

**Patronage Driven Democracy:  
Narratives of Survival and Failure of District Heads in the  
Emerging Democratic Indonesia (A Case Study in Four Rural  
and Urban Districts in East Java, Indonesia)**

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## Abstract

The thesis conducted in four rural and urban districts in East Java aims to understand the socio-political dynamics of the direct election process of district heads (*pilkada*). The research was conducted to assess the recent emerging democracy in Indonesia. In particular, the research addresses the political logic of why and how the incumbents' succeed or fail in their re-election bids.

To do so, it explores and undertakes a comparative assessment of policy behaviour and informal politics associated with the success or failure of the incumbents in four rural and urban districts in East Java, Indonesia.

The major contribution made by the thesis is to explore the conundrum as to why good leaders who promote good policy and practice are not necessarily re-elected.

The key reasons for survival hinge on the capacity to manage rivalry risks across the incumbent leaders and a small number of informal backers. That is, the ability to play political factions against one and another and to be able to meet the popular needs of enough people to secure their re-election.

The capacity to count votes and work on factions is also to their advantage, along with promoting their re-election bids based on practical policy outputs and popular campaigns, rather than striving to address long-term policy outcomes.

The incumbents' re-election strategies are indicative of a degree of narrow pragmatism that needs to be re-dressed through wider engagement in discursive or participatory engagement with the electorate. Democratic succession does not stress the importance of the electoral accountability of the leaders to the people, but rather the ability to control the dynamics of support and opposition to them through what could be called a form of elitist control through patronage. I suggest this is a form of patronage driven democracy that needs to be reformed through wider engagement with the community.

This, then, has led to the criticism of the *pilkada* by the central government and law makers. On 26<sup>th</sup> September 2014, the law makers under the *Red-and-White* Coalition (*Koalisi Merah*

*Putih*),<sup>1</sup> that have more seats in the legislature, campaigned and succeeded in its removal. According to this coalition, the *pilkada* did not deepen democracy or assist in developing Indonesia as a democracy.

However, this thesis argues against this invalidation because the more people who are involved in thinking about whom they should vote for and why, the more people will learn about democracy and its potential benefits. Consequently, they will be capable of shaping policy through their democratic voice and choices.

To sum up, the thesis can be seen as making a contribution to understanding the importance of participation in enabling participants to comprehend the democratic process at the local level.

The key points are that populism, rivalry and tangibility are the core strategies for the successful incumbents in retaining their offices. Populism refers to the strategies that emphasise winning through making populist policies and activities, rather than effective or relevant policy that has medium and long term implications.

Rivalry refers to the capability to manage support and opposition both from formal and informal actors through fair or unfair means.

Tangibility refers to the ability to deliver tangible policy outputs for the electorate, by building tangible infrastructures or distributing goods that will support the incumbents' re-elections.

In particular, the survival of an incumbent hinges on their capacity to manage rivalry risks from other incumbent leaders and to gain the support from informal backers. Instead of helping liberal democracy to grow, these strategies potentially support patronage driven democracy in the country, in which a small number of elites who control patronage and thus exert influential control over the country's electoral processes.

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<sup>1</sup> The coalition of five political parties (*Golkar, PKS, PAN, Gerindra* and *PPP*) that supported the pair of Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa in 2014 Presidential election. Legislators from these parties proposed the *pilkada* via provincial and district legislative bodies.

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I would like to dedicate the accomplishment of my PhD study as well as my life journey to my father almr. **Warya** and my mother almrh. **Anasih** who always encouraged me to pursue my study although they lived within many limitations.

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## Abbreviations and Glossary

Abangan	Socio-religious norms that take the Hinduism element in Javanese tradition
Abang Becak	Pedicab Driver
AKD	Asosiasi Kepala Desa - Village Heads Association
ALPETA	Aliansi Pembela Kota – The Alliance of City’s Defenders
AMAK	Aliansi Masyarakat Anti Korupsi - Community Alliance against Corruption
AMPI	Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia – The Indonesian Reform Youth Force
Anut grubyuk (Javanese)	The adjustment of individual behaviour to communal behaviour in the neighbourhood (fitting in). In this case study, <i>anut grubyuk</i> refers to individual voting decision that adjusts to communal voting decisions in the neighbourhood.
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah – Local Budget
APBN	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara – State Budget
APINDO	Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia - The Indonesian Employers Association
AROMA	Arif Fuadi – Heri Romadhon
Aspal Mandiri	A sharing program between villagers and district government to build roads and bridges at the village level. The government provides asphalt, machine and road engineers. Villagers provide other materials and workers to construct these infrastructures.
Askeskin	Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin - Health Insurance for the Poor
AUD	Australian Dollar
Bansos	Dana Bantuan Sosial – Social Aid Funds
BARIS	Bambang Irianto - Sugeng Rismiyanto
Bawaslu	Badan Pengawas Pemilu – The Elections Supervisory Agency
Blusukan	Visiting community meeting points or community spots
BOS	Bantuan Operasional Sekolah - School Operational Aid
BPK	Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan – The Supreme Audit Agency
BPR	Badan Perkreditan Rakyat – Rural Banks
Cangkru’an (Javanese)	Hanging out
CLTS	Community-Led Total Sanitation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAK	Dana Alokasi Khusus - the Specific-Purpose Grant
DKPP	Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilihan Umum – The

	Election Organisers Ethics Council
DLLAJ	Dinas Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan - Local Traffic and Land Transportation Office
DPID	Dana Penyesuaian Infrastruktur Daerah – Regional Infrastructure Adjustment Fund
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - The House of Representatives
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – Local Legislative Council
DPRK	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten/Kota - Local Legislative Council
DPRP	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Provinsi – Provincial Legislative Council
FDR	Front Demokrasi Rakyat - Front Democratic People
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGI	Focus Group Interview
FGPL	Forum Generasi Peduli Lingkungan - Forum of Environmental Care Generation
FKPPI	Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Purnawirawan dan Putra Putri TNI Polri – The Communication Forum for Children of Retired Police and Military Officers
Forda UKM	Forum Daerah Usaha Kecil dan Menengah – The Regional Forum for Small and Medium Enterprise
Forum Pro-Damai Kota Madiun	The Pro-Peace Forum of Madiun City
GAPEKNAS	Gabungan Pengusaha Kontraktor Nasional Indonesia - The Indonesian National Contractors Association
GAPENSI	Gabungan Pelaksanan Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia - The Indonesian Builders Association
GAWAN	Gatut Supriyoga - Kus Hendrawan
GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GMNI	Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia - The Indonesia National Student Movement
Golput	Golongan Putih – the White Group or the group of people who dislike the available candidates or parties in the election, then, they prefer not to vote or to be absentees
GOPTKI	Gabungan Organisasi Penyelenggara Taman Kanak-Kanak Indonesia - The Organization of Pre-school Education Facilities
GOR	Gedung Olah Raga – Sport Building
GP Ansor	Gerakan Pemuda Ansor – The Ansor Youth Movement, a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)

GPP	Gabungan Pengusaha Perkebunan - The Plantation Employers Association
GTM	Grounded Theory Method
HARSAM	Soeharto - Samsuri
HAYO	Hari Sutji Kusumedi – Hartoyo
HDI	Human Development Index
HERO OK	Herry Noegroho-Rijanto
HIPMI	Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia - The Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association
HISWANA MIGAS	Himpunan Wiraswasta Nasional Minyak dan Gas Bumi - The Association of National Oil and Gas Entrepreneurs
HKTI	Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia - The Association of Indonesian Farmers
ICW	The Indonesia Corruption Watch
IDI	Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia – Indonesia Democracy Index
IKM	Indeks Kepuasan Masyarakat – Community Satisfaction Index
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
IPNU	Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama - The Nahdlatul Ulama Students Association
IPW	Indonesia Procurement Watch
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
Jamkesda	Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah – The Regional Health Insurances
Jamkesmas	Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat - The National Health Insurance
Jaranan (Javanese)	Jaranan derives from a Javanese word <i>jaran</i> meaning horse. Jaranan is a traditional dance performance using hobbyhorses made of bamboo. It was originally performed for sacred ceremonies in the palace aimed to connect with ancestral spirits. Nowadays, Jaranan is performed to mobilise people in a campaign and to attract tourists.
Jasmas	Jaring Aspirasi Masyarakat - Community Aspiration Net
JPPR	Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Untuk Rakyat - The People’ Voter Education Network
JTV	Jawa Pos Television
KADIN	Kamar Dagang dan Industri - The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Kamituwo (Javanese)	The head of hamlet
Kejari	Kejaksaan Negeri – Regency/Municipality Prosecutors Office

KIA	Kesehatan Ibu dan Anak – Women and Child Health
Kiai	Islamic religious leader and teacher
KK	Kartu Keluarga - Family Card
Koalisi LSM Peduli Madiun	The Care for Madiun NGO Coalition
KOMIT	Kokok Raya – Suparminto
KORPRI	Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia - The Indonesian Civil Servants Corp
KPK	Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi – The Corruption Eradication Commission
KPPS	Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara - Polling Station Working Committee
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum – The General Elections Commission
KPUD	Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah – The Provincial/District General Elections Commission
KRT	Konsorsium Rakyat Trenggalek - The People Consortium of Trenggalek
KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk – Identity Card
KUA	Kebijakan Umum Anggaran - General Budget Policy
KY	Komisi Yudisial – The Judicial Commission
Laskar Merah Putih	The Red and White Troop
Laporo Rek (Javanese)	Just Report Mate!
LBH	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – Legal Aid Institute
LDII	Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia - The Indonesian Islam Propagation Institute
LHKPN	Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara - The State Official Wealth Report
LIRA	Lambung Informasi Rakyat - The People's Information Centre
LKK	Lembaga Keuangan Kelurahan - The Village Financial Institution
LKPJ	Laporan Keterangan Pertanggungjawaban - The Governor/Regent/Mayor’s End of Term Accountability Report
LMDH	Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan - The Forest Village Community Institute
LPPD	Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah - The Regency/Municipality Administration Realization Report
LSI	Lingkaran Survei Indonesia – The Indonesia Survey Circle
Ludruk	Traditional Drama from East Java
MA	Mahkamah Agung – The Supreme Court



MAHIR	Mahsun Ismail – Joko Irianto Soetran
Mancanagari	The outer region of the regional diversity of Javanese culture. The Javanese culture in the outer region is similar to that of Central Javanese court culture of Yogyakarta and Surakarta
Masyarakat Jasa Konstruksi Blitar	The Community of Construction Service of Blitar
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia - The Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims
MBO	Muslim Mass-Based Organisation
MCK	Mandi Cuci Kakus - Washing and Toilet Facility
MCW	Madiun Corruption Watch
MK	Mahkamah Konstitusi – The Constitutional Court
MK	Mulyadi WR – Kholiq
MKGR	Musyawaharah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong - The Mutual Assistance Consultative Organisation
MMR	Maternal Mortality Ratio
MOCAF	Modified Cassava Flour
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - The People’s Consultative Assembly
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia - Indonesian <i>Ulema</i> Council
Muslimat NU	A Women Wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (for housewives)
Musrenbang	Musyawaharah Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah - The Annual Regency/Municipality Development Planning Meeting
Nahdliyin	Members of Indonesian Largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama – Indonesia’s largest mass Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama
ODF	Open Defecation Free
P2T-P2A	Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak – The Integrated Service Centre of Women and Child’s Empowerment
Panwaslu	Panitia Pengawas Pemilu – The District Elections Supervisory Committees
Partai Demokrat	The Democratic Party
Partai Gerindra	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya - The Great Indonesia Movement Party
Partai Golkar	Partai Golongan Karya – The Functional Group Party
Partai Hanura	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat - The People's Conscience Party

Partai Merdeka	The Freedom Party
Partai Patriot Pancasila	The Patriot Party of Pancasila
Partai Perintis	The Pioneer Party
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional – The National Mandate Party
Party ID	Party Identification
PAUD	Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini - Early Childhood Education Centres
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang - The Crescent Star Party
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi - The Reform Star Party
PBSD	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat - The Social Democratic Labour Party
PDAM	Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum – The District-owned Tap Water Company
PDAU	Perusahaan Daerah Aneka Usaha – The Local Government Owned Enterprise of <i>Aneka Usaha</i>
PDE	Pusat Data Elektronik - Electronic Data Centre
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan – The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PDI Pro-Mega	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Pro-Mega - The Indonesian Democratic Party under Megawati Sukarnoputri
PDP	Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan – The Reform Democracy Party
PDS	Partai Damai Sejahtera – The Prosperous Peaceful Party
PEA	Public Expenditure Analysis
Perhutani	Perusahaan Hutan Negara Indonesia - The State-Owned Forestry Company
Perppu	Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang – The Government Regulation that replaces Law
Pesantren	Islamic Boarding School
PGRI	Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia – The Indonesian Teachers Association
PHBM	Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat – The Community-Based Forest Management
Pilkada	Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung – Direct Election for Local Leaders
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa – The National Awakening Party
PKBM	Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat – Community Learning Activity Centres
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia – The Indonesian Communist Party
PKK	Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga – Family Welfare Movement

PKL	Pedagang Kaki Lima – Street Vendors
PKNU	Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama – The National <i>Ulema</i> Awakening Party
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa – The Concern for the Nation Functional Party
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia – The Indonesian Justice and Unity Party
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – The Prosperous Justice Party
PMDMK	Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dalam Mengatasi Kemiskinan - The Community Empowerment in Alleviating Poverty
PMII	Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia – The Indonesian Muslim Students Movement
PN	Pengadilan Negeri - The District Court
PNBK	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan – The Freedom Bull National Party
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia – The Indonesian National Party
PNI Marhaenisme	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme – The Marhaenism Indonesian National Party
PNPM	Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat – The National Program for Community Empowerment
PNU	Partai Nahdlatul Ulama – The Nahdlatul Community Party
Polresta	Kepolisian Resor Kota – The Regency/Municipality Police
Polwil	Kepolisian Wilayah - The Regional Police
Posyandu	Pos Pelayanan Terpadu - the Integrated Health Services Post
PPI	Partai Persatuan Indonesia – The Indonesian Unity Party
PPID	Program Percepatan Pembangunan Infrastruktur Daerah – Infrastructure Development Acceleration Program
PPIP	Program Pembangunan Infrastruktur Perdesaan – Rural Infrastructure Development Program
PPL	Pengawas Pemilu Lapangan – Election Field Supervisor
PPNUI	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia - The Indonesia United Nahdlatul Ummah Party
PPDI	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia – The Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party
PPDK	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan - The United Democratic Party of Nationalism
PPIB	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru - The New Indonesia Alliance Party
PPK	Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan - Sub-District Electoral Committee

PPS	Panitia Pemungutan Suara - Poll Committee
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – The United Development Party
PPP Index	Purchasing Power Parity Index
PPRN	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional – The National Care for People Party
Pramuka	Praja Muda Karana – Scout Movement
Priyayi	According to Geertz (1960) <i>Priyayi</i> is socio-religious norms rooted in the Hindu-Javanese courts of pre-colonial times, including a Hindu-Buddhist mysticism. It originally referred only to the hereditary aristocracy which was reconstructed by the Dutch into an appointive, salaried civil service or white collar elite who maintains highly refined court etiquette and a very complex Javanese art.
PSBI	Persatuan Sepakbola Indonesia Blitar – The Indonesia Blitar Soccer Association
PSI	Partai Sarekat Indonesia - The Indonesian Unity Party
PT KTI	Perseroan Terbatas Kutai Timber Indonesia _ The Kutai Timber Indonesia Limited
Puskesmas	Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat - Community Health Centre
Pustu	Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat Pembantu – Subsidiary Community Health Centre
Raskin	Beras untuk Orang Miskin - Rice for the Poor
RGDP	Regional Gross Domestic Product
RHD	Research Higher Degree
RPJMD	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah – The Mid-term Regional Development Plan
RSBI	Rintisan Sekolah Bertaraf Internasional - The International Pilot Project School
RSUD	Local Government Owned Hospital
RT	Rukun Tetangga - Neighbourhood Unit
RTLH	Rumah Tidak Layah Huni - Home Unfit for Habitation
RW	Rukun Warga – Community Unit
Santri	Socio-religious norms that take Islamic doctrine as their main pattern way of life orientation, a set of beliefs, values and expressive symbols. Santri also means the pupils of Islamic Boarding Schools or <i>pesantren</i> .
SBMI	Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia - The Indonesian Migrant Workers Union
SBMP	Subsidi Biaya Minimal Pendidikan - The Subsidy for Minimal Cost of Elementary Education

SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the 6 <sup>th</sup> President of the Republic of Indonesia (2004-2014)
SD	Sekolah Dasar – Elementary School
Serangan fajar	Money or materials disbursed by the candidates or the candidates' supporter in the early morning of the Election Day. <i>Serangan fajar</i> is intended to bribe voters to vote for whom giving the cash or materials.
SKPD	Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah - Local Government Office
SMA	Sekolah Menengah Atas – Senior High School
SMP	Sekolah Menengah Pertama – Junior High School
SNBI	Sekolah Nasional Bertaraf Internasional – The National School with International Standard
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat
Takziah	To visit, to deliver condolence and to give funeral aid
TAPD	Tim Anggaran Pemerintah Daerah – The Local Government's Budget Team
TII	The Transparency International Indonesia
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia – The Indonesian Military
TPS	Tempat Pemungutan Suara - Polling Station
Tribina	The Three Empowerment Efforts
TSSM	Total Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing
UKM	Usaha Kecil dan Menengah - Small and Medium Enterprise
UU Tipikor	Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi - The Anti-corruption Law
WANGI	Wisnu Suwanto Dewa - Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto
WIP	Work in Progress
WSP	Water and Sanitation Program
YSB	Yayasan Supporter Blitar – The Supporter Foundation of Blitar

## **Candidate's Declaration**

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or a diploma in any university and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Date: December 2014

Candidate

Wawan Sobari

# Chapter 1

## *Pilkada*, Incumbency and their Political Conundrums

... district heads generally win local elections in their respective regions because they used the local government budget for their own benefit by pouring money into generous social programs that increased their popularity (Efendi, *the Jakarta Post* 17 December 2009).

