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# **The impact of the Israeli Separation Wall on Palestinian livelihoods in the West Bank**

**A Thesis Submitted to the  
College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences,  
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## **Declaration**

I am aware of the University's policy on Academic Dishonesty, and, except where appropriately acknowledged this thesis is my own work, has been expressed in my own words and has not previously been submitted for assessment, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Khadija Asmar

Date: 15 December 2020

## **Abstract**

Since 1948 Palestinians and the land of Palestine have experienced a series of changes, challenges and restrictions which have affected all sectors of Palestinian life. When Israel was established in 1948, it covered 33 percent of the territory of historic Palestine. After the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the remaining parts of Palestine and controlled the land and Palestinians. Since that time, Israel has been carrying out practices that violate human rights in the Palestinian territories, such as confiscation of land, demolitions, and political imprisonment against Palestinians. These practices by the Israeli occupation have led to resistance from the Palestinian side against Israel. As a result of this resistance, the Israeli government decided to build a wall in the West Bank to separate the Palestinian territories from the Israeli areas. To understand how the Wall affected Palestinians in the West Bank, this thesis reviews literature and data from international organizations such as United Nations, Amnesty international, World Bank. These data relate to the Separation Wall impact on Palestinian communities in the West Bank on both economic and social levels. Data clarify the indicators; services, agriculture, Palestinian workers in the Israeli labor market, land confiscation and the demolition of Palestinian structures, on the social level data on Palestinian displacing, family and communities relations, educational sector, permits granted to Palestinians by the Israeli government.

For a better understanding of the Wall impact, this thesis explains the Wall construction, perspectives, and goals. Based on available secondary sources this work explores how the Wall affects Palestinian communities' livelihood, social relations, and economy in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Wall and the accompanying regime that includes gates, checkpoints, and permit requisition, have restricted Palestinian movements and access to other Palestinian lands or Israeli areas. Although the Israeli government's promoted aim is to provide security to Israeli areas by building the Wall to prevent Palestinian attacks, this thesis uncovers the different hidden aims beyond the Wall construction by exploring the Wall's negative impacts on the Palestinian communities in the West Bank, and the Palestinian response and adaptation to the Wall construction and its impact.

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## **List of ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

B'Tselem	Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
DFID	Department for International Development
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMFA	Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics
PLO	Palestinian liberation organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UN OCHA oPt	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory

## **Chapter 1: The impact of the Israeli Separation Wall on Palestinians livelihood in the West Bank - an introduction**

This thesis discusses the impacts that the Separation Wall created by the Government of Israel against the Palestinians who live in the West Bank. As a Palestinian from the West Bank, born in Jerusalem and living the daily impacts of the Wall, I am conducting this thesis from a Palestinian perspective. As a person who witnessed the construction of the Wall in the West Bank and reviewed the literature related to the topic, I will adopt the term "Separation Wall" that is used in much of the academic literature, or simply "Wall". The Wall separates Palestinian cities, villages, towns, and communities from each other, and prevents them from practicing their normal lives easily. It also separates East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and makes Palestinian access very difficult. I use the term "Wall", not "fence" or "barrier", because a fence or barrier could be understood as something temporary, rather than the actual, huge concrete structure that makes the separation and represents the current border (Amir, 2011; Adnan, 2015; Karam, 2017; Ozguc, 2020).

By 2019, the majority of the Wall was constructed, cutting deep into the West Bank, which Israel has occupied since the Six Day War of 1967. Its route through the occupied West Bank territories affects directly 210,000 Palestinians residing in 67 cities, villages and towns, in addition to impacting the lives of all Palestinians who live in the West Bank (Jones et al 2016, p.271). Palestinians' daily lives have been transformed through the increase of Israeli military checkpoints relating to the Wall, which are now the main part of people's daily routine and cut Palestinians off from their land; and which separate Palestinians in East Jerusalem from family members in the West Bank (Karam, 2017; Adnan, 2015; Braverman, 2012). This has permanently affected their daily movements, work, properties demolition, land confiscation, and their livelihood.

According to Williams et al. (2014, p.305) livelihoods in the developing countries are based on the household, which is viewed as including "a range of assets, classified as financial capital (e.g. money), physical capital (e.g. tools or equipment), human capital (skills and education of household members), social capital (connections and relationships of trust) and natural capital (e.g. land or access to natural resources)". Self-employment, Informal employment, and small businesses are considered as part



of a livelihoods approach. The UK Department for International Development, as cited in Williams et al. (2014, p.305) defines livelihoods as:

"The capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base". (DFID, 1999)

This definition matches with the Palestinian situation because the livelihood in Palestine mainly relies on both: on materials, such as assets, land and natural resources, and small business, and also on the social and community relations.

### **1.1 The Palestinian – Israeli conflict and the origins of the Wall**

Since 1948, Palestinians and the land of Palestine have experienced a series of changes, challenges and restrictions which have affected all sectors of Palestinian life. Palestinians initially suffered forced displacement in 1948 when Israel was created, followed by Israeli occupation (1967 to date) of the remaining land of Palestine - West Bank and Gaza (Adnan, 2015; Karam, 2017; Dolphin, 2006; Amir, 2011; Amir & Kotef, 2015). The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories was accompanied by many oppressive and coercive measures and policies against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip, as they are internationally considered lands under the control of the Israeli occupation power (Adnan, 2015; Karam, 2017; Dolphin, 2006). The Israeli measures were often responded to by national Palestinian refusal and resistance in Palestinian communities. The Israeli occupation military measures and escalations such as demolitions, land confiscations, restricting of free movements, or unlawful killings against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted into two uprisings (Intifada)<sup>1</sup>, the first Intifada lasted from 1987 until 1993, ending with the signing of the Oslo Accords. However, Israeli human rights violations in the occupied Palestinian territories continued with forced displacement, unlawful killings, abusive detention, the closure of the Gaza Strip and building Israeli settlements in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, along with discriminatory policies that disadvantage Palestinians.

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<sup>1</sup> Intifada or intifadah, an Arabic word means "shaking off". That refers to the two popular uprisings of Palestinians in Gaza strip and the West Bank as resistance against the Israeli occupation and creating an independent Palestinian state (Dolphin 2015).

Thus, the second Intifada occurred in 2000 (Amir, 2011; Adnan, 2015; Nasrallah, 2013). After the death of the former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, who was supporting the Palestinian armed resistance against the Israeli occupation, Mahmood Abas, also called "Abu Mazen", was elected in 2005 as a new Palestinian president (Nasrallah 2013, p.78). In the following year, he signed an agreement with the Israeli government to end the Palestinian armed resistance, thus, some literature and positions consider the second Intifada finished by then, some consider it is ongoing because of the Israeli polices and measures that took place in the second Intifada against Palestinians still continue (Nasrallah, 2013, pp. 78-81). Furthermore, the political, social, and economic instability caused by the second Intifada and the Israeli military attacks and military escalation against Palestinians, within the Palestinian community still exist (Abdallah & Swaileh 2011, p.543; Nasrallah 2013, pp.80-1).

In response to the second Intifada, in 2002, the Israeli government decided to build a barrier between the Israeli and Palestinian areas around the West Bank, claiming that the purpose is to prevent violent attacks by Palestinians in Israel (Dolphin 2006, p.37). However, the idea of an Israeli-built Wall goes back to the June 1967 war when an Israeli proposal to draw defensible borders from one side was prepared (Dolphin 2006, p.43). The Israeli government drew up plans to separate the Palestinian areas from Israel along the "Green Line" as named officially and internationally, whose proper name is the 1949 Armistice Line, drawn after Israel's establishment in 1948. It refers to the border separating pre-1967 Israel from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)<sup>2</sup> and constitutes an internationally recognised border (Fig. 1.1). The proposal of the separation initially revolved around a separation zone or a protected area (Cohen, 2006; Baskin, 2002; Falk, 2012). Then the matter turned into a Separation Wall, as the Israeli government agreed on this idea as a project in 1988 (Cohen, 2006; Baskin, 2002; Falk, 2012). Over the years, between 1988 and 2000, successive Israeli governments worked to erect fences and concrete walls to protect settlements in the West Bank.

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<sup>2</sup> The Occupied Palestinian Territories is the term used after the 1967 war, to refer to Gaza strip and the West Bank (Amir, 2011).

However, with the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 and the return of armed Palestinian resistance and attacks on Israeli cities and settlements, a plan was approved and adopted to erect a "security fence" separating Palestinian areas from Israel in 2001 (Cohen, 2006; Baskin, 2002; Falk, 2012; Nasrallah 2013). The Wall has had different names since the announcement of the construction. The Israeli government promotes it as a "security wall" or "security fence" that it is constructed for the purpose of self-defense (Jones, 2016; Pallister, 2015; Till et al., 2013). However, from the beginning, Palestinians have called it "the Separation Wall" or, more often, "the Apartheid wall". The Palestinian cabinet called it the "Wall of Annexation and Expansion" and opponents likened it to the Apartheid regime in Africa (1948-1994), as well as the Berlin Wall (1961-1989) (Dolphin 2006, pp. 38-40; Till et al. 2013, pp. 52-4). These different perspectives will be further discussed in the second chapter.

## **1.2 Describing the Separation Wall**

The Separation Wall is a long wall built by Israel in the West Bank near the Green Line. The Israeli government claims it is to prevent Palestinian residents from entering Israel or nearby settlements, while Palestinians say it is an attempt to disrupt their lives, requisition and annex lands from the West Bank to Israel, (Jones, 2016; Leuenberger & Wills 2016, p.276) (see Figure 1.1).

Image removed due to copyright restriction.

Figure 3.1: Location of the Green Line and the Separation Wall in Palestine  
Source: Adnan 2015 p.88

In constructing the Wall, the foremost strategic goal of the Israeli government was to improve the security of the Israeli state (Braverman, 2011; 2012; Adnan, 2015; Karam, 2017). However, the Separation Wall also serves the Israeli occupation expansionist policies that seek to control land through a process of dispossessing Palestinian people. Since 1948, the West Bank territory has shrunk under Israeli control and land confiscations. The border between the West Bank and Israel has changed due the Israeli occupation after 1967 war, as the map below shows (Latte Abdallah & Parizot 2016 p.15) (Figure 1.2).

Image removed due to copyright restriction.

Figure 1.2: The 1967-1993-2014 Palestinian – Israeli Borders (West Bank)  
Source: PLO, 2014

The Wall enters up to 22 kilometers deep into the West Bank and passes through inhabited and agricultural lands there. This prevents Palestinians from accessing local streets and fields that lie on the Israeli side of the Wall. Its path in the northern region isolates more than five thousand Palestinians in "closed" areas between the Green Line and the Wall (Baumann, 2016; Jones, 2016; Adnan, 2015). The Israeli government has established a network of gates within the Wall and a system of pass permits to move through it, and the effectiveness of this system will be discussed in the second chapter. The length of the Wall in the occupied West Bank is 770 km, including about 142 km surrounding Jerusalem, called "Jerusalem's vicinity". The height of the Wall reaches eight meters in some areas. Israel planned on building a concrete Separation Wall of 4.5 to 9 meters in Palestinian populated areas, alternating with an electronic fence in areas with low population density, as well as observation towers equipped with cameras and sensors, and a sandy dirt road to detect the marks

of Palestinians who try to pass through (Jones, 2016; Leuenberger & Wills 2016, p. 277).

