

**Cooperation and Confrontation in the  
East China Sea Dispute:  
Lessons for China-Japan Relations**

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## Summary

A gap exists in our understanding of the East China Sea territorial dispute. This dispute is concerned with the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the contested jurisdiction over related maritime areas granted under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. Scholarship on the dispute can be divided into two camps. On the one hand are scholars who analyse the impact of material and ideational interests on escalation dynamics and dispute management. On the other side are those who have outlined several innovative delimitation solutions to the dispute, despite the lack of political will in China and Japan to pursue them. Absent from this debate is an understanding of the process by which Chinese and Japanese leaders pursue cooperative policy choices over confrontational ones. By exploring the cooperative and confrontational dynamics of the East China Sea dispute, this thesis aims to identify the conditions under which the political will to pursue settlement may emerge. This research aim is accomplished by a comparison between two cases of cooperation—over fisheries and marine scientific research—with two cases of confrontation, both over the Chunxiao gas field. Viewed through Harvey Starr's opportunity and willingness framework, the aim is to identify the conditions under which China and Japan may develop the political will to settle the East China Sea dispute. In light of the nascent joint development agreement reached in June 2008, and the importance of joint development as a first step towards the settlement options proposed by Ji Guoxing, Mark Valencia, and others, this thesis is particularly timely and provides a substantial contribution to the existing scholarly literature in the issue area.

## **Declaration**

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

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## Acronyms

Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE)
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
Arabian Oil Company (AOC)
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Basic Ocean Law (BOL)
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Confidence Building Measure (CBM)
Continental Shelf Convention (CSC)
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
Distant Water Fishery (DWF)
East China Sea (ECS)
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Exclusive Fisheries Zone (EFZ)
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Japan Coast Guard (JCG)
Japan Defense Agency (JDA)
Japan Fisheries Agency (JFA)
Japan National Oil Company (JNOC)
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)
Japan Petroleum Exploration Company (JAPEX)
Joint Development Zone (JDZ)
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (LTC)
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
Marine Scientific Research (MSR)
Maritime Safety Agency (MSA)
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP)
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
Ministry of Defense (MOD)
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
Ministry of Finance (MOF)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (MFA)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MOFA)
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives (NFFC)
National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS)
National Oil Company (NOC)
National People's Congress (NPC)
Official Development Assistance (ODA)
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)



People's Republic of China (PRC)
Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ)
Sea Line of Communication (SLOC)
Self-Defense Force (SDF)
South China Sea (SCS)
State Oceanic Administration (SOA)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
World Trade Organization (WTO)
<b>Units</b>
Barrels per day (b/d)
Cubic Feet (cf)
Million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe)
Nautical mile (nm)