The advantage of incumbency is unavoidable in any election. Popularity, access to campaign resources and influence over the bureaucracy are attached to the holders of power (Harjanto, *the Jakarta Post* 7 April 2012).

...the *pilkada* process, which is heavily coloured by political and business collusive practices, will have an important influence on local governance in the post *pilkada* period. One of the dangers that commonly occur is the emergence of so-called “informal governance” practices (Hidayat as cited in Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 142).

### 1.1. Introduction

In a democracy, participation in an election is open to anyone. In a re-election bid, an incumbent leader can lose out to another as every nominated leader has an equal opportunity to compete. In fact, an incumbent leader who appears to be democratic may not survive. Thus, this thesis began with a conundrum of the results of democratic processes at the local level. What are the factors that lead to re-election? Why are the incumbents, who have access to local government resources and control over bureaucracy, unsuccessful in securing their posts in a re-election? The focus of the thesis is to address the question:

How does the role of political dynamics contribute to their survival or failure? And, what are the implications of surviving and non-surviving strategies for democracy? By examining populist policies and informal politics associated with the incumbents a more detailed understanding of local politics is revealed.

The rising number of failed incumbents and the declining number of successful incumbents who win the elections for a second term is an academic challenge requesting answers. Debates following the incumbents' survival and failure need support through scrutiny based on academic evidence. By looking at the new and emerging democracy in Indonesia, it is important for this study to examine the social dynamics of local democracy in the country. How do incumbents get re-elected, or not? What are the bases for voting patterns? Who gets rewards and for what reason?

I conducted this study because I am an academic in political science in Indonesia and this is a matter of interest in the new Indonesian democracy. Why are some people successful

in getting re-elected or not? This general question guides my academic curiosity to trace the incumbents' policy behaviour and their personal networks while staying in office. Comparison, explanation and analysis of policy choices between the surviving and failed incumbents attempt to reveal the opportunities of remaining in office for distributing politically self-advantageous resources and gaining support from networking alliances and local residents. The research explores also a grounded link between the incumbent's policy choice and its logic of political survival. Moreover, it seeks to enrich the explanation of informal politics in driving local policy processes. As another contribution, it seeks to contribute to better understanding of voting behaviour in direct elections for local leaders (*pilkada*).<sup>2</sup>

## 1.2. Background

Absolute access, wide personal networks, and rampant power abuse are common perceptions addressed to the incumbent<sup>3</sup> in contemporary local politics in Indonesia. The incumbents have direct access to local policy making as well as local budgeting processes. They can drive the budget allocation and disbursement in favour of their own interests. Some observers highlighted the advantageous position of incumbents compared to non-incumbents or challengers in the *pilkada* in Indonesia.

Firstly, under their authority, the incumbents are able to disburse local budgets to give direct benefit to local residents. They are able to gain certain political credits from local government programs. This self-advantageous position probably boosts their popularity amongst potential voters in the regions.<sup>4</sup> Social aid funds are one of the selected expenditures that are open to free handed decisions made by the incumbents. As released by the Corruption Eradication Commission (*KPK*), there were significant increases of APBD (local budget) allocated for social aid. "The total amount allocated for social aid from 2007 to 2010 was more than Rp 300 trillion (US\$34.6 billion)" (The Jakarta Post, 6 April 2011). As a head of district or governor, an incumbent has privileges to disburse this fund directly to local residents.

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout the thesis I employ a shorthand original term of direct election for local leaders as "Pilkada". *Pilkada* is an acronym of *pemilihan kepala daerah*. It is a regular local election that has been conducted since June 2005 (every five years) at the district and provincial level in Indonesia. I adapt Erb and Sulistiyanto's (2009) English translation of the *pilkada*.

<sup>3</sup> Throughout the thesis, the term incumbent refers to the district head (regent or mayor) occupying the office during a re-election bid.

<sup>4</sup> As some political observers remarked, see Yuwono (*Suara Merdeka*, 21 September 2010), Rangkuti (Koran Jakarta, 30 June 2010), Badoh (Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), *Media Indonesia*, 8 January 2010), Sobari (*The Jakarta Post*, 29 April, 2011)



Secondly, the incumbents have greater opportunities to link with many influential people, organisations, and communities and undertake intensive communication to develop political alliances. Due to their exclusive position, the incumbents easily meet with these informal forces.<sup>5</sup> The incumbents can act as patrons for them by disbursing exclusive benefits to their clients. In addition to non-government actors, the incumbents have the influence to mobilise bureaucracy<sup>6</sup> as well as to intervene in district election commissions (*KPUD*) and district elections supervisory committees (*Panwaslu*) to support their candidatures.<sup>7</sup>

Confirming these highlighted points, four recent studies about the *pilkada* in Indonesia reflect similar situations. Because the incumbents have already remained longer in office than the contenders, they have control over the bureaucracy, policy formulation and program implementation and have already gained better mass media self-coverage. These privileges give advantages for the incumbents to run in the *pilkada*. Besides, the incumbents get benefits from their position to build personal patronage networks with informal actors, namely business communities, religious leaders, partisan mass media, local politicians and/or local legislators, gangsters, partisan NGOs, and mass-based organisations (Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 198; Schiller, 2009, p. 165; Ratnawati, 2009, p. 185; Hidayat, 2009, p. 142-143).<sup>8</sup>

Beyond the Indonesian context, other studies also confirm the incumbents' advantages for running in re-election bids. As an office holder, the incumbent has access to complete information about a government's finance and budget. This privilege is an important resource to do tax-setting that is useful for the incumbents to boost their performance credit amongst

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<sup>5</sup> As remarked by some political observers, see Yuwono (*Suara Merdeka*, 21 September 2010), Yazid (*Rakyat Merdeka*, 21 January 2011)

<sup>6</sup> As remarked by some political observers, see Harun (*Rakyat Merdeka*, 26 September 2010), Sobari (*Jawa Pos*, 18 May 2010). Also, Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) revealed 54 cases of bureaucracies' involvement in the 2009 *Pilkada* in four districts (*Jawa pos*, 18 May 2010). General Elections Supervisory Board (*Bawaslu*) found also 1,751 violations in the 2010 *Pilkada* (Source: <http://us.nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/195259-2010--ada-1-751-pelanggaran-di-pilkada> accessed on 31 May 2013) and 1,221 violations in the 2011 *Pilkada* (Source: <http://news.detik.com/read/2011/06/16/175735/1662013/10/bawaslu-terima-1221-pelanggaran-selama-pilkada-2011> accessed on 31 May 2013). Relating to the bureaucracies' involvement, *Bawaslu* revealed two main modus, namely bureaucracy's mobilization to support the incumbents and the deployment of state owned facilities for the incumbents' campaigns. According to the existing regulations, the involvement of civil servants in *Pilkada* is strictly prohibited. The government issued two regulations relating to this restriction, namely the Instruction of Administrative Reform Minister No. 7/2009 on the Neutrality of Civil Servants in Election and the Instruction of Home Minister No. 270/4627/SJ on Instruction to Governor and District Head to Assure Civil Servants' Neutrality in *Pilkada*.

<sup>7</sup> As remarked by some political observers, see Rangkuti (*Koran Jakarta*, 30 June 2010), Badoh, (*Media Indonesia*, 8 January 2010). Some recent legal evidence of local election commission's violations are proven by the Election Organizers Ethics Council (*DKPP*). For instances, the council dismissed all of the Pamekasan General Election's Commissioners due to impartiality violation (Source: <http://www.antarajatim.com/lihat/berita/100318/kpu-pamekasan-hormati-keputusan-dkpp> accessed on 31 May 2013). The council dismissed also three of five commissioners of the Municipality of Gorontalo General Election Commission due to similar violation (Source: <http://www.jpnn.com/read/2013/03/07/161669/DKPP-Copot-Tiga-Komisioner-KPU-Kota-Gorontalo-> accessed on 31 May 2013).

<sup>8</sup> These studies are published in Erb, Maribeth and Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (eds.) (2009) *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

voters (Besley and Case, 1995, p. 25). In addition, the incumbent's government can play power games to set grant policies as a vote-purchasing effort. The government succeeds in winning votes by influencing grants distribution policies from central to lower-governments, especially to regions with significant numbers of swinging voters (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002, p. 27).

Although incumbents have advantages during the occupation of office, the re-election results, indeed, do not automatically favour them. According to the Indonesia Survey Circle (LSI)'s compiled reports, the failed incumbents in the *pilkada* have increased in the first five years (2005-2010). From June 2005 to December 2006, 87 of 230 incumbents (37.83%) did not succeed in retaining their office as a result of the provincial and district elections (LSI, 2007, p. 4).<sup>9</sup> Five years later (2010), this number rose moderately to 44% (64 of 146) (*Rakyat Merdeka*, 26 September 2010).<sup>10</sup>

At the provincial level, particularly in East Java where this research was conducted, the comparison between the surviving and the non-surviving incumbents<sup>11</sup> demonstrated a similar trend. From June 2005 to December 2006, 16 incumbents had run in the district *pilkada*. Three (18.8%) incumbents did not succeed in retaining their posts. Next, 3 of 5 incumbents who had occupied office during 2006-2010 failed to maintain their positions (LSI, 2007). Inconsistencies between the advantages of the incumbents' favourable position and the re-election result, then, sparked a set of questions to address this political conundrum.

In order to explain the puzzle, I have compared and analysed the expenditure of five local governments budgets (APBD) in East Java chaired by the incumbents.<sup>12</sup> The analysis focuses on five budget allocation sectors, namely education, health, social assistance, public works and small and micro economy within five years (2006-2010). A conundrum emerges as the comparison does not show an extreme difference. The districts chaired by the surviving

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<sup>9</sup> The data refer to the monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia/LSI (The Indonesia Survey Circle) 2<sup>nd</sup> edition - June 2007. Incumbents are district heads and governors who run for a second election. Indonesia had held 296 district and provincial elections from June 2005 to December 2006. 230 district heads and governors ran for *pilkada* as the candidate of district heads and governors. Also, 63 incumbents of deputy of district heads and governors competed for district head and governor positions in the 2005-2006 *pilkada*.

<sup>10</sup> These data refer to a review of Lembaga Survei Indonesia (The Indonesia Survey Institute) published in *Rakyat Merdeka Daily*, 26 September 2010.

<sup>11</sup> In this research, an incumbent is a person who holds the office as a regent or mayor (not as deputy of regent or mayor) in 2005. Thus, when they contested in the 2010 *pilkada*, these incumbents had stayed in office for 5 years.

<sup>12</sup> APBD is an acronym of *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (Local budget). APBD is an annual local budget displaying total revenue and expenditure of district/provincial government and every single item of this.

and non-surviving incumbents had disbursed a similar pattern of budget amount in these five sectors. Table 1.1 exposes education expenditure in five rural districts.<sup>13</sup>

**Table 1.1** Education Expenditure of Five Rural Districts in East Java 2006-2010 (%)

Year	Districts					Districts average
	Blitar (Successful)	Ponorogo (Failed)	Jember (Successful)	Trenggalek (Failed)	Mojokerto (Failed)	
2006	44.6	39.49	37.63	43.21	32.41	33.38
2007	43.91↓	39.6↑	39.01↑	43.11↓	34.59↑	33.27
2008	44.42↑	40.01↑	40.37↑	42.84↓	37.20↑	36.84
2009	49.1↑	46.87↑	39.07↓	40.71↓	40.83↑	35.98
2010	51.47↑	52.69↑	45.56↑	52.26↑	46.87↑	41.17

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher

These districts spent similar trends of budget allocation on education in five consecutive years.<sup>14</sup> The districts with surviving and failed incumbents increased their education budget in 2010. Even Ponorogo Regency had constantly improved the budget from 2006 to 2010.

In four other expenditure sectors, these five districts allocated also similar disbursement patterns, particularly during the time the incumbents were in office (2006-2010). In the case of rural districts, there is no consistent logic between the budget allocation and the incumbents' survival. In other words, the rising amount of expenditure on these five major budget sectors does not mean a better opportunity for the incumbents to retain their posts.

**Table 1.2** Education Expenditure of Two Urban Districts in East Java 2006-2008

Year	Probolinggo Municipality (Successful) (%)	Madiun Municipality (Failed) (%)	Districts average (%)
2006	26.5	34.58	33.38
2007	22.48↓	7.53	33.27
2008	23.68↑	45.75↑	36.84

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher

The comparison of education expenditure between two municipalities also demonstrates similar spending patterns. Probolinggo Municipality, representing an urban district with surviving incumbent, spent an increased budget in 2008 when the *pilkada* was held. Madiun Municipality, representing an urban district with a non-surviving incumbent,

<sup>13</sup> The law no. 32/2004 on Local Administration mentions two categories of district which are rural district/regency (*kabupaten*) and urban district/municipality (*kota*). The distinction in these categories is based on sociological characteristics and major livelihood of the population in each district.

<sup>14</sup> There are a total of 38 districts in East Java Province comprising 29 regencies and 9 municipalities.

pursued a similar spending policy on education in 2008, which was even almost double Probolinggo's expenditure.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, Madiun pursued similar expenditure patterns on health, public works, small and micro economy and social assistance within three years (2006-2008). Health expenditure shows an ambivalent example. The decreased amount of health expenditure during 2006-2008 in Probolinggo was in contrast to the increased amount of health expenditure in Madiun. In fact, the incumbent in Madiun was unsuccessful in maintaining his post in the 2008 *Pilkada*. These data have negated prior assumptions about the logic of possible vote-buying beyond public spending.

**Table 1.3** Health Expenditure of Two Urban Districts in East Java 2006-2008 (%)

Year	Probolinggo (surviving)	Madiun (non-surviving)	District average
2006	12.82	6.02	8.40
2007	12.17 ↓	6.7 ↑	8.94
2008	9.71 ↓	7.76 ↑	9.60

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher

Another political puzzle is connected to the practices of money politics in the *pilkada*. Transparency International Indonesia (TII) suspected these practices in the first *pilkada* round across the country in 2005. TII revealed that money politics had been started in the first phase of the *pilkada*, namely in the candidacy process. Someone who intends to run for a candidacy may need to pay some amount of money to a certain political party. The money is intended to obtain a candidature ticket from the party.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The last city mayor incumbents who ran for *pilkada* in East Java were conducted in 2008. In the 2010 *pilkada*, there were no mayor incumbents who were eligible to contest, as they have served the maximum two periods in office.

<sup>16</sup> Source: <http://www.kompas.co.id/kompas-cetak/0504/09/Pilkada/1673174.htm> accessed on 25 November 2011. Chapter 4 presents a complete explanation of the regulations on the *pilkada*.

**Figure 1.1** Money Politics Evidence of the 2010 *Pilkada* in Purbalingga Regency, Central Java



Source: [www.suaramerdeka.com](http://www.suaramerdeka.com)<sup>17</sup>

Five years later, these practices have developed into some more diverse methods. The Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) discovered nine *modus operandi* exercised by the incumbents and the non-incumbents in the 2010 *Pilkada* as demonstrated in table 1.4. Direct cash disbursement dominated money politics cases (69.4 per cent of 1,517 cases).

**Table 1.4** Money Politics Practices in the 2010 *Pilkada* in Indonesia

No.	Modus Operandi	Frequency of cases
1.	Direct cash disbursement	1,053
2.	Groceries distribution	326
3.	Hand tractor distribution	1
4.	Road repair	5
5.	Veil or <i>hijab</i> distribution	39
6.	Liquid natural gas (LNG) tube distribution	47
7.	Umbrella distribution	6
8.	Fertiliser distribution	39
9.	Other	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,517</b>

Source: Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), 2010.

The Indonesia Survey Circle (LSI) (2010) investigated money politics exercises in the *pilkada* through a national survey covering 1,000 samples. Money politics practices were more frequent in the 2010 *Pilkada* than in the 2005 *Pilkada*. 20.8 per cent of respondents confirmed money politics exercises in the 2010 *Pilkada*. This frequency was higher than 11.9 per cent respondents corroborating the same practices in the 2005 *Pilkada*.