The Wall isolates 733 sq km of Palestinian land (circa 12.9 per cent of the entire area of the West Bank) by cutting or restricting the access from or to these areas. This excision consists of agricultural land (348 sq km or about 47 percent); open and forest land (250 sq km or about 34 percent), and Israeli settlements and military bases (110 sq km or about 15 per cent) (Leuenberger & Wills 2016, p.275), all of which is now under Israeli government control. In addition, the Wall has isolated about two hundred square kilometers from the Jordan Valley, which is the Palestine main food resource located on the eastern side of Palestine (Dolphin, 2006). Along its route, the Wall affects eight Palestinian governorates with 180 communities, and reports indicate that it directly affects the lives of 20 percent of Palestinian population in the West Bank, including occupied East Jerusalem. In total, the Wall confiscated about 46 percent of the West Bank's area of 5800 square kilometers, in addition to isolating Jerusalem demographically and geographically from the West Bank cities and villages (Baumann 2016, pp.174-7).

### **1.3 Research Questions and Significance**

This thesis provides evidence that the lives of almost three million Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem have been transformed into a new reality that is almost beyond recognition because of the Separation Wall impact on their life and livelihood.

The main research question is:

***What is the social and economic impact of the “Separation Wall” on the Palestinians livelihood in the occupied territory of the West Bank and East Jerusalem?***

Hindering individuals' access to a land or a home has serious repercussions for communities, individuals, and societies. Physical barriers not only limit social intercommunications, but they also affect society in many ways. These implications

for Palestinian communities are often invisible but have far-reaching and long-term consequences. However, these several consequences run more profound than the concrete barrier that has shaped them. Palestinian communities' social connection has frequently been obstructed due to the geopolitical changes, restrictions on movement and access to places. The measures of separation resulted by the Wall, and the accompanying permit regime, have dramatically separated Palestinians from each other. This raises the following sub-questions which the thesis will aim to answer:

1. How has the Wall separated the Palestinians who live in the West Bank from their land, work, houses, and communities?
2. How has the separation affected the social life of the people, including education and community relations in West Bank and East Jerusalem, and how are Palestinians adapting and coping with the created reality and the Separation Wall impacts?
3. How does this separation affect livelihoods and Palestinian way of life?

There is a large body of research focusing on the political impact of the Separation Wall on the peace process and wellbeing of the Palestinian people (Bell, 2004; Bishara, 2015; Kershner, 2005; Pullan, 2013; Till et al, 2013). However, there has not been much systematic study of the social and economic impacts of the Wall on Palestinian communities in the West Bank from a Palestinian perspective. This thesis will build on the existing literature by tracing the social and economic impacts of the Wall. The aim is to shed light on the multi-dimensional impacts of the Wall on the indigenous Palestinian community. This may contribute to arguments for social change through a critique of Israeli hegemony over the West Bank, oppression, and asymmetrical power relations between Palestinian communities and Israel. This thesis also explores the Palestinian resilience and responses against the Wall's social and economic impacts in order to illustrate how Palestinians in the West Bank have attempted to continue their daily lives, access education, and improve the economy. The findings of this thesis may have implications for decision-makers locally and internationally. Due to time constraints, travel restrictions and instability in the West Bank, it was not possible to collect or access primary data; therefore, this thesis uses secondary sources and publicly available statistics. To collect peer reviewed articles

the thesis used nine online databases: Taylor & Francis Online, ScienceDirect, JSTOR, Google Scholar, Wiley Online Library, ProQuest, Oxford University Press, United Nations (UN), World Bank, Amnesty International databases.

#### **1.4 Outline of the Thesis**

The first chapter provides a brief historical overview and a description of the Wall, which is the focus of this study, and outlined the research questions and the significance of the study. The second chapter explains in some detail the Wall construction, location, regime and route and the difference in designation from several perspectives. It also explores those perspectives and position from the Wall through a review of the relevant literature and international organisations. Aiming at having the most related articles on this particular chapter while searching for data through databases, the following keywords were used: Impact, fence, Separation Wall, West Bank, conflict, security, social, livelihood. To make the chapter as contemporary as possible, it mainly analysed the resources published in the last ten years.

The third chapter explains the social and demographical impacts of the Separation Wall on East Jerusalem as a case study. Palestinians consider Jerusalem their most significant city as it is the capital city of Palestine and has great historical and religious status. Peer-reviewed articles, statistical data from grey literature from the UN, humanitarian organisations, citizenship policies of Israel and reports of the international humanitarian organisations will be used to supplement peer reviewed literature to provide more evidence of real experiences of people as data for this chapter.

The fourth chapter analyses the impacts of the Wall on the West Bank economy, the agriculture sector, and Palestinian workers in the Israeli labour market. It also provides some insights into the Palestinian response against the Wall impacts by using scholarly articles and data from the UN and world bank websites on multidimensional implications associated with the Separation Wall construction and regime. The fifth chapter is the conclusion that summarises the findings and articulates the key arguments.



## **Chapter 2: The Separation Wall construction and operating system**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter explores the different perspectives on the Wall, and why they support or oppose its construction and impacts. It provides a discussion of the Wall route by explaining how the Palestinian areas have been divided into different categories (A, B, and C) according to Israel's territorial interests. A detailed description of how the Separation Wall is operated by the Israeli government and army helps to understand how the gates that spread along the Wall control the movement of Palestinians whose daily lives have been affected by the Wall.

### **2.2 Perspectives on the Wall**

As stated in the introduction, the names for the Wall vary depending on the supportive or opposing perspective. According to Falk (2012, pp.229) the conception of boundaries plays a fundamental role in the dispute of territory, resources, and nation-building in the Middle East. For the political parties and the government in Israel, the notion of the border "is a vague, elusive and problematic term, after they have lived more than seventy years without clear boundaries, but lived with constant, mutual attacks with the Palestinians and some of the Arab countries neighboring Israel" (Falk 2012, pp .229-30). Falk (2012, p.231) further argues that although the borders are known as the product of social processes, in the Israeli context, the borders cannot be identified clearly as they depend on several contexts. According to Jürgen Osterhammel, in Israel, "the boundary of the military, the economists, the lawyers, and the geographers ... seldom coincide" (Osterhammel, 2009, p.19, cited in Falk, 2012 p.230). Israel's borders with Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories are still undefined (Ozguc 2020, p. 3). According to Ozguc (2020, p. 7-8), this is because Israel seeks to expand its geographical borders. The Separation Wall can be seen as an example of this, as it enabled Israel to redraw its border regardless of the Palestinian position.

From an Israeli government perspective, the formal attitude is to separate Palestinians from Israelis. Baskin, after interviewing many Israeli politicians, concludes and argues that "[c]onstructing a hard boundary would end Palestinian physical presence within

the State of Israel.” (2002, p.2). However, the purpose of initial goals for establishing such a “solid border” is seen as problematic by Baskin, as it involves the separation of Palestinian and Israeli societies and as well Palestinian communities from each other in demographic, economic and also political terms. Political and geographical separation refers to separating Palestinians from Israeli areas or the Palestinian areas located on the other side of the Wall (Baskin 2002, p.1). This prevents the Palestinians from accessing these areas geographically, in addition to cutting some Palestinian areas out of the political Palestinian control to Israeli control and as well depriving the independent sovereign Palestinian state solution (Baskin 2002, p.5-7).

Establishing barriers, fences or walls is not a new idea; it has been discussed by successive Israeli governments, and by the early 1990s the notion of physical separation became politically acceptable (Braverman, 2011). Yitzhak Rabin, in 1996, officially declared the Israeli government’s desire to separate the West Bank from Israeli areas by a separation fence (Perry 2016, p.770). In 2001, the Israeli cabinet approved the construction of the Separation Wall (Busbridge, 2017; Perry 2016, p.771).

The secular right in Israel, which includes center-left and right-wing political parties, dominated successive Israeli governments stressing the main reason for the Wall is to ensure Israel’s national security (Perry, 2014). Most of the Israeli secular rightists defend the legitimacy of the Separation Wall by arguing that Israel was forced to build the Wall to protect the Israelis from Palestinian attacks (Schnell, 2014 p.620). This position is also supported by scholars who argue for the right of Israel to build the Wall. For example, Perry (2016, p.730) defends the Wall as a deterrent mechanism against Palestinian terror attacks and states that its efficiency has already been proven due to the decrease in the number of Israeli casualties in the period 2009-2014. Although Perry mentioned the increase in Palestinian victims, she justifies the construction of the Wall by Israel, and recommends that the Israeli government take tougher measures against Palestinians who try to commit crimes against Israel.

The Israeli government claims that before the Wall construction many Palestinian “terrorists” could cross from the West Bank into Israel when no barriers of any kind existed. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) (2017), about 75 percent of Palestinians attacking targets inside the Israeli cities came across the

border in the area where the first stage of the Wall was built. Therefore, the Israeli authorities and the Wall advocates argue that the Wall has three main goals; the primary goal of the Separation Wall is to ensure security for Israelis. This is connected to the second main goal, which is to improve the Israeli economic situation, which had suffered due to “terrorist attacks” in Israel causing a sharp decline in the tourism industry (IMFA, 2017; Perry, 2016; Schell, 2014). The third major goal from the Israeli government perspective is to form a clear boundary between illegal and legal residents in Israel. Israel claims that without such a boundary, Israel will not be able to counter the growing problem of illegal Palestinian access (Perry 2016, p.730).

Israel's Wall faced international condemnation, but from the Israeli government perspective the outrage is a clear double standard. As the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017) points out: “There is nothing new about the construction of a security fence. Many nations have fences to protect their borders - the United States, for example, has one to prevent illegal immigration”. In the context of trying to justify the Separation Wall, the Israeli government has played down or ignored the impacts of the Wall on the lives of Palestinians, and focused instead on the security issues for Israel, presenting it as a "benign" step to prevent Palestinian attackers from entering Israel (Braverman, 2011 and 2011; Karam, 2017; Pallister, 2015; Stead, 2018).

Many critics of the Separation Wall have contested this security viewpoint, arguing that it exaggerated the brutality of the Palestinian attacks to justify Israeli human rights violations in the West Bank (Adnan, 2015; Dolphin, 2006; Jones et al., 2016; Karam, 2017; Ozguc, 2020). Therefore, the Wall has different names depending on which side is talking about it. From the Israeli government perspective and the Wall advocates, the Wall is called the ‘security fence’. On the other hand, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has used the term " Wall" because the other expressions are no longer “accurate if understood in the physical sense” (ICJ 2005). This is because the separation structure is predominantly constructed as a concrete Wall, rather than a more permeable fence. Whilst, using the term "fence" can be understood by the temporary and non-permanent concept, which often refers to the use of wire or metal to construct, that can make it removable in the future and does not indicate strong and solid physical borders (Baskin 2002, pp.6-7; Till et al. 2013, pp.55-6), while the " Wall" refers to the permanent border that signifies the physical and geographical separation, as the case was in the Berlin Wall in Germany 1961-1989 or the United states -Mexico

border Wall (Till et al. 2013, p.54). Palestinians, Palestinian supporters, and other Wall critics have at times referred to the Wall as an "Apartheid Wall", which highlights its "separation" or "segregation" function. Others call it "Seam zone", a term used internationally to refer to a land area in the West Bank located east of the Green Line and west of Israel's Separation Wall<sup>3</sup>. This area is populated largely by Israelis in settlements and an estimated 57,000 Palestinians living in villages in this seam zone, separated by the Wall from the rest of the West Bank. (Larkin 2014, p.135).

