rayner, 2012).

Finally, in Lonergan's model, there is the judgement stage; the conclusion 'it is so', which can be viewed as a truth claim for the insight. 'Truthful' means the well-formed and meaningful data are an 'accurate', 'correct' or 'valid' description of the object.

However, agents can and do organise their world based on inaccurate, incorrect and invalid descriptions of the world thought to be true. For example, up until 1915, essential elements of modern science were based on incorrect Newtonian principles and, despite the discovery of quantum mechanics, some school students are still taught and believe inaccurate Newtonian ‘rules’, such as ‘parallel lines never meet’. Or, up until the Millennium Drought, water was allocated to various users in the Murray-Darling Basin based on misunderstood notions of average water flows. The point to note is that Lonergan’s conceptualisation applies as much to the generation of ‘scientific evidence’ as it does to the everyday decision-making of the political executive.

Figure 2-3: A Cognitional Structure of Information Based on Lonergan



2.6.2 Information and Power

Twenty years apart, Claudio Radaelli (1995) and Falk Daviter (2015) provide comprehensive reviews of the public policy literature discussing the relationship between information and power. Radaelli suggests that power and information (or knowledge to use his term) perform complementary functions in policymaking, rather than conflicting. He comes to this conclusion based on a review of fields such as evaluation research, epistemic communities, diffusion of economic policy paradigms, agenda setting and policy learning. This view challenges earlier debates which

tended to position either power or information as the dominant or most important variable, noting that the evidence-based policy movement is premised on the notion that (political) power and (scientific) information compete rather than complement.

Radaelli further contends that the conventional wisdom in political science focuses on power as the most important independent variable explaining policy. However, scholars like Hecló (1974), Lindblom (1990) and Weiss (1986b) position information, both 'lay' and professional/scientific, as an independent and highly significant variable explaining policy, though still in a dialectical relationship with power. According to these and other scholars, learning then takes on a vital role, not as conflict resolution, but as collective decisions, in a process of unending enquiry (Daviter, 2015; Mead, 2015; Radaelli, 1995).

The literature investigating knowledge utilisation and that investigating the factors affecting the policy process have mainly developed independently of one another, despite repeated calls for their integration (Daviter, 2015; Radaelli, 1995; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988), perhaps because of the divergence of views about the importance of information and power. While some integration has occurred (see Boswell, 2008; Mead, 2015; Newman et al., 2016; and Newman & Head, 2015 for examples and discussion) much of this debate seems premised on a normative understanding of knowledge utilisation, positioning policy learning as the main driver of conceptual knowledge. Consequently, the quest to understand different types of information *and* their use as factors affecting the policy process remains substantially unresolved (Daviter, 2015).

Daviter (2015) proposes adding two elements to our conceptualisation of information's function in policy, thereby better integrating the theories of knowledge utilisation and information as a factor in policymaking. The first element is a role for administrative and political contest for both policy authority and the structure of political control. The second is to add a role for organisational epistemologies. This underscores that conceptual knowledge used in policymaking is shaped by organisationally embedded rules of observation and inference. The effect of adding these two elements is that policy learning as the main driver for knowledge use is 'partially rejected in favor of a logic of administrative and political contestation' (Daviter, 2015, p. 502).

In a manner consistent with Daviter's findings, for Weiss, information does not exist, or have bearing for policy, in discrete chunks, but is embedded in sets of ideas,

explanatory frameworks and theoretical models (1983, pp. 225-226). Such ideas, frameworks and models may be supported by scholarly research. However, according to Weiss, they are more likely to be supported by tacit knowledge; professional/craft knowledge (Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980a, p. 266); direct experience; folk wisdom; or gut feeling (Weiss, 1983). In this context, Weiss underscores that policymakers, like all other members of society, absorb and accrue the knowledge in 'good currency' in that society, and will often rely heavily on this ordinary knowledge (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) and the beliefs and assumptions accompanying it (Weiss, 1983, p. 228). This becomes apparent, for example, in the way the SA political executive framed its ideology, as we will see in Chapter 5.

Information pours into the policymaking environment from a wide variety of sources, creating information overload more often than information shortage. There is an informational melange wherein secondary reports make up a sizable share of policy-relevant information (Weiss, 1983, p. 227). Further, media have a highly influential function because such reporting reaches not just policymakers but the wider public (Weiss, 1983, 1985; Weiss & Singer, 1988). Beyond the media, policymakers get information from their own organisations, through formal channels (statistics, program records, reports, etc.) and informal interaction with colleagues (meetings, conversations, the grapevine, etc.). Policymakers solicit advice from a wide array of actors (consultants, advisors, experts and friends) and unsolicited information pours in from individuals (e.g. constituents) and interest groups who provide not only advocacy statements but also the informational underlay for their positions (Weiss, 1983, pp. 227-228; 1995, p. 574). However, it is interesting to note bioscience's lack of profile with a broad public meant the volume and range of sources of advice was narrower than was the case for the more resonant and publicised areas of radioactive waste and urban water supply.

Somewhere in this crowded melange, research evidence contributes 'bits' of information, often as generalisations and ideas communicated through existing channels such as those listed above (Weiss, 1983, p. 228). Weiss' conceptualisation of how this occurs is remarkably similar to the four types of idea proposed by Smith (2013): institutional, critical, charismatic and chameleonic ideas. According to Weiss, ideas encounter a substratum of settled understandings built up based on prior information ('institutional ideas'). Then, to have traction, the new information usually has to fit into the policymakers' general understanding based on 'chameleonic ideas'. In contrast, 'charismatic ideas' alter the explanatory framework within which the

whole problem is considered (Weiss, 1983, p. 225; 1999, p. 478; 2001, p. 286). For Weiss, this 'charismatic' effect is best achieved through research as 'ideas and criticism', wherein the traditional research outputs of data and findings are transmuted into a simple 'story' that alters the way people conceptualise the issues and frame the problem (Weiss, 1991a; Weiss & Singer, 1988). This is what Weiss refers to as the 'enlightenment' or 'knowledge creep' model of research utilisation (Weiss, 1977, 1980, 1986a; 1991b, p. 313). However, Weiss argues that the 'knowledge creep' model has remained little more than a descriptive metaphor, a situation assessed by Daviter (2015) as persisting. That is, 'enlightenment' is often used as descriptive imagery for research utilisation without being underpinned by a detailed explanation of the phenomenon's mechanisms (Weiss, 1986a).

Daviter (2015, pp. 492, 502) criticises Weiss for limiting the role of information in policymaking by giving politics 'endemic priority' (Weiss, 1999, p. 471). However, I consider this unfairly caricatures Weiss' understanding of the role of politics in policymaking. It does so, in part, by limiting the understanding of political use of information to distortion and misrepresentation and excluding the accurate and truthful use of research to support a predetermined position (cf. Weiss, 1979). It also tends to cast Weiss' theorising about political context as focused solely on winning authority and control, ignoring her emphasis on adjudicating between competing values. Weiss' theorising in the context of the 4I's framework brings into sharper focus her views about how information is bound by the organisational structure, as do her ideas about how conflict affects information use.

2.7 Conclusion

Having reviewed a body of relevant public policy literature, a range of issues emerge regarding how to apply Weiss' 4I's framework. In the institutional arena, the emphasis Weiss places on organisational culture and decision-making rules led me to several critical theoretical decisions. The first is to draw on Archer's morphogenetic approach, which distinguishes (organisational) structure and (organisational) culture and agency. The second decision regarding the institutional arena was to draw on Archer to distinguish between primary and corporate agency, thereby providing a basis for investigating the political executive as a group. The principal strength in applying this aspect of Archer's critical realist approach is that it provides a theoretical basis for treating the group as the primary unit of analysis.

Regarding ideology, I positioned Weiss very much within a conceptual approach. As such, I located ideology in the shared cognitive patterns of the group, not in its behavioural patterns or the linguistic symbols of its discourse, though it is still reflected in them.

Alongside the reliance on Archer's work for understanding the institutional arena, one of the more significant adjustments to Weiss is to expand the definition of interests beyond self-interest to include other-regarding public interest, understood as a concern for the general welfare, as in those things that are good for the group, organisation or community as bodies corporate, as well as political self-interest, as in a motivation focused on winning power, office and influence. We will see that the political executive's policymaking in the urban water supply area was substantially motivated by public interest and in radioactive waste management by political self-interest.

Finally, information is presented as an element in policymaking actively created by agents, not passively received as sense data. It is not, and does not need to be, exclusively a rational process to have meaning or utility. In this context, (political) contest, and the institutional rules which surround such contest, are critical. This position brings us full circle, back to consideration of the institutional arena.

The analysis and discussion in the following chapters will proceed in light of the debates explored in this chapter, the theoretical decisions I have made and the insights they bring. This means, for instance, that in investigating the institutional area of the SA political executive I focus on culture and seek to identify the socio-cultural interactions underpinning important elaborations or reproductions of the institutional arrangement. Similarly, again as an example, in considering what interests motivated the activation of particular ideological values, I am alive to the possibility that 'conscience leadership' was at play and not just statecraft. Therefore, I look for instances of the political executive acting in the public interest and not just pursuing political self-interest. Then, in Chapter 8, based on the theory discussed above and the analysis in Chapters 5–7, I will propose some extensions to the 4I's framework. However, before turning to analyse the SA case in terms of the elements of the 4I's framework, I will use the next chapter to outline the methods I deployed to select the SA case, collect the relevant primary data and then analyse it.

3 Methods

As already noted, this thesis is a case study of policymaking by the SA political executive over two terms of office from March 2002 to March 2010. My analysis focuses on the political executive's approach in three specific policy areas: bioscience industry development, management of radioactive waste and urban water supply. The thesis asks, *what kinds of processes and information did the political executive use in policymaking?* To address this question, I collected original data and took a broad set of theoretical approaches into account (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Héritier, 2016; Rohlfing, 2012). Overall, the thesis uses Weiss' 4I's framework (1983, 1995, 2001) to explain the kinds of processes and information used by the political executive in its decision-making, particularly considering what 'caused' the executive to use the processes and information it did (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Collier, 2011). This consideration involves using qualitative methods to look for 'causal patterns' or configurations rather than seeking to measure correlations in a linear-additive fashion (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Rohlfing, 2012; Yin, 1994).

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, according to the 4I's framework, policy change occurs through the interaction of three broad factors – ideology, interests and information – in an institutional context. Further, the interaction among the 4I's is constant and iterative, with decision-makers repeatedly (re)specifying their ideologies and interests in the course of processing information (Weiss, 1983, 1995, 1999). This dialectical understanding aligns with configurational thinking (George & Bennett, 2005), which sees almost all social outcomes resulting from a combination of multiple causal factors. As such, there are divergent pathways to similar social outcomes, and the same causal factors can have different effects in different contexts and combinations (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Blatter & Haverland, 2012). In the face of such complexity, George and Bennett (2005) advance causal-process tracing and congruence analysis as two possible techniques for drawing causal inferences, both of which are grounded in a critical realist epistemology. This alignment further reinforces the 'family resemblance' between Weiss' approach and critical realism, as well as highlighting that critical realism points to specific methods. In terms of data collection, these methods include ethnography, participant observation, structured and unstructured interviews, descriptive statistics, and participatory action research. In terms of analysis, these methods include process tracing and triangulation (Downward et al., 2002; McEvoy & Richards, 2003; Mingers et al., 2013; Roberts, 2014).

There are five main parts to this chapter. Section 3.1 discusses issues relating to the use of a single case and this case being SA. Section 3.2 considers the process for selecting the three focus policy areas, as well as providing summaries of key events in each of these policy areas, including a comparative timeline that assisted with their analysis. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the methods employed to select and collect the primary source data used in this study. Section 3.4 discusses how these primary source data were analysed. This discussion includes explaining the process tracing used in the analysis of the SA case. Finally, Section 3.5 briefly highlights some limitations to the methods used.

3.1 Case Selection

As mentioned above, this thesis is a qualitative case study, defined as intensive, non-experimental research into a single case or a small number of cases by making a large number of diverse observations per case to shed light on a larger population of cases (Yin, 2018). In this thesis the observations flow from my intensive reflection on the relationship between concrete empirical data and abstract theoretical concepts (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 19; Gerring & Cojocar, 2016, p. 396) in a single case, policymaking by the political executive in SA in 2002–10.

My rationale for a single case approach is to better support theory testing in a research area where the variables are not fully known or understood. Some schools of thought take a narrower view on the possible role of a single case study. For example, interpretivism promotes single-case investigations because of their ability to take into account the unique character of a situation (e.g. Rhodes, 2005; Rhodes & Tiernan, 2016). In contrast, those upholding the importance of falsification tend to limit the single case to an illustrative role (see Dowding, 2015). However, other scholars assume greater explanatory power for the single case compared with either interpretivism or 'falsificationism' (Koenig, 2009). Yin (1994) considers a single case appropriate where it represents the critical test of a significant theory. Donald Campbell, who was initially severely critical of case studies (Campbell & Stanley, 1966), later came to view them as having a place in theory building (Campbell, 1975). This theory-building view of single case studies is shared by Arend Lijphart (1971), as well as Gerring and Cojocar (2016), who propose using single cases to shed light on circumstances where the variables are not known or are poorly understood, as a precursor to later comparative case studies or large-N quantitative studies.

Those adopting a realist approach (e.g. Koenig, 2009) or process tracing as a method (e.g. Kristianssen & Olsson, 2016; Wenzelburger & Staff, 2017) recognise the credentials of single case studies. Indeed, Blatter and Haverland (2012) consider selecting a single case for process tracing is sufficient precisely because the purpose of process tracing is to identify and understand the operation of causal mechanisms, and not to make across-case comparisons. First, this approach better enables thick descriptions which demonstrate particular causal relationships (Blatter & Blume, 2008), with the analysis of causal relationships being vitally important. As these descriptions are not ahistorical narratives about the unfolding of largely accidental events, attention to the sequence of events in policymaking is necessary, looking for predictability (in a very general sense) in these events (Howlett, 2009; Pollitt, 2008). Second, armed with these thick descriptions, the tracing can reveal with greater confidence whether the causal process unfolded as predicted (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 2014; Rimkute, 2015). As noted in this chapter's introduction, for this research, predictions are those suggested by, and flowing from, the 4I's framework. This approach best facilitates achieving the purpose of identifying the relevant variables and understanding the causal mechanisms in the little-understood area of decision-making by the political executive as a corporate actor.

Having opted for a single case to better facilitate theory building using process tracing among other methods, I chose SA as the case because it has one of the more liberal regimes for accessing relatively recent core Cabinet documents, and I was able to access former ministers and senior bureaucrats more easily in this jurisdiction. After ten years, all SA 'Cabinet submissions' and 'Cabinet notes' are listed by title on a searchable website maintained by the state's Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and can be applied for under *Freedom of Information Act 1991* (SA) provisions, at no charge. Cabinet documents already released under these provisions are available for download on the same DPC website. By comparison, Commonwealth of Australia Cabinet documents, while more fully and proactively released, are only available after 20 years. While some other state jurisdictions have followed SA's lead in making records available after ten years, at the time of commencing this research they were not so easily accessible or even identifiable for application. Accordingly, at the time of researching this thesis, the SA Cabinet documents constituted a unique data source.

3.2 Three Policy Areas


3.2.1 Selection

To undertake case analysis, selection of at least one policy area is necessary. However, given the limited knowledge about my research topic, I selected three areas to ensure a sufficiently large number of diverse observations could be made to draw relevant conclusions. The three policy areas are bioscience industry development, management of radioactive waste and urban water supply.

Figure 3-1 illustrates the funnelling process I went through to arrive at the three focus areas selected. It sets out in detail the criteria used in this process, as well as their application. The key point is that my selection of policy areas was not made based on any prior determination that they fitted with the theories tested in this thesis.

The first level in Figure 3-1 lists the 17 possible areas emerging from analysis of the 41 election statements the Labor Party released for the 2002 election, which reflect the party's policy preference concerning the range of areas. The second level shows the narrowing of possibilities to those areas that where it was either stated or implied that more than one ministry would be involved. This characteristic was used as a proximate indicator for potential negotiation or contest in policymaking. These policy areas are: bioscience industry; defence industry; early childhood; education engagement; homelessness policy; nuclear policy; renewable energy policy; and water policy. The third level illustrates a further narrowing of possibilities based on systematic searches to assess the level of policy activity, selecting those which appeared to have had the greatest amount of such activity evidenced by the number of Cabinet submissions, media releases and the like, thereby providing data for 'thick descriptions'. As a result of this preliminary process the three policy areas of bioscience industry, nuclear policy and water policy emerged. The fourth and final level presents the outcome of the further narrowing based on a preliminary search of the volume of material potentially within scope for analysis.

Figure 3-1: Funnelling Process to Select Focus Policy Areas



3.2.2 Policymaking Events

Each of the three policymaking areas selected involved complex contextual factors which I seek to incorporate in my analysis. For instance, in the case of urban water supply, the longstanding public understanding of water supply as an essential service delivered through publicly owned, monopolistic utilities contended with an emerging notion of water as a user-pays commodity subject to full cost recovery, external regulation and market forces.


Related to the complex interplay of contextual factors, which were part of the institutional arena, policymaking in each of the three areas played out through multiple interrelated steps over time, with the timeframes progressing at very different and changing tempos. Figure 3-2 illustrates this timeline regarding key policy events, with 'events' represented as the preparation and consideration of a Cabinet

submission or note. It shows how the political executive's policy positions in all three areas have their origin in the 'puzzling' of the parliamentary Labor Party, in opposition, to set an agenda to present to the electorate for the 2002 state election. For policymaking concerning urban water supply (to the right of the column noting key political events), there was some delay in progressing the political executive's agenda articulated in the 2002 election statements. The first opportunity was the establishment of an Essential Services Commission (June 2002). However, policy attention only materialised in February 2003, almost a year into the political executive's term. While there was consistent attention across the subsequent years, late 2006 to mid-2008 witnessed the most intense policy attention.

In the case of radioactive waste management (presented to the right of water supply), there was more concentrated attention. This focus began within weeks of the political executive taking office in March 2002 when Cabinet approved the drafting and introduction of a Bill to amend the *Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Act*. It concluded in Nov 2005 when Cabinet considered a feasibility study on longer-term storage options for lower-level waste owned or generated in SA. That is, the major considerations had concluded before the end of the government's first term.

In contrast, for bioscience industry development (shown on the right side of the figure), the first significant policy event was Cabinet's decision in May 2002 to contribute funding to a crop genomics research centre and the last in the case study period was in December 2009, relating to establishment of a health and medical research institute. This timeline of 'key policy events' is an important reminder of the disjointed, elongated and interwoven way in which a political executive engages with multiple policy areas and issues. It also functioned as a useful tool to signpost documents and events that should be included in my analysis. In discussing my approach to analysing data in Section 3.4, I will refer back to this timeline.

Figure 3-2: Timeline of Key Policy Events (Time Not to Scale)



3.3 Data Collection

So as to make multiple, diverse observations about policymaking by the SA political executive, it was first necessary to collect sufficient relevant data. The complexities outlined above pointed to the need to gather a significant volume of varied material to support the qualitative method adopted for this study but not so much material as to make the analytical task impossible in the time and space available. A 'dragnet' (Eckstein, 1975) approach to data collection was used, involving attention to primary sources; concern for detail; and empathy for the meanings given to events by the participants themselves (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 105; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009, pp. 189-191). This 'dragnet' phase was one part 'archival research' and one part collecting 'oral history'. Material from archives and transcripts of interviews, together, constituted the data used to analyse the SA case. In this section, I summarise the processes for collecting these data, with greater detail provided in Appendix 4.

3.3.1 Archival Research

Regarding archival research, three kinds of documents were collected and analysed. The first were official documents publicly recording part of the policymaking process, for example, Hansard, 'green' papers, 'white' papers, departmental strategies and party policies. Most were still available on government department websites or archived websites. Others had to be accessed through the State Library of South Australia (whose charter includes protecting the state's documentary heritage).

The second type of archival documents collected for this research came from official restricted-access archives. These documents, which predominantly included Cabinet documents created before 31 December 2009, were accessed under the provisions of the *SA Freedom of Information Act 1991*. This Act's primary purpose is to promote transparency and accountability in government by giving members of the public a legal right to access documents held by the government unless there is a matter of public interest or personal privacy that warrants withholding the information.

The third type was public documents produced outside of the SA Government commenting on aspects of policymaking. Newspapers and web-based media reports constituted the bulk of these documents, which were in most instances freely available online, with others held in the State Library's collection.

I was also open to receiving documents from 'personal archives', that is, the personal documents of interviewees such as diaries, letters, contemporaneous notes, photographs, news clippings or private copies of published material. No such material was collected during or after interviews. However, it was clear from comments made by several interviewees that they had consulted some form of 'personal archive' before attending an interview.

Being familiar with the published research on SA for the period 2002–10 assisted in contextualising and interpreting these documents. Principally, I achieved this by reviewing the SA section of the Political Chronicles published biannually in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, as listed in Appendix 5. These articles by recognised experts provide surveys and digests of relevant political events in SA, and 'served both as source of information and political commentary' (Moses, 2004, p. 156). This resource often highlighted issues or events requiring more detailed context, which was then searched for in other articles or monographs. Familiarity with the secondary material helped me to assess each record in terms of relevance, reliability and representativeness and thereby frame questions or identify issues for further exploration (Wellings, 2013).

In total, I accessed and reviewed 181 Cabinet documents. Table 3-1 sets out how these documents were treated. This table is organised by each of the three policy areas, plus those of a more general nature, which included Cabinet submissions relating to performance reporting, the annual State Budget process and the SA Strategic Plan. Of the 181 Cabinet papers reviewed not all were directly relevant to the research. For example, a Cabinet document about radiation protection once received and reviewed was discovered to concern the appointment of members to a statutory advisory committee. In all, 113 Cabinet documents were closely analysed, with 68 being analysed and coded without being specifically cited and 45 being cited as well as analysed and coded. Table 3-1 quantifies the documents accessed for this research, noting which were analysed and cited for this research. A full list of these documents can be found in Appendix 6.

Table 3-1: Number of Cabinet Documents Accessed by Policy Area

	Reviewed Only	Analysed	Analysed and Cited	Total Accessed
Bioscience Industry	11	23	8	42
Radioactive Waste	23	17	12	52
Water Supply	34	20	12	66
General	0	8	13	21
Total	68	68	45	181

3.3.2 Interviews

Consistent with the concept of court government, I conducted interviews with key members of the Rann court: the Premier, members of the Cabinet, partisan political staffers, senior members of the bureaucracy and advisors from outside of government. Those invited to participate were approached because they had held roles of relevance to the case study's focus areas. The views of opposition Members of Parliament who had served as ministers with responsibility for water policy, environmental policy and industry policy in previous administrations were also sought (Rhodes & Tiernan, 2016; Savoie, 2008) but these approaches were not successful. For the period under consideration (2002–10), the number of Cabinet ministers ranged from 13 to 15 at any point in time, with a total of 19 Members of Parliament serving as ministers/premier, one of whom was already deceased when the research commenced.

The study design called for a 'saturation sample', that is, reaching the point where little new knowledge is forthcoming, or the stories begin to sound the same (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). I identified potential participants from public record documents such as the Government Gazette, Hansard, government department annual reports and media reports. Then I approached these persons directly via email or letter with an invitation to participate. By using a 'snowball' technique, additional potential participants were identified during the initial interviews. Table 3-2 sets out the number of potential interviewees in each population pool, the number approached,

and the number interviewed. Of the 45 potential interviewees approached, nine did not respond, eight declined an interview and 28 agreed to an interview. Of the 28 persons who agreed to be interviewed, six subsequently ceased communication with the researcher, failing to reply to two separate communications seeking to set up a time for an interview.

Table 3-2: Participants – Number Approached from Relevant Population Pools

Participant Type / Group	Number approached	Agreed to Interview	Number Interviewed
Former SA Premier 2002-10	1	1	1
Former SA Premier 2001	1	0	0
Former SA cabinet ministers 2002-10	13	11	10
Former SA cabinet ministers pre 2002 for select portfolios	3	0	0
Political advisors 2002-10	9	4	3
Public servants 2002-10	12	10	7
Expert advisors 2002-10	6	2	1
	45	28	22

Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured style. With the consent of interviewees, and consistent with the research approval given by the Flinders University Ethics Committee, 18 out of 22 interviews were audio-recorded; the four remaining interviewees consented to being interviewed and to me making notes during the interview but did not agree to the recording of the interview. The audio-recordings were professionally transcribed. Appendix 7 lists the 22 interviewee, noting the date of the interview and the position(s) relevant to this research held in 2002-10.

The former premier and former ministers interviewed consented to being identified in the research. All but one agreed to their interview being audio-recorded. However, several former ministers requested some audio-recorded comments not be attributed to them. Further, in some instances, they provided 'off-the-record' remarks when the audio-recording device was turned off (as requested or at the end of the interview). For interviewees who were members of the SA public service during the case study

period, three of the six interviewed requested that their identity be kept confidential. Consistent with the ethics approval for this research, the identities of the three former political advisors interviewed remain confidential. In citing interview transcripts in this study, interviewees who consented to being identified are named. Those whose identity is confidential are cited by a category and number (for example 'Political Advisor 1').

3.4 Data Analysis

In this section I describe the process used to analyse data collected from archival research and interviews, the latter being in the form of transcripts. Overall, the approach can be characterised as 'thematic analysis' (Marshall & Rossman, 2011), with the aim of the analysis being 'to convert a mass of raw data into a coherent account' (Weiss, 1998, p. 271). After providing an overview of this approach, I discuss frame analysis, triangulation and process tracing, as more specific elements of my approach to thematic analysis.

3.4.1 Overall Approach

The two main types of primary source – interviews (documented as transcripts) and archival material – were analysed in combination (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) and contextualised with reference to key secondary sources (Yin, 2018). Analysis commenced and continued concurrently with data collection. In the early stages this involved repeatedly re-reading the data (archival material and interview transcripts) to gain maximum familiarity with them. To assist in this familiarisation, I wrote summaries and documented emerging patterns, and sought to memorise these as foundations. This process assisted in identifying areas for further exploration and supported subsequent deeper analysis. As with my questioning of interviewees, the initial coding and thematic analysis was guided by the research question, the structure of Weiss' 4I's framework and the meaning of its four elements, and early iterations of my literature review. This structure is reflected in Appendix 8. Basic 'displays', like the figures and tables in this chapter, assisted in organising data to both facilitate analysis and present initial findings. This organisation and display of the clustering, coding and analysis was crucial in ensuring that the data were retrievable and manageable as my analysis progressed. As my enquiry progressed I used basic analytic strategies such as: describing, counting, factoring (as in dividing into constituent parts), clustering, comparing, finding commonalities, ruling out rival explanations, modelling and story-telling (Weiss, 1998).

The analytic strategy of 'describing' is used throughout this thesis to provide observations and narrative chronicles of events and personalities in context. Even though this is a qualitative study, counting forms a part of description and most other analytic strategies. Often this is simply an assessment that something is 'more' or 'less', or 'many' or 'a few'. In other instances, it is more complex, as discussed below regarding triangulation. In whichever way it is used, counting supported my thematic analysis by showing what was typical and what was aberrant, what was part of a cluster and what was unique, what was true and what was false. For example, several interviewees made claims similar to that of Public Servant 5: 'I don't remember anything about the desal, specifically [being in the media in 2004 and 2005]' (interview, 2019). In response, I undertook a search of the frequency of articles about desalination in *The Advertiser*, the only major daily newspaper in Adelaide in 2002–10. This search occurred using the Factiva (Dow Jones, n.d.) search engine, and looking for items containing the term 'desalination' in each year 2005 to 2010, excluding duplicate articles. Discussion of the results and interpretation is in Chapter 6.

Following Weiss (1998), I took 'factoring' in the algebraic sense to mean breaking down events or ideas into constituent parts or factors. Consistent with many qualitative methodologies, I ultimately sought to treat people and events holistically, rather than abstracted into components. However, throughout the thesis, I take disaggregated aspects of events or experiences and deal with them in sequence, while trying to keep the broader context in mind. Coding narrative material into categories – more often manually but at times using NVivo – allowed analysis of the content, frequency and relationship of each category. Process tracing, which I will discuss shortly, allowed not just the sequence of different aspects of events to be identified but also the causal relationship of these aspects.

Whether through structured coding or iteratively grouping the identified constituent parts, clustering was a crucial analytical strategy employed throughout this research. 'It identifies characteristics or processes that seem to group, aggregate, or side along together' (Weiss, 1998, p. 286). In undertaking the analysis, I used both intuitive and explicit concepts to group factors together. Consistent with many qualitative approaches, including ethnography, grounded theory and various forms of analytic induction, I relied on my immersion in the primary source materials through repeated rereading of these data to arrive at appropriate clusters (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). At a higher level the 4I's – institutions, ideology,

interests, information – functioned as categories. Under each of these, the categories suggested by the theory and questions set out in Appendix 8 provided initial finer grained categories. As the analysis progressed, some concepts were refined or redefined, while others were dropped and replaced with categories that made more sense of the data. Through ongoing conceptual clarification, I placed the relevant information together to create explanations of central outcomes. However, this was not just a determination of how each factor contributed to achieving the observed results. Nor was it restricted to assessing the relative weight of contributions, or which theories were, or were not, supported in the analysis. I set out to present the data in a way that told a story about the political executive. Given the extensive use and interpretation of historical records, the approach is categorisable as qualitative historical analysis, which does not delineate a new or different methodological approach to the study of public policy, but rather simply highlights features of this research that are common to many longstanding research traditions in the field of history (Thies, 2003).

I selected and interpreted the archival documents in a way to minimise investigator bias. The following section on frame analysis demonstrates this approach. However, in general, the method here involves ensuring the authenticity of the historical records used, evaluating the documents in their context and triangulation of data. More specifically, consistent with the recommendations of Thies (2003) on the issue of avoiding bias and selectivity in the use of historical material, first, I sought to get to know the case context well so as to avoid inaccuracies in interpretation of primary sources. Second, among secondary sources I considered the views of researchers beyond those providing confirmation for my theorising. Third, I chose Cabinet documents as the main primary source documents precisely because they were not intended to be made public when they were generated, let alone generated for propaganda purposes. This gives them a higher degree of ‘unguardedness’ than many other primary source documents such as media releases or parliamentary debates.

More generally, inaccurate, incomplete or biased data, as well as biased interpretation of such data, threatens the development of valid descriptions and interpretations. Collecting a large volume of previously confidential archival material, the audio-recording and transcription of interviews, and the collection of both interview and archival data to the point of ‘saturation’ were strategies designed to reduce the risk of working with incomplete data. The use of multiple methods, but

especially triangulation of data and process tracing, was designed to reduce bias and ensure conceptual congruency and encourage alternative explanations.

Finally, the continuing analytical process involved both inductive analysis (through which patterns, themes and categories were discovered in the data) and deductive analysis wherein the themes and categories in existing frameworks were identified in the data (Patton, 2002). Examples of the former are the emergence of 'sustainability' as an ideological value of the political executive (discussed in Chapter 5) and 'doing things' to 'make a difference' as a manifestation of acting in the public interest (discussed in Chapter 6). The elements of the 4I's framework are an obvious example of the latter. During the early stages of analysis, I moved backwards and forwards between these two approaches.

Through this process of immersion, note taking, reflection, coding and thematic analysis, I was able to engage more and more in the interpretation of the data, that is, to bring meaning and coherence to the themes, patterns and categories by developing linkages and a storyline that made sense (Marshall & Rossman, 2011), with observations forming a narrative chronicle of events and personalities in context. There are two points to note about this overall process. First, thick, rich description provided the foundation for qualitative analysis and reporting (Patton, 2002). Second, as stated by Marshall and Rossman in an earlier edition of their work, 'the process of bringing order, structure, and interpretation to a mass of collected data is messy, ambiguous, time consuming, creative, and fascinating. It does not proceed in a linear fashion; it is not neat' (2006, p. 154).

3.4.2 Frame Analysis

A specific way in which I categorised, clustered and interpreted 'factors' (that is, engaged in thematic analysis) was by applying Donald Schön and Martin Rein's (1994) frame analysis to identify the political executive's ideology. In keeping with Weiss' theorising, I treat ideological values as 'assumptional' structures that underlie policy design and, ultimately, policy action. That is, I see values as implied beliefs about what ought to be, therefore accounting for the patterns of more or less coherent action by agents. Even though implicit in the decision-making at the time, these values are identifiable in policy-relevant texts or policy-relevant behaviour, something I do in Chapter 5.

This analysis of the political executive's ideology is anchored in a set of policy-relevant texts; the suite of 41 policy statements that Labor developed in the lead-up to the 2002 election which, as noted above, I also used in the process to select the three focus policy areas. I analysed these texts looking for their assumptional structure, following the approach proposed by Schön and Rein (Rein & Schön, 1991, 1996; Schön & Rein, 1994) and subsequently employed and adjusted by others (e.g. Daviter, 2007, 2011; Fischer, 2003; Wolf & Van Dooren, 2017). This approach makes the tacit elements of (competing) values in policy documents explicit by identifying the issue terrain; naming frames within the debate; and positing the dynamics of those frames in action over time. The naming of frames in the debate is based on qualitative review and coding of emergent themes and patterns in identified texts (Mah et al., 2014). The analysis is augmented by information collected during interviews, and contextualised with reference to norms in the broader socio-cultural context, as discussed in secondary sources.

Chapter 5 presents the insights that emerged from the application of this method. The outcome is the identification of several ideological values. Then, as the analysis of that chapter unfolds further, I will consider how these values were activated, modified and had influence over the case study period. The emergence of 'sustainability' as an ideology value and then as a category to guide further analysis is an example of both frame analysis and the more general thematic analysis I undertook.

It is noteworthy that the identified ideological values are an analytical construct designed to point to the political executive's beliefs and interpretations of meaning and, as such, form the basis for discussion of the implications of these beliefs for the executive's policymaking. Therefore, in constructing such an analytical frame, 'we encounter inherent possibilities for ambiguity because the same beliefs and meanings can be consistent with different courses of action and attitudes toward truth' (Rein & Schön, 1996, p. 90). Such ambiguity is not a reason to avoid this kind of analysis but reinforces that the conclusions are contestable.

3.4.3 Triangulation

The importance of ensuring that the storyline emerging from my analysis is 'descriptively accurate' cannot be understated (Peters, 2013, p. 3). Triangulation of various forms of data assisted in ensuring descriptive and interpretative accuracy. For example, differing views among interviewees concerning the type of interest at

play in the radioactive waste management policy area were triangulated with one another and with relevant Cabinet documents so as to better understand the causal mechanisms at play.

Triangulation also occurred by comparing my qualitative interpretations with quantitative presentations of qualitative data. Often this happened through simple word searches of particular sets of documents. A more sophisticated approach involved using the word frequency tool in NVivo to generate a series of tables showing the frequency of words (both as numbers and proportions) and comparing these across documents. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, my re-reading and coding of two water-related policy documents – *Water Proofing Adelaide* and *Water for Good* – indicated that the former intensely focused on sustainability and the environment, and the latter was strongly focused on economic development and water security, indicating a stark change in emphasis. I confirmed this interpretation via quantitative word frequency analysis. That is, quantification was not used to condense the analytical steps of the qualitative research but as a checking mechanism, and restricted to those documents where such comparison made sense (Schönfelder, 2011).

3.4.4 Process Tracing

Process tracing focuses on the temporal unfolding of situations, actions and events, and then tracing motivations, evidence of interactions between causal factors, and information about contexts/conditions. By understanding the temporal unfolding and interaction of events and actions, it is possible to determine the most significant features of a specific outcome. The goal of process tracing is to show the interaction between the elements of a causal configuration, identifying those elements that are individually necessary and together sufficient to bring about the outcome of interest (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Kay & Baker, 2015).

As a method, process tracing allowed me to fill-out ‘storylines’ with two elements: 1) a description of the most critical structural causal conditions thought to have influenced the decision of interest over time; *and* 2) identification of the most important steps that led to the decision of interest (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Blatter & Haverland, 2012, pp. 111-115). Having documented the policymaking process in this way, I sought to determine the characteristics of the causal conditions involved. This determination involved three levels of analysis: categorising these causal conditions according to type; determining the evidentiary/explanatory strength of these causes;

and finally, the necessity of these factors as causes for specific instances of the political executive articulating, mobilising and accommodating values, information and interests. Figure 3-3 presents these levels of analysis. I will now briefly explore each of these levels or steps in the analytical process.

The first level of analysis – categorising the conditions according to type – involved considering whether it was a/an:

- 1) material cause – the outcome was shaped by social structures;
- 2) formal cause – individuals were influenced by ideas, rules or norms in discourses;
- 3) efficient cause – the actions of agents caused other prime forces for change; or
- 4) final cause – the intentions of the actors (the reasons why they did what they did) shaped the outcome (Kurki, 2008).


These categories assisted in identifying the relative roles of structure (material cause), culture (formal cause) and agency (efficient and final causes) in the change process. The second level of analysis involved identifying the explanatory strength of the specified causal conditions. Here the task was to determine whether the condition was a ‘smoking gun observation’ or a ‘confession’ (Bennett & Checkel, 2015; Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Kay & Baker, 2015). Smoking gun observations involve connecting the range of observations made into relevant clusters to make causal claims inductively. These smoking gun observations document actions, interactions and consequences at critical moments on a meso-level with explanatory features on the micro-level. As such, they do not usually reveal motivations (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 117). A smoking gun observation is always an observation and not based on a test. However, their dense temporal and spatial connections to other empirical observations gives them some strength in making causal inferences (Kay & Baker, 2015) about the pathways leading from cause to effect. An example is decision-making regarding bioscience industry development. Some data indicated that bioscience initiatives faced tough resistance from the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF). However, I did not have access to any admissions from DTF officials that they sought to block bioscience initiatives on fiscal grounds. Instead, the repeated process around such initiatives of submitting Cabinet submissions only to withdraw them, negotiate and resubmit constitute smoking gun observations that support the claims by some ministers of science that this how DTF acted. Such smoking gun observations can have varying degrees of strength and contestability.

The more necessary the observation to explain the outcome of interest, the stronger its truth claim (Mahoney, 2012)

'Confessions' are stronger, being the identification of the underlying action-formation mechanisms that link causes and effects (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). They can take one of two forms: stated confessions and inferred confessions. Stated confessions are explicit accounts by actors (at interview or in historical records) in which they reveal why they acted as they did. These statements can be detailed explanations or general reflections. For this study, in most instances, the statements took the form of general reflections. In either case, however, I needed to carefully examine the contexts in which the interviewees provided such information, being particularly alive to the presence of ex-post rationalisation. Inferred confessions are developed by combining empirical data from the case with behavioural theory. This would be relevant, for example, to an interaction between two actors where each is promoting a different position and each position is underpinned by vastly different values. This empirical information can be combined with a theory such as Schwartz's value theory (Schwartz, 1992, 2012) which says these different values will conflict. In this situation, interviewees admitting these different values will be taken as an inferred confession of conflict even there is no explicit discussion of a clash. Through this kind of combination of empirical data and theory, I provide a clear and consistent conceptualisation of an action-formation mechanism. I note, however, that this kind of analysis tends to work best on the level of individual actors rather than whole groups (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 118). However, in Chapter 6, I will present data regarding radioactive waste management policy that constitutes a confession from multiple members of the political executive.

The third level of analysing the identified causal conditions is to determine their necessity as causes for the outcome of interest, that is, determining if a causal factor is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition. A necessary condition implies that the outcome would not have occurred without this condition. A sufficient condition indicates that factor is able to cause the next step in the chain or the final outcome without further causal factors (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, pp. 119-121; Collier, 2011). For example, in discussing the institutional arena, I will contend that change could not have occurred without the influence of structural factors such as the constitutional role played by ministers (i.e., they were necessary), but that on their own they were not sufficient. Change also required an additional component; a cultural element in the form of the leadership style operating within the political executive.

Figure 3-3: Levels of Analysis to Determine the Characteristics of Causal Conditions



'Retroduction' (Blaikie, 2004, p. 972) entails the idea of going back from, below or behind observed patterns or regularities to discover what produces them. As such, retroduction argues backwards, as it were, 'from some phenomenon of interest via metaphor and analogy to a totally different kind of thing, structure, or mechanism that causally governs the behaviour of that phenomenon' (Fleetwood, 2014, p. 210). For Roy Bhaskar (1978, 2015), this kind of empirical scrutiny is a creative activity involving disciplined scientific imagination to construct a hypothetical model or theory and then establish whether the structure or mechanism that one postulates actually exists (Bhaskar, 2015; Blaikie & Priest, 2018; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). For this research, rather than build a hypothetical model based on an initial 'parsing' of the data, I use Weiss' 4I's framework as the starting point in my explanation of the causal mechanisms driving the political executive's policymaking.

Finally, the kind of predictability referred to above is not the same as statistical generalisability, but neither is it intended to present a unique or random situation. Indeed, beyond this thesis, further comparative research will be needed to confirm whether the causal patterns identified in the SA case unfold in other political executives. Certainly, having identified the nature and relationships of variables through process tracing, co-variation analysis becomes a more productive

proposition. This is because process tracing tests help establish that 1) an initial event or process took place, 2) a subsequent outcome also occurred, and 3) the former was a cause of the latter (Mahoney, 2012). That is, the analytical approach combines pre-existing generalisations with specific observations from within a single case to make causal inferences about that case. Kay and Baker (2015) argue the robust application of this method facilitates a detailed understanding of causality within a single case, thereby allowing for comparability between single case studies using the common theoretical framework without *requiring* explicitly comparative work. In a similar vein, Hall concludes:

Provided the principal theories being tested are formulated in terms that apply to a wide range of cases and spell out the relevant causal process in detail, much can be learned from establishing whether that process is present in a single case. (2006, p. 30)

3.5 Limitations of the Research Design

At the level of data collection, the study has several limitations. First, the most recent events discussed in this research occurred eight years before my first interview and the more distant ones occurred more than twenty years before then when Labor was in opposition. The elapse of time means interviewees' memories were often partial and, in some instances, clouded. For example, one interviewee, after reviewing the transcript of his interview, commented via an email on 'some (my) factual errors and embarrassingly many memory gaps!' Second, while interviewees were generally very generous in sharing insider information, there were multiple instances where interviewees indicated that they considered themselves still bound by the conventions regarding Cabinet confidentiality. Third, due to capacity restrictions, there was a limit to the number of previously unreleased Cabinet documents upon which the SA DPC was prepared to make an FOI determination. Fourth, in a small number of instances material was redacted from released Cabinet documents; in all cases the redaction related to the professionally privileged legal advice provided to the Cabinet. Fifth, while Cabinet documents were able to be accessed under the '10 Year Rule', associated documents such as ministerial briefing papers, speaking notes and departmental comments on these same Cabinet documents are still embargoed for 20 years. These additional data, which would have allowed for 'thicker' storylines and more detailed insight into points of contest and debate, were not available for this research. Finally, as no member of the opposition during the

case study period agreed to participate in the study that different perspective is absent.

These gaps in data, and a general focus on policy as a mid-range concept, mean the process tracing was not as detailed as, say, Kristianssen and Olsson's (2016), who used the method to analysis how priorities were handled during an organisational change process in the municipal service centre of a mid-sized Swedish municipality. The purpose was to investigate the effects and consequences of these changes for the broader organisation. Rather, my process tracing is more akin to Wenzelburger and Staff's (2017) analysis of the 1990s to explain the differences in 'tough on crime' law and order reforms implemented by Blair's New Labour Government in the UK and Schröder's SPD Government in Germany. However, while micro orders of change need to be taken into account in process tracing, the emphasis is generally on mid-range concepts, making some of these gaps less problematic (Kay & Baker, 2015). Nonetheless, these limitations in the research methodology are real and acknowledged.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter began by describing the case study approach, including making the argument for approaching the research question based on a single case. I then turned my attention to some specific issues of method and approach for this qualitative case study, which relied on archival records and elite interviews. These issues included noting how the primary source material was collected and the way I proposed to use framing, triangulation and process tracing in the analysis of the data, as well as some limitations to the methodology employed. In summary, I proposed using the methods of qualitative historical research to identify and interpret institutional factors, interests and the information used in policymaking. This approach was augmented by the use of frame analysis to draw out the political executive's ideology.

In the chapters that follow, I will use the methods outlined above to consider how the political executive articulated, mobilised and accommodated ideology, information and interests to make choices in the areas of bioscience industry development, radioactive waste disposal and urban water supply. I examine how the processes and inputs used in these three policy areas were influenced by a wider set of values held by the political executive – its ideology (Weiss, 1983, 1995) – and the overall institutional arrangement within which the policymaking occurred. Accordingly, the

next chapter (Chapter 4) focuses on the institutional area of the SA case, and Chapter 5 on how the ideology of the SA political executive was formed and affected the three policy areas, before a detailed analysis of how interests operated (Chapter 6) and information was used (Chapter 7) in each area.

4 Institutional Arena

This chapter commences the application of the 4I's framework by exploring the SA case's institutional arena. As discussed in Chapter 2, this study builds on the contention that socially relevant behaviour is embedded in the broader social context of relationships and institutional arrangements (Archer, 1995; Giddens, 1984; Hays, 1994; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009). Accordingly, institutions have a powerful shaping effect on policymaking in the form of material and formal causes (Kurki, 2008). However, agents can and do have influence in the form of efficient and final causes (Kurki, 2008), though through corporate agency (coordinated action based on a shared purpose; (Archer, 2000)) rather than through individual or primary agency.

Following Weiss, I propose that the institutional arena is inclusive of 'the structure, culture, standard operating procedures, and decision rules of the organization within which decisions are made' (1995, p. 576). In adopting this approach, I treat the institutional arena as a 'social structure' including both structural and cultural elements (Porpora, 2015) without either conflating or dichotomising these two elements (Archer, 1995; Newman, 2019). Similarly, I do not treat institutions as pure constraint nor do I conceptualise agency as absolute freedom.

Based on this understanding of agency and the institutional arena, like Weiss, I argue that institutions shape policymaking in two ways. One way is by determining who is empowered to make decisions, as well as when and how they make them. The other way is by influencing how agents interpret their ideology and interests and the information they access (Weiss, 1995). In presenting this argument, I focus my analysis on the culture of an 'organisation' (a specific political executive over a particular timeframe) and the institutional rules guiding the operation of this organisation, without losing sight of the institutional structures.

This chapter has four main parts. In Section 4.1, I describe how the SA political executive of 2002–10 constituted a political court. The notion of 'court government' has two complementary applications. One is as a way to frame and understand a political executive as a corporate actor. The other application is to view and understand policymaking as a group process involving 'puzzling' and 'powering' (Hecl, 1974, 1978). As discussed in Chapter 2, puzzling involves argumentation, discussion and bargaining. Powering involves political contest between competing positions or concerns. That is, 'court' and 'executive' are interchangeable as

descriptors of structure, but 'court politics' brings the issue of group dynamics and culture more clearly into focus as part of the analysis. The position proposed is that significant policy decisions are the output of '*social interaction* between those holding high office and those around them' (t Hart, 1997, p. 311; emphasis added). This social interaction occurs within a political court consisting of intersecting and overlapping groups, functions, factions and processes, often including elaborate procedures for engagement and consultation.

In the next three sections, I consider the institutional arena at the macro, meso and micro levels. Sociological inquiry often recognises a minimum unit (micro) and a maximum unit (macro) of analysis. Typically, macro-level analysis looks at broad systems, institutions, hierarchies and patterns, often discussed in terms of cultures, economies, legal systems, political systems, societies and the like (Archer, 1982; Giddens, 2006; Little, 2020; Serpa & Ferreira, 2019). Meso-level analysis examines the social patterns among larger groupings of people such as companies, political parties and community organisations. Micro-level analysis examines interactions between individuals, such as people's behaviour during negotiations, confrontations and everyday conversations. That is, it is about 'small group' behavioural and conceptual patterns. Section 4.2 focuses on the influence of meta-institutional contextual factors like SA's geography, history and the economy, as well as its formal political structures. This section ends with the contextualising idea of SA's 'rustbelt' decay, which was in common currency at the beginning of the case study period, and associated with the collapse of the State Bank of SA.

Section 4.3 explores the meso-level manifestations of the institutional area, focusing on the Labor Party and the dominant logic that emerged in the case study. According to Archer (2014a), change is not just caused by social or socio-cultural interaction within each stratum. There is also upwards and downwards causation between the macro, meso and micro levels. This point is particularly pertinent for the analysis in this section, where we see the State Bank debacle and the economic ideas in good currency at the time strongly shaping Labor's emergent dominant logic.

Section 4.4 considers the institutional arena at the micro-level by examining the group dynamics of the SA Cabinet. While the ability for agents to change institutions is more limited at the macro-level of the society, in this micro-level exploration we see that the socio-cultural interaction among agents both influences and is influenced by institutional factors (cf. Archer, 1982, 2014a; Mutch, 2009; Whittington, 1989).

An important conclusion from this chapter is to reinforce the centrality of corporate agency and how this is inclusive of the power of decision-makers with proposal authority. The embeddedness of socially relevant behaviour is often so pronounced that a general observer will ascribe the judgement, decision, course of action or outcome to the group or the institution rather than an individual (Engel, 2010), for example, 'the department announced ...' or 'the government failed to deliver ...' While there is a tendency for these outside observers also to believe that the decision-maker with proposal power has the most influence (Duch et al., 2015), organisational research indicates that group behaviour is not the sum of individual variables but an emergent property of the collective, not as in the group having a single thought or feeling but through shared cognitive and behavioural patterns (Forsyth, 2006; Hackman, 2012; Larson & Christensen, 1993; Levi, 2015). These are observable routines that are necessarily recurring and collective. These patterns are 'the way things are done' (Schein & Schein, 2017) in an organisation, occupying the nexus between the organisation as an object and organising as a process (Becker, 2004).

4.1 Structure of the Political Court

The SA political executive of 2002–10, was, for most of this period, a Labor-National-independent coalition government whose ministers were predominantly from the Labor Party. Premier Mike Rann MP led the coalition; hence the decision to refer to the broader body corporate as 'the Rann court'. Figure 4-1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the main elements of the Rann court, with four of the five components – parties and factions, Premier's court, ministers' courts and Cabinet – represented as overlapping ellipses. The fifth element – the key sources of advice – is presented as a shifting network of interconnected nodes off to the side. These are the broad categories identified by scholars like Rhodes and Tiernan (2016), which I have populated based on a wide range of primary (e.g. annual reports of government departments) and secondary (e.g. biannual 'Political Chronicles' in the *Australian Journal of Politics & History*) sources. The figure highlights the centrality of the Cabinet and the Cabinet process, the connection of ministers' courts with the Cabinet process and the Premier's court, and the oversight and control exercised through the Premier's court. Parties and factions are 'outside' the Cabinet process and more distant in their influence on Cabinet decision-making, as suggested by Vercesi (2012). The significant array of advisory structures and processes includes government departments like the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) and

DPC, advisory bodies such as the Economic Development Board and programs such as Thinkers in Residence.