<sup>17</sup> Accessed on 24 November 2011.

**Figure 1.2** Money Politics Evidence (groceries) of the 2010 *Pilkada* in Pangkep Regency, South Sulawesi<sup>18</sup>



Source: [www.beritakotamakassar.com](http://www.beritakotamakassar.com)

In addition, ICW calculated the huge amount of money disbursed by candidates in the 2010 *Pilkada*. ICW predicted the candidates spent Rp 10.98 trillion (approximately AUD 1.98 billion) on 244 *pilkada* at the district and provincial level.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, the significant increase in cash and the more diverse money politics practices in the 2010 *Pilkada* could not assure the incumbents would stay in office. Thus, money politics practices are the second riddle.

The next puzzle pertains to the disbursement of *dana bantuan sosial* (*bansos*) or social aid funds. The incumbents have exclusive access to the local budget and development programs. This privileged access encourages the incumbents to exploit directly or indirectly the budget and program aims to capitalise their popularity (Santoso, 2007, p. 76). The incumbents are able to embed their generous image amongst local residents or potential voters.<sup>20</sup>

Nonetheless, this assumption does not succeed in explaining the incumbents' performance or why and how they have managed to survive and endure the challenges of office, particularly in East Java. The amount of local budget disbursed for donating aid to local residents is no longer relevant to secure the incumbents' post in the re-election bid in 2010. Table 1.5 demonstrates this situation.

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<sup>18</sup> Accessed on 24 November 2011.

<sup>19</sup> ICW presented its monitoring findings on 20 December 2010. These data were accessed from ICW's website <http://www.m.antikorupsi.org/> on 25 November 2011.

<sup>20</sup> The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) of the Republic of Indonesia released a seminal study finding about the social assistance funds disbursement on 3 June 2011. KPK said district and provincial governments had disbursed more than Rp 300 trillion of the social assistance fund (approximately AUD 33.3 billion) in the last four years (2007-2010). This anti-graft body found 10 systemic loopholes of social assistance funds disbursement that is prone to graft. KPK has sentenced two district heads and one deputy of district head due to social aid fund embezzlement up to mid-2011. Source: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/06/social-assistance-funds-prone-graft-kpk-study-says.html> accessed on 23 November 2011.

**Table 1.5** Social Assistance Expenditure of Seven Rural and Urban Districts in East Java 2006-2010 (%)

Year	Rural Districts					Urban Districts		Districts Average
	Blitar (Successful)	Ponorogo (Failed)	Jember (Successful)	Trenggalek (Failed) <sup>21</sup>	Mojokerto (Failed)	Probolinggo (Successful)	Madiun (Failed)	
2006	1.19	1.52	0.24	0	0.27	12.82	6.02	8.40
2007	3.2 ↑	3.46 ↑	2.5 ↑	1.99 ↑	1.97 ↑	12.17 ↓	6.7 ↑	8.94
2008	2.12 ↓	2.69 ↓	3.95 ↑	1.53 ↓	2.01 ↑	9.71 ↓	7.76 ↑	9.60
2009	0.92 ↓	1.4 ↓	2.48 ↓	2.54 ↑	2.08 ↓			2.65
2010	1.86 ↑	2.35 ↑	4.94 ↑	1.52 ↓	3.01 ↑			2.82

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher

Both the surviving incumbents and the non-surviving incumbents in rural districts had spent a similar pattern of social aid fund expenditure within five years (2006-2010). The surviving incumbents in Blitar and Jember regencies had spent surprisingly under the district expenditure average in East Java. In contrast, the case of urban districts shows an ambivalent spending pattern. Social aid expenditure decreased in the last two years prior to the 2008 *Pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality, where the incumbent succeeded in maintaining his office. Conversely, the improvement in social aid expenditure in Madiun Municipality prior to the 2008 *Pilkada* was unable to support the incumbent to maintain his post. These facts imply that the rising amount of social assistance funding cannot assure the incumbents' survival.

The last puzzle is associated with the explanation of voting behaviour in the *pilkada*. The incumbents' survival and failure in the race is not always consistent with the logic of rewards and punishment. The incumbents' survivals are not a reward for their good performance from voters. Likewise, the incumbents' failures are not definite evidence that they were punished by voters.

LSI undertook a preliminary survey to explain the incumbents' survival and failure in four provinces and four districts in 2006. LSI asserted that there is no similar pattern of connection amongst provinces and districts concerning the incumbents' survival and failure and the incumbents' performance during their tenure. In order to comprehend better the factors endorsing the incumbents' survival or failure in the *pilkada*, LSI suggests undertaking further intensive studies (LSI, 2007, p. 15). These presentations, then, arrive at a crucial challenging question. Why are the incumbents, who have access to local government resources and opportunities to campaign permanently, unsuccessful in securing their posts?

<sup>21</sup> The 2006 Trenggalek's local budget does not show a specific budget allocation to social aid.

### **1.3. Research Aims**

The thesis aims to explore the socio-political dynamics of re-elections in Indonesia. The practical aim of this study is to explain the incumbents' political survival and failure in Indonesian democracy, especially at the district levels in a major region. Its specific objectives are to explore critically the incumbents (district heads)'s policy behaviour while staying in office, to compare policy behaviour of the surviving and failed incumbents and to arrive at an academic explanation regarding the pathway to their survival or failure. The study also aims to assess previous works about the phenomena of informal politics in the *pilkada* and to develop a recent framework of informal political practices and actors (informal politics) pertaining to the incumbents' policy behaviour and their survivals and failures in the *pilkada*, and to explain voting behaviour in the *pilkada* through narrative searches by exploring voters' values, contexts, and praxis as well as power issues amongst them. Theoretically, this study is, therefore, aimed at enriching the new discourse of local politics content, especially about the logic of the incumbents' political survivals and failures in democratic elections. In addition, this study aims at expanding voting behaviour explanation by emphasising narrative explanations of values, contexts, pragmatism and practical realities of voters.

### **1.4. Statement of the Problems**

Following those aims are four sets of operational research questions. The first set is related to the portrait of the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics associated with the incumbents at the district level. During the incumbents' period of holding office, what is the full picture of the incumbents' policy choices? Particularly, what are the prominent policies pursued by the incumbents? What sorts of incentives can explain the incumbents' policy choices? What are the determining factors that can endorse the incumbents' policy choices? Moreover, this study inquiries into what the full picture of informal politics (actors and practices) is, associated with the incumbents. Specifically, who are they and how do they work? How does informal politics shape the incumbents' policy choices? What are the factors endorsing the occurrence of informal politics? Which factor is more central in determining the incumbents' policy choices, between formal institutions or actors inside local government and informal institutions or actors outside local government?

The second set of questions is about the impact of the incumbents' policy choices and the informal politics associated with them on the incumbents' political survival and failure in the *pilkada*. To what extent do the incumbents' policy choices contribute to their political survival and failure? How do informal politics (actors and practices) contribute to the



incumbents' survival? How do voters compromise with the incumbents' policy choices and informal politics? Do they gain any advantages from the incumbents' policy choices and informal political practices? How do money politics practices distort voters' logic in deciding their ballots?

The third set of questions is about the significance of this study for a theoretical explanation of the logic of the incumbents' survival in an electoral democracy. As has been mentioned in the first part of this chapter, four political puzzles challenge the incumbents' advantages in competing in re-election bids. The study, hence, investigates the contribution of policy choices and informal politics to the incumbents' survival, especially by reviewing voters' logic to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. Do the incumbents' policy choices contribute to voters' logic to vote or not to vote for them? Do the voters consider informal political practices and actors attached to the incumbents? Can any other factors, such as value-rationality, contexts, pragmatism, voters' practical realities and the issue of power amongst voters, contribute to voters' decision to vote or not to vote for the incumbents?

The last set of questions addresses the concern of women's involvement in the *pilkada*. Since women have equal political citizenship in the country and represent a greater population as well as suffrage than men, inquiring into women's roles and participation in the race is a relevant aspect for democratic engagement that should be covered in the thesis. It addresses some specific questions; what is women's role in the *pilkada*? How do gender-related development achievements explain the incumbents' survival? What are the impacts of informal political manoeuvres on women? How do women explain their preferences? And what are the implications for the incumbents' political survival or failure?

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review, Key Concepts and Definition of Terms

This chapter strives to address the theoretical gaps of the incumbents' survival and failure in re-election bids that this study attempts to fill through developing a contribution grounded in the literature. This study aims to ground analysis in the relevant participants' voices regarding the incumbents' political survival and integrates critical thinking, critical ethnography and a case study approach in a commensurate way to enrich the explanation of the incumbents' political survival and failure at the local level.

The chapter seeks to outline the academic position on the study of political survival. It particularly focuses on the incumbents' survival and failure at the local level.

#### 2.1. Definition of Terms

This thesis employs several terms that are essential throughout the study. It defines them to avoid misunderstanding.

##### *Policy behaviour*

This term refers to a set of decisions made by the incumbents in office and/or prior to the *pilkada*. These decisions represent the incumbents' policy choices, responding to certain situations at the local level. This study sets policy choices in the five sectors of populist local development policies, namely education, health, public works, small and micro-economy, and social assistance. This thesis frames policy choices as the annual local budget (APBD)<sup>22</sup> and local development policies. APBD policy comprises development programs, activities and budget allocation. It portrays the incumbents' policy choices to allocate resources under complex circumstances.

##### *Informal Politics*

Many scholars give various titles to this concept. Hidayat (2009) and Peters call it "informal governance" referring to "governance conducted through actors and processes outside formal government" (2007).<sup>23</sup> Helmke and Levitsky (2004 & 2006) and Bratton (2007) name it "informal institution". Also, Lake and Newman (2002) and Reno (2008) use the term

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<sup>22</sup> APBD is an acronym of *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (local budget)

<sup>23</sup> In Bevir, 2007, p. 555

“shadow state”. These scholars, indeed, describe the similar phenomena of the involvement of non-government actors in governing the state.

In this thesis, informal roles are possibly more influential than formal institutions of government. They play a role in designing and approving the incumbents’ policy choices as well as in distributing the resources of local government. Actors practising informal politics are not limited to non-government or informal actors. They also include partisan bureaucrats supporting the incumbents. Thus, informal politics means the play of politics of particularism involving the incumbents, informal and formal actors.

The incumbent or district head is the person (regent or mayor) holding a defined constitutional or formal position as a district head (*kepala daerah*) prior to the *pilkada*. The incumbent runs in the *pilkada* to retain the next term (five years) in office. This study sets a limitation that an incumbent merely refers to the incumbent of the position of regent or mayor, not to the incumbent of the position of deputy regent or deputy mayor. There are two reasons for this limitation. Firstly, based on the applied legal standing on local government,<sup>24</sup> a district head (regent or mayor) has major and strategic (steering) authorities compared to a deputy. He or she has six main areas of authority. The most important areas of authority are to lead local government, to propose local regulations and to draft and decide the local budget (APBD). In contrast, a deputy district head is positioned as an assistant to the district head. The deputy conducts his authority by order of the district head. Secondly, these legal stipulations are also publicly accepted, as a deputy district head is considered to be powerless.

#### *Direct election for local leaders (pilkada)*

*Pilkada* or *pemilihan kepala daerah* is a regular local election conducted every five years at the district and provincial level in Indonesia. Every eligible citizen<sup>25</sup> has a right to vote freely for a pair of candidates consisting of district head and the deputy district head. In this thesis, the *pilkada* is a regular local election conducted every five years to vote for district head and deputy.

#### *Political survival*

This term refers to the result of the *pilkada*, indicating the incumbents’ survival or failure to be re-elected to the office. Political survival is a set of perceptions of the incumbents and

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<sup>24</sup> The Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government. See articles 25 and 26.

<sup>25</sup> The Law No. 32/2004 on Local Administration stipulates that every citizen who attains the age of 17 years old, or is married/has been married on the Election Day has a right to vote. In the new Law, namely the Government Regulation that replaces Law (*Perppu*) No.1/2014 on the Election of Governor, Regent and Mayor, citizens only vote for the head of district or governor. The deputy is elected by the head of district or governor, approved by the home minister or president.

their supporters<sup>26</sup> on the accomplishment of their goal to maintain office. The achievement of the goal is contributed to by the incumbents' policy choices and the informal politics associated with the incumbent prior to the *pilkada*.

#### *Voting behaviour*

This term refers to local residents' preferences in the *pilkada*. The primary substance is based on local residents' explication to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*. Their arguments probably explain causal conditions between the incumbents' policy behaviour and/or informal politics and voters' preference to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. Moreover, voters may have other judgements to vote or not to vote for the incumbents or the challengers, which rely on factors outside policy choices and informal politics.

#### *Patronage driven democracy*

This is actually not an academic term that has been applied commonly in political science. Patronage driven democracy is a conceptual abstraction of the practice of particularism that may support or undermine the survival of the incumbent leaders in the direct election of local leaders (*pilkada*), which is specifically revealed in this case study in four districts in East Java. The term patronage in this study has two meanings, namely person and political relation. The former refers to Latin word *patronus* (patron) in the meaning 'protector, defender'. The latter reflects in the relationship between supporters and government leaders who distribute favours in return for votes (McMillan, in McLean and McMillan (eds.), 2003, p.400). The relation is expressed in loyalties and particularist value orientations between both parties (Lauth, 2000, p. 31).

The divergent analogy of patronage and democracy is when the survival of an incumbent leader is mainly contributed to by his capability to gain support from small number of protectors and defenders (backers), particularly informal actors, in return for the private benefits of the public budget distributed by the leader. Although the leader is elected by voters who have equal rights to vote in the *pilkada*, in fact, their voting preferences are driven by tangible aspects of policy outputs and other goods donated by the incumbent, who is supported by minor numbers of actors or backers who gain certain benefits from the disbursement of the local budget (APBD). In addition, effective control over these actors, including bureaucrats, is crucial for an incumbent to prevent the motives of rivalry that may undermine the incumbent leader's influence amongst local people and in implementing local

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<sup>26</sup> De Mesquita et.al (2003:11) utilises the term of the *winning coalition* or the sub-group of the *selectorate* who maintain incumbents in office and in exchange receives special privileges.

government populist policies. Hence, patronage driven democracy is the practice of the incumbent leaders' survival in a re-election bid that hinges on the ability to manage rivalry risks from informal (and partisan formal) actors and the support of two other instruments, namely populism and tangibility (the ability to deliver tangible policy outputs). Unlike non-democratic system, patronage driven democracy gives and protects individual participation in electing the leader. Thus, popular election takes place to legitimise the re-election of the surviving leaders who employs non-repressive methods to lure voters, by shaping favourable issues and perceptions credited to them.

## **2.2. The Logic of Political Survival in a Democratic World**

The 2013 Freedom House report underlined the decline of countries registered with improved political rights and civil liberties compared to the preceding year's report. Some dramatic events in the Middle East and instability or authoritarian retrenchment in other regions have contributed to the state of global freedom. Nonetheless, the report claims a slight improvement in the number of electoral democratic countries. Until 2012, countries designated as electoral democracies reached 61 per cent of a total of 195 countries. This means that 118 countries have enjoyed the elected power of national decision-making authorities. Or, the majority of countries in the world have undertaken electoral processes, recognised as political pluralism and participation, and run well functioning governments (Puddington, 2013, pp.1-3).

This recognised report considers that election is one of the important indicators to measure countries' democratic practices. A country with electoral democracy has legitimised a person or a group of people to run for office and make decisions in the name of all represented people. Indeed, election as one of the democratic standardised indicators is not a simple practice. It involves the play of power amongst political actors. Regular and fair election in a democratic world is not only a mechanism of electing the leaders, but also the way of competing, struggling, and defending public offices.

Many political scientists have theorised about the leaders' political survival. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (2003) are some of the outstanding political scientists consistently producing academic works on the logic of political survival of incumbent politicians. They work on the *selectorate* theory, explaining the logic of the incumbents' political survival in the state of democracy.

The *selectorate* theory stresses its core predictions on hypotheses about taxing and spending decisions and the tendency of *kleptocracy*. In order to survive, leaders construct financial related policies to gain support from the winning coalition (W) and *selectorate*

(S).<sup>27</sup> The ratio of W and S determines the enormity of leaders' discretionary budget. The leader plays politics in deciding revenue and expenditure policies to maintain the W and S support (de Mesquita et.al, 2003, pp. 129-130). The size of the winning coalition affects public spending policy through the provision of public and private goods.<sup>28</sup> The higher the number in the winning coalition compared to the *selectorate*, the greater is the opportunity for the incumbent to spend revenue on public goods. In contrast, a small number in a winning coalition changes the policy focuses to the narrow orientation of policies, giving more advantages to cronies and luxury for officers (de Mesquita and Smith, 2010, p. 937). These scholars apply mathematical models as a basis for this theory.