Using the term Separation Wall draws attention to its function as a colonial line that seeks to exercise control over the colonised by separating cultures, influencing values and restricting the economy (Ozguc, 2020 p.8). As Ozguc (2020, p.9) elaborates:

The wall is a colonizing network. It first empties Palestinian land to occupy it. It then captures that land, its people and their time and resources, and imposes its own behavioral, legal and institutional codes.

Karam (2017, pp.887-9), considers that the Wall as a security fence is a 'lie' published by the Israeli government propaganda. It promotes the idea that the Wall separates "two states" while in reality, it appropriates the territory of the Palestinian state. She cites as evidence that "the Wall actually runs more or less well inside the occupied West Bank". As Clarno (2018, pp.326-9) argues, 85 percent of the Wall was built inside the West Bank on Palestinian lands. It deviates from the Green Line of 1948, going west to annex illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Separation Wall is also longer than the Green Line. According to Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories- (B'Tselem, 2017) "the route of the barrier is more than twice as long as the Green Line." This shows that Israel did not abide by the borders of the Green Line with the Palestinians, but rather built the Wall on Palestinian land.

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice published its advisory opinion on the legality of the Separation Wall and its route. It held that erecting the Wall within the West Bank is illegal because it violates the human rights of the Palestinians and annexes illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Karam, p.887). According to ICJ advisory opinion (2004), the Separation Wall was established in violation of international humanitarian law (Murphy, 2005; Wedgwood, 2005). Thus, the court

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<sup>3</sup> "Seam Zone" refer to Palestinian 'C' areas-will explain it later in this chapter- in the West Bank, those areas populated by Israelis in settlements. And Palestinian population lived in villages located in enclaves in the seam zone, separated from the rest of the West Bank by the Wall. (Larkin, 2014 p.135).

ruled that Israel should stop construction of the Wall, dismantle the parts already established within the West Bank area and compensate the Palestinians who were injured as a result of its construction (UN 2004). However, Israeli government did not adhere to this decision, as with many other UN decisions related to Palestinian – Israeli conflict (Clarno, 2018; Karam, 2017; Ozguc, 2020). Thus, according to international law, the construction of the Wall within the West Bank violates a long line of human rights of the Palestinians living on both sides. Among other things, their right to freedom of movement is violated - and consequently their right to work, education, medical care, family life, livelihood and proper living standards. The Palestinians' collective right to self-determination is also violated, as the convoluted route of the Separation Wall cuts off Palestinian space and divides the population living there (Jones 2016, p.275; Karam, 2017; Ozguc, 2020).

In this part of the chapter, the various names of the Israeli Wall in the West Bank were discussed through the reviewing of literature reviews. The next part will explain about the construction of the Wall and the accompanying permit regime, location, the Wall gates and checkpoints and how the Wall operates. This enables an understanding of how the Wall works and how it impacts on Palestinians in the West Bank.

### **2.3 Construction of the Wall**

The boundary walls, built historically for borders, control, ethnic or economic separation purposes and distinguished by strength and durability, represented a colonial or occupational power separating countries or peoples (Pallister 2015, p.439). In the Palestinian case, the Israeli Separation Wall was constructed to separate Palestinian land and people from Israel for reasons related to the security of Israel. Through the Wall, gates, checkpoints and the related permit system, Israel has had many impacts on the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank. This section explains the Separation Wall construction, location, the operating system and the related gates to give a better understanding of how the Wall controls and impacts Palestinian lives.

The Separation Wall, with its military roads, checkpoints, and observation systems, is the largest infrastructure scheme carried out by the Israeli government to date. It required a variety of planners and landscapers; suppliers of fencing, concrete, and

heavy machinery; as well as other several high-tech equipment and security companies (; Larkin 2014, pp.137-9; Pallister, 2015; 2016). About 90–95 percent of the Wall constructed as a "multi-layered fence system" consisting of barbed wire in some areas, and cement in other areas with a height of up to 8 meters. In addition, there is a trench up to four meters in-depth, with a similar width in some vital areas and bordered by a military road for Israeli army patrols, sand-covered dirt road to detect traces, electric fence, dual paved road for patrolling and surveillance towers equipped with cameras and sensors, checkpoints, earth walls, road gates, and roadblocks (Larkin 2014, pp.140-1; Pallister 2016) (Figure 2.1).

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Figure 4.1: The components of the Separation Wall in the West Bank  
Source: UN OCHA oPt/ Sep 2018, p.11

By 2019, approximately 80 percent of the Wall had already been built on Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank (B'Tselem 2019; Ozguc, 2020; UN OCHA oPt, 2020). Its surveillance system includes the military towers topped by armed Israeli soldiers. These towers are located every three kilometers in the populated Palestinian areas and every ten kilometers in non-populated areas (Bell 2004, p.298). In addition, the Wall contains different types of gates, divided into security, agricultural, and border

gates. All of these gates are barriers to Palestinians crossing the Wall unless they have obtained work or visit permits from the Israeli side (Jones 2016, p.272). As Pallister (2015) and others point out, there are about 600 crossing gates and checkpoints throughout the West Bank, and each requires a special permit. Only those who obtain permits can legally access the Israeli side. More about these Wall impacts will be explored in the third and fourth chapters in this thesis.

This section has described the Separation Wall construction and design. Due to the enormity of the project, it has been built in several phases over two decades, and is still not completed (B'Tselem, 2019; UN OCHA oPt, 2020; Ozguc 2020). The next section reviews briefly the stages of building the Wall and how it affects the different Palestinian areas.

#### **2.4 The categorization of Palestinian land and the Separation Wall**

The process of building the Separation Wall comprises four stages. The first three phases are completed, but the fourth, from south of Jerusalem to its east, is still under construction. As yet, no timetable has been set for the implementation (UN OCHA oPt, 2019). According to Israeli government, the path of the Wall could be modified due to demographic security, political or ideological considerations (Perry, 2014), and this is expected to extend its length. The *Stop the Wall Campaign* (2017) asserts that there is conflicting information reported by the Israeli official media and some academic literature about the length of the final Wall route. The estimates range between 600 and 1000 km, almost all of it constructed on West Bank land (Dolphin, 2015; Karam, 2017; Kersel, 2014).

As Palestine is an occupied country, many agreements have been signed to solve or manage the situation there. Since the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, the West Bank has been divided into three types of regions (A, B, and C) (Buttu, 2019; Cohen, 2006). As the Wall route crosses all these regions, it is necessary to include an explanation about these classifications (see Figure 2.2). Areas A and B were, for the most part, Palestinian villages and towns at the time of signing the agreements, inhabited, then and now, by the Palestinian population. Area A covers about 3 percent of the West Bank with 26 percent of the Palestinian population. It contains the major Palestinian

cities and the Israelis are not allowed to live in or enter it except for military purposes. Area A is governed by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (civil and military control), which means that infrastructure, civil and daily services are a Palestinian responsibility. Area B covers about 24 percent of the West Bank with 70 percent Palestinian population and is under full or partial control of the Palestinian Authority (Kersel, 2015, p.27). The PNA has civil control but in many areas, Israel maintains military control. Area B includes rural areas and villages and a buffer zone around Area A (Kresel 2015, p27). Area B is not contiguous but comprises 165 "isolated" pieces of land scattered across the West Bank. The Wall construction effectively annexes about 30 percent of this Area B to the Israeli side (Gordon 2008; 2016 p.36; Kersel 2015, p27-8; Rubenberg 2003, pp.68-70).

All remaining areas have been designated as Area C under Israeli civil and military control. Area C includes 73 percent of the West Bank territory with 4 percent of the Palestinian population and encompasses Palestinian towns and villages as well as Israeli settlements, outposts, and military installations. About 40 percent of this area is annexed to Israel by building the Wall (Kersel 2015, pp.27-9). This area includes almost all the land resources of the Palestinian communities and all the Israeli settlements or territories that Israel is planning to develop under its control (Rubenberg 2003, pp. 68-70). According to the international community, building the Israeli settlements neither the Wall is legal in any of these Palestinian areas, but Israel has not adhered to international decisions or opinion in this regard (Wedgwood 2005, p.56; White 2019, p.24).

This division was supposed to be valid for only five years until a permanent agreement was signed, but Israel enforces it to this day, more than twenty years after the division was established (Buttu 2019, p.18-9). As Buttu (2019, p.22) points out, the division does not meet the urban and regional development needs of the Palestinian population, and it prevents any possibility of economic growth. This division also creates an illusion that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is the primary body responsible for the lives of most Palestinian residents of the West Bank, while in fact any decision, however marginal, requires the consent of the Israeli government in most of Areas B and C (Handel 2014, pp.507-8). As Areas A and B are not contiguous, but consist of isolated lands surrounded by Area C, any use of these lands for the



extension of the remaining localities in Areas A and B for the establishment of industry, agriculture, water pipes, road construction or any other construction must obtain Israel's approval, which is frequently denied (Handel 2014, pp.510-2).

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Figure 2.2: Areas (A, B, and C) in the West Bank according to the Oslo accords 1995  
Source: Israel Today, 2017

## 2.5 How does the Wall operate?

To address the question what the Separation Wall does beyond blockading or demarcating territory, this section argues that the Wall operates as a system of sociotechnical devices through which Palestinian lives are controlled and restricted. Through movement restrictions, permits and gates, the Wall restricts Palestinians from reaching their belongings, workplaces, lands, and services.

Many scholars have analysed the impacts of walls on societies, pointing out the myriad ways in which such separation devices profoundly disrupt social life and day-to-day activities (Adnan, 2015, p. 88). Pallister (2016, p.439; 2015, p.153) argues that the Wall represents the occupation power of Israel against Palestinian freedoms and rights to access other Palestinian or Israeli places (see also Braverman, 2012; 2011). Referring the livelihood definition, it includes a combination of material and social resources (Williams et al. 2014, p.305). The permit regime is not just a security device but one that affects the social life and relations of Palestinians, and particularly their economy and livelihood, by either banning or restricting access to livelihood resources including land, employment, and social networks (Adnan 2015, p.96). As the Wall transects and carves up the Palestinian Areas A, B and C, it restricts the movement of Palestinians not only from or to Israel, but also between their own communities, cities, towns, and other villages (Adnan 2015, p.90-4). Pallister (2016) therefore suggests a rearticulation of security barriers as more than physical technologies or the producers and products of 'sovereign' power. Pallister (2016, pp.152-3) also argues that the Separation Wall is beyond what can be considered 'geopolitics of security', where the referent object is the boundary and asks that Israel also should consider how the Wall works with mobility as productive devices to control people in several ways.