4.1.1 Parties and Factions

As already noted, and illustrated in the ellipse on the left side of Figure 4-1, the political executive was a Labor-National-independent coalition, and the SA Labor Party had two distinct factions. The Labor Left faction placed greater emphasis on the party's 'social democratic' traditions, with an emphasis on social change (Przeworski, 1986; Scase, 1977). In contrast, the Right faction placed more significant focus on its labourist traditions (Faulkner, 2006; Leigh, 2000), and was more accepting of the possibility of social and economic advancement for the 'working classes' within the existing capitalist framework of society (Saville, 1967, 1973). However, a small number of Labor Party ministers, including Rann, were factionally unaligned. Manning (2005) reports that Rann met regularly with the conveners of the Right-aligned trade unions (Don Farrell) and the Left-aligned trade unions (Mark Butler) to assist in managing the extra-parliamentary dynamics of the factions.

4.1.2 Cabinet

Central to the policymaking of Rann court was the 15-member Cabinet. As with other parliamentary systems of government, SA's Cabinet is a set of ministers, coordinated by a premier in a context of collegiality and collective responsibility. However, as illustrated in Figure 4-1, there was something of a hierarchy, with an informal 'inner Cabinet' focused on political considerations. The inner Cabinet consisted of the Premier and two senior ministers, Patrick Conlon and Kevin Foley. Several ministers emerged as more influential in policymaking than others, based on their 'personal resources', generally defined as including characteristics such as reputation, skill, ability, association with actual or anticipated political success, and high standing in his or her party (Helms, 2017). These were John Hill, Paul Holloway, Jane Lomax-Smith, Karlene Maywald and Jay Weatherill (who would eventually succeed Rann as SA Premier in 2011). I refer to these individuals as 'key policy influencers'.

Figure 4-1: Representation of the Rann Court



In March 2002, the Cabinet began with 13 Labor members (including the Premier), with membership increased to 14 and then 15 to accommodate Rory McEwen (December 2002) and Maywald (July 2004). At the core of the generally stable membership were Rann (Premier), Foley (Deputy Premier; Treasurer; key Right faction member), Conlon (Manager of Government Business in the Assembly; Chair of Caucus; key Left faction member), Holloway (Leader in the Legislative Council), Michael Atkinson (Attorney General), Hill, Lomax-Smith, Maywald and Weatherill. The full membership in 2002–10 is as set out in Table 4-1. The first column lists ministers by name, indicating whether they sat in the lower house (MP) or upper house (MLC). The second column shows the portion of the case study period the minister held office; nine of the 21 were ministers for the entire ten years. The next column documents the party and factional allegiance of each Cabinet member. Throughout most of the case study period, the Cabinet had five members each from Labor's Left and Right factions and three factionally unaligned members (Rann, Hill and Lomax-Smith). When McEwen resigned from Cabinet in March 2009, a Right faction member (Michael O'Brien) replaced him. The final column identifies whether the minister held a ministerial portfolio of relevance to the three policy areas of focus in this case study.

4.1.3 Ministers' Courts

As is common in parliamentary systems of government (Connaughton, 2010; Craft & Halligan, 2017; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2014), 'partisan advisors' were an essential feature of all ministers' courts, including that of the premier. A chief of staff led this group and, in most instances, was a trusted 'lead' advisor. There were clear examples of appointing Labor apparatchiks to all such advisor roles. However, Hill, Lomax-Smith and Maywald discussed how they sought out advisors and chiefs of staff based on skill and fit rather than political affiliation (interviews with: Hill, 2018; Lomax-Smith, 2018; Maywald, 2018). That is, they sought good policy-political generalists rather than partisans or gofers (Connaughton, 2010).

A media advisor was assigned to each minister's office but formally appointed to the Media Unit in the 'Office of the Premier', not the minister's office. They reported to the Director of the Premier's Media Unit and maintained a desk in both the ministerial office and the Premier's Media Unit. This arrangement loosened over time but, throughout the case study period, it gave Rann institutional line of sight over all government messaging.

Table 4-1: Members of SA Cabinet, 2002–10

Member	Period of membership	Party & Faction	Relevant Portfolios
Mike Rann MP*	Whole period	ALP Unaligned	Premier Economic Development
Kevin Foley MP	Whole period	ALP Right	Deputy Premier; Treasurer
Patrick Conlon MP	Whole period	ALP Left	Government Enterprises
Paul Holloway MLC†	Whole period	ALP Right	Mines & Resources
John Hill MP	Whole period	ALP Unaligned	Environment; Water; Health (medical research)
Jane Lomax-Smith MP	Whole period	ALP Unaligned	Science
Jay Weatherill MP	Whole period	ALP Left	Government Enterprises
Michael Atkinson MP	Whole period	ALP Right	
Michael Wright MP	Whole period	ALP Right	Government Enterprises
Karlene Maywald MP	From July 2004	Nationals	Science; Water
Rory McEwen MP	December 2002 to March 2009	Independent	
Trish White MP	To March 2005	ALP Right	Science
Lea Stevens MP	To December 2005	ALP Left	
Stephaney Key MP	To March 2006	ALP Left	
Terry Roberts MLC	To February 2006 (died in office)	ALP Left	
Carmel Zollo MLC	March 2005 to March 2009 (replacing White)	ALP Right	
Paul Caica MP	From March 2006 (replacing Stevens)	ALP Left	Science
Gale Gago MLC	From March 2006 (replacing Roberts)	ALP Left	Environment
Jennifer Rankine MP	From March 2006 (replacing Key)	ALP Left	
Tom Koutsantonis MP	March 2009 (replacing Zollo)	ALP Right	
Michael O'Brien MP	From March 2009 (replacing McEwen)	ALP Right	Science

* MP (Member of Parliament) designates members of the lower house, the House of Assembly

† MLC (Member of the Legislative Council) identifies members of the upper house, the Legislative Council

Senior bureaucrats were also members of the court of the premier/minister in whose department they worked, as suggested by the court government literature (Rhodes & Tiernan, 2016; Savoie, 2008; Walter, 2010). However, in SA, they do not appear to have been as central as some theorists claim (e.g. Connaughton, 2010; Craft & Halligan, 2017; Folino, 2010; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2014). Certainly, a good, trusting and complementary working relationship between a minister and senior bureaucrats, especially department heads, was essential and there were several instances of chief executives being replaced because this was not the case (interview with Conlon, 2018). Commenting on the relationship between the Premier's Office and DPC, the Chief Executive of DPC in 2000–09, Warren McCann, stated:

So, as a public servant, they kept you a little bit distant ... I put a lot of effort into the relationship and encouraged all the other senior people in the department to do likewise. At times you have the odd spat obviously given the nature of the pressure cooker environment which you're operating in, but an effective office, as I think most of them were. (interview, 2018)

The picture is one of bureaucrats being in the court but on the periphery; seeking to balance the 'demand for responsiveness against the demand for correct behaviour' (Christensen & Opstrup, 2018, p. 482). This situation is consistent with the findings of Christiansen et al. (2016) that, with sufficient numbers of active political advisors in place, the functional politicisation of the permanent public service decreases. They compared Denmark (where ministers have few partisan advisers) and Sweden (where ministers have large numbers of partisan advisers). They found there was greater 'functional politicisation' of Danish bureaucrats who were more involved in providing political advice than their Swedish counterparts. Bureaucrats in Sweden were more focused on providing classic policy advice but often viewed as less 'politically responsive'. While Australian bureaucrats with experience of the Commonwealth Public Service noted a more 'porous relationship between the political and the bureaucratic layer' in SA (interview with Smith, 2019), McCann's assessment of a degree of distance accords with the judgements of other interviewees.

4.1.4 The Premier's Court

The court of the Premier, operating within the institution of the Office of the Premier, was established by arrangements that included (limited) legal structure, Crown prerogatives, conventions and, most of all, an expectation that as the head of government the Premier would direct and oversee the political machinery of the government. In terms of structure, as noted above, the Premier's court was similar to that of the ministers. Its differentiation is based on a broader focus and public profile.

Also noteworthy is that, consistent with the general practice of SA Cabinets, the Premier's Chief of Staff and the Chief Executive of DPC were observers (and a resource) at all Cabinet meetings. Accordingly, this meant that, apart from the Cabinet Clerk, they were generally the only non-ministers in the room. The presence of these two figures from the Premier's court in meetings of the Cabinet subtly heightened the power and degree of control available to the Premier.

4.1.5 Key Sources of Advice

The fifth element of the political court was the extensive and shifting network of advice-giving structures. They are represented as interconnecting nodes off to the right-hand side of

Figure 4-1, in an endeavour to communicate the diverse nature of areas covered, and the variety of organisational types involved (departments, committees, statutory bodies, commissioners). This representation also points to the fact they intersected with the court more than directly participating in it, and were generally activated and channelled 'as needed' to support the policymaking needs of the political executive.

It is immediately evident the bureaucracy constituted only part of this advice-giving element of the court. It included a typically dominant but narrowly focused DTF; a Crown Solicitor's Office within the Attorney-General's Department, which was more influential than seen in other Australian jurisdictions (Fahey et al., 2002); and a Cabinet Office within DPC that 'wasn't all that influential in the policy sense' (interview with McCann, 2018). Overall, there was a continuing place for the systematic problem solving and process control approaches traditionally associated with the bureaucracy (cf. Colebatch & Larmour, 1993) but some diminishment of its power.

There was a proliferation of advisory groups, including bodies as diverse as the Economic Development Board (EDB), Social Inclusion Board (SIB), Defence Industry Board, Sustainability Round Table, Premier's Science Council, Women's Council, and the Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission. In addition, the political executive relied on several influential individuals as key external advisors, the two most notable being the inaugural Chair of the EDB, businessman Robert Champion de Crespigny, and the Chair of the SIB, Catholic priest Monsignor David Cappelletti, whom Rann (interview, 2018) described as 'not my confessor but my grand inquisitor'. Labor also established the 'Thinkers in Residence Program' to bring 'world-class' thought leaders to SA to promote new ideas and 'raise the profile of South Australia as a knowledge and creative state' (Rann, 2000b), something several thinkers achieved (Manwaring, 2017). Of particular interest to this study are the residencies of Peter Cullen (2004) dealing with water, Maire Smith (2005) dealing with bioscience industry development, and Susan Greenfield (2006) dealing with science generally but including the commercialisation of medical research.

The preceding discussion of the main features of the political executive/court – Cabinet, Premier's court, ministers' courts, central sources of advice and party/factional arrangements – describes its broad structure. Each element involves examples of both elaboration and reproduction based on the social interaction of the central agents in this story. With this general understanding of how the roles and relationships of the political executive were structured, I will now turn to consider some more cultural aspects of the institutional arena.

4.2 The Macro-Level Arena: Broader Context

In considering the institutional arena at the macro-level, I include both meta-institutional contexts like the geography, economy and society, as well as the macropolitical structures and processes like the Parliament and the electoral system. For this thesis, the importance of these broad systems and institutions (Giddens, 2006; Serpa & Ferreira, 2019) is their 'downwards causation' (Archer, 2014a, p. 96) on the meso and micro levels of the political executive's institutional arena and their more general constraining effect on policymaking (i.e. the 'material cause'; (Kurki, 2008). The description of this 'conditionalising' (Blatter & Haverland, 2012) context is mainly based on academic literature discussing this era but was initiated, in the main, based on issues arising from reading and analysing primary sources. For example, interviewees raising issues about the storage capacity of Adelaide Hills reservoirs and Murray River flows (interviews with Foley, 2018; Hill, 2018; Maywald, 2018) sent me looking for details on these contextual issues.

4.2.1 Meta-Institutional Context

The first point of meta-institutional context to note is SA's geography and demography. A region situated in the south-central area of the Australian continent, SA occupies a large landmass (about 983,000 km²) that is bigger than Texas or France, with a small population (in 2002 approximately 1.5 million persons), about 75% of whom live in its capital city, Adelaide (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2003). These factors were relevant to the Commonwealth Government's decision to site a radioactive waste facility in SA. The region has a generally temperate coastal area and arid inland but, as most SA schoolchildren learn, SA is the driest region in the driest inhabited continent, a factor of considerable importance for urban water supply policy.

In this context of aridity, the city of Adelaide, and most urban centres across SA, was heavily reliant for potable water on the water-scarce rivers of the Murray-Darling Basin. While being river reliant is a unique situation for an Australian capital city, it is a characteristic that Adelaide shares with half of all cities worldwide with populations greater than 100,000 persons (Richter et al., 2013). Across the basin's mostly flat, one-million-square-kilometre area, most creeks and rivers are meandering and slow-flowing. This low-lying topography combines with warm to hot semi-arid conditions in most regions to cause the characteristic high evaporation, which accounts for the bulk of all water depletions, and virtually no runoff into the major rivers, except in times of flood. As a result, the small southern catchments of the upper Murray, Murrumbidgee and Goulburn rivers contribute around 45% of the basin's total annual runoff from 11% of its area. Despite this knowledge, during the case study

period, the basin was managed based on overly optimistic average flow data. The 40 years from 1950 to 1990 saw unusually wet conditions in the Murray-Darling Basin and then, over subsequent years, the basin experienced persistent drying (Cullen, 2007).

The second point of meta-institutional context to note is SA's economic trajectory. The landmass constituting SA was a former British colony. From the colony's establishment in 1836, its settlers gradually displaced and dispossessed the peoples of the region's First Nations (Howell, 1986; Main, 1986; Roe, 1974). The colony began as a convict-free, yeomen settler-society but the twentieth century saw two significant social/economic shifts for the region. The first shift was from an Anglo-Celtic agrarian community to a manufacturing-agrarian immigrant society, and the second to a multicultural, internationally oriented economy in transition (Sendziuk & Foster, 2018). In this context, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the SA economy was more dependent on a declining manufacturing sector and still strong agriculture sector – and less geared toward mineral resource export, financial services and technology sectors – than the rest of Australia (ABS, 2002). It was also experiencing slower economic and population growth than the rest of the nation (Hugo, 2008). In the lead-up to the case study period, there was a sense of 'rustbelt' decay in SA and the need to develop 'new' industries, particularly in the areas of minerals extraction and advanced manufacturing, factors of significance for the policy areas of radioactive waste and bioscience industry development considered in this thesis.

The post-World War II shift of the SA economy to become an immigrant manufacturing region was, in part, supported by significant investment in infrastructure for the collection, storage and distribution of water for domestic and industrial use. The topography of the Adelaide Hills means it is not possible to build large-capacity dams. Further, low average and highly variable rainfall mean the area's ten small-capacity dams (total capacity of 198.5 GL) can provide only 60% of Adelaide's average annual water needs. In fact, median water runoff in SA is the lowest in Australia and the low rainfall among the most variable in the world. The engineering solution was to pipe water from the River Murray via the 60 km long Mannum-to-Adelaide pipeline (1955) and the 48.6 km long Murray Bridge-to-Onkaparinga pipeline (1973) to recharge the Adelaide Hills reservoirs.

Consequently, on average, about 40% of Adelaide's annual water supply was sourced from the River Murray, and in drought years as much as 90% of supply. Conventional wisdom considered SA to have a 'guaranteed' source of water from the Murray. The basis of this conclusion was that the water-sharing arrangements with upstream states had for decades ensured SA received agreed 'entitlement flows' every month of the year, even during times of low flow in the SA reaches of the river.

The relevant literature recognises that public water utilities were traditionally dominated by an 'engineering ethos' (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014; Lawhon Isler et al., 2010) focused on building, maintaining and operating infrastructure, which in most Australian jurisdictions meant dams. In SA, the unique set of circumstances outlined above – low rainfall, restrictive topography, piping water from a water-scarce river – created a differently focused engineering ethos, one engrossed with pipelines. This situation, in turn, shaped the nature of policy advice provided by the state-owned water utility, known by the name SA Water during the case study period.

Next, as part of the meta-institutional context, it is important to note a watershed event. Like the rest of Australia, and much of the developed world, the 'structural adjustments' of the 1970s and 1980s saw SA transition from controlled and inward-looking industrial capitalism to a form of unrestrained global capitalism. In SA this transition was symbolised by the rapid expansion and international reach of the state-owned State Bank of SA. But in early 1992, the State Bank 'collapsed', ushering in a decade of government austerity to manage the resultant debt to SA taxpayers (McCarthy, 2002). As a result, SA confronted economic contraction and significant reductions in public services due to government austerity policies, and experienced few if any benefits from the 1994–2001 'tech boom' (Bongiorno, 2015; McCarthy, 2002). The bank collapse became a metaphor for the transformation of SA, in a generation, from industrial heartland to perceived rustbelt. It also accelerated a series of inevitable changes to the SA economy. However, the State Bank debacle ensured the transition to rustbelt was indelibly associated with Labor. It was in power at the time of the bank's collapse (Parkin, 2003), something of great significance for the policymaking explored in this thesis. Further some members of the political executive were involved with the administration of the former Labor Premier John Bannon (1982–92); Rann as a junior minister, Holloway a backbencher, and Foley and Hill partisan ministerial advisors.

Finally, 'ideas in good currency' (Schön, 1971, p. 166) in western capitalist democracies formed part of the political executive's meta-institutional context. These include notions such as modernisation and progress (Taylor, 2007; Wagner, 2012); the rise of mass culture and perceived decline of civil society (Putnam, 2001); the triumph of the view that markets, and market mechanisms, are the primary instruments for achieving the public good (Pusey, 1991; Sandel, 2013); increased mediatisation of public discourse (Christians et al., 2010; Peters, 2016a; Zelizer, 2009); and growing concerns about globalisation (Rist, 2014) and the environment. Consistent with relevant theorising (e.g. Argyris, 2003; Parsons, 2002; Radaelli, 1995), such ideas can be seen to have strengthened or limited the political

executive's actions. However, political executives rarely, if ever, generate such ideas but instead consume, (re)interpret and facilitate their dissemination.

4.2.2 Macropolitical Context and Structure

In this section I will describe the macropolitical context, firstly, in terms of Australia's constitutional arrangements as a federation, including noting how this impacts on the three policy areas under consideration. Secondly, I will consider the constitutional arrangements within SA, before turning to consider the party system and electoral arrangements operating in the state. The final macropolitical consideration is the way the Rann-led political executive came to power in 2002. As already noted, this discussion is mainly drawn from secondary sources.

The Australian federation is a constitutional monarchy with four divisions of power: Commonwealth, state, territory and local government. As already noted, SA is a state jurisdiction within this federation. In SA, the putative head of state is an appointed vice-regal governor, and the head of the Cabinet government is the premier (Selway, 1997). Within the Australia federation, there was initially a clear division of powers and relatively strong states. However, over time, the Commonwealth's power gradually came to increasingly control that of the states (Jaensch, 1986).

Nonetheless, within the federal system, state governments still hold significant responsibilities relating to critical areas of public policy. These include agriculture, education, environment protection, mining, police, public transport, public utilities, roads, tertiary health care, public health and overseeing local government. These powers are increasingly exercised in terms of service delivery and less in terms of large-scale social or economic reform (Carney, 2006; Saunders, 1999). This division of power situates two policy areas that will be a focus for the case study – radioactive waste disposal and urban water supply – firmly within the constitutional jurisdiction of a state government. Nonetheless, we will see some direct policy encroachment by the Commonwealth into these areas.

By comparison, for bioscience industry development, the division of responsibility and power between the state and Commonwealth levels of government is less clear. Sub-national governments in Australia seeking to encourage and support entrepreneurial individuals and organisations to commercialise, or otherwise generate economic value from, bioscience research findings and discoveries have a narrower range of policy instruments at their disposal. Typically, national governments can use policy instruments such as: advocacy by ministers and senior officials; government consultation with key stakeholders; establishing

committees of enquiry; establishing advisory bodies; creating new research centres; establishing specialised commercialisation agencies; investing in expensive research infrastructure; providing grants, subsidies and other financial incentives; taxation concessions; and legislation and regulation relating to areas such as intellectual property (Harman, 2005). Constitutional divisions of power (for example laws relating to patents and copyright are Commonwealth powers in Australia), fiscal constraints, smaller economies of scale and a service delivery focus give state governments less scope for universal policy intervention, requiring instead a more focused and selective approach.

Turning more specifically to SA, it has a bicameral Parliament with a majoritarian lower house (House of Assembly or 'Assembly'). The proportional upper house (Legislative Council or 'Council') has veto power over all legislation, including budgetary legislation (Ganghof, 2018; Ganghof et al., 2018; Taflaga, 2018). Two parties dominate the lower house political landscape of SA: a traditionally left-of-centre 'workers' party' (Beilharz, 1994; Payton, 2016), the Labor Party's SA Branch, and a historically right-of-centre SA Liberal Party (Jaensch, 2006b). The former was the dominant member of the political executive in the period under consideration in this thesis.

Nationally, and in other states, a socially conservative former farmers' party – the National Party – is a prominent minor party in almost perpetual coalition with the Liberals. However, in SA the Nationals have rarely held parliamentary seats and never been in coalition with the Liberals. Throughout the case study period, there was a single Nationals member in the House of Assembly, Karlene Maywald, who as I have already noted was in coalition with Labor for almost six years (Jaensch, 2006b; Manning, 2002; Manwaring, 2010; Stock, 2002).

Despite the prominence of the Labor and Liberal parties in the House of Assembly, SA's constitutional arrangements and political geography works against the creation of powerful one-party majority governments. The "Constitution Act 1934 (SA)" (s. 77) requires the number of electors in each electoral district to be as equal as possible but not to vary from a state-wide average by more than 10%. However, since the 1980s the Liberal Party had consistently won more than 50% of the state-wide vote without winning a majority of the Assembly's 47 single-member electoral districts. Two factors drive these 'wrong winner' outcomes. First was a heavy concentration of voter support for the Liberal Party in rural SA (where less than 25% of the population lives). Second, the Liberals have consistently failed to campaign effectively in marginal urban seats, with a more recent instance of Labor winning marginal seats against a state-wide trend of votes to the Liberals (Manning & Manwaring, 2014). Consequently, it has been challenging for the Liberals to win a majority of

seats in the Assembly with anything less than 52% of the two-party-preferred vote (Newton-Farrelly, 2010).

As a result, there has been a pattern of 'wrong winner' (Newton-Farrelly, 2010) and, more commonly, 'no winner' elections. That is, the absence of an absolute majority in the Assembly is a periodic occurrence in SA (Rodrigues & Brenton, 2010) and the need for a coalition, or a minority government stabilised by a 'confidence and supply' agreement, is a not unusual necessity. In the almost 52 years between 1962 and 2014, there have been eight periods of minority government in SA totalling about 22 years (Australian Politics and Elections Database; Griffith, 2010; Rodrigues & Brenton, 2010).

As noted in Section 4.1 above, the political executive in this case study began its term in March 2002 as a Labor Party minority government led by Mike Rann. While the principal focus is on a political executive or the government, Labor's period in opposition leading up to the 2002 election is relevant for addressing the research question concerning the types of processes and information used by a political executive in policymaking, and for this reason data from this period is also considered. After nine months in office, the executive became a coalition government when joined by McEwen, a conservative country independent (and later Maywald from the National Party), an arrangement that continued throughout the case study period, despite Labor winning a landslide victory at the 2006 election (Jaensch, 2006a).

The success of Labor in forming a minority government in March 2002 is set against the background of wildly shifting electoral fortunes for both Labor and Liberal parties through the 1990s. Following the early 1992 State Bank collapse, Labor experienced a defeat of historic proportions at the December 1993 election, with the Liberal Party winning government in a massive landslide, securing the most significant majority ever won in the House of Assembly (37 of 47 seats) (Parkin, 1999). In November 1994, Mike Rann became parliamentary leader of a dis-spirited opposition Labor Party.

At the 1997 election, Labor stunned political commentators (see Parkin, 1998) and themselves (interview with Foley, 2018) by winning ten additional seats to secure 21 of the 47 Assembly seats and seeing the Liberals reduced to minority government with 23 seats (McCarthy, 1999). Four years later, at the February 2002 state election, Labor won 23 seats (one short of a majority). The Liberals, with only 20 seats (and 40% of the primary vote and 50.9% of the two-party-preferred vote), expected to continue to govern with 'supply and confidence' support from one Nationals MP and three conservative independent MPs. Instead, Labor took office in March 2002 with the support of Peter Lewis MP, a former

Liberal turned independent (Manning, 2002; Stock, 2002). Lewis and another of the independents, Bob Such, were elected Speaker and Deputy-Speaker respectively. This was the macropolitical context at the time the political executive assumed power, forming part of the overall institutional arena that influenced policymaking.

In summary, it is worth noting most of the identified macro-level factors are structural, such as the economic structure, the constitutional arrangements and the electoral system. The exception is the 'ideas in good currency', which are cultural, though operating more to provide 'hermeneutic understanding' (Archer, 2005, p. 25) than direct persuasion. That is, these ideas dominated political discourse more generally, and therefore permeated Labor Party debates and thinking. My contention is that meta-institutional contexts such as climate, geography and economy, and macro-political institutions like the electoral system and 'ideas in good currency' created patterns of constraint and enablement for the institutional arena operating at the meso and micro level. This contention is not to suggest these contexts and institutions motored change by themselves. Instead, the suggestion is that the choices of the corporate agents to elaborate or reproduce institutional arrangements operating at the meso and micro levels were constrained and enabled over time by the structure and culture at the macro-level (Bell & Feng, 2014). Therefore, the impact of these macro-level factors on the three policy areas – bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply – was indirect in three ways: as hermeneutic context, by shaping the institutional arena at the meso and micro level, and, as I will explain below, by these two indirect influences also shaping ideology, interests and information.

4.3 The Meso-Level Arena: Structure to Culture

At its most basic, meso-level analysis focuses on a point between the micro and macro. For example, it attends to the region rather than micro analysis focusing on the local area or the macro analysis focusing on the nation. It attends to the family, school or party rather than the individual (micro level) or the society (macro level). Generally, meso-level analysis examines the structural and cultural patterns among intermediate groupings to which individuals belong or through which they gain knowledge and norms (Eatwell, 2000; Little, 2010). In relevant scholarship, political parties are usually considered at this level of analysis (Eatwell, 2000; Georgiadou et al., 2018; Mudde, 2007). While roles and structures are important for this study, my research at the meso-level focused on cultural elements, consistent with Weiss' concentration on the culture and rules of organisations when considering the institutional arena. This focus meant I analysed the primary source material to identify 'shared' cognitive patterns, or the 'dominant logic' (Mutch, 2009) of the Labor Party. Here the

primary source material analysed was principally transcripts of interviews and Labor Party election statements, but also included Cabinet submissions related to general policymaking (see Appendix 6). The analysis was a conscious search for the symbols and systems of meaning the Labor Party used to intermeditate between the macro-environment and the political executive's decisions; between prior assumptions and subsequent ideological values (Hatch, 1993), the latter being considered in Chapter 5.

In this regard, the State Bank debacle loomed large in the memories of interviewees. All former ministers interviewed who were part of the opposition team leading up to the 2002 election mentioned it when asked about the development of policy positions in opposition and Labor securing government in 2002. Some – Conlon, Foley and Rann – reflected on its significance at greater length and depth. They reported that Labor's dominant logic was framed in terms of how the party interpreted its massive defeat at the 1993 election, with the interpretation operating through a form of cooperative factionalisms to effectively shift the party's policy economic agenda to the right. I argue that both the dominant logic and the political complexion were shaped by 'downward causation' from macro-level elements: the economic ideas in good currency at the time and the 'public judgement' concerning the State Bank collapse.

4.3.1 Dominant Logic

Background

Mutch (2009, p. 151) argues that how a group interprets significant past events becomes its 'dominant logic'. It seems this is especially so regarding the conclusions a political party draws concerning the reasons for previously losing office (Lavelle, 2018) or failing to regain office (Taflaga, 2016). Such a dominant logic delineates not just how the political group sees the world, but also its political complexion and policymaking approach (Burch & Holliday, 1996). This section analyses the words and actions of key actors in the political executive to identify the interpretation the party gave to the most significant event in Labor's then-recent political history – the State Bank collapse – and the effect of this interpretation. I suggest Labor's priorities regarding economic policy illustrate this issue. I describe a political party whose choices were shaped by an exogenous event (the financial collapse of a bank) such that it needed to adopt a more economically conservative political complexion than might otherwise have been the case. Then, in an electoral context with a bias towards minority or slim majority governments, this shift to the right facilitated the formation of an otherwise unusual Labor-Nationals-independent coalition. In turn, this coalition sustained the conservative political complexion of the Labor Party longer than may otherwise have been

the case, thereby facilitating an extended life not just for the coalition, but arguably for Labor beyond the life of the alliance.

To engage in continuing political discourse, a defeated party must explain electoral defeat to itself and then engage with policy and the electorate on this basis (Lavelle, 2018; Taflaga, 2016). In determining its interpretation of the State Bank debacle, I suggest Labor confronted a choice between two broad 'logics of appropriateness' (March & Olsen, 2008). The first was feeling betrayed by the perceived treachery of the 'corporate types' who constituted the State Bank board, to reject the prevailing economic rationalism and retreat. This path would have involved seeking refuge in the organisational convictions of the Labor movement (cf. Romzek, 2000), especially its social democratic traditions. Such a response would have involved a 'shift to the left', arguably casting themselves as the demonised victims of corporate excess, the containment of which was essential. The alternative logic of appropriateness involved both embracing the dominant economic orthodoxy and implicitly accepting responsibility for the State Bank collapse. This would involve moving to the right in its policy preferences to engage a larger cohort of voters, drawing on the party's labourist traditions to promote policy positions governed and circumscribed by 'mainstream' economics and broader political sentiment at the national level.

Under Rann's leadership, the parliamentary party adopted the second logic of appropriateness. However, I contend that the parliamentary party could only come to this position and sustain it because the Left and Right factions of the party had formed a joint view and worked together to achieve the desired outcome. Using the language of Archer, they articulated shared interests and organised for collective action in an act of corporate agency.

Some authors treat factionalism as the antithesis of such cohesion (Hume, 1985; Janda, 1983; Rose, 1964). However, rather than cause division, Labor's bounded and visible 'principle-based' Left and Right factions assisted in both maintaining diversity (Duverger, 1969) and building consensus (Boucek, 2009; McAllister, 1991). Continuing diversity is evident in the maintained difference in each faction's *raison d'être*; voiced democratic socialism for the Left and implied labourism for the Right. Consensus building is evident in the preparedness of both factions to reach out to sections of the electorate beyond not just each faction's membership but also that of the party. To explain this interaction and emergent condition, I need to turn my analytical attention away from the organisational forms of factions and towards faction dynamics (Belloni & Beller, 1978; Boucek, 2009, 2012; Verge & Gómez, 2012). In other words, I look at organisational culture.

Adopting this approach, Boucek (2009) identifies three types of factional dynamics: cooperative, competitive and disintegrating. With disintegrating dynamics, power becomes fragmented and diffuse, transforming factions into veto players. In this climate, arriving at majority positions becomes difficult, creating collective action dilemmas and risking party disintegration. With competitive dynamics, factions adopt polarised positions and through complicated decision-making processes trade-off losing on some policy positions to win others. The result is policy packages that lack coherence and carry fragmentation pressures. With cooperative dynamics, at points of policy difference, factions negotiate to fuse cleavages and arrive at consensus positions that constitute coherent policy packages. This type of factionalism reduces political extremism, facilitating not only cross-party cooperation but also diversifying party electoral appeal.

Analysis

In applying these theoretical constructs in my analysis, the factional element of the 'Rann court' displayed the features of a cooperative dynamic. Maywald reports that, upon joining the Cabinet in July 2004, she expected to encounter a competitive factional environment where

they'd all caucus, and that was the way it would be. I didn't experience that ... [instead] Cabinet functioned as what I imagine a Cabinet should, which was in the interests of government first and the party stuff had to be dealt with elsewhere. (interview, 2018)

In the context of this cooperative factionalism, I have identified three steps in the logic of the interpretation Labor gave to its profound defeat at the 1993 election. First, the rout was electoral punishment for the collapse of the State Bank. Second, it was a 'public judgement' that Labor was responsible for the debacle and therefore incapable of managing the state's finances or economy in the foreseeable future. Third, it created a negative electoral legacy for Labor that would be difficult to overcome quickly or easily. As Conlon (from the Left faction) put it, 'we knew that the first thing we had to do was regain credibility' (interview, 2018). In part, this was for electoral viability but also motivated by a sense of loyalty to the party. In most political parties, members feel a sense of obligation as custodians of something received that in turn must be passed on in a good state (White, 2017). Conlon spoke about the party as if it were a thinking, feeling being, with longevity and a membership which provides protection and even a safety net:

The Labor Party has a very good infrastructure as a party, and it is very old. It has unions as a support base when you have something like a disaster, and it has a genuine belief that it is going to be around forever. (interview with Conlon, 2018)

The comments of most interviewees imply similarly feeling obligated to Labor's past and ensuring a future consistent with this history. An example is Foley's preparedness to spend his 'best and most productive years' (interview, 2018) in opposition, rebuilding a party damaged by the State Bank collapse.

What we see is that the historical structure of the Labor Party as described by Conlon above, the loyalty-based relationships of various members of the nascent political executive to the party, and the State Bank collapse all interacted. Corporate agency – a joint goal to see the party continue plus coordinated action – generated a form of cooperative factionalism. This emergent structure then provided the new structural conditioning that was the context for debates about policy direction, to which I will now turn.

Conservative Fiscal Management

To regain credibility, a central policy preference was a conservative approach to state financing and budgets. While this occurred in a context where, since the early 1990s, budget management at all levels of Australian government was quite conservative (Burgan & Spoehr, 2013), there was a heightened level of stringency in the Labor position on restrained expenditure, revenue capping and budget surpluses. That is, ideas in good currency were absorbed and extended. Foley (interview, 2018), who was from the Right faction and served as Shadow Treasurer during opposition and then Treasurer (2002–10), presented the situation in opposition and government as follows:

I took us as far to the Right economically and financially as I could. And I could get away with it in the Labor Party because even the left wingers knew that, unless people could trust us or at least be neutral when it came to finances, no one was going to give Labor a serious go again in government.

To regain economic credibility, post the State Bank debacle, the political executive set as a core goal securing from the international rating agencies a AAA credit rating; success would mean a third-party endorsement of Labor's 'redeemed' economic credentials. Rann admits he and Foley were the ones most obsessed with achieving such a rating. However, it seems their motivations were different. For Rann, in the shadow of the State Bank disaster, Labor needed to change community perceptions about its capabilities:

We needed a mantra, and the mantra was a AAA credit rating, but most of all, it was kind of like sending ... a message to the business community that we were serious. That we were serious about finances and serious about economic development. (interview with Rann, 2018)

For Foley, pursuing a AAA credit rating was undoubtedly in part a means to this end. However, it is apparent that he was also more influenced by ideas associated with economic rationalism:

What my job was, was to stop it [revenue] going into spending. And you know, that caused a few ulcers, metaphorically speaking, because I had to be really ruthless with my colleagues. And ... [once] we had cleaned out all of the state debt, and we got our AAA credit rating back [in 2004] ... I would have loved to have built up surpluses over the next four years, big strong structural surpluses. (interview with Foley, 2018)

To secure a AAA credit rating, Labor framed its first budget (2002) in terms of the election commitment to achieve 'balanced budgets', 'a General Government operating surplus' over the forward estimates and 'zero net lending on average over the medium term' (Cabinet Submission 25 March, 2002, § 3.1). In the early twenty-first century, Australian governments, SA included, had some of the lowest levels of public debt in the OECD, measured as a ratio of net debt to GDP/GSP (Burgan & Spoehr, 2013). Nevertheless, DTF's advice to Cabinet was that SA had 'substantial General Government sector net borrowing', a position the new government had accepted in opposition, and framed its first budget accordingly. This kind of assessment from Treasury aligns with the fiscal policy ideas of market liberalism, namely, that fiscal policy should aim at maintaining a balance between revenue and expenditure, 'and at constraining the total share of resources allocated to public expenditure' (Quiggin, 2014, p. 47).

In the next chapter, we will see how this dominant logic and resultant conservative approach to fiscal policy influenced the development of the political executive's ideology. At this point, it is noteworthy that we see the structural conditioning of cooperative factionalism affecting the way ideas were shaped and deployed in the cultural domain. Further, consistent with Archer's theorising, it is apparent that multiple morphogenic cycles (conditioning T^1 , interaction T^2 to T^3 , elaboration T^4 as illustrated in Figure 2-1) were needed for change to occur. Again, the impact of the dominant logic and conservative approach to policymaking on the policy areas of bioscience industry development, radioactive waste management and urban water supply was not direct but rather mediated through their impact on the political executive's ideology, interests and the information it accessed.

4.3.2 A Conservative Coalition

As noted earlier in this chapter, the political executive took office in March 2002 as a minority Labor Government and subsequently become a Labor-Nationals-independent coalition government (Abjorensen, 2010; Manning, 2005; Parkin, 2005). Coalition formation theory

(Andeweg, 2000; Bäck et al., 2017; Boucek, 2009; Dunleavy & Boucek, 2003; Fischer & Maggetti, 2016; Lijphart, 2012; Sotirov & Winkel, 2016) would predict that such a seemingly politically opportune coalition would be fraught. Instead, McEwan and Maywald remained comfortable members of the political executive until March 2009 and March 2010 respectively, even though Labor had won government in its own right at the 2006 election. Again, we see a 'dialectical relationship' (Marsh, 2009) between structure, culture and agency, enabling Labor, Maywald and McEwen to negotiate a set of conditions beyond the predictions of what was 'standard'.

The coalition turned out to be a meeting of minds and (conservative) agendas, not an uncomfortable marriage of convenience. Cabinet Minister Hill encapsulated the dynamic:

[Maywald and McEwen] just contributed like any other member of Cabinet ... They wanted to see the government succeed. It didn't feel like they were strangers in the room who you couldn't talk in front of. It was just a very open process. (interview, 2018)

In policy terms, the cautious and conservative approach of the government was born in opposition based on Labor's interpretation of the meaning and implications of the State Bank debacle and reflected from day one in the way the political executive governed. It is not something that was adopted to attract Maywald and McEwen into the coalition arrangement. However, it is what made them, particularly Maywald, comfortable enough to consider such an agreement. On one interpretation, the presence of Maywald and McEwen numerically shifted the Cabinet's political composition to a more right-conservative complexion. However, it seems preferable to see their membership of the political executive as encouraging, perhaps facilitating, the perpetuation of this complexion, because the balance of power still rested with the factionally unaligned, which included Rann. The continued alignment of the Premier – and to a lesser extent, two other unaligned Labor Party Ministers Hill and Lomax-Smith – with a more conservative policy approach was critical to its maintenance.

It is relevant to clarify what is meant by conservative policy approach. Maywald (interview, 2018) interpreted Labor's policy commitments and the way the political executive implemented them as indicators of a conservative government:

I don't say right-conservative; I mean centre-right and ... more relevant to what the broader community were looking for in politics. ... [A] focus on the wealth of the state with a social conscience.

Similarly, Rann and his closest advisors described a situation whereby Labor moved to the left on some issues (e.g. the environment) and the right on others (e.g. the economy and law

and order) to occupy the so-called 'middle ground'. This variegated approach recognised that crafting an election-winning strategy becomes more complicated as electorates became more fragmented.

Within this kind of conceptualisation of left, centre and right in politics, Maywald described Tom Playford (Liberal and Country League Premier of SA from 1938 to 1965) as 'probably the most lefty conservative Premier the state's ever had' (interview with Maywald, 2018). Labor Left faction member Paul Caica reports speaking at a Caucus meeting in favour of the already executed inclusion of Maywald into the ministry saying: 'Why should we be so concerned? I mean she's a conservative agrarian socialist, and we're a conservative government' (interview, 2019). Adding to the 'minestrone', the Chief Executive, DPC during this period assessed the government 'as very much a Labor Cabinet and they never lost that throughout the eight years'. As an observer at Cabinet meetings, he concluded there were few instances around the Cabinet table where the non-Labor status of Maywald or McEwan was obvious (interview with McCann, 2018).

4.3.3 Conclusion

In summary, while in opposition, Labor drew a series of conclusions concerning why it lost office in 1993. This meso-level event was necessitated by an 'exogenous crisis' in the form of structural factors operating at the macro-level. In response to this external shock, the parliamentary party could easily have fallen into conflict in an attempt to resolve its understanding of these events. Instead, the cooperative factional arrangements did not just prevent this from occurring but supported the group to engage in purposeful pursuit of electoral success with a broad constituency, based on consensus and cooperation. Consistent with theory regarding teleological processes, it is difficult to discern a predictable sequence to the process of goal setting; that is, the issue definition, discussion of alternatives and selection of goal(s) (Arrow et al., 2004; Capano, 2009). There was an almost self-organising aspect at this stage, supporting the contention that a 'logic of appropriateness' was in operation. However, once the goal was set, the processes of implementation and adaptation of means to reach the desired end are more easily identified.

Implicitly, the 'selected' interpretation of reasons for the 1993 defeat meant choosing a particular policy goal – to regain credibility as managers of public finances. In turn, this goal necessitated the selection of a series of 'conservative' policy positions, which were then pursued with vigour once Labor was in office. It is clear that in the context of a fragmented electorate Labor presented a series of policy positions seeking to mobilise a diverse range of constituencies rather than a homogenous 'working class' (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). The

overall assessment at this point is that these more informal or cultural institutional features of the nascent political executive (the factional dynamic and its interpretation of history) created an arena that would shape an overall more conservative agenda than some in the party would have preferred. The resultant cognitive and behavioural patterns showed the government as sufficiently conservative to entice Maywald and McEwen into coalition and to retain them comfortably. This interpretation of how the nascent political executive 'selected' its dominant logic raises the question of how agency and ideation interact.

By proposing that Labor 'selected' the interpretation of reasons for the 1993 defeat, I am not suggesting a post-structuralist or interpretivist approach akin to Bevir and Rhodes (2006a, 2008). As important as ideational processes were for the construction of the political executive's reasons (discussed in Chapter 5 on ideology) and motivations (discussed in Chapter 6 on interests) for acting, ideas and norms alone (constitutive logic) did not constitute the policymaking environment (Saurugger, 2013). Nor was this environment caused solely by tools consciously used by agents to attain their goals (causal logic). Using Kirki's (2008) schema, I suggest that material causes (outcomes shaped by social structures), formal causes (individuals being influenced by ideas, rules and norms) and efficient causes (the actions of agents causing other prime forces for change) were all present (Gofas & Hay, 2008; Marsh, 2009). That is, I content that cognitive and material factors operated together to elaborate or reproduce the environment in which agents were embedded, and 'structure' and 'agency' influenced the operation of all elements of the 4I's framework in each of the three policy areas of bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply.

As such, I am suggesting that Labor's dominant logic functioned both as a conceptual enabler (the idea of being fiscally conservative), and to create the effects such as the pursuit of a AAA credit rating and a conservative approach to financing investment in public infrastructure. That is, I am proposing an approach that is 'both sensitive to the significance of constitutive logics yet unapologetically explanatory in its concerns' (Gofas & Hay, 2008, p. 5). As Jack Newman (2019) points out, in critical realist terms, this means recognising the interconnection of structure and culture. It also means realising that cultural systems have causal powers and agents have causal power in their reaction to such cultural systems (see also Gofas & Hay, 2008, 2010; Porpora, 2015). I will return to the implications of this conceptualisation of agency and restraint in Chapter 8, as well as the discussion of ideas and the causal power of culture, and this discussion's links with 't Hart's notion of the political court as a 'think-tank'.

4.4 The Micro-Level Arena: Group Dynamics

At the micro-level, analysis of the institutional arena examines interactions between individuals and within small groups. The SA Cabinet, a structure made up of 13–15 clearly identifiable individuals, is posited here as such a small group. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Cabinet sat at the heart of the overlapping groups, role functions and processes that made up the political executive. Various typologies and models exist to explore the possible variations in the division of labour and types of hierarchy implied by a 'Cabinet' (e.g. Andeweg, 1993, 1997; Burch & Holliday, 1996; Vercesi, 2012; Weller & Bakvis, 1997). However, my focus is on the behavioural and conceptual patterns of this group as demonstrated during negotiations, confrontations and everyday interaction, which in turn influenced policymaking. That is, this is very much an examination of the group dynamics of the Cabinet, which structured the political executive's culture.

In this section, I will first identify and discuss some of these dynamics, highlighting that the political court is a 'field of competition'. These include a commitment to consensus and the discipline of Cabinet government; several dimensions of asymmetrical power relations; and the Premier's approach to leadership. Further, I will explore one example of the rules of the institution, some of the procedures surrounding the Cabinet process. My argument is that these standard operating procedures functioned not just as organisational norms but also reflected something of the court as ritual ('t Hart, 2014) and progressively reinforced the political executive's fiscally conservative approach. These dynamics are set against the backdrop of the two previous sections, wherein I described the political executive's broader context from which emerged the dominant logic of the Labor Party and, therefore, that of the executive. The importance of these dynamics and standard operating procedures is that they establish who was empowered to make decisions when, and how. One way in which this had implications for policymaking on bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply is that a position or formal role (e.g. being the Minister for Science) was less important than power, group dynamics and norms.

4.4.1 Consensus

Typical of Cabinet governments, SA Cabinets usually use consensus-based processes, making decisions by agreement rather than formal votes (DPC, 2006). Interviewees spoke about Rann as the 'coordinator' of Cabinet and, going further, as initiating a process aiming for consensus-based outcomes, emulating aspects of the Hawke Commonwealth Government's (1983–91) approach (Bloustien, 2009; Bramston, 2003; Evans, 2014; Johnson, 2009). This approach meant Rann, 'as chair of Cabinet like Hawke', was more a

facilitator than a director of debate and as Premier tended to 'give ministers their head', rather than manage policy development from the centre (interview with McCann, 2018). Nonetheless, this was all within a broad policy framework and political strategy, over which Rann exercised some control, though via corporate agency. So, while in Cabinet policy debates Rann emerges as a consensus-focused facilitator of discussion (Abjorensen, 2010; Manning, 2005), on matters of political or media strategy he seems to have been more interventionist. While Rann implicitly proposed this way of working through his approach to chairing, it only became entrenched through the tacit cooperation of the whole political executive.

This focus on consensus-based outcomes created a decision-making culture where policymaking could be protracted in the absence of broad agreement. So, while general agreement seems to have been a common feature, a stark example of the lack of early consensus putting a brake on decision-making is the political executive's grappling with urban water supply policy, specifically the issue of whether to build a desalination plant. Amid SA experiencing extreme and prolonged drought conditions (2002–10), there was a genuine prospect of Adelaide running out of potable water. By late 2006 there was significant and mounting public pressure for the government to commit to desalination as the solution. In 2007, embracing desalination was the politically expedient decision. However, key Cabinet members had divergent views, coalescing into three broad perspectives on desalination: 1) environmentally disastrous, and unnecessary if water use was reduced; 2) economically devastating and unnecessary if water was purchased from elsewhere; and 3) a contributor to state development and essential to ensure water security. Once established, the consensus approach created a potential institutional block to a speedy decision in the face of these divergent views. As discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, only group 'puzzling' (Hecló, 1974) broke this impasse. Ultimately the decision was to build a desalination plant, discussed further in Chapter 5.

There was extensive criticism of the previous Liberal Government (mainly when led by John Olsen) for a breakdown in Cabinet government. Ministers would 'avoid taking things to Cabinet if they could' and, when unavoidable, the Olsen faction would use its numbers to 'steamroll things through Cabinet' (interview with Maywald, 2018). A striking example of an important decision not taken to Cabinet in that era was Partnerships 21, a significant education reform (House of Assembly, 2002a, p. 65). An example of one decision pushed through Cabinet with inadequate consideration was a high-value infrastructure project, the Hindmarsh Soccer Stadium redevelopment. Cabinet was found to have made its decision without the benefit of a feasibility study at project initiation, based on inaccurate and

incomplete information, and without adequate identification of the principal objective for the expenditure of public moneys (SA Auditor General, 2001). In the ensuing scandal the Minister for Sport was forced to resign. Labor's election policy statement on governance, subtitled *Labor's Plan for Honesty in Government* (ALP(SA), 2002j), committed to 'doing better' in its approach to decision-making.

Rann's approach of giving ministers 'their head' might have heightened the potential for ministers' courts (and their departments) to control policymaking. However, the centrality of the Cabinet and Cabinet processes in the Rann court and the consensus approach to decision-making placed limits on the policymaking power of individual ministers and their courts. That is, the corporate agency of the political executive caused the emergence of an approach to ministerial power that was more subject to group accountability than had been the case with the previous Liberal Government.

The Chief Executive of DPC at the time, also a former Commonwealth and Victorian government department head, observed:

Having lived through a Cabinet in Victoria in the early 90s where discipline broke down, I'd seen the consequences of that. That never occurred in South Australia ... the longer [a party is] in government, the more tendency there is [for ministers] to be mavericks and go out and do their own thing. [In SA] Cabinet remained at the centre of policymaking, and you didn't have this minister going off and not even bother going to Cabinet. (interview with McCann, 2018)

That is, the political executive did not dissemble but continued to give the Cabinet process power, or at least acquiesced in its institutional control (Lukes, 2005). In so doing, the power of the non-Cabinet parts of the political executive, such as partisan advisors and senior bureaucrats, was constrained. However, while giving the Cabinet process power, the political executive was still able to reshape the process to better support its policy goals and way of working. By continuing to give the Cabinet process power, the political executive reinforced the mystique and status of Cabinet as a sign of success for politicians, and the weight and legitimacy of its decisions as the currency of government (Searing, 1994; Weller, 2003). For policymaking, this meant ministers and their departments formed a view about how Cabinet as a body corporate would respond to particular proposals and framed their proposals with this in mind. Again, this is not to suggest that Cabinet 'thought', but rather corporate agency was apparent through the political executive (and especially the Cabinet) as a group with discernible behavioural and cognitive patterns which shaped policymaking inputs.

This dynamic contributed to a culture that supported adherence to the discipline of Cabinet government and a consensus-based approach to Cabinet decision-making. However, this

dynamic did not emerge from thin air. It was the product of corporate agency; the political executive articulating the aim of maintaining the discipline of Cabinet government and a consensus-based approach and then taking coordinated action to this end.

While this disciplined and consensus approach to decision-making prevailed, all interviewees who participated in or observed the inner functioning of Cabinet agreed there was an asymmetry in the power held and exercised by ministers. There were at least three dimensions to this: the operation of a de facto inner Cabinet based on positional power; a group of ministers whose personal resources afforded them more significant influence; and a 'gendered disposition' in Cabinet's functioning. Each of these dimensions are discussed immediately below. However, it is worth reiterating that they resulted in personal power, group dynamics and group norms being more significant for policymaking on bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply than the positional power of being the minister with responsibility for these policy areas.

4.4.2 Asymmetrical Power

For Weiss, a critical function of the institutional arena is to shape both the decision-making process and the decision-making inputs. In terms of process, organisational arrangements influence who is empowered to make decisions, when and how. In terms of inputs, the institutional environment influences how individuals and groups interpret their interests, ideology and information. Accordingly, an understanding of hierarchies and divisions of labour is necessary, as much as anything, as a basis for analysing the framework's other three elements.

Inner Cabinet

Interviewees reported the existence of a de facto inner Cabinet, constituted by Rann, Foley and Conlon. Such 'inner circles' are a common feature of groups and are a recognised dimension of Cabinet government. For example, at the same time as the Rann court was forming in SA, in Victoria Cabinet was dominated by an inner group consisting of Premier Steve Bracks and John Brumby, John Thwaites and Rob Hulls (Deane, 2015). Most interviewees offered one of two explanations for this inner Cabinet's existence in SA. One, the factionally unaligned Rann relied on Foley and Conlon to manage the two Labor factions. Or two, Rann was channelling the energies of two significant egos. These explanations seem insufficient on their own, placing excessive emphasis on the agency of the Premier and overly downplaying that of Foley and Conlon.