The deployment of a positivist approach is very convincing to dismantle the logic of the incumbents' political survival. This approach intends to result in a generalisation of the factors contributing to the incumbents' political survival. However, this thesis does not rely on such an approach. It emphasises the purpose of providing a better understanding of the incumbents' and voters' political dynamics in a more specific context by focusing on some detailed cases. Some relevant academic works are valuable to enrich the viewpoint of this study. They focus mostly on local politics in Indonesia, such as Sidel (2004),<sup>29</sup> Nordholt and Klinken (eds.) (2007), Buehler (2010) and Palmer (2010).<sup>30</sup>

Eight relevant essays, published in *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia: Direct Election for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*,<sup>31</sup> are very useful to give some insight into the incumbents' political survival and failure in the *pilkada*. Sulistiyanto (2009) in his "Pilkada in Bantul District: Incumbent, Populism and the Decline of Royal Power" gives useful explanations of factors contributing to the incumbent's survival, namely populist policies, local leadership style (populism), local political networks, local cultural resources, and historical knowledge. Sulistiyanto (2009) suggested also that the *pilkada* in Bantul is a local political phenomenon that is closely connected to a local specific background. Schillers (2009) in his "Electing District Heads in Indonesia: Democratic Deepening or Elite Entrenchment?" provides critical insights into the *pilkada* assessment in deepening

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<sup>27</sup> Selectorate is the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership. A winning coalition is a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society (de Mesqueta, et.al, 2003: 42, 51).

<sup>28</sup> De Mesquita and Smith remarked that public goods benefit all members of society and private goods filter the benefit for limited numbers of society.

<sup>29</sup> It is one of the chapters in Harris, Kristian, and Tornquist (eds.) (2004) *Politicising Democracy: the new local politics and democratization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>30</sup> The last two essays are part of the book edited by Aspinall and Mietzner (2010) *Problem of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

<sup>31</sup> Erb, Maribeth, and Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (eds.) (2009) *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia: Direct Election for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

Indonesian Democracy, as well as factors that contribute to the survival of the incumbent in Jepara Regency, which are performance based factors, media based factors, cultural based factors and personality based factors.

Then, Ratnawati (2009) in her “Gender and Reform in Indonesian Politics: The Case of a Javanese Woman *Bupati*” explores the distinguished performance of a woman incumbent. She revealed several supporting factors that may contribute to the incumbent’s survival that are her powerful popularity compared to her rivals, the advantage of personal attributes as a female politician in an emerging democracy, generous programs for the poor and an example of good governance, the clever use of IT to build the incumbent’s image, and the support of a major Muslim mass-based organisation (*Nahdlatul Ulama/NU*)’s followers. Smith in her “The Return of the Sultan? Patronage, Power, and Political Machines in “Post”-Conflict North Maluku” discovers insightful findings about the struggle of the incumbent in the *pilkada* in a post-conflict region. The incumbent succeeded in maintaining his power in office due to party machine support, including the superior access to campaign funds and the role of political protection, though the incumbent had to encounter the strong figure of the challenger as a respected royal leader in the region.

Subianto (2009) in his “Ethnic Politics and the Rise of the Dayak-Bureaucrats in Local Elections in six *Kabupaten* in West Kalimantan” provides useful explorations of the influence of ethnic identity in driving voters’ attachment to the incumbent in six districts in West Kalimantan. Subianto revealed the importance of exploiting religious sentiments, bureaucracy support, funding donations from the logging industry and strong campaign team management. Subianto provides also some useful findings revealing factors leading to the incumbent’s failure. Allegations of involvement in illegal logging and corruption diminished the incumbent’s popularity. Also, the ingenuity of the winning challenger in luring voters across ethnicity and religion in the region has contributed to the defeat of the incumbent.

Buehler (2009) in “The Rising Importance of Personal Networks in Indonesian Local Politics: An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005” gave useful explanations about the incumbents’ failure in the *pilkada* in two districts due to underestimated assessments of the role of the challengers’ personal networks. The incumbents were supported by ill-consolidated parties and did not connect directly to the grassroots. They were overconfident in their popularity, as the incumbents, amongst voters. Erb and Anggal in their “Conflict and the Growth of Democracy in Manggarai District”, demonstrated excellent findings explaining the incumbent’s failure to stay in office. The incumbent’s less sympathetic figure due to human rights abuse allegations has led to the success of the challenger. Interestingly, traditional values of kinship, lineage and wealth as

well as party machines are no longer relevant to explain voters' orientations, compared to development issues and the incumbent's low performance in certain areas of the district.

Finally, Hidayat (2009) in his "*Pilkada*, Money Politics, and the Dangers of 'Informal Governance' Practices" gives useful findings about the role of "shadow rulers" in local governments as well as their role in driving provincial governments' policies. He confirmed also the *modus operandi* of money politics in the *pilkada*.

In addition to these compiled publications, Tomsa (2009) in his "Local Elections and Party Politics in a Post-Conflict Area: the *Pilkada* in Maluku" reveals similar useful findings in the 2008 *Pilkada* in Maluku. At the provincial level, he argued that the incumbent governor's survival was endorsed by two main factors, namely popularity and the ability to gain networks of support. Although the region was rampant with post-conflict situations, indeed, smart strategies to boost popularity among voters and the ingenuity to maintain patronage with extensive networks secured the incumbent to retain office.

Relating to this study, those previous studies have developed academic foundations to understand the *pilkada* from the viewpoint of local politics and democracy. Various issues relating to the dynamics of the *pilkada* are well presented. Nevertheless, most of the studies were conducted in 2005, when the *pilkada* was first conducted in Indonesia.

To the best of my knowledge, more extensive studies are limited. Furthermore, these previous studies did not undertake a comparative assessment to understand the factors contributing to the incumbents' survival or failure. This study attempts to partly fill this gap by assessing factors leading to the incumbents' survival and failure as well as voters' explications about their preferences for incumbents by employing a comparative assessment and covering cases in urban and rural districts in one province. Also, this study expands the explanation of the relevance of informal politics in the *pilkada*.

### **2.3. Enlarging the Space of Context: Voting Behaviour in the *Pilkada* and Money Politics Practices**

The previous studies mainly view the incumbents' survival or failure based on non-voters' views. This study enriches the narrative explanation of voting behaviour (preferences and reasons) in the *pilkada*, particularly pertaining to policy outputs, personal image and political networks. This study explains voters' decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in detail. These narratives may encourage a better explanation of voters' logic in the *pilkada*.

Eight essays, in *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia: Direct Election for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*, do not narrate voters' logic beyond their ballots. As well, Tomsa's work focused more on the depiction of the *pilkada* in a post-conflict province, by assessing the role of



parties, the incumbents' survival and networks and the implementation of the *pilkada*. Relating to voting behaviour in the *pilkada*, useful insights were obtained from several studies conducted by Indonesian academics.

Two voting behaviour studies which focused on the *pilkada* at the provincial level, in the 2008 *Pilkada* in Central Java, present useful findings. Susilo Utomo (2008), in his "Kepemimpinan Lokal Era Pilkada Langsung: Belajar dari Kemenangan Bibit Waluyo-Rustriningsih Pada Pilgub Jateng 2008" (Local Leadership in the Era of Direct *Pilkada*: Lesson from the Victory of Bibit Waluyo-Rustriningsih in the 2008 Central Java gubernatorial Election), underlines that perceptions of the ideal leadership figure contributed to the victory of Bibit Waluyo and his running mate Rustriningsih. Utomo explained further that the socio-cultural model of the ideal Javanese leader is expected by voters and this attribute was reflected in the winning pair.

On the other hand, another quantitative survey in the Municipality of Semarang demonstrated different findings. Adhi P. Wicaksono (2009), in his "Perilaku Pemilih dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung: Studi Penelitian pada Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Jawa Tengah tahun 2008 di Kota Semarang (Voter Behaviour in Direct Election for Local Leaders: A Study of the 2008 Central Java gubernatorial Election in the Municipality of Semarang)", argues that there is no significant influence of the variables of candidates' image, party identification level, and campaign effectiveness on voting behaviour. Also, cross tabulation of social indicators, such as gender, education, age, and religion does not show positive association with voters' choice. These contradictory results show there is an unfinished explanation for understanding voters' logic in electing candidates.

Fortunately, I conducted a similar survey in 2010 to research the electability of candidates in the 2010 *Pilkada* of Malang Regency. The survey revealed that better personal image and popularity of the winning candidate compared to the competitors boosted the candidate's electability amongst voters. Voters neglected their party preferences in the 2009 legislative election by devoting their ballots to the winning candidate (Sobari et al., 2010, pp. 36-37).<sup>32</sup> This study has strengthened an earlier study conducted by Utomo (2008).

A very useful and relevant previous study was conducted by Afan Gaffar (1992) in his published dissertation "Javanese Voters: A Case Study of Election under a Hegemonic Party System". Though Gaffar's survey was focused on voting behaviour for a political party, in contrast, this quantitative research succeeded in revealing some explanatory variables of

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<sup>32</sup> The winning candidate (Rendra-Subhan) was proposed by the Golkar Party, Democratic Party (PD), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and United Development Party (PPP). This coalition of parties is smaller, in the number of legislative seats in the Local Parliament, than other coalitions. The regency of Malang parliament is dominated by two parties, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) that allied to propose the pair of Geng-Rahman. Indeed, the former coalition succeeded in defeating the later coalition in the 2010 *pilkada*.

Javanese voting behaviour, especially in rural Java. His general conclusion demonstrated that norms and values, which are transferred via political socialisation, have contributed to the creation of partisan choice among Javanese villagers. By referring to Geertz's well known trichotomic Javanese society, Gaffar argued that the manifests of these norms and values are *aliran* (mainstream) that are rooted in socio-religious norms amongst the so-called *abangan* (who take the Hinduism element in Javanese tradition) and *santri* (who take as their main pattern and way of life orientation, a set of beliefs, values and expressive symbols based primarily on Islamic doctrine) (Gaffar, 1992, p. 185).

The most relevant finding in this study is about the relationship between leadership and voters' preferences. Gaffar concludes that voters' preferences are shaped by their interaction with leaders. Voters who attach to the formal leaders (village officials and their assistants and the heads of hamlets) vote for the government party (Golkar). In contrast, voters who attach to the informal leaders, especially religious leaders, vote for the Islamic party (PPP).<sup>33</sup> Consequently, the control of socio-religious orientation gives a clear pattern that the *abangan* voters who attach to formal leaders vote for Golkar and the *santri* who attach to the religious leaders vote for PPP (Gaffar, 1992, pp. 193-194).

An important note to Gaffar's (1992) study is that his research was conducted under a situation of a hegemonic party system and authoritarian government. It is fair to say that contemporary Indonesian politics is very different. Indonesia has implemented open political competition or regular and fair elections since 1999. The Freedom House classified Indonesia as a free country in terms of electoral democracy.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, Indonesia's contemporary voters' behaviour is assumed to have transformed into a new pattern. Nonetheless, the socio-religious orientation and leaders and party relationships remain relevant to elucidate voting behaviour in the *pilkada*, particularly in a narrative way.

This study draws on the relevant input from behavioural economic studies contributing to the development of voting behaviour theories. Two important works are authored by Anthony Downs (1957) and Bryan Caplan (2007). Downs firstly remarked that citizens or voters mostly encounter the situation of multi-limitations. One of the limitations is the situation of incomplete information or imperfect knowledge. This situation, then, leads to the limited opportunities of voters to perform rational analysis in getting adequate information or knowledge as a foundation for voting for a candidate or party. As obtaining complete information is costly, compared to the benefit of voting, voters act in rational ignorance. They

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<sup>33</sup> Golkar is acronym of Golongan Karya or the group of workers. PPP is acronym of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or the United Development Party.

<sup>34</sup> See the Freedom House report entitled *Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance*.

vote pragmatically without considering enough of their preferences (Downs, 1957, pp. 139-140). In other words, rational ignorance exists when voters are tired of searching for adequate information in order to vote correctly (Caplan, 2007, p.123).

Caplan suggested expanding the concept of rational ignorance. In addition to preference and price, voters consider also beliefs or false beliefs before making decisions. Caplan argues that beliefs can drive voters to act irrationally in terms of gaining or losing material benefits. Still, voters act rationally, based on their beliefs, to obtain consistently what they want. He labels this theory as rational irrationality, to represent voters who actively avoid the truth (efficiency) (Caplan, 2007, pp.122-123).

In addition to deepening the logic of the incumbents' political survival through voters' narrative explanations, the study expands its discussion on the practices of money politics (political bribery) in the *pilkada*. Two scholars have given useful foundations to research money politics practices in the *pilkada*. Hidayat (2009) has elaborated both the direct and indirect *modus operandi* of money politics in the *pilkada* as well as their relationships with informal actors who invest their money to support candidates. He has also discussed the implication of money politics on the operation of local government after the *pilkada*. Moreover, Hadiz (2010) discovered the practices of money politics and thuggery in a new local democracy, especially in Medan and Surabaya. Distinctively, this case study presents a different explanation of money politics by investigating suggesting a narrative experience from receivers of money politics as well as its impact on voter "cash driven" behaviour.

#### **2.4. Significance and Limitations**

This thesis has both significance and limitations. The study provides an examination of the incumbents' survival in an electoral democratic country, especially at the local level. It does not focus only on the surviving incumbents, but also on a comparative assessment of the surviving and the non-surviving incumbents, as well as discussing cases in the rural and urban districts. By researching three aspects, namely the incumbents' policy behaviour, informal politics associated with the incumbents, and voters' explanations about their preferences, this thesis, thus, serves scholars interested in questioning political conundrums on the logic of the incumbents' survival and failure at the local level, especially in Indonesia or Southeast Asian area studies. Hopefully, it can also serve Indonesian policy makers to help evaluate the recent practices of the *pilkada*, its existing regulations and its further contribution to the practices of local democracy that are valuable for people as well as Indonesia as a democratic country. For practical interest, this study provides also a conceptual qualitative-based framework for politicians, political parties, and people involved

in political consultancy activities. This thesis aims to provide some insights into the context-specific dynamics of election and re-election at the local level. Rural and urban contexts will be compared. The aim is also to enable a greater understanding of what factors support re-election, why and why not. The study is confined to the incumbents' survival in only four districts in East Java Province, which is the region of the home of the major ethnic group in Indonesia, the Javanese. This study provides specific links to both distinctive cultural values and praxis, which are determinant in character and have a specific place among voters' hearts and minds. Finally, this case study explores women's role in the *pilkada*, their preferences and implications for the incumbents' survival or failure.

Nonetheless, this study is aware of several limitations that should be recognised, pertaining to its findings. The study applies three criteria to select the study sites, namely the regions with incumbents who have run for re-election, the incumbents who have occupied the office for five years, and the degree of the incumbents' success or failure compared to the challengers in the *pilkada*.<sup>35</sup> Due to the application of these criteria, this study cannot cover regions with all the main cultural settings in East Java.<sup>36</sup> Also, this thesis is not intended to develop new theoretical concepts about the logic of the incumbents' political survival. Limited time and resources as well as designated locations in specific areas of the case study, rather than wide covering comparative areas involving multi-countries, have bounded the study to not address various types of theories of political survival. However, the study seeks to contribute theoretically via detailed narrative presentation that is insightful for future efforts of theory building.

## **2.5. The Importance of the Complementary Approach**

To understand the democratic system, the study cannot rely solely on literature that has been published. Local democracy in Indonesia is a new and evolving study. For that reason, this study will build on and contribute to the theory. However, the study is not using traditional grounded theory, because it is in fact founded on some political concepts. Hence, this study is applying the essence of grounded theory in a very loose sense. In addition, it is preferable to say that this study is closer to applying the complementary approach to respond to the statement of the problems. The approach sees the phenomena of political survival and democracy at the local level, possibly in diverse thought and action. Flood and Romm

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<sup>35</sup> This study sets the degree of incumbent or challenger's winning which reaches the minimum size of winning by 50 per cent. The rationale to set the 50 per cent of degree of winning due to the supposition of solid winning indicates the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of incumbency.

<sup>36</sup> East Java has five main cultural-setting classifications, namely Mataraman (Javanese), Madurese, Arek, Osing, and Pandalungan (Mainly mixed Javanese and Madurese). However, this study is helped by the Geertz's trichotomic Javanese society, namely *abangan*, *santri*, and *priyayi* (Geertz, 1960).

emphasise the priority of keeping diversity as the goal of this approach by arguing that “Preservation of diversity enhances opportunities people have to manage intelligently and responsibly the most exacting issues that arise in organisational and societal affairs” (1996, p. 5).

Based on this argument, this thesis examines the incumbents’ political survival or failure in electoral democratic practices by implementing, firstly, diverse and commensurate research methods that are able to identify factors relevant to the survival or failure. It is based firmly on data founded in fieldwork; secondly, by obtaining relevant data from various participants who have firsthand knowledge and experience related to the *pilkada*, namely the *pilkada* implementers, the incumbents, local politicians, voters, local NGO activists and the *pilkada* supervisory body members. They are treated equally to construct acceptable grounded explanation of factors that may lead to the survival or failure of district heads in their re-election bids.