The daily activities of most communities, such as the employment, health, trade, cultural and leisure centers in the cities and villages are located in the western Wall side (East Jerusalem). Communities such as Abu Deas, Al-Eizariya, Kofor Akab, and Akabat Gabber are located between the Wall and the Green Line. Thus, residents of these communities are forced to go through checkpoints daily, including going to work, visiting family and friends, or shopping (Amir, 2011; Chiodelli, 2013; Karam, 2017).

These restrictions on free movement also impede the access of the rural population to basic services, such as hospitals that are located in nearby cities. The education system is disrupted as many of the teachers who teach in localities west of the Wall live in settlements east of the Wall, unable to access their workplace daily or even regularly, which directly affects their livelihood (Karam, 2017). This issue will be discussed further in the fourth chapter.

According to UN OCHA oPt (2016), the Separation Wall has 89 gates for Palestinian movements in the West Bank located in areas A, B, and C. Eleven of them are Closed Area Community Checkpoint (CACpt), which serve the entire West Bank population for daily passage between the segregated parts of the West Bank. Some of these checkpoints are open for 12 hours and others are open 24 hours a day (UN OCHA oPt 2016). 38 passageways are agricultural (A) gates used by Palestinian farmers who own land on the other side of the Separation Wall. The opening times of these gates vary, some open two or three times each day, usually for only one hour. There are 17 other gates that are seasonal or weekly (S/W) and open only between October and December during the harvest season. During these seasons, the gates usually open two or three times a day at regular hours. Ten other gates only open during the harvest season “Seasonal” (S). The remaining 23 gates are usually closed and need permission (P) from the Israeli liaison offices<sup>4</sup> (Table 2.1).

The system of gates described above shows that the security operations imposed on the Palestinians as a result of the operating system/regime of the Wall constituted a major obstacle for Palestinians to reach their workplaces, lands, properties, and services normally, which greatly contributed to affecting their social life and livelihoods resources (Karam, 2017; UN OCHA oPt, 2016; Ozguc, 2020).

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<sup>4</sup> Israeli liaison offices are units established to represent the Israeli defence force (IDF) and implement IDF policy (Karam, 2017).

Table 2.2: Separation Wall Gates, by type and city, July 2016  
 Source: (UN OCHA oPt, 2016)

City	Closed Area Community Checkpoint (CACpt)	agricultural (A)	Seasonal/Weekly (S/W)	Seasonal (S)	closed and need permission (P)
Jenin	2	9	4	5	1
Tulkarm	2	5	3	1	1
Hebron	1	5	0	2	5
Ramallah	1	5	1	2	4
Salfit	1		0	4	2
East Jerusalem	3	0	0	2	9
Qalqilia	1	3	3	1	1
<b>Total (89)</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>

## Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, it is evident that the different labels given to the Israeli Wall in the West Bank reflect different perspectives on the Wall's purpose but there are also unstated objectives for building the Wall. For proponents and supporters of the Wall, and for the Israeli government, the Wall is a security fence that offers protection for Israeli citizens from Palestinian attacks. Critics, including the United Nations and the Palestinian Authority, adopt the term Separation Wall because it separates Palestinian communities from each other. This chapter has examined how and where the Wall has been built and how it operates, demonstrating that Separation Wall is a more apt term as the Wall separates Palestinians as individuals and collectively from their lands, homes, workplaces, and basic services. The Wall has met with wide-spread opposition and condemnation worldwide, and most of the international human rights organizations, including the United Nations, adopted the advisory opinion of the

International Court of Justice on the need to remove the Wall and compensate the affected Palestinians. The third chapter will discuss the social impact of the Wall on Palestinian communities in the West Bank, using East Jerusalem as a case study.

## **Chapter 3: The Separation Wall in East Jerusalem and its social impacts**

### **3.1 Introduction**

With its religious, civilizational, and political dimensions, Jerusalem city has a symbolic meaning to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Jerusalem represents a significant cultural symbol for the Palestinian people in the diaspora and Palestinian territories. Palestinians see Jerusalem as the capital city of Palestine, as it used to be before the Israeli occupation. The Wall path in the West Bank has impacted most on East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, geographically, socially and economically (Adnan, 2015; Amir, 2011; Joronen & Griffiths, 2019; Karam, 2107). Therefore East Jerusalem was chosen as a case in this chapter to study the social impact of the Wall on the Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem and surroundings areas.

Since the occupation of Jerusalem's western part in the 1948 war, and the occupation of the eastern part in the 1967 war, the Israeli occupation authorities continue the policy of annexation in the part allocated to the Palestinians. By constructing the Separation Wall, the Israeli government sought to tighten its control over Jerusalem through various means, such as confiscating land, demolitions, separating families from each other, denying access to services (Amir, 2011; Dolphin, 2015; Karam, 2017). Amir considers the Wall around East Jerusalem as the most fundamental section of the Separation Wall in the West Bank because it has a direct aim to annex all the Palestinian Jerusalem land (East Jerusalem) to Israel and to ethnically clean the Palestinian population by imposing coercive policies. As he states:

Unlike in the rest of the West Bank, where the Wall enables the de facto annexation of the areas to its west into the State of Israel and, appears to be serving processes of ethnically cleansing these areas from their Palestinian population, the Wall in East Jerusalem is harnessed to complex processes of subjectivisation for the Palestinians of East Jerusalem (Amir 2011, p.769).

This chapter examines the impact of the Separation Wall around East Jerusalem and its surrounding towns and villages, explains its geographical path, using primary and secondary sources and analyses data from the UN OCHA oPt, World Bank reports, and the Israeli NGO B'Tselem. Through these data the chapter examines the demographic impacts of the Wall (population shifts; displacement; demolishing

Palestinian properties). It shows how movement obstructions in East Jerusalem have affected social structures by restricting access to education, housing, medical services, intermarriage relationships, work, families and social life. Later in this thesis, the fourth chapter will focus on the economic impact of the Separation Wall on the West Bank.

### **3.2 The route and purpose of the Wall in East Jerusalem**

The Wall around East Jerusalem is considered the most influential part of the Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem because it separates Palestinian families and neighborhoods from each other, as will be explained later in this chapter. This section will provide a detailed description about the features of the Separation Wall surrounding East Jerusalem to clarify how the Wall tightly controls the Palestinian communities there.

In 2002 the Israeli government approved a plan to build the Wall around Jerusalem with the aim to connect the Israeli settlements established outside the borders of Jerusalem municipality to other Israeli neighbourhoods within its new borders to be within one geographical body (Amir 2011). This involved on the one hand linking the Israeli settlements in West Jerusalem via a network of roads and tunnels, and on the other hand, linking East Jerusalem geographically with Tel Aviv which is considered the economical capital city of Israel. All of these actions serve to implement the “Greater Jerusalem” project established in 1988 which aimed to create a united Jerusalem by merging East and West Jerusalem under Israeli control (Allarbadī & Haradan 2016, pp.70-4). The Separation Wall section around East Jerusalem is 440 km long, extending from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the south and from Jericho in the east to the Israeli settlement Kiryat Anafim in the west (Amir 2011; Allarbadī & Haradan 2016; Karam 2017). Figure 3.1 shows the Wall route around East Jerusalem and how it separates the city from its surrounding suburbs such as 'AL-Eizariya and Abu Dis, and other West Bank cities, such as Bethlehem (Dolphin, 2015).

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Figure 3.1: The Separation Wall around East Jerusalem  
Source: UNOCHA oPt, 2011

Over the past 17 years, the Israeli government increased the confiscation of Palestinian lands in the outskirts of East Jerusalem to build the Separation Wall around the city and its surrounding Palestinian areas known as the “Jerusalem envelope.” Which is part of the Greater Jerusalem project and aims to physically connect East Jerusalem and the surrounding Israeli settlements in Area C to Israel and subject them to Israeli governance (see Figure 3.1) (Dolphin 2006, pp.124-5; Gordon 2016, pp.20-3).

This “envelope” includes the establishment of a set of security and population belts to completely separate Jerusalem from the West Bank. The aim is to control Palestinians’ movement to and from Jerusalem city and control the growth of its Palestinian population (Gordon 2016, p.25; Karam 2017, pp.908-9). These measures have



pushed the majority of Palestinians to the east, which led to significant changes in demographic patterns and social relationships and cut off Palestinians from their lands (Chioddelli 2013, pp.220-3; Dolphin 2006, p.125). In the long-term the Israeli government aims to annex the Israeli settlements around Jerusalem with an aim to increase the Israeli population there, and to reduce the Palestinian population (Amir, 2011). B'Tselem reports that Israel aims to annex 36 settlements in the West Bank inhabited by more than 350 thousand Israeli settlers with an aim to increase their number to one million, while at the same time reducing the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem to 12 percent by 2030 (B'Tselem, 2017, n.p).

The route of the Wall did not consider the geographic entanglement and the relationships between the residents of East Jerusalem and its surroundings (Dolphin 2006 pp.113-6, Chioddelli 2013 pp.420; Gordon 2017 pp.23-4,). By building the Wall Israel penetrated more than 4 km east of the Green Line which put nearly 200,000 Palestinians within the boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality and prevents around 60,000 suburban residents from entering the city. Moreover, some neighborhoods became completely cut off by the Wall and now form separate ghettos (Karam, pp.888-9). Thus the 60,000 Jerusalemites living in suburbs such as Al-Eizariya, Kafr Aqab, Al-Salam, Ras Khamis, Anata, Qalandia, and Shuafat, have been transferred to the West Bank boundaries, while before the Wall was constructed, these suburbs used to lie within Jerusalem's boundaries (see Figure 3.1) (Karam 2017).

In Jerusalem around 60,000 – 80,000 Palestinian residents hold the Jerusalem identification document called Blue card, which is a special ID card granted by the Israeli government to those Palestinians who live in the city. However, many of these residents became unable to pay the high housing costs in the city, and now live outside the borders of the Jerusalem municipality, which puts them at risk of losing their Blue card (Dolphin 2006, pp.129-30; Dhaher 2016, pp. 92-3; Wills 2016, pp.309-12). According to Israeli laws, the Israeli government has the right to seize any Palestinian property in East Jerusalem and area C in the West Bank if the owner has been "absentee" for six months.

On the other hand, Jafari and Abdulla (2019, p.10) point out, some Palestinians have moved to Jerusalem centre, where they live in very small houses in the Old City of Jerusalem. Some of those who could not pay the high rent in Jerusalem moved into

relatives' houses in order to keep their Blue card. The old city houses are mostly designed with small rooms without yards, their Palestinian owners are not allowed to renovate them because of Israeli cultural heritage policies, so reshaping them is illegal, this led to overcrowding and unhealthy living conditions for Palestinians (Gordon 2016).

In summary, 60 percent of the Jerusalemites are estimated to be affected by the Wall (Jafari & Abdulla 2019, pp.10-2; Tawil 2011, pp.70-7). It should be noted that the measures described above go against the charters and humanitarian principles of the United Nations and its international decisions regarding the political status of Jerusalem, which stipulate keeping East Jerusalem as part of the West Bank and not to tamper with its borders.