The Rann-Conlon-Foley troika was an informal mechanism, recognised at the time but rarely discussed. It was the institutional power of three senior roles (ministerial and factional) that activated the 'structure'. However, activation of the troika as a 'cultural' element required at least the informal corporate agency of its members based on their personalities 'clicking'. As an 'in group', the troika would not have existed unless each of the members at least tacitly expressed an interest in so organising, and then coordinated their actions to bring it about. For this to occur, 'in-group' members first needed to connect as colleagues, enabling effective communication and productive working in a manner that created positive outcomes for the in-group and the broader group (Erdogan & Bauer, 2015; Northouse, 2012). The desalination plant decision provides an example of how this way of interacting had settled into place. As discussed further in Chapter 5, after months of 'puzzling' through the competing views, the troika collectively arrived at an 'Aha!' type moment of insight (Sternberg & Davidson, 1996) to support the advice of Maywald, Minister for Water Security, to build a desalination plant. Foley described it in these terms: 'Rann turned to me in a Cabinet meeting, we looked at Karlene [Maywald], looked at Pat Conlon, we've got to build a desal, and we all made the decision there and then' (interview, 2018).

The informal function of the troika was to sift and balance emerging policy considerations, thereby maintaining a high degree of control over priorities and directions (cf. Dunleavy, 2003). Accordingly, the troika's support was essential for a proposal to be approved by Cabinet, and Foley and Conlon emerged as enforcers of discipline on the critical issue of fiscal restraint, as well as the broad political strategy promoted by the troika. When necessary, the two factional heavyweights could 'tag team' to yell, swear and thump the table about an unsupported proposal, while the Premier remained above the fray.

Within the troika, the Premier–Treasurer relationship was particularly significant. It was Rann's political judgement that, while the connection was strong between first ministers and finance ministers, governments were successful. In support of this view, he often cited the examples of Hawke and Keating (Australia), Blair and Brown (UK); Lange and Douglas (New Zealand), and Howard and Costello (Australia) (interview with McCann, 2018; Wiseman, 2008); a view supported by relevant academic literature (Dunleavy, 2003; Larsson, 1993; Weller, 2003). While this relationship was rocked by Foley's October 2008 'I'm ready to lead' declaration at a late-night party in Parliament House, this stillborn putsch did not directly impact on any of the three policy areas considered in this thesis. It was judged by Manning (2009, p. 295) as 'a passing aberration'.

Influential Ministers

Alongside the troika, several other ministers emerged as more influential in the Cabinet room than their remaining colleagues. There is general agreement among interviewees that Holloway and Hill quickly assumed this mantle but, over time, Lomax-Smith, Maywald and Weatherill joined them. Consistent with the relevant literature on ‘personal resources’ (e.g., Elgie, 2011; Heffernan, 2003; Helms, 2017), this heightened influence seems to have flowed from the intellect, skill and strategic acumen these individuals brought to their role (Burch & Holliday, 1996). The influence of these ministers took three forms. One, in terms of their own Cabinet submissions, these ministers were ‘policy initiators’ (Headey, 1975) who translated policy proposals into administratively and politically achievable programs. We will see this regarding Hill and Holloway’s competing work regarding the management of nuclear waste, Lomax-Smith, Maywald and Hill’s successive work regarding bioscience, and Hill and Maywald’s work in the area of urban water supply.

The second form of their influence was the ability these ministers had to comment with authority on issues outside of their portfolio, thereby exercising power over the government’s direction. In this regard, Lomax-Smith described her position and approach in these terms:

I was on all the committees; that was my major power. I had no power with Foley and Conlon. Mike obviously liked me, and we got on well. But I was on every committee and sub-committee that I could get myself onto because knowledge is power. And also nobody else read anything; I used to read everything and could often do things. (interview, 2018)

Their third form of influence is they were willing and able, at times and each in their own way, to challenge the views advanced by troika members. Lomax-Smith did this via the use of information. One interviewee, while acknowledging the ‘veto power’ of Rann, Foley and Conlon went on to say:

That doesn’t mean that they dominated. Other ministers often very robustly, and I mentioned Weatherill, and he’s a good example of taking it up to the triumvirate when he felt he was driven to do so and believed in a particular policy position, no question about that. (interview with McCann, 2018)

These dynamics, together with Rann’s chairing of Cabinet, point to a group that took its policy responsibilities seriously and set about (further) developing and implementing a clear policy agenda. Some ministers actively defined and directed policy development, advancing an ‘aggressive’ agenda. In contrast, others were more passive dilettante types, ‘advancing their department’s agenda rather than having any policy thoughts of their own’ (interview with McCann, 2018). However, whether the proposal was brought forward from an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ minister, senior public servants interviewed for this research report that all critical

policy matters were brought to Cabinet and were thoroughly debated before being decided. If Cabinet was not satisfied with the proposal, it was returned to the minister and the department for further work before returning to Cabinet (interviews with: McCann, 2018; Smith, 2019).

Gendered Disposition

The third dimension of asymmetrical power was the gendered disposition of the political executive. By gendered disposition I mean the favouring of one gender (male) over another (female), either nominally, as in the number of positions of power occupied, or substantively, as in the way in which the formal and informal rules of the institution operated (Annesley & Gains, 2010; Chappell & Waylen, 2013). Detailed analysis of this dimension is beyond the scope of this thesis, though I will touch on the gendered nature of policy analysis in Chapter 7. However, the embedded nature of this aspect of asymmetry in political power is noteworthy.

In terms of a nominal gendered disposition (i.e., 'structure'), women consistently constituted one-third of Cabinet's members in 2002–10. While this was a significant advancement on the proportions achieved by previous SA and Australian political executives, it was not equal and women were in less senior roles, as reflected in the order of precedence (Government Gazette, 2002; 2006). In terms of a substantive gendered disposition (i.e., 'culture'), the most significant issue was the informal rules, reflected in the operation of what interviewees variously referred to as a 'blokey' or 'macho' culture. SA's political executive is comparable to New Labour in the UK at roughly the same time, described as more female-friendly in its policies than its political culture (Annesley & Gains, 2010). One example of the political executive's commitment to 'female-friendly' policy change is the vigorous pursuit of a 50% target for female membership of all SA Government boards and committees. However, as one male minister said, reflecting on the 'blokey' culture of the political executive, it 'might have been an exemplar in terms of the number of women in Cabinet, it wasn't an exemplar in the way it treated them' (interview with Holloway, 2019). Similarly, in an instance of 'gender blindness' – an inculcated way of not seeing or being unaware (Wilson, 1996) – the initially proposed membership for an Executive Committee of Cabinet (ExComm) did not include any women. Lomax-Smith reports:

I put on a turn about it and said it looked really bad. And I said they should put Lea Stevens [the most senior woman in Cabinet] on it, but they wouldn't have Lea Stevens, so they had to have me. (interview, 2018)

However, to whatever degree there was a stratification of power and privilege within the political executive (Archer, 2000, 2003; Lukes, 2005), women were not without agency, as

evident in the roles played by both Lomax-Smith and Maywald in policy areas such as bioscience and water supply.

4.4.3 Leadership

A further aspect of the executive's court dynamics is the style of leadership exercised by Rann as Premier. Generally, the core role of the premier is to direct and oversee the political machinery of an administration. Each incumbent gives this role, and the institutional arrangements surrounding it, a specific shape. There are two points of note. First, this individual 'style of management' (Weller, 2017) emerged in the context of the group dynamics such as those discussed in the previous sections; it is an elaboration based on a cycle of social interactions. While these arrangements were adjusted somewhat in response to changing fortunes and circumstances, I contend that, once Rann took office, the emergent properties quickly surfaced and became relatively institutionalised and greatly influenced the way policymaking occurred. Second, because of the negligible status of the premier in the SA Constitution – a common feature of nineteenth-century Westminster constitutions – the arrangements put in place related to 'culture' more than 'structure'.

To effectively oversee the political machinery, all premiers must rely on others, and this requires a premier to convince her/his colleagues to act in particular ways (O'Malley, 2007). Three quickly institutionalised dynamics to characterise Rann's leadership style in support of the task of persuasion are: 1) controlling the government's narrative; 2) keeping watch over the government's 'broad policy framework'; and 3) simultaneously deploying 'mobilising' and 'expressive' (Elgie, 1997) mechanisms of leadership. These dynamics were shaped by Rann and then 'institutionalised', but not just because of the power of Rann. As indicated in the analysis that follows, I identified these three dynamics from my interviews, especially those with Caica, Conlon, Foley, Hill, Holloway, Rann, Stevens and White.

Interviewees made it clear that Rann closely managed the government's narrative. He was a journalist by training and a professional politician who served an apprenticeship as media advisor to two premiers, Dunstan and Bannon. He described himself as 'the Minister for Politics'. The public recognised him as 'Media Mike' and a 'King of Spin' (Manning, 2005). Rann's direction of the government's narrative of opposition to a national radioactive waste repository in SA is illustrative. He had fashioned a position of 'no compromise' and 'stick to your guns'. Hill, the responsible minister, described a situation where the opposition finessed a more nuanced position from him, with the result that 'Rann's office was furious'. He went on to say, 'that's where Mike was very good; at being clear about what you're standing for and what you're standing against. He was right. You can't put complex arguments out in the

marketplace very easily' (interview with Hill, 2018). As we will see in Chapter 5, Hill continued with the successful implementation of a 'no compromise' position.

An aspect of 'keeping watch over' the government's broad policy framework was the Premier's conciliation role in instances of policy conflict among ministers. An example of this relates to the early conflict between Hill (Environment Minister) and Holloway (Mining Minister) regarding the proclamation of Crown land as national parks or for mining use. Holloway was a self-described 'policy wonk' with a keen interest in, and commitment to, economic development. His commitment to mining expansion was such that his colleagues saw him as someone who would 'dig up Hindmarsh Square¹ if he thought there was a resource underneath it' (interview with Foley, 2018). As early as 2002, Holloway was eager to open up as much of SA to mining exploration as possible. Hill, as the minister responsible for Crown land, reported that their relationship became strained because: 'I refused to give approval for anything until I could establish what was going to be a national park ... Mike [Rann] eventually pulled us together, and we worked out a compromise' (interview with Hill, 2018).

Holloway's concern was that large areas of the state would be declared wilderness without being adequately surveyed to determine their mining potential. Hill's interest, in part, was that a potential strategy to block a national radioactive waste repository was to declare large areas of the state as national parks. With the Premier having intervened:

It was just a matter of working through with good people in the department to sort of get those compromises, and generally, we got them, I think. And in some ways, I think the tension, looking back, was probably a good thing. There should be that tension actually. (interview with Holloway, 2019)

One of the compromises was, in some instances, instead of declaring large areas as contiguous reserves, the declarations preserved the most important wilderness areas and allowed exploration in the less important ones, including horizontal drilling under the restricted areas. That is, mining exploration was allowed below the surface of conservation areas without exploration teams setting foot in these areas.

A further dynamic of Rann's leadership with implications for policymaking was his simultaneously deploying 'mobilising' and 'expressive' mechanisms of leadership. This approach exemplifies a less obvious approach to exercising a degree of predominance. Expressive leadership emphasises cohesion and being willing to represent and respond to diverse interests. This style was most evident in Rann's approach to chairing Cabinet, but

¹ Hindmarsh Square (or Mukata in the language of the Kaurna People) is one of five public squares in the Adelaide Central Business District (CBD).

also in community engagement exercises such as the Drugs Summit (in 2002) and Economic Growth Summit (in 2003). At the same time, he used proxies or surrogates to create tension in the system so that he could exercise mobilising leadership without necessarily directly experiencing the usual negative consequence of this style of leadership, the alienation of support. Mobilising leadership is associated with the likes of Thatcher, including an emphasis on strategic decision-making functions and task performance. For example, Conlon and Foley were often Rann's proxy 'bad cops' with the public, in addition to fulfilling this role in the Cabinet room. The chairs of the two central advisory boards, Cappa and de Crespigny, often performed this role with the bureaucracy.

In summary, then, we see a set of leadership dynamics, such as the use of proxies to exercise mobilising leadership, that originated in Rann's personal style but only had social relevance in the context of relationships, and the cultural aspect of the institutional arena brought to life via corporate agency. The emphasis on relationships underlines that, as powerful as the leader may have been, joint aims and coordinated action were still necessary drivers of policymaking. Further, the emphasis on the cultural aspects of the institutional arena is not to deny that the structural component of these arrangements, such as the constitutional role of ministers, and the role and function of bureaucrats and partisan advisors, was necessary to motor change. However, as important as they were, these structural elements were insufficient on their own; change required the cultural component also. These emphases on corporate agency and the cultural component of the institutional arena are recurring themes to emerge from this research.

4.4.4 Cabinet Process

Having considered several crucial elements of the political executive's emergent culture, I will now turn to consider some rules relating to the Cabinet process that constituted a different but also an essential aspect of the institutional arena. The notion is not new that, to some extent, procedures determine outcomes. In policymaking, 'control over how things are done facilitates controlling what is done' (Weller, 1982, p. 146). Therefore, understanding the procedural constraints and enablers of the Cabinet process is critical to this study of policymaking. In this section, I focus on the 'standard operating procedure' guiding the form and content of Cabinet documents. While such routines for coordinating government have received some research attention, this mainly relates to their impact on bureaucrats (e.g. Bouckaert et al., 2010; Davis, 1995; Dery, 1998), with less attention given to politicians (e.g. Weller, 2003).

Format and Content of Documents

When the political executive took office in 2002, it inherited the Cabinet systems reflected in the 1997 Cabinet Handbook (DPC, 1997), as approved by the previous Liberal Government. The 1997 handbook was substantially based on the 1993 Cabinet Handbook approved by Cabinet in the final months of the last Labor administration (Cabinet Submission 1 November, 1993; DPC, 1993). These handbooks described how the business of Cabinet ought to be run, with prescription of the form and content of the documents submitted to Cabinet being a subset. It is clear that the existing institutional arrangements, as reflected in the 1997 Cabinet Handbook, did not constrain the Rann-led political executive. It was not content, as the Brown Government was in 1993, to leave things unchanged. Instead, post-2002, the political executive introduced significant changes to the format and content of Cabinet documents, separate from an unfulfilled promise to update the handbook. Labor flagged its intention to improve the standard of economic and environmental impact assessments in its election policy statements (ALP(SA), 2002e). As a Cabinet Office official from the late 1990s and early 2000s put it, 'My initial reaction to your question about changes post 2002 is that there were lots! The new Labor govt wanted to change [Cabinet documents] quite a bit' (email communication with Dennis, 2018). These changes happened iteratively, first through altering templates and then through two significant 'resets' communicated in official DPC circulars (DPC, 2003; DPC, 2006). The first change came in early 2002 with the almost immediate addition of a 'regional impact' section:

It's certainly no secret that, because the Rann Government relied on the support of country members, initially Peter Lewis and later Karlene Maywald and Rory McEwen, it decided to beef up regional engagement. ... a new regional impact assessment process began early in the life of the Rann Government ... clearly an advance on the impact assessments required in the 1997 [Cabinet] Handbook. (Dennis, 2018)

Table 4-2 provides a comparison of three iterations of the required format for Cabinet submissions, which I am calling inherited (1997), reformed (2003) and enhanced (2006). The 'inherited' form required the discussion section of Cabinet submissions to outline the economic and human resources implications of a policy proposal; describe State development, social and environmental impacts; and explain the consultation process undertaken. The changes represented in Table 4-2 highlight the specific focus of the Rann-led executive. There are four aspects to note with the 'reformed' format. First, there was a proliferation of the types of impact assessment to be provided to Cabinet, consistent with developments at the EU Commission, in the UK government, and state and federal governments in the USA (Nilsson et al., 2008; Radaelli, 2008, 2010). Second, a section was required addressing the risks associated with the proposal and how to manage them. Third, advice had to be given to Cabinet on how the

proposal, if approved, would be implemented. Four, a communication strategy was to be included advising on the proposed process for publicly announcing the proposal.

Table 4-2: Format for Cabinet Submissions – Comparison of Iterations

2002 – Inherited	2003 – Reformed	2006 – Enhanced
1. Proposal 2. Background 3. Discussion, which should also include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic, financial and budget implications - Staffing and IR implications - State development, social, environmental and other implications <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consultation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any Executive Council requirements 4. Recommendations Minister's declaration regarding conflicts of interest	1. Proposal 2. Background 3. Discussion, which should also include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic, financial and budget implications, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Required resources o Staffing implications - Gender-based analysis - Social inclusion - Impact on the community and environment, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Regulatory impact o Impact on families and society o Regional impact o Impact on small business o Environmental impact - Risk management strategy - Consultation - Implementation plan - Communication strategy - Any Executive Council requirements 4. Recommendations Minister's declaration regarding conflicts of interest	1. Proposal 2. Background 3. Discussion, which should also include (as relevant): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic, financial and budget implications - Resources required - Staffing implications - ICT component - Impact on the community and environment – relevant issues to be discussed after considering questions in an extensive checklist covering the following domains: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Community (24 checklist items) o Regions (7 checklist items) o Business (2 checklist items) o Environment (13 checklist items) - Risk management strategy - Consultation - Implementation plan - Communication strategy - Any Executive Council requirements 4. Recommendations Minister's declaration regarding conflicts of interest

The 'enhanced' format introduced a requirement to provide information regarding material ICT components. This requirement included a summary of any advice provided by a newly created, government-wide, Chief Information Officer and a declaration of her/his agreement with the basis of the assessment of the ICT component contained in this submission (DPC, 2006). More significantly, however, it provided advice on how to streamline the process for making impact assessments using a series of checklists. While similar lists were available in earlier documents, they were more rudimentary and not promoted in the same way.

Rigour and Control

The Auditor-General's scathing criticisms of the former Liberal Cabinet's decision-making regarding the Hindmarsh Stadium (referred to above) framed the processes the Labor political executive put in place. The criticisms included the Liberal Cabinet relying on inaccurate and incomplete information, an inadequate feasibility study and no cost-benefit analysis (SA Auditor General, 2001). Consistent with the 'dominant logic' described in Section 4.3.1, the political executive adopted Cabinet processes that supported a conservative position on finance and budgeting as part of its quest to regain credibility as managers of public funds, as well as greater rigour in the overall Cabinet process. In Chapter 5, I will discuss how this influenced the formation of the political executive's ideology. As illustrated by Table 4-3, this included an enhanced role for an already powerful DTF, more thorough collegial vetting of submissions by ministers and departments with an interest in specific proposals, and a more substantial gatekeeping role for the Cabinet Office. This increased rigour aligns with Labor's election policy for increased accountability in government (ALP(SA), 2002j).

The strictly applied requirement for all Cabinet submissions with a budget impact to include a DTF 'costing comment' reflects the enhanced role of DTF. This 'comment' was written advice from DTF on budgetary aspects of the initiative. Further via Treasurer's Instruction 17 (2003), department chief executives were required to seek Cabinet approval for expenditure above specified amounts even when 'the enabling Act of the public authority authorises its governing body or other employees to enter into contracts or projects and to delegate that authority'.

Increased collegial vetting of initiatives was facilitated by the requirement to lodge Cabinet submissions ten days in advance of consideration (instead of the previous six days) to allow for more thorough comment. In developing initiatives, ministers and their departments were required to consult relevant portfolios and record the outcome of these consultations in the Cabinet submission (see Table 4-2). The purpose of the extended comment period referenced in Table 4-3 was to ensure that, before the submission reached Cabinet, consultation had occurred and that the reporting of it in the submission was accurate. Its purpose was to guard against Cabinet relying on inaccurate and incomplete information.

Table 4-3: Timeline for Cabinet Submissions

ITEM	DEADLINE	Comment
Cabinet submissions received in Cabinet Office	Thursday 12.00 noon	Lodgement of submissions 10 days before Cabinet meeting; replace previous '6-day rule'
Submissions circulated to Ministers for comment	Friday	Submissions circulated to key policy analysts across Government to provide comment through their minister back to the lodging agency
Comments received in Cabinet Office	Tuesday 5:00pm	Comments provided back to lodging minister and agency for consideration
Cabinet bags available for collection from Cabinet Office	Wednesday 4:30pm	Submissions provided to ministers in locked dispatch cases; often amended based on comments
Cabinet notes (pinks) received in Cabinet Office	Thursday 12.00 noon	On pink paper
Cabinet comments finalised for inclusion in Friday Cabinet satchels	Friday 4:00pm	This refers to the DTF costing comments and the Cabinet Office policy comments (Blues), provided to all ministers
Cabinet satchels available for collection from Cabinet Office	Friday 4:30pm	Cabinet comments and Cabinet notes provided in locked dispatch cases
Cabinet Meeting	Monday 11:00am	Premier also has access to separate Cabinet comments (Reds) for him as chair
Cabinet decisions and dockets available for collection from Cabinet Office	Tuesday 12.00 noon	
Executive Council Meeting	Thursday 9:15am	Matters approved by Cabinet requiring approval of Governor considered by the Governor in Executive Council
Executive Council dockets available for collection from Cabinet Office	Thursday 12.00 noon	

Source: based on an appendix in a Department of the Premier and Cabinet circular (DPC, 2003)

The more significant gatekeeping role for the Cabinet Office is reflected in its coordination of the comments process and the preparation, when considered appropriate, of a 'Cabinet Blue'. This 'Blue' was a Cabinet Office briefing on an initiative, provided to all ministers, to inform them of: the proposal's consistency with government policy; the outcome of consultation with relevant ministers and agencies; and any concerns about the proposal from a whole-of-government perspective (DPC, 2003). Among other purposes, a Cabinet Blue was a further 'fail-safe' mechanism to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information reaching Cabinet. These are the process control approaches traditionally associated with the bureaucracy (cf. Colebatch & Larmour, 1993). They do not, however,

specifically focus on policy content of proposals, consistent with earlier comments about the constrained policy advice role of Cabinet Office in this period.

Despite the institutionalisation of these Cabinet processes, a degree of uncertainty and interpretation remained. However, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, these 'standard operating procedures' did shape the roles and choices of ministers. Weller's fundamental question, whether this 'changed the manner and location of decisions' (2003, p. 705), remains to be answered based on the analysis in subsequent chapters.

4.5 Conclusion

According to Weiss (1995), institutions provide a culture and set of rules which buffer broader environmental influence, create order and modify individual motives. In the SA case, we saw that the institutional arena at the meso and micro levels at times buffered, but did not fully insulate, agents from the influence of macro-level institutional forces. Further, these same meso- and micro-level institutional forces helped agents to create meanings which gave direction to their decision-making. Finally, while these institutional forces strongly shaped the behaviour of agents, corporate agents also shaped institutions, especially at the cultural level. To explain this dialectic, in this chapter I drew on Archer's critical realism, which was particularly important in terms of understanding the interaction of agency and culture/structure.

We have seen that meta-institutional contexts such as climate, geography and economy, and macro-political institutions such as the electoral system, created patterns of constraint and enablement for institutions at the meso and micro levels. These, in turn, created specific requirements and limitations for policymaking regarding bioscience industry development, the management of radioactive waste and urban water supply by influencing how agents interpret their interests, ideology and information.

Choices made by corporate agents to elaborate or reproduce the institutional arrangements operating at the meso and micro levels are constrained and enabled over time by the structure at the macro-level (Bell & Feng, 2014). Agency is central to the discussion in this chapter. It sets the scene for how the other elements of the 4I's framework – ideology, interests and information – are discussed in the chapters that follow.

Throughout this chapter, 'cultural' aspects of the institutional arena, as separate from but intimately related to the 'structural' elements, have emerged as the most useful aspect of institutions to analyse. Notions associated with group process and group action, using the

extended metaphor of 'court government' helped to demonstrate the proposition that group dynamics influence policymaking, which therefore involves corporate agency. This approach to agency contrasts with many public policy investigations that by implication attribute responsibility to a single actor, or a unified actor behaving in much the same way as an individual (Duch et al., 2015; Ostrom, 2009), giving rise to a range of typologies variously focusing on prime ministerial, ministerial or collegial power (see: Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990; Elgie, 1997; Laver & Shepsle, 1994). The analysis so far reinforces 't Hart et al.'s conclusion that policymaking by groups cannot be predicted by 'parsimonious models of rational choice', nor can group behaviour be fully explained by 'meso level decision-making models' (1997, p. 5). The institutional arena is not just a collection of impersonal institutional forces but also includes the political executive's organisational culture, inclusive of its social-psychological dynamics, its dominant logic and its standard operating procedures.

This approach presents the three factors of agency, structure and culture as working in conjunction (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Donati, 2018; Spicker, 2010); as being in a 'dialectical relationship' (Marsh, 2009). Rather than positioning one as the independent variable and the others as dependent variables (co-variance), or all three as having some form of multivariate relationship, the focus is on emergence, in the sense of related phenomena emerging from its components but being more than the sum of its parts (Hackman, 2012). According to Archer (2014a, p. 107), this means accentuating 'relationality, rather than multivariate analysis; contestation rather than co-variance; and mal-integration, rather than functional differentiation'.

In terms of the institutional arena determining who is empowered to make decisions, when and how, the court dynamics outlined in this chapter – including the consensus approach, asymmetrical power relations, Rann's style of leadership and Cabinet's standard operating procedures – challenge traditional notions of 'prime-ministerial predominance' (Bennister, 2007; Doherty, 1988; Heffernan, 2003; O'Malley, 2007) and Cabinet collegiality. 't Hart's image of the political court as a field of contest comes into sharp focus. This understanding is of particular importance for my analysis in subsequent chapters of the political executive's ideology (Chapter 5), interests (Chapter 6) and use of information (Chapter 7).

In summation, my argument is, first, the political executive created the structure and culture of court government as something different to the court arrangements and dynamics of its predecessors. That is, the group exercised corporate agency to shape this 'institution'. Second, while individuals were essential to this process of shaping institutions – e.g. Rann's leadership style; the personalities of Foley and Conlon; and the 'personal resources' (Heffernan, 2003) of Hill, Holloway, Lomax-Smith and Maywald – this capacity was always

activated through coordinated action. Third, there was a reasonably high degree of flexibility within SA's institutions and, while this was especially so at the beginning of the political executive's term, it remained the case throughout the case study period. A clear example of this was the creation of ExComm in 2005, a committee of Cabinet which included among its members not only non-ministers, but persons who were not Members of Parliament. This novel experimentation of appointing 'lay people' (AAP, 2005) to Cabinet was variously described as 'a bold move' (ABC News, 2005), having 'dramatic consequences for the Westminster political system' (Sykes, 2005), and 'breach[ing] protocols going back to Charles II or something. Not that any of the writers knew anything about Charles II' (interview with Rann, 2018).

Fourth, this flexibility was nonetheless constrained by what went before. 'Structure necessarily predates the action(s) which transform it' (Archer, 1995, p. 138) and any new structure is, therefore, an elaboration of what went before. Finally, while this flexibility in SA institutions remained for those with positional power who could articulate a motivating aim and then galvanised coordinating action among relevant actors, over the life of the political executive these court arrangements and dynamics did create a degree of determinism in policymaking.

Similarly, we saw how an interpretation of history – the understanding the political executive developed as to why the Labor Party lost office in 1993 – influenced and even constrained policymaking. This interpretation was a set of ideas, logically constructed by some members of the nascent political executive (particularly Rann and Foley), which gradually came to influence the thinking of the broader group to the point of producing a degree of cultural uniformity as a 'conservative' government. As is the case with any such process, these ideas were imposed 'through the whole gamut of familiar techniques, which often entail the use of power – argument, persuasion, manipulation, and mystification' (Archer, 2005, p. 25). Of course, policymaking, like any human action, is not driven by ideas alone. However, this particular set of ideas, institutionalised as part of the political executive's culture, became hidden persuaders.

This analysis in this chapter reinforces that the institutional arena both shapes and is shaped by the mix of individual and group preferences. That is, the institutional arena shapes policymaking by influencing how agents interpret their ideology and interests and the information they access. As the study of the SA case continues, I will both build on and further test these conclusions with regard to the three policy areas of water, nuclear waste and bioscience, beginning with the next chapter dealing with the ideology of the political executive.

5 Ideology

This chapter investigates the second of the 4I's – the political executive's ideology. This element of Weiss' framework encourages the researcher to consider the place of values and politics in policymaking, assuming a positive role for them. As discussed in Chapter 2, this position runs counter to a significant body of scholarship within public policy.

In Chapter 4, I characterised the political executive as a conservative coalition wherein the dominant party, Labor, emphasised its 'labourist' rather than 'democratic socialist' traditions. However, this description of political complexion does not fully capture the political executive's 'ideology' in the sense in which Weiss uses the concept, or my analysis of the case reveals. While Weiss defines 'ideology' as applicable to a broad spectrum of concepts, including world views, philosophies, principles, political orientation, beliefs and values (Weiss, 1972, 1983, 1995, 2001), she finds ideology is most often a cluster of implicit beliefs and values. As such it tends towards being partial and fluid, with competition and even conflict among the multiple values held by an individual or group (Weiss, 1983), rather than being Minogue's blueprint for an 'endeavour to transform society' (2017, p. xxi). Indeed, in Chapter 4, I suggested that the broader conceptualisations of ideology – world views, political orientations and the like – are more usefully seen as part of the cultural aspects of the institutional arena, thereby squarely focusing the ideology element of the 4I's framework on values and beliefs.

In whichever way constituted – world view, explicit ideology, political complexion, explicit beliefs or implicit values – ideology takes shape within the context of organisations and is then drawn on to make decisions about immediate, concrete issues. Ideology is, then, the 'assumptive basis' (Rein & Schön, 1996) for this decision-making. As a cluster of implicit values, ideology determines the boundaries of policymaking and gives it coherence, while lying beneath the surface of the language and behaviour used in the process. These values could be characterised as policy frames (see Daviter, 2011; Schön & Rein, 1994) in their most basic form, providing underlying structures, boundaries or even schemas of interpretation for policymaking.

By its nature, such ideology is not always self-evident and is usually inferred from the available evidence. In my case, the available evidence was policy-relevant texts (principally Labor Party documents from the era and Cabinet documents relating to the three focus areas, as identified in Chapter 3) and reflections by interviewees on their policy actions, the

goals they were trying to achieve and, in some instances, the assumptions that sat behind these goals and activities.

My exploration finds that the political executive's ideology developed through a negotiated process, rather than being an adopted, ready-made manifesto or ideal political character. This negotiation saw the coterminous formation of the policy positions and ideology of the political executive *during opposition*, each informing the iterative development of the other. Once in government, the emergent ideology was then applied and developed in response to evolving events and the context of further negotiation among the members of the political executive. These negotiations were themselves constrained and enabled by the institutional arena described in the previous chapter. Further, I find that this cluster of implicit values influenced policymaking by the political executive. That is, the ideology developed in opposition guided the political executives' policymaking in government.

In analysing 19 of Labor's policy statements for the 2002 election (the method for which is discussed in Chapter 3), I identified that the ideology was made up of five core values. They were: one, 'democratic motivation', adopting policy stances that transcended the political executive's partisan power base; two, 'state pride', defining the identity of the sub-national state in terms of its ability to succeed against the odds; three, 'sustainability', commitment to economic and social development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs; four, 'economic rationalism', confidence in the reliability of prices, markets and economies for setting values and delivering social and economic outcomes; and five, 'state developmentalism', valuing an autonomous role for the state within the economy, using its financial management and public administration tools to exert control over non-state interests to protect the public interest. The status of these frames within the political executive was confirmed by triangulation with interview data, particularly in response to questions regarding purpose, agenda and 'what made the Rann Government a Labor government?'

Further, based on my analysis of Cabinet documents, especially those regarding bioscience, nuclear waste and water supply, I find these five values operated as a 'system' of political thinking to influence the political executive's policymaking significantly. However, consistent with theorising by Weiss and others, this system was partial and fluid. As a result, in some situations, there was competition or even conflict among the five values. That is, while these values seemed individually robust, collectively their interrelationship appeared loose, not forming an entirely comprehensive or even consistent whole (Weiss, 1983, p. 232). This understanding reinforces that the ideology was a set of interrelating *values* through which

the political executive constructed an understanding of its political world (Freeden, 1996; Weiss, 1983).

An example of the loose relationship among the values is that sustainability and state developmentalism at times competed with one another. However, despite this, both remained elements of the political executive's ideology. Also, some values were not relevant to some policy areas. We will see that sustainability and democratic motivation, while influential for policymaking concerning the management of radioactive waste, were less relevant for bioscience industry development. Despite these and other internal tensions, based on my interviews with key actors, I will contend that the five values still interacted to function as a tacit system of political thinking. Further, it was through this system that the political executive implicitly constructed its understanding of the political world, shaping the general disposition out of which it operated in dealing with immediate, concrete policy issues (Freeden, 1996).

As the analysis in this chapter unfolds, I will show that external factors influenced the political executive's ideology in its generation and its application. Examples of external factors affecting its generation include being the opposition, the State Bank debacle and Labor's history of labourism. Examples of external factors influencing the ideology's application include the actions of the Commonwealth Government and the Millennium Drought. Further, while the values and personal ideologies of the individuals who joined Cabinet were important to the development and functioning of the ideology, they were important as contributions to the agential power plays that generated the corporate agency. Therefore, what emerges is that causation moved in two directions. External factors and corporate agency influenced the five values, *and* the resulting ideology shaped the decisions of the political executive, with these decisions changing the dynamics of the political executive and the environment within which it operated.

Archer's (1995) theorising about continuity and change explains this sequence of events. Further, as I discussed in Chapter 4, multiple interrelated morphogenic cycles (conditioning T^1 , interaction T^2 to T^3 , elaboration T^4) are needed for change to occur. In this instance, the first cluster of morphogenic sequences led to the emergence of the ideology. At T_1 , the institutional arena, inclusive of the State Bank debacle, provides a socio-cultural context or 'cultural conditioning'. At T_2 to T_3 , there is a 'socio-cultural interaction' of the political executive's corporate agency with the context. At T_4 , there is a 'cultural elaboration' which is the ideology described above. Then in the cluster of subsequent sequences, at T_1 these cultural elaborations provided the new or emergent conditioning contexts. At T_2 to T_3 there were further interactions of the executive's agency and the elaborated culture. This

interaction results, at T₄, in either a socio-cultural reproduction, wherein the recently constructed ideology shapes the decision-making, or a further cultural elaboration, wherein corporate agency adjusts how the ideology is structured. This somewhat stylised analysis reinforces Weiss' notion of the institutional arena interacting with ideology, exercising a potentially ongoing and determining effect without necessarily being deterministic.

The structure of the remainder of this chapter is first, Section 5.1 briefly describes the contribution of the opposition years to the formation of the political executive's ideology. Section 5.2 explores the five values that emerged from these years and the different kinds of agential power relations that allowed them to contribute to the overall ideology. In this context, I will draw on the distinction made by Archer (1995, 2002, 2003, 2005) between primary and corporate agency (as discussed in Chapter 2) and the necessity of coordinated action *and* explicitly shared purposes for the activation of corporate agency.

Section 5.3 discusses examples of how these values shaped policymaking in the three focus policy areas: bioscience industry development, radioactive waste disposal and urban water supply. We will see instances of multiple values influencing a policy area, e.g. bioscience by both state developmentalism and economic rationalism. In the case of water, we witness a policy area influenced by different values at different phases of its development, initially by sustainability and later by state developmentalism. We also see an example of different values influencing disparate aspects of a policy area; in the case of radioactive waste, issues relating to a national repository framed by state pride and democratic motivation, and management of radioactive waste at uranium mining sites framed by sustainability. Woven within these examples are instances of the dynamic of court government, especially agential power plays and the negotiation of dimensions of the corporately held values through the compromising of initially advanced individual positions. We will begin with a consideration of the nascent political executive as the official opposition of 1993–2002.

5.1 Opposition Years

In this section, I briefly describe the contribution of the opposition years to the formation of the political executive's ideology. One interpretation of the opposition is as a powerless, alternative government, and one 'in waiting' (e.g. Johnson, 1997). My research supports an alternative view: one of a combative opposition engaging in a contest, in some instances, to control the government (Garritzmann, 2017) and in others to develop an election-winning strategy. As typically presented in the relevant literature, this strategy included providing policy positions that pointed to governing competence, demonstrated management of party politics and gaining dominance in the battle of ideas (Buller & James, 2012). These

processes of combat and strategy development resulted in the coterminous formation of policy priorities and an ideology, in the sense of interrelating values reflecting an understanding of a specific political world. The ideology then shaped policymaking once the political executive was in office.

The ideal Westminster parliament is majoritarian, with only two parties, one which commands a majority of seats and therefore can govern with no institutional restrictions, and the other which is in a minority and functions as 'Her Majesty's Opposition' (Kaiser, 2008). We have already noted that the SA parliamentary system operates with a powerful upper house and lower house electoral system biased against commanding majorities. As a result, the parliamentary opposition in SA, in common with most Australian legislatures, is not as institutionally powerless as the standard Westminster theorising suggests (Kaiser, 2008). The opposition is a real political identity, not a principle (Reid & Forrest, 1989). It refers to the opposition *party* which exists for the political goal of replacing the government, rather than the Westminster myth, which portrays the opposition as existing to promote democratic accountability (Rhodes et al., 2009; Taflaga, 2016).

In the previous chapter, I discussed how the political executive's interpretation of significant events in its (then) recent history – the State Bank debacle and subsequent electoral defeat – formed part of the institutional arena. Further, the nature of being the opposition, together with the constitutional requirements to work toward forming a working majority of members in the House of Assembly, generated the causal impetus for Labor to battle to become the government. Similarly, the institution of opposition also emerged as critical in the development of the distinctive values constituting the political executive's ideology. Interviewees consistently indicated the importance of the 'puzzling' (Hecló, 1974) and deciding that occurred during opposition for the direction the political executive took in office.

[As a minister] you have got diversion, diversion, diversion, so it is really important, I suppose, to use opposition. I used to say that to some of the opposition colleagues, you have got to be doing your work now because you won't get time if you ever [become a minister]. You will have wished you would have done your homework. (interview with Holloway, 2019)

This reflection by Holloway in part explains why policy positions developed in opposition are so important and reinforces that a realistic assessment of the political executive's policymaking is only possible based on an understanding of its actions as the opposition.

When Mike Rann became the leader of the Labor opposition in November 1994, he believed the Labor Party could achieve the goal of replacing the government within two parliamentary terms (eight years) despite the State Bank debacle. Few, if any, shared his confidence. As

already noted, Foley said that after the 1993 election routing: 'I thought I'd spend the best and most productive years of my working life sitting in Opposition' (interview, 2018).

Similarly, Caica said: 'I remember handing out how to vote cards after the State Bank, and I thought we'd be a generation before we'd get back in' (interview, 2019). In 1994 the media viewed Rann as an interim leader, opining that the next Labor premier was, as Rann quipped: 'not me, ... not in the Parliament and ... wasn't even born yet' (interview, 2018).

Drawing on data from my interviews, especially those with Rann, Conlon, Foley, Hill, Stevens and two former political advisors, three core elements emerge as part of Labor's two-term strategy to regain government: one, engage with the electorate; two, harry the government; and three, develop detailed policies. Rann and Stevens stressed community engagement as the core basis for the subsequent policy development; Stevens and Hill pointed to other engagement processes as also critical; Foley and Conlon emphasised the harrying of the government as essential (Stevens looked back on this with a degree of disdain); the two former advisors stressed all of these elements. Overall, these three elements are consistent with what the relevant research and theorising predict, including Buller and James' (2012) investigation of Tony Blair as Opposition Leader and Prime Minister, and Taflaga's (2016) exploration of challenges faced by the Australian Liberal Party in transitioning from opposition to government at the federal level.

The first element – community engagement – was a seven-year process called Labor Listens, involving 150 community meetings. Early meetings were general in focus to gauge issues and concerns. They gradually became more focused, at times concentrating on particular policy areas, and then road testing emerging policy ideas and priorities (interview with PA 1, 2018). An example is the way conservation of the River Murray, as an environmental asset and vital source of water for human consumption, emerged as an issue of community concern. For my research, the engagement strategy has particular significance because in its nascent form as Labor Listens it influenced the development of the 'democratic motivation' value discussed below, and once the political executive was in office the engagement processes became a manifestation of the value.

The second element was to attack the government relentlessly, 'from all directions and forcing them into difficult and unpleasant policy positions' (interview with Foley, 2018). One example is the pursuit of the Liberal Government over Commonwealth plans for a nuclear waste dump in SA. Throughout 1999 and 2000 the SA Liberal administration pursued a nuanced policy position. On the one hand, it opposed the construction in SA of a national repository for the storage of long-life intermediate-level and high-level radioactive waste. On the other, it was simultaneously open to discussions with the Commonwealth Government

regarding a national repository for low-level and short-life intermediate-level waste (Cabinet Submission 17 April, 2000).

In contrast, the Labor opposition harried the government with a position of complete opposition to a national waste repository of any kind. Labor introduced a private members Bill to this effect (SA Assembly, 2000a). They then sought to amend government legislation to include the need for a plebiscite if the Commonwealth Government sought to override SA legislation regarding nuclear waste storage (SA Assembly, 2000b). The goal was to paint the SA Liberal Government as weak in its defence of SA interests.

These actions constitute a clear example of a combative opposition attacking the government to control it. In the context of the formation of the political executive's ideology, this behaviour was significant in two ways. One is it shaped certain aspects of the 'state pride' value discussed below. The other is it entrenched a policy position regarding managing radioactive waste; one of complete opposition, as noted in the previous chapter when considering the dynamics of court government.

The third element of Rann's election strategy was detailed policy development, only substantially actioned during the second term in Opposition (1997–2002). Drawing in part on insights gained from Labor Listens, this process had four main steps. The first was the development of a broad election platform developed through a process governed by the extra-parliamentary party (released in October 2000). Next was for the parliamentary leadership team and its advisors to develop and issue a series of more specific policy direction statements during 2001. The third was seeking comment from the public on these direction statements in the latter part of 2001. Then the fourth involved, in the months and weeks leading up to the February 2002 election, releasing various policy statements that set out Labor's policy positions and commitments if elected. This suite of policy positions – developed against the backdrop of Labor's interpretation of the meaning of the State Bank collapse, and in the context of the political strategy to engage and harry – produced and in turn influenced a set of emerging values that would become the political executive's ideology. The next section of this chapter considers these values.

5.2 Developing an Ideology

As noted above, through my analysis, I identify five values which interacted to function as the political executive's ideology; the way the executive constructed an understanding of the political world, thereby influencing its decision-making. They are: democratic motivation, state pride, sustainability, economic rationalism and state developmentalism. In combination

they became the ideology (Weiss, 1983, 1995) of the political executive, having both 'sense-making' utility and the ability to generate 'affective commitments' (Leader Maynard, 2013, p. 314). When functioning in this way, the ideology also indicates something of the centre-right political complexion of the Rann Government, reinforced by the absence of social justice as a value. In this section, I overview the meaning of the five values and discuss the absence of a social justice value. In each instance, I explore how the political executive negotiated its collective position, finding that corporate agency was exercised in a variety of ways as part of the overall dynamics of court government.

5.2.1 Democratic Motivation

The first value identified is democratic motivation. Like Karsten (2015), I use this term to refer to the political party being responsive to the concerns of the broad constituency it faced, rather than the narrow sectional interest of its rank-and-file membership. To transcend their sectional base and claim to govern for all citizens, the political executive first needed to have ways to read the public mood and then be flexible and adaptable enough to respond to this view. In opposition, this occurred through Labor Listens. My analysis of 19 Labor Party 2002 election policy statements highlights that all were painted as the product of Labor spending 'eight years ... listening and learning' and having 'heard loudly ... that South Australians want a Government with their priorities – priorities for the many not just the few' (Rann, 2002, p. 1). This position is consistent with the narrative fashioned by Rann at Labor's 2000 State Convention: that the party's success at the 1997 election was achieved by 'going back to the community' through Labor Listens (Rann, 2000a, p. 8). Among the 2002 election policy statements analysed, the democratic motivation value was most explicitly present in the *No Nuclear Dumps* policy, which was presented in terms of wanting to fulfil the 'wishes of the people' (ALP(SA), 2002f, p. 3). However, it is also evident in something like the defence industry statement which framed Labor as committed to a 'partnership between Government and the defence industry for the benefit of South Australia' (ALP(SA), 2002m, p. 2), despite the strong association of the party's Left faction with the nuclear disarmament and peace movements.

In government, the political executive sought to read the community mood through Community Cabinets, summits, roundtables, consultative committees and community engagement processes, as well as through qualitative and quantitative polling. Head et al. (2005) identify 'ordinary popularism', 'cautious pragmatism' and the use of participatory engagement techniques as characteristics that Rann shared with other Labor state premiers during the early 2000s. However, rather than this being a matter of leadership style, I contend that democratic motivation became a shared value for the political executive's

policymaking. Further, this shared value grew out of, and therefore was shaped by, the institutional arena described in Chapter 4.

Within the political executive, there was a continuum of preferences regarding the appropriateness of the engagement techniques that formed part of ‘operationalising’ this value. When interviewed, Foley and Conlon spoke of their general scepticism regarding the level and type of engagement represented by Labor Listens in opposition, and Community Cabinets, community summits and consultation generally in government; the implication was that top-down political judgement based on polling was valued more highly. In stark contrast, Stevens fully supported the engagement approach implicit in Labor Listens and all that followed, implying a preference for approaches with an even greater focus on participation and community empowerment (interviews with Conlon, 2018; Foley, 2018; Stevens, 2018).

However, Foley’s changing attitude to the Economic Summit held in April 2003 is revealing. The summit was modelled on the Hawke Government’s National Economic (1983) and Tax (1985) summits. Foley commented:

I wasn’t that big a fan of [the proposal], to be honest, I thought it just looked too sort of, oh, I don’t know, formulated. It had been done before. It was a bit – I thought it was a bit hokey-pokey, to be honest with you. But both Mike and Robert [de Crespigny] were insistent on it. It was extraordinarily successful, extraordinarily popular, and the perfect timing for that type of event. (interview, 2018)

We see that Rann as leader advanced aspects of the democratic motivation value. Initially, as indicated by the quotation from Foley above, some members at the political executive intellectually resisted it by not agreeing with the articulated participatory goals. However, they still coordinated their actions with Rann and others through what might be called ‘informal corporate agency’ (Karlsson, 2020; cf. Figure 2-2 above). Over time, as acting on this value proved successful, there was at least a tacit joint commitment to the stated aims, as well as continued coordination of action, thereby achieving something closer to ‘formal corporate agency’ (Karlsson, 2020). As discussed below, the democratic motivation value was central to policy development in the area of urban water supply, with a very detailed process of consultation unpinning policy work in this area. It was also prominent regarding policymaking for radioactive waste management but, by comparison, driven by political polling and statecraft rather than any attempt at engagement. For reasons discussed later in this chapter, it was not found to apply to bioscience industry development policymaking.

5.2.2 State Pride

The second value – state pride – communicated itself in two ways. The first was the political executive’s desire to carve out policy niches, where SA was ‘nationally leading’ and

'internationally known' (interview with Rann, 2018). This value emerged as a frame in multiple 2002 election policy statements. For instance, *A Path to Prosperity* articulates a vision for SA as an 'internationally competitive' economy and for the state to 'get back out in front' (ALP(SA), 2002k, p. 2) and *Labor's Plan for a Science and Research Council* aimed for SA to be 'a national leader in science and research' (ALP (SA), 2002n, p. 1). Policy statements regarding renewable energy exemplified this, seeking recognition or notoriety relative to the performance of other jurisdictions.

The second avenue for communicating the state pride value was by galvanising a sense of state chauvinism, that is, generating in citizens a belief that SA was capable of great things in at least some areas. This continued a Labor tradition from the Dunstan era and demonstrated the continuing loyalty to certain approaches, which were institutionalised in the SA Labor Party. The state pride value was built on the assumption that, despite its 'rustbelt' status, small population and 'geographical' disadvantages, SA was prepared to fight against the odds *and* excel in certain areas. The kinds of principles discernible as underpinning state pride are: embracing the historical uniqueness of SA; the preparedness of the political executive to stand up for the state's interests; being optimistic, positive and unyielding; and never adopting a fatalistic or defeatist attitude.

With the formation of this value, I identify coordinated action and explicitly shared purpose from the beginning. The ultimately successful attempts by Labor in opposition to control the Olsen Liberal Government on the issue of a national radioactive waste repository in SA seems to have been particularly crucial in defining the value. But having fashioned its policy positions on managing radioactive waste in the context of developing the state pride value, the political executive's policymaking choices were significantly narrowed once in government. This value also came into operation in battling with Victoria over water in the River Murray. McCann (interview, 2018) remembers Rann as 'a fairly laid back sort of guy' who 'most aggressively prosecuted' SA's policy goals in this area, motivated partly by a commitment to the environment, but substantially by state pride:

[Rann] had a keen interest in the environment, there's no question about that, but – I don't want to misstate his view – of equal importance if not greater importance was his passion to see South Australia get a fair deal, that's what really motivated him [in this instance] ... He was determined, and he said, 'That's what I am there for, to make sure that South Australia gets a fair deal.' But he was hugely strong on that. (interview with McCann, 2018)

As the leader of the political executive, Rann's behaviour exemplified the political executive's commitment to this value. While he avoided the reactionary, strong-man state chauvinism of the likes of former state premiers Tom Playford (SA 1938–65) or Joh Bjelke-Petersen

(Queensland 1968–87) (Orr & Levy, 2009), his communication at times involved ostentatious language that was reminiscent of them. That is, without denying the legitimate role of federal, national and global forces (as Bjelke-Petersen did), Rann strenuously called out ‘unfair attacks’ on SA interests by such forces. As such, Queensland’s *The Courier-Mail* saw Rann’s style in addressing voters’ concerns and talking up the development of the state as being in the ‘Queensland tradition’ (Williams, 2011, p. 22).

5.2.3 Sustainability

The third value identified is sustainability. As a value, it broadly refers to development occurring to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs (Brundtland et al., 1987). While the term ‘sustainable development’ was increasingly in use in SA policymaking in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the concept was not as normalised nor indeed as ubiquitous as now (Cockerill et al., 2017). Labor developed a range of policy positions for the 2002 election drawing on and thereby further elaborating this value, using language such as ‘intergenerational equity’ (ALP(SA), 2002e, p. 1), ‘ecological integrity’ (ALP(SA), 2002l, p. 1) and sustainable development (ALP(SA), 2002c, 2002d).

As adopted by Labor, sustainability meant a universalised application of the notion of intergenerational equality. Underpinned by ‘post-materialist’ ideals (Braithwaite et al., 1996; Inglehart, 1990), this concept holds that, in a context where the rights of humans are respected, and our material needs sufficiently met, we are now consuming more than is sustainable and need to curb this excessive consumption (Doyle et al., 2015). The work of David Suzuki well reflects this concept. Suzuki is an environmental advocate personally known to Rann, and whose book *The sacred balance: Recovering our place in nature* (1997) influenced John Hill, the principal architect of much of the detail in Labor’s election policies for the environment portfolio (interview with Hill, 2018).