## Chapter 3

### Methodology

This thesis follows the inductive logic of qualitative research. This study is grounded in data gathered from intensive fieldwork. Data from observation, research conversations with participants and secondary data from relevant documents and media are the main sources on which the analysis was based and on which the thesis was based.

Fieldwork was undertaken from June 2012 to January 2013 covering four districts in East Java, namely the Regency of Blitar, the Regency of Trenggalek, the Municipality of Probolinggo and the Municipality of Madiun. In each district, eight weeks were spent interviewing all the participants, undertaking observation, collecting documents, undertaking data coding and conducting the focus group interviews (FGI).

#### 3.1. Personal Concern

This study is centred on the incumbents' political survival and failure in the new and emerging local democracy in Indonesia; how the surviving and the non-surviving incumbents manage their policy choices; how the incumbents engage in plays of power in local policy-making; how the incumbents build networks with informal actors; how informal actors support the incumbents and are involved in resources allocation. The study also considers the extent to which policy choice and informal actors contribute to the incumbents' survival; what is taken into consideration for voters to vote or not to vote for the incumbents and how the practice of money politics drives voter's choices. These questions are linked directly to the practices of recent local politics and evolving local democracy in Indonesia.

Local politics and public policy is not a new concern. I have been involved in this issue since 2002, especially following the implementation of regional autonomy (decentralisation) implementation in Indonesia since 2001.<sup>37</sup> My interest in this topic was fostered by my long standing focus on researching local politics, public policy and decentralisation issues since joining the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP) in 2002. JPIP is an epistemic community organisation with the independent support of Jawa Pos, one of the most influential newspapers in Indonesia, published from Surabaya. The main characteristic of JPIP is that it is an independent and non-profit organisation whose main mission is to encourage progressive decentralisation in Indonesia. JPIP endeavours consistently to initiate the new perspective of decentralisation that is rooted in the interests of local governments and

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<sup>37</sup> The policy is the Law No. 22/1999 on Local Administration. This law was amended by the Law No. 32/2004.

local residents. It seeks to encounter the dominant discourse of decentralisation amplified by the central government and other Jakarta-based institutions.<sup>38</sup>

Observing local innovation policies has provided a basic foundation to develop my academic curiosity concerning the dynamics of local politics as well as local policy-making processes. This starts from the assumption that local innovation policy does not stand solely on the rational consideration of promoting local advancement and/or to responding to local residents' demands and needs. Local government, especially the district head, has a hidden interest of constructing his or her image of success in the leadership period.

In 2005, the International Fellowship Program of the Ford Foundation (IFP) appreciated these research and advocacy activities at JPIP by awarding a prospective and distinguished scholarship to pursue a Master of Arts (MA) degree at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, The Netherlands. My study at ISS has developed fruitful knowledge and skills to study further about decentralisation, local politics and policies and public management.

After completing my MA degree, I returned to join to JPIP in early 2007. I also started to teach at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Brawijaya University. At JPIP, I had many opportunities to continue my concerns regarding local politics, public policy and decentralisation related studies. In the 2007 annual decentralisation monitoring research in 38 districts in East Java, JPIP and I conducted elaborative research to inquire into some policy aspects of local (district) government innovations. One of the crucial conclusions supports this thesis' argument about political interests beyond these innovative policies. The study found that the domination of district heads over local innovation policy-making processes indicates their interest to secure their image by selecting innovations proposed by the local offices (Sobari, et.al, 2007). In other words, there can be no local government innovations without first obtaining the district heads' approvals to pursue the innovation policies.

This interest in intensely studying the dynamics of local politics has found its momentum after the implementation of direct election for local leaders (*pilkada*) since 1 June 2005. *Pilkada* has changed the profile of local politics towards becoming more energetic. Local political competition has involved not only local elites, but also national elites through political parties' decisions about candidacy and support. The *pilkada*, then, is not only an arena of local political contestation, but it is also the arena of national political competition.

In addition, the *pilkada* has shifted local policy-making processes and choices among governors and district heads to become more inclusive of the voices of local people. The transformation of the local policy making process has indirectly forced local bureaucracy to

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<sup>38</sup> Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia

confront problematic situations. The law<sup>39</sup> stipulates that bureaucracies shall be neutral in all election events, including the *pilkada*; indeed, they can be trapped in a trade-off that situates them into two positions as the victims and the players. Some good local bureaucrats are forced to accommodate the incumbents' interests in local policy-making and implementation. Conversely, some others actively engage in plays of power to support (or oppose) the incumbents by designing bias policies favouring their interests (Sobari, 2010).<sup>40</sup>

Joining JPIP has provided an opportunity to connect closely with local political dynamics issues. JPIP's research and advocacy supports this connection to local politics and policy issues including Public Expenditure Analysis (PEA) in East Java (2010-2011). PEA has provided useful data on local government budget policies, especially in East Java, which can be basic for inquiring into the incumbents' policy choices while staying in office.

As a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Brawijaya University, I have taught four core subjects relating to politics and public policy, namely Civil Society and Democratisation, the Politics of Local Budget, Introduction to Public Policy and Policy Analysis from 2007 to 2011. Teaching activities have maintained my interest in studying local politics and public policy. In addition to teaching, I have conducted three surveys about electability and voting behaviour from 2010 to 2011 in two districts, namely Malang Regency and Malang Municipality. The key finding from these surveys is that image building plays a major part in contributing to the success of a candidate in the *pilkada*.

Nevertheless, involvement in the East Java Public Expenditure Analysis (PEA) project with the World Bank within 2010-2011 has given some theoretical and academic challenges. Independent analysis of local budget allocation within five years (2006-2010) in several districts chaired by the incumbents has asserted that the major portion of the local budget allocation in five populist local development sectors cannot ensure that the incumbents will be re-elected. In other words, the *pilkada* retains some academic mysteries. Linear logic is no longer adequate to explain the incumbents' success or failure in the *pilkada*.

Addressing the theme of *pilkada*, especially focused on the inquiry into the incumbents' survival and failure, as a research higher degree (RHD) thesis, has provided an opportunity to examine this theme deeply and systematically through a case study research design. The specific focus on the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics will provide the detailed logic of their survival or failure.

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<sup>39</sup> Article 3 point (2) the Law number 43/1999 concerning Revision of the Law number 8/1974 concerning Civil Service Administration

<sup>40</sup> "Mencermati Keterlibatan Birokrasi dalam Pilkada: Menjadi Korban dan Pemeran" (to Watch Bureaucracy's Involvement in the *Pilkada*: To be A Victim as well as Actor), article published in *Jawa pos*, 18 May 2010.



Therefore, the methodological preference employed in this study must allow opportunities to research details and convincing academic explanations about why the incumbent does or does not survive in the re-election bid. Research method and data gathering techniques employed in this study have to deal with past knowledge and experience as well as the current policy artefacts which construct the incumbents' survival or failure. Another challenging situation is that data and information needed in this study are "under earth" data, such as hidden policy agendas and informal decision-making practices that are not easily accessed. Thus, this research has to deploy adequate techniques to gather precise data which are relevant to answer the research questions and aims.

### **3.2. Qualitative Research based on *Interpretivism***

Throughout this study qualitative research principles with *interpretivism* (or often combined with social constructivism; Mertens, 1998)<sup>41</sup> as the philosophical worldview or paradigm are applied. Interpretivism stands on assumptions that researchers are involved in the natural settings of people being researched. Researchers attempt to interpret the social world or phenomena under the guidance of those researched, who bring meanings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 4).

Yanow remarks that the interpretive method is based on the presupposition that to understand the social world, all possibilities of multiple interpretations have to be treated fairly. Since there are no "perfect data" results without dispute, every datum is processed under considerations of embedded meaning. By this she means single interpretations, such as practised in scientific method, are the opposite of this interpretive way of thinking (2000, p. 5). An interpretive researcher does not dominate the process of data interpretation. He or she just facilitates the people who are being researched to share their opinions, perceptions, and actual interpretations on an object.

McIntyre-Mills argues that the closest we can get to truth is through dialogue. Taking into account the emotions and values in a participatory manner helps researchers (or policy analysts) to understand better the world (2003, pp. 50-51). Interpretive researchers rely on participants' meanings of the situations being studied (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). Thus, researchers cannot impose their own interpretation on the people' meanings. McIntyre-Mills suggests interpretive researchers pursue dialogue, listening and enabling people to understand their views of the world (2003, p. 51).

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<sup>41</sup> In Creswell (2009:8)

Based on these stances, this study utilised an interpretive approach in order to reveal the incumbents' policy behaviour and the informal politics attached to the incumbents and voters' explanations about their preference to vote or not to vote for the incumbents.

Moreover, meaning is the core of interpretive approach. This study, then, inquired into expressions or representations of ideas, thoughts, and factual actions performed by the incumbents, the formal and informal actors attached to them and the voters. A district head pursues many policies while staying in office. These policies could express or represent a district head's ideas and actions as well as incentives and interests pertaining to the effort of maintaining office in the re-election bid.

The incumbents' policy behaviour, informal political practices and the voting behaviour of local residents were explored by using a locally accommodative perspective. Knowledge and experiences of local people, then, are reliable sources of data. In addition, the study explored the incumbents' policy choices and policy outputs and the informal and formal actors attached to the incumbents and the constellation of local politics prior to the *pilkada*.

### **3.3. Methods of Inquiry**

The primary objectives of this study are to explore critically the socio-political dynamic of the *pilkada* which is specified in the exploration of the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics involving the incumbents; to compare these phenomena between the surviving and non-surviving incumbents, and to arrive at a grounded explanation about the pathways of the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics for the survival or failure of the incumbents. In order to accomplish these aims, this study utilised case study as the research method.

The rationale to apply case study, first is because this study involved "an exploration of event, activity and process of one or more individuals" (Stake, 1995).<sup>42</sup> It focused on the explorations of the incumbents' activities in local politics and policy implementation. Every incumbent's choice and action has a connection and/or impact on his public image amongst local residents or potential voters. In addition, this study explored informal politics relating to the incumbents to support their incumbency. Informal actors play also several roles in driving the incumbents' policy choices. This case study is concerned with exploring these actors and practices. Finally, the *pilkada* is an event of political contestation at the local level that has some local specific contexts, demanding in-depth and detailed inquiry. A *pilkada* event in a district has its distinct context compared to other districts. Local specific contexts of social,

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<sup>42</sup> In Creswell (2009, p. 13)

culture, economy and politics play important roles in colouring the *pilkada* event in each district. Thus, a case study is appropriate to scrutinise this event.

Secondly, the case study is appropriate for qualitative research, though it can also be conducted for a quantitative one and the consideration of the three principles of case study, namely the type of research question posed, the extent of the researcher's control over actual behaviour and events and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin, 2003, p. xiv; pp. 5-9).

Furthermore, researching the *pilkada* is very much connected to politics and power. The *pilkada* is an arena of political games amongst local leaders involving the tactics and strategies of contestation to gain office. Every actor's action, language and performance are viewed as having political impact on bargaining and maintaining positions and acquiring influence and affinity. More specifically, the incumbents' policy behaviour while remaining in office or prior to the *pilkada*, as well as the informal political practices and actors around them, takes the form of a power exercise.

Power frequently demonstrates two characteristics, which have both obtrusive and unobtrusive aspects. Regarding obtrusive aspect, power is clearly shown in concrete objects, such as laws, regulations, decrees, police actions to handle crime and riots, and other government authorised actions. Power is often also shown through abstract aspects, such as influence, sympathy, hidden compromise among political actors or decision makers and informal deals. In this study, the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal political practices are exercised in both noticeable and unnoticeable forms. Especially, local policy-making processes involving informal actors represent unobtrusive practices. The implication for the methodological approach applied in this study is the ability to cover all academic evidence concerning local power dynamics requiring strong supports through both obtrusive and unobtrusive objects. Therefore qualitative case study is appropriate to apply in this study.

By considering the characteristics of the object of this study, critical ethnography was also employed as a research method. This method assisted in uncovering unnoticeable practices amongst the objects of this study. This study refers to Thomas' remark saying that:

Critical ethnography is a type of reflection that examines culture, knowledge, and action...Critical ethnographers describe, analyse, and open to scrutiny otherwise hidden agendas, power centres, and assumptions that inhibit, repress, and constrain (1993, pp.2-6).

In this study, critical ethnography is central to linking policy behaviour, informal politics, voting behaviour and the logic of the incumbents' survival and failure as well as the practice of power. From a practical consideration, critical ethnography provides the

instruments to excavate the underneath realities that are more empirical than common appearance.

Ethnography, in general terms, has a close relationship with narrative methods, especially, critical ethnography that attempts to describe in detail and understand the social and political realities. In the practice of ethnography, narrative method is frequently employed to record observations and to consider oral stories of societies being studied. Narrative method is appropriately combined with critical ethnography due to their similar characteristics. Narrative method tries to depict society being researched in a holistic way, by tracing the stories and showing how they connect with macro-events (Brophy, 2009, p.28). In addition, Webster and Mertova comment that narrative studies tell both personal and social stories (2007, p.13). Relating to this study, every participant's story about the incumbent's policy behaviour, informal politics, and his or her perception on how they behave in the election is fruitful knowledge that may explain a macro picture about the *pilkada* in each district.

In addition, like ethnography, narrative method involves efforts to reveal and to convey the meaning of story of the events. The researcher is able to obtain inferences of the occurrences through the interpretation of the stories. Moreover, every story denotes a perspective or viewpoint of the narrator or person being studied (Brophy, 2009, p.28). In practice, through the narrators' stories about the *pilkada* in the districts, their claims that are relevant to events being researched can be extracted. In this study, narrative method is pertinent, especially for listening to the stories of voters about their preferences in the *pilkada*. These preferences tell about events which voters participated in, as well as their logic to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*.

Although there is significant diversity in defining the methodology of narrative, Riessman suggests that one common term is "story" (2008, p.3).<sup>43</sup> The role of story in narrative method is a core dimension and Webster and Mertova call narrative method a "story-based approach in research". Narrative research focuses on the human, in that it apprehends and examines life stories (2007, p.13).

In this study, narrative method was employed, particularly to explore voters' explanations concerning their voting behaviour and experience as well as their engagement in the *pilkada*. Stories derived from voters examined the logic of the incumbents' political

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<sup>43</sup> Some authors vary between story and discourse to represent the understanding of narrative. Such as, Barthes (1966) stated that story is the material to be told (what) while discourse is the way to tell this (how), including the perspective taken (in Brophy, 2009, p. 35). In this research, the researcher prefers story to represent the understanding of narrative. This refers to Denzin's (2000) argument that "narrative is a telling, a performance event, the process of making or telling a story. A story is an account involving the narration of a series of events in a plotted sequence which unfolds in time" (in Brophy, 2009, p. 35).

survival, specifically relating to their policy behaviour and the informal politics attached to them. Besides, these stories verified the significance of the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics for maintaining the incumbents' position in office. In other words, narrative method results in stories of voters' experiences, knowledge, and perceptions concerning the *pilkada* and the incumbents. In addition, voters' stories reflect the underlying beliefs and attitudes in their voting preference for the incumbents.

### **3.4. Data Gathering Techniques**

According to Yanow, an interpretive approach includes the use of observation (with whatever degree of participation), conversational (“in-depth”) interviewing, and the close reading of documents (local budgets, local regulations and district head decrees, contemporaneous newspaper accounts) (2007).<sup>44</sup> McIntyre-Mills suggests similarly some methods of inquiry have a participatory design. This consists of interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), and direct participation in participants' community activities, literature and documentary reviews, iterative reflection on key findings, and generative dialogue with participants (2003, pp. 56-58).

Relevant to the employment of interpretivism as a paradigm, this study applied case study method by using critical ethnography and narrative method for its implementation. Critical ethnography applies interview, document analysis and observation to gather data during fieldwork (Thomas, 1993, pp. 40-41). In a more specific context, this study also applied narrative method utilising oral history as a specific technique of interviewing so as to elicit stories of individuals researched (Bryman, 2008).<sup>45</sup> Oral history was employed to address changes and the impact of the *pilkada* on the voters' life experiences. How do the voters take advantages from the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics attached to them? How do the voters deal with them? To what extent do the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics encourage the voters to vote for the incumbents? Why do many voters give their votes to the challengers?

Interviews were addressed to all stakeholders involved in the policy process and informal politics. Interviews cover also people affected by policy choices. Individual interviews are addressed to the district heads (the incumbent regent and mayor or the former regent and mayor), heads of local government offices at the district level, local staffs, local observers (academics, NGOs, and community based organisation leaders and activists), local political party leaders, local businessmen, political consultants, and local residents affected

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<sup>44</sup> In Bevir (2007, pp. 489-490).

<sup>45</sup> In Liamputtong (2008, p.113)

by the incumbents' policy choices. Overall, these interviewees are participants who have firsthand knowledge and experiences of the policy process and its impacts on the incumbents' survival or failure.