### **3.3 The Wall impacts on demographic structure of East Jerusalem**

As discussed in the previous section, the Wall around Jerusalem targets several goals with a demographic dimension, such as isolating Jerusalem from its Palestinian surroundings, emptying it of Palestinians, and making it the centre of the Israeli state. While the construction of the Wall was completed in the southern, eastern and northern sides, the western region remained open under Israeli control (Gordon, 2016; Jafari & Abdulla, 2019; Karam, 2017). The negative effects of the Wall in East Jerusalem were multi-dimensional. First, thousands of Palestinians lost land and properties because of land confiscation and demolitions caused by the Wall construction requirements (B'tselem 2017; Dolphin 2006; Jafari & Abdulla 2019; Karam 2017; UN OCHA oPt 2020; 2019; 2017). As previously explained, most of the Wall route in the West Bank was built on Palestinian land which was confiscated illegally and forcibly.

Secondly, many Palestinian people lost access to hospitals, schools, places of work and worship. Rather, these issues of access to basic services are exacerbated by demographic changes in the city (Jafari & Abdulla 2019, p.6). After the Wall construction, more towns, villages, and suburbs are located outside the new borders created by the Wall route around the East Jerusalem municipality. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2019) predicts that the population in this area will

be more than double within 3-5 years. This population will be deprived of the educational and health services that they obtained when they were within the borders of Jerusalem municipality, and some of them have also lost their work and trade in the long term (Jafari & Abdulla 2019, p.6).

Thirdly, families and social networks have been separated by the Wall. Gordon (2016) gives the example of 800 families ending up with different ID cards on both sides of Abu Dis and Al-Eizariya and facing an uncertain future after the family reunification procedures were suspended by the Israeli government in 2000 for Palestinian in East Jerusalem. By suspending family reunification for Palestinians, Israel seeks to reduce their population, leaving no choice for them to communicate and live in a secure way.

The next sections examine these issues in more detail, beginning with a range of Israeli practices and policies which pressure many Palestinians throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, to leave certain areas or be subjected to forcible transfer (UN OCHA oPt, 2019; Joronen & Griffiths, 2019; Karam, 2017).

### **3.4 Demolition and displacing Palestinians in East Jerusalem**

This section explores the Israeli demolitions against Palestinian properties in the West Bank and East Jerusalem which led to thousands of Palestinians displacement from East Jerusalem and surrounding suburbs as a result of their property being demolished to build the Wall. (Chiodelli, 2013 p.420; Gordon, 2019). According to UN OCHA oPt report (2020) around 7.000 Palestinian structures have been demolished in the West Bank, and around 6,000 Palestinians displaced. East Jerusalem accounted for a third of all demolitions and a third of all people displaced in the West Bank. Around 25 percent of structures demolished in East Jerusalem were inhabited, while livelihood-related or agricultural structures accounted for some 39 percent of all demolitions.

Demolitions were facilitated by the restrictive planning regime in East Jerusalem and Area C which makes it almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits to improve housing and infrastructure. In addition, Palestinians who build properties close to the Separation Wall route face the risk of demolition and other penalties. This does not only affect people's homes but also schools and business structures (Karam

2017 pp.888-902). Joronen and Griffiths (2019, pp.563-5) argue, that in recent years, the rate of demolitions by Israeli military in the West Bank particularly in East Jerusalem has been increasing, affecting people's ability to obtain secure residency. According to UN OCHA oPt (2019), "from 2009 when UN OCHA first started systematically recording demolitions, until 2015, six structures were demolished per month on average". However, The rate of demolitions increased significantly in 2016 during the construction of the final phase of the Wall around Jerusalem, when the annual rate of demolitions was the highest rate recorded so far. As a result of the increase in demolitions, more Palestinians have been displaced in East Jerusalem from 2009 until August 2017 around 1500 have been displaced (Figure 3.2). Subsequently, In the period 2017 – 2020 the demolition rate in East Jerusalem increased again because at least a third of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem do not have Israeli-issued building permits. It is estimated that this will potentially place a further 100,000 residents at risk of displacement (UN OCHA oPt, 2020, Figure 3.3).

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Figure 3.2: Demolished structures and displaced persons in East Jerusalem 2009-2017

Source: UN OCHA oPt 2017

Image removed due to copyright restriction.

Figure 3.3: Demolished structures in East Jerusalem by year 2009-July-2020  
Source: UN OCHA oPt 2020

The eastern suburbs of Jerusalem are among the most affected areas. People are trapped within their villages because the Wall separates them from the surrounding area, creating a range of problems (Joronen & Griffiths, 2019; Karam, 2017; UN OCHA oPt, 2019). The figure below shows four structures belonging to Palestinian families in Al-Eizariya that have been earmarked for demolition by the Israeli forces (UN OCHA oPt, 2019) (Figure 3.4). The reason for the demolitions was a decision by the Israeli government to confiscate 43 hectares from Al-Eizariya town to complete the construction of the Wall (UN OCHA oPt, 2019).

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Figure 3.4: Buildings at risk of demolition in AL- Eizariya  
Source: UN OCHA oPt 2019

The demolitions practised by the Israeli government, from the demolition of Palestinian properties in East Jerusalem to the displacing of many Palestinians outside the Jerusalem municipality, thus affected the social relations between Palestinian families and communities there. The next section discusses the social impacts that the Wall has created on the communities of East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas. The Wall has had an impact on Palestinian communities' social life because it cut off communities and families from each other and has also affected their ability to obtain or reach health and education services.

### **3.5 The social impacts of the Separation Wall**

The Separation Wall has impacted Palestinian social lives in several aspects, especially on the social life of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the surrounding communities. Geographically, these communities, villages and towns are close to

each other, but due to the political and existential division created by the Wall, they are socially separated and isolated from each other (Gordon 2016). This section discusses social and family relationships, access to education, and health services in East Jerusalem.

### **3.5.1 Social and Families Relationships**

Family relations form one of the fundamental pillars of Palestinian society that support a shared culture and collective resilience against the Israeli occupation (Karam, 2017; Marie et al., 2018; Massad, 2018). This pillar is being eroded by the Wall, however. Karam's (2017) study found that a number of families located to the west of the Wall were unable to visit their relatives who live in the east, and the ability to engage in social and cultural activities for a wide segment of Jerusalem families is constrained. For example, many small families in Jerusalem originating from towns in the West Bank are prevented by the Wall from gathering for religious and festive occasions, such as weddings and funerals. Similar findings are reported by Marie et al., by pointing out that Israeli government often does not grant permits related to social family relations.

For example, Al-Eizariya town has a population of 25,000 people of whom 10,000 live east of the Wall and hold West Bank ID cards, and 15,000 live in the west with the Blue ID cards issued by the Israeli government. Building the Wall has resulted in separating families and communities and depriving them of the ability to visit each other.

Another example of the Wall's impact on family connection is the "Sawana Salah" neighborhood in Al-Eizariya, where the Wall divided the "Al-Sarkhi family" of 51 members into two parts. Many of their houses were located within the borders of Jerusalem municipality but have become excluded from the city by the Separation Wall. This means that members of the same family (brothers, children, and parents) are not able to visit or socially contact each other easily because of the Wall permits regime restrictions. In some cases, the Wall separates family houses that are located only a few meters away from each other (UN OCHA oPt, 2019) (Figure 3.5). This separation also affects the connections between neighbours and Palestinian communities that have been severed by the Wall.

According to Marie et al (2018, p.25). Despite the existence of family relations between villages on both sides of the Wall, members of the same family have become isolated from each other, where more than half of them live in the West, separated from their relatives, the Israeli occupation government do not grant permits for pursuing family relations purposes.

The Wall has a negative impact on the social networks of women and their social and physical mobility, according to Griffiths and Repo (2020, pp.110-4). Social norms in Palestine stipulate that women should not travel alone during late hours or spend the night outside the home. However, this is very likely to happen if a Palestinian woman wants to cross the checkpoints or the gates of the Wall. Many families in Jerusalem and the surrounding villages do not allow women to go to educational institutions on the other side of the Wall due to insecure circumstances. As high schools and universities are mostly located on the Israeli site of the Wall, women's access to education has been diminished, causing a decrease in education levels. This leads to women opting to, or being pushed into, marrying at an earlier age (Karam 2017). However, the Wall has also become an obstacle to individuals finding marriage partners. Families prefer to choose people residing on the same side of the Wall as marriage partners for their children, because maintaining family connections across the Wall is very difficult. UN OCHA oPt (2019) data show that the rate of the marriage cases involving people from both sides of the Wall has decreased from 69.6 percent before the Wall construction to 31.4 percent after its construction.

The same studies show that the psychological effects of the Wall include depression, anxiety, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, lack of social support systems (Karam, 2017 pp.908). The Wall's widespread impacts on relationships leads to the disintegration of social relations, making people more socially isolated in their homes and villages. This has consequences for people's psychological well-being. With social networks and educational opportunities disrupted, many Jerusalemites expressed a feeling of losing hope for the future of their villages (Karam 2017).



Image removed due to copyright restriction.

Figure 3.5: Sawana Salah neighbourhood in Al-Eizariya divided into two parts  
Source: UN OCHA oPt 2019

### **3.5.2 Movement obstructions**

The impacts of the Wall regime described in the second chapter are practised particularly in East Jerusalem, where neighbourhoods are divided into Israeli and Palestinian areas, with pervasive restrictions on the movement of Palestinians. These restrictions do not allow Palestinians to move easily due to the discriminatory policies which are formalised by different identification cards issued to Palestinians, depending on which side of the Wall they live. The Separation Wall and associated checkpoints regime impose many restrictions on movement and daily lives of the Palestinians, which affect livelihoods and futures. Palestinians cannot easily access basic services, school, land, or workplace which has affected all aspects of Palestinian life there. As Dolphin (2006, p.135) notes, religious practices are also impacted: "in addition to restricting freedom of movement in general, the Wall further limits the ability of Palestinian Muslims and Christians to reach their mosques and churches".

The Wall has transformed Jerusalem into what some experience as a "large prison", surrounded by concrete walls and observation towers (Dolphin 2006, p.138). No Palestinian can enter or exit the city except through the gate located at its eastern entrance on foot only, not by vehicle because Palestinian vehicles are banned by Israeli law from entering Israel. An Israeli soldier controlling the gate has the right to sort and classify the passengers and to say, "allowed or forbidden" (Karam 2017, p.901). According to UN OCHA oPt (2019 a) report, during the period 2017 -2019, the Israeli government rejected around 50 percent of permission requests by Palestinians who live in Jerusalem's suburbs outside the Wall (see Figure 3.6). The report also shows that crossing of checkpoints and gates related to the Wall was an obstacle of movement for 94.7 percent Jerusalemites. These movement restrictions impact especially east Jerusalem because the Wall has separated the city from its surroundings and that led to difficulties for Palestinians to practise their normal lives, including going to school, as the next section will argue.