While the two preceding values emerged from a more interactive process across the political executive, the sustainability value was substantially driven by Rann’s commitment to environmentalism, especially renewable energy (interview with Conlon, 2018) and significant pre-election policy work by Hill (interview with Holloway, 2019). As such, this value was more reliant on the leader’s political judgement (Berlin, 1996), and this judgement being accepted by the party, rather than the more negotiated processes seen with the other values discussed so far. As Conlon put it, referring to Rann’s leadership on renewable energy:

He [Rann] just could sense ... that people would give a big tick with renewables into the future. He is intelligent, and he believes science, so he understands climate change and that the world was going to go away from carbon. (interview, 2018)

This reinforces and further contextualises the assessment of Rann's leadership in Chapter 4.

However, while the authority of Rann as leader/Premier was significant, the personal resources of Hill were also critical (Shadow Minister 1997–2002 and, as already noted, subsequently Minister for the Environment 2002–06). This influence was discussed as part of the exploration of court government in Chapter 4. In opposition, Hill developed a sophisticated understanding of environmentalism from a confessed zero base (Hill, 2016) and contributed significantly to the shaping of the sustainability value and the selection of a broad range of policy positions in the environment portfolio. The nascent political executive's at least tacit joint commitment to these positions is evident in the adoption and public release of several policy statements for the 2002 election, including *Labor's Plan For Tougher Environmental Protection* (ALP(SA), 2002d); *Labor's Plans for the Environment and Conservation* (ALP(SA), 2002e); *Labor's No Nuclear Dumps Policy* (ALP(SA), 2002f); and *Wildcountry – A Plan For Better Reserves and Habitats* (ALP(SA), 2002o). In government, this joint commitment came together with coordinated action in the areas of urban water supply policy and radioactive waste policy. Again, there was no real connection of this ideological value to bioscience industry policy, though theoretically there could have been.

5.2.4 Economic Rationalism

The fourth value identified is economic rationalism, the first of two economically focused values. Given the analysis in the previous chapter regarding Labor's interpretation of its State Bank history, the economic values unsurprisingly seemed at times to dominate. As already noted, Labor's sense of the need to redeem its reputation after the State Bank debacle imbued its policymaking endeavours, both in opposition and government, with a high degree of fiscal conservatism. The consensus in the parliamentary party was that Labor needed to demonstrate iron-clad economic credibility. That meant adopting policy positions governed and circumscribed by 'mainstream' economics, which at the time was dominated by economic rationalism (Pusey, 1991). These views strongly influenced Labor's policy positions, including notions of minimising taxes and maximising budget surpluses to regain a AAA credit rating for SA, lost with the State Bank debacle and not regained by the former Liberal Government. Alongside the failure symbolised by the State Bank, the success ascribed to the Hawke/Keating Labor Commonwealth administration of 1983–96 (interviews with: Conlon, 2018; PA 1, 2018; and Rann, 2018) reinforced the appropriateness of adopting an 'electorally feasible economic rationalism' (Frankel, 1997).

The focus in Labor's economic election statement (ALP(SA), 2002k) was on 'balanced budgets' (p. 10) and 'financial responsibility' (p. 11), with any microeconomic reforms to increase market competitiveness subject to quantifiable and fairly direct public interest (p. 5) requirements. There was no promotion of tax reduction, deregulation or privatisation, as found in supply-side economics and 'trickle-down' theory. As discussed in Chapter 4, the political executive's dominant logic drove a conservative position on finance and budgeting as part of the executive's quest for recognition of its credibility as managers of public funds. Labor used some of the language of economic rationalism 'in good currency' but moved away from the more nuanced neo-liberal understandings of the term. Instead, under the influence of its democratic motivation and state developmentalism, the economic rationalist value was framed to serve the goal of regaining credibility as economic managers more than to communicate a deep trust in prices, markets and economies as the most reliable means for making policy choices. That is, the political executive's coordinated action more often related to fiscal restraint than the use of market instruments, which will be seen concerning water pricing policy but also regarding the issue of accessing venture capital to support bioscience industry development.

5.2.5 State Developmentalism

The fifth value is state developmentalism, by which I mean a policy approach wherein the state remains autonomous within the economy and uses its tools of economic management and public administration to exert significant power over non-state economic interests (Thurbon, 2012; Weiss, 2012; Weller & O'Neill, 2014). This conceptualisation is well represented in a comment from former Minister Hill, reflecting on the role of government regulation in improving health and social outcomes in the community:

[Such regulation is] not draconian, it's just sensible, and we're a sensible well-regulated community and, by and large, there's consent for most of the regulations ... It's not regulation for the sake of it. It's public benefit that accrues. I think that's what government is there for ... It's not just there to stimulate the economy and let certain people get really rich. (interview with Hill, 2018)

That is, a focus on state developmentalism situated the political executive as more economically interventionist (c.f. Beramendi et al., 2015) than would be the case if it focused on the economic rationalist value alone. Election policy statements dealing with infrastructure development (ALP(SA), 2002k) and industry development in the bioscience, defence (ALP(SA), 2002m), manufacturing (ALP(SA), 2002k) and mining (ALP(SA), 2002g) sectors were all framed in terms of intervention to support development that was in the public interest. Election policy statements dealing with aspects of education (ALP(SA), 2002a) and social inclusion (ALP(SA), 2002i) also adopted some of the economics language

of 'investment' and 'opportunity' that Labor associated with state developmentalism. Arguably, including developmentalism alongside economic rationalism draws on the older labourist traditions of 'civilising capitalism' discussed in Chapter 4.

Accordingly, Labor framed its overall economic plan in terms of improving living standards by maximising employment opportunities. The Labor Party's platform and relevant election policies posited sustained high levels of economic growth as fundamental to job creation, but with a requirement of significant investment by both government and the private sector. In contrast, the Olsen Liberal Government was stridently opposed to any form of public sector debt, advancing a more forceful neo-liberal position focused on a reduced role for government and wealth creation through individual effort and private sector enterprise (Spoehr, 1999).

As early as 2000, Labor described the proposed policy focus on the state's economic development as a dual emphasis on market forces and social responsibility: 'As much free market as possible but as much social responsibility as necessary' (Rann, 2000a). However, agreement within the political executive about the right balance between economic rationalism and state developmentalism was not automatic, was only broadly resolved after a period of contest, and was subject to periods of re-litigation. That is, agreement emerged through the dynamics of court government discussed in Chapter 4. It seems that Foley would have liked a 'drier' economic approach (interview with Foley, 2018) and Rann more state intervention than represented in the accommodation that generally prevailed.

My analysis points to the interrelationship of the two economic values being the outcome of an agential power play among policy actors based on their different policy positions and in the context of asymmetrical power relations (described in Section 4.4.2). However, it also emerged that these positions were rarely static but, having been initially advanced, were modified in the course of the negotiation. Consistent with theorising by Weiss (1983, 1995) and Archer (1995, 2005), I find multiple instances of the policy position adopted by the political executive being emergent. The most obvious is the 2007 decision to build a desalination plant. It was not the position initially advanced by powerful and competing agents but the product of negotiation and compromise, and it was subsequently defended by them as if it were their own precisely because that is what it had become as the emergent position from the group processes.

The Labor Party's 'no new privatisation' policy position is another case in point. Throughout the 1990s, Australian governments introduced and then accelerated a variety of privatisation programs: sale of public assets; sale of public enterprises through either public share

offerings ('floats') or direct sales of state enterprises; long-term leases; and various forms of operating concessions (Parker & Saal, 2003). The justification was to reduce public debt. In SA, the Liberal Brown/Olsen Government privatised a range of public enterprises to pay down public debt in the aftermath of the State Bank collapse (Gowland & Aiken, 2009). These 'sales' included outsourcing management of a public hospital (at Modbury), a state prison (at Mount Gambier), and especially aspects of the SA Water business (McCarthy, 1999); as well as the privatisation of the state's largest public enterprise, the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA) (Marshall, 1998). At the 1997 state election, the Labor opposition's criticism focused on what they argued were low sale prices, rather than the principle of privatisation *per se* (ALP SA, 1997; interview with Conlon, 2018).

The more economic rationalist members of the parliamentary Labor Party, including Foley (interview with PA 3, 2018), were still open to the idea of privatising a range of government assets. However, Rann used the anti-privatisation 'public judgement' (Yankelovich, 1991) articulated through Labor Listens, and the political damage the ETSA privatisation proposal was causing the government, to negotiate the 'no new privatisations' policy position. As Rann said, these negotiations were with 'some of my own colleagues who had a different view to me on those issues, who actually believed ... that [privatisation] was the way to go' (interview with, 2018).

Scholars generally assess Labor's arguments around 'no privatisation' as unconvincing and disingenuous (Manning, 2001; Marshall, 1998), with an ineffective policy outcome (Manning, 2004), even if pragmatic rather than ideological in origin. These arguments make sense if one imagines the policy position as just a vote-maximising strategy jointly held by Rann and Foley throughout, and that other members of the political executive readily accepted this view. However, my conclusion is that the 'no more privatisations' agenda going into the 2002 election (ALP SA, 2002h), for example as it was applied to urban water supply, reflects an emergent compromise and hence the 'untidiness' identified by other researchers. The policy was a more anti-privatisation position than Foley initially advanced but weaker than that initially desired by Rann. However, both subsequently defended the negotiated compromise economic rationalist – state development position, as illustrated in Manwaring's (2013) review of the Rann Government. That is, an agential power play generated not just an emergent policy position but also a shared conceptual pattern or understanding and coordinated action to bring it about. However, the implicit tension between economic rationalism and state developmentalism continued, as we will see concerning both water supply and bioscience industry policy. In the case of the former, the pricing of water will be

discussed in the next chapter. In the case of the latter, the facilitation of access for start-up bioscience companies to venture capital will be discussed later in this chapter.

Nonetheless, for Lomax-Smith, as a minister in the political executive, this commitment to no further privatisation was a core manifestation of the political executive's values. When asked what made the Rann Government a Labor Government, her first answer was, 'Well, we weren't selling [the] Lands Titles Office to start with' (it was eventually sold by Labor under Weatherill in 2016). Then, after listing several achievements of the Rann era, she returned to her critique of privatisation in the Weatherill era: 'I think the challenge then became in the last terms when there was an obsession with selling assets and getting rid of functions; that's when it felt less and less like a Labor Government' (interview, 2018). Consistent with state developmentalism, there was an expectation that the government would not just exert significant power over non-state economic interests, but also retain a broad range of functions within the economy.

5.2.6 Social Justice: A Surprising Absence

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, a social justice value was noteworthy for its absence. By social justice, I mean some surface-level language or behaviour pointing to a cognitive or appreciative schema that encapsulated notions of economic distributive/redistributive justice, human rights-based procedural justice, or interactional justice based on ideas about the dignity of the human person (Jost & Kay, 2010; Sabag & Schmitt, 2016). This kind of value is often associated with social democratic agendas (see for example, Bonoli & Powell, 2004). This includes those promoted by Labor's Left faction, as reflected in 'social justice' being used 16 times in the party's platform, beginning with the following paragraph: 'Labor is committed to the elimination of discrimination and privilege which limit opportunity. Labor believes in social justice, encouraging a strong social infrastructure and access for all South Australians to a better standard of living' (ALP(SA), 2000, p. 5). In my research, social justice in any of the senses listed above (redistributive, procedural or interactional) did not emerge as a value shaping the political executive's policymaking regarding bioscience, radioactive waste or water. Individuals within the Rann court subscribed to such values, but it was not part of the corporate ideology of the executive. Some interviewees noted significant expenditure on hospitals and schools, as well as the activities of the Social Inclusion Board. However, this was not about social democracy (Wilson & Spoehr, 2015), but the ideology outlined above, especially the state developmentalism value.

The absence of social justice as a value of the political executive was a surprise because two interviewees explicitly denied that it was present; as the researcher, I had not gone looking for it. In the course of these denials, the two interviewees used language and examples reinforcing state developmentalism, a democratic motivation and state pride as values. One responded very hesitantly to the question ‘What made the government a Labor Government?’:

Um, [pause] listening to people. Um [pause]. The primary healthcare stuff, um [pause, then dropping voice] not a lot else. [Long pause before becoming more animated.] Depending on what – ‘Labor’ in terms of equity and social injustice, um, you see I’m struggling to think, particularly; certainly, in a strategic way that really would make a long-term difference. There were bits and pieces ... Education funding, I suppose. I mean, there were things in education. (interview, former Minister, 2018)

The other interviewee first assessed the political executive’s achievements in renewable energy development as nation leading and its facilitating defence industry development as creating a buffer against the rapidly declining automotive sector – ‘whatever you believe about defence, and that’s another whole story’. Then they went on to say:

Obviously from my point of view, I would sincerely have wished to have nominated things [achievements] within the social policy domain, but in spite of there being several things I could mention, at the end of the day, I don’t think so. (PA 2, 2018).

Next, in response to the question ‘What made the Rann Government a Labor Government?’ this interviewee said:

One might say I reject the premise of your question [chuckles], but it was [a Labor Government]. I think what made it a Labor Government was that it wasn’t a Liberal Government. It’s really interesting, like in the days of post-ideology where everybody is merging towards the centre, I think there is still a difference, and sometimes it’s hard to see, and sometimes it’s intangible, but I think there is a difference in terms of ultimately values ... collectivity as opposed to individualism. (interview, PA 2)

The reflections of these and other interviewees point to three interconnecting issues. First, at the sub-national level governments are increasingly focused on service delivery functions – hospitals, police, public transport, schools – which demand a performance/enterprise focus (Considine & Lewis, 2003) and create less policy space for more whole-of-population social change endeavours (Manwaring, 2016). Accordingly, the values and policy agenda of a political executive at this sub-national level will increasingly reflect this more constrained perspective. Second, successful political parties cannot have an ideology consisting of a shopping list of values; they make choices about where to place their emphasis and therefore about what not to emphasise (Daviter, 2015). Third, in making these at times difficult choices while in opposition, a political party draws on the lessons of government, and the reasons for losing office (Lavelle, 2003) or failing to win office (Taflaga, 2016). In

Labor's case, the 'lessons learned' from the State Bank debacle had a significant bearing on the emphasis given to fiscal and economic development values and the kinds of policy agendas embraced by the Rann opposition-come-government.

In terms of agency and causation, it seems appropriate to categorise the absence of a social justice value as an example of 'withdrawn agency' (Karlsson, 2020). That is, it is an instance where 'stated aims' were present – some members of the political executive firmly held the idea, and most other members gave a degree of intellectual assent. However, there was no coordinated action among core members of the political executive to activate this value.

5.2.7 Summary

In this section (5.2), I have provided an overview of the meaning and content of each of the five values that constituted the political executive's ideology. In addition, I have pointed to the agential process underlying the formation of each value, drawing on Archer's (1995, 2003) distinction between primary and corporate agency and Karlsson's (2020) refinement of this classification. Across the five values (plus the non-adoption of social justice), there was a continuum in how corporate agency operated. In the case of state pride, there was a speedy and explicit arrival at 'formal corporate agency' without internal contest. With sustainability the corporate agency emerged through more implicit forms of sharing stated aims and coordinating action. With democratic motivation, 'informal corporate agency' operated initially, with the transition to 'formal corporate agency' occurring over time as key actors in the political executive became sufficiently convinced of the utility of the idea of participatory engagement. In the case of economic rationalism and state developmentalism there was a higher degree of contest to arrive at agreed aims before coordinated action was possible. Finally, with social justice we discover 'withdrawn agency'. Even though there was broad agreement concerning the meaning of the stated aims of such a conceptual pattern, coordinated action was absent. This absence meant the value did not materialise as an element of the political executive's ideology, even if it remained prominent in the rhetoric of the extra-parliamentary party and the values of some individuals.

This analysis of how agency influenced the creation of ideology supports the conclusion that an actor's status, legitimacy and authority, while critical, does not automatically give her/him power over others. This is highlighted in Rann and Foley's competing views about privatisation, for example. Power is the product of social relations, exercised in the context of social interaction. Similarly, it is not intellectual power in the debates and negotiations typical of a political executive that gives an actor ultimate influence in forming an ideology. These personal characteristics are necessary ingredients, as exemplified in the actions of Hill and

Lomax-Smith discussed in Chapter 4 but were insufficient on their own. No matter how creative the thinking of a resourceful minister or how adept the premier is at negotiating contradictions between ideas, we encounter causal power only when ideas become shared aims, and there is coordinated action towards achieving these aims. It was corporate agency, something more significant than the sum of the individual agency of the political executive's members, that generated the ideology outlined in this section.

As the analysis in this thesis continues, I will show that the five values identified above were not harmonised to form jointly the political executive's ideology. Instead, they were 'de-contested' through the meaning and hierarchy assigned to them relative to one another. While this hierarchy changed in response to shifting circumstances, it becomes clear that economic rationalism and state developmentalism dominated. Consistent with the ideas in 'good currency' in the early 2000s, this saw economic rationalism having some primacy. Sustainability had considerable prominence in the hierarchy of values, but almost as a special case, and democratic motivation and state pride played more supporting roles. However, in the context of changing interests, we will see the political executive cycled between the values as needed.

However, the dominance of economic rationalism was not just about ideas in 'good currency'. More significantly, the dominant logic of the institutional arena also shaped both the emergence of this value and its prominence. Similarly, the political executive's dominant logic and the SA electoral system's structural bias against large majorities combined to form a powerful conditioning environment to generate the democratic motivation value. I will return to this issue of the interaction of the elements of the framework as the analysis progresses.

5.3 Ideology Influencing Policy

In the previous two sections, I identified how the experience of opposition and operation of corporate agency influenced the creation of the political executive's ideology. The methodological implication is that to properly understand the policymaking of a government, especially in its early years, it is essential to study its policy-relevant decisions and actions as an opposition. The theoretical implication is to reinforce Archer's 'before, during and after' schema, requiring a preexisting structure or culture, which corporate agency acts on to generate a new or emergent structure or culture (change). In terms of corporate agency, I argue that, without such coordinated action, the structure or culture is reproduced (continuity); and that individual agency is insufficient to bring about change.

In this section, I argue, using examples from the three focus policy areas – bioscience, radioactive waste and urban water supply – that the emergent ideology, largely shaped during opposition, influenced the political executive’s decisions once in office. Across each of the policy areas, we encounter different patterns of ideology influencing policymaking. In the case of bioscience industry development, it was state developmentalism and economic rationalism that exercised a shaping effect. For urban water supply, different values exercised an influence at different phases of policymaking. Initially, sustainability was the influencing value and later state developmentalism. In the case of radioactive waste disposal, we see different aspects of the policy area influenced by changing combinations of values. Issues relating to the management of radioactive waste at uranium mining sites were framed by sustainability and economic developmentalism. Concerning a national repository, the sustainability value somewhat framed the issues, but state pride and democratic motivation were more prominent. I will now consider how these values influenced each policy area, beginning with managing the disposal of radioactive waste.

5.3.1 Radioactive Waste

Regarding radioactive waste, three overlapping aspects of policymaking emerged: responding to the Commonwealth Government’s attempts to locate a national waste repository in SA; responding to repeated leaks of radioactive waste from uranium ore processing plants at mining sites in SA; and managing the disposal/decontamination of various legacy radioactive waste stockpiles and contaminated sites in SA. Exogenous events – the Commonwealth’s decision-making and the failure of a pipe fitting at an ore processing plant – had a catalysing effect for bigger picture policymaking. That is, policymaking commenced in response to these exogenous events that occurred while the political executive was still in opposition. The development of policy positions in response to these events and the development of core values occurred in tandem, again beginning in opposition. In turn, this policymaking created momentum for further policy work. However, this momentum did not necessarily result in the acceptance and actioning of the policy advice generated. I will now discuss the three aspects just identified, noting that they will also be subject to additional investigation in the analysis of interests (Chapter 6) and information (Chapter 7).

National Waste Repository

As noted in Chapter 1, Australia has vast uranium reserves, mainly found in SA. The state has a decades-long history as a significant miner and exporter of uranium, despite Australia having no nuclear energy production and no defence use of uranium (either for weapons or

submarine/ship propulsion). Apart from substantial amounts of lower-level waste generated by the extraction and processing of uranium ore (35.4 million m² in 2004), during the case study period, as now, SA's low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste was minimal in volume (52 m² in 2004). As already noted, the only high-level waste generated in Australia came from a small research and medical science reactor located at Lucas Heights in NSW, owned and operated by the Commonwealth Government.

Management of Australia's small but growing stockpile of very high-level nuclear waste was marked by more than two decades of the political inability of successive Commonwealth Governments to determine the site for final storage of spent fuel rods in interim storage at Lucas Heights in NSW. This situation was not unique to Australia and similar to that faced by scientists and governments in the USA, Germany and elsewhere (Blowers & Sundqvist, 2010; Lees, 2000; Lehtonen, 2010; Macfarlane, 2003; Tiggemann, 2019; J. S. Walker, 2017). Not only was there no agreement concerning the precise science and engineering solution for long-term waste disposal, there was also a lack of public trust, which meant there was a concern about the integrity of the decision-making process and the ability of governments to make the right decision (Rosa et al., 2010).

As noted above, as the opposition, Labor had vehemently opposed the Commonwealth plan for a national radioactive waste repository in SA and harried the then SA Liberal Government to likewise oppose certain aspects of the Commonwealth plan. Labor came to power in 2002 with three significant policy commitments regarding a repository, the first two reflecting the state pride value and the third the democratic motivation. The first commitment was to extend the existing legislative ban on the storage of non-SA medium- and high-level radioactive waste in SA also to include low-level waste. The second was to prohibit and criminalise the transport of radioactive waste from interstate or overseas into the state. The third was to establish a legislative requirement for a plebiscite if the Commonwealth Government announced plans to develop a higher-level radioactive waste dump in SA (ALP(SA), 2002f).

In its first months in office, Cabinet approved drafting instructions for the necessary Bill (Cabinet Submission 29 April, 2002a). The provisions to expand the scope of the ban and to prohibit transport became law in March 2003. However, the already discussed parliamentary dynamics of a powerful upper house not controlled by the government meant the notion of a plebiscite was not realised as policy.

Despite this setback, the political executive then moved to introduce legislation to convert the SA Crown land identified for a Commonwealth repository into a public conservation park.

At the time the land was under pastoral leases (Cabinet Submission 20 May, 2003; Cabinet Submission 26 May, 2003a). As we saw in the last chapter when discussing court government, the proposal ultimately permitted the continuation of pastoral activity, protected native title rights and still allowed mining activity. The legislation was intended to block the compulsory acquisition of the land by the Commonwealth Government while not alienating First Nations people, mining interests or pastoralists. The Commonwealth moved quickly to compulsorily acquire the Crown land before the legislation passed the SA Parliament. The political executive challenged this decision through the Federal Court, claiming a denial of natural justice. In the first instance, the Federal Court ruled in favour of the Commonwealth, holding that the Commonwealth *Lands Acquisitions Act* allows for a denial of natural justice in particular circumstances of urgency. On appeal (Cabinet Note 11 December, 2003) the SA Government won in a unanimous judgment handed down in the Full Court of the Federal Court in June 2004. The Commonwealth Government decided not to appeal this decision to the High Court, and on 14 July 2004 announced it was abandoning its plan to build a single national radioactive waste dump in SA.

Rann's reflections on this saga illustrate the operation of both the state pride and democratic motivation values. He reported that 'the polling was that South Australians felt left out or left behind' and that the Commonwealth's unilateral actions reinforced this feeling and the SA political executive's efforts positively resonated because of public hostility to enriched uranium and a sense that the SA Government was doing the 'right thing'. The political executive concluded that a prolonged legal challenge would give it political advantage and do political harm to the Commonwealth Government: 'If we win, we fought and won; if we lose, we fought the good fight.' Win or lose; the political executive could claim to have stood up for SA in times of challenge. In victory, the political executive could also claim to have been positive, unyielding and never defeatist: 'This was a demonstration that we [SA] could take on the big – David and Goliath – take on the big boys and win if we wanted' (interview with Rann, 2018).

Leaks at Mining Sites

The public judgement concerning radioactive waste at uranium mines seemed to be one of expecting high standards and proper systems for its management just like mining for any ore, not uncompromising hostility as with waste associated with enriched uranium (Graetz & Manning, 2016). Accordingly, the political executive's definition of the policy problem concerning mining was more nuanced. Labor presented its policy position for the 2002 election in terms of environmental protection, safe working environments and good governance. The primary political contest was over the Liberal Government's handling of

tailings dam spills at the new Beverley mine. These spills occurred in the context of Beverley using the (then) controversial in-situ leaching process to extract and process uranium,² which gave added complexity to the contest. However, on the eve of the election campaign, a whistle-blower publicly revealed that the operators of all three SA uranium mines had reported multiple waste spills which the Liberal Government did not reveal to the public. This revelation led Labor to make an election commitment for an independent inquiry into the reporting regime and to look closely into the appropriateness of in-situ leaching (ALP(SA), 2002b).

Once in office, the political executive faced the dilemma of its sustainability rhetoric and state developmentalism goals conflicting. As a carryover from the electioneering, the political executive's language was perceived by mining interests as hostile. As the minister responsible for mining, Holloway was:

going around to try to calm tension – because they [the operators of Beverley] were about ready to move out of the state – to go and speak to Mike [Rann] and say, look, do you think you can just keep the rhetoric down a bit because there is however many jobs ... and 50 million a year, plus the sovereign risk and all those sorts of issues. (interview with Holloway, 2019)

As part of this tension calming, the mining portfolio, not the environment portfolio, progressed the election commitment to hold an inquiry into the reporting of waste spillages (Cabinet Submission 6 May, 2002a). The political executive ultimately framed the problem and the solution (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7) in terms of state developmentalism, and only secondarily in terms of sustainability. The response to repeated leaks of radioactive waste at mining sites highlighted that Rann's personal commitment to sustainability and interest in populist rhetoric was moderated by the political executive's prioritisation of economically focused values within its ideology. Such moderation of the influence of one value in preference to another supports the earlier contention that there was a hierarchy among the values constituting the political executive's ideology.

Managing Legacy Waste

Rejecting, and then successfully defeating, the proposition of a national radioactive waste repository in SA created policy momentum for the political executive to follow through with its

² With in-situ leaching, there is no mining as such. Instead, a leaching solution (in the case of Beverley, sulphuric acid and hydrogen peroxide) is diluted in groundwater which is then returned to its aquifer through the host rock (permeable sandstone). Through continuous reticulation of the solution, the uranium is leached from the host rock. At the surface, the solution is circulated through a resin bed to extract and concentrate the uranium. While in-situ leaching involves minimal ground disturbance – unlike mines, especially open-cut mines – there is a risk of contamination of 'non-target' aquifers (Energy Information Administration, 2018; Scarce, 2016).

commitment to deal with the 52 m² of radioactive material stored across the state, mainly at hospital, university and industrial sites. This activity, in turn, drew attention to contaminated former uranium mining (Radium Hill) and processing (Port Pirie) sites. That is, the Commonwealth's decision-making set off something of a chain reaction of policy activity. Once commenced, SA policymaking in response to the exogenous Commonwealth action created momentum for further policy work in the area. However, this momentum did not necessarily result in the acceptance and actioning of the policy advice generated.

Labor's election policy addressed the issue of the 'stockpile' of waste with a commitment to direct the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) to undertake an audit of such waste as a precursor to identifying solutions (ALP(SA), 2002d). Having completed the audit (Cabinet Submission 4 December, 2003), bureaucrats identified and recommended a preferred solution, which was endorsed by Hill as the relevant minister (Cabinet Note 21 November, 2005). The language of the audit report aligns with the political executive's sustainability value, with an explicit focus on protecting the environment and future generations, both in terms of safeguarding health and avoiding financial and management burdens. However, while the audit facilitated better management of radioactive waste in SA, a SA repository was not established, and management of waste continued at the sites 'creating' it. In a parallel fashion, the review of the management of the legacy Radium Hill and Port Pirie sites (Cabinet Note, 12 June 2004) was influenced by the political executive's values without necessarily leading to a comprehensive resolution of the concerns.

In both instances, the policy positions brought to Cabinet were framed by the political executive's sustainability value. However, the sustainability goals implied by this value were insufficient to motivate the political executive, as a group, to adopt the recommended course of action. That is, sustainability was insufficiently important to displace other policy initiatives in the competition for limited funds. Again this reinforces the hierarchy within the values constituting the ideology. That is, priority was given to economic values and, sitting behind this, the dominant logic concerning the meaning of the State Bank debacle leading to a conservative position on finance and budgeting.

5.3.2 Urban Water Supply


The analysis in this section focuses on the influence of the political executive's ideology on its policymaking concerning urban water supply. I argue that the inclusion of urban water supply among Labor's election policies was serendipitous; that an exogenous event resulted not only in its addition but its sustainability focus. This value then shaped the policy development in a direction that focused on the goals of conserving the environment and

sustainable resource use, rather than either the essential service and engineering paradigms that had long dominated water policy, or the more recent competition and corporatisation paradigms. This is an instance of corporate agency coordinating action based on sustainability as a shared goal. The elaboration that followed shifted the prior institutional focus. Ultimately, in the context of extreme drought, this sustainability focus did not support the political executive's governing responsibilities. Responding to an entirely different exogenous event, the political executive changed course, drawing on an alternative value from within its ideology, that of state developmentalism. That is, there was a further elaboration. But rather than being an adjudication between competing values, it was ultimately a cycling between them, not because there had been a change in government, as is often the case, but because there had been a change in circumstances (c.f. Thacher & Rein, 2004), or what Weiss would call the 'broader environment'.

Figure 5-1 presents a timeline of the events associated with the developments in urban water supply policy highlighted in the paragraph above. It replicates the timeline of water-related key policy events from Figure 3-2, with 'events' represented as the preparation and consideration of a Cabinet submission. The figure illustrates how these policy developments extended over most of the course of the case study period. Clearly, this was a complex area of policymaking, with significant policy attention commencing in February 2003, almost a year into the political executive's term. Then from late 2006 to mid-2008 we witness the most intense policy attention. The timeline reminds us of the disjointed and elongated policy path in this area.

As already noted, modern cities cannot exist without potable water (Swyngedouw, 2004). Between 2006 and 2008, there was escalating concern that the already long-running drought would cause Adelaide's supply of potable water to run out. This situation was a similar emergency to that subsequently faced by Cape Town, South Africa in 2017–18 (Muller, 2018) and a range of NSW regional cities in 2019. While the Labor opposition established its policy positions in late 2001, there was a delayed start in policymaking by the government, followed by an extensive process of community consultation, analysis and negotiation. The government's initial policy position, *Water Proofing Adelaide* (June 2005), whose core philosophy was environmental, with a focus on reducing domestic consumption of water, was then released.

Figure 5-1: Timeline of Critical Events for Urban Water Supply Policy



However, almost as soon as the document was released, drought conditions that had been affecting SA since 2001 worsened. This forced the political executive to grapple with competing views within the 'court' regarding how to respond. As noted in Chapter 4, after significant 'puzzling', Cabinet made the controversial decision to invest significantly in constructing a desalination plant. In light of this decision, the supposed twenty-year *Water Proofing Adelaide* plan was replaced in less than four years with a differently focused policy position (*Water for Good*), seeking to balance social and economic considerations with environmental ones.

In the lead-up to the 2002 election, the urban water supply policy did not form a prominent part of the Labor Party platform (ALP SA, 2000) nor did it achieve the status of an overall programmatic view. Instead, it was discussed tangentially in the context of other policy areas: privatisation, water quality, integrated urban design, economic development and conservation. Then, in late 2001, a senior bureaucrat gave Hill, the (then) Opposition Spokesperson on the Environment, a list of urban water supply initiatives the water department was considering (Hill, 2016). Hill says he ‘just put a different label on it – *Water Proofing Adelaide* – and made it a bit more ambitious and put other things into it’ (interview with Hill, 2018).

However, as a late addition, *Water Proofing Adelaide* was simply embedded within a broader environmental policy, *Labor’s Plans for the Environment and Conservation* (ALP SA, 2002e), and was not road tested through either the Labor Listens forums or the directions statements process. Including policy pledges regarding urban water supply among its election commitments allowed the Labor opposition to get on the political front foot. However, in 2002 this policy domain did not have a well-established home in the environmental policy area. Until then it was generally publicly framed as an essential service and a public good; as organisationally underpinned by an engineering ethos and as the recent subject of a competition/productivity policy turn. Nonetheless, via a seemingly serendipitous turn of events, that is where it found itself at that time, encased in post-materialist (Doyle et al., 2015) environmental values.

Once Labor was in office, portfolios were allocated to ministers in a reasonably standard way, with urban water supply policy sitting within a government enterprises portfolio, not the environment portfolio. There is evidence the newly established Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation (DWLBC) sought to progress the *Water Proofing Adelaide* agenda (DWLBC, 2002). However, this was unsuccessful in the face of indifference from both Conlon (Minister for Government Enterprises) and SA Water (the public water utility). This inaction is another example of institutional factors influencing policymaking.

Instead, serious efforts to advance the development of the vaunted ‘integrated water management strategy’ were not made until early 2003. Progress was possible because, as announced in the Government Gazette in December 2002, Conlon delegated all his ‘powers and functions’ for urban water supply policy to his assistant minister, Weatherill (Government Printer, 2002). Hill and Weatherill then jointly sponsored the necessary policy work (Cabinet Submission 10 February, 2003) and, consistent with the political executive’s election commitments, the final product had a decided environmental focus. Indeed it was seen as a

'blueprint for ... conservation' as much as anything (Cabinet Submission 11 July, 2005, §2.1).

The main policy instruments in the Cabinet-approved strategy focused on water-saving initiatives and generating 'new' water by encouraging domestic rainwater collection and use, and investing in the retention and purification of stormwater to recharge aquifers for more extensive use (Cabinet Submission 11 July, 2005, §3.1). Just as significantly, the language had a strong sustainability flavour, with very high use of words such as 'conservation', 'efficient', 'efficiency', 'environment', 'environmental', 'reduce', 'restrictions' and 'sustainable' (NVivo word analysis, 12 November 2019). Although desalination was later to become a significant policy instrument, at this point, within a sustainability frame, there was no place for desalination as a new water source within a sustainability value. Desalination required large amounts of electricity and disposal strategies for significant volumes of salt by-product. At the time, some community voices were calling for serious consideration of desalination, as can be seen in the consultation records for *Water Proofing Adelaide (WPA)* (Government of South Australia, 2005b).

Further, through the Thinkers in Residence program, there was an expert prediction that desalination would eventually be required to secure Adelaide's water supply, and therefore there was a need for contingency planning to begin (Cullen, 2004). Despite this, at each step in the policy development process the desalination option was further marginalised. Desalination was beyond serious conceptualisation in 2005 because of the sustainability value, as well as SA Water's absolute confidence in the River Murray pipeline. That is, ideology constrained and shaped policymaking.

As I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6, just over a year after the *WPA* 20-year strategy was adopted by the political executive, the appropriateness of its emphasis was brought into question by the worsening drought, ultimately leading to a decision to build a desalination plant. *WPA* focused on water-saving initiatives and generating 'new' water through the collection and use of rooftop rainwater and street-level stormwater. While it is possible to conceptualise a desalination plant as a commitment to economic and social survival that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs, it was generally inconsistent with the post-materialist ethic underpinning *WPA*. Therefore, it is unsurprising that, hard on the heels of the desalination plant decision, work commenced on a strategy to replace *WPA* with *Water for Good (WfG)*.

An analysis of word use in the two strategies (see Chapter 3 for a description of the method) demonstrated a shift in focus from a sustainability value to a state development value,

wherein there emerge three relevant differences between the two strategies. The first relates to the discussion of water source categories: aquifers, groundwater, recycling, reservoirs, rainwater, stormwater, wastewater and so on. Unsurprisingly, 'desalination' is more frequently used in *WfG* (125 times, being the 44th most used word and accounting for 0.25% of total words) than in *WPA* (29 times, being the 128th most used word and accounting for 0.14% of total words). More significantly, *Water for Good* introduces the terminology of water 'harvesting' (not used at all in *WPA*). Used 75 times and being the 110th most used word, 'harvesting' frames rainwater and stormwater collection as 'taming' or 'domestication' processes (consistent with more traditional approaches within water management) rather than 'adaptive management' (Lach et al., 2005) as implied within the ecological turn of *WPA*.

The second difference between the two strategies is in the way sustainability was discussed. *WfG* continued to use sustainability language but did so sparingly (0.97% of words compared to 2.32% in *WPA*) and with a very different emphasis. In *WfG*, to the extent that there was a focus on environmental language, the emphasis was on sustainable *use*, with significantly less engagement of language relating to conservation and reduction in the use of water than in *WPA*. The third difference to highlight is the prevalence of state developmentalism language and concepts in *WfG*. The word 'security' was used 118 times in *WfG* but not once in *WPA*. Supply and demand language dominated in *WfG* (3rd and 11th most used words respectively), and it emphasised language related to industry, development and economics in a way not apparent in *WPA*.

Across the two strategies, the range of policy instruments used remained mostly unchanged, as did the way of using them; for example, strategies such as the use of water pricing and community education to shift behaviour, or the capture and recycling of stormwater to diversify the sources of water supply. However, despite the similarities in their policy instruments, there was a fundamental shift in the goals, objectives, settings and the logic for using these instruments. This shift occurred as part of changing from a sustainability to a state developmentalism focus. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the cycling from one ideology value to another was driven by a modification in how the political executive conceptualised the public interest. The analysis in this chapter points to *WfG* being much more than *WPA* plus a desalination plant.

The goals of *WPA* were conserving the environment and sustainable resource use, with the objectives of restoring the health of the River Murray, better groundwater management and reduced water diversions from River Murray for Adelaide's water supply. By comparison, the goals for *WfG* were security, innovation and economic development, as well as conservation of the environment, with the objectives of guaranteeing Adelaide's water supply, sustaining

economic and population growth, and climate resilience. As a result, *WPA* focused on responsible water use and education and behaviour change as a way to achieve this. *WfG* focused on increased water sources through the use of adaptive water management. While both emphasised the health of the River Murray, *WPA* did so as an environmental imperative, and *WfG* did so by also stressing a healthy River Murray as a back-up to Adelaide's water supply.

In summary, then, my analysis of urban water supply policymaking to this point reinforces the conclusion from the previous chapter that institutions matter. Institutionalism in the form of 'events' – such as a bureaucrat unexpectedly giving the Shadow Environment Minister a policy paper, the allocation of portfolio responsibilities to ministers with particular personalities and interests (with Weatherill taking them on from Conlon), and the onset and then worsening of drought conditions – influenced policy direction.

However, while these historical events coming together to create a 'policy window' were constraining, it was not in an entirely determinist way. When activating corporate agency in response to changing circumstances, the political executive was able to draw on different aspects of its ideology, pivoting in different directions as necessary. So, for example, with Conlon uninterested in urban water supply policy, there was no opportunity for Hill to coordinate his actions with the relevant minister. In the context of the political court, his individual agency was insufficient for active policymaking. Once a different minister assumed responsibility, the opportunity to coordinate action arose, and he took it. Policymaking then progressed in keeping with the value established by the political executive.

Further, when drought made it sensible to pivot away from the sustainability value, this was initially impossible and only achieved through an exercise of corporate agency. The next chapter dealing with interests considers what motivated this change. At this point, it is noteworthy that when the change occurred the political executive drew on another element of its ideology – state developmentalism – rather than drawing on the paradigms previously associated with water policy, such as essential service or engineering. The analysis reinforces Weiss' contentions concerning elements of an ideology being partial and fluid, to the extent of there being conflict or competition among them, and that decision-makers alter their ideology in the process of negotiation inherent in policymaking. Further, it points to the alteration of the political executive's ideology possibly being a process of cycling between competing values rather than negotiating trade-offs between them, as is often suggested. This notion of cycling raises questions about practical reasoning as opposed to instrumental rationality (Thacher & Rein, 2004), which will be explored further in Chapters 7 (information) and 8 (findings and conclusions).

5.3.3 Bioscience Industry Development

This section analyses the influence of the political executive's ideology on the shape of bioscience industry development policy. Consistent with the overall state developmentalism emphasis on economic growth, the political executive came to office with a commitment to promote 'technology-based industries' by building an 'innovation environment' and encouraging 'entrepreneurial activities' (ALP(SA), 2000, 2001b, 2002k). The policy proposal was to focus on creating new products and accessing new skills, new technologies and new markets to retain and create jobs. In the Labor opposition's policy documents, there is an underlying tension as to whether to focus on innovation in existing industries and firms, thereby being seen to protect existing (unionised) jobs, or on new industries and firms and thus encourage new employment.

While there was no single bioscience industry development policy for the 2002 election, policy commitments to this sector were articulated clearly in the party's industry (ALP(SA), 2002k) and science (ALP(SA), 2002n) policy statements. The underlying logic was to maximise the business and industry potential of SA's multiple scientific research institutions through commercialisation of their scientific developments. The aim was to create new industries, new jobs and exports. Labor applied the same logic to the areas of advanced manufacturing and defence-related industries (ALP(SA), 2002m).

There is a clear sense of an autonomous role for government within the economy, especially through the use of its public administration tools, to exert control over non-state interests to generate a community-wide benefit in the form of new employment opportunities. This state developmentalism value continued to influence the development of bioscience initiatives brought forward by successive ministers of science. Figure 3-2 (Timeline of Key Policy Events) illustrates that policymaking in the area began and ended with the political executive supporting the establishment of research centres with a translational emphasis: a crop genomics research centre in 2002 and one relating to health and medical research in 2009. In the intervening years policymaking focused mainly on the Thebarton bioscience precinct and on providing access to venture capital. These initiatives were either slowed, blunted or abandoned by the operation of economic rationalism on the political executive's decision-making. That is, in this policy area, we again see the operation of a hierarchy within the ideological values, with economic rationalism dominating. However, as will be reinforced in subsequent chapters, this was not economic rationalism as a trust in market instruments but more a kind of fiscal conservatism based on economic rationalist ideas about budget surpluses *and* a desire to redeem the Labor brand regarding economic management. Despite this, corporate agency was able to overcome the power and influence of the

Treasurer in at least one instance of policymaking, that regarding support for a plant genomic research centre.

When interviewed, Foley made three points about Labor's position on bioscience industry development. First, under various guises, this type of policy had been a focus for the ALP since the 1980s. Second, the reason for this continuing focus was the realisation in the context of the persistent structural readjustment of the Australian economy (Pusey, 1991), that SA's heavy reliance on manufacturing meant the state needed to transition to higher-skill, higher-pay advanced manufacturing jobs. Third, the whole notion of bioscience was 'very much the talk of the town in the early 2000s' and Labor needed to be seen to have such a policy (interview, 2018). This representation further highlights the tension between the desire for innovation on the one hand and the preservation of established social and cultural values of existing industries on the other (Birch, 2006; OECD, 2009).

In the vein of bioscience industry development being part of transitioning jobs to a 'new economy', Caica (Minister for Science 2007–09) commented that 'technology shouldn't just be seen from a technological perspective. Let the scientists do that. We should see it as an economic opportunity'. Lomax-Smith, the political executive's first Minister for Science, and a medical scientist, took a more critical and differently graded perspective. One element of this view was a more nuanced perspective on where any employment would come from, supporting activities rather than high-skilled scientific jobs:

There was a view that this [bioscience] was the new economy and everything else was going down the gurgler, and if you invested here, there'd be lots of jobs. In reality, it's like mining, there are not lots of jobs, there are some very highly paid jobs, but the numbers are almost ephemeral, [but] where the spin-offs are, it's in the building trade, it's in the electricals, it's in managing the fridges not going out at night. You know, there are a lot of jobs and not high-tech jobs, but they're the support. (interview, 2018)

A second element was a view on the relative merits of bioscience jobs compared with other 'new economy' jobs such as in information technology. Her view was that the research strengths of the state's three large universities, plus SA's small population size and particular economic history, meant bioscience offered a better chance of success:

the challenge for South Australia is that pretending we're going to be Silicon Valley is a bit delusional because we haven't got a population base to sustain it, but what we do have really is strength in, is the biosciences, and if you look at the ... stuff that comes out of particularly University of Adelaide, and also [University of] SA and Flinders [University], their strengths have some engineering opportunities, but the easy money has to be in the biosciences I would have thought. (interview, 2018)

The experience with Playford Capital reinforces this position. This was a SA Government controlled fund that channelled venture capital into start-up software and technology companies. Over ten years, it secured an investment of \$100 million (\$19.6m Commonwealth funding, plus \$80m guaranteed from co-investors) into 42 start-ups to create around 200 jobs (Moscaritolo, 2010).

The political executive's policy commitments on bioscience may have been, in Foley's words, ticking an expected box, and the underpinning ideas had been around for some time. However, while the policy goals articulated in the Labor Party election documents had a reasonable level of sophistication, this was not matched at the level of the specific instruments for implementation described in these documents. The proposed instruments – planning, advice giving, changing administrative structures – are much less interventionist in the economy than might be expected, relying heavily on moral suasion. For example, one such commitment was to create a Premier's Science and Research Council. Its tasks included: developing a 'ten year strategy on scientific research and development'; promoting teaming between research institutions and industry 'to capture the broader economic benefits for our State; and creating better co-ordination in securing research dollars by SA education and research institutions' (ALP(SA), 2002n).

Once the political executive was in office, successive ministers for science – Lomax-Smith (2002–04), White (2004–05), Maywald (2005–07), Caica (2007–09) and O'Brien (2009–10) – embraced opportunities to develop more specific means to achieve the policy goals of increased jobs and economic growth. Examples included: Lomax-Smith supporting an initiative for commercialising plant genomics research; White and Maywald proposing a venture capital fund for innovative start-ups; and Caica promoting consolidation of medical and health research activity as well as support for the early-stage commercialisation of research.

The process by which Cabinet approved the initiative for commercialising plant genomics research is discussed in Chapter 6, especially regarding the view of DTF and Foley that it was not a funding priority. However, it is worth noting that, even at this very early stage in the life of the political executive (April and May 2002), there was a recognition that investment in this bioscience project would not lead to a material, net increase in employment. Cabinet supported the position consistent with Lomax-Smith's views cited above. That is, the small employment value from bioscience was in helping the transition of lower-skilled workers to para-professional roles and the retention of small numbers of skilled professionals, particularly biotechnology graduates (Cabinet Submission 6 May, 2002b, §2.4). The policy focus in supporting the research centre was placed on positioning SA 'as a

national leader in science and research' (§2.1) and thereby increasing the percentage of Australian research and development funding that reached SA (§2.2). As such, the selection of implementation instruments, and the justification of them, had the effect of subtly reshaping the goals for bioscience industry development and thereby the meaning attached to state developmentalism in this context, emphasising economic growth rather than employment growth.

Regarding the establishment of a venture capital fund for innovative bioscience start-ups, we encounter a parallel insight into some shades of meaning entering the economic rationalism value. In early 2005, White brought forward the proposal for what eventually became known as the Terra Rose Venture Capital fund. The proposal was for the government to facilitate access to a market-based source of venture capital for bioscience start-ups. This access would involve the MTAA Superannuation Fund establishing a Venture Capital Limited Partnership, which was the standard kind of entity used for venture capital investments in Australia at the time. MTAA Super would invest \$35m in the fund, at some risk, but with the prospect of high rates of return on those start-ups that ultimately proved successful. The SA Government involvement would be through the government agency Bio Innovation SA linking potential projects with the fund. These would be identified through analysis for commercialisation potential, running an 'entrepreneur in residence program' and proof of concept support of applicants (Cabinet Submission 21 March, 2005). These were the kinds of activities Bio Innovation SA was performing regardless. DTF strongly opposed the proposal, on the basis that, even though no government funds were directly at risk, in the event of the fund failing the state government could be under political pressure to make good the losses incurred by a superannuation fund. That is, financial prudence was valued more highly than any trust in the economic theory that prices and markets are the most reliable means for setting values and delivering outcomes.

However, exemplifying court government dynamics, rather than being rejected out of hand, the proposal was deferred for further work. In the decision section of the submission is written, in the Premier's hand:

Deferred for further discussion between:

- 1) Chair, Bio Innovation SA Board (Dennis Mutton);
- 2) CE, DPC;
- 3) Under-Treasurer;
- 4) Chair, PMG (Terry Evans)

and refer back to Cabinet.

Above group to be assisted by an expert private equity adviser to be engaged by the Bio Innovation SA Board. (Cabinet Submission 21 March, 2005, p. 15)

The inclusion of the Chief Executive DPC (McCann) in this group indicates the Premier had an interest in such a proposal succeeding. The directed 'further discussion' took nine months to conclude and, in the meantime, Maywald had replaced White as Minister for Science. Maywald described her strategy in this and other instances of DTF opposition as follows:

I would always go to the Treasurer, and I'd say 'I've got this idea. I don't think Treasury is going to like it because I think Treasury will think this is a risk, this is a risk, this is a risk. Can you give me someone to work with from Treasury to see if we can come up with ways in which we can mitigate those risks?' So the Treasurer would then appoint someone to work with my people to see if we can find a way to work through mitigating what any of the objections that Treasury might have. (interview, 2018)

Maywald said, 'I never took anything to Cabinet to lose it'. In this regard, she was unlike some ministers, as described by multiple interviews, who often brought proposals to Cabinet suspecting they would fail and did. These tended to be ministers who, as previously described by McCann, advanced their department's agenda rather than having policy thoughts of their own, that is, something akin to dilettantes.

Cabinet ultimately approved the proposal for this venture capital fund. The broad contours remained unchanged from the original submission, though the risk mitigation strategies were enhanced and more thoroughly documented. The substantive recommendation was simply three lines as opposed to almost a page in the 2005 document (Cabinet Submission 16 January, 2006). From the perspective of court government, the most interesting feature was the inclusion of an additional recommendation for Bio Innovation SA to organise a signing ceremony involving the Premier. Media coverage of Rann signing a memorandum of agreement with a private sector superannuation fund to support innovative start-up companies in the field of bioscience reinforced the economic development credentials of the political executive. While the anticipated direct employment growth was small, such a signing ceremony was part of the political executive signalling to the broader business community and the electorate as a whole that SA was 'open for business'.

Subsequent chapters consider these initiatives further. However, at this point, it is relevant to note that the economic rationalism value tended to occupy a kind of default power with the economically focused state developmentalism, as much as with any other part of the political executive's ideology. However, this was not a doctrinaire adoption of this economic-based value. Economic rationalism was marked more by a conservative approach to budget management rather than an outright trust in market instruments. This interpretation undermines suggestions that the political executive was 'neo-liberal' (Dean, 2018) or that it

was 'adopting neo-liberal policies' (Broomhill & Sharp, 2018). My contention is that constraining public spending is not sufficient on its own to justify the label 'neo-liberal', which as a term is both unhelpfully emotive and poorly defined (Venugopal, 2015; Weiss, 2012; Weller & O'Neill, 2014).

The emerging picture is far more complex than suggested by those applying 'neo-liberalism' to the SA case. The political executive was, in part at least, using economic rationalist ideas and language about financial management, especially regarding budget surpluses, to advance its desire to redeem Labor's brand post the State Bank debacle. Loyalty to the party, as in its heritage and its future (rather than immediate partisan advantage), was more important than ideas about markets.