In its implementation, this study specifically utilised a specific type of qualitative interview, namely semi-structured interview. It is a type of in-depth interview with a certain degree of structure.<sup>46</sup> Semi-structured interview is focused on a specific research agenda, albeit it still gives interviewees an opportunity to describe situations in their own words and in their own time (Holloway, 1997, pp. 94-95). Sarantakos remarks that semi-structured interview has some characteristics between structured and unstructured interview (2005, p. 269). To undertake the interview, an interview guide was employed, related to the research questions. The guide is not intended to restrict and interrupt the interview. It is just a tool to keep the interview remaining on track.

The interview guide requests information from participants about the incumbents' policy behaviour, informal politics and voters' explanations about their voting behaviour. Also, the interview does not restrict key informants in expressing their knowledge and experience pertaining to the research questions. Participants were invited to tell their stories and to express their own areas of concern and knowledge drawn from lived experience concerning their local election, the incumbents' policy behaviour and the informal politics that may contribute to the incumbents' survival or failure. During the interviews, the researcher utilised a recorder device (MP3-audio) and ensured that the participants were comfortable with being recorded.<sup>47</sup>

Then four focused group interviews in four districts were undertaken; they were respectively conducted in Blitar on 11 July 2012, in Trenggalek on 29 September 2012, in Probolinggo on 10 November 2012 and in Madiun on 5 January 2013. These interviews are an important method to bring the experience and knowledge of interviewees into the research. This is a medium of confirmation and clarification of preliminary findings resulting from interviews and observations, and budget and local macro data analysis. Thus, interviewees could express their experience and ideas relating to the incumbents' survival or failure in the *pilkada*. Moreover, it prevented the researcher from driving the experience of interviewees towards an absolute interpretation.

Following the interviews and focus group interviews, some observations were then conducted in each district. Some of the infrastructure that resulted from policy and mission

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<sup>46</sup> Holloway classifies two types of qualitative interviews based on their degree of structure, namely unstructured, non-standardised interviews and semi-structured interviews (1997, p. 94).

<sup>47</sup> During the fieldwork in four districts, I did not get any objections from participants about recorded interviews.

statements mentioned by participants during the interviews was observed, namely roads, bridges, monuments, city gardens, and street vendors' kiosks. Observations helped in understanding the policy dynamic and the actors as much as possible from their own frame of reference and their own sense-making of the situation (Yanow, in Fischer, 2007).

Document analysis was also undertaken. An advantage of using document analysis as a data collection method is documents can minimise interview pitfalls due to participants' forgetfulness and other interview weaknesses. Documents pertaining to the research questions were analysed, namely local budgets, local development policies and local newspaper reports, and internet based reports and other documents relating to policy processes and informal politics associated with the incumbents. This study obtained these documents from local government offices and local newspapers as well as online local content news portals.

### **3.5. Sampling Procedures: Participant Selection and Judgements**

Common agreement in qualitative research suggests that sampling is frequently purposive or purposeful (Holloway, 1995, p.142). In other words, qualitative research applies purposive sampling to select participants (Kuzel, 1992; Morse, 1989).<sup>48</sup> Sarantakos calls qualitative sampling judgemental sampling, since the procedure to select a sample is directed by the investigator's judgement. This study used purposive sampling to select relevant participants.

So as to screen these participants, four relevant considerations were referred to, excerpted from Kuzel (1992) and Patton (1990),<sup>49</sup> namely:

1. Maximum variation of diverse participants' backgrounds that have knowledge and/or experience concerning the *pilkada*, the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics associated with the incumbents. Variation is considered to collect diverse knowledge and/or experience of the *pilkada* and to identify common patterns among them.
2. Intensity, to reveal information-rich cases of the incumbents' survival or failure in the *pilkada*.
3. The criterion of having knowledge and/or experience concerning the *pilkada*, the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics.
4. The combination of methods and participants' background to enable the researcher to conduct triangulation and to accommodate multiple interests and needs.

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<sup>48</sup> In Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 27)

<sup>49</sup> They are elaborated in Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 28)

According to these judgements, the researcher selected purposively 12 types of participants, namely the incumbents (regent and mayor or the former regent and mayor), heads of local government agencies, local government agencies' staff, local observers (academics and NGO activists), political consultants, local political parties' leaders, local businessmen, community based organisation leaders and activists, district election chairs and commissioners, the chair and members of district election supervisory committees, local journalists, and voters. They are selected participants who have specific knowledge and/or experience pertaining to local policy processes and informal politics around the incumbents. Their selection was grounded in their backgrounds and the possession of knowledge and/or experience of involvement in the *pilkada*. Research questions were addressed to this limited number of people who are pertinent to the purposes of the study. In critical ethnography, this group of selected participants are called as "informants who are most likely to possess an 'insider's knowledge' of the research domain" (Thomas, 1993, p.37).

To be able to exercise participant selection, snowball sampling was used, as an instrument for undertaking purposive sampling. Snowball techniques were applied, especially for participants or informants who do not have single identities, namely local businessmen, community based organisation activists, local journalists, local observers, and local residents. To practise snowball sampling, for recommendations were first requested from the previous informants that were selected by purposive sampling. In order to keep the snowball techniques objective, the four considerations applied to purposive sampling were employed. In addition, the participants' voluntary willingness to be involved was requested. The new participants were then interviewed until saturation (Sarantakos, 2005, p.165).

Furthermore, in order to decide the sample size, this research refers to Strauss and Corbin's (1998) explanation on theoretical saturation. Saturation is a sampling process ending when exploration is no longer uncovering new ideas from additional participants.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the final judgement, to decide the size of the sample, relies on the saturation process. Under these judgements, this study interviewed 40-50 people in each district. This number has met the previously stated considerations.

### **3.6. Data Recording and Storage**

Provided that participants consent to record their interview on audio-MP3, the data was stored in a softcopy format. Moreover, picture or visual data were saved in a digital format. Also, written and/or official documents were copied, but it is not necessary to store them in a specific place.

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<sup>50</sup> In Holloway (1997:143)



In accordance with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research and Flinders University policy, audio-MP3 interview files and digital pictures as well as notes are stored securely at Flinders University for at least five years from the date of publication. These data are available for the public, provided that the anonymity of interviewees is maintained. Access to participants' names and information is blocked.

### **3.7. Data Analysis Procedures**

This study covers three types of data, namely acts, language, and policy relevant objects or physical policy artefacts. They consist of what people say and write about the policy and associated acts, including the written language of local regulations, local development policy documents, and reports. These data, then, were processed and analysed to arrive at interpretation and meaning.

In order to process and analyse data gathered from the fieldworks, this study applied an inductive data analysis and comparison method that particularly refers to Strauss and Corbin's work (1998), called grounded theory method (GTM). In the first stage, all data collected from the field (each district) were processed carefully through transcribing and typing interview results and notes and document content analysis. Then, the transcripts were sorted and arranged into various data categories based on information sources. Next, all transcribed data was read to find a general sense of categorised data. In this process, the researcher grasped some of the general ideas delivered by participants and documents referring to the research questions.

At the next stage, three coding processes were used to organise the transcribed data, namely open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Open coding is addressed, to build categories of information. In this process, transcripts of interviews, field notes, and policy and non-policy documents were coded to develop the categories of the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics in each district. The next step was axial coding. This is a process to explain the central phenomenon identified in the previous coding. In this step, supporting data was augmented, to better explicate the central phenomenon, namely data about the incumbents' survival or failure. Data were examined about the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics and their pathway to the incumbents' survival or failure.

Open and axial coding was not followed directly by selective coding. The explanations of the incumbents' survival or failure and their relationship to the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics were presented firstly in a focused group interview (FGI) in each district. The findings about the central phenomenon were presented to get confirmation, feedback, and criticism from participants. In a meeting format, this research obtained

important additional data to explain the central phenomenon of the incumbents' survival or failure and other factors contributing to it. The data gathered from focus group interviews were then organised to develop a better explanation of the central phenomenon. The researcher read through all data obtained from FGIs.

The next step was undertaking selective coding. In this process, propositions were generated concerning the incumbents' success or failure in each district. This was an attempt to find causal conditions amongst the incumbents' policy behaviour, informal politics, other relevant factors explicating the success or failure of an incumbent and voters' explanations about their voting behaviour.

Propositions yielded from selective coding were presented through a narrative process of interpretation. Propositions regarding the central phenomenon were classified into several themes that are relevant to the research questions and findings. Each urban and rural district, as well as successful and unsuccessful incumbent cases, was presented separately. Finally, the researcher compared both cases to obtain a final explanation of the phenomenon of the incumbents' survival or failure in the *pilkada*.

### **3.8. Role and Position in the Study**

In this study, I undertook all the data collection. I thus acted as an interpreter and translated expressive ideas, acts, events, facts, data, and experiences associating with the incumbents' policy behaviour and the informal politics pertaining to them. I focused the inquiry on the meanings of the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics contributing to their survival or failure as well as voters' explanations about their voting behaviour.

As an academic, I was situated in an unbiased position as an independent agent who interprets the incumbents' policy choices and processes, the informal political actors and practices related to the incumbent, and voters' explications for voting or not voting for the incumbents. Furthermore, I sought to gain meaningful explanations of the political survival of the incumbents based on acts, ideas, facts, experiences and data pertaining to policy choices and informal politics related to the incumbents.

I do not have any affiliation with political parties, the incumbents, challengers, political consultants or any interested parties involved in the *pilkada*. I am a part of an academic community who endeavours to solve some political puzzles of the phenomena of the incumbents' survival and failure in the *pilkada*. Moreover, the Government of Indonesia as the single funder of my RHD study does not demand specific and purposive interests and strict targets for the research output.

### 3.9. Designing Case Study Sites

Locating the area of concern is a fundamental foundation in a case study. A case denotes the area of research concern. The first important step to initiate a case study is the process of selecting some cases to be scrutinised.

In this study, firstly a general area of concern, namely the *pilkada* was located. In order to specify the case, this area of concern was divided into two more specific areas of rural and urban districts. This division is crucial to accommodate the local specific contexts of socio-culture, economy, and politics that may encourage a different study result. This study considers that urban and rural districts are different in their embedded contexts, but not in terms of dichotomist distinctions.

Amongst rural and urban districts in East Java,<sup>51</sup> I chose two units of analysis by referring to the main research question of this study, namely districts with surviving and failed incumbents. The experience of the incumbents' survival and failure in the *pilkada* is the main concern of this study as it wants to reveal the comparative political logics of both *pilkada* results. The survival incumbents might have similar experiences to the failed incumbents. Or, in contrast, the surviving and failed incumbents have extremely different experiences.

In each location, some specific emphasises were considered to decide on some of the aspects to be inquired into. According to the research questions stated in this study, in each district, the study focuses its investigation on the same aspects, namely the incumbents' policy behaviour, informal politics, and voters' perceptions about their preferences to vote or not to vote for the incumbents.

To select the research sites or districts, several criteria were assigned. Firstly, the study sites have incumbents running for re-election. The incumbent is a district head who is running for the second term in office; he or she is not the deputy of the district head. Next, the study sites have incumbents who have occupied the post for 5 years from 2005 to 2010. This periodization is a way to assess the period of incumbency. Then the incumbents' policy behaviour and informal politics while staying in office were examined. Furthermore, this certain period of incumbency provides for voters to possibly remember and evaluate what incumbents have already done. Every selected study site has an incumbent who has controlled the office for five years from 2005 to 2010. The last is the degree of the

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<sup>51</sup> To start selecting locations and specific areas of concern for this study, I determined East Java Province as a general research site. Two judgements support the selection of East Java as the main research location. Firstly, East Java has the most dynamic local politics compared to other provinces in Indonesia (Zuhro, 2011). Secondly, I have ten years' experience in conducting studies on local politics and decentralisation in this province. It will be a fruitful encouragement to undertake the study.

incumbents' success or failure compared to the challengers in the *pilkada*. This study sets the degree of the incumbent or challenger's success, which reaches a minimum size of winning by 50 per cent.<sup>52</sup> The rationale to set 50 per cent as the degree of success, due to the supposition of a solid win, indicates the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of incumbency.

According to the East Java Election Commission's data (table 3.3), there were 18 districts conducting *pilkada* in 2010. 15 *pilkada* were held in rural districts, and the rest were conducted in urban districts. However, none of the urban districts had an incumbent running for re-election in the 2010 *pilkada*. Meanwhile, there were only five incumbents in the rural districts running for the second *pilkada* in 2010. Three of the five incumbents failed to maintain their post in the 2010 *Pilkada*.

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<sup>52</sup> The size of 50 per cent represents absolute winning or failure of the incumbents as well as challengers.

**Table 3.1** 2010 *Pilkada* Result in East Java

No.	Districts	Incumbents' Participation in <i>Pilkada</i>	Rural or Urban district	Degree of winning <sup>53</sup>
1.	Regency of Kediri	No	Rural	
2.	Regency of Ngawi	No	Rural	
3.	Regency of Lamongan	No	Rural	
4.	Regency of Gresik	No	Rural	
5.	Municipality of Blitar	No	Urban	
6.	Regency of Trenggalek	Yes	Rural	The incumbent: 22.37%; the winning challenger: 54.40% <sup>54</sup>
7.	Municipality of Surabaya	No	Urban	
8.	Regency of Mojokerto	Yes	Rural	The incumbent: 32.33 %; the winning challenger: 65.90% <sup>55</sup>
9.	Regency of Sumenep	No	Rural	
10.	Regency of Situbondo	No	Rural	
11.	Regency of Ponorogo	Yes	Rural	The incumbent: 32.16%; the winning challenger: 46.31%
12.	Regency of Jember	Yes	Rural	The incumbent: 58.37%
13.	Municipality of Pasuruan	No	Urban	
14.	Regency of Banyuwangi	No	Rural	
15.	Regency of Sidoarjo	No	Rural	
16.	Regency of Malang	No	Rural	
17.	Regency of Blitar	Yes	Rural	Incumbent: 62.04%
18.	Regency of Pacitan	No	Rural	

Source: the East Java Election Commission of East Java, 2010. Researcher processed these data in accordance with the criteria of case selection.

From these five *pilkada* in rural districts, three criteria were used to select two districts as the case study sites, denoting the districts with successful and failed incumbents. Districts meeting three criteria that have already been assigned were preferred. Table 3.2 shows the results of this selection.

<sup>53</sup> It is based on the number of voters who participate in voting. The data refers to each local election commission in four districts and the East Java Election Commission.

<sup>54</sup> Incumbent positioned the 3<sup>rd</sup> rank in the 2010 *Pilkada* under the two challengers. He was defeated by Mulyadi W. R., (the previous regent beaten by the incumbent (Suharto) in 2005) and by non-party candidate (Mahsun Ismail, the former incumbent's deputy) in the 2010 *pilkada*.

<sup>55</sup> In the 2010 *pilkada* of Mojokerto Regency, the incumbent (H. Suwandi) had only occupied the office for three years (2008-2010). He was previously the Deputy of the Regent under the Administration of Achmady. Due to Achmady's resignation in 2008 for running in the East Java Governor Election, Suwandi then took control of the office in 2008.

**Table 3.2** Selected Case Study Sites for Rural Districts

No.	Districts	Criteria		
		Incumbents running for the 2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>pilkada</i>	Incumbent had occupied office for 5 years	Degree of winning <sup>56</sup>
1.	Regency of Trenggalek	Yes	Yes	Yes (the winning challenger 54.40%)
2.	Regency of Mojokerto	Yes	No	Yes
3.	Regency of Ponorogo	Yes	Yes	No
4.	Regency of Jember	Yes	Yes	Yes (58.37%)
5.	Regency of Blitar	Yes	Yes	Yes (the incumbent 62.04%)

Source: the Provincial Election Commission of East Java, 2010. Researcher processed these data in accordance with the criteria of case selection.

The last step in the selection of rural district case study sites was opting for the Regency of Trenggalek and the Regency of Blitar as case study locations. The Regency of Trenggalek represents a rural district with a failed incumbent. It meets all criteria of the incumbent running for the second *pilkada*, the incumbent having occupied office for five years prior to the 2010 *Pilkada*, and the degree of the challenger's winning being above 50 per cent. The Regency of Blitar and the Regency of Jember met all the criteria for a district with a successful incumbent. Finally, the Regency of Blitar was preferred as a case study site because of the incumbent's higher degree of winning compared to the Regency of Jember.

To select case study locations in urban districts, locations with an incumbent running in the 2010 *Pilkada* were not able to be selected as there were no incumbent mayors running in the 2010 *Pilkada*. The last *pilkada* where an incumbent ran was conducted in 2008. There were four municipalities which undertook the *pilkada* in this year, namely the Municipality of Probolinggo, Madiun, Mojokerto, and Malang. Table 3.3 shows the selection results among these urban districts.