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Figure 3.6: Permit approval rate East Jerusalem 2017-2019

Source: UN 2020

### **3.5.3 Educational impact**

The education sector in East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas is one of the most affected sectors. This is because the Wall has cut access to the schools from small villages that have relied on educational services located in bigger nearby towns (Karam 2017), making journeys to school more arduous and time consuming. According to a report by the NGO B'Tselem (2017), some students are forced to travel a distance of 15 km to reach their school even though it is only 300 meters away from their home behind the Separation Wall. They spend 40 minutes on the commute to school and pass through control checkpoints, a complex process which has become a daily routine. Teachers' access to their workplaces has also become more cumbersome, with hundreds of education professionals finding it difficult to reach their schools. Some female teachers working in schools located behind the Wall have resigned or changed the workplace due to the difficulty of access and the insecurities involved (Griffiths & Repo, 2020 pp.1107-8).

The detrimental impacts on Palestinian families' access to education are significant. Eighty percent of Jerusalemite families with members enrolled in higher education have to endure long journeys to university via dirt roads due to the Wall (Alian 2015, pp.10-11). Families with children in primary schools are similarly affected, with 72.1 percent of families having had to change schools. Dropout rates from secondary schools in East Jerusalem increased after the Wall construction, as shown in the figure below. The drop out in year 10 increased in 2013-2015 coinciding with building of the final section of the Wall in East Jerusalem (Figure 3.7).

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Figure 3.7 Dropout rate from secondary schools in East Jerusalem 2013-2105

Source: Alian 2016, p.11

Palestinian communities, individuals or communities tried to cope with the Wall impacts by finding alternatives ways (Marie et al. 2018, pp.27-8). School children interacted with innovative methods of resisting and coping with the restrictions imposed by the Wall. In the West Bank, children have shown high flexibility in constantly finding new ways of reaching their schools. According to Karam (2017, pp.890-2), the daily struggle that children encounter in going to school and the concerns they faced developed their resilience:

they believed in their own power to make a difference by reaching their schools, doing their homework, handling their fears by themselves, arguing with military officers..., and so forth” (Karam 2017 p.895).

In response to the difficulties and hardships created by the Separation Wall and its regime, children in the West Bank have turned their school into sites of resistance through their coping and determination. Other evidence of Palestinian resilience will be discussed further in the fourth chapter. The above data indicate that the educational

sector in East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas has been significantly affected by the restrictions imposed on Palestinian movement due to the construction of the Wall by cutting off Palestinian students and teachers from their schools, or made their access so difficult. However, Palestinians' response to this impact is by managing to go to their schools by using different long paths.

### **3.5.4 Health impacts**

Health services are among the basic services that any community needs. After the construction of the Wall in East Jerusalem, the areas surrounding East Jerusalem have seen their access to the health services impeded due to their separation from the city centre which hosts a large proportion of hospitals and medical services. Villages in the isolated western area face a lack of medical facilities and depend on mobile health care workers to obtain health services, who come irregularly because of the access difficulties (Chiodelli, 2013). This makes these Jerusalem residents vulnerable to health problems, water-borne diseases, high infant mortality rates, and lack of emergency health services (Amir, 2011).

The UN OCHA oPt (2019) data show that 34.5 percent of Jerusalemite families were separated from medical services they accessed before the Wall was built. Particularly highly affected were families living outside the Jerusalem Wall. About one third of families surveyed were unable to access medical staff, and again those living outside the Wall were disproportionately impacted. This shows the high degree of dependence of all surrounding areas on the city centre to obtain the health services and reach the medical centres and hospitals in the city prior to the Wall, and the lack of planning to ensure that health services are accessible to those excluded by the Wall.

In addition to preventing access to health services and facilities, the Wall's impact on the health sector extends to restrictions on managing the waste and sewerage in East Jerusalem, which has become a major concern of the Jerusalem villages on both sides of the Wall (Gordon 2016, pp.22-4). Restriction on movements and access to the health services in East Jerusalem surrounding areas affected most people seeking to obtain health services because most of them depend on the city centre to provide the medical services and facilities.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

Since 2002, Jerusalem has become more isolated from its Palestinian surroundings, because of the Separation Wall construction along with its surroundings towns and villages and turned it into a large "ghetto" surrounded by Israeli settlements on all sides. Currently, the Separation Wall separates many villages and towns of East Jerusalem inhabited by Palestinians from Jerusalem city by imposing various access hardships and coercive environment on them.

The Wall and accompanying permit regime have effectively split Palestinian communities and families from each other and has fragmented the Palestinian communities and society in East Jerusalem, eroding people's ability to function within a cohesive society (Baumann, 2016). This has been achieved by significantly restricting freedom of movement's, demolishing Palestinian properties, separating people from their land and displacing them, generating more obstacles to obtain an education, health services, and by altering living arrangements in fundamental ways. 84.6 percent of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem were affected by their ability to engage in cultural, religious, social and recreational activities, 84 percent inside the Wall, and 85.2 outside it (UN OCHA oPt, 2019). The Wall and permit regime have affected the lives of all Palestinians living in its proximity, from freedom of movement, to the access to land, and to choice of spouse.

Despite these harmful effects, the Wall has also proven to be an impetus among Palestinians to demonstrate resilience and solidarity with each other. Resilience is demonstrated by Palestinians enduring the often time-consuming and humiliating procedures simply to travel from one place to another on their own land and territory. The following chapter explains about the economic impact on the West Bank and will explore these resistance methods through offering more stories and data of Palestinian communities' resilience in the West Bank.

## **Chapter 4: The impacts of the Separation Wall on the West Bank economy**

Occupations and colonisation throughout history have always had economic dimensions. This is also the case with the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), where the Israeli occupation drives heavy economic costs on the Palestinian economy. These costs are further compounded by the military escalation of Israeli restrictions on the West Bank, with the Separation Wall being one of the most significant restrictions that has affected the region economically.

One way to define the impacts of the Separation Wall on the Palestinian economy in the West Bank is to estimate the losses and damages resulting from construction of the separation wall and its dimensions that impede the sustainable development process there. While it is not possible to estimate all monetary losses accurately or in detail, the UNCTAD (//APP 2016 p.10; 2020 p.3) report, suggested that the size of the Palestinian economy could be increased or even doubled, had the Separation Wall not occurred.

The Wall significantly impacts the West Bank economic and labour market in several ways. It affects the agricultural sector, disrupts commerce and trade, and obstructs Palestinian workers' access to non-agricultural employment, particularly in the Israeli labour market. These impacts will be further discussed in this chapter by analysing data from international organisations (UNCTAD, UNOCHA oPt, Amnesty, World Bank, PCBS), followed by a brief discussion of the mechanisms of resistance and response to these impacts that Palestinians have adopted to cope with the current situation imposed by the Wall in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

### **4.1. Impact on the Tradable goods and Tourism**

Freedom of mobility is an indispensable requirement for the enjoyment of economic success. The Palestinian national market is effectively divided into a group of disconnected markets, the ability to trade in services and goods, or search for jobs in the entire market become an unpredictable and expensive issue which affects all aspects of the economic growth or development. According to PCBS (2019) data,

Palestinians lose about 60 million work hours per year (equivalent to \$274 million) as a result of movement restrictions and also lose about 80 million litres of fuel as a result of waiting to cross the Israeli checkpoints or using longer ways to reach their destinations. The World Bank (2018) estimates that easing road restrictions alone, would be enough to enhance market access by 10 percent, which would increase the GDP per capita in the West Bank. Recent reports by the UN Conference on Trade and Development show that fragmentation and mobility restrictions imposed by the Wall regime foster poverty in the West Bank because it affects, workers, trade and goods mobility (UNCTAD /APP 2016 p.3; 2020 TD/B/67/5 p.3). UNCTAD (2016; 2020) also indicates that the mobility restrictions have changed the Palestinian economy which is now marked by reduction in the tradable goods sectors (industry and agriculture) and growth in the non-tradable sectors (services and construction). The continuous process of de-industrialisation and de-agriculturalisation reduces the Palestinians' capability to produce and makes the West Bank more dependent on aid and imports. The figure below shows the changes of the West Bank economy over the past two decades. During the period 1995-2014, the contribution of the tradable goods sector to GDP in the West Bank has fallen by half, from 37 percent five years before the Wall to 18 percent in 2014, while its contribution to employment dropped from 47 to 23 percent (Figure 4.1) (UNCTAD /APP 2016 pp11-14).



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Figure 4.1: Changes of the economy in the West Bank 1995-2014  
Source: UNCTAD/ APP 2016, p.9

Jones et al. (2016) argue that due to restrictions imposed by the Wall regime on the movement of individuals, goods and commercial trucks, it has become very difficult for some small economic enterprises to market their products or get supplies from and to

the entire Palestinian territories in the West Bank. This has a detrimental impact on the ability of factories and commercial enterprises in the West Bank to grow and prosper. This can be seen clearly in the example of local marketplaces. Before the construction of the Wall, the Palestinian local markets were heavily dependent on Palestinian consumers who live on the opposite side of the Wall, for example import of food products, raw materials, and medical materials.

Further, although services have increased their share in the GDP and employment, the Wall has affected the tourism sector. As Gelbman (2016, p.672) argues, borders that are heavily policed and controlled can affect the motivation of tourists to travel: "Tourism is affected by borders that are political or physical barriers". In the West Bank the border checkpoints, gates, and permit system that form part of the Wall regime are restricting and hindering tourism and affecting the related business and livelihood outcomes. The Wall has effectively annexed historical and archaeological sites in Jerusalem to Israel. By placing access restrictions to those places that contain archaeological sites dating back to the Roman and Byzantine periods, it isolates and separates main tourist cities in Palestine (Bethlehem and Jerusalem) from each other and restricts access to them. This directly affects the tourism sector by decreasing the number of Christian pilgrims and Muslims tourists visiting Bethlehem and Jerusalem (Gelbman 2016, p.675; Karam, 2017, p.839). This section provides data analysis and reviews literature that relates to the impact of movement restrictions imposed by the Wall on the Palestinian market, goods, and people which led to decline in the tradable and tourism sectors, the next section will examine how Palestinians working in the Israel labour market are affected by the movement restrictions and Wall permit regime and discusses how that affects Palestinian livelihood.

#### **4.2 impact on Palestinian workers in the Israel labour market**

One of the most important features of an efficient economy is effective mobility of labour. In the Palestinian case, there are many restrictions on workers' mobility which affect economic efficiency, income, and profits (Busbridge, 2017). One of the ways in which the Wall obstructs Palestinian workers is through restricting their access to the Israeli labour market. Border communities rely heavily on Israeli employment, especially in East Jerusalem, which is the most economically affected area in the West Bank as demonstrated by the high incidence of demolition and land confiscation

(Adnan 2015 p.89). This section will examine how the Separation Wall affects Palestinian workers to access the Israeli labour market.