A further example of the 'virtue signalling' nature of bioscience industry development policymaking is the continued focus on state development ideals, even though no initiatives in the bioscience area achieved the state development status of, say, the TechPort initiative in the defence industries area. TechPort involved significant capital investment for a SA Government developed and owned maritime industrial precinct, consisting of common user shipbuilding facilities, including a 213-metre wharf, runway, dry berth, transfer system and the largest ship lift in the Southern Hemisphere. The funding also allowed for a fully integrated system of supply, and a commercial and education precinct, underpinning large employment and investment growth (Cabinet Submission 6 December, 2004; Cabinet Submission 19 June, 2006; Cabinet Submission 27 June, 2005). As we will see in Chapter 7, the political executive's decision to support the SA Medical and Health Research Institute constituted support for a significant bioscience project (Cabinet Submission 14 December, 2009). However, this depended on Commonwealth Government funding. It was not a priority of the political executive in the same way as TechPort, which was largely funded using SA Government funds.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented five values – democratic motivation, state pride, sustainability, economic rationalism and state developmentalism – as constituting the political executive's ideology. Further, even though it did operate as a system of political thinking, the ideology did not form an entirely comprehensive whole, much as predicted by Weiss. Nonetheless, it still influenced the executive's policy priorities and shaped its policymaking in the three focus areas of bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply. Further, this ideology could not be said to have had a corrupting influence on policymaking as assumed by, say, the evidence-based policy movement. That is, rather than being a 'fact-free' exercise, the application of

values occurred in the context of the available information, but with information interpreted through the lens of ideological values.

There are several other issues of note to emerge from this chapter. First, the dynamics of court government are woven within the examples of the ideology being activated. This is an example of the institutional arena influencing the operation of ideology, rather than directly shaping the policy areas of bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply. Further, the presence of these group dynamics highlights the importance of debate and negotiation (or the lack of it) when the political executive made significant decisions. For instance, the negotiation and ultimate coordination between Rann and Foley regarding privatisation and between Hill and Holloway concerning managing nuclear waste was a precursor to the emergence of an elaborated position. The lack of negotiation and coordination between Conlon and Hill about water supply policy created a stalemate. The causal requirement for debate and negotiation means that personal resources and individual power were necessary but insufficient motors of change. Something more is required, namely corporate agency.

Second, the operation of these court dynamics in decision-making reinforces Weiss' emphasis on negotiation and power as essential mechanisms driving the interaction of the elements of the 4I's framework. Further, the analysis points to corporate agency as a convincing explanation of the operation of these driving mechanisms. Archer's conceptualisation of corporate agency emerges as a sound and applicable *theoretical* basis for explaining how agents can both shape, and be shaped by, ideology. Archer's theoretical requirement for coordinated action was found to be empirically relevant for explaining not just how some ideas became a component of the political executive's ideology. As we saw with the discussion of corporate agency relating to each of the five ideological values, the presence of coordinated action governed how and when these elements of the ideology shaped policymaking. This explanation includes showing how, on occasions, the political executive cycled from one value to another within a hierarchy of values, for example from sustainability to state developmentalism in the case of water supply policy.

Third, a particularly significant finding of this chapter is that causality can move in two directions. Corporate agency influenced the shape of the political executive's ideology and, having been formed (in opposition), the ideology influenced the political executive's decision-making (in government). That is, agency shaped ideology and ideology shaped agency. This was the case, for instance, with Labor's approach to radioactive waste management, where the ideology developed and adopted in opposition constrained and steered policy choices in government. Further, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, causality also moved in both directions between ideology and each of the other elements (interests, information

and institutions), as hypothesised by Weiss. The value added by Archer is that her morphogenic cycle, with corporate agency at its heart, provides an explanation for this process of change.

Fourth, as implied in the previous point, the 'collective puzzlement' (Hecllo, 1974, p. 305) and deciding that occurred during opposition was of great importance for the political executive's policymaking direction once in office. In an instance of the institutional arena influencing policymaking, the ideology, constituted by the five values discussed in this chapter and formed predominantly in opposition influenced decision-making in government. This finding points to the need for cognisance of the consequence of policy capacity within an opposition. An equally important finding is that the coterminous development of policy positions and the values constituting the political executive's ideology occurred through the usual processes of opposition: combating the government and strategy development. However, the political executive still could and did activate its ideology in ways different from that established during opposition, most notably with water policy but also with bioscience, though to a less degree.

Fifth, from a methodological point of view, it is valuable to separately identify and consider policy ends and policy means and goals, objectives and settings at both levels. Analysis in this vein illustrates that significant policy change is possible (at least in some circumstances) by altering only one element of policy, an insight less quickly arrived at if one conflates these components into a single thing called 'policy' (Cashore & Howlett, 2007). For example, in replacing *WPA* with *WfG* most of the policy implementation instruments (e.g. water pricing and community education to shift behaviour and the capture and recycling of stormwater to diversify the sources of water supply) remained unchanged, but the overall understanding of their function was significantly altered. That is, the change-shaping effect of ideology does not need to be across all of the elements but can operate on one or a small number of aspects with significant impact. While Weiss does not explicitly turn her mind to these issues in discussing the 4I's framework, she does in the larger corpus of theorising on evaluation. Clearly, it is valuable to keep this wider aspect of her scholarship in mind when applying the 4I's framework, a point revisited in Chapters 7 and 8.

In summation, my analysis in this chapter illustrates that the political executive's values or beliefs (i.e., its ideology) strongly shaped its policymaking. This ideology was partial and fluid, with the political executive cycling between values, as necessary, based on corporate agency and influenced by both the institutional arena and the broader environment without being determined by them. The role of negotiation and contest underscores both the centrality of group dynamics and the non-deterministic nature of institutions. Policymaking is

shown to be directed by reasons for action (ideology) but with these reasons playing out in the context of asymmetrical power relations. If ideology is the reason for action, this raises the question 'what is the motivation for action?', which is core to my analysis in the next chapter.

6 Interests

The focus of this chapter is interests, the third element of the 4I's framework. Generally in the social sciences, interest theory addresses the question of motivation: 'what people want' (Swidler, 1986, p. 274; Vaisey, 2010), and in a range of disciplines interests are seen as a mechanism for activating and transacting the balancing of competing goals and values (Stone, 1997). This is the position adopted by Weiss (1983, 1995). So far in this thesis, policymaking has been presented as balancing conflicting or competing and changing goals via a strategic presentation of the problem (Chapter 1) and ideology as a loose cluster of implicit values providing the underlying structures, boundaries and schemas of interpretation for such goals (Chapter 5). Further, I identify instances where the political executive did not so much change ideological values but instead cycled between different values within its ideology. Here I will argue that this cycling between competing values was motivated by interests.

Accordingly, in this chapter, I explore how interests fulfilled the function of activation and transaction regarding the ideological values in the SA case, as well as how the political executive's interests were not just self-regarding but also sought on occasions to address the public interest. The exploration involves not just describing and analysing instances of such transactions in the three policy areas – bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply – but also identifying ways in which an understanding of this interest-based process enhances a conception of the ideology and institutional elements of the 4I's framework.

Consistent with relevant theorising discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter identifies two kinds of interest-based transactions operating in the political executive's policymaking: other-regarding public interests and self-regarding political interests. By public interest I mean a motivation focused on the 'general welfare', as in those things that are good for the community as a community (Bozeman, 2007), and by political self-interest I mean a motivation focused on winning power, office and influence (Buller & James, 2012).

As discussed previously, this approach differs from that adopted by Weiss (1983, 1995). Consistent with the dominant thinking in political science in the 1980s and 1990s, Weiss made the methodological decision to interpret interest as self-interest (1995, p. 574). While there is a growing body of public policy scholarship focused on interests as a motivation beyond self-interest (Berman, 2011; Fischer, 2003; James, 2018; Lewin, 1991; Ritz, 2011; van der Wal, 2013), the explicit notion that human beings are motivated overwhelmingly by self-interest remains resilient in such scholarship (e.g. Buller & James, 2012; Mueller, 2011).

Further, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is implicit in a wide range of public policy research and the popular caricatures of politicians as vote maximisers and rent seekers.

This case study provides examples of the political executive discarding options that would have produced a beneficial political result in favour of alternatives considered the 'right thing' to do. Accordingly, the analysis in this chapter illustrates that, in some circumstances, the political executive 'puzzled' through policy questions motivated by a sense of public interest. In these instances, if political self-interest were the executive's primary motivator, a quick, definite and conclusive decision would have resulted. Instead of such definitiveness, the executive endured considerable political pain in its protracted efforts to make the 'right' decision. This desire to make the right decision is evident with aspects of both bioscience policy and urban water supply policy. This is not to deny the presence of political self-interest or of instances where it dominated. In fact, with at least one aspect of policymaking regarding the management of radioactive waste, I find that political self-interest was the primary kind of interest motivating the executive's actions. However, the case study highlights that the political executive often subordinated self-interest to a sense of duty or the general welfare. This situation is not unique to the SA case, as suggested by the following from Archer:

Those who take on social roles are subject to normative expectations. Insofar as their conduct is subject to social norms, they act out of a sense of duty rather than according to a 'rational man's' [sic] self-interest. (2001, p. 51)

While it is possible for interests and ideology to 'pull policy makers in different directions' (Weiss, 1999, p. 483), the pattern emerging from the case study is the definition of interests through a process of negotiation, which in turn emphasised particular values from within the political executive's ideology. That is, there was an interest-driven process of goal selection wherein the negotiation positions were informed by different values from the political executive's ideology, and the decision reflected the prioritisation of one of these values. This interests-based transaction demonstrates a degree of competition, rather than conflict, among the values that constituted the political executive's ideology, reinforcing conclusions from the previous chapter.

Therefore, the position presented in this thesis contradicts the established and somewhat dated (e.g. Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1976) but perduring (e.g. Mueller, 2003, 2011; Munger, 2011) 'public choice' research suggesting political decision-makers seek re-election above all else. Instead, this research corroborates and extends the competing body of literature on altruism, which indicates politicians can rise above politicking to 'do the right thing' (e.g. Andersen et al., 2013; Johnston, 2017). My more nuanced finding from this case study is

that a mix of self-regarding and other-regarding interests often characterised the political executive's decision-making and that the latter dominated at times. This finding is a significant contribution to our understanding of how executives make decisions because it ensures a place for democracy in policymaking (a concern for Botterill and Fenna (2019), for example), while also allowing room for research to provide the technical and scientific information required to solve policy problems, rather than shutting it out in the name of politics' primacy (a concern for Daviter (2015) and Schneider (2020) for example). Allowing a place for both positions fits into the overall thesis for this research project, which is that executive decision-making is a dynamic and interactive exercise consisting of high levels of political agency within established institutional and ideational constraints.

In this chapter, I analyse certain aspects of the political executive's policymaking in terms of public interest and then political self-interest. My investigation of urban water supply policy and bioscience industry development policy identifies the public interest as the stronger motivation for the SA political executive, more than the individual egotism that was also inevitably involved. By comparison, I argue that political self-interest was the more pronounced motivation concerning crucial aspects of radioactive waste disposal policy. I am not making a blanket claim that there was a single, 'objective' public good in each area of policymaking. Instead, I am suggesting the political executive confronted multiple publics, each with different interests. In the process of negotiation, compromise and accommodation among these competing interests (Bozeman, 2007; Johnston, 2016; Wheeler, 2006) we can variously discern both the operation of public interest and political self-interest.

Further, in undertaking this analysis, I will consider the interplay of the interests and ideology in the policy areas of bioscience, urban water supply and radioactive waste management, and touch on the relationship of interests to the institutional arena. The chapter will conclude by identifying four aspects of interests that emerge from the analysis as being of significance for understanding this element of the 4I's. First, the political executive was motivated by a mix of political self-interest and pursuit of the public interest. Second, interests and ideology are intimately related as motivator and reason for action respectively. Third, the political executive's corporate sense of these interests was more than the sum of the positions of its members. Fourth, interests were rarely hard-and-fast single-position commitments but were instead continually redefined, as we saw with ideology. Regarding primary sources, this chapter again draws on interviews and archival material from the era, especially Cabinet documents. These are listed in Appendix 6, and the method for analysing them discussed in Chapter 3.

6.1 Public Interest

In analysing the SA case, I identified how public interest operated as a 'language' (Stone, 1997) or mechanism to activate the political executive's ideology. This operation is evident in the desire of the political executive not just to 'do things' but to do things that made a positive difference. That is, to do the 'right' things, not just in terms of altruism but also responding to a cultural expectation to be competent leaders (Ciulla & Forsyth, 2011; Kuhl, 2018). In this section, I will, firstly, discuss how the political executive self-consciously sought to be successful, in part because it considered that the former Bannan Labor Government had been a 'lame duck'. I will then identify the kind of difference it sought to make and what motivated this decision-making. I will conclude that the political executive was seeking more than just to be noticed by the electorate.

There are at least three ways for a political executive to satisfy its desire to 'do things'. The first is by pandering to the electorate, either by pursuing 'good' policies that align with the wishes of the 'median voter' or pushing towards policies that are widely thought of as advantageous but are known by the executive as pointless or even detrimental in the longer term (Canes-Wrone et al., 2001; Maor, 2019). Both kinds of pandering seek to maximise votes. However, the second also implies rent-seeking behaviour, wherein the political executive pursues electoral advantage for itself at the community's cost. This cost can take the form of side effects such as reduced economic efficiency, the misallocation of resources, lost government revenue, or the decline of civil society. Satisfaction of the desire to 'do things' is also possible by creating a legacy, as in a positive, deep and enduring impression that influences policy direction after the political executive's term in office (Fong et al., 2019), as we have seen with the response to the State Bank, for instance. Finally, the political executive could 'do things' by pursuing the public interest. That is, politicians can be motivated by altruism and self-sacrifice, as well as prosocial behaviour that can be grounded in particular organisational cultures, a sense of public service and a desire to bring about positive change (James, 2018; Perry et al., 2010; van der Wal, 2013). Of course, these three ways of 'doing things' are not mutually exclusive, either over the life of a political executive or in a specific instance of policymaking.

My analysis in this section makes it clear that, on occasions, the political executive engaged in the necessary struggle to ensure the chosen course of action was the 'right' thing to do. Consistent with the findings of van der Wal (2013) and James (2018), I find that the political executive was motivated by a desire to make a difference; to bring about positive change in SA. When interviewed, several former ministers spoke in terms of a political executive that

not only wanted to ‘do things’, but that also ‘did things’; that the political executive worked its way through problems to make tough decisions and act on them. Of course, it is conceivable that this was simply the rhetoric of a group of self-interested, rational and cohesive actors whose policies and underlying policy-related behaviour was overwhelmingly driven by the desire to win elections – however, the evidence points in the other direction. We see a group of politicians who, undoubtedly, wanted to win elections but also had a sense of loyalty to party and place, as well as a sense of duty to the public interest. My finding is that this often, but not always, influenced the shape of policy decisions. The conclusion to this chapter discusses the conditions under which this did and did not occur.

6.1.1 ‘Doing Things’

All former Cabinet ministers interviewed for this project expressed some level of satisfaction with what the political executive achieved during their tenure. Most wished they had realised more, but, overall, there was a strong sense of pride in their individual and collective accomplishments. Most spoke of a government wanting to meet specific goals and of a leader driving such a shared agenda. Minister Hill, a ministerial advisor in the Bannon era (1982–92) and Labor State Secretary (1994–97), described this motivation by way of comparison with two previous Labor Governments led respectively by Dunston and Bannon:

We had a workshop with all the advisors in the late ‘80s. There were 25 of us in the room and [Mike Duigan, former MP and (then) strategist] said, ‘Get out a piece of paper, write three things that this [Bannon] government’s achieved.’ We couldn’t think of more than one. It was the submarines I think was the thing. It was really hard to think of anything. I mean what Bannon tried to do was not to be Don Dunstan and he succeeded (and then the State Bank fell on him) whereas Mike [Rann] wanted to be Don Dunstan. He wanted to do a lot. So, I mean I’m proud to have been part of the government that actually *did things*. [emphasis added]

Conlon distinguished between careerist politicians and those who ‘do politics because they want to do some things’. Among the latter, he distinguished between those who ‘want to do things in the real world’ and idealistic ideologues who are ‘too damn romantic to understand’. While he identified the presence of all three types in the political executive of which he was a member, he assessed the corporate commitment as wanting to ‘*do things* in the real world’ (emphasis added) and that they made substantial achievements in this regard (interview with Conlon, 2018). That is, Conlon saw the executive as something other than the rent seekers described above. Rann reinforced this sentiment when interviewed: ‘there’s no point in fighting to get into government if you don’t want to *do things*. So, I thought there was an incredibly good spirit in the government’ (emphasis added).

Building on this theme, Maywald described a 'highly successful Cabinet ... one of the better-performing Cabinets' in SA history, with an 'ability to make controversial decisions and then stick them through thick and thin ... because the Cabinet was so solid, we were all prepared to back each other in' (interview with Maywald, 2018). Her description underlines an idea in the group performance literature that cohesion and performance reinforce one another, but group performance has a more significant impact on group cohesion than cohesion on performance (Forsyth, 2006; Mullen & Copper, 1994). That is, actively pursuing success out of an interest in being successful creates cohesion. This pursuit of success in the political executive seems to have had two aspects. The first was 'making a difference', as in an ideal (as opposed to material) interest for the community; a kind of 'conscience leadership' (James, 2018), as discussed in Chapter 2. The 'conscience leadership' of public interest is conceivable as a counterpoint to the statecraft (Buller & James, 2012; Bulpitt, 1986; James, 2016) of political self-interest.

The second aspect of this pursuit of success was the political executive's desire to leave a legacy. That is, there is a sense of the executive wanting its achievements to leave a positive, deep and enduring impression that influenced policy direction after its term in office: 'durable' rather than 'faux paradigmatic' (Cashore & Howlett, 2007, p. 533) policy change. This desire included both hard legacies and soft legacies. While the two are related and the former contributes to the latter, hard legacies are the tangible things the political executive delivers. Examples from the SA case include the SAHMRI building regarding bioscience, a desalination plant regarding urban water supply and statutes increasing environmental controls around radioactive waste management. Soft legacies are the overall brand of the executive while in office and the enduring sense of its achievements after it leaves office, such as 'an infrastructure government', 'economically conservative', 'tough on crime' and 'renewable energy champions'. This 'soft legacy' is akin to notions of the community's collective political memory of the Rann Government (Fong et al., 2019). Further, such legacy seeking need not necessarily be wholly due to vanity or fame seeking but can be in pursuit of responsible leadership (Ciulla & Forsyth, 2011) and the public interest (Fong et al., 2017).

Certainly, personal egos were at play during the case study period and, when interviewed, most former Cabinet ministers still displayed the kind of healthy conceit one expects from politicians. However, it seemed well recognised among interviewees that, apart from recollecting (some) past premiers, the broad public has an extremely short and limited memory of most political identities. There was no indication they were seeking this kind of wide recognition. As Conlon observed, after retiring from politics, any attempt to 'drive the state ... saying, "See that, I built that"' would bore even his wife (interview, 2018). While

these politicians could still have been individually concerned with establishing their personal legacy among a much narrower group, such as historians, public intellectuals or party elites (Fong et al., 2019), it seems that, in terms of their group identity, the primary focus was elsewhere. The political executives' apparent attention was in part on establishing a legacy for the government and a political inheritance for their respective party. This focus on loyalty to the party was evident in the case of Labor members of the coalition Cabinet but also hinted at by Maywald when interviewed. Despite being in coalition with Labor for five years, she said, 'I never resigned from the National Party. I retained my position in the National Party Council. I think I missed one council meeting.' Similarly, there was a sense of pride in the legacy of the government as a whole, illustrated in her comments about Cabinet's 'ability to make controversial decisions and then stick them through ... the Cabinet was so solid we were all prepared to back each other in' (interview with Maywald, 2018).

While discussion of coalition theory is beyond the scope of this research, this case study does raise interesting issues about the differences in legacy-seeking behaviour of 'junior' and 'senior' parties in a coalition. However, for Labor, as the coalition's 'senior' partner, the political inheritance notion links with the concept of loyalty to an organisation, which was discussed in Chapter 2 when considering Labor's interpretation of the State Bank debacle as an element of the institutional arena. A more significant part of the political executive's focus on 'doing things' was a sense of serving the public interest by doing the 'right thing'. I will return to this shortly.

An additional way in which the political executive demonstrated this kind of interest in 'doing things' to leave a policy legacy is the level of performance-focused accountability to which it subjected itself. In the first instance, Labor framed several election policy statements in terms of ostensibly measurable targets or the establishment of such a regime. Examples of such targets include: 'reduce water diversions for Adelaide's water supply from the Murray by 50 per cent' (ALP, 2002e); 'reduce homelessness by 50% during the life of our government' (ALP, 2002i) and insisting that '[the value of wine] exports must more than double in the ten years to 2010, to over \$3 billion' (ALP, 2001a). And in terms of establishing an accountability regime: 'Labor will require the Economic Development Board to develop and report annually on meaningful indicators by which to measure the State's progress' (ALP, 2001b).

Once in office, the political executive sought to reframe a broader range of its election commitments as targets. In contemplating this approach, the political executive considered comprehensively reporting against them in terms of outcomes and timeframes (Cabinet Submission 22 April, 2002). Logistical challenges, as well as the risk that progress would

appear insufficient for what were in many instances long-term agenda, resulted in the release of a more modest list of leading achievements. This reporting occurred after 100 days (Cabinet Submission 25 May, 2002) and six months (Cabinet Submission 12 August, 2002) in office. However, this preparedness to be scrutinised took a firmer hold in the form of *South Australia's Strategic Plan* (SASP, 2004). The notion of a comprehensive plan for the state had been endorsed and recommended by the Economic Development Board (2003) and then embraced by the political executive, unsurprisingly given the election commitment noted above. With the bureaucracy struggling to deliver a sufficiently challenging product (Cabinet Note 31 March, 2003), the ultimately adopted version involved significant direct input from Cabinet ministers (interview with McCann, 2018). The entire performance regime that the political executive created eventually included an independent audit committee to check and endorse the two-yearly formal reports on progress (Audit Committee, 2006, 2008, 2010) and, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Executive Committee of Cabinet to regularly monitor progress.

Rann recognised that this opened the government to criticism for not including some targets, not meeting targets in some areas or not setting ambitious enough targets in others (SASP, 2004, preface). That is, the political executive was aware of the propensity for voluntary accountability to make a government more vulnerable (Koop, 2014). However, the political executive took this risk to 'build a dynamism into the policy framework' and 'get forward momentum' in state development (interview with Rann, 2018). There was undoubtedly a degree of political-strategic motivation here, though seemingly to demonstrate the political executive's leadership of the state, rather than merely giving the political executive the power to steer the accountability debate in its preferred direction (Karsten, 2015). A more apparent impetus is what is referred to in the literature as a 'learning motivation' (Bovens et al., 2008; March & Olsen, 2008). The political executive was keen to increase the effectiveness of governing, both to improve the quality of future policymaking and as part of activating the executive's state pride value, that is, as 'making a difference'. This desire is particularly evident in many Strategic Plan targets being framed in terms of the aspiration to 'exceed the national average', 'double SA's share' and 'match or exceed Australia's ratio' (SASP, 2004).

This scrutiny-seeking behaviour played out differently not only over time but also in each of the three policy areas under closer consideration in this thesis. In the case of urban water supply policy, reporting progress on the *Water Proofing Adelaide* agenda was included at the beginning of the 100-day and six-month scorecard process (Cabinet Submission 22 April, 2002) but was quickly excluded because it was not progressing at all (Cabinet

Submission 25 May, 2002). There were no targets relevant to urban water supply in the first iteration of the state Strategic Plan (SASP, 2004). This absence was because the development of a twenty-year 'integrated water management strategy to reduce water diversions for Adelaide's water supply from the Murray by 50 per cent' (ALP, 2002e) was still in its early stages of development. However, the next iteration of the SA Strategic Plan included a sustainable water use target as part of the 'attaining sustainability' objective (SASP, 2007).

It is interesting to note that the Audit Committee (2010) concluded the only way the sustainable water use target could be met for the Adelaide metropolitan area was through the construction of the desalination plant. That is, the sustainability agenda ushered in by *Water Proofing Adelaide* was only demonstrably achievable by the building of a desalination plant which could not be justified with reference to sustainably values, but was based on state developmentalism instead. As will be discussed below, this ironic twist was only possible through the cycling from one ideological value to another in a transaction motivated by a sense of public interest. My assertion is that such interest-based transactions are integral to policymaking.

Similarly, for bioscience industry development there was a preparedness to voluntarily seek accountability for establishing the processes to support increased commercialisation of research (Cabinet Submissions: 12 August, 2002; 22 April, 2002; 25 May, 2002) and then for increased expenditure on R&D by the government and private sectors and increased revenue from commercialisation of research (SASP, 2004, 2007). By comparison, for nuclear waste management, trumpeting fulfilment of election promises was fulsome (Cabinet Submissions: 12 August, 2002; 22 April, 2002; 25 May, 2002) but then, once the Full Federal Court ruled in SA's favour and the Commonwealth withdrew its plan to site a national waste repository in SA, the issue received minimal attention. This adds weight to my earlier point that this area of policymaking was motivated mainly by political self-interest.

Across all three policy areas, we see the political executive seek particular kinds of accountability or assume accountability for specific types of action, to shape the accountability relationship with the electorate (c.f. Karsten, 2015). This scrutiny seeking is indicative of a degree of political self-interest operating in all three areas. That is, by willingly subjecting itself to particular types of scrutiny, the political executive had more significant influence over to whom they were accountable, for what, through which processes and by which standards of judgement, than if it engaged in wide-scale accountability-avoiding behaviour. While this preparedness to accept some level of the vulnerability associated with voluntary accountability, the political executive pursued such accountability with a high

degree of political strategy. It was, if you like, calculated risk taking in pursuit of policy success, which demonstrated an ability to govern and increased the possibility of re-election. Also, there is a sense that, through the political executive's desire to 'do things', it was seeking the 'public interest', and that such achievements were evident, and had an impact beyond its term in office.

The process surrounding the Executive Committee of Cabinet reinforced this performance focus, designed as it was to drive the bureaucracy to get the 'forward momentum' for which the political executive was looking. It was also evident in the way Labor framed its election policies for the 2006 election. A significant portion of each policy focused on cataloguing the political executive's achievements with references, both implied and explicit, to its promises at the 2002 election. The successful implementation of *Water Proofing Adelaide* initiatives was declared to be helping the environment (ALP(SA), 2006b). The election policy positioned efforts to expand SA's 'biotechnology industry' and the 'commercialisation of new scientific discoveries' as contributing to the growing prosperity of the state (ALP(SA), 2006a).

6.1.2 Doing the 'Right' Thing

In seeking to 'do things' and leave a legacy, the political executive could have pursued easily achievable or highly popular agendas, described earlier in this chapter as pandering. There are instances of this approach. Examples include the 'law and order' agenda which the political executive vigorously transacted throughout its time in office (McCarthy, 2008) and the 'no nuclear dumps' campaign that the political executive pursued (discussed further below). However, this was not universally the case, and there are examples of the political executive actively seeking to do the 'right' thing, as in that considered to be in the long-term interests of the whole state or the interests of constituencies that did not vote for Labor. That is, it was not just pursuing the short- to medium-term interests of Labor's constituency and the party's electoral success. In the policy areas being focused on here, drought response is one of these instances and seeking to develop a bioscience industry is another. I will consider each in turn.

Urban Water Supply: Drought Response

In Chapter 4, I referred to the Millennium Drought, from 2001 to 2009, and its devastating effect on SA communities, industries and environments. A combination of low rainfall and the lowest inflows into the River Murray in recorded history meant flows over the border into SA fell dramatically to just 960 GL per year at the peak of the drought (compared to a long-

term median of 4,880 GL per year (Murray–Darling Basin Authority, 2010)), with unprecedented impacts. For example, in terms of urban water use, Adelaide was placed on Level 3 water restrictions. This level meant that, apart from buckets and watering cans (usable at any time), there was the prohibition of: all reticulation sprinklers; filling or emptying of swimming pools and spas without a permit; operation of fountains and ponds; car washing except by bucket or commercial car wash; and washing or hosing down hard surfaces. For gardens, hand-held hose watering (with trigger nozzle) and use of drippers were allowed one day per week, 6–9 am or 5–8 pm. In terms of agricultural production, irrigators commenced 2008–09 and 2009–10 with the smallest starting allocations on record – just 2 per cent of the water they would usually get for irrigating crops, vineyards and orchards.

In its early years, the SA political executive was mostly unaware of the drought's growing severity and impact. Maywald noted that when she joined the political executive in mid-2004:

Cabinet had no concept of the gravity of the situation we were heading into ... City-based politicians turn on a tap, and the water comes out and has been doing for a very long time, all of their lives, and what happens between where it leaves a dam in Dartmouth [in Victoria] and arrives in their tap they generally have very little idea. (interview, 2018)

That is, significantly increased information regarding the drought and its impacts in media reporting and departmental briefings (for example, Cabinet Note 20 January, 2003) were insufficient to activate policymaking attention or action by the political executive. Firstly, this reporting did not provide a motivating interest for city-based Labor ministers because it framed the drought as either a rural issue or an environmental issue. Second, the political executive's ideology had already framed urban water supply policy in terms of sustainability and curbing consumption so that 'even in drought years, impacts on the broad community of Adelaide can be effectively managed' (SA Government, 2005a).

However, Maywald and McEwen quickly activated interests within the political executive, first to respond to the effects in regional SA and then subsequently, though less easily reframed, the issues for metropolitan Adelaide. It seems the motivating interest they focused on was the economic, social and environmental well-being of the whole state. That is, it was ultimately the public interest as defined earlier. Foley described the activation of this interest thus:

Karlene Maywald and Rory McEwan called me aside after one Cabinet meeting and said, 'We need to have a talk to you.' ... And they said, 'We have a drought out there.' And it's like ... I didn't [know] – I mean, it had sort of caught up on us that, things were looking pretty bad ... And so, hell, so we had to focus on this water issue. And we went from a point of almost ignorance to a massive – I wouldn't say overreaction, but we threw enormous resources at it. (interview, 2018)

Indeed, as reported by Maywald, during the time she was minister, the government invested around \$3 billion in different water programs (interview with Maywald, 2018). In the case of drought relief measures in regional SA, these were initiatives mostly supporting segments of the electorate that would never vote Labor. A cynical interpretation of this action is as an attempt to keep Maywald and McEwen in coalition with Labor, which of course would have been a consideration. However, these measures continued and strengthened after the 2006 election, when Labor could have governed in its own right if the coalition collapsed. For example in late 2008, Cabinet approved phase 9 of the government's drought response initiatives presented by McEwen as Minister for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (Cabinet Submission 15 December, 2008). Therefore, consideration of the broader public interest appeared to be a significant motivation. The pursuit of the public interest in this instance saw the political executive adopt policy proposals that were the 'right' thing to do with little or no partisan advantage. The approved proposals included investment in programs to address the significant mental and emotional strain experienced by many people living in drought-affected areas, as well as facilitating a high level of local control over the development and oversight of initiatives receiving exceptional circumstances drought funding. Community control was ensured through the formation of Regional Drought Taskforces that brought together the relevant Regional Natural Resources Management Board, Regional Development Board(s), and regional local government bodies, along with industry and community representatives (McEwan, 2008).

This approach, as well as Foley's reaction related above, aligns with the democratic motivation value in the political executive's ideology, that is, being a government for the whole state and not just sections of the electorate who voted for the Labor Party. However, I suggest that, in this instance, the political executive's commitment to the public interest 'activated' this value (rather than the other way around). This conclusion is drawn to explain democratic motivation being activated so as to counter the operation of the more dominant economic rationalism ideological value. Democratic motivation then provided an underlying ideational schema that explained the structure and boundaries of the political executive's actions.

Urban Water Supply: Desalination Plant

A substantial part of throwing 'enormous resources' at the drought was the ultimate decision to build a desalination plant to augment Adelaide's water supply for domestic and industrial use. This decision came after a lengthy period of debate, contest and negotiation. The whole process is an instance of court government at its most intense and productive, through which the political executive arrived at a shared understanding of the public interest. The

basic timeline for this process is as follows. In July 2005 Cabinet approved the *Water Proofing Adelaide* strategy with its sustainability focus. From then until late 2006, SA Water resisted involvement in a potential desalination project with BHP Billiton. Further, it did not seriously advance the contingency planning for Adelaide's anticipated eventual desalination requirements, as had been recommended by Thinker in Residence Peter Cullen. With the drought worsening and public discourse about desalination increasing, SA Water dramatically altered its advice to Cabinet, to the total dismay of the political executive. Then, during late 2006 and early 2007, there was a series of politician-initiated processes to begin to negotiate through the competing views concerning a way forward. By August 2007 there was an in-principle decision in favour of building a desalination plant and by early 2008 the public announcement of a defined proposal.

In terms of court politics, we encounter several interesting features, beginning with bureaucratic resistance. Also, among members of Cabinet, there was agnosticism in terms of views about desalination technology, but strong and conflicting starting positions based on competing ideological values. Then, given the sense of crisis that surrounded the decision-making, the political executive abandoned the usual bureaucratic sources of advice on this policy area (SA Water and Department of Environment) in favour of alternative sources (including a coordinating role for expert advisors from outside partisan and bureaucratic circles), and an intense process of negotiation followed.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the *Water Proofing Adelaide* strategy (Cabinet Submission 11 July, 2005) framed the solution to the metropolitan area's future water needs in terms of greater efficiency and curbing 'excessive' consumption, even in the context of ambitious population growth targets. This framing contributed to the institutionalised resistance to desalination as a viable option for Adelaide. In so doing, the strategy reflected the sustainability value within the political executive's ideology. SA Water officials continued to view desalination as unfeasible and unnecessary.

In comparison, significant members of the political executive – especially Conlon, Foley and Holloway – were agnostic about desalination technology. This is evidenced by their desire for SA Water to participate in a BHP Billiton project to deliver both non-potable desalinated water to the Olympic Dam mine and potable water to SA Water's supply network. As a government corporation, SA Water vigorously resisted the political executive, citing excessive supply costs (Cabinet Submission 6 February, 2006). In the end, the political executive decided to contribute state funds from consolidated revenue (rather than via SA Water as a statutory corporation), so that the Olympic Dam desalination project could provide approximately 11 GL per year of potable water to the SA Water system.


Then, at the very time the political executive needed to consider its response to the prospect of Adelaide running out of potable water, it lost all confidence in SA Water, then the main source of urban water supply policy advice within the bureaucracy. This loss of confidence occurred because the corporation suddenly altered its advice. It went from resisting all desalination options and continuing to reassure the political executive that the River Murray would sustain Adelaide's water security needs even in drought conditions, to confidentially declaring to Cabinet the urgent need for significant desalination capabilities. As Conlon described the events:

Our response to water security and the drought was driven by the utter incompetency of SA Water at the time ... We have been through a process where we're all discussing with Olympic Dam – it was still going to do its major expansion – the sort of stuff they needed. They were talking about a desal plant ... it would be source of potable water and SA Water – I had to make them [SA Water] come to a meeting with BHP because they wouldn't meet with them [BHP] – said we don't need a desal plant. BHP went through their presentation and SA Water said, 'We do not see any need for any desal plant.' Then I reckon it was probably within a year that they came to Cabinet saying, 'We may have to give out bottled water next year, we are going to need a desal plant.' Sorry!?' (interview, 2018)

Interviewees reported that Cabinet was irate at the time. Some interviewees remained scathing in their assessment of the corporation in retrospect. They variously described SA Water as tone deaf and lacking 'a political antenna' (interview with Wright, 2018); providing 'bad advice' and going 'from being difficult to panicking' (interview with Foley, 2018); and as an organisation whose actions were 'appalling' (interview with Conlon, 2018). The seeming absence of quality, gradually evolving advice saw what little confidence there was in SA Water vanish.

In late 2006 and early 2007, the politically expedient, vote-maximising thing to do was to approve the building a desalination plant as then recommended by SA Water. At that time, public discourse increasingly canvassed desalination as a solution to the drought-related challenges faced by Adelaide. As an indicator of this, Figure 6-1 below shows the rapid increase in articles and other items mentioning the topic in 2002–10 in *The Advertiser*, Adelaide's only major print daily newspaper. They went from 28 items mentioning 'desalination' in 2005, 94 in 2006 (with most of the increase late in the year) and jumping to 407 in 2007 (which is an average of more than one item per day). It then remained at approximately between 250 and 300 items for the next three years. In January 2007 *The Advertiser* reported the opposition's pledge to build a desalination plant (Kelton, 2007a). In May 2007 a poll reported in *The Advertiser* showed '69 per cent – including 73 per cent of Labor voters – supported [building a desalination plant], with only 23 per cent opposed to the idea' (Kelton, 2007b).

Figure 6-1: Items Mentioning 'Desalination' in *The Advertiser* by Year (Number)



The executive not adopting the politically expedient position could indicate an immobilised Cabinet, making policy through inaction. However, the Cabinet documents from the period point to a political executive keen to make the 'right' decision. This is evidenced, for instance, in Cabinet appointing Foley as Treasurer to chair a Water Security Advisory Group of nationally recognised water experts (Cabinet Submission 5 February, 2007) to advise on alternatives, ranging from tapping aquifers to building additional weirs and expanding dam capacity. The head of the Cabinet Office from that period remembers the desalination plant decision-making as 'a good process' (interview with Smith, 2019), with the final decision made after active consideration of multiple options through a variety of processes. In the next chapter on information, I will explore this further.

In addition to Foley chairing the Water Security Advisory Group, the variety of processes included a machinery-of-government change whereby SA Water was no longer in a government enterprises portfolio but part of a new water security portfolio under Maywald (Cabinet Note 19 March, 2007). Maywald as Water Minister had already established an expert working group, headed by Ian Kowalick, Murray-Darling Basin Commissioner, and a former Liberal-era Chief Executive of DPC (Cabinet Note 13 March, 2007), to investigate further the issue of building a desalination plant.

As already noted in Chapter 4, in 2006 and 2007, key Cabinet members had divergent views, coalescing into three broad perspectives on desalination: environmentally disastrous and unnecessary; economically devastating and unnecessary; and essential to ensure water security. Hill entered the debate firmly committed to the sustainability value and continued to maintain that a desalination plant was unnecessary (interview with Hill, 2018). By late 2006 Maywald considered a desalination plant was needed, based on her accepting Murray-Darling Basin Commission modelling showing a realistic prospect of Adelaide running out of

potable water as early as 2008 and a firmly held state development perspective (interview with Maywald, 2018). In announcing the June 2007 State Budget, Foley continued to publicly maintain the economic rationalist position that a desalination plant was a poor use of public funds and other options should be considered first (State Budget answer, 2007). Conlon supported Foley. Holloway, while generally keeping his own counsel in the early stages of the debate, had made a similar assessment to that of Maywald (interview with Holloway, 2019). Because Rann remained undecided at this point, the power of the troika was not activated to drive a resolution of the issue.

After an extensive process (discussed in the next chapter), the policy position promoted by Maywald prevailed. It did so in the absence of definitive advice from a range of policy actors; in the Desalination Work Group Interim Report, the bureaucrats and external advisors presented a desalination plant as a 'policy choice' (Cabinet Note 27 August, 2007), that is, as one option among several, as one not favoured by Treasury, and whose pursuit would require forgoing other 'policy choices'. However, when Cabinet considered this report, and armed with advice that, unless there were substantial rain, within 18 months Adelaide would not have potable water, it resolved, in principle, to build a desalination plant. As described by Foley and cited in Chapter 4, this decision was driven in large part by the troika backing Maywald's advice to Cabinet without a definitive recommendation from the bureaucracy: 'So it was a decision made by politicians, not a firm recommendation from the policy body' (interview with Foley, 2018).

While we initially see Hill, Foley and Maywald focused on different positions and each position aligned with a value from the political executive's ideology – sustainability, economic rationalism and state development – the words and behaviour of each indicate a belief that their position would not just achieve positive outcomes for the community but was the choice that would best serve the 'general welfare' or 'common good'. That is, we see a shared interest but competing and perhaps even conflicting ideological values defining what constituted the public interest.

Further, in the face of these firmly held views, Rann's consensus approach to managing Cabinet meant a quick 'public interest' decision was not possible. That is, it was necessary for the Cabinet, in the words of Hecló (1974), to 'puzzle' about the matter. This negotiation is a clear example of the political executive seeking to serve the public interest and being prepared to work the issues through in the face of central actors initially having conflicting views about the way forward but ultimately coming to a corporate position concerning the 'right' direction.

Finally, the preparedness to ‘puzzle’ demonstrates ‘t Hart’s (2014) idea of the political court both as a field of contest *and* think-tank. Even though there was a real sense of crisis – a city of 1.3 million people could run out of potable water – groupthink did not set in. Competing values, reflected in varying conceptual frames were surfaced and debated, sometimes hotly, based on a shared interest, in the sense of wanting a positive outcome for the community and wanting that positive outcome to be in the ‘general welfare’ (Goodin, 1996) or ‘common good’ (Bozeman, 2007). In this instance, conflict occurred in a cooperative environment (rather than a competitive one). It was a positive dynamic that facilitated mutual exchange leading to quality decisions and confidence in the final decision (c.f. Tjosvold, 1998).

When interviewed a decade after the decision, the major protagonists still described the solution in terms of ‘water security’ and ‘an insurance policy’ (emphasis added in each case):

If we’d run out of water, we’d be back in the stone age and what we have guaranteed with the desal plant, that has a 100-year life, is that no one in Adelaide has to ever go to bed again and worry about running out of water and there’s been a whole range of other things done, but it’s an *insurance policy* for the next 100 years and, with climate change, there’s going to be a hell of a lot more droughts. (Rann, 2018)

I think the desal plant is like *house insurance* ... you don’t think you’ve wasted your money on house insurance because your house hasn’t burnt down yet. (Conlon, 2018)

In the end ... I agree that it was a reasonable policy because it was the *insurance policy* that’s there now and will be there forever, I suppose. We’ll have another drought. (Hill, 2018)

We knew it would start pouring with rain the day it was completed, but regardless of what people think we now have *insurance* against any future drought, which will come. (Foley, 2018)

The reason this kind of agreement arose is that the shared commitment to the public interest created an environment of cooperative conflict. If competing self-interests were at play, one would expect to see behaviour such as avoiding discussion, refusal to consider alternative views or attempted coercion, which would have resulted in frustration, hostility and even attempts at revenge (Tjosvold, 1998). Instead, we see productive exchange leading to a shared confidence in mutual success.

Bioscience Industry Development

A further example of the political executive actively seeking to do the ‘right’ thing, as in that considered to be in the long-term interests of the whole state, is its attempts to develop a bioscience industry in SA. Here I will discuss just one example of this endeavour, the establishment of a plant genomics centre, selected because it also illustrates some of the

dynamics of court politics. However, a similar interest in the 'general good' is also identifiable in decisions relating to the bioscience innovation incubator and innovations accelerator at Thebarton in the western suburbs of Adelaide, and the establishment of the South Australian Health and Medical Research Institute (SAHMRI).

In March 2002, among Lomax-Smith's ministerial appointments was that of Minister for Science and Information Economy, giving her responsibility for bioscience industry development. Within four weeks of taking office, the newly minted minister received advice that the nomination of SA as the site for a national plant genomics centre by the previous Liberal Government had been successful (Cabinet Submission 29 April, 2002b). Its proponents envisaged that the centre would create and commercialise industry-leading knowledge that enhanced the quality and yield of grains (ACPF, 2003).

An independent panel had recommended the SA proposal to the Commonwealth Minister for Science, and the recommendation was accepted. The bulk of the funding for the proposed centre would come from the Commonwealth Government. However, the ultimate success of the nomination required the investment of \$12 million over five years from SA Government funds, with \$6 million already allocated from within the science budget. That is, Cabinet would need to approve an additional \$6 million expenditure over five years that was not part of the incoming government's budget calculation. Such a proposition conflicted with the political executive's economic rationalism value. Lomax-Smith nonetheless sought the support of the Treasurer and then Cabinet for the additional \$6 million (interviews with: Lomax-Smith, 2018; and Rann, 2018).

In late April 2002, Lomax-Smith's department prepared and lodged a Cabinet submission (Cabinet Submission 29 April, 2002b) for consultation with other agencies, and she sought a meeting with Treasurer Foley. The submission focused on the supposed financial benefits of commercialising plant research and the centre's potential to retain graduate scientists in SA who would otherwise migrate to other states. Lomax-Smith – who before her political career was a clinical pathologist, medical researcher and university teacher – clearly accepted this logic, but also articulated other motives: she thought it would be 'unconscionable to turn down federal money'; politically, the Liberals would make the government 'look like idiots' if it did; and she was 'doing the right thing for the state' (interview with Lomax-Smith, 2018). That is, in terms of ideology, her language reflects the political executive's state developmentalism and state pride' values. In terms of interests, a sense of the public interest was powerfully present, though also bolstered by a degree of corporate political self-interest.

Lomax-Smith reported that, when she met with Foley, he categorically rejected the proposal, to which she reported replying, 'but Kevin, you are only one vote in Cabinet, surely others will see the merit of this proposal'. In the face of Foley's reaction, Lomax-Smith beat a 'tactical retreat', withdrawing the submission from the Cabinet agenda. She realised that Foley had more than one vote in Cabinet; Holloway (as Minister of Agriculture) advised if the Treasurer did not support the initiative, she should let it go (interview with Lomax-Smith, 2018). It seemed, in this instance, the requirement for fiscal conservatism would prevail over any sense of state development or state pride. In terms of personal self-interest, I would argue that the cost of alienating Foley would have outweighed the small electoral benefit to an inner-city Labor MP like Lomax-Smith of being successful in establishing an (agricultural) plant genomics research centre. However, instead of allowing matters to rest, Lomax-Smith lobbied de Crespigny and Prof Tim Flannery (a key advisor to the Premier on science policy). They, in turn, promoted to the Premier the initiative's merits in terms of economic development and raising SA's national and international profile. Rann, who as Leader of the Opposition and as Premier was a regular attendee at international biotechnology conferences (see Rann's US trade, 2003), was easily convinced.

The Premier advised Foley he supported the project, and the Cabinet submission was re-lodged (Cabinet Submission 6 May, 2002b), with the additional funding approved. According to Lomax-Smith, Foley was furious and accused her of disloyalty and going behind his back. However, this interaction seems to have been an early element in establishing Lomax-Smith's standing as a formidable member of the Rann court. Lomax-Smith described the negotiations as:

my first lesson in government that just because you were right, just because you knew what you were talking about, just because you had a reasonable plan that was well researched, based on evidence, didn't mean you always won. (Lomax-Smith, 2018)

Of course, this victory was won by actively engaging in the dynamics of court government. In this series of exchanges, we encounter an early example of court government as an arena. We see different members of the court articulating and dramatising their positions, yet ultimately reconciling competing policy ideological values as to what constituted the public interest (Hart, 1997). That is, we again see the operation of cooperative conflict.

With all three examples – the drought response, the desalination plant and the plant genomics facility – we encounter the operation of mixed motives. Both public interest and political self-interest were at play, though with public interest coming through as the more significant motivational force. Further, the public interest can be categorised as a desire to make a difference by doing the 'right thing' for SA. However, there was a spectrum of views

as to what constituted the public interest. The resolution of this divergence was through negotiation, requiring members of the political executive to shift or cycle from one conceptualisation of the solution to another and through ideological values. In this process, we see, as was the case in Chapter 5, the final position as one of formal corporate agency. To arrive at this point involved, first, the determination of a shared understanding or purpose, which happened through a process of cooperative conflict. Coordinated action then followed the shared understanding. Finally, in terms of causal direction, we see interests activating the values in the political executive's ideology, but also these values influencing how the interests operated.

6.2 Political Self-Interest

Having identified clear examples of other-regarding motivations of the political executive, it is essential still to acknowledge and account for the operation of self-regarding interests driving aspects of its behaviour. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, this is not an investigation of individual self-interest, but the operation of collective political self-interest. This joint position was the political court's 'agreed' view on what the executive needed to do to ensure it won particular contests; demonstrating governing competence, managing of party politics and dominating in the battle of ideas (Buller & James, 2012).

In this section, I use policymaking regarding a radioactive waste repository as an example of the operation of such political self-interest. As noted in Chapter 5, the absolute and uncompromising opposition to the siting of a national radioactive waste repository in SA emerged as part of the then Labor opposition's strategy of harrying the Liberal Government of John Olsen. Two features of political self-interest that emerge are first that its application arose as opportunistic responses to happenstance. The second is an emphasis on posturing reflected in the use of language and preparedness to move and change direction quickly to sustain the possibility of winning the political contest.

6.2.1 Radioactive Waste: Opportunistic Self-Interest

In earlier chapters, we saw that the policy of opposition to a radioactive waste repository, born while Labor was in opposition, was part of its strategy to harry the then Liberal Government relentlessly. As such, it was very much an exercise in statecraft (Buller & James, 2012); an exercise that continued well into Labor governing the state. Through Labor Listens, the party's polling and focus group work, the opposition was aware that there was an underlying concern in the SA community about the risks of a radioactive waste repository. These concerns were injected with a degree of 'moral panic' by aspects of media reporting,

especially a series of reports by the Channel 7 television station in 2001 (South Australia Legislative Council, 2001). The Labor tactic then became to create, magnify and exploit dividing lines on this issue within the Liberal Party as a route to political success. The aim was to win the political argument on a matter of importance to voters as part of building an election-winning strategy.

When interviewed for this project, Rann was able to recite a long list of public interest justifications for Labor's 'no nuclear dumps policy' (ALP(SA), 2002f). These included the wishes of the First Nations peoples from the proposed sites; the desire of the general public for SA to maintain its credentials as a 'clean, green' food bowl and tourist destination; and the failure of the Commonwealth to transparently consult with the government and citizens of SA (Rann, 2018). However, others described the origins of the policy differently.

As the person left to prosecute the details of the case both in opposition and government, Hill reflected that the policy position was 'principally driven by politics' and that the public interests justifications were post hoc nuances and 'largely rhetorical kind of stuff' (interview with Hill, 2018). Stevens similarly talked about it in terms of grabbing 'issues of the day' and 'reacting to a political opportunity' (interview with Stevens, 2018). For his part, Conlon implied that the strenuous prosecution of this case both in opposition and government was so successful it elevated an excellent tactic to the (unfortunate) status of principle. So much so that a Rann-led political executive could never have considered establishing a revenue-raising international radioactive waste repository in SA, something the subsequent Weatherill-led political executive did seriously propose (Scarce, 2016). In fact, Labor MP Tom Kenyon first advanced the idea of an income-earning repository at a parliamentary party meeting in the Rann era. Such was the sensitivity that Conlon, as Chair of Caucus, remembers going up to Kenyon and saying 'go and eat every copy of what you brought, alright. It doesn't damn exist' (interview with Conlon, 2018).