<sup>56</sup> This refers to a criterion of 50% minimum degree of incumbent or challenger's winning

**Table 3.3** Selected Case Study Sites for Urban Districts

No.	Districts	Criteria		
		Incumbents running for 2 <sup>nd</sup> <i>pilkada</i>	Incumbent had occupied office for 5 years	Degree of winning <sup>57</sup>
1.	Municipality of Probolinggo	Yes	Yes	Yes (72.7%) <sup>58</sup>
2.	Municipality of Mojokerto	No	Yes	No
3.	Municipality of Malang	Yes	Yes	No (44.31%) <sup>59</sup>
4.	Municipality of Madiun	Yes	Yes	Yes (Challenger 53.51%) <sup>60</sup>

Source: the District Election Commission of the Municipality of Probolinggo, Mojokerto, Malang, and Madiun, 2008. Researcher directly quotes the data from the online version of local and national newspapers referring to each district election commission. Researcher processed these data in accordance with the criteria of case selection.

I selected the Municipality of Probolinggo and Madiun as the case study locations in urban districts. Probolinggo Municipality represents a case study site with the surviving incumbent in the 2008 *Pilkada*. This municipality meets all the criteria of the incumbent running for re-election, the incumbent having occupied office for five years prior to the 2008 *Pilkada*, and the degree of the incumbent's winning being above 50 per cent. The Municipality of Madiun denotes a case study location with a failed incumbent in the 2008 *Pilkada*. It meets all criteria as well.

After selecting the case study sites, the unit of analysis in each selected district was determined. As a multiple and comparative case study, the unit of analysis in each district has some objects of study and certain boundaries, referring to the research questions in chapter 1. Thus, the unit of analysis in this study is the phenomena of the incumbents' survival and failure. This general unit of analysis comprises four sub-units of analysis, namely the incumbent's policy behaviour during in office, the informal politics relating to the incumbent, and voters' explanations about their rationales to vote or not to vote for the incumbent. Finally, the result of the exploration of these sub-units of analysis arrived at the explanation of the logic of the incumbents' survival or failure in each district.

<sup>57</sup> This refers to a criterion of 50% minimum degree of incumbent or challenger's winning

<sup>58</sup>Source:[http://kpudprobolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_jdownloads&view=viewcategory&catid=21&Itemid=37](http://kpudprobolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&view=viewcategory&catid=21&Itemid=37) accessed on 12 October 2011

<sup>59</sup> <http://indonesianic.wordpress.com/2008/07/31/penetapan-hasil-pilkada-dilangsungkan-hari-ini/> accessed on 12 December 2011. This news refers to <http://www.malang-post.com/>

<sup>60</sup> Source: <http://www.tempointeraktif.co.id/> accessed on 26 September 2011.

### 3.10. Strategies to Ensure Reliability and Validity

In order to avoid the issue of *anecdotalism*, several strategies were applied to make this study meet qualitative research reliability and validity. Relevant strategies to meet this research's validity are quoted from Silverman (2001). These strategies were utilised in conformity with data collection and analysis.

1. The comparison of different kinds of data, sources, and methods or triangulation (Silverman, 2001, pp. 225-226). Qualitative and quantitative data verify one another. In addition, corroboration among three different methods (interview, observation, and document analysis) obtained from different data sources helps to assure the "true or accurate" statements and data.
2. Participants' feedback and confirmations were obtained in the form of FGI or respondents' validation (Silverman, 2001: 233). In this interview, preliminary interpretations (results of open and axial coding) were returned to participants to gain reactions, criticism, clarification, and additional explanations. In each district, the researcher undertook one FGI which invited non-government participants.
3. Peer examinations were undertaken during research design setting, data analysis, and thesis writing. The researcher presented the research design in a forum named the Indonesian PhD Student Association at Flinders University bi-weekly seminar (*diskusi reboan*) on 16 November 2011 and in the Work in Progress (WIP) meeting at the Department of Politics and Public Policy on 2 December 2011. The researcher also presented the proposal at the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP) on 27 December 2011 and at the Department of Political Science, Brawijaya University on 29 December 2011. Furthermore, the preliminary results of this study were presented in the WIP meeting at the Department of Politics and Public Policy, Flinders University on 5 April 2013.
4. The researcher's statement for avoiding bias is specially written in this chapter under the heading, "Role and Position in the Study". This states clearly the researcher's position as an interpreter of the participants' meanings concerning the incumbents' policy behaviour, the informal politics, and voters' explanations about their preferences to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. This statement is a form of clarification to anticipate researcher's bias in this study.



### **3.11. Challenges during the Fieldwork**

There were some challenges in doing fieldwork. I could not obtain optimum data from the incumbents. Two of the four incumbents refused to be interviewed. I first made an official request to interview them. I attached a letter of introduction from the supervisor, an information sheet, interview questions, consent form, and a letter of research permit from the Nation Unity and Community Protection and Politics Board (*Bakesbanglinmaspol*) in each district. For every request, I received the number of the document acceptance from the district head's secretary's office. In one district, I did not receive any response from the incumbent until the end of the targeted fieldwork period. I had visited the secretary's office three times to ask for the incumbent's response to my request, but the secretary said that the incumbent had not answered my request. The incumbent did not delegate the answer to my request to his staff. Then, I contacted one of the heads of a local government agency who has a good relationship with the incumbent. He promised to link me directly with the incumbent. Still, he could not help with my request to interview the incumbent.

In another district, I met a similar problem. I could not interview the incumbent. In addition to pursuing a similar formal way, I was also helped by a friend who could connect me to the incumbent via a political party connection. The incumbent, then, responded to my request by delegating the interview to the secretary of the district. He then delegated it to the head of the local development planning board. However, I did not interview the latter as I had interviewed him previously.

To overcome these challenges, I benefited from my position as an academic from a reputable university in East Java. I could easily interview the heads of local government agencies and get some data as many of them are alumni of the university where I teach. They showed respect as we have previous similar academic affiliations. In addition to an introduction as a RHD student of Flinders University, I was introduced also as a lecturer of Brawijaya University. By introducing my identity as a lecturer at the university, I could interview important officers, especially in two districts where the incumbents did not want to participate in the interview. Fortunately, these officers have adequate information about the incumbents' policy behaviour and they have worked with the incumbents. Furthermore, official macro data gathered from local government agencies, such as local development reports and local budgets, are very helpful to explain the incumbents' policy behaviour.

Moreover, it was more difficult to conduct interviews with some political party leaders and the heads of local government agencies in the districts with the surviving incumbents rather than in the districts with the failed incumbents. Applying the formal approach to these potential participants, indeed, was not a good strategy to gather data. In order to overcome

those difficulties, I replaced the interviews with political party leaders with some other party's members who were eligible to be interviewed. For the absence of the heads of local government agencies, I replaced their interviews with some delegated officers.

In every district, I attempted to gather the poll results assessing the incumbents' popularity among voters in the region. I could only gather one of the four poll results. In one district I could access the result from the incumbent's staff, who I have been familiar with. In another district, I could not get the data as I had to obey the principle of anonymity applied by the pollsters who conduct the poll. They blocked all access to the data without any consent from their clients (the incumbents). In the other two districts, the poll results were not available. However, I was able to rely on my data collected from voters that give original reasons as well as expression about their vote.

Another challenge was that it was not easy to meet with some religious leaders (Islam) without getting a recommendation from a trusted person linked to them. So as to obtain similar data, I attempted to replace this position by interviewing major Muslim Mass-Based Organisation (MBO) leaders. In each district, I interviewed at least a MBO leader. In the interview, I also questioned about the connection and support of religious leaders for the incumbent during his first term in office. These interviews may explain the relationship between religious leaders and the incumbents.

### **3.12. Management of Risk and Confidentiality**

This study involved human subjects and some official documents as the main data sources. The research revealed some categories of sensitive information pertaining to the incumbents' policy behaviour, informal politics, and voters' perceptions concerning the incumbents. Therefore the ethical and risk considerations in the forms of respect and consent of participants and the confidentiality of participants' identities needed to be addressed.

So as to anticipate ethical problems and risks, several strategies and actions to protect participants' rights, positions, and institutions were pursued in the thesis. Firstly, to keep the anonymity of participants' identities, aliases or pseudonyms were used for individual informants and places. This decision was intended to secure the protection of identities. Secondly, participants' clarifications were incorporated, to examine the accuracy of my interpretation of the interview results and documents and news related to them. Some participants involved in FGI gave comments that helped to shape the coding on which the interpretation and analysis of central phenomena were based. FGI has supported the quality of data analysis and the accuracy of interpretation through participants' validation.

Thirdly, triangulation of data sources and data gathering techniques has supported better quality analysis and researcher's integrity. Triangulation made possible the inter-corroboration amongst data from different sources, which were gained through different techniques. The last is data storage which has been stated in the point 3.6.

In the writing process, the report has been written in plain language and an effort has been made to ensure that status, gender, race, political affiliation, and ethnic identities of the informants were represented. Specific labels were given for the informants without exposing their names, such as 'woman activist' or 'man party leader', and other labels.

Finally, the research report was written for limited purposes. In addition to writing for a RHD thesis, some relevant parts of the research will be published in international journals and Indonesian national journals. The research has complied with Human Research Ethics at all stages by maintaining the anonymity of the informants involved in this study.

## Chapter 4

### **The *Pilkada*: History, Debates and Existing Regulations**

This chapter discusses several important features of the *pilkada*. It is intended to tell the history, positive and negative aspects of the *pilkada*, its implementation and some vital rules of the game in the *pilkada*. This information provides background about the *pilkada* which has specific characteristics compared with other local-based democratic practices in other countries.

#### **4.1. Electing Local Executive Heads: from Early Independence to the Reform Era**

Indonesia's local electoral democracy era had just begun when the country commenced running direct elections for local leaders (*pilkada*) in June 2005. After overcoming some key events hampering the implementation of the *pilkada*, the first historical moment of the local democratic era took place in the Regency of Kutai Kertanegara, East Kalimantan on Wednesday 1 June 2005. In this first ever *pilkada* in Indonesia, Syaukani H.R. and his running mate Samsuri Aspar gained 159,303 votes (60.85 per cent) and won the race.<sup>61</sup> This event is labelled as the first historical democratic moment since all eligible citizens<sup>62</sup> had an equal opportunity to vote directly for their local executive heads in a free and fair situation. This election provided a confidentiality guarantee for every single ballot, which was impossible for all citizens in the previous authoritarian regime.

Long before the implementation of the first *pilkada* in June 2005, local residents had actually experienced voting directly for their executive heads at the village level. The village heads in Java and some other parts of Indonesia were elected directly by all eligible villagers. Under the New Order Regime, this traditional practice was legalised by the government through the enactment of the Law No. 5/1979 on Village Administration. At that time, the law, then, formalised all direct elections for the executive village heads throughout the country (Pratikno, 2009, pp. 54-55).<sup>63</sup> Albeit the law assure normatively a direct, inclusive, free, and confidential election for all villagers, but this was not a truly free and fair election because the law gave opportunities for the government to intervene in the election processes.

According to the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 6/1981 on the Mechanism of Executive Village Head Election, the regent (*bupati*) has authority to establish a village

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<sup>61</sup> See [http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=5607](http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5607) accessed on 17 July 2013.

<sup>62</sup> 17 years old or married or have been married on the Election Day.

<sup>63</sup> In Erb, Maribeth and Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (eds.) (2009) *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

electoral committee and to appoint a village election supervisory committee<sup>64</sup> and a committee of investigation and examination of candidates.<sup>65</sup> The involvement of local government, Army, and Police officers had opened spaces for the government to intervene in the candidate screening process. The government wanted to make sure that the chosen candidates were loyal to its national interests. In addition, the regent had similar interventions in the legalisation, designation, and inauguration of the elected village heads. Thus, under these laws, villagers actually could not vote for some of their aspiring democratic candidates due to the regent's intervention in the candidature process. Therefore it can be argued that this is not a free and fair election, although all eligible citizens had an equal opportunity to vote.

Returning to the early era of the country's establishment, the existence of local leaders<sup>66</sup> cannot be separated from the recognition of local and regional administration. Shortly after declaring Indonesian independence in 1945, the government issued the Law No. 1/1945 on the Standing of National Committee on Regions. This law regulated the position of the national committee at the local level. The head of the committee chaired the local executive as well as the legislative board. In that period, it was mostly impossible to conduct elections due to the emergency situation and the weak constitutional foundation. Three years later, the government enacted the law No. 22/1948 on the Principles of Self-Government in the Autonomous Regions. The law stipulated that all local executive leaders, including village heads, were appointed by the government.<sup>67</sup> All appointed candidates were proposed by the legislative body; local residents did not have the right to vote for the candidates.

The amendment of the state's constitution from unitary state to federalism in 1950 had forced the government to amend the law No. 22/1948. The government, then, enacted the law No. 1/1957 on the Principles of Local Administration. There was a radical change in this new law. It provided three options in electing local leaders, namely direct election, election by local legislatures, and appointment by the President or Minister of Home Affairs. These options were possible due to different situations among the regions and the amendment of the state's constitution. In 1959, The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno, issued the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. The decree disbanded *Badan Konstituante* (legislative body)<sup>68</sup> and amended the 1950 interim constitution by re-activating the 1945 constitution.

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<sup>64</sup> The committee consists of the head of sub-district, Army, and Police officers.

<sup>65</sup> The committee consists of the Secretary of the Region and other relevant local government officials.

<sup>66</sup> Governor, regent, and mayor.

<sup>67</sup> A governor was appointed by the President; a regent was appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs; a village head was appointed by a regent.

<sup>68</sup> This body was formed through the 1955 legislative election. The body had the main task of drafting the new state constitution aimed to replace the 1950 interim constitution.

Due to this amendment, consequently, the government issued the Law No. 18/1965 on the Principles of Local Administration to replace the law No. 1/1957. Under the new law, there was a democratic setback as governors, regents, and mayors were not elected. The central government had the privilege of appointing them amongst the candidates proposed by local legislatures.

The collapse of Soekarno's administration in 1966 changed the Indonesian political system into a more authoritarian system. The regime, claimed as the New Order, promoted a new hope for better Indonesia. Although the regime defended the 1945 constitution, it changed the Law No. 18/1965 via the enactment of the Law No. 5/1974 on the Principles of Local Administration. The law enacted a pretend democratic selection for electing governors, regents, and mayors. The article 15 and 16 gave a mandate to local legislatures to elect local leaders via a voting mechanism. The local legislature, then, proposed the two candidates gaining the most votes to the President (for governor) and to the Home Affairs Minister (for regent or mayor). Finally, the President and Home Minister appointed one of the two candidates gaining the most votes without requesting the local legislature's approval.

The downfall of Soeharto's regime in 1998 shifted the paradigm of the national and local government relationship. Local governments demanded to have greater autonomy in managing their regions and more sensitive government on local needs and demands. The central government was forced to delegate its authority, especially to regencies and municipalities. The government, then, enacted the Law No. 22/1999 on Local Administration to respond to the demand for decentralised government. Article 7 of the law delegated almost the entire central government authority to the local governments, except for judiciary, foreign policy, national security and defence, religious affairs, and fiscal and monetary authority.

The alteration of regime and regulation also changed the mechanism of local executive head (governor, regent, and mayor) elections. Article 40 of the Law No. 22/1999 stipulated that every local legislator has the right to vote for a pair of candidates. Candidates obtaining the most votes are assigned as the elected local executive head (governor, regent, mayor, and their deputies). Compared to the Law 5/1974, this mechanism was more representative as the central government could not be directly involved in any intervention in the election process. The central government via the President had only the right to legalise the elected candidates.

The collapse of the Soeharto regime continued also to the demand for the 1945 constitutional amendment. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) had amended the constitution in four steps from 1999 to 2002. Article 6A stipulates that the President and the Vice President are elected directly by the people. Then, the Presidential Election in 2004 elected Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the first ever directly elected President.

The direct Presidential Election, then, sparked the argument of consistent implementation to all layers of local government (Pratikno, 2009, p.55; Wardani, 2005, pp. 56-57). The government and the House of Representatives (DPR) responded to this demand by amending the Law No. 22/1999 and enacting the Law No. 32/2004 on Local Administration. Pratikno has noted two main important amendments relating to the position of local executive heads (governor, regent, and mayor). Firstly, the law strengthens the position of local executive head in relation to the local legislature. The head was no longer accountable to the local legislature; consequently, it dispelled the possibility of the head's dismissal by the legislature. Secondly, the law transfers the right to elect governor and district heads to local residents; they are no longer elected by provincial and local legislators (2009, p.55).<sup>69</sup>

Two months prior to the first *pilkada* in June 2005, some challenges impeded the implementation. Wardani has revealed three main problems, firstly, the problem of updating voters' data. Until April 2005, the majority of local election commissions did not succeed in releasing the tentative voters' list. Secondly, both of the central and local governments faced insufficient budgets to finance the *pilkada*. Mohammad Ma'ruf, the Minister of Home Affairs, stated that the central and local government should share the total budget of Rp 2,283,318,232,508 (approximate to AUD 253,702,025.8) for financing all *pilkada* in 2005. Thirdly, the dispute about the local election commission's legal standing had impeded the preparedness of the commission to hold the *pilkada*. The local election commission was forced to face the uncertainty of its legal position, whether the commission was the organic apparatus of the Home Ministry or the General Election Commission (KPU) (2005, pp.52-56).<sup>70</sup> These obstacles threatened that some local election commissions would postpone the implementation of the *pilkada* in 2005. On 27 April 2005, the Government issued government regulation that replaces Law No. 3/2005 (*Perppu*) on the Amendment of the Law

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<sup>69</sup> In Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009.