According to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2019), about 150,000 Palestinian from the West Bank work in Israel, mainly in the construction and service sectors. Palestinian employment in Israel is very important to the Palestinian economy, in 2019, the number of Palestinians working in Israel was estimated at 11.7 percent of the total Palestinian workforce in the West Bank, while their wages amounted to about 12.3 percent of GDP. Many Palestinian workers in Israel seek to take advantage of higher income in Israel compared to the West Bank labour market. As Busbridge (2017, p.78) argues, the economic situation in the West Bank has long been precarious, many Palestinian families rely on the Israeli labour market. However, the opportunity to access the Israeli labour markets was greater in the past, and due to the restrictions imposed by Israel on the access of Palestinian workers into the Israeli labour market, the number of workers has been decreasing after construction of the Wall since 2002.

There are several reasons for this decline in Israel-based employment. First, workers have to get either a monthly or weekly permit to access the Wall gates. About 45 percent of entry permits for the purpose of work were rejected in 2018 (UNOCHA, 2019). This compels workers to seek illegal ways of accessing their workplace, and 30 percent of Palestinian workers in Israel manage to enter Israel irregularly, mostly because their permit request was rejected.

Secondly, as Braverman (2012, p. 300) illustrates, the inappropriate and cruel treatment by the Israeli soldiers against Palestinians at the Wall gates and checkpoints, as well as the decrease in approval of permits, led some Palestinians to become reluctant working in Israel. For Palestinian workers who have obtained a permit, they have to wait for long hours in queues crowded with people waiting to be allowed to pass to Israel and undergo extensive security checks (Figure 4.2). Identity cards are collected from them, then the security check begins by examining each card separately. Then the physical inspection process takes place, and after checking their identity cards again by another checkpoint at the same gate they will be allowed to pass. Sometimes the Israeli soldiers throw the identity cards of the Palestinians on the ground with the intention of humiliating them.

According to Busbridge (2017, p. 375), because of these lengthy and oppressive procedures, many Palestinian workers hesitate to enter Israel to avoid maltreatment and violation of their human dignity by Israeli soldiers at security checkpoints. Some Palestinian workers find their way to enter Israel by 'the backdoor', mostly by making illegal openings in the Separation Wall, a point which will be discussed further in the end of this chapter. This section provides evidence on the Wall impact on Palestinian workers in the Israeli labour market by imposing an extensive system of mobility restrictions. The next section will explore the Wall impact on water and then the agricultural resources in the West Bank, to demonstrate how this impact affected the Palestinian livelihood there.

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Figure 4.2: Palestinian workers standing in a queue at the Qalandia Crossing checkpoint  
Source: Aljazeera, 2020

### **4.3 Impact on water resources**

Water is a crucial and politically sensitive issue in Palestine, as water resources are limited and not uniformly distributed. Since the year 1967, Israel has taken several steps to control water in Palestine, including the decision issued in 1967 which states that all water in the lands that were reoccupied are the property of Israel. This was

reaffirmed by a decision in 1997 that granted Israel full power to control all matters related to the concerned water (Alkam 2016, p.42; Malone 2004, pp.640-3). As Alkam (2017 p.44) explains, the Israeli government controls over 82 percent of water resources in the West Bank. Alkam (2016, p.40) contends that one of the key strategic objectives of building the Separation Wall in the West Bank is to reinforce Israeli control over water resources, to forcibly remove Palestinians from their water resources, and to seriously damage their wells near the Wall that are currently used in watering the agricultural land. Using its authority as the occupying power, Israel has prevented the West Bank Palestinians from increasing their portion of the abundant aquifers that lie in the region. At the same time, the Israelis have tapped into these supplies to satisfy a significant portion of their own water requirements and to supply Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The isolated area behind the western side of the Wall is located over the western and north-eastern subterranean basins under Israeli control since 1967, while the eastern isolated area -annexed to the Israeli side- lies entirely above the eastern basin after the Wall's construction

The UN OCHA oPt report (2019) shows that the Wall separates water sources and irrigation networks on the one hand, and agricultural land from irrigation networks on the other. It destroyed 35,000 meters of water pipes used for irrigation, agriculture, and household use. West Bank cities depend on the mountain aquifer lying beneath the West Bank, which consists of three basins - western, eastern, and north-eastern. Palestinian Water Authority stated (PWA) (2018, n.p), the Wall allows Israel to control over 95 percent of the water that exists in the Western Water Basin, which is the major water resource there. An Amnesty International report (2018, n.p) confirms this, showing that Israel has gained access to 50 wells along the Wall, and extended a pipeline to transport water from the West Bank to northern Israel. The areas included in the Wall route of these governorates are consistent with sites where groundwater collects.

Israeli control of water resources has affected Palestinian communities in the West Bank, by preventing them from using adequate water resource for humans, agricultural, industrial and tourist consumption. Some of these communities experience a severe water shortage especially in summer, leading to a decline in the agricultural sector and Palestinian livelihood (Alkam, 2017). This means that Israel plundered a huge proportion of water resources depriving Palestinians of these

resources. Thus, water confiscations impose a threat to Palestinian lives, rights, economy, social relations and development, which add more hardships on Palestinians and in some cases forcing them to leave the affected villages and towns (UNCTAD 2020 TD/B/67/5, p.7-8).

#### **4.4 Impact on Agriculture sector and land confiscation**

In Palestinian culture, land represents an honour and pride for Palestinian families and individuals as they pass down their land from one generation to the next. This section explores the Wall's impact on access to agriculture land by farmers' and workers' permit rejection, and land confiscation, as they are the most impacts affecting the Palestinian agriculture sector in the West Bank. In this section analysis data from UN OCHA oPt and Amnesty reports. Agriculture plays an essential role in Palestinian life. Despite the fact that it comprises a 4 percent share of the Palestinian economy, it represents a traditional source of livelihood. It is also a common economic enterprise for the many Palestinians in the West Bank and represents a significant key for their survival in times of economic difficulties (Kittaneh 2020, p.205). As well, land has non-economic value, including identity dignity and pride.

The Wall has greatly affected the agricultural infrastructure, the role of agriculture in achieving development, and reduced the contribution of agriculture as a source of livelihood in the West Bank (Jones et al. (2016, p.272-5). Many communities to the East of the Wall are cut off from their agricultural lands and therefore from their main source of livelihood. Palestinian are required to obtain individual permits to access their land and primary agricultural inputs, such as water and fertilizer (Kittaneh 2020). When farmers are prevented from reaching their agricultural lands and fields, or to obtain sufficient water resources, this endangers the agricultural production of some of the West Banks's most productive land. In the agriculture-intensive governorates of Qalqilia, Jenin, Tulkarm, these problems affect 10.2 percent of the overall area cultivated in the West Bank with an average economic value of USD 38 million (UNCTAD 2020 TD/B/67/5, p.3-4).

UN OCHA oPt (2019) data reveal a notable decline in the number of permits issued by the Israeli government for Palestinian workers and farmers to reach their land in

the East Jerusalem surroundings (behind the Wall). The data show that the approval rates for permits for landowner farmers fell from 76 per cent in 2014 to 28 percent in 2018. Permits issued to agricultural workers decreased from 70 per cent to 50 per cent in the same period, as can be seen from data below the requests for workers permits in 2018 is 10 times less than in 2014, but requests for farmer permits is doubled. This raises questions: Is it because farmers have given up on working their land? Is this related to the low income from the harvests? (Figure 4.3).

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Figure 4.3: Permit applications for farmers and agricultural workers in WB  
Source: UNOCHA oPt 2019

Karam (2017) suggests that preventing access to all or part of the land, water sources and work facilities results in the loss of agricultural market and income. Furthermore, isolating communities from their properties, such as land, livestock and water sources between the Wall and the Green Line, has led to increasing the costs of transporting crops and goods. He observes that Palestinians who no longer have access to their lands to cultivate or to harvest their olives and crops, or feed their livestock, are in an

extremely difficult economic situation. According to UNOCHA oPt (2019) data, 53 out of 74 agriculture gates are open only in the Olive harvest period but farmers cannot access their crops at other times to take care of them (Figure 4.4).

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Figure 4.4: Wall agriculture gate openings in the West Bank (2019)  
Source: UN OCHA oPt 2019

The limited allocation of permits and the limited number of opening times of the Wall gates hamper the essential agricultural activities required to be undertaken throughout the year, such as ploughing, pruning, fertilizing, dealing with pests and weeds. As a result, there is a negative impact on olive yield value. Data collected by UN OCHA oPt (2018) in the northern West Bank shows that the yield of olive trees in the area between the Wall and the Green Line decreased by approximately 65 percent compared to the corresponding trees in the areas that can be accessed all year round. A report by Amnesty International (2018) provides anecdotes about farmers' lived experience of the Wall regime. For example, the Israeli soldiers at the gate refuse to allow farmers to pass their agricultural equipment such as tractors, saws, and



fertilizers. The report cites Tayseer, a farmer from the West Bank, saying “even seedlings and plants need coordination before they are allowed to cross”.

Israel not only restricted movement and confiscated water resources in the West Bank, but also confiscated thousands of hectares of fertile and urban land to build the Separation Wall. UN OCHA oPt (2019) data indicate that 31.4 percent of East Jerusalem families who live outside the Wall lost their urban and agricultural land to the Wall construction, and a further 5.3 percent of those who live on the city side of the Wall. Encircling the West Bank by the Separation Wall also required creating an infrastructure of streets to link the northern and southern parts of Israeli settlements to Jerusalem and then link them together to Israeli borders. These new infrastructures confiscated lands from villages and towns near Ramallah and Jerusalem, for example as showed in UN OCHA oPt (2020) report:

- Street No. 45, which confiscated lands from Beit Ur Al-Tahta and Beit Ur Al-Fawqa (villages located between Ramallah and Jerusalem in area C).
- Street No. 443, which confiscated the lands of Bitunia, Rafat and Qalandiyah (villages located between Ramallah and Jerusalem in area B).
- Street No. 60 from Ramallah and Nablus to Jerusalem. (cross through areas B and C)
- Street No. 60 from Bethlehem to the Israeli settlement 'Gush Etzion' (area C).

The Wall around the West Bank deprived Palestinians from their economic, agriculture and urban land and their ability to use them efficiently. Through mobility restrictions, land confiscations and the control of water resources, Israeli government tends to restrict the Palestinian mobility and access to their land by rejecting almost a half of the permit requests. Land confiscation for the Wall construction purpose is another way to deprive Palestinians from their land. (Jafari & Abdulla 2019, p.19). Therefore, the Wall hinders agricultural planning and development in the West Bank, by depriving the Palestinians of portions of their social life and livelihoods (Oberholzer 2015).

#### 4.5 Palestinian resilience and adaptation

The resistance and response to the restrictions imposed by the occupation have always been a reflection of people's desire for liberation and to live independently (Hammami 2015, p.2). This section analyses Palestinian resilience, adjustment and adaptation to the newly created situation by focusing on some types of resistance methods and response that Palestinians in the West Bank have provided against the Israeli Separation Wall, permit regime, and measures. Rather than accepting the new fragmenting reality, they have created a new reality and tried to find the best economic and living opportunities to support themselves and their families. This indicates the Palestinian resilience in the face of persistent hardships and illustrates their responses as individuals and collectives.