Foley's reflections on the political executive's radioactive waste repository policy position best capture the extent to which it was an exercise in statecraft motivated by political self-interest. The policy was popular with a broad constituency, particularly appealing to a left-of-centre constituency, contributing contestability to characterisations of the government as right wing, despite its conservative economic policies:

Mike Rann is the ultimate – you know, the ultimate politician. We've been talking a lot here about, having to be fiscally conservative, economically right wing, all of this to sort of win back confidence ... But Mike knew he had to – you know, this is the dark and light – he had to have a bit of light. So, he got onto that nuclear dump issue ... It just polled beautifully. It was just a really good issue to, you know, not pigeonhole us

as a one-type government. We lurched to the left on this dump. That was largely politically driven, of course it was. (interview with Foley, 2018)

6.2.2 Radioactive Waste: Posturing

Some indicators of the political posturing involved in this area of policy are the language used, the speed with which the political executive advanced its agenda, and its ready willingness to pivot in response to changing circumstances. The political executive's election statement framed the policy as an 'anti-nuclear dump' commitment, evocative language that it repeatedly used once in office. Having taken office on 6 March 2002, the executive moved quickly to implement its 'anti-dump' promise. In late April, Cabinet approved the *Radioactive Waste: Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Bill* (Cabinet Submission 29 April, 2002a). It was introduced into the House of Assembly on 8 May and passed there on 9 July. Given, at this stage, Labor was a minority government, the legislation's progress was rapid. However, the Bill languished in the upper house for more than six months and, in February 2003, Cabinet noted that an alternative Bill would be introduced. This approach separated the plebiscite component of the proposed legislation from those extending the legislative ban on storing radioactive waste in SA also to include the storage of low-level waste and prohibiting and criminalising the transport of radioactive waste from interstate or overseas into the state (Cabinet Note 17 February, 2003).

Then, in May 2003, Cabinet approved a submission to instruct the Parliamentary Counsel to prepare two Bills to create a public park in the area where the Commonwealth proposed to site the radioactive waste dump and to prevent the transportation of radioactive waste through SA (Cabinet Submission 20 May, 2003). The submission is annotated in handwriting – most likely by the Cabinet Clerk – 'walked-in'. This designation meant the submission was tabled on the day and not circulated ten days prior for comments from affected agencies nor provided three days in advance to ministers with all other submissions in their Cabinet dispatch bag. This non-compliance with the institutionalised processes described in Chapter 4 is an indication of urgency.

The following Monday, this matter was back before Cabinet, with Parliamentary Counsel having already drafted the required legislation – again annotated as 'walked-in' (Cabinet Submission 26 May, 2003a). The submission, which was approved, advised Cabinet of the need to move quickly to convert the designated Crown land into a public conservation park (but still allow pastoral activity and preserve native title and mining rights) to block its compulsory acquisition by the Commonwealth. Further, the submission noted that the provisions to criminalise the transportation of radioactive waste to SA, or the supply of

nuclear waste to any person for delivery to a nuclear waste facility in SA, were designed to apply to the fullest extent possible the state's extra-territorial powers. The intended effect was to make it illegal for a person to supply radioactive material to the Commonwealth Government if the intention was to deposit the material in SA.

As noted in Chapter 4, the Commonwealth moved quickly, compulsorily acquiring the Crown land for the radioactive waste repository. To fight the matter further, the SA Government pursued the case through the Federal Court, ultimately appealing to the Full Court. On Thursday 11 December 2003 Hill advised Cabinet of his intention to lodge this appeal (Cabinet Note 11 December, 2003). There are two features of interest regarding this Cabinet note. First, Cabinet considered it on a Thursday. Cabinet meetings were nearly always on a Monday. On Thursdays, Executive Council was convened by the Governor to deal with those matters of public administration needing vice-regal assent. Because the Governor and the entire Cabinet constituted the Executive Council, it was not uncommon for Cabinet to briefly convene (without the Governor) either immediately before or after Executive Council on Thursday to deal with very urgent matters. Second, the document is annotated 'walked-in', a further indication of urgency. However, this urgency would not have been about the timing for lodging the appeal documents but urgently wanting to announce to the public that this was the government's intention. The fact that the political executive maintained this level of discipline around the Cabinet process, even concerning political posturing, indicates that at least one criticism of court government made by Savoie (2008, p. 16) does not apply in the SA case – that of the making of policy by announcements without involving Cabinet. The centrality of Cabinet to the court process in the SA case, albeit with the asymmetrical power relations discussed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4-1 'Representation of the Rann Court'), provides an explanation for this dynamic.

A 'policy paradox' (Stone, 1997) emerged at this time that further underscores the degree to which the rapidly moving policy development in this area was motivated by political self-interest. Amid Cabinet's debate concerning the best strategy for opposing the 'nuclear waste dump', it was also considering how to respond positively to confidential advice regarding plans to expand the Olympic Dam uranium mine. This prospect was said to represent 'possibly the largest economic development opportunity in South Australia' (Cabinet Submission 7 July, 2003b). The pursuit of this opportunity, with a decided focus on job creation, led Rann to say 'if uranium is the fuel for the future, we're not the Texas, we're the Saudi Arabia of it' (cited by McIntyre-Mills, 2008, p. 231).

None of this undermines the association of this aspect of the political executive's radioactive waste policy with the democratic motivation value of its ideology. Instead, it reinforces that

the broad constituency the political executive faced had inconsistent self-interested views regarding uranium and its waste, and highlights that positive and laudable sounding ideological values can be activated by self-interest as easily as by ideal interests. Finally, it is important to reiterate that this kind of self-interest is about gaining an advantage in a political contest. It is not corruption, as in the misuse of a position of authority or power to acquire an illicit benefit for private gain. However, it does raise questions beyond the scope of this thesis concerning the analytical treatment of untruthful, incorrect or misleading information.

6.3 Conclusion

In terms of the broader 'public choice' versus altruism debate, the analysis in this chapter clearly demonstrates that the political executive was motivated by more than political self-interest. A mix of self-regarding and other-regarding interests often influenced the political executive's decision-making; and these latter, ideal interests, focused on the public interest, dominated in some of the instances considered here. Similar to Weiss' observations on self-interest, my analysis finds that both public interest and political self-interest were rarely hard-and-fast single-position commitments but were instead continually redefined. Again, following Weiss, I find that this redefinition of interests occurred in ways that were consistent with a formulation or reformulation of ideology, but with the ideological values selected or formulated to accord with the current interest rather than vice versa (Weiss, 1983, p. 237). That is, I find that the SA political executive exerted the values that constituted its ideology (as discussed in Chapter 5) and responded to changing circumstances, through interests-based transactions.

Therefore, interests and ideology are intimately related. This relationship reinforces conclusions in early chapters concerning the political executive's fundamental characteristic as a social subject and a corporate actor with reasons (i.e. its ideology) for attempting to do things (Archer, 2000). This notion of interests activating ideology also emphasises that having a value or an ideology is not the same as exerting effort to fulfil it. Interests are a motivational variable and not just a psychological state (Renninger & Hidi, 2015). Functioning as the motivator and the criteria for decision-making (Stone, 1997), interests bring about the 'exertion' to realise one's values. As a variety of conceptual studies highlight, interests and ideology have an entwined relationship, making it difficult to uncouple them or to assume one causes the other. Therefore, it is seldom realistic to assume that 'the other concept' is approximately constant (see Andersen et al., 2013). It is for this reason that

Weiss (1983, 1995) treats interests and ideology as overlapping without integrating them into a single construct.

It is also apparent that political self-interest and the public interest functioned as co-existing motivations rather than as dichotomous ones. A psychologically healthy individual achieves and acts out of a sense of congruence between socio-cultural norms (societal demands), other-regarding interests (altruism) and her/his implicit or unconscious motives (self-interest). In a similar way, a psychologically healthy group has a self-concept where the inherent competition of societal demands, altruism and collective self-interest are integrated so as to reconcile contradictions, thereby permitting high levels of flexibility and creativity in behaviour and 'resilient' forms of self-control. For groups, this reconciliation is achieved through debate and negotiation, such as attempts to convince dissenting voices to support a proposed goal (Kazén & Kuhl, 2011; Kuhl, 2018).

Through the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that, as a corporate actor, the political executive had sets of both material and ideal interests that were more than the sum of the interests of its members. That is, the political executive's corporate interests emerged from the interplay of the interests of its members as individual agents with the previously articulated corporate interests. The details of this interplay reflected the dynamics of court government discussed in Chapter 4. This pushing and pulling dynamic had a profound effect on individual agency, reshaping its context, pulling it into the ideological fray and mobilising it for the corporate agency. Archer's (2000, 2005) notion of corporate agency (discussed in Chapter 4) is foundational to my conception of how this process of negotiation occurs, with the final group interest emerging as either an elaboration of that initially proposed or as a reproduction of what one actor initially articulated. In either case, it emerges from this social interaction as something belonging to the group, to the court.

As Weiss (1983) reminds us, interests are rarely hard-and-fast single-position commitments but instead continually redefined. The redefinition decision (whether to go with the status quo, work for incremental changes, or take more drastic steps) depends in large part on how the political executive estimates: (1) the consequences of these courses for its political self-interest; (2) the consequences for the welfare of the people, place, organisations and products to which they feel a sense of loyalty; and (3) the well-being of the community or the state, that is, the public interest (Stone, 1997). This estimation sits alongside the executive's assessment of the achievability of its decision – 'the sacrifice of "principles" to "politics"' (Weiss, 1983, p. 238) to achieve Bismarck's 'next best thing'.

In summary, my analysis confirms the contention that both types of interest variously operated to shape the selection of the values guiding decision-making by the political executive. Further, in most instances, a mixture of these motives was at play. While I am able to cite cases of each type being dominant in these situations of mixed motives, it remains important to avoid dichotomising these two kinds of interest. The public interest was predominant regarding the response to the Millennium Drought and plant genomics centre, and self-interest regarding opposition to the siting of a national radioactive waste repository in SA. However, there was always a mixture of both kinds of interests at play.

7 Information

This chapter investigates the fourth element in the 4I's: information. Over the last three chapters, I discussed ways in which the political executive's ideology and interests, in the context of an institutional arena, shaped its policymaking. The discussion to date has reinforced the position that information is only one basis of policymaking ('t Hart, 2014; 't Hart et al., 1997; Rhodes & Tiernan, 2016; Weiss, 1983, 1995, 2001) and that positivist or functionalist approaches do not explain the dynamics of elite policymaking ('t Hart, 1993; Shore, 2007). As outlined in Chapter 2, Weiss views information as the range of understandings that help people make sense of the current state of affairs by helping to answer questions such as: why things happen as they do, where the problems are, which potential solutions hold promise for addressing them effectively, and which proposals will hinder a solution (Weiss, 1995). In my case study, information emerges as an essential element of decision-making and as critical on occasions. However, consistent with Weiss' theorising, I contend that in most instances the importance of information is outweighed by that of ideology and interests because they 'carry higher emotional loadings' (Weiss, 1983, p. 220). Further, the process of policymaking was so awash with information that the sheer volume made it impossible for the political executive to apply an ideal, rational approach to its use, even if this is what it desired to do. That is, the assumptions of 'evidence-based' policymaking are extraneous to this context.

Therefore, information should not be equated with 'objective', impersonal research findings, as in something akin to the laboratory findings of basic science. Nor should experts and policymakers be assumed to form 'two communities' with a 'know-do gap' between scientific 'facts' and practice, and with practitioners awaiting the expert findings of researchers to fill the gap. Instead, the SA case shows that information was created and used by a variety of actors and through a variety of processes. The ritualised form of Cabinet documents – a critical primary source for this research – created information of a particular kind. Ideas entered the decision-making forum more often as judgements based on insight rather than via a process of abstraction and detailed conceptualisation. Competition between differing insights was seemingly resolved through a process of argument underpinned by the dynamics of court government.

However, rather than align with the 'hard' constructivist position that 'facts' are socially constructed, the observations above support Archer's 'soft' constructivism wherein knowledge is seen as real but socially conditioned. Accordingly, information is defined as meaningful, well-formed data (Floridi, 2011) that is assumed to be 'true' (Weiss, 1983). As

discussed in Chapter 2, 'well-formed' means the data are clustered together following the syntax or rules of the chosen language (e.g. English) or system of thinking (e.g. hydrology). As such, 'well-formed' data are not just scientific, technical or academic information. They include craft knowledge and everyday empiricism. 'Meaningful' means that for the end user the well-formed data have a recognisable logic that communicates a recognisable function. Information can be 'accurate', 'correct' or 'valid' as well as partial, biased or invalid. The critical issue is that the actor making use of the meaningful, well-formed data believes it to be true. This multi-layered understanding of information posits that it is an objective (mind-independent) entity (Audi, 1999), even if culturally conditioned in its construction and use.

The three main sections of this chapter focus on ritualised data, information as insight or 'enlightenment', and argumentation. Each is positioned as a core kind of information the political executive relied on in policymaking. Section 7.1 considers the Cabinet process, discussing how the paper-based and highly ritualised format for preparing, reading and considering Cabinet submissions shaped the information and thereby influenced policymaking. In a sense, this reveals one way in which the 'medium is the message' (McLuhan, 1964). In Section 7.2, I discuss the contribution of three different kinds of judgement: public judgement, expert judgement and bureaucratic judgement. Each constitutes both different ways of knowing (Freeman, 2007; Schneider & Ingram, 2007; Schön, 1971) and different kinds of information (Adams, 2004; Head, 2008, 2010; Shonkoff, 2000) that were inputs into the policymaking process. Section 7.3 considers how argument functions as a kind of information input. I suggest that debate and persuasion generated additional information used in policymaking, though this operated in slightly different ways in each of the three policy areas of bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply. The conclusion is that this information is an emergent property of the social/socio-cultural interactions of the policymaking process; and that data must be processed to have meaning in a particular context. As such, policymaking is not the dispassionate, 'scientific' rational process of 'Modernity's Man' but neither is it necessarily made chaotic by the incorporation of our 'normativity and emotionality' (Archer, 2000, p. 253). Further, once generated, data has a power of its own, separate from those who created it.

On the one hand, the analysis in this chapter provides examples of both information affecting actors *and* actors changing the shape of information. On the other hand, we will see emotions and creativity (Langley et al., 1995, p. 260) functioning alongside 'casual empiricism' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) to enlighten the policy 'weaving' (Parsons, 2004) or *bricolage* (Carstensen, 2011; Levi-Strauss, 1972) undertaken by the political executive in the public interest.

7.1 Ritualised Information

In this section, I discuss the ritualised, paper-based form in which the political executive received and considered information. As noted in Chapter 4 on institutions, the political executive altered the structure and content of Cabinet documents and I argue that these changes to the group's standard operating procedures had a determining effect on outcomes. In this chapter, I take the analysis a step further, by investigating how these processes shaped the kind of information the political executive received.


The four changes to the standard operating procedures discussed in Chapter 4 are the specification and proliferation of impact assessment statements, adding risk identification and proposed treatments, describing implementation processes, and including a communication strategy for publicly announcing a proposal if approved. Reforming the process is expected to influence the form of the information produced, as well as the political executive's actions (Weller, 1982). The analysis in this section builds on the finding in Chapter 4, by first considering the general types and formats of the Cabinet submissions and notes, and the order in which different types of information were generally considered at Cabinet meetings. Consideration is then given to the consultation section in Cabinet submissions, followed by a more detailed discussion of impact assessments as a critical feature of submissions. Finally, the nature and content of the cover sheets to Cabinet submissions is explored. My general argument is that the form of the information produced perceptual filters that directed the political executive's attention towards particular considerations. That is, the ritualised form of Cabinet documents influenced the syntax and meaning of the data considered by the political executive.

7.1.1 Agenda and Templates

As noted in Chapter 4, during the case study period, the political executive rigorously maintained the discipline of a Cabinet system of government. As part of this disciplined approach, Cabinet convened at least once per week and often twice. By convention, in SA, Cabinets' discussions were not minuted (DPC, 2006), making the annotated agenda and the papers lodged by ministers for each agenda item the only contemporaneous documentary evidence *currently* available. As a means for communicating Cabinet's discussion and decision, the approved recommendations from submissions were central. Not infrequently, the recommendations were amended during the Cabinet meeting, most commonly in the hand of the Premier as chair of the Cabinet.

As illustrated by Figure 7-1, Cabinet considered more than two thousand submissions and notes each year, an average of 46 each week for 49 weeks of the year, only going into recess for just three weeks over the Christmas/New Year period. In order to manage such a volume of material, Cabinet meetings proceeded according to a well-established agenda that saw more strategic matters discussed first. As shown in Table 7-1, new policy or initiatives (Item 1), consideration of whether to develop new legislation (Item 2) and the acceptability of proposed draft legislation (Item 3) were discussed and dealt with first. This ordering is something of a proxy measure of priorities, with appointments, ‘other matters’, Cabinet notes and reports on national meetings and from sub-committees further down the list.

Figure 7-1: Number of Cabinet Documents Lodged by Year 1991–2009



The rigid format of these documents (as discussed in Chapter 4) and the structured order in which they were considered presents an ‘organisational epistemology’ (Dery, 1986). That is, the paper ritual of Cabinet submissions created perceptual filters that directed attention towards providing particular types of information and inserted information in particular ways into the decision-making environment (Daviter, 2015; Dery, 1986, 1990). A particularly interesting feature of this paper ritual is its creation according to the political executive’s specification – or at least those articulated by Rann and Foley – rather than to satisfy some separate bureaucratic agenda. Of course, bureaucrats prepared the templates and drafted the handbooks to accompany them. A key Cabinet Office functionary from the period recollected Rann and Foley setting the direction (email communication with Dennis, 2018), with the resultant document ultimately approved by Cabinet (Cabinet Submission 7 July, 2003a; Cabinet Submission 20 January, 2003). As discussed below, the apparent goal was

to assert a particular type of political control over the policymaking process, rather than create coherence among the material relating to impact assessments, risk management strategies, implementation plans and communication strategies. That is, to influence the construction of information based on, or perhaps to align with, the political executive's ideology and interests.

Table 7-1: Cabinet Agenda – Order of Cabinet Business in SA, 2002–10

No	Item	Description / Details
1	New Initiatives/ Policy Matters	'To assist the Cabinet in this task, all Cabinet Submission involving major initiatives must include an assessment of their wider impact on the community' (DPC, 2006).
2	Bills and Regulations in Principle	Submission seeking Cabinet's approval to draft legislation: A Cabinet submission recommending the drafting of new or amending legislation must contain a brief for Parliamentary Counsel and be accompanied by relevant correspondence, reports, legal opinions and other background material' (DPC, 2003, p. 40)
3	Bills for Introduction	'Once a Bill has been prepared by Parliamentary Counsel another submission is required to obtain Cabinet approval to introduce the newly drafted Bill into Parliament' (DPC, 2003, p. 41)
4	Appointments	Submissions regarding appointments to positions, boards or committees by either the Governor or a minister: 'Appointments by the Governor must be approved by Cabinet. Appointments by Ministers may be brought to Cabinet for approval or for noting if Ministers wish. Appointments to major Boards or Committees or appointments with significant implications for the State or the Government should be brought to Cabinet even though Ministers have the power to make the appointments alone' (DPC, 2003, p. 51)
5	Other Matters	Any other discussion
6	Cabinet Notes	'Cabinet notes (or "pinks", because they are prepared on pink paper) are used in place of formal Cabinet submissions when Ministers wish to bring matters to Cabinet simply for noting or for information' (DPC, 2003, p. 7).
7	Reports from Ministerial Councils and Cabinet Committees	Generally, for noting or information only
8	Parliamentary Questions	To assist with strategizing for question time in Parliament, as well as to provide Cabinet-in-Confidence protection for Ministers' question time briefing folders.

Thinking of these elements of the Cabinet submission as perceptual filters, we can see that impact assessments focused attention on surfacing as fully as possible the multiple and competing view or values to be traded off against one another in the decision process (Botterill & Fenna, 2019; Dahl, 1985; 't Hart, 1997; Parkhurst, 2016). The risk management strategies focused attention on providing road maps for minimising or managing the reaction

of those citizens whose interests or priorities would be passed over. The implementation plans and communication strategies focused attention on the structure of the accountability relationship with the electorate for each proposal and the kind of legacy it would leave (Fong et al., 2017, 2019; Karsten, 2015). Operating as a set of perceptual filters to these ends, the structure of the Cabinet submissions influenced the submission-drafting decisions of bureaucrats, the submission-endorsing decisions of ministers and the ultimate authoritative decision-making of the political executive.

7.1.2 Consultation

My analysis of 113 Cabinet submissions (using the method discussed in Chapter 3) included a review of how the consultation section of the Cabinet submission template was used in each of them. This analysis indicates an expectation-come-group norm that policy initiatives would be subjected to prior consultation. The expectation was that an opportunity to comment on the merits of a proposal would be afforded to other ministers and public sector agencies with a policy interest or responsibility in the topic, as well as to provide input into impact statements. The structure of the submission template including such a section, the instructions in the Cabinet Office handbook and the way details of such consultation were recorded in analysed submissions support this contention. In uncontroversial circumstances, the entities consulted would be listed and, in some circumstances, a general description provided of the kind of consultation. An example of the former is a submission for the construction of a government-owned, bioscience business incubator. It simply stated, ‘the following State agencies and organisations have been consulted’, and then listed by name nine government agencies, the City of West Torrens and the University of Adelaide (Cabinet Submission 25 September, 2006, § 3.10). An example of the latter is the submission presenting the *Report on the Audit of Radioactive Material in South Australia*. It similarly listed the government agencies consulted and then went on to state, ‘the EPA has consulted stakeholders (primarily in the fields of industry, science and medicine) on findings of inspections that required prompt attention to improve safety and compliance with legislation’ (Cabinet Submission 4 December, 2003, § 3.7).

When there were different views among agencies, these were ventilated. Some agencies would indicate concerns without opposing the submission, while others, especially the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF), would flag a lack of support. The consultation section of the submission to approve the release of the *Water Proofing Adelaide* strategy (Cabinet Submission 15 November, 2004) neatly encapsulates the range of views and approaches that could be presented in a single submission:

The Department of Health supports the aims and overall approach of the draft strategy ... (§ 3.10.12)

The EPA has no opposition to the submission proceeding to Cabinet ... (§3.10.10)

[Primary Industries and Resources SA] stated the draft strategy was a reasonably balanced, concise and comprehensive document. PIRSA expressed some concern that the proposed strategies are tougher on irrigators than they are on commercial and industrial users ... (§3.10.11)

DTF does not however support the release of the draft strategy in its current form as it includes commitments with potential financial implications and would prefer that the proposed strategies be subject to more detailed evaluation before being included in the final strategy. (§3.10.1)

In this instance, having considered the diverse views, including DTF's objection, Cabinet approved the release of the draft strategy. The point is that harmonisation of views was not always and everywhere a prerequisite; however, Cabinet having an understanding of the divergent views, where they existed, was. Harmonisation did not necessarily occur in the bulk of the preparation of information presented to Cabinet but in Cabinet's decision-making. The process of *bricolage* was undertaken by politicians not bureaucrats.

7.1.3 Impact Assessments: Inviting Debate

The impact assessment subsection of Cabinet submissions was anchored around an assessment of the overall economic impact of a proposal and its impact on the state budget and public sector employment numbers. This points to the primacy of the political executive's economic rationalist value. The implied aspirations were to maximise the positive effect on the state's economy and minimise the impact on government expenditure and growth in the number of bureaucrats. A cost-benefit analysis was considered the core methodology for undertaking such financial assessments. However, the relevant DTF documents made it clear that essential prior steps were to develop a 'base case scenario' and to justify the impact and value of the proposed initiative against the effects of doing nothing (DTF, 2008; Treasurer's Instruction 17, 2003, 2008). According to this approach, the economic and budgetary analysis focused on efficiency-enhancing policy options, positioning the consideration of political factors as a subsequent step, often labelled as an exercise of 'policy choice'. However, this approach itself reflects a value-laden world view, which powerfully influenced the policymaking process by promoting fiscal restraint and, therefore, a position of policy equilibrium. The influence of this world view was reinforced and potentially enhanced by the political executive's economic rationalism value.

Alongside these core economic assessments, were 'gender-based analysis' (requiring the assessment of gender issues to ensure 'outcomes are fair and effective and achieve the

anticipated results for all sections of the South Australian community' (DPC, 2003, p. 13); 'social inclusion analysis' regarding specific issues (initially homelessness, school retention and illicit drugs); and five separate community and environmental impacts: 'regulatory', 'families and society', 'regional', 'small business' and 'environmental'. This proliferation of areas of assessment tended to function as an invitation for debate. They encouraged identification of any tensions or conflicts between the interests of different constituencies or publics and implied the need to manage any emerging challenges.

Again, and as discussed in Chapter 3, my analysis of 113 Cabinet submissions included a review of how the impact assessment section of the Cabinet submission template was used in each of them. Through this analysis across the three policy focus areas, six themes emerged. First, submissions that did not include an economic and budgetary assessment, undertaken on a basis agreed with DTF, were usually deferred from the Cabinet agenda until completion of such an assessment. Such a deferral occurred, for example, with Cabinet's consideration of the report on an audit of radioactive waste held in SA (Cabinet Submission: 4 December, 2003; 20 October, 2003, as discussed further below). That is, this kind of impact assessment functioned not so much for rational policymaking as for 'public management reform' (Radaelli, 2010, p. 210). It was a mechanism to control expenditure and drive efficiencies in a manner consistent with the political executive's economic rationalist value.

Second, as a general pattern, Cabinet submissions by ministers with responsibility for line agencies at the very least included an assessment statement for most suggested areas in the 'Impact on the community and environment' section. This general pattern included summary *statements* of impact without providing any supporting evaluative information, for example, baldly stating that the proposed plant genomics centre would have 'no adverse impact on regions' (Cabinet Submission 6 May, 2002b). It also included the making of axiomatic claims such as that the *Water Proofing Adelaide* strategy would 'benefit families and society from the better management of water resources' (Cabinet Submission 11 July, 2005, § 3.6.4). More common were statements of summary *assessment*. While still brief, they contained some evaluative information, such as the brief discussion connecting the proposals in the report on the audit of radioactive waste in SA with enhanced 'protection and safety of families and society from potentially harmful effects of radiation from radioactive materials' (Cabinet Submission 4 December, 2003, § 3.4.4). On those occasions when a submission provided to Cabinet an even more thorough assessment of community or environmental impacts, it was invariably found within a separate, often independently prepared report attached to the Cabinet submission. This was the case, for example, with

submissions related to radioactive waste, such as the report on the review of the management of the legacy Radium Hill and Port Pirie sites (Cabinet Note 12 June, 2004) and the EPA feasibility study for establishing a SA government waste repository (Cabinet Note 21 November, 2005); water supply related submissions such the investigation into the burden of River Murray levies relative to water use among different categories of water users (Cabinet Submission 24 May, 2004) and the final report of the Desalination Plant Working Group (Cabinet Submission 26 November, 2007); and bioscience-related submissions such as that for referring the proposal to build the plant genomics centre to Parliament's Public Works Committee (Cabinet Submission 28 October, 2002) and the proposal for SAHMRI (Cabinet Submission 14 December, 2009). The implications of this are that the detailed impact assessments were unlikely to have been read by most ministers. Cabinet was relying on the quality control role of the Cabinet Office to ensure that the summaries provided in the main part of the submission truthfully and adequately reflected the detailed information.

Third, while submissions presented by ministers with line agency responsibilities generally attended to the requirement for a broad range of assessments, those prepared by DTF often considered only economic and budgetary impacts and were narrowly consulted. Cabinet generally considered and approved these submissions regardless. An example is the Save the River Murray Levy, a tax on water use by households and business, including agricultural industries. The first submission on this matter (Cabinet Submission 26 May, 2003b) is marked 'walked-in', meaning it was not circulated to other ministers beforehand. Despite this, Cabinet approved the proposal. Three days later Cabinet urgently amended the scheme to exempt the public housing authority from the levy (Cabinet Submission 29 May, 2003). Within a year of the levy's commencement, the rating of 'family owned marina berths' was changed from commercial to residential (Cabinet Submission 8 March, 2004) and the class of not-for-profit organisations exempted from the levy broadened (Cabinet Note 21 June, 2004). Further, detailed modelling highlighted the application of this, and other levies meant irrigators' contribution to the cost of River Murray management was significantly lower than the benefit they received (Cabinet Submission 24 May, 2004). These findings supported a suspicion the National Competition Council (2001) held about anti-competitive water pricing by the SA Government, which were articulated in the context of the competition/productivity turn in water policy noted in Chapter 5.

This example highlights the generally narrow focus of DTF's advice to Cabinet on economic and budgetary impacts, as well as the potential for negative consequences of failing to undertake a broader range of assessments. Proper consultation, and correctly applying the family and community impact assessments in the first instance, could have alerted Cabinet

to potential concerns regarding the rating of government properties (public housing), recreational property (marina berths) and community groups (not-for-profit organisations), avoiding the need to repeatedly change the original decision. The approval of DTF-prepared submissions without these assessments reflects the court government dynamics of the power of the Treasurer and DTF in the Cabinet process, as well as Foley's authority as a member of the troika of senior ministers.

A fourth theme to emerge from my analysis of Cabinet submissions is that impact assessments completed by the EPA and the Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation were, in general, more thorough and less likely to be perfunctory than those prepared by other agencies. A possible 'institutionalist' explanation is that longstanding experience within these agencies in undertaking, interpreting and using environmental impact statements meant policy workers and analysts within their employ had greater understanding and skill in grappling with these approaches. This explanation is consistent with findings elsewhere (e.g. Turnpenny et al., 2008) that paradigms, organisational traditions and the background of bureaucrats working in those organisations will influence how and to what degree impact assessments are used. Returning to Floridi's (2011) definition of information noted above, one implication of these more thorough assessments is that in the summary form of a Cabinet submission they created the impression that information coming from these environment departments is high quality in terms of being 'well-formed'. However, being 'well-formed' does not seem to have been as impactful as being 'meaningful', as in having a recognisable logic that communicates a recognisable function; that is, aligning with the value frames and judgements of the political executive.

Fifth, there was a significant gap between the aspirations articulated in the official guidance regarding gender analysis and what occurred in practice. None of the Cabinet submissions considered in this analysis include a separate gender impact assessment as recommended, and none consider gender in the context of assessing economic impact, regional impacts, or family and community impacts. There is no consideration of the different economic effects of levies and charges on women and women-headed households, despite them being, on average, less affluent. In considering the management of radioactive waste, there is no discussion of the possibility of radiation having a different impact on the body tissue of women in an environment when almost all scientific research assumes the average human person is male (Perez, 2019). Again, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore such gender issues in any depth. However, this gap between aspiration and practice not only starkly points to a very narrow conceptualisation of gender impact, it also further alerts us to a generally narrow conceptualisation of social and economic impact, reinforcing that the primary purpose of this policy work was not to make policymaking more 'rational' or even to directly inform it (Adelle & Weiland, 2012; Hertin et al., 2009). Instead, it was to facilitate

political control by providing a 'fire alarm' to alert the political executive to the potential effects on pressure groups of a proposed policy change (Radaelli, 2010).

The sixth theme to emerge from my analysis of the application of impact assessments relates to the kind of reasoning evident in them. Impact assessments of the type outlined above, except for those relating to economic and budgetary impacts, rarely rely on quantitative measures. Consistent with the findings of Nilsson et al. (2008: 347) they generally use a common-sense approach, relying on qualitative data, checklists and a deductive form of logic. This kind of reasoning is consistent with the 'fire alarm' approach to political control and encourages the use of in-house expertise provided by bureaucrats and therefore reinforces a bias towards simpler tools, given resource and capacity constraints in the bureaucracy (2008: 343). In a more general way, this aligns with Weiss' notion of decision-makers often having a 'general sensitivity' (Weiss, 1986b; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980b) to the outcomes of research or analysis rather than to the details of its findings (Weiss, 1983).

In Chapter 2, I highlighted the debates in the public policy literature emphasising a dichotomised relationship between power and information. Together, the six themes outlined above reinforce the inapplicability of such dichotomies and point to a more dialectical relationship between information and power. Clearly, the political executive attributed greater power to information provided by DTF than that coming from other sources. However, knowledge was not simply the configuration of power relationships and the dominant interests of the Treasurer and DTF. Instead, information was a separate factor with a logic and communicative effect but having 'a dialectic link with power' (Radaelli, 1995, p. 164). Further, we see the weaving together of data, ideas and argument (Weiss, 1986b) and, despite the institutionalisation of certain processes, uncertainty and interpretation remained.

7.1.4 Cover Sheets: Engendering Certainty

An additional element in the ritualised form of information provided in Cabinet submissions was the inclusion of cover sheets, which provide a summary of the key features of policy proposals. This summarisation particularly related to the main financial, economic and budgetary impacts and (post-2003) the main impacts on the community, business and the environment. The cover sheet especially provided value when introducing lengthy and complex submissions (DPC, 2003). Given that Cabinet considered on average 46 submissions a week, they were an invaluable aide to time-poor ministers. For example, the cover sheet for the approval to build a desalination plant summarised in 86 words a very

complex array of economic and budgetary considerations relating to the potential expenditure of almost \$2.5 billion as follows:

On the basis that capital expenditure by SA Water is fully debt financed and increased expenses are fully recovered by increased revenue, there will be no adverse impact on the Budget. The recommended strategy of the Desalination Working Group entails expenditures associated with:

- 200 GL increase in water storage (Mt Bold or equivalent) – \$1,110 million;
- 50 GL desalination plant – \$1,097 million;
- North–south interconnection pipe work – \$304 million.

Further advice will be provided on recommended options for funding and procuring these works. (Cabinet Submission 26 November, 2007, cover sheet)

Such summaries, of course, create a kind of knowledge that is accessible and usable, with an ease and clarity that was not possible in the 87-page Desalination Working Group report (and its voluminous attachments running to over 1,000 pages), which formed part of the Cabinet submission. This summary created a definitiveness that was not present in more detailed and nuanced technical documents. As one former minister reported, he was able to be selective about which Cabinet submissions he read in detail because they were ‘compartmentalised in such a way that you don’t have to read every fine detail. You read the introduction and read the summary and the recommendation, and that would be it’ (interview with Caica, 2019). In relying on summaries provided in cover sheets, the political executive trusted that those responsible for creating them were both competent and honest in their endeavours; or at least that the Cabinet Office staff checked to ensure this was the case.

Whereas the documentation of consultation and impact assessments in the Cabinet submissions reviewed points to the role of uncertainty and interpretation in policymaking, the cover sheet and its potential function point to structure and definitiveness. However, this difference does not constitute an argument against the operation of ‘weaving’ or craft-like approaches to information use by the political executive. Rather, it points on the one hand to a process that allowed the political executive to sift and prioritise its explicit efforts, and on the other hand to bureaucrats anticipating the preferences of the political executive and aligning policy proposals to the politicians’ explicit or assumed wishes (c.f. Page, 2012). Also, as we will see below regarding the proposal for a medical and health research institute, conflicts were more often than not resolved through other arenas of court government before coming to Cabinet.

7.2 Judgement

In discussing some debates about information (Chapter 2), I note Lonergan's (1990, 1992) conceptualisation of knowledge creation as insight, understanding then judgement. Judgement involves giving a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer to the question 'Is it so?' Ideally, the question is posed regarding the concepts formulated on a reasonable level of understanding (i.e., based on definition and conceptualisation) but it can also be posed on the basis of the 'Eureka!' moment of insight. According to Lonergan, through the act of judgement propositions are transformed from objects of thought to objects of knowledge. In my analysis of the three policy areas – bioscience, radioactive waste disposal and urban water supply – three sources of judgement emerged as important inputs for the political executive's policymaking: public judgement, expert judgement and bureaucratic judgement (c.f. Head, 2008, 2010). That is, the inputs of bureaucrats, experts and the public, drawn on by the political executive in making policy decisions, were substantially at the level of judgement rather than in the form of facts and empirical models. In this section, I explore something of how the political executive used the judgements from each of these sources in its decision-making, with such use being in the form of judgement – 'political judgement' – and often based on insight rather than definition and conceptualisation. However, as we will see in Section 7.3, through debate or argument the political executive did engage in a process of definition and conceptualisation.

7.2.1 Public Judgement

It is the nature of politics for 'public judgement' – in the sense of views held by a significant section of the public over a reasonable timeframe and with a high degree of stridency (Yankelovich, 1991) – to have some influence on the political executive's policymaking. To identify the 'public judgement' for each of the three policy areas (bioscience, radioactive waste and urban water supply) I first consider relevant discussions in the biannual Political Chronicles in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History*. Public judgement is a particularly prominent kind of information influencing policymaking regarding radioactive waste management. However, the impact assessment section of Cabinet submissions (discussed above) shone a light on aspects of public judgement for every policy initiative the political executive considered. As defined above, public judgement is something generated in the public sphere and gauged through various proxy measures such as opinion polls, focus groups, media monitoring, the share market values of particular stocks, deliberative exercises and general elections; but also through the 'common-sense' appraisal of bureaucrats preparing Cabinet submissions and ministers reading them. These point-in-time

measures are not public judgement but are evocative of it, just as a photograph of a family is not identical to the family process (Bauer, 2014). But they are the kinds of gauges that were at the disposal of the political executive, and they were used. As Foley said:

You don't develop policy in isolation from polling. It's what we call qualitative polling. You know, politics – sometimes you might say oh, we're visionaries, we lead, I'd say we're probably more – at best we're one out and one behind, in many cases we follow. (interview, 2018)

Relying on such gauges raises questions about the ability of mass media to synchronise opinion, wittingly or unwittingly, and who and what gets counted. Investigating such issues is beyond the scope of this thesis but being cognisant of them is crucial in exploring how the political executive engaged with public judgement as a type of information.

Relying on public judgement as a kind of information for policymaking was potently evident concerning radioactive waste management policy, intermittently at play regarding urban water supply policy (especially regarding desalination as a water supply option), and more opaque in bioscience industry development policy. In the case of radioactive waste management, the political executive followed the public judgement from the beginning. Regarding desalination, the political executive resisted the public judgement for many months. In both instances, I suggest, this was because of the degree of alignment (or non-alignment in the case of desalination) of the public judgement with the political executive's ideological values and construction of interests.

Accordingly, I now further investigate public judgement as it operated and was drawn on by the political executive in the area of radioactive waste management. It emerges that the political executive pursued different, almost contradictory, policy options regarding different aspects of this policy area because that is how they were treated by public judgement. Regarding waste from enriched uranium, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, the political executive tapped into firmly held anti-nuclear views in the electorate using emotive language and inductive reasoning. In contrast, regarding waste from uranium mining, the political executive used much more moderate rhetoric and was, therefore, able to rely more readily on technical information and technocratic advice. This different approach was enabled because the weight of public opinion favoured a different assessment of the risks associated with the extraction of uranium ore *and* there was positive alignment between the political opportunities and the political executive's developmentalism values. This difference in the weight of opinion regarding uranium mining waste and nuclear waste was, of course, inconsistent and to an extent illogical. However, that was the concrete situation the political executive faced.

Opposing a National Repository

In the case of a national nuclear waste repository, as discussed in previous chapters, policymaking was framed by ideological values relating to state pride and democratic motivation, mostly activated by political self-interest. So constituted, these elements of ideology and interest drove a 'political model' of information use. This political model saw the executive seek out 'evidence' to reinforce its firmly adopted position, which typically involved finding and using information that would 'neutralise opponents, convince waverers, and bolster supporters' (Weiss, 1979, p. 429).

Rather being a logical debate of ideas, the political executive's approach was almost entirely rhetorical. Firstly, the language of the electorate was employed to appeal for summary judgement. For example, the plebiscite proposal (Cabinet Note 17 February, 2003) discussed in Chapter 5 was characterised by the political executive as a 'nuclear deterrent' (ALP(SA), 2002f). The language ironically turned on its head a concept usually employed by the proponents of nuclear weapons, but easily resonated with the electorate if not understood with technical exactness. Secondly, there was limited speculative debate on broad principles, like whether SA had any ethical responsibilities for waste management flowing from the economic benefits it received by exporting large amounts of uranium yellowcake. Indeed, in the face of such ethical considerations, the political executive's response in the media and Parliament was to use SA's wine production as an analogy – 'we export wine too, but we don't take the empties back' (PA 1, 2018).

The third aspect to this rhetorical rather than dialectical approach was the scant appeal to authority but rather heavy reliance on opinion and popular conceptions of the problem, particularly that the Commonwealth Government's proposed lower-level repository was the thin edge of the wedge leading to the realisation of the 'Pangea concept' in SA – a permanent, commercially operated, deep geological disposal facility for high-level radioactive waste from around the globe (ALP(SA), 2002f; Holland, 2002).

The above analysis reinforces early conclusions regarding this aspect of nuclear waste policymaking: the use of *pathos* (Toye, 2013) as the primary mode of persuasion (principally the emotion of fear in this instance); and the reliance on ordinary and local knowledge to the virtual exclusion of technical knowledge. However, *pathos* and 'casual empiricism' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) were not ends in themselves. The political executive used them as rhetorical mechanisms to align itself with anti-nuclear ideas that were well established in the mind of the SA community.

Dealing with Waste Spills at Uranium Mines

Turning now to nuclear waste generated as a by-product from uranium mining, we encounter a very different kind of public judgement and, therefore, a different approach to information use. Despite the absence of support for atomic energy *in Australia* (McAllister & Studlar, 1993; Roy Morgan, 2007, 2011); there was longstanding support for the mining of uranium for export to other countries to be used for peaceful purposes (Roy Morgan, 2011). The political executive recognised this seeming inconsistency in public judgement. As one political advisor said:

South Australians do not broadly link the two [radioactive waste and uranium mining] together. They saw nuclear waste as something very different from mining and exporting uranium. By the time we came back in, in 2002, Olympic Dam was long established. Everyone knew someone who had worked there; it was part of the furniture. (interview with PA 1, 2018)

The public judgement concerning (radioactive) waste at uranium mines seemed to be one of expecting high standards and proper systems for its management, not uncompromising hostility as with waste associated with enriched uranium (Graetz & Manning, 2016). Accordingly, the political executive's definition of the policy problem concerning mining was more nuanced. Labor's policy position for the 2002 election was framed in terms of environmental protection, safe working conditions and good governance (ALP(SA), 2002g). As discussed in Chapter 5, the major political contest was over the Liberal government's handling of tailings dam spills at a new mine – Beverley – in the context of its use of the in-situ leaching process to extract and process uranium. Labor's election commitment was to hold an independent inquiry into the reporting regime for such spills (ALP(SA), 2002b).

The political executive selected a former senior bureaucrat, Hedley Bachmann, to lead the inquiry (Cabinet Submission 6 May, 2002a). Holloway judged that 'Hedley was just the man for the job ... he understood the political possibilities but also the need to resolve the issues' (interview, 2019). Consistent with the public judgement concerning high standards and proper systems, Holloway publicly framed the issue as substantially one of 'total confusion' about the reporting mechanisms (O'Brien, 2002).

However, while Bachmann was in the early stages of his work, the political executive was confronted by continued waste leakage events at the Beverley mine. Hill (as Environment Minister) announced on 8 May 2002 the government's decision to 'take more immediate action' by sending a high-level government investigative team to assess the mine's 'operating procedures, its environmental integrity and public safety' (SA House of Assembly, 2002c). Within a week the interim findings of the investigative team were reported to

Parliament in a ministerial statement and the written report tabled in Parliament. In doing so, Hill was at pains to assure the House that the operators of the Beverley mine provided 'full cooperation' and agreed with the recommended steps to minimise the possibility of future spills (SA House of Assembly, 2002b).

A few months later, Bachmann reported to Cabinet, validating Holloway's assessment that the core problem was confusion about the reporting procedures. He found that the provisions regarding 'confidentiality', 'secrecy', and 'misuse of information' in at least nine Acts of the SA Parliament inhibited public disclosure of waste spills (Bachmann, 2002, p. 6). Based very much on 'casual empiricism' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979), Bachmann recommended the review and amendment of relevant legislation, recommended criteria and procedures for recording and reporting incidents at SA uranium mines, and proposed an incident reporting form. Also, in light of Labor's policy commitment to 'transparency and open and accountable government' (ALP(SA), 2002j), Bachmann's report encouraged the executive to establish a web-based register for 'regular reporting direct to the public' of waste spills at uranium mining sites (Bachmann, 2002, p. 15). In less than 50 pages he provided a roadmap for undoing a half-century tradition of bureaucratic secrecy surrounding uranium mining in SA. Holloway was particularly pleased with the proactive reporting regime recommended by Bachmann:

We started putting stuff on the internet ... and of course, no one actually bothers to look at them now. It is not as sexy looking ... he [Bachmann] settled that down, and it resolved that issue, and it all went away. (interview with Holloway, 2019)

This is an example of the political executive adopting the public's articulation of information. This public judgement was selected based on previously activated ideological value of democratic motivation and the fact that the political executive was substantially pursuing political self-interest in this area. In the case of the repository, the public judgement was that radioactive waste was unsafe and should be categorically rejected. In this instance, the executive adopted the language of the electorate and made decisions with little to no debate about the substantive issues. As Conlon (interview, 2018) indicated, in this area good tactics were 'elevated' to the level of principle. Then, as we saw in the discussion of interests in Chapter 6, the considerations were made opportunistically and so as to reinforce the posturing that had commenced in opposition. In the case of responding to radioactive waste leaks at mining sites, a more nuanced public judgement that mining could be undertaken safely elicited a more nuanced use of information. Expert advice was sought and relied upon. However, it was not used in any problem-solving kind of way, but instead still demonstrated the 'political' (Weiss, 1979) use of information.

The dynamics of court government were also at play, with Holloway and Hill each engaging in behaviour that fulfilled the specific responsibilities of their respective portfolios (mining and environment), and drawing on information relevant to their portfolio. Hill drew on information to support environmental protection through mining that adhered to high standards and proper systems (SA House of Assembly, 2002b). Holloway drew on information to support economic development through mining endeavours that were open and transparent about the way and the degree to which it adhered to these standards and systems (Cabinet Submission 8 October, 2002). In combination, these two streams of information modified the political executive's policymaking to arrive at a new, more agile collective position.

7.2.2 Expert Judgement

Across all three focus policy areas, we encounter the political executive seeking expert advice from outside the bureaucracy, for example, in bioscience through the Shine and Young review, in radioactive waste with the Bachmann review discussed above and in water supply with the Cullen report. In so doing, the executive created what Ayres (2001) terms a 'partial policy market'. That is, rather than traditional forms of bureaucratic policy advice giving, the political executive created an advisory system where other sources were used to challenge, supplement or substitute advice from the bureaucracy but without creating fully competitive policy markets.

At times this partial market took the form of contestability between the policy advice provided by the bureaucracy and that from external networks. Examples of such external bodies are the Economic Development Board or the Strategic Plan Audit Committee's assessment of the SA Strategic Plan water target. At other times this partial policy market involved supplementation of the bureaucracy's advice by engaging political fellow travellers or content experts. The engagement of Don Hopgood (a former Labor Deputy Premier from the Bannon era) as chair of the *Water Proofing Adelaide* advisory committee is an example of the former; Marie Smith's advice on bioscience industry development through the Thinkers in Residence program and Ian Kowalick's (a Murray-Darling Basin Commissioner, engineer and sometime senior bureaucrat) chairing of the Desalination Work Group are examples of the latter. The Shine and Young report on health and medical research and the Bachmann review are examples of substitution. With all three approaches – contestability, supplementation and substitution – the implied purpose was to open up the debate and provide advice that either complemented or compensated for a lack of capacity in bureaucratic analysis rather than competing with it. But, as I will highlight below, sometimes it was simply to leverage 'authority' or 'independence'. However, none of these approaches

incorporated out-and-out economic rationalism wherein there was a competitive policy market with effective pricing mechanisms and the tendering out of policy functions.

Even though several of the external experts relied upon in the focus policy areas were academics (for example, Professor Peter Cullen on water; Baroness Professor Susan Greenfield and Professor John Shine on bioscience), there is little indication that the information they provided used research evidence in an 'instrumental' or 'problem-solving' (Weiss, 1979) way. Indeed, explicit referencing of academic publications was rare among these and other experts, even in an 'enlightenment' sense. Whether we are talking about contestability, supplementation or substitution, it was much more common to reference technical information, especially government reports or (particularly in the case of radioactive waste) think-tanks and international associations.

In the course of analysing 113 Cabinet documents used as a primary source for this research, I identified 12 that appended a report or strategy which had expert input designed to challenge, supplement or substitute advice from the bureaucracy. Table 7-2 lists these reports or strategies, all of which are referred to in this or earlier chapters, by policy area. It then indicates whether the document includes references (Y/N) and, if so, the number of references, and the number of these that were academic publications or government publications. It shows that only four of these appended reports or strategies included a bibliography or reference list. Of those including a reference list, citation of peer-reviewed publications or works published by recognised academic publishing houses was not common (0–18% of all references). Instead, citations were predominately to reports and papers prepared by government agencies, usually either Commonwealth or state government bodies.

Earlier in this chapter, I cited Foley on using polling to follow public judgement. When interviewed he also said: 'There's plenty of good policy that I would say ... is bloody awful politics. Sometimes you just have to do it' (interview, 2018). Good policy could be described as knowledge or choices developed through analytical inquiry based on collecting and analysing evidence, and drawing conclusions and recommendations from this evidence (Banks, 2009): the 'scientific' rational approach. This policy work produces arguments that are communicated in text and speech for consideration by policymakers who are focused on balancing this choice with a range of other choices, rather than considering the 'good policy' in isolation. The kinds of expert input I am considering here had the additional function of subjecting the arguments of 'good policy' to preliminary social processes of discussion, dialogue and negotiations before they were considered by the political executive (Majone, 1989; Valovirta, 2016; Weiss, 1999). That is, for the political executive, the identification of

good policy was not enough. The more significant issue was whether to do the good thing that had been identified. The expert input represented in the reports and strategies listed in Table 7-2 forms one part of the process of balancing good policy and politics.

Table 7-2: Types of Citations in Reports or Strategies Prepared by or Under the Supervision of External Experts

Report or Strategy	References Included Y/N	No. of References	No. (%) of Academic Publications	No. of Government Publications
Bioscience				
Ernst & Young (2003) Report of the Review of Bio Innovation SA	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Greenfield (2006), Getting to the Future First	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Shine and Young (2008), Review of Health and Medical Research in SA	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Smith (2005) Developing a Bioeconomy in SA	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Radioactive Waste				
Bachmann (2002), Independent Review of Reporting Procedures for the SA Uranium Mining Industry	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Radiation Protection Committee (2003) Audit of Radioactive Material in SA	Y	24	1 (4)	7
URS Australia Pty Ltd (2005) Feasibility Study into Interim Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Waste in SA	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Water				
Cullen (2004), Water Challenges for SA in the Twenty-First Century	Y	22	4 (18)	16
Desalination Working Group (2007) Report	Y	18	0 (0)	18
Marsden Jacob Associates (2004) Independent Report on Sharing Services and Costs of River Murray	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Water For Good (2008)	Y	26	1 (4)	22
Water Proofing Adelaide (2005)	N	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

With the recommendation in the Shine and Young (2008) report (discussed further in Section 7.3.3 below) to establish a health and medical research centre we see good policy and politics aligning, and the Cabinet deciding to support the recommendation. In the case of the (URS Australia, 2005) report on a feasibility study into how and where to establish an interim storage facility to dispose of SA-‘owned’, low-level radioactive waste, we encounter recommendations that can be seen as good policy but ‘awful politics’ because the costs were disproportionate to risk. Cabinet decided to do nothing. Similarly, the Marsden Jacob Associates (2004)report’s recommendation that irrigators contribute to the cost of River

Murray water to a level commensurate with the benefit they receive was good policy but 'awful politics'. This advice was not followed, and the report was quietly buried. In contrast, the good policy recommendation in the Cullen (2004) report to commence planning for a desalination plant was 'awful politics' in 2004 in light of the political executive's sustainability value but excellent politics three years later in the context of severe drought and the executive's state developmentalism value.

Three features about this expert input are noteworthy. First, there is no sense of expert advice being in competition with or replacing political decision-making. In each of the examples above, political judgement prevailed. For example, if Greenfield's 2005 recommendation regarding a medical research precinct (discussed below in Section 7.3.3) was accepted without question there would have been no need for the Shine and Young report. Further, the purpose of the Ernst & Young review of Bio Innovation SA was to 'inform and guide' (Cabinet Note 12 January, 2004, § 2.3). Even though Cullen (2004) presented his findings regarding water management as 'actions that South Australia needs to take in its journey to sustainability', this direction was to the people of the state not the government and, in the end, he conceded in his report that his recommendations were 'opinions and suggestions' (p. 9).

A second and related feature is that the experts did not present themselves as an unequivocal source of indisputable knowledge but rather as a useful resource for policymaking. Their advice was open to interpretation, contest or even rejection. For example, the Cabinet note (21 November, 2005) reporting on the URS Australia feasibility study into the interim storage of radioactive waste makes it clear that Cabinet could decide that the recommended approach was unnecessary and a 'do nothing' option was conceivable. Indeed, this is what Cabinet ultimately elected to do. Maasen and Weingart (2005, pp. 4-5) write about the seeming paradox of the 'scientization of politics' (the increasing reliance on expert advice) occurring in parallel with 'a general democratization' of expert advice wherein expertise, including scientific expertise, is subject to competition and critical scrutiny from a proliferation of expertise, including 'lay' expertise and the expertise of political craft. Therefore, if the political executive wanted to rely on the expert advice, it did so by positioning it as information required to address a 'problem' and as legitimate because of a perception of authoritative independence. As Rann said about the Thinkers in Residence program (an innovative policy advisory program which over 10 years introduced 24 thinkers to SA with a wide range of policy expertise (Manwaring, 2017)):

some of the Thinkers have said to me retrospectively ... 'You praise us for what you were going to do anyway'. I said, 'Yeah, but I needed you to be – to kind of –

you were the sort of fuel that I poured on the fire, and you were my kind of sword and shield internally and externally'. That's what a lot of the Thinkers were there was a whole range of areas where I was personally passionate, and the Thinkers gave me a sword and a shield to do that. So I could say to people, 'So you know more than a world expert who has been working with people [in SA]?' (interview, 2018)

However, the legitimacy of expert judgement was not treated as so strong that the use of information from them was mandatory. Tacit, and sometimes explicit, rejection of the advice was not uncommon, as happened with the Marsden Jacob Associates report on the distribution of benefits and costs of River Murray management in SA, discussed earlier in this chapter. Also, as noted in Chapter 6, Cullen's advice in 2004 to begin advanced planning for Adelaide's anticipated eventual desalination requirements was not actioned so as to mitigate the risks associated with the crisis of water insecurity. Instead, planning was commenced three years later in response to the actual crisis Cullen had predicted. That is, it was risk response planning rather than risk mitigation planning.

Finally, consistent with developments elsewhere, what was taken to be expert knowledge extended beyond the boundaries of academically established disciplines. So, for example, Ernst & Young consultants, experts in neither bioscience nor bio-economics, provided advice on how to manage a government bio-innovation agency; consultant environmental engineers URS, with no specific expertise in managing radioactive waste, provided advice on the storage and disposal of the SA radioactive waste stockpile; and Ian Kowalick, engineer, one-time senior bureaucrat and Murray-Darlin Basin Commissioner, but with no specialist knowledge of desalination, oversaw the Desalination Working Group. The concept of expertise was stretched to the point of denoting almost any kind of professional knowledge that was separate from government. It did not need to be academic or, except for the Thinkers in Residence, necessarily specific to the area of investigation. As the examples above indicate, such expertise is almost indistinguishable from that accumulated in the course of pertinent professional activities. Its authority came more from its appearance of independence from government than from the specificity of any expertise. That is, when accepted, it was the expert judgement (as in the definitive, summative assessment 'it is so') that mattered more than any detailed formulation based on thorough definitions and conceptualisations.

7.2.3 Bureaucratic Judgement

Despite this reliance on information acquired from outside of the public sector, 'independent' information such as that identified in Table 7-2 was then transferred to the political

executive, with the bureaucracy providing a high degree of translation. To begin with, 'independent' reports never stood on their own. They were appended to a Cabinet submission, or Cabinet note, in which the content of the report was not just summarised and discussed but also assessed at the very least through the lens of impact and risk assessments. That is, the bureaucracy got a final say before input and ultimately decision by the political executive. Of course, to use the distinction discussed in Chapter 4, in the face of active ministers advancing an 'aggressive' agenda, the bureaucracy had less scope in this regard than when working with more passive ministers. This is because the latter tended to advance 'their department's agenda rather than having any policy thoughts of their own' (interview with McCann, 2018). Consistent with the notion of a 'partial policy market' (Ayres, 2001) discussed earlier, the independent and expert advice functioned as a challenge, supplement or alternative to advice from the bureaucracy but not as a replacement.

Further, the majority of the 113 Cabinet submissions and notes I analysed for this research present advice generated based on bureaucratic judgement. The format and style of this material tends to follow business-type writing conventions with a neutral or analytical tone for a knowledgeable rather than general or expert audience. The reasoning in these documents is generally deductive, because that is what the Cabinet document templates encouraged. Further, while the genre is clearly non-fiction, purporting to narrate facts and tell the 'truth' about events, persons, objects, places or natural features, these facts did not exist independently of this ritualised structure functioning as an interpretive lens.

Three critical differences emerge between expert judgement and bureaucratic judgement communicated to the political executive in the Cabinet process. The first is the kind of language used, that of the bureaucratic judgement being much more ritualised, again, because this is what the Cabinet document templates encouraged. The second is the organising perspective. The expert advice was generally organised from the perspective of the topic and the expertise involved. The bureaucratic advice was generally organised from the perspective of the ministry or portfolio through which it was presented. For example, while the Shine and Young (2008) report on developing health and medical research in SA was very much from the perspective of research and industry development, the covering Cabinet document conveyed the perspective of the Department of Health (having been commissioned by the Health Minister) rather than that of the science or industry portfolios. The third, less obvious difference between expert and bureaucratic judgement is the nature of the consensus underpinning each kind of information. In the case of bureaucratic judgement 'consensus' is based on prevailing organisational ideas and the unequal and hierarchical relations between those participating in generating the advice. In the case of

expert judgements, consensus is typically based not only on consent but agreement among independent experts in the field (Turner, 2005). That is, there are very different sets of power relations underpinning these two kinds of information.

7.3 Argument

In this section, based on the contention that argument and debate are not just a process but a kind of information input, I argue that information is constructed by the processes and people involved in policymaking, giving it meaning in a particular context. In the case of urban water supply and the decision to build a desalination plant, we encounter argument and debate based on divergent views founded on competing values. Regarding nuclear waste and the management of SA's own small stockpile of radioactive material, we encounter a much more ritualised argument and debate, with a decision to do nothing. Finally, with bioscience industry development and the decision to build a health and medical research institute we see that a negative view of the sources or 'author' of an argument can result in the rejection of an argument regardless of its quality. The common theme across all three is the role played by ideological values in shaping the processes of argumentation.

As noted at the beginning of this thesis, the 4I's framework holds that policy is the outcome of negotiation. Through discussion and bargaining, policy actors first advance, then modify and finally agree on a position (Weiss, 1983). This is the political court operating as both think-tank and arena ('t Hart, 2014). Accordingly, the policy positions of both individual and corporate agents are rarely static but evolve over the course of negotiation. Parties to this process are seldom equal; there are always differences in power. The bargaining may or may not involve coercion, and the discussions might be cooperative or competitive. However, policymaking is essentially a process of 'puzzling', built on argument and persuasion, to change actors' behaviour by operating on their minds and perceptions (Hecl, 1974; Stone, 1997).

Ideal models of this process often present a positive and negative face to persuasion. The former is the notion that decision-makers receive all the information necessary to make a decision and then engage in a rational and well-reasoned debate. This face of persuasion is government through logical and evidence-based deliberation. The latter is the notion that the decision-maker receives distorted or incomplete information and decides on the basis of emotional appeal or coercion. In its extreme form, this is government through propaganda and manipulation. Of course, the positive side of this dichotomy assumes facts are neutral. However, as Stone (1997) notes, 'the rational ideal not only overstates the purity of information, but it also exaggerates the rationality of people using information' (p. 256).

Information is always interpreted through the lenses of ideology and interests, meaning the boundary between these two faces of persuasion is blurred. This helps explain the continuing tension in views about the relative places of knowledge and power: which is or ought to be the most important variable?

7.3.1 Urban Water Supply

In Chapters 4 and 6, I discussed different aspects of the decision to build a desalination plant, noting the assessment of various observers that it was a 'good' decision-making process. Two aspects of the process underpin these assessments. The first, as indicated in previous chapters, is that the political executive canvassed and seriously considered multiple alternatives before settling on desalination as the solution to the realistic prospect of Adelaide running out of potable water. The second is the cooperative, rather than competitive, way that the political executive worked through the significant conflict that existed among its members as to the appropriate way forward. That is, conflict and argument were essential and, in this instance, productive.

The process began with the participants developing and expressing their initial views. As we saw in Chapter 5, this involved Hill characterising desalination as environmentally disastrous and unnecessary if water use was reduced; Conlon and Foley seeing it as economically devastating and unnecessary if water was purchased from elsewhere; and Maywald seeing it as a contributor to state development and essential to ensure water security. Of course, each position was, at this stage, based on minimal information and framed by the experiences and ministerial roles that each played. In articulating their initial positions to one another, the members of the political court were engaging in a kind of 'cognitive rehearsal' (Tjosvold, 1998), through which each gained a deeper understanding of their own position. This cognitive rehearsal began in their reactions to SA Water's 'panicking' desalination proposal when first presented to Cabinet.

When confronted with one another's opposing views, the members of the political executive developed enough uncertainty about the effectiveness of their respective original conclusions that they commissioned and participated in a range of processes to obtain more information. The expert working group chaired by Ian Kowalick was the most thorough of several processes they established to gain more information and greater understanding. The documents relating to the expert working group's deliberations provided to Cabinet (Cabinet Submission 26 November, 2007) reveal detailed modelling of a degree some researchers (e.g. Maier et al., 2013) assumed to be absent, based on their review of the *Water for Good* strategy document alone.

Armed with this information, a new, more elegant conceptualisation of the problem emerged. The political executive reframed the problem as one of 'water security' and of desalination as an 'insurance policy' rather than as a sustainability issue, a fiscal burden or merely a state development initiative. In effect, the exploration of positions and the creation of a new solution during controversy resulted in a more considered and confident decision that the protagonists were committed to implementing. We encounter what Tjosvold (1998) calls an environment of 'cooperative conflict' emerging from three competing ideological values: sustainability, state development and economic rationalism. If competing self-interests were at play, one would expect to see behaviour such as avoiding discussion, refusal to consider alternative views or attempted coercion, which would have resulted in frustration, hostility and even attempts at revenge. Instead, consistent with cooperative conflict theory, we see productive exchange leading to a shared confidence in the correctness and potential for success of the chosen solution.

7.3.2 Radioactive Waste

In the process of defeating the Commonwealth's proposal for a national repository for radioactive waste in SA, the political executive made public commitments to deal with the local stockpile of such waste. Labor's election policy included a commitment that the EPA would undertake an audit of such waste as a precursor to identifying solutions (ALP(SA), 2002d). Even though it took over three years to get to the point of identifying a preferred solution, SA was still ahead of all states and territories in completing an audit and assessing possible state repository sites (Cabinet Note 21 November, 2005). Nonetheless, while the audit facilitated better management of radioactive waste in SA, a repository was not established, and management of waste continued at the sites creating it.

In stark contrast to the opportunistic and posturing approach to opposing the Commonwealth repository, the Audit Report was developed based on the investigations and assessments of experts in the field of radiation management and controlled through a structured and rational process based on an approved project plan. The advice of an expert statutory committee guided both the audit and the report. At the end of the seven-month audit process, the Radiation Protection Committee report on the audit of radioactive material in SA (Cabinet Submission 4 December, 2003) presented a narrative that ran counter to the community's entrenched concerns about the dangers of radioactive waste. The political executive had reinforced these community concerns as part of its earlier strategy of opposing the siting of a national repository in SA. The underlying message of the finalised report was that the low-level and intermediate-level waste was, in the main, stored in ways consistent with national and international standards and posed no risk to the general public. Further, it informed the

community that some very-low-level waste in solid form was being placed in landfill under EPA supervision and in diluted liquid form into the general sewer system, and that this was considered safe (Cabinet Submission 4 December, 2003).

In Table 7-3 below, we see that Cabinet delayed its consideration of the Audit Report on three occasions. The first delay ('submission withdrawn') related to fiscal matters, discussed further below. The two subsequent deferrals (17 November and 1 December) were part of a process of determining how to manage the public release of the report. In the end, it was tabled in Parliament on the afternoon of 4 December, just before the House of Assembly rose for the long summer break, thereby limiting its public exposure.

Table 7-3: Progress in Cabinet of the Report on the Audit of Radioactive Material in SA

	Signed by Minister	On Cabinet Agenda	Outcome
Version 1	9 October 2003	20 October 2003	Withdrawn
Version 2	12 November 2003	17 November 2003	Deferred
		1 December 2003	Deferred
		4 December 2003	Approved

Regarding fiscal considerations, the treatment of this submission is indicative of the political executive's systematic and consistent application of budgetary controls, as discussed in my analysis of impact statements earlier in this chapter. The political executive considered information about the economic and budget impacts of policymaking as central to its decision-making. The first version of the Cabinet submission (20 October, 2003) stated that the budget implications of implementing the report's recommendations were 'within agency budget' (cover sheet). Then, in the body of the document, there followed the potentially contradictory statement: 'the costs associated with addressing the Key Recommendations of the report will depend on the course of action determined by Government' (§ 5.1). Missing from the submission was the essential greenlight phrase 'Treasury and Finance agrees with the basis of the assessment of costs contained in this submission'. DTF's agreement was dependent upon explicit quantification of costs for all implicated agencies, and Cabinet generally required unambiguous recommendations as to the course of action the government should take. Unsurprisingly, the minister withdrew the submission and officers of his department were instructed to work with DTF. Based on this work, version 2 identified and quantified costs for both the EPA and for public hospitals, with all implicated agencies

committing to managing these costs within their existing budgets. This version included a positive costing comment from DTF.

Central to the Audit Report recommendations approved by the political executive was the authorisation of the EPA to assess options for the interim and final storage of radioactive waste, a task tendered out to a private sector engineering firm. The report identified three potential sites for the interim store: Olympic Dam above ground, Olympic Dam underground in a disused mine drive, and Radium Hill. It also recommended a cost structure involving partial cost recovery for currently existing radioactive waste and full cost recovery for any waste created in the future (Cabinet Note 21 November, 2005). The order of magnitude of costs was estimated, with Olympic Dam underground determined as the recommended site, and Cabinet advised that negotiations with BHP Billiton, the owners of the Olympic Dam mine, would commence. However, SA did not establish either a repository or an interim store because of financial and political considerations. There is no indication that Cabinet discussed the matter again during the case study period. To this time (2021) radioactive waste in SA must be safely stored and managed by its owners who are now also required to report annually to the EPA on their handling of such waste (EPA, 2020).

In essence, well-ordered, technocratic advice demonstrated that there was no significant issue with lower-level radioactive waste being stored and managed by its owners in the community. Further, this same kind of advice showed that moving existing waste to a state-owned and operated facility would involve significant construction and management costs to the SA budget, with marginal benefits only, mainly in terms of security. The proposed policy response was rationally constructed, ventilating a significant amount of information and exploring multiple options. The proposed solution did not align with any political self-interest, did not activate any real debate or competition among the executive's ideological values, and did not address any issue of pressing public interest. For these reasons, despite the quality of the arguments, the proposal was implicitly rejected by the political executive doing nothing.

7.3.3 Bioscience

As noted in Chapter 5, support for the SA Health and Medical Research Institute (SAHMRI) constituted the political executive's most significant bioscience initiative (Cabinet Submission 14 December, 2009). However, this enterprise depended in no small degree on Commonwealth Government funding, rather than the allocation of funds from the state budget. The origins of the initiative rested in the recommendations of the Thinker in Residence Susan Greenfield. She identified a small precinct in the Adelaide CBD (centred

on North Terrace and Frome Road) accounting for a large proportion of the state's scientific, health and medical workforce. While it was attracting about \$70m per annum in research funds from outside the state, it was experiencing declining success in attracting grants in an increasingly competitive grants environment and was housed across aging and increasingly inappropriate infrastructure.

To Greenfield's mind, this hub of health and medical activity provided an opportunity to become

a major driver of economic development in South Australia through a package of initiatives to develop it as a nationally and internationally renowned location for excellence in health and medical R&D, health education and knowledge transfer to clinical practice. (Greenfield, 2006, p. 65)

She recommended re-badging the area as the 'Florey Precinct' in honour of Adelaide-born and trained medical doctor Howard Florey, who went on to further study at Oxford and became a co-recipient of the 1945 Noble Prize for Medicine for his role in the development of penicillin. As well as an identity-creating name, she recommended construction of a flagship and landmark building to serve as the new headquarters of the precinct and to house significant research and development activity.

The Premier regarded Greenfield well, and several of her recommendations were quickly taken up by the political executive and produced long-lasting and successful initiatives. These included supporting her proposal to establish the Australian Science Media Centre, which is an independent, not-for-profit service for the news media seeking 'to enhance the media's coverage of science' by providing 'the evidence and experts when science hits the headlines' (AusSMC, 2020). It also supported her recommendation to establish RI Australia, the first and only sister organisation outside of the UK of the Royal Institution of Great Britain. It is a national scientific not-for-profit organisation with a mission to 'bring science to people and people to science' by promoting public awareness and understanding of science (RiAus, 2020).

However, as noted in Chapter 4, when Caica (as Minister for Science) and Hill (as Minister for Health) jointly met with Rann to discuss a proposal from scientists to advance an aspect of this thinking about a 'Florey Precinct', it did not go well. In essence, they presented ideas which Rann saw as a boon for the scientists rather than the state. Whereas Greenfield was perceived as being able to 'talk about science as you would want and expect, in such multifaceted ways and she'd engage people on a broad basis' (interview with PA3, 2018), there was a view within the political executive that many scientists, including those on the

Premier's Science Council, were often self-serving and their advice was approached with caution:

The idea of researchers being these far-sighted people who rise above pecuniary interest is utter BS and if you went around the room, the brightest minds around the room, [asking] what's the most important project? 'Well, it's my project'. 'No, it's my project', 'No it's my project'. So, there's no capacity [to be unbiased] – well, not no capacity, but it was bloody hard. (interview with PA3, 2018)

In a similar vein, a senior bureaucrat described an occasion when a nationally and internationally recognised scientist attended a meeting of ExComm. They 'went in as an advocate and thumped the table a little bit on the importance of [their area of interest]', rather than using his access to key policy actors as an opportunity 'to have more influence through the system and to actively shape government policy' (interview with Smith, 2019).

In this environment, and in the face of Rann's reaction to the proposal put forward by Caica and himself, Hill commissioned Professor John Shine, the then Executive Director of the Garvan Institute, an internationally recognised gene-based medical research institute in Sydney, and Mr Alan Young, a prominent Adelaide businessman and stockbroker, to investigate how to expand health and medical research in SA. The resultant report recommended:

The establishment of an independent health and medical research institute [which] would develop a structure to link together the state's researchers to position South Australia at the forefront of health and medical research and would attract and retain world-class talent. It would provide a focus for health and medical research in South Australia, which would attract increasing levels of national and international funding and enhance collaborative health and medical research activity. (South Australia House of Assembly, 2008)

The Shine and Young report broadly supported Greenfield's recommendations, without referring to them, but extended the thinking in the context of the political executive's announcement in June 2007 that the Royal Adelaide Hospital would be replaced on a new site. With the new hospital as an anchor, SAHMRI formed part of a broader bio-medical research and education precinct. Reframed as anchored to the new hospital project, the project gained the Premier's support, including for lobbying the Commonwealth Government for financial support to realise the vision:

With a new Royal Adelaide Hospital ... [we used] this giant hospital to be the mother ship of a medical science bioscience with a new bioscience SAHMRI and others that are flowing since. And I think it's that classic thing, if you build it they will come. But the hospital became a mother ship of all of that and increasingly so with universities co-locating. (interview with Rann, 2018)

Again, we see that assembling relevant information and developing ideas formed the basis of advice to the political executive, but with the need to construct it in a way, and communicate it at a time, that aligned with the interests, beliefs and priorities of the political executive.

7.4 Conclusion

In earlier chapters, the emerging picture was of institutions *and* (corporate) agency together influencing policymaking. We see institutions affecting individual actors *and* corporate actors affecting institutions, corporate actors shaping ideology *and* ideology shaping actors' decisions, and interests motivating individual actors *and* corporate actors influencing interests. In this process, we see agency, structure and culture working in a 'dialectical relationship' (Marsh, 2009), wherein none is the independent variable but all three are interrelated in a process of emergence (Archer, 1995, 2000, 2005; Blatter & Blume, 2008; Donati, 2018; Spicker, 2010). In this chapter, we saw that information is not a stand-alone element potentially shaping policymaking, as would be hoped for by the proponents of 'evidence-based policy'. It is not an independent variable, but neither is it entirely subservient to power. Once created, information has an objective, mind-independent existence (Archer, 2003; Audi, 1999; Lonergan, 1992) with a dialectical or dialogical relationship with power (Radaelli, 1995; Weiss, 1983) that influences how ideology and interests come into play. This relationship is explored further in Chapter 8.

In this chapter, in each of the three focus policy areas, we encountered the following characteristics. First, in initiating the policymaking process, the political executive defined, perhaps even 'constructed' (Bacchi, 2009), the problem and often selected the policy instruments before seeking advice on how to achieve its policy goals. That is, regarding bioscience industry development, nuclear waste management and urban water supply policy, the policy advice was given in response to political demand and subject to a degree of political control.

Second, in seeking such advice in these policy areas, the political executive created what Ayres (2001) terms a 'partial policy market'. That is, rather than traditional forms of bureaucratic policy advice giving, the political executive built an advisory system where other sources were used to challenge, supplement or substitute advice from the bureaucracy but without creating fully competitive policy markets. At times this partial market took the form of contestability between the policy advice provided by the bureaucracy and that from external networks. Examples of such external bodies are the Economic Development Board and the Strategic Plan Audit Committee's assessment of the SA Strategic Plan's water target. At

other times this partial policy market involved supplementation of the bureaucracy's advice by engaging political fellow travellers or content experts. The engagement of Hopgood as chair of the *Water Proofing Adelaide* advisory committee is an example of the former, and Smith's advice on bioscience industry development through the Thinkers in Residence program and Kowalick's chairing of the Desalination Work Group are examples of the latter. The Shine and Young report on a health and medical research institution is an example of substitution. I suggest, with all three approaches – contest (competition between the advice of bureaucrats and external experts), supplementation (complementing bureaucrat advice with that of external experts) and substitution (replacing bureaucrat advice with that of external experts) – the purpose was to open up the debate and provide advice that either complemented or compensated for a lack of capacity in bureaucratic analysis rather than supplanting its role. The approach adopted in each instance – contest, supplementation and substitution – was based on political need. This was not out-and-out economic rationalism in a competitive policy market with advice generated based on price through a tendering out of policy functions. The noteworthy point in the SA case is that information was acquired by either the bureaucracy alone or by the bureaucracy assisted by individuals or bodies outside of the bureaucracy's direct control.

The third characteristic is that the acquired information was then transferred to the political executive with a high degree of translation provided by the bureaucracy. The data were translated into the highly ritualised format of a Cabinet submission or Cabinet note. That is, the information was structured following prescriptive templates and then discussed following a well-established agenda to produce an institutionalised form of information. Yet, key actors, whether ministers or bureaucrats, while sometimes influencing the way information was presented to Cabinet, generally did so from the perspective of the ministry or portfolio role they held.

Fourth, the received information was then assessed by the political executive and either accepted or rejected, with any debate exhibiting an inductive style of reasoning. We saw policymakers weaving together multiple sets of information through a process of bricolage (Altglas, 2018; Johnson, 2012) and calling on tacit knowledge, usually of a political nature. An example is the way Holloway and Hill engaged with each other about managing radioactive waste at mining sites, bringing together two streams of information to arrive at a new, more agile collective position. In this process, decision-making was motivated and shaped by ideology and interests, not by the quality of the information. That does not mean that well-formed, meaningful data did not play a role. It is just that these characteristics of the information were of secondary importance.

Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the decision-making was a chaotic process. Policy did not emerge inconsistently from a vortex (Hickson et al., 1986) or garbage can (Cohen et al., 1972). It was a fundamentally political process directed by politicians, using judgements based more on moments of insight (Lonergan, 1990, 1992) than on logic, reason and rational analysis. None of these four emerging themes constitutes a ground-breaking finding. Their importance lays in what they can tell us about the relationship of information to the other three elements in order to produce policy decisions. This interaction is a core consideration in the next and final chapter of this thesis.

8 Findings and Conclusions

This thesis investigates policymaking by the Labor Party-led political executive in SA, over the period 2002–10. It does so using a modified version of Carol Weiss' 4I's framework of policymaking, focusing on three policy areas: bioscience industry development, radioactive waste management and urban water supply. It makes a distinct contribution to public policy scholarship by extending the theoretical understanding of a political executive's policymaking, based on analysis of unique data not previously accessed and breaking new ground in applying Weiss' framework to a political executive.

In this chapter, I present my findings in three broad ways. Firstly, I make summary comments about the three policy areas of bioscience, radioactive waste and water supply (Section 8.1). Secondly, I discuss the four research hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 (Section 8.2). Thirdly, I present four more general findings (Section 8.3). In so doing I highlight this study's unique contribution to public policy scholarship. I then outline the study's limitations, and suggest further research possibilities (Section 8.4), before concluding with a brief summing-up (Section 8.5).

This research provides support for the four hypotheses, thereby demonstrating that the 4I's framework is an effective model to explain policymaking by a political executive. The four hypotheses are as follows. One, the political executive was often more motivated by other-regarding public interests than by (political) self-interest. Two, the political executive's values or beliefs (i.e., its ideology) determined its policymaking more than either its interests or the information available to the executive, with the caveat that prior ideational processes shaped the construction and operation of the other three elements. Three, ideology, interests and information were influenced by the institutional arena within which the political executive operated. Four, corporate agency was more important than individual agency, with corporate agency being essential to cause change.

The first of the four general findings arising from the case study is that the enhancements suggested in Chapter 2 are central to effectiveness of the 4I's framework as a theoretical model for investigating policymaking by a political executive. These adjustments to the framework are based on more recent research and theorising, especially concerning the institutional arena, interests and group dynamics. Archer's concepts of emergence (Archer, 1995) and corporate agency (Archer, 2000, 2002, 2005) are also central to my enhancements to the explanation of change presented by the 4I's framework.

The second is that there is some scope to define the elements of the 4I's framework more economically and state how they operate and are applied. I therefore recommend a structured and unambiguous configuration of the four elements and a way of 'modelling' the interaction of these elements of the framework, with institutions first and then in order ideology, interests and information. As well, I recommend using more focused definitions for the institutional arena and ideology.

Third, as assumed, the political executive could not be caricatured as a group of either dilettantes or vote maximisers but was an effective *political* policymaker. While individual ministers were at times dilettantes (as illustrated by the interview with McCann), as a group the executive was actively involved in directing policymaking and, while statecraft was practised, there were instances of acting in the public interest.

Finally, the Labor Party's experience of opposition, especially the sense of continuing blame for the State Bank debacle, fundamentally influenced the political executive's policymaking approach by shaping its dominant logic, which in turn substantially shaped its ideology before it took office. Before returning to a discussion of these four general findings and the study's support for the hypotheses in Chapter 1, I will make some summary comments about the three policy areas.

8.1 Three Policy Areas

This thesis has investigated three policy areas – bioscience industry development, management of nuclear waste and urban water supply – to test the hypotheses outlined above. In my analysis of these three policy areas, I sought to take the middle path on a range of methodological and theoretical issues. This endeavour began using a 'mid-range' definition of policy from Hecló (1972), situating policy between individual decisions and world views. Choosing to study policymaking by the *political executive* at the *sub-national level* of government meant I selected a meso-level case, one situated between the individual politician and the government and between the municipal and national levels of governing (Little, 2010).

In drawing on critical realism to extend the 4I's framework, I took a *via media* between positivist and constructivist/interpretivist approaches to social science. In so doing I sought to recognise the political and contested character of research and the inability of social scientists to achieve disinterest, but without descending into the 'self-defeating relativist scepticism' (Potter & López, 2005, p. 9) of radical constructivism (Donati, 2010; Hay, 2002; Sayer, 1992). On the one hand, adopting this theoretical approach brought the challenge of

engaging with a large body of public policy research literature that acknowledges the limits of positivism without entirely acting upon this recognition. The challenge is that such literature implicitly treats policymaking as a closed system with simple causal mechanisms (Clarke, 2009; Gofas & Hay, 2010; Hay, 2002). On the other hand, it was tested by the methodological danger of generating overly 'thick descriptions' of complex causal processes that incorporated too much context and attempted to combine too many theoretical insights (Clarke, 2009; Sayer, 1992). However, I took these three middle paths – definition of policy, selection of case and adoption of theory – because, as Daniel Little (2010, p. 22) says, 'at this level we get explanations that have a great deal of power and breadth, and yet that are also closely tied to the concrete historical experience of the subject matter'. This thesis' subject matter is the political executive and, more specifically, the processes and information it used in policymaking.

8.1.1 Bioscience Industry Development

Regarding bioscience industry development, we see that the first significant policy event was the May 2002 Cabinet decision to contribute funding to a crop genomics research centre. Between then and the December 2009 decision concerning a health and medical research institute, we observe a disjointed and elongated policymaking process, reminding us of the interwoven way a political executive engages with multiple policy areas and issues. Until the political executive engaged with the notion of a health and medical research centre, the bioscience policy area had limited public profile. However, the decision to support the SAHMRI project, including its iconic building, was the first connection of this policy area with the political executive's ideological value of democratic motivation. Until that point, bioscience industry development was somewhat distanced from the world of statecraft. Therefore, of the three policy areas investigated here, this was the one where there was the greatest theoretical potential for information and policy learning rather than contest and power to be the dominant variables.

There is little evidence of policymaking in this area being focused on creating an election-winning strategy, demonstrating governing competency and effective party management, as there is with, say, radioactive waste management. That is, the hallmarks of statecraft were not on obvious display in policymaking regarding bioscience industry development. Nonetheless, as was evident with decision-making concerning a bioscience business incubator and accelerator and establishing a venture capital fund, the political executive's dominant logic and ideology remained central. Information in the form of technical expertise did not come to the fore – at least not to the point of being the dominant element.

8.1.2 Managing Radioactive Waste

Concerning the management of radioactive waste, policymaking similarly began within weeks of the political executive taking office, when Cabinet approved the drafting and introduction of a Bill to amend the *Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Act*. It concluded in November 2005 when Cabinet considered a feasibility study on longer-term storage options for lower-level waste owned or generated in SA, without approving the proposed approach. Political self-interest activated a strong focus on the value of democratic motivation in all aspects of policymaking in this area, but mostly as they related to challenging the Commonwealth's plans to build a waste repository in SA.

However, despite the strength of focus on statecraft in this area, it did not displace the political executive's dominant logic of fiscal conservatism and the overall dominance of the economic ideological values of economic rationalism and state developmentalism. That is, political self-interest was moderated such that Rann toned down his rhetoric in response to spills of radioactive waste at mining sites so as not to undermine the expansion of minerals exploration and extraction as part of an economic development plan. Similarly, the political executive chose to allow the continued storage of non-mining radioactive waste material in the community rather than fulfil its election pledge with a deliberately disproportionate policy response (Maor, 2019) in the form of a high-cost SA waste depository. All four elements of the 4I's framework – ideology, interests and information framed by the institutional arena – were necessarily at play in policymaking.

8.1.3 Urban Water Supply

For policymaking concerning urban water supply, the first substantial effort to pursue urban water supply-related policies was not made until February 2003, almost a year into the political executive's term. The case study identified a lack of corporate agency – joint goals *and* joint action – as sitting at the heart of this delayed commencement of policymaking activity. While this area was given consistent attention across the subsequent years, it was from late 2006 to mid-2008 that this issue witnessed the most intense policy attention.

In this policy area, we observe the most pronounced cycling from one ideological value to another in response to changing circumstances: from the sustainability-focused *Water Proofing Adelaide* strategy to the state developmentalism-focused *Water for Good* strategy. The catalyst for this shift was the decision to build a desalination plant, itself an example of the political executive 'puzzling' to identify what was in the public interest. These policymaking events highlight that the public interest is not a fixed, ready-made proposition.

Instead, its shape is determined by the decision-making context and the decision-makers' values.

Information was of significant importance in this policy area, most intensely in the latter stages when the political executive was considering multiple options to address the water security crisis the state was facing from late 2006 through to 2010. However, as important as this was for policymaking, it was at all times secondary to and interpreted in the light of the political executive's ideology and interests.

In summation, the analysis of the three policy areas reveals a political executive that, firstly, sought out and relied upon information – including 'scientific' evidence – from various sources. This information was generally taken up when received as ideas and interpreted through the lens of a set of policy frames or values established during opposition, which then functioned as the government's ideology. Secondly, the political executive had a sense of loyalty to a cause and community that emerged as a strong motivational component, which was in turn connected to the achievement of change that was in the public interest. Certainly, political self-interest, which I considered in terms of statecraft, emerged as a dominant motivator in some circumstances. However, in applying a set of values to sift information and make decisions, the political executive was (in part) motivated by a desire to 'make a difference'. Thirdly, in looking to multiple information sources – many beyond the bureaucracy – the political executive created a semi-competitive market of ideas, with decision-making exercised as a form of 'political craft' rather than an 'administrative science'. As such, the information taken up and used was that which helped the political executive understand issues and events, weighing them in inter-subjective terms through a shared 'court' understanding. The fact that the 'external experts' leading the reviews (the information sources outside of the bureaucracy) were carefully chosen probably supported achievement of this 'court' understanding. Finally, the case study reinforces that policy decisions can be constrained or enabled by institutional arrangements which include the highly ritualised structure of Cabinet documents and, in some instances, the political executive's agency determined the level of constraint or enablement. However, with all occurrences, it is corporate agency that mattered, and the cultural aspects of institutions were more relevant than the structural.

8.2 Hypotheses

The above conclusions regarding the operation of the four elements of the 4I's framework across the policy areas I investigated indicate that this research supports the hypotheses

articulated in Chapter 1. I will now address each hypothesis, outlining how the SA case study supports them.

8.2.1 H1 The political executive was often more motivated by other-regarding public interests than by (political) self-interest.

H1 suggests that the political executive can be motivated by both self-interest and the public interest, often simultaneously (as in having mixed motives) but also often being more strongly motivated by the latter. Across two policy areas (bioscience and water), we see instances of the political executive being more motivated by seeking to do the ‘right’ thing for the State of SA than by political self-interest. In another area (radioactive waste), we see an example of political self-interest being the dominant motivator. However, other factors constrained the self-interest such that it remained politically advantageous without being at a disproportionate economic cost to the State of SA.

Further, in this study, there is evidence that the political executive was repeatedly motivated by a desire to ‘do things’ for the benefit of the public they served and deliberately sought to determine the ‘right’ or ‘best’ thing to do. These actions can be characterised as ‘conscience leadership’ (James, 2018), or seen in Weberian terms as an ideal interest, as opposed to a material one. Regarding bioscience industry development and urban water supply, I found the political executive was motivated to serve the public interest, as evidenced by its collective ‘puzzling’ to identify the right thing to do. The 2007–08 decision to build a desalination plant emerges strongly as an exercise in seeking the public interest. While there was still evidence of statecraft, here it operated as a tool rather than an end. That is, the political executive was motivated by a mix of self-regarding and other-regarding interests, but with the latter dominating.

8.2.2 H2: The political executive’s values or beliefs (i.e., its ideology) determined its policymaking more than either its interests or the information available to the executive.

Regarding H2, I found the SA political executive exerted the values constituting its ideology through interests-based transactions. In all three policy areas, interests functioned as the motivator and the criteria for decision-making (Renninger & Hidi, 2015; Stone, 1997), activating the ‘exertion’ to realise the political executive’s values. Ideology was the political executive’s reason for attempting to ‘do things’ (Archer, 2000). This notion of interests activating ideology emphasises that having an ideology is not the same as exerting effort to fulfil it.

Certainly, interests influenced the selection of and cycling between ideological values; interests may even have influenced the interpretation of these values. This was particularly evident regarding urban water supply policy. However, no evidence emerged of interests fundamentally altering the political executive's dominant logic or its overall ideology. Indeed, as noted above concerning H1, in at least one instance (radioactive waste management), the institutional arena and ideology functioned to moderate the operation of political self-interest. Similarly, information, which entered the decision-making realm more as ideas, influenced the interpretation of the political executive's ideology without changing it essentially. That is, ideology, interests and information were each necessary, but none on its own was sufficient. However, as the reason for attempting to do things, ideology was (analytically) prior and more influential overall.

8.2.3 H3: These three determinants – ideology, interests and information – were influenced by the institutional arena within which the political executive operated.

My analysis has identified three cultural aspects of the institutional arena that were more immediately pertinent to this study than any structural factors. One is recognised at the meso-level of analysis, being the political executive's dominant logic, an example of the cultural aspect of institutions. The other two are identified at the micro-level of investigation, being the group dynamics or behavioural norms of the political executive and its standard operating procedures. I find that these aspects of the institutional arena influenced the shape of the executive's ideology (e.g. the hierarchy among the ideological values) and the operation of interests and the influence of different sources of information (e.g. precedence to advice from Department of Treasury and Finance and a focus on impact assessments).

In terms of causal mechanisms, we see both endogenous and exogenous factors operating, and a relationship between them. The 4I's is not a structuralist framework with asymmetrically designed causal factors where exogenous factors have a stronger role than endogenous factors (c.f. Capano, 2009). In applying the framework to the SA case, endogenous factors principally operated through ideology and interests, for example through corporate agents acting to cycle between different ideological values in the area of water supply policy. In contrast, exogenous factors operated primarily via the institutional arena (e.g. the pervasive effect of the State Bank debacle) or the broader environment (e.g. the Millennium Drought). Further, we see a pivotal role for ideation in causation. Ideas shaped information and ideology, as well as 'shared cognitive patterns' and 'dominant logic' in the institutional arena, and 'ideas in good currency' in the broader environment, as discussed

above. This conclusion positions external factors as necessary conditions in the chain of causation but as insufficient on their own. They provided structural or cultural conditioning but there was still the requirement for social or socio-cultural interaction leading to elaboration.

I agree with Capano (2009) that in many policymaking models the power of external factors is prevalent, and insufficient theoretical attention is paid to the impact of internal factors and the feedback effects from the internal dynamics of policymaking. However, I conclude this is not the case with the 4I's framework. Analysis of the SA case shows actors not only competed with each other inside the political executive (e.g. regarding urban water supply) but also tried to manipulate the external environment to their advantage (e.g. regarding radioactive waste management). Highlighting the role of court politics in the executive's internal dynamics and associating statecraft with the operation of political self-interest, as I do, focuses attention on internal dynamics and factors in a manner consistent with that promoted by Capano.

8.2.4 H4: Corporate agency was more important than individual agency, with corporate agency being essential to cause change.

Woven throughout this thesis is the argument that 'collective leadership' matters. Consistent with H4, we see that Premier Rann did not completely dominate the political executive and that court politics played a significant role in policymaking. Without denying instances of 'prime ministerial' dominance, this case study shows that the court was central to policymaking. Rather than a dichotomy between the leader and court we see a high degree of collective leadership in the Cabinet room, with the Premier's authority being activated and enhanced through his facilitation of the court process, including but not limited to the Cabinet process. This also highlights notions of the political executive as a think-tank and place of contest which 'puzzled' and at times engaged in dispute to come to a shared understanding of key policy ideas (i.e., articulating joint goals) and make decisions (i.e., take joint action).

The dynamics of court government are an essential component in all of the examples of policymaking considered in this thesis, highlighting the importance of debate, negotiation and contest. An example is the negotiation and ultimate coordination between the Environment Minister Hill and Mineral Resources Minister Holloway concerning managing radioactive waste at mining sites to address both sustainability and state developmentalist concerns. While each participant's personal resources and individual power were necessary contributors to change, they were by themselves insufficient to explain the outcome. The

articulation of joint aims and then the coordination of action was also required to bring about change.

8.3 General Findings

8.3.1 Effectiveness of the Enhanced 4I's Framework

The first more general finding from the case study is that, with the enhancements suggested, the 4I's framework provides a useful theoretical model for investigating policymaking by a political executive. In other words, the 4I's framework has utility beyond its heuristic value of reminding us of the key factors influencing policymaking by the political executive. As discussed in Chapter 2, I extended the 4I's framework in three ways. First, I drew on critical realism (especially Margaret Archer's morphogenic approach) to further specify the theoretical underpinnings of the framework, particularly concerning the definition of institutions and information and the operation of agency and change/status. Second, I widened the understanding of interests with reference to more recent scholarship than that available to Weiss. Third, I used both Archer's concept of corporate agency and the literature relating to court government and court politics to apply the framework to a political executive as a group rather than to individual decision-makers. Each of these adjustments proved useful in discussing policymaking by the political executive. Based on these discussions, I have identified ways to define the elements of the 4I's framework and its operation and application more economically without losing the framework's dynamism.

As noted earlier in this chapter, in combination, the four elements allow us to recognise how actors' motives and actions are dependent on their social, historical and institutional settings without overemphasising path dependence or making the motor for change completely exogenous. In this regard, and linking back to the earlier point about collective leadership, it is corporate agency that most readily powers change or, alternatively, reproduces or reinforces the status quo. My study suggests that information was never a replacement for ideology, and it rarely entered the decision-making process in a form that aligned with the 'evidence hierarchies' (Parkhurst, 2016, p. 29) presented by those promoting evidence-based policy, wherein randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are rated highly and observational studies poorly (Nutley et al., 2013). In the SA case, even when there was an alignment of policy knowledge with statecraft and ideology (for example as was the case with the decision to replace public strategy *Water Proofing Adelaide* with *Water for Good*), information still entered policymaking more as ideas than as detailed evidence (Weiss, 1982, 1983).

A challenge to effectively applying the framework is to distinguish ideas operating at the level of 'information' from the ideational aspects of the institutional arena, ideology and interests. For example, in my case study, Labor's the dominant logic (as part of the institutional arena) was shaped by ideas in 'good currency', and each of the policy frames that constituted its ideology were identified as an 'assumptional basis' (Rein & Schön, 1996). I resolved this challenge by using Archer's morphogenic cycle, wherein the elements of the 4I's framework are understood as cultural elaborations emerging from prior morphogenic (ideational) cycles and in turn become the cultural conditioning for a subsequent cycle (conditioning T¹, interaction T² to T³, elaboration T⁴ – see Figure 2-1) involving interaction in response to policy-relevant information. In the prior cycles, information (in the form of ideas) contributes to the formation of the institutional arena, then information (in the form of ideas) and the institutional arena contribute to the formation of ideology, then interests, which together create the 'cultural conditioning' for the next morphogenic cycle wherein the political executive engages with policy-relevant information to make decisions.

8.3.2 Economical Restatement

As discussed in Chapter 2 and reinforced by the discussion of ideation above, the 4I's framework is an 'interactive model' (Bryant, 2011), meaning the four elements interact in an ongoing and iterative way, without a specific or regular course of interaction. However, for analytical purposes, this thesis examined the SA case by applying the framework in the following order: institutional arena, ideology, interests, information. Situating the institutional arena first aligns with Archer's (analytical) notion that structure and culture necessarily predate any actions which transform the institutional arena. Further, the interaction of interests and ideology as motivations and reasons for action situates them as part of the social or socio-cultural interaction which produces either elaboration or reproduction. Information is an ideational input to this process. This configuration provides a structured and unambiguous way to model the interaction of the four elements of the framework.


Further, I recommend conceptualising the elements of the framework more narrowly. This introduces a greater level of parsimony, while also reinforcing a strong ideational flavour to the framework, which is consistent with Weiss' overall theorising about policymaking. The recommended enhancements are as follows:

1. The macro institutional forces of the broader environment should be explicitly distinguished from the more micro forces of the institutional arena. Figure 8-1 illustrates this recommended adjustment.

2. The cultural manifestations of institutions at both these levels should be a focus. In the broader environment this means concentrating analysis on ideas in good currency. In the institutional arena it means focusing on the political executive's dominant logic and forces such as group dynamics and standard operating procedures.
3. Ideology is more economically defined as 'values', or 'frames' that provide the reasons for a political executive's action (Rein & Schön, 1991, 1996; Schön & Rein, 1994).
4. Political self-interest and the public interest should be viewed as co-existing motivations.
5. Information relevant to political decision-making comprises applied knowledge. The impact of academic or scientific knowledge is mostly only indirectly felt at the institutional level, and not at the interplay of ideology, interests and information.

In summation, while the 4I's framework presents the underlying logic of policymaking as a dialectical interaction of competing forces, introducing Archer's theory of morphogenesis (and with it the notion of emergence) allows for a tendency towards the evolutionary achievement of cumulative goals. In the context of 'puzzling', conflict and confrontation between competing interests or values, there is a role for both exogenous and endogenous forces in driving change.

Figure 8-1: Adjusted Version of the 4I's Framework



8.3.3 Active Policymakers

Clearly, I undertook this research with the assumption that politicians are the ultimate decision-makers and have a central role in all aspects of policymaking (Crick, 1962; Dunn, 2000; Flinders, 2010; Stoker, 2006). The fourth finding to emerge from this case study supports my argument that politicians are *the* policymakers and are actively engaged rather than *merely* either dilettantes or vote maximisers. There are sure to be examples of both dilettantism and vote maximising in the SA political executive's decisions, and there were elements of statecraft and reliance on bureaucratic expertise in the three policy areas considered in this case study. My argument is that, overall, the political executive was actively engaged as the policymaker in these areas.

In responding to the Commonwealth's proposal for a radioactive waste repository in SA, dilettantes would perhaps have accepted the longstanding bureaucrat judgement that it was safe and appropriate to store higher-level radioactive waste from Lucas Heights in this way.

Vote maximisers might have spent a disproportionate amount of public funds to store low-level radioactive waste that was already being managed appropriately in-situ. Instead, the political executive fought the Commonwealth's proposal for political advantage but then backed away from building the promised SA repository because of its dominant logic of fiscal conservatism and its commitment to economic rationalism.

Similarly, regarding the proposal to build a desalination plant, vote maximisers might have decided to build the plant as soon as the opinion polls indicated high levels of public support (late 2006/early 2007). While there was divided bureaucratic advice on this issue, it is arguable that dilettantes with a dominant logic of fiscal conservatism would have followed the very forceful DTF position of not expending public funds on something that would serve a safety net function in the short to medium term. Instead, the political executive 'puzzled' about the issue, weighing its sustainability, economic rationalist and state developmentalism values to arrive at a considered public interest position in favour of building such a plant. In the case of bioscience industry development, dilettantes following the line-agency view might have quickly decided to support a venture capital fund, for instance, or following the DTF position rejected it out of hand. Vote maximisers might instead have added government funding to the pot and spruiked employment benefits widely believed as possible from this sector but understood by the likes of Lomax-Smith to be more modest. Or they might have abandoned the idea altogether in favour of more politically popular issues like providing support to the auto industry. Again, we saw careful consideration and strategic decision-making.

This case study concludes that politicians, like all people, are in part motivated by self-interest. However, the political executive, like most politicians, also had a sense of loyalty to a cause and community, which was, in turn, connected to the achievement of change in the public interest. Through the exercise of a form of 'political craft', the political executive applied a set of values to sift information and make decisions so as to 'make a difference'. In seeking to do so, the political executive confronted citizens' competing expectations of politicians regarding behaviour on the one hand and delivery of results on the other. In the final analysis the public good is hard to realise, and to secure the good a political executive may at times have to 'sacrifice the best' (Bellamy, 2010, p. 414). Therefore, a combination of statecraft and conscience leadership is an essential characteristic of policymaking by a political executive.

8.3.4 Importance of Opposition Years

The fourth and final general finding to highlight is that Labor's experience of opposition fundamentally shaped its policymaking approach as the political executive in 2002–10. It did this in three ways. One was that the understanding the nascent political executive developed as to why it had lost office influenced the policy parameters it established for itself. This understanding manifested itself more generally in the political executive's conservative approach and very specifically in the economic rationalism that was central to its ideology. Another way opposition shaped policymaking was that the nascent political executive's practice of statecraft – in the sense of developing an election-winning strategy, including prevailing in the political argument in the public battle of policy ideas – established a kind of path dependency from which it was difficult to break free. For example, these two factors starkly influenced the political executive's inability to decide how to manage SA's modest stockpile of enriched radioactive waste. The third way the experience of opposition shaped policymaking is that the suite of policies the Labor Opposition placed before the electorate at the 2002 election established a compact with voters that the political executive felt obliged to honour.

This finding's importance is that it alerts researchers into a political executive's policymaking of the need to closely consider a government's years as an opposition to interpret its actions as an executive more fully, especially in the early years in office. Again, Archer's (analytical) notion that structure and culture necessarily predate, and have a constraining/enabling influence on, any action reinforces the obviousness of this point. However, as noted in earlier chapters, the range of scholarship taking this approach is relatively narrow.

In summation, each of the findings outlined above is grounded in empirical evidence, contributes to an under-researched area of public policy scholarship as identified in Chapter 1 (t Hart & Rhodes, 2014; Hartley & Benington, 2011) and extends the theoretical understanding of policymaking by the political executives. Whether lauded or loathed, politicians significantly direct the operation of governments which influence the lives of a polity's citizens. Better understanding how citizens' preferences are converted into policy outcomes by politicians who are necessarily motivated by both the public interest and political self-interest is a valuable step in being able to more effectively opine upon the quality of political judgements and the outcomes they deliver. This contribution to our understanding of policymaking ensures a place for democracy and room for policy-relevant research to contribute to the solution of policy problems, rather than excluding such research in the name of politics' primacy.

8.4 Limitations and Further Research

As outlined above, this research makes a number of valuable contributions to the study of public policy. Nonetheless, there are some limitations to this study. First, it relates to a single case. Selecting a single case was appropriate given the theory-building nature of the research in an area not well understood (Lijphart, 1971). Further, the analytical approach used was designed to identify and understand the operation of causal mechanisms without the need to make across-case comparisons. However, having described the operation of these mechanisms in the SA case, testing of them beyond SA is necessary to provide further confidence in the findings outlined above. A second limitation relates to the focus on three policy areas and the fact that they had their origin in the agenda setting of an opposition. A different set of policy areas or the inclusion of additional policy areas may have painted a different view of the SA political executive in 2002–10 and the policymaking process. This thesis' findings could be tested by studying other policymaking areas involving the same political executive. Third, while I accessed Cabinet documents from 2002–10, associated documents such as ministerial briefing papers, speaking notes and departmental comments on these same Cabinet documents were still embargoed at the time of the research. These additional data being unavailable means the 'storylines' in this qualitative research were not as 'thick' as might otherwise have been the case. Once they become iteratively available over the decade beginning 2023, more detailed insight into points of contest and debate may emerge.