Karam (2017, p.869) refers to the concept of resilience here as "a wider collective and social representation of what it means to endure". But as Marie et al (2018, p.22) explain, "there are four overlapping waves of resilience: individual traits; protective mechanisms; developmental assets: individual and community; social ecological: culturally embedded understanding of resilience and 'new voices'". Palestinians in the West Bank responded to the interventions caused by the Separation Wall and its regime in several forms. Indeed, the response of communities to the imposed changes will rely on their own resilience: their vulnerabilities, adaptive capacities, and resources. Marie et al (2018, pp.23-7) point out that the Palestinian sense of the Arabic word *Sumud*, which means the determination to exist through being solid and rooted to the land, is the core of the Palestinian resilience against the Israeli occupation. The common practice and attitude of West Bank residents reflect their beliefs that endurance and suffering has to be explained at both levels, collective and individual, as Palestinian communities and persons are facing the same challenges in their daily routine that created a need of finding new ways to respond to the Separation Wall consequences.

Based on this definition of resilience, which goes beyond individual capacity to cope, Palestinians show a spirit of cooperation and response against the Separation Wall (Karam, 2017; Marie et al., 2018; Nguyen-Gillham et al., 2008). There have been many investments by Palestinian individuals who either felt the need to create new jobs or lost their jobs in Israel and East Jerusalem after the Separation Wall had cut off towns

from their centres. Some Palestinians cooperated to establish small businesses to fill the gap (Marie et al. 2018, p.30). The emerging of the medium, small and microeconomic business during the last decade in the West Bank is a response to the Wall complexity and restrictions. Hammami (2015, p.8) found that family enterprises inside small villages have grown and reduced dependence on the Israeli labour market or central cities. A new reality is emerging seen in the shift towards decentralisation of work and services.

As the previous section showed, the Wall affects Palestinian workers who used to work in Israel, but in response to this, entrepreneurship emerged in the Palestinian social context. Ryan (2015, pp.301-4) posits that Palestinians' attitudes have changed from viewing only the inconveniences and problems caused by the Wall, to making and adapting the most out of the situation. When change in the political environment and socio-economy occurred, alternative and effective strategies and methods for local development should be implemented through cooperation between public and private sectors, and civil society.

Forms of adaptation and adjustment to the problems in order to survive the hardships occurred after the Wall can be seen in the education sector. As mentioned in the third chapter, and as Massad (2018, pp286-9) noted, many students, especially in high schools, found alternative ways to reach their schools; for example, by crossing through holes in the Wall that Palestinians had made, such as the hole in the Wall in the village of Alwalja which students use to access their schools in Bethlehem city. However, after years of facing the same daily challenges associated with insecure access pathways, a need to find solutions at the educational level became essential. Therefore, the PNA, in cooperation with grassroots movements and charitable organizations, established some local schools located within the village, making it easier for students to access education. Massad (2018, p.290) expresses the hope that young generations will create new modes of response so that the Palestinian economy and culture will endure against great hardships imposed by the Wall.

Furthermore, Palestinians have collectively protested the construction of the Wall. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has launched several representative offices in the towns affected by the Wall route, such as AL-Eizariya and Abou Des near East Jerusalem, and established a special governmental body called the " Wall Resistance

and Annexation Commission" to monitor the Wall's impact and the Israeli military escalations involving demolitions, land confiscations and repressive measures preventing Palestinians from accessing their land. As the response of the Israeli soldiers against protest usually includes rubber bullets, tear gas, and arrests of activists, few of these protests have been successful. One successful case involves the Village of Budrus (Northwest of Ramallah) where months of protests in 2007 succeeded and the Wall was re-routed, which saved the major part of the village's agriculture land. An example of an unsuccessful protest was in the village of Bili'in, where the Israeli army was requested to relocate sections of the Wall based on an Israeli court decision, but subsequently appealed the decision (Ozguc 2020 pp.13-5).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Wall impeded the movement of Palestinian workers to and from Israel and made it an expensive, difficult, and risky daily journey, and many requests for work permits were refused. To deal with these issues, Palestinian workers exploited the punctures in the Separation Wall to cross illegally into Israel (Busbridge 2017, p.374). Busbridge further explains that some Palestinian workers travel to a specific area in the West Bank (near Jerusalem or Bethlehem) where some holes have been made to illegally cross the Wall, and often they cross the border in the night or on weekend afternoons when the Israeli security forces are reduced. They are assisted by Israeli smugglers on the other side of the Wall who drive them to Israel. Although frontier police and army patrols of the Separation Wall regime and police inspect Israeli worksites, many construction companies and farms in Israel depend on Palestinian labour (Flaig et al., 2013 p.145). As Busbridge (2017, p.380) argues, finding a way across the Wall benefits both Palestinian workers and the Israeli employer. Palestinian workers take advantage of the Israeli labour market needs and cooperation from Israeli employers who need cheaper workers.

While the Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank have generated harm and fragmentation to Palestinian people, society, and economy, they have also become economic sites that represent Palestinian resilience. Although they are under surveillance and controlled by the Israeli military, Palestinian traders have been able to make the best of bad conditions by creating new economic opportunities to sustain themselves and their families, selling local goods and food and providing taxi services to Palestinian crowds near Israeli checkpoints at what has become known as "checkpoint markets" (Karam, 2017 pp.904-5).

Ozugo (2020) argues that collective restrictions on movement in a society often generate a force for change that makes it capable of devising new methods of resistance, and this is what happened with Palestinian societies. Palestinians strive to find alternative ways to continue in their daily life when restrictions are imposed by Israel. In various ways, Palestinians are trying to cope with the reality created by the Wall on Palestinians in the West Bank areas. School students are trying to find alternative ways to get to their schools; small business inside small villages popped up to provide work opportunities and services; some found illegal ways to access the Israeli labour market by making holes in the Wall; or by serving Palestinian crowds waiting at the Israeli checkpoints.

## **Conclusion**

The Wall and the permit regime have created a new fragmenting reality of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank. The impacts on the Palestinian agricultural sector are multidimensional, ranging from confiscating land, controlling the access of farmers and workers to their agricultural lands behind the Wall, to preventing the access of necessary materials for agriculture, controlling the main water sources in the West Bank, and restricting the access of Palestinian workers to Israel.

However, the Palestinians, individuals, and collectives, were able to find new ways to resist and respond to the Wall impacts. Some have established small economic projects within local communities in the areas that do not require crossing the Wall, some created punctures in the Separation Wall to enable workers cross and work inside Israel. Through these methods and manners, the Palestinians in the West Bank can cope and survive economically at least at this stage, but since the Israeli restrictions will remained imposed on the West Bank the situation might be more complicated in the coming years.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The Separation Wall in the West Bank represents the colonial character of Israel because it imposes measures, a coercive environment, and policies against the Palestinians in West Bank as occupied territories (Braverman, 2011;2012; Pallister, 2015; Till et al., 2013). This research concluded that Israel's goals differ from the security aim it claims as the main reason for the Wall, as the evidence shows the Wall serves to annex Palestinian land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to Israeli borders. It is clear from the construction design of the Israeli Separation Wall in the West Bank that its main aim is to obstruct Palestinian access not only to Israel but also to the Palestinian areas, cities, villages, and lands on the Israeli side of the Wall. Through the construction of this Separation Wall, Israel has imposed restrictions on Palestinians in the West Bank that affect their social, livelihood, and economic lives.

In this research, East Jerusalem and its surroundings were used as a case study of the social impact of the Wall on Palestinian communities. This research explored the social, livelihood and economic impacts of the Separation Wall on Palestinian communities in its proximity. Over 20 percent of the Palestinian population in West Bank has been impacted by the Wall (Abdallah & Sawaileh, 2011; Amir, 2011; Dolphin, 2006; Griffiths &Repo, 2020; Karam, 2017; Ozguc, 2020). The Separation Wall and its permit regime have significantly eroded and fragmented Palestinian society and communities and negatively affected their ability to function within a cohesive society.

As this thesis and other research (Amir 2011; Chiodelli, 2013; Dolphin, 2006; Gordon, 2016; Karam, 2017; Ozguc 2020) have revealed, the Separation Wall and its accompanying permit regime have separated Palestinians from Palestinians and from entering Israeli areas. The Wall has fragmented the Palestinian communities and society through its structure, and by greatly restricting freedom of movement, splitting families who live on opposite sides of the Wall, and creating more obstacles to obtain an education and other services.

It has also had significant impacts on the Palestinian economy. Firstly, it has separated Palestinians from their land, by decaying economic arrangements in fundamental ways. As for the economic and agriculture impact, the Wall has affected the Palestinians' access to their workplaces, their agricultural lands, products and tools,

access to the Israeli labour market, as well as Israeli control of water sources, and the whole Palestinian products marketing process. Demolition of Palestinian property for the purposes of building the Wall, displacing Palestinian and confiscation of agricultural and non-agricultural lands also affected the Palestinian economy.

whereas the Separation Wall and its accompanying permit regime have had pernicious impacts on Palestinian communities and individuals, the Wall and the permit regime have proven to be advantageous for Israelis resident in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank that the Wall surrounds, for example, by confiscating water and lands in West Bank. Israelis do not need to cross or stop on checkpoints; they simply do not notice that they have passed the Wall as new road networks have been made for them to move with security from their settlement sites to the cities that bypass the Israeli checkpoints altogether. When they do pass through checkpoints, Israelis settlers are not asked to stop for examination and checking measures but are easily allowed to pass through. This contrasts with the regularly time-consuming and humiliating systems endured by Palestinians when they travel from one place to another on their own land.

However, Palestinians have adopted several methods of resilience and responses against the Wall restrictions; there are persistent evidence of Palestinian response. For example, school students who strengthen their pursuits to get an education, traders who create new jobs by selling goods to Palestinians on the Israeli checkpoints, Palestinian and solidarity political actions seeking the removal and rerouting of the Wall, all reflect the resilience and response of the Palestinian society and people. This research has examined the social and economic impact of the Separation Wall on Palestinian communities in the West Bank and as well examined the duality existing in Palestine. The Separation Wall, the permit regime and accompanying demolitions and displacements led to fragmenting and debasing the fabric of Palestinian society, whilst at the same time strengthening a sense of national and community identity by the shared collective experience of persecution.

Despite all difficulties imposed on people by the Israeli government, Palestinians still manage some ways to cope and resist the new certainties that the Wall and the permit regime have generated. Palestinians need to keep finding alternative ways to adapt response and resilience in their lives, educational system, families, and society while

attempting to build a functioning economy. Although the lack of freedom of mobility due to the Wall, permit regime and checkpoints, will continue to hamper these attempts and goals, Palestinians have not admitted defeat. The actual Palestinian existence and extension of social connection is a form of resistance (Karam, 2017).

According to many items of literature and human rights reports, Israel is still developing the Israeli settlements and providing them with road networks and infrastructure indicating the expansion of buildings there and the increase in the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank. There is a fear of increasing the impact of the Separation Wall on Palestinian communities in the future, and this fear is justified, based on facts that exist historically and on the ground through stories, Israeli practices, and reports from international and local human rights organizations (Amir, 2011; Dolphin 2006; Karam, 2017; Ozguc, 2020; UN OCHA oPt, 2016; 2017; 2019; 2020).



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