In addition to these three areas – the value of comparative research with other cases, consideration of policy areas beyond bioscience, radioactive waste and water, and inclusion of additional data due to be available in the future – several other areas for further research are worth noting, and three are of particular note. One relates to the 'gendered disposition' noted as operating in Cabinet's functioning. Further research is needed to investigate to what extent and how this may have influenced policymaking. Another concerns coalition theory, where further research could create better understanding of the differences in the legacy-seeking behaviour of 'junior' and 'senior' parties in a coalition. Finally, further research to better identify the factors causing a political executive to emphasise the public interest or political self-interest is highlighted for additional investigation.

8.5 Conclusion

The notion that politicians have to sacrifice the best to secure the good has been widely discussed in political theory but runs counter to views of adherents to the evidence-based

policymaking movement. In part, this is because such sacrifice is often understood as operating through a kind of duplicity. To paraphrase Isaiah Berlin (1996), citizens expect that politicians *are* intellectual, well-read, moral and benevolent but want them *to behave* pragmatically and with political adeptness. Based on this study, I suggest we need not premise our understanding of politics and policymaking on the notion that citizens are hypocritical in having these expectations or that politicians necessarily engage in trickery in responding to them. Instead, we can see these two views – being principled and being pragmatic – as competing aspirations for policymaking which must be held in tension.

By utilising Weiss' 4I's framework, this thesis points to an analytical approach that accepts policymaking is a messy business without expecting it to be a dirty business; it neither pretends politicians can behave in a manner more principled than the rest of us nor accepts they must be less principled. Based on its acceptance of the political nature of all decision-making for or on behalf of groups, the 4I's framework allows us to explore policymaking as the value-laden enterprise it is. Here decision-makers are equally capable of being careerist politicians, doing politics to 'do things in the real world' or idealistic ideologues who are 'too damn romantic to understand' (interview with Conlon, 2018). In the SA case, on the whole, we encountered a political executive 'puzzling' so as to do things in the real world of the institutional arena they inherited and engaging in agential power plays to resolve points of competition between the interests of multiple publics. The processes by which the political executive did this were predominantly shaped by its ideological values but also 'enlightened' by information. This is the political way of policymaking, necessarily involving negotiation and compromise which, at its best, serves the public interest.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Systemic Search for Works Citing the 4I's Framework

I undertook a systematic search (Bettany-Saltikov, 2012; Gough et al., 2013) for works citing Weiss' three core articles on the 4I's framework. I recognised the challenges of 'cited reference searching', including inconsistency and errors in citation formats due to minimal editing of citation databases and indexes and the limited number and functionality of databases with direct or indirect 'cited reference search' capability (CSUN Oviatt Library, 2019). Also, 'cited reference searches' work best for references to journal articles and only one of the three Weiss articles is from a journal.

An indirect 'cited reference search' was undertaken with Google Scholar, JSTOR and Sage Journals Online, by searching for the specific author (Weiss) and title (individually for each of the three core articles) and then checking which had positive returns for citation and then reviewing these returns. A direct search was possible with ProQuest Research Library, Scopus and Web of Science using the cited author and cited title filters in those databases. There were no positive returns in Sage or JSTOR but 809 returns across the remaining databases.

The 809 positive returns were copied into an Excel spreadsheet, sorted and then manually reviewed so as to exclude returns where Weiss cites herself and returns categorised as duplicates (i.e., identified by more than one search engine or identified more than once in a single data set), and identifying returns citing more than one of Weiss' works. Through this process the number of positive returns was reduced to 571 references citing one or more of Weiss' core works on the 4I's framework. It is noteworthy that 411 returns were only in one data base (370 in Google Scholar), which further underlines the poor quality and variable accuracy of data generated from such searches. Accordingly, the conclusions here are very much indicative rather than in any way definitive.

The 571 results citing one or more of Weiss' three core articles were then sorted and tabulated separately by which of the three articles they cited, by type of publication the cited work was in, and by the year they were published. Table A1 below tallies the review results by which one or two of Weiss' three main articles they cited. Ninety-six works cited both Weiss' 1983 and 1995 articles, and one work cited the 1995 and 2001 articles. I found no work citing all three articles. Table A2 below shows that the largest proportion of these 571 positive search results were journal articles (41%) followed by 'grey literature' (23%) and then theses (19%). Table A3 below shows that 22% (n. 125) of the literature citing one or more of Weiss' articles as published in the past five years and more than 60% in the past 15

years. However, this is somewhat of an artifice of more recent improvement in the indexing of citations in search data bases. What it does show is that Weiss' 4I's framework continues to be cited positively in a range of relevant academic literature.

Table A1: Number of Citations of Weiss' 4I's Framework

Weiss' Articles	Number of citations
1983 only	194
1995 only	219
2001 only	61
1983 & 1995	96
1995 & 2001	1
	571

Table A2: Type of Publication in which Weiss' 4I's Framework is Cited

Type of Citation	Number	Percentage
Journal Articles	235	41%
Books	74	13%
Book Chapters	23	4%
Theses	108	19%
Grey Lit	131	23%
	571	

Table A3: Time Period in Which Works Citing Weiss' 4I's Framework Were Published

Time period	Number	Proportion
2016-2000	125	22%
2011-2015	117	20%
2006-2010	118	21%
2001-2005	76	13%
1996-2000	82	14%
1991-1995	21	4%
1986-1990	24	4%
1983-1985	3	1%
n.d.	5	1%
	571	

Appendix 2. Process of Selecting the Three Policy Areas

Seven Criteria

The selection of the three policy areas used in this case study – bioscience industry development, management of radioactive waste and urban water supply – was based on the following seven features, or criteria. First, the Labor Party went to the 2002 election having expressed a policy preference concerning the area. Second, the policy area was not at the time of beginning this research (2017) the focus for public, partisan conflict such that potential interviewees might be less likely to speak candidly about prior related events. Third, policymaking in government involved the portfolio of more than one minister at one or more critical junctures, thereby increasing the possibility of debate and negotiation. Fourth, at significant points, Cabinet considered and made decisions about the policy area. This feature, and the previous one, point to policymaking involving a degree of collective decision-making by the political executive. Fifth, decision-making involved a level of contest, among the ministers or in Cabinet, concerning the direction of the policy area. That is, a potential policy area was contentious enough in 2002–10 that there was likely to have been debate and disagreement among the key actors at some stage in the policymaking process. This contest means there was a greater likelihood of more documentation and the decision-making was less likely to be path dependent and more likely to involve the active agency of the political executive, which would assist with process tracing. Also, such contest increases the likelihood of interviewees having memories about the decision-making. Sixth, at some point a decision of the Commonwealth Government or another significant actor external to the SA political executive had an impact on the political executive's policymaking, thereby generating additional sources of information which could be used in the analysis. Finally, to ensure an appropriate degree of objectivity, the selected policy areas were ones in which the researcher, a former South Australian senior public servant, was not involved as a policy actor.

Applying the Criteria

In the lead-up to the 2002 election, the parliamentary Labor Party issued a series of discussion papers on policy issues. After receiving feedback on these Directions Statements, the party prepared and released 41 election policy statements, listed in Appendix 3. Based on a review of these documents, I identified a list of 17 possible policy areas (the first criterion). By applying the criteria above, I went through a funnelling process to arrive at the three focus areas selected. A further review of the relevant Labor election

statements found that eight either stated or implied that more than one ministry or portfolio would be involved (the third criterion). These were: bioscience industry; defence industry; early childhood; education engagement; homelessness policy; nuclear policy; renewable energy policy; and water policy. Renewable energy was removed from this list because in 2017 (when this research commenced) it was the subject of considerable partisan dispute (the second criterion).

To assess the level of policy activity in the remaining policy areas, I undertook preliminary, simple, keyword searches of the DPC Cabinet documents database, the Capital Media database for government media releases and the Factiva database of print and electronic media. Table A4 below presents the findings of the keyword searches. The keywords were as follows: for bioscience industry development 'bioscience'; for defence industry policy 'defence', for early childhood interventions 'home visiting'; for education engagement 'school retention'; for homelessness 'homeless'; for nuclear policy 'nuclear'; and for water policy 'water'.

Based on these search results, early childhood development, educational engagement and homelessness were eliminated because the searches indicated smaller levels of documentation of policymaking by the political executive. Also, the researcher was involved as a policy actor with both educational engagement and homelessness during the case study period (seventh criterion). Defence industry development was eliminated because of the possibility of access being denied to significant amounts of material on national security grounds.

As a consequence of this preliminary process, the three remaining policy areas were bioscience industry, nuclear policy and water policy. I identified that intersection with Commonwealth Government policymaking was present in all three areas, as were instances of submissions being withdrawn and resubmitted (a proximate measure of contest). During the collection and analysis of primary source material, further relevant documents, including Cabinet documents, were identified and it became apparent that the scope of the nuclear and water policy areas was too broad. The sheer number of possibly relevant documents suggested an analytical task beyond the time and length limitations set for this study. Therefore, as a possible focus area, nuclear policy was narrowed to radioactive waste management, substantially excluding uranium mining policy not related to radioactive waste. Similarly, water policy was focused on urban water supply, largely excluding policymaking relating to agricultural use and environmental flows.

Table A4: Levels of Policy Activity – Results of Preliminary Keyword Searches

Policy Area	Number of Cabinet Documents	Number of Government Media Releases	Number of Media Items
Bioscience Industry	28	41	325
Defence Industry	32	60	350
Early Childhood ("home visiting")	1	3	8
Education Engagement ("school retention")	6	8	41
Homelessness	10	9	68
Nuclear Policy	25	150	4,126
Water Policy	87	814	5,500

Appendix 3. Full list of ALP 'Election 2002' Policies

As shown on the ALP(SA) Branch Website at the end of the Election Campaign

Labor's Plans for ...

- Aged Care, Health and Hospitals
 - Better Hospitals – More beds
 - Better Mental Health Services
 - Carers
 - Cleaner and Healthier Hospitals
 - Protecting Older South Australians From Falls
 - Regional Health and Hospital Services
 - Older South Australians
- Arts and Film
- Community Affairs
 - Families and Communities
 - Northern Region – A Vision for the North
 - Protecting Older South Australians
 - Protecting South Australians
 - Racing Industry
 - Social Inclusion
 - Sport and Recreation
- Education
 - Better Schools – Reopening Sturt Street
 - Primary and Improving Maintenance and Security
 - Extra Classroom Support
 - More Teachers – Improving Literacy and Numeracy
 - Quality Teaching and School Support
 - Tackling School Absenteeism
 - TAFE – Training for Work
- Electricity, Treasury and Government Enterprises
 - A Path to Prosperity
 - Putting the Public Interest Back into Our Private Electricity System
 - Electricity Consumers
 - No More Privatisations
- Environment and Natural Resources [sic]
 - A Greener City
 - Better Reserves and Habitats
 - Environment and Conservation
 - No Nuclear Dumps
 - Our Environment
 - Sustainable Energy
 - Tougher Environmental Protection
- Government and Parliamentary Affairs
 - Accountability and Honesty in Government – Labor's 10 Point Plan
 - Honesty in Government
 - Local Government – Building Stronger Communities
- Industry, Science and Technology
 - Information and Communications Technology
 - Science and Research Council
 - Small Business
 - South Australia's Defence Industry
- The Taxi Industry

Appendix 4. Data Collection Process

Collecting Archival Documents

The process for identifying and collecting archival documents was iterative, building on the initial searches described in Chapter 3 relating to the selection of the three focus policy areas (Section 3.2.1). For official government documents, records from official, restricted access archives and media reports, it began with electronic searches using: the online DPC search tool for browsing all Cabinet documents listed for possible access (DPC, n.d.); the Australia and New Zealand Newsstream database (ProQuest, n.d.) and Factiva (Dow Jones, n.d.) to access full-text media content; Capital Monitor Services (LexisNexis, n.d.), to identify media releases; Capital Monitor Services (LexisNexis, n.d.) and Hansard (Parliament of SA, n.d.) for parliamentary debates; and relevant government department websites to access annual reports and the like, often via the web archive platform Wayback Machine (Internet Archive, n.d.). At this early stage, search terms were restricted to those relating to the 'titles' and keywords associated with the three focus policy areas ('Bioscience', 'Research', 'Science', 'Nuclear', 'Radioactive', 'Uranium', 'Water', 'Drought', 'River Murray', 'Desalination'). As a result of the examination of these documents, additional pertinent material was identified. Also, a detailed timeline was developed for each area of interest, presenting chronologies of relevant events; similar to the summary one present as Figure 3-2. Any questions or issues needing further clarification were noted against the timelines.

Cabinet documents were accessed in four tranches, with the initial application subject to some negotiation. Tranche one consisted of 76 seemingly relevant documents previously requested by other persons and available on the DPC website. For the second tranche, in January 2018, my initial application was for 147 Cabinet papers which required assessment by DPC to ensure there were no public interest reasons to disallow their release. As this was being undertaken without charge, under Section 18(1) of the *Freedom of Information Act 1991*, the Manager, Freedom of Information, determined that the application represented 'an unreasonable diversion of departmental resources, due to the large amount of material captured'. In negotiations, the number of documents was reduced to 80 Cabinet submissions and Cabinet notes. I lodged two further applications for the release of documents, being for 14 in late 2019 (tranche 3) and 11 in early 2020 (tranche 4).

Collecting Interviews

Interviews were undertaken in a venue selected by the interviewee from among a range of generic options, usually an office or meeting room affording appropriate privacy. One

interview was conducted via Skype and another via the telephone, with the remaining being face-to-face interviews. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured style. Such interviewing is about avoiding standardised interview patterns and adapting the questions asked of each interviewee according to a common framework dealing with common themes. As discussed above, current (and former) politicians are inclined to use masking language to sanitise concepts and issues, and disguise meaning. To encourage less disguised accounts, I sought to build rapport and trust by adopting more of a conversational tone and generally 'de-ritualising' the interview situation (Gervais, 2013, pp. 169-172).

To prepare for each interview, I reviewed background information on the interviewee; considered the relevant timeline developed from the archival research, as well as the associated questions; and identified the most pertinent key questions and associated prompting questions (see Appendix 8). This preparation allowed the conversational style and tone to be complemented by an 'interviews to the archives' approach (Gervais, 2013), whereby as the interviewer I prodded interviewees (without leading them) based on the chronology developed from the archives or asked about the meaning of particular documents or events. However, every effort was made to weave such questions into the conversational approach. Consistent with the experience of other researchers (Searing, 1994), this approach saved time and assisted in developing a good rapport.

Appendix 5. List of AJPS Political Chronicles Reviewed

All articles reviewed are listed in publication order, with those cited in the thesis noted.

Author	Year	Title	Reference	Cited
Marshall, V.	1998	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 1998	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 44(4), 603-608. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00042	✓
Parkin, A.	1999	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 1998	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 45(2), 284-292. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00065	✓
Marshall, V.	1999	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 1999	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 45(4), 589-596. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00080	✓
Parkin, A.	2000	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 1999	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 46(2), 254-262. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00094	✓
Marshall, V.	2000	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2000	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 46(4), 588-594. org/10.1111/1467-8497.00113	
Manning, H.	2000	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2000	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 47(2), 285-293. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00230	✓
Parkin, A.	2001	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2001	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 47(4), 568-574. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00244	✓
O'Neil, A.	2002	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2001	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 48(2), 275-284. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00261	✓
Manning, H.	2002	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2002	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 48(4), 576-583. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00275	✓
O'Neil, A.	2003	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2002	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 49(2), 287-292. doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00308	✓
Parkin, A.	2003	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2003	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 49(4), 597-603. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2003.00314.x	✓
Manning, H.	2004	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2003	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 50(2), 287-294. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.247_6.x	✓
Manning, H.	2004	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2004	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 50(4), 618-623. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.354_1.x	✓
Parkin, A.	2005	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2004	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 51(2), 303-309. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2005.374_6.x	✓
Manning, H.	2005	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2005	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 51(4), 606-612. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2005.00395.x	✓
Anderson, G., & Parkin, A.	2006	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2005	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 52(2), 316-322. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2005.00420.x	✓
Manning, H.	2006	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2006	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 52(4), 667-673. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2006.00437a.x	✓
Parkin, A.	2007	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2006	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 53(2), 313-319. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00460.x	✓
Manning, H.	2007	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2007	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 53(4), 646-651. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00478.x	✓
Parkin, A.	2008	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2007	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 54(2), 320-325. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2008.00499.x	✓
Manning, H.	2008	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2008	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 54(4), 640-646. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2008.00519.x	✓
Manning, H.	2009	Political Chronicles: South Australia July-December 2008	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 55(2), 291-297. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2009.01517a.x	✓
Manning, H.	2009	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2009	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 55(4), 618-624. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2009.01535.x	✓
Manning, H.	2010	Political Chronicles: South Australia July to December 2009	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 56(2), 305-311. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2010.01554.x	✓
Manwaring, R.	2010	Political Chronicles: South Australia January to June 2010	<i>Australian Journal of Politics & History</i> , 56(4), 660-666. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2010.01577.x	✓

Appendix 6. Cabinet Documents Accessed and Assessed

Date	Docket Number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
Bioscience					
1998-05-19	DIT210-003	State Science Policy	Hon Graham Ingerson		
1999-07-26	MIT160-001	Biotechnology Commercialisation and Development in South Australia	Hon Iain Evans		
1999-07-26	MPNR032-99CS	A Strategy for Accelerating the Commercial Development of the Biotechnology Industry in South Australia	Hon Rob Kerin	✓	
1999-12-13	DIT210-003	Innovation, Science and Technology Policy Statement	Hon Iain Evans		
2000-01-31	DPC059-99CS	Biotechnology – Economic Development	Hon John Olsen		
2000-07-17	N/A	Principles for Guiding the South Australian Governments Involvement in Biotechnology	Hon Rob Kerin		
2000-11-27	MPRI070-2000CS	Acceleration of SA Bioscience Industry	Hon Rob Kerin		
2000-12-21	MPRI077-2000CS	Bio Innovation SA Business Structure	Hon Rob Kerin		
2000-12-21	MPRI079-2000CS	Approval and Release of Bio Innovation SA Strategy	Hon Rob Kerin		
2001-11-26	DIT268-002	Extension of the Thebarton Bioscience Precinct	Hon Rob Lucas		
2002-04-29	MSIE	Plant Functional Genomics Centre	Hon Jane Lomax-Smith	✓	✓
2002-05-06	MSIE01/02CS	South Australian Bid for the Australian Plant Functional Genomic Centre	Hon Jane Lomax-Smith	✓	✓
2002-09-16	MSIE04-02CS	Bio-Innovation SA Business Structure	Hon Jane Lomax-Smith	✓	
2002-10-21	MSIE04-02CS	Bio Innovation SA Business Structure	Hon Jane Lomax-Smith	✓	
2002-10-28	MSIE07-02CS	South Australian Plant Biotechnology Facility	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	✓
2002-12-16	MSIE10102CS	Australian Centre for Plant Functional Genomics	Hon Jane Lomax-Smith	✓	
2002-12-19	MSIE10102CS	Australian Centre for Plant Functional Genomics	Hon Jane Lomax-Smith	✓	
2003-03-24	DBMT268-002	Extension of the Thebarton Bioscience Precinct	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	
2003-09-04	N/A	Response to Commonwealth Government Science, Technology and Innovation Reviews	N/A	✓	
2003-10-27	MAFF0035-03CS	Release of Draft Genetically Modified Crops Management Bill for Public Consultation	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2003-12-08	MAFF0057-03CS	Environmental Biotechnology Cooperative Research Centre	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2004-01-12	N/A	Report of the Review of Bio Innovation SA	N/A	✓	
2004-03-08	MSIE03-04CS	10 Year Vision for Science, Technology and Innovation in South Australia – STI 10 Vision	Hon Trish White	✓	
2004-06-21	MSIE06-04CS	Bio Innovation SA – Base Budget	Hon Trish White	✓	
2004-09-27	N/A	Project Catalyst Update – Baroness Professor Susan Greenfield's Program	N/A	✓	
2004-11-08	N/A	Project Catalyst November Update: Baroness Professor Susan Greenfield's Program	N/A	✓	
2004-11-15	MSIE09-04CS	Bio Innovation SA – Base Budget	Hon Trish White	✓	
2004-11-22	MSIE09-04CS	Bio Innovation SA – Base Budget	Hon Trish White	✓	
2004-12-09	MSIE09-04CS	Bio Innovation – Base Budget	Hon Trish White	✓	✓
2005-03-14	N/A	Appointment of Board Membership to the Premier's Science and Research Council	N/A		
2005-03-21	MSIE01-05CS	Bio Innovation SA – South Australian Lifescience Venture Capital Fund	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	
2005-05-02	N/A	Developing a Bioeconomy in South Australia – Dr Maire Smith's Report as a Thinker in Residence	N/A	✓	

Date	Docket number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
2005-05-06	MMRD007/05CS	Australian Minerals Science Research Institute	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2005-11-21	N/A	Minutes of the Major Projects and Infrastructure Cabinet Committee – 22 Sept 2005	N/A	✓	
2006-01-16	CSMIE030106	Bio Innovation SA – South Australian Lifescience Venture Capital Fund	Hon Karlene Maywald	✓	✓
2006-01-30	N/A	Report on Progress on Recommendations from Adelaide Thinker in Residence, Dr Maire Smith \Developing a Bioeconomy in South Australia\	N/A	✓	
2006-01-30	N/A	Getting to the Future First – Baroness Professor Susan Greenfield's Report as a Thinker in Residence	N/A	✓	✓
2006-09-25	MSICS06-008	Thebarton Bioscience Business Incubator Development	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon	✓	✓
2008-06-10	MSI03/08CS	South Australian Government Support for Early-Stage Commercialisation of Research – Trans Tasman Commercialisation Fund	Hon Paul Caica	✓	
2009-10-26	N/A	Proposed Science Research Infrastructure Co-Funding Policy	Hon Michael O'Brien	✓	
2009-11-09	N/A	Cooperative Research Centre (CRCs) Guidelines and Annual Reporting on CRCs Receiving Funds Through DFEEST	Hon Michael O'Brien	✓	
2009-12-14	HEAC-2009-00075	South Australian Health and Medical Research Institute	Hon John Hill	✓	✓
General					
1993-11-01		Cabinet Handbook – Material Provided to Cabinet DPC26-93CS. Adelaide: Cabinet Office, Department of the Premier and Cabinet		✓	
2002-03-21	DPC050/96PT7CS	A Staged Approach to the Implementation of the Economic Development Vision of the Government	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	
2002-03-25	T&F021014CS	2002-03 Budget Process	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	✓
2002-04-22	DPC013/02CS	Government Scorecards	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	✓
2002-04-22	DHS10/02CS	Review of Child Protection in SA	Hon Stephanie Key	✓	✓
2002-05-06	DHS12/02CS	Generational Review of South Australia's Health System	Hon Lea Stevens	✓	✓
2002-05-25	DPC013/02CS	Government Scorecards – 100 Days Scorecard	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	✓
2002-06-06	DPC013/02CS	Government Scorecards – 100 Days Scorecard	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	✓
2002-08-12	DPC013/02CS	Government Achievements – Six Months	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	✓
2003-03-10	N/A	Economic Development Board – Implementation of the State of the State Report, the Preparation of the Strategic Economic Plan and the Economic Growth Summit	N/A	✓	
2003-03-31	N/A	Draft Economic Development Plan	N/A	✓	✓
2003-09-08	N/A	State Strategic Plan	N/A	✓	
2004-03-08	DPC007-04CS	State Strategic Plan – Creating Opportunity	Hon Michael David Rann	✓	
2004-12-06	DTED145-002 6/12/04	Osborne Maritime Precinct – Infrastructure Support to Tenix Bid for Air Warfare Destroyer Program		✓	✓
2005-01-31	MINF001/05CS	Strategic Infrastructure Plan – Public Release	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon	✓	

Date	Docket number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
2005-06-27	MUDP 07/05 CS	Osborne Maritime Area – Development Assessment (Considered in Sub-Committee)		✓	✓
2005-10-04	N/A	Premier's Round Table on Sustainability – Appointments	N/A	✓	
2006-06-19	PAMC06-003CS 19/06/0	Techport Australia – Common User Facility Design, Planning and Construction Contract		✓	✓
2002-08-18	MFI 03/06 PN	Public Private Partnerships Project List	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon	✓	
2003-01-20		Guidelines for Preparing Cabinet Submissions. Adelaide: Cabinet Office, Department of the Premier and Cabinet		✓	✓
2003-07-07		Guidelines for Preparing Cabinet Submissions. Adelaide: Cabinet Office, Department of the Premier and Cabinet		✓	✓
Radioactive Waste Management					
1992-12-14	MH030064-059	Proposed National Repository for Radioactive Waste	Mr Martyn Evans	✓	✓
1996-02-19	DPC001-96CS	Australia's Ratification of the Nuclear Safety Convention	Hon Dean Brown		
1999-03-25	DTF015-99CS	Western Mining Corporation – Amendments to Olympic Dam and Stuart Shelf Indenture	Hon Rob Lucas		
1999-03-29	DTF015-99CS	Western Mining Corporation – Amendments to Olympic Dam and Stuart Shelf Indenture	Hon Rob Lucas		
1999-04-01	DTF015-99CS	Western Mining Corporation Amendments to Olympic Dam and Stuart Shelf Indenture	Hon Rob Lucas		
1999-09-13	DTF073-99CS	Western Mining Corporation – Amendments to Olympic Dam and Stuart Shelf Indenture	Hon Rob Lucas		
2000-04-17	MEH 17/04/00	Drafting Instructions for a Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Bill	Hon Iain Evans		✓
2000-05-29	MEH0011-00CS	Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Bill 2000	Hon Iain Evans		
2000-07-10	N/A	Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Bill 2000	Hon Iain Evans		
2000-11-06	N/A	Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition Bill) Referendum Amendment	Hon Iain Evans		
2000-11-13	N/A	Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Bill Amendment to Clause 4	Hon Iain Evans		
2000-12-11	N/A	Beverley Uranium Mine	N/A		
2001-01-22	MEH0011-01CS	Proclamation and Committal of the Nuclear Waste Storage Facility Prohibition Act 2000	Hon Iain Evans		
2001-03-19	N/A	Assessment of the Proposed National Low Level Radioactive Waste Repository Under the Commonwealth's Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999	N/A		
2001-07-30	N/A	Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	N/A		
2001-08-27	N/A	National Store for Australia's Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste	N/A		
2002-03-25	N/A	Review of Reporting Procedures in the SA Uranium Mining Industry	N/A	✓	
2002-04-22	MMRD0058-02C	Review of Reporting Procedures in the SA Uranium Mining Industry	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2002-04-29	MEC0012-02CS	Radioactive Waste: Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2002	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2002-04-29	MMRD0058-02C	Review of Reporting Procedures in the SA Uranium Mining Industry	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2002-05-06	MMRD0058-02C	Review of Reporting Procedures in the SA Uranium Mining Industry	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	✓

Date	Docket number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
2002-05-21	N/A	Nuclear Waste Policy Initiatives	N/A	✓	
2002-09-09	604	Independent Review of Reporting Procedures for Incidents at Uranium Mines	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2002-10-08	MMRD0065-02CS	Independent Review of Reporting Procedures for the SA Uranium Mining Industry	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2002-10-21	MEC0064-02CS	Draft Environment Impact Statement – National (Low/Short-Lived Intermediate) Radioactive Waste Repository	Hon John David Hill	✓	
2002-11-18	MMRD0072-02CS	Amendments to Mining Legislation – Bachmann Report into the SA Uranium Mining Industry	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2003-01-13	N/A	Olympic Dam and Beverley Community Consultative Forum	N/A		
2003-02-17	N/A	Radioactive Waste: Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) (Referendum) Amendment Bill 2002	N/A	✓	
2003-04-07	MEC0029-03CS	Transport of Radioactive Material Regulations 2003	Hon John David Hill	✓	
2003-05-03	MEC0057-03CS	Drafting of Legislation to Reserve Land Under Certain Pastoral Leases as Public Parks and Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000 and the Dangerous Substances Act 1979	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2003-05-26	MEC0057-03CS	Introduction of the Northern Public Park Bill 2003 and the Statutes Amendment (Nuclear Waste) Bill 2003	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2003-07-07	OED095-002-157CS	Possible Expansion of Olympic Dam Mine	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	
2003-07-07	OED095-002 - 7/07/03	Possible Expansion of Olympic Dam Mine	Hon Kevin Owen Foley		
2003-08-18	N/A	Options for the Disposal of Solid Very Low Level Radioactive Waste	N/A	✓	
2003-10-20	MEC0093-03CS	Report on the Audit of Radioactive Material in South Australia	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2003-11-17	MEC0093-03CS	Audit of Radioactive Material in South Australia	Hon John David Hill	✓	
2003-12-01	MEC0093-03CS	Report on the Audit of Radioactive Material in South Australia	Hon John David Hill	✓	
2003-12-04	MEC0093-03CS	Report on the Audit of Radioactive Material in South Australia	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2003-12-11	N/A	Further Action to Stop the National Radioactive Waste Repository in South Australia	N/A	✓	✓
2003-12-15	MEC0029-03CS	Radiation Protection and Control (Transport of Radioactive Substances) Regulations 2003	Hon John David Hill	✓	
2004-02-02	N/A	Invitation to Attend ARPANSA Forum in Adelaide, National Radioactive Waste Repository	N/A		
2004-07-12	N/A	Radium Hill Project Management Plans	N/A	✓	✓
2004-12-06	N/A	Mining Royalties Review	N/A		
2004-12-06	N/A	Radiation Protection Committee	N/A		
2004-12-06	DPC042/04CS	Trial Shipments of Uranium Oxide Concentrate from Olympic Dam and Beverley to Darwin, Northern Territory	Hon Paul Holloway		
2005-11-21	N/A	Feasibility Study into Interim Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Waste in SA	N/A	✓	✓
2006-02-06	MIT06-003CS	Desalination Plant for Olympic Dam and Upper Spencer Gulf	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	✓
2006-02-16	N/A	Progress Report – Proposed Olympic Dam Expansion	N/A	✓	

Date	Docket number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
2006-09-04	N/A	Licence to Mine and Mill Radioactive Ores from the Honeymoon Uranium Project	N/A	✓	
2006-09-25	N/A	Licence to Mine and Mill Radioactive Ores for the Honeymoon Uranium Project	N/A	✓	
2006-09-25	N/A	Olympic Dam – EIS Process	N/A		
2006-10-16	N/A	Olympic Dam – Appointment of Resources	N/A		
2006-09-04	N/A	Licence to Mine and Mill Radioactive Ores from the Honeymoon Uranium Project	N/A	✓	
Water Supply					
2000-10-23	N/A	Health of the Murray – Development of a Communication Strategy to Reinforce South Australia's Interest in the Health of the River Murray	Hon John Olsen		
2002-03-21	MGE0001/02CS	Appointment of the Chair of the South Australian Water Corporation Board	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon		
2002-04-04	N/A	Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council, Meeting, 12 April 2002, Corowa NSW	N/A		
2002-04-14	DPC014-02CS	Murray Darling Basin Agreement Amending Agreement (MDBAAA) and the River Murray Environmental Flows Fund	Hon Michael David Rann		
2002-04-29	N/A	Clare Valley Region Water Supply Scheme	N/A		
2002-06-11	MRM0002-02CS	Proposed River Murray Act – Release of Public Discussion Paper	Hon John David Hill		
2002-06-20	TFD043/02CS	Establishment of the Essential Services Commission	Hon Kevin Owen Foley		
2002-07-29	MGE010/02CS	SA Water Workforce Refreshment Program 2002/03 – 2004/05	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon		
2002-09-30	MRM0005-02CS	Consultation Draft River Murray Bill and Explanatory Paper	Hon John David Hill		
2002-11-04	EC02/0070CS	Submission to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Inquiry into Future Water Supplies for Australia's Rural Industries and Communities.	Hon John David Hill		
2002-11-18	MGE018/02CS	SA Water IT Contract with Aspect Computing	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon		
2002-11-25	N/A	Availability of Water Resources from the River Murray for 2002/03 and Implications for South Australia	N/A		
2002-11-25	MGE025/02CS	Setting of Water Prices for 2003/2004	Hon Patrick Frederick Conlon		
2002-12-18	N/A	River Murray Forum: Obtaining a Consensus of Views Among South Australian Commonwealth and State Parliamentarians on the Health of the River Murray	N/A		
2003-01-20	N/A	Drought in the Lower River Murray	N/A	✓	✓
2003-02-10	MEC0016-03CS	Development of an Integrated 20 Year Strategic Water Plan for Adelaide and its Environs (Water Proofing Adelaide)	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2003-05-26	TFD056-03CS	Waterworks (River Murray Levy) Amendment Bill 2003	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	✓
2003-05-29	TFD060-03CS	Waterworks (Save the River Murray Levy) Amendment Bill 2003	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	✓
2003-08-21	N/A	Proposal for an Advance of Water from Snowy Hydro Limited to Augment South Australian River Murray Water Availability for 2003/04	N/A		
2003-10-11	MEC0076-04CS	Water Proofing Adelaide Draft Strategy	Hon John David Hill		

Date	Docket number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
2004-03-08	DTF008-04CS	Save the River Murray Levy – Marina Berths	Hon John David Hill	✓	
2004-05-24	MRM0002-04CS	Release of the Report – Sharing the Services and Costs of Managing the River Murray in South Australia	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	
2004-06-21	N/A	Save the River Murray Levy – Not-for-Profit Organisations	N/A	✓	
2004-08-30	N/A	Water Challenges for South Australia – Peter Cullen's Report as a Thinker in Residence	N/A		
2004-10-11	N/A	Government Response to Peter Cullen's Thinker-in-Residence Report	N/A		
2004-10-11	MRM0005-04CS	Environmental Flows for the River Murray – South Australia's Framework for Collective Action to Restore River Health 2005-2010 – Draft for Consultation	Hon Karlene Maywald		
2004-10-18	MEC0076-04CS	Water Proofing Adelaide Draft Strategy	Hon John David Hill		
2004-11-15	MEC0076-04CS	Water Proofing Adelaide Draft Strategy	Hon Michael John Wright	✓	
2005-01-24	MRM001-05CS	Irrigation and Other Assets, Financial Adjustments between the Treasurer, Minister for the River Murray and SA Water	Hon Michael John Wright		
2005-01-24	DPC024-04CS	Conferral of Ministerial Powers on the Minister for the River Murray	Hon Michael David Rann		
2005-04-26	N/A	River Murray Water Allocations 2005/06	N/A		
2005-07-11	MEC0052-05CS	Water Proofing Adelaide Final Strategy	Hon Michael John Wright	✓	✓
2005-07-25	N/A	River Murray High Level Taskforce Review	N/A	✓	
2005-10-17	EC05/0066CS	Government Response to Professor Peter Cullen's Report: Water Challenges for South Australia in the 21st Century	Hon John David Hill	✓	✓
2006-01-23	N/A	South Australian River Murray Drought Water Allocation Policy	N/A		
2006-08-28	TF06-040CS	National Water Initiative Urban Water and Wastewater Pricing Obligations: Discussions with the National Water Commission	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	
2006-09-25	N/A	Water Restrictions in 2006/07	N/A		
2006-10-12	SAW06-011CS	Water Restrictions for 2006/07	Hon Michael John Wright		
2006-10-23	N/A	Further Deterioration in the River Murray Water Resource Outlook 2006-07	N/A	✓	
2006-11-06	N/A	Water Restrictions – SA Water Information	N/A		
2006-11-13	N/A	Water Restrictions – SA Water Information	N/A		
2006-11-20	SAW06-012CS	Setting Water and Sewerage Prices for 2007-08, and In-Principle Revenue Direction for the Period to 2011-12	Hon Michael John Wright		
2006-11-20	SAW06-012CSPT2	Setting Water and Sewerage Prices for 2007-08, and In-Principle Revenue Direction for the Period to 2011-12 – Supplement	Hon Michael John Wright		
2006-11-27	SAW06-013CS	Level 3 Water Restrictions	Hon Michael John Wright	✓	
2006-12-04	SAW06-012CS	Setting Water and Sewerage Prices for 2007-08, and In-Principle Revenue Direction for the Period to 2011-12	Hon Michael John Wright		
2006-12-04	SAW06-012CSPT3	Setting Water and Sewerage Prices for 2007-08 and In-Principle Revenue Direction for the Period to 2011-12 – Supplement	Hon Michael John Wright		
2006-12-05	SAW06-012CSPT3	Setting Water and Sewerage Prices for 2007-08 and In-Principle Revenue Direction for the Period to 2011-12 – Supplement	Hon Michael John Wright		
2006-12-11	SAW06-014CS	Country Water Quality Improvement Program – Non-Filtered River Murray Supplies	Hon Michael John Wright		
2007-02-05	T&F07/010CS	Water Security 2007/08	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	✓

Date	Docket number	Title	Submitting Minister	Coded	Cited
2007-03-01	MWSCS07/010	Location and Concept Design for a Temporary Weir for Water Security Purposes	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	
2007-03-13	N/A	Establishment of Desalination Working Group	N/A	✓	✓
2007-03-19	N/A	New Administrative Arrangements – Water Security	N/A	✓	✓
2007-04-23	N/A	Potential for Adelaide Plains Aquifers to be Used as an Emergency Water Supply	N/A	✓	
2007-05-07	N/A	Desalination Working Group – Issues Summary	N/A	✓	
2007-08-27	N/A	Interim Report of Desalination Working Group	N/A	✓	✓
2007-09-27	MWSCS07/065	Water Security 2007/08	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	
2007-11-26	MWSCS07/077	Desalination Working Group Report	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	✓
2007-12-10	N/A	Restricting Irrigators from SA Water's System	N/A	✓	
2008-07-10	MWSCS08/056	Glenelg to Adelaide Park Lands Recycled Water Project	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	
2008-07-31	MRMCS08/067	Water Security Situation and Contingency Planning	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	
2008-09-22	MWSCS08/091	Appointment of a Commissioner for Water Security	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	
2008-09-22	MWSCS08/084	Adelaide Desalination Project	Hon Kevin Owen Foley	✓	
2008-11-13	MWSCS08/103	Adelaide Desalination Plant	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	
2009-06-15	MUDP09/016CS	Water Sensitive Urban Design in Greater Adelaide	Hon Paul Holloway	✓	
2009-06-22	MWSCS09/051	Water for Good – A Plan to Ensure Our Water Future to 2050	Hon Karlene Ann Maywald	✓	
2008-12-15	N/A	Ongoing SA Government Drought Support Measures – Phase 9	N/A	✓	✓

Appendix 7. Interviewees

Interviewee (date interviewed). Position(s) relevant to this research	Audio-recorded
Caica, P. (2019, January 29). Minister for Science and Information Economy, 6 February 2007 to 2 March 2009.	319319✓
Cappo, D. (2019, January 7). Chair, Social Inclusion Board 2002-11; Commissioner for Social Inclusion, 2006-11.	✗
Conlon, P. F. (2018, August 23). Manager of Government Business in House of Assembly, March 2002 to March 2010; Chair of ALP Caucus March, 2002 to March 2010; Minister for Government Enterprises, 6 March 2002 to 13 May 2003.	319319✓
Foley, K. (2018, August 30). Deputy Premier and Treasurer from 6 March 2002.	319319✓
Hill, J. (2018, October 30). Minister for River Murray, 6 March 2002 to 23 July 2004; Minister for Environment and Conservation, 6 March 2002 to 23 March 2006; Minister for Health, 4 November 2005 to 25 March 2010.	319319✓
Holloway, P. (2019, March 13). Minister for Mineral Resources Development, 6 March 2002 to 25 March 2010.	319319✓
Lomax-Smith, J. (2018, September 27). Minister for Science and Information Economy, 6 March 2002 to 5 May 2004.	319319✓
Maywald, K. (2018, November 23). Minister for River Murray, 23 July 2004 to 25 March 2010; Minister for Science and Information Economy, 23 March 2005 to 6 February 2007; Minister for Water Security, 6 February 2007 to 25 March 2010.	319319✓
McCann, W. (2018, December 18). Chief Executive, Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2000–09.	319319✓
Political Advisor 1 (2018, August 28). ALP Partisan Advisor to Minister of the Crown.	319319✓
Political Advisor 2 (2018, September 7). ALP Partisan Advisor to Minister of the Crown.	319319✓
Political Advisor 3 (2018, September 18). ALP Partisan Advisor to Minister of the Crown.	319319✓
Public Servant 1 (2018, September 6). Member of the South Australia Public Service.	319319✓

Interviewee (date interviewed). Position(s) relevant to this research	Audio-recorded
Public Servant 2 (2018, October 29). Member of the South Australia Public Service.	✘
Public Servant 3 (2018, December 4). Member of the South Australia Public Service.	320320✓
Public Servant 4 (2019, January 29). Member of the South Australia Public Service.	✘
Public Servant 5 (2019, March 5). Member of the South Australia Public Service.	320320✓
Rann, M. (2018, June 28). Premier from 6 March 2002.	320320✓
Smith, T. (2019, January 23). Executive Director, Office of the Executive Committee of Cabinet Aug 2005 – Apr 2007; Deputy Chief Executive, Department of the Premier and Cabinet and Head of Cabinet Office May 2007 – May 2010.	320320✓
Stevens, L. (2018, June 13). Minister for Health, 6 March 2002 to 4 November 2005.	320320✓
White, P.L. (Trish) (2018). Minister for Science and Information Economy, 5 March 2004 - 17 March 2005.	✘
Wright, M. (2018, December 10). Minister for Administrative Services, 5 March 2004 - 23 March 2006; Minister for Administrative Services and Government Enterprises; 23 March 2006 - 14 December 2006; Minister for Government Enterprises, 14 December 2006 - 24 July 2008.	320320✓

Appendix 8. Initial Framework for Enquiry and Analysis

Topics	Key Questions	Prompting Questions
Force 1: Information: What 'information' did the political executive (PE) have available to it?		
Types of Information	Was the information in the form of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data • Ideas • Paradigms • Argument (Radaelli, 1995) 	What kind of information or advice did you/the PE rely on in framing the bio-science/nuclear/water policy?
Users of the Information	Which actors used which types of information?	
Categories of Information	Was the information/knowledge/ideas available to the PE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • scientific knowledge • political knowledge • the professional and technical knowledge of practitioners; or • the experiential knowledge of service users and stakeholders? (Head, 2008, 2010) 	What kind of information or advice to you/the PE rely on in framing the bio-science/nuclear/water policy?
Salience of Information	Which of these kinds and types of information were most relied upon and which were least relied upon in decision-making? Is there any evidence of contradictory and opposing information/knowledge/ideas?	Which of these kinds of information or advice were the most influential, and why?
Sources of Information	What were the sources of information for the election policy regarding bio-science/nuclear/water policy and any post-election developments of these policy position (Weiss, 1983, 1995)?	Who provided the information or advice? OR What was the channel through which the information came to you?
Role of the information	Was the information used to support the policy proposal or to critique or undermine it?	What purpose did the information serve in the policymaking process? How did the PE use the information?
Types of Utilisation	How was the information used cognitively? How could the information usage be categorised? (Weiss, 1979)	
Influence of Election Policy	To what extent did policy platforms/manifestos/proposals advanced during the election constrain or direct the policy choices made in government (Flynn, 2011, 2017)?	What role did the election policy relating to bio-science/nuclear/water policy play in the post-election policy environment?

Topics	Key Questions	Prompting Questions
Ideology: What was the 'ideology' of the PE that could have influenced the way it selected and used information in policymaking?		
Philosophy	How could the PE approach be characterised in terms of socially, economically and environmentally (Norgaard, 1984, 1988)?	<p>How would you characterise your/the PE's approach to social issues?</p> <p>How would you characterise your/the PE's approach to economic issues?</p> <p>How would you characterise your/the PE's approach to environmental issues?</p> <p>When is it appropriate to prioritise the needs of the environment over the needs of people?</p> <p>When is it appropriate to prioritise the needs of the environment over the economic needs of the state?</p>
Paradigms	<p>Is there any evidence of one or more policy paradigms operating in the bio-science/nuclear/water policy domain?</p> <p>Is there any evidence of a paradigm shift in the PE's approach to policymaking vis-à-vis the previous administration?</p> <p>Is there any evidence of a paradigm shift in the PE's approach to the bio-science/nuclear/water policy domain (Baumgartner, 2014; Daigneault, 2014a, 2014b; Princen & Hart, 2014)?</p>	<p>What sort of ideas, if any, influenced the PE's policymaking in the bio-science/nuclear/water policy domain?</p> <p>How were they different from the ideas that influenced the previous government?</p> <p>Did these ideas remain constant or did they change over time?</p>
Beliefs and values	<p>What were the shared beliefs and values of the PE relevant to bio-science/nuclear/water policy?</p> <p>What were the conflicting individual beliefs and values among PE members relevant to bio-science/nuclear/water policy?</p>	
Political predispositions	How could the PE be characterised politically?	How would you characterise your/the PE's political leaning?

Topics	Key Questions	Prompting Questions
Interest: What were the 'interests' of the PE that could have influenced the way it selected and used information in policymaking?		
<p>Policymaking identity</p>	<p>Can ministerial members of the PE be categorised as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • leaders, team players or followers (Andeweg, 2014)? • ideologues, partisans or loyalists (Alexiadou, 2015, 2016)? • administrators or politicians (Searing, 1994)? • policy initiators, policy selectors, executives, ambassadors or minimalists (Headey, 1975)? <p>Can partisan advisors members of the PE be categorised as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • glorified gofers, policy experts or good generalists (Connaughton, 2010)? 	<p>How did you conduct yourself in Cabinet decision-making?</p> <p>Did you limit your contribution to matters concerning your own department, or did you also actively participate in matters that related solely to other departments?</p> <p>Whom did you rely on most for policy and strategy advice?</p> <p>How much does either political weight or force of personality allow a minister to change policy direction?</p> <p>What did a typical day as a political advisor look like for you?</p> <p>What role did you play and what knowledge did you bring to the policymaking process?</p> <p>To what extent did your minister expect you to be involved in policy formulation?</p> <p>In what ways did you seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of policy?</p>
<p>Power Relations</p>	<p>Where was the power 'centre of gravity' in the decision-making generally and in relation to bio-science/nuclear/water policy (Wenzelburger & Staff, 2017)?</p> <p>What types of power were used by those with the power 'centre of gravity' (French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1983)?</p>	<p>Were there cliques within the PE?</p> <p>If so, did some have more or less influence than others?</p> <p>How, if at all, did these kinds of relations affect the policymaking process?</p>
<p>Motivations</p>	<p>To what extent were the members of the PE motivated by a desire or intention to build institutional capital?</p> <p>To what extent were the members of the PE driven by political-strategic motives?</p> <p>To what extent were the members of the PE driven by psychological motives?</p> <p>To what extent were the members of the PE driven by altruistic motives (Karsten, 2015)?</p>	<p>What was your interest in this policy domain?</p> <p>Why was it important to pursue this policy agenda?</p> <p>What did the government gain from the developments in the policy?</p> <p>What did South Australia gain from the developments in the policy?</p>
Institutional Arena: In what ways, if any, was the decision-making of the PE constrained or directed by 'institutional' arrangements?		
<p>'Policy succession'</p>	<p>To what extent did pre-existing bio-science/nuclear/water policies constrain the policymaking of the government?</p>	<p>What were the pre-existing policies in this area?</p> <p>What effect, if any, did these pre-existing policies have on the government's change agenda?</p>

Topics	Key Questions	Prompting Questions
Structures	<p>To what extent did state structures define who had power to make policy decisions (Diamond, 2014)?</p> <p>To what extent were departmental structures a source of continuity, stability or opposition to policy change?</p> <p>Did ministers and officials operate on the basis of symbiosis or conflict in the policymaking process?</p> <p>To what extent did new structures (e.g. Powerful Boards (EDB, SIB, SRT); Thinkers In Residence Program; Executive Committee of Cabinet) bypass traditional decision-making process (Egeberg, 2012)?</p>	<p>Do you think participation in the policy debate by any member of the PE was constrained by their role?</p> <p>Were Cabinet meetings and Cabinet committees the place in which important issues were discussed in detail?</p> <p>How important was the Premier in determining matters related to your department?</p> <p>In what ways did changes to departmental structures and responsibilities in 2002 affect policymaking in bio-science, nuclear and water policy?</p> <p>When you took on portfolio X, in what ways did you change the way your department briefed you in general, on strategic issues and for Cabinet?</p> <p>How much confidence did you have in the advice of your department to start with and then over time?</p> <p>How did new structures like 'x' affect policymaking in bio-science, nuclear and water policy?</p>

Topics	Key Questions	Prompting Questions
Culture	<p>Upon forming government in March 2002:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the sense of allegiance to the Premier? 	<p>How was the Premier perceived by his Cabinet colleagues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the lead up to and during the 2002 election campaign? • Upon forming governments • Going into the 2006 election?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the sense of mission among the PE, generally and in relation to bio-science/nuclear/water policy? 	<p>How do you think the Shadow Cabinet and Caucus felt about the collection of policies the party took to the 2002 election?</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there an esprit de corps and, if so, how could it be characterised? 	<p>How did the Shadow Cabinet operate?</p> <p>What was the feeling in the room of the first Cabinet meeting in March 2002?</p> <p>How differently did the Cabinet operate from the Shadow Cabinet?</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the sagas the members of the PE shared about past leaders and past ALP governments, generally and in relation to bio-science/nuclear/water policy (Schein & Schein, 2017)? 	<p>How was the Rann government different to the Dunstan, Bannon and Arnold governments, generally and in relation to bio-science/nuclear/water policy?</p>
	<p>What were the traditions/rituals of the PE?</p>	<p>In terms of policymaking, what made the Rann government a Labor Government?</p>
	<p>Can public servant members of the PE be categorised as: technicians, legalists, brokers, facilitators, partisans, advocates or trustees (Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach & Rockman, 1997, 2001)?</p>	<p>Did you see your role as to develop policy or just to implement it?</p> <p>In what ways did you seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of this policy?</p> <p>To what extent did you expect the minister's office to involve you in policy formulation?</p> <p>What level of discretion did you have in terms of decision-making in general and policymaking in particular?</p> <p>How did you see you role vis-à-vis groups and interests outside of government?</p>

Topics	Key Questions	Prompting Questions
Standard operating procedures	<p>To what extent did the procedures in Cabinet Handbook support or constrain the policymaking agenda of the PE?</p> <p>Did the PE's changes to the Cabinet Handbook make any difference?</p>	<p>How rule bound was the Cabinet process?</p> <p>Did this matter?</p> <p>How aware of the details of the Cabinet Handbook were you?</p> <p>How stringently did the Cabinet Office and the Premier enforce the procedures in it?</p>
Organisational rules	<p>What were the informal rules for the way the Rann PE approached policymaking?</p> <p>What was the expected status/role/influence of ALP party platform?</p> <p>What was the expected status/role/influence of the ALP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Factional Conveners? • State Executive? 	<p>What were the unspoken rules of the PE?</p> <p>Where there any tacit rules of non-intervention in the interests of another Cabinet minister?</p> <p>What influence did the party platform have on your approach to policymaking generally and specifically with regard to bio-science/nuclear/water policy?</p> <p>How frequently did you report to party functionaries on the work of the government: caucus; factional leaders within the parliamentary party; factional leaders of the party who were not Members of Parliament?</p> <p>Did you ever receive directions from a party functionary: factional leaders within the parliamentary party; factional leaders of the party who were not Members of Parliament; member of party executive?</p>