<sup>70</sup> The crux of the dispute is the article 21 of the Law No. 32/2004 stipulating that in accordance with the regional autonomy, regions have the authority to conduct *pilkada*. Based on this law, article 57 mandated a provincial/local election commission (KPUD) to organise *pilkada* and the KPUD should be responsible to the local legislature. Some national NGOs and KPUD commissioners protested the implementation of these articles because they would harm the independence of the KPUD as an independent local election organiser that should actually be responsible to the public, not to the local legislature. The NGOs and KPUD's commissioners, then, brought the dispute to the Constitutional Court (MK). However, MK decided to refuse the NGOs and KPUD's claim by opining that *pilkada* was not categorised as election. The consequences of this decision are the organisation of *pilkada* could be different from a general election in terms of regulations and regulatory body, organiser, and dispute settlements. Therefore, *pilkada* was decided to be organised under the regional autonomy regime, not under the national election regime. KPUD, then, was controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs; it was not attached to the General Election Commission (KPU). Finally, the Government and the House agreed to issue the Law No. 22/2007 on the General Election Implementers. The law returned *pilkada* as part of the General Election Regime. KPUD is not responsible to the local legislature; KPUD does only reporting about the implementation of *pilkada* to the local legislature. In addition, all *pilkada* implementing regulations refer to the KPU's regulations, not to the Ministry of Home Affairs' regulations.

No. 32/2004<sup>71</sup> in order to give a legal foundation to reschedule some *pilkada*. Finally, Indonesia held 226 *pilkada* in 2005 consisting of 215 district *pilkada* (regency and municipality) and 11 gubernatorial *pilkada*.

Another momentous event was the accommodation of individual candidates<sup>72</sup> to compete in the *pilkada*. On 24 July 2007, the Constitutional Court (MK) decided to accept Lalu Ranggalawe's<sup>73</sup> suit about the dispute of article 59 of the Law No. 32/2004 concerning candidates who are eligible to run in the *pilkada*. Consequently, the Government and the House agreed to amend this article by enacting the Law No. 12/2008 on the Second Amendment of the Law No 32/2004 on Local Administration. Article 59 clause b of the law allows individual or non-party supported candidates to run in the *pilkada*.

#### **4.2. Decentralisation and Responsive Local Leaders: Some Promising Arguments about the *Pilkada***

Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, Weist, Hofman, Kaiser and others, in their *Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia: The 'Big Bang' Program and Its Economic Consequences* agreed that Indonesia's decentralisation was embarked upon in 2001. The extraordinary short period between the enactment of the Law No. 22/1999 on Local Administration and its implementation is the main reason for this shared assessment of when democracy really commenced. They labelled it the 'big bang' of the birth or beginning of decentralisation. Also, the central government gave broad autonomy to the regions. The country demonstrated an enormous transfer of personnel to the regions and a significant increase in the regional share of the government spending. Decentralization in Indonesia is also assumed by many observers to be a new bridge to democracy that will foster democracy and introduce legitimacy to the recent political system (2004, p.1; pp.15-16; Buehler in Aspinall and Mietzner (eds.), 2010, p. 269; Said, 2005, p. 17).

In this section of the chapter, decentralisation is considered to be the starting point for the emerging local democracy in Indonesia through the *pilkada*. Decentralisation has transferred responsibilities to self-manage the regions from central government to more autonomous local governments. In theory, the transfer will empower local authorities and

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<sup>71</sup> In the Indonesian legal system, the government is allowed to issue a government regulation that replaces Law (*perppu*), which has an equal position to the law, without the House of Representative's approval. Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution is the legal basis for the government to issue a *Perpu*. The reason to issue a *Perpu* is to tackle an emergency situation demanding a legal basis, but the government and the house have no enough time to discuss the draft of the law. Thus, the government is allowed to issue *Perpu* by the terms that the house should approve the amendment of *perppu* to become the Law in the next house's general meeting.

<sup>72</sup> An individual candidate is a candidate who is supported by a certain number of people to run in *pilkada*. Prior to the amendment, article 59 of the Law No. 32/2004 stipulated that candidates who are eligible to run in *pilkada* should be proposed by a political party or coalition of political parties.

<sup>73</sup> Lalu Ranggalawe was a Legislator at the Regency of Central Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara.



bring better service delivery and infrastructure to the local population (the World Bank, 2006, p. 1).<sup>74</sup> Decentralisation is also assumed to open more space for the local population to participate in the development of their region. In order to realise their aspirations, local residents should vote directly for the leaders who can possibly actualise the expectations promised by decentralisation (Rauf, 2005, p. v).<sup>75</sup>

Thus, it can be argued that the *pilkada* is not merely about the follow-up on the implementation of direct presidential election initiated in 2004. The implementation of the *pilkada* is also an answer to objectify the ideals of decentralisation or regional autonomy implemented earlier than direct presidential election. Directly elected local leaders are assumed be more aware and sensitive to local needs and demands. Decentralisation policy opens wide spaces for elected local leaders to implement local government programs autonomously. In the Indonesian context, the promising arguments about decentralisation are closely linked to the importance of the *pilkada* in Indonesia. The following discussion presents the urgency needs of the *pilkada* in the early stages of its implementation.

As a post-authoritarian country, Indonesians have deep hopes and expectations concerning democracy. It has been positively argued that direct presidential election and the *pilkada* would tackle some previous problems, both in terms of political equality and socio-economic aspects of life. The first argument is concerned with participation. As decentralisation has made it possible for regions to have more say in running their own affairs (Sulistiyanto & Erb, 2009, p.3; Agustino, 2009, p. 11), the *pilkada* has found its momentum to be a booster for local residents to voice their local specific demands and needs. Through their participation in the *pilkada*, they can vote for candidates who are more aware about their specific demands and needs. Then, the elected candidate will include these in more sensitive local policies. In the end, participatory and more sensitive policies pursued by democratically elected leaders will impact on the improved well-being of the local population.

Next, the *pilkada* is a solution to create checks and balances at the local level. Under the Law No. 22/1999, the local legislature has more power over local government as the local executive head is elected and is accountable to the local legislature. The enactment of the Law No. 32/2004 brought local government back into an equal position with the local legislature (Sulistiyanto and Erb, 2009, p.18; Agustino, 2009, p. 11; Chalid, 2005, p. 11). The *Pilkada* has created an adequate legitimacy for elected local executive heads. Both local legislatures and local executive heads have an equal position since people vote directly for

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<sup>74</sup> The World Bank (2006) 'Decentralizing Infrastructure Services: Lessons from the East Asia Experience' *PREMnotes Public Sector*, June 2006 Number 109.

<sup>75</sup> In Chalid (2005)

them. As stipulated in article 19 clause 2 the Law No. 32/2004, the organisers of local government<sup>76</sup> are the local executive government<sup>77</sup> and local legislature. Thus, the local executive head and local legislature both have equal legitimacies in terms of voters' recognition and the state's legal standing.

The third argument is the *pilkada* endorses open recruitment of local leaders (Sulistiyanto & Erb, 2009, p. 18). In contrast to the local leaders' recruitment in the New Order Era, which was intentionally dominated by military officers and bureaucracies, the *pilkada* gives opportunities to all eligible candidates from various backgrounds. Gamawan Fauzi, Home Affairs Minister, mentioned that in addition to former military and police officers and former bureaucracies, the *pilkada* has opened up opportunities to other diverse candidate backgrounds, namely political party leaders, business persons, academics, religious leaders, and NGO activists.<sup>78</sup> Thus, the *pilkada* has practised the core of democracy in terms of giving equal rights and equal chances to all eligible candidates without limiting their backgrounds.

Finally, the *pilkada* may establish an accountability link between elected leaders and local people. Elected leaders will be accountable morally to local people who have voted for them. Elected leaders are assumed to perform their best performance during office in order to meet voters' expectations (Agustino, 2009, p. 10; Asfar, in Nadir, 2005, p. x). The main idea in this last point is that the practice of democracy through *pilkada* is closely linked to its output and outcome. The *pilkada* does not only select elected local leaders but also the output and outcome of directly elected government. Adopting Rothstein's work, the *pilkada* result is legitimised by the performing quality of local government (2009, p. 313). Local people put their trust in their elected local leaders in order to objectify their collective dreams about a better quality of life.

### **4.3. Negative Campaigns concerning the *Pilkada***

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's biggest Muslim organisation, recommended putting a stop to direct gubernatorial election during its national conference in March 2010. NU argued that the election leads to budget inefficiencies and political conflicts. It also stressed that regional autonomy is emphasized more at the district level; consequently, the gubernatorial

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<sup>76</sup> Provincial and district government

<sup>77</sup> Governor, regent, mayor and their agencies.

<sup>78</sup> Source *Koran Jakarta* accessed from <http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2013/04/30/banyak-kepala-daerah-tak-paham-aturan> on 21 July 2013.

*pilkada* is irrelevant to the regional autonomy scheme (the Jakarta Post, 29 March 2010).<sup>79</sup> Two years later, NU recommended a more radical proposal for the *pilkada* to revert to the local legislature. In its national meeting in 2012, NU considered that in addition to triggering horizontal conflicts among candidates' supporters, direct election for local leaders had sparked money politics practices and budget inefficiency. Thus, NU advocated stopping all the *pilkada* (the Jakarta Post 17 September 2012).<sup>80</sup>

NU did not make a mistake in its recommendations. Instead of strengthening the idea of direct democracy at the local level, the implementation of the *pilkada* did indeed lead to many bad practices. Conflicts among candidates' supporters, corruption involving elected local leaders, and bureaucracy's alignments' in the *pilkada* have attracted mass media to publish these problems and those publications have driven negative public opinion about the *pilkada*. These practices are, indeed, the forms of a negative campaign concerning the *pilkada*. NU and many others mass organisations, including the central government have recommended stopping the *pilkada*. Worse, in the ongoing discussion of the *pilkada* bill in the house, the government proposed to return the election of district heads (regent and mayor) to the local legislature. Otherwise, the government proposed that the *pilkada* is only performed for gubernatorial elections (Koran Tempo, 15 June 2013).

The pessimistic camp on the *pilkada*, such as the central government, NU, Democratic Party and United Development Party (PPP)<sup>81</sup> argues that instead of endorsing popular participation, the *pilkada* has supported the flourishing of narrowly pragmatic participation through money politics practices. These practices have destroyed or undermined the morality of the people and the local elites, including NU's followers and elites at the local level. In addition, one of NU's elites, Sahal Mahfudh, argued that 'one man, one vote' in the *pilkada* is in contrast to the principle of the Democracy of Pancasila<sup>82</sup> that adheres to the principle of

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<sup>79</sup> Source <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/29/less-elections-better-regions-nu-says.html> accessed on 21 July 2013. In the early of 2010, Minister of Home Affairs, Gamawan Fauzi, and the chair of the House of Representative, Marzuki Alie, have asserted the idea to revert gubernatorial elections to local legislatures. The former Minister of Home Affairs, Mardiyanto, stated a previously similar idea by referring to the post-*pilkada* conflicts in North Maluku and South Sulawesi and expensive *pilkada* in East Java which spent Rp 830 billion (approximately AUD 92,22 million) (Jawa Pos, 12 January 2010).

<sup>80</sup> Source <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/17/nu-calls-members-stop-paying-taxes.html> accessed on 21 July 2013. See also <http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/nu-dukung-pilkada-dipilih-dprd/24716> and <http://www.solopos.com/2012/09/17/konferensi-besar-nu-pilkada-diminta-dihentikan-329489> accessed on 21 July 2013.

<sup>81</sup> These two parties have agreed to stop *pilkada* at the district level (Koran Tempo, 15 June 2013).

<sup>82</sup> Pancasila is the official state foundation of the Republic of Indonesia. Pancasila is explicitly stated in the 1945 constitution. The word Pancasila was originally from Sanskrit, *panca* (five) and *sila* (principles). These five principles are inseparable and interconnected, namely:

1. *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Belief in the one and only God).
2. *Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab* (Just and civilized humanity)
3. *Persatuan Indonesia* (The unity of Indonesia)

representative democracy.<sup>83</sup> Due to the massive practice of political transactions among candidates, local elites, and the local population, the elected candidates are trapped in a mud hole. They have to favour certain communities or persons or elites to reimburse what the supporters have donated during the *pilkada*.

In addition, instead of introducing open recruitment, the *pilkada*, in contrast, has boosted closed recruitment. Elitist requirements for candidature and the escalating campaign costs have limited equal opportunity for all potential people to run in the race. A close examination conducted by Buehler revealed that 63.3 per cent of the backgrounds of all candidates in gubernatorial elections between 2005 and 2008 were bureaucrats, legislators, and regents/mayors. These elites had a better starting point to finance their candidacy as they received benefits from their previous networks and contacts. On the contrary, political parties have only proposed 2.7 per cent of their cadres to run in gubernatorial elections (2010, pp. 273-275).<sup>84</sup>

Money politics practices have also impeded open recruitment in the *pilkada*. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) found that money politics practices have started with the nomination process. Candidates are required to deposit some amount of money to political party/ies to gain a candidacy ticket for their nomination in the *pilkada* (Jawa Pos, 24 February 2010). Besides, the Director of Gratification of Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Lambok Hamonangan Hutauruk predicted that money politics in the *pilkada* increased by more than 200 per cent compared to the previous era in which local leaders were elected by local legislatures (Media Indonesia, 25 March 2005).<sup>85</sup> These networks and financial barriers have hampered the equal opportunities of all eligible citizens to contest the *pilkada*. Of course, these situations are far from the universal principles of democracy ensuring equal rights and political liberties.

Furthermore, the *pilkada* has been distorted by the poor accountability of elected local leaders. Massive corruption has been committed by elected local leaders and this corruption is the primary indicator of weakening accountability. According to the data released by the

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4. *Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan* (Democracy guided by Wisdom in Deliberation and Representation )

5. *Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia* (Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia)

I adapted English translation of *Pancasila* and the five principles from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pancasila\\_\(politics\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pancasila_(politics)) accessed on 23 July 2013. I did not find any official English translation of *Pancasila*.

<sup>83</sup> Source <http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/nu-dukung-pilkada-dipilih-dprd/24716> accessed on 21 July 2013.

<sup>84</sup> In Aspinall and Mietzner (eds.) (2010). *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

<sup>85</sup> Accessed from <http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/politik-uang-meningkat-200-pilkada-era-dulu-dan-sekarang> on 22 July 2013.

Ministry of Home Affairs, up to April 2013, there were 290 elected local leaders (governors and district heads) who have to face investigation and trial. Of these, 86.2 per cent of them are caught in corruption cases (Koran Jakarta, 30 April 2013).<sup>86</sup> Elected local leaders committed graft because they have to pay money back to the financial sponsors who disburse cash and other materials aimed at mobilizing constituents. Hidayat remarked implicitly that political and business collusive practices between local leaders and their sponsors have negated the idea of the people's sovereignty in democracy (2009, pp. 142-143).<sup>87</sup> Hence, favouritism has broken accountability ties between local leaders and the local population. Local leaders are more accountable to their sponsors who have given favours rather than to local people in the region.

The problem of accountability also emerges since local government cannot ensure the local bureaucracy's impartiality. The *Pilkada* has forced bureaucracy to give support to certain candidates in order to secure their position. In 2010, the Elections Supervisory Committee (*Bawaslu*) found that the two main modes of the bureaucracy's involvement in the *pilkada* are the abuse of state facilities and civil servants' mobilisation aimed at supporting certain candidates (Jawa Pos, 18 May 2010).

Finally, direct election for local leaders is also inefficient. Both the central and local governments should allocate a much larger budget to hold the *pilkada*. Local election is very expensive and it is not worthwhile, as the majority of elected local leaders could not demonstrate good performance to improve their regions. The 2008 East Java election was predicated as the most expensive local election ever in Indonesia. The three rounds of gubernatorial elections spent Rp 830 billion (approximately AUD 92.22 million) of the state and local budget on logistics, security, and operational expenditures. This huge amount of the budget, then, sparked criticism from election activists and academics (Kompas, 24 January 2009).<sup>88</sup>

These negative campaigns have eroded people's trust in the *pilkada*. The high rate of absentees or *Golongan Putih* (*Golput*) is assumed to indicate the low trust of the people concerning the *pilkada*. *Golput* denotes voters' distrust and dissatisfaction with political elites, parties, and democratic performance. Abstaining is also interpreted as protest voting.

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<sup>86</sup> Accessed from <http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2013/04/30/banyak-kepala-daerah-tak-paham-aturan> on 21 July 2013

<sup>87</sup> In Erb and Sulistiyanto (eds.), 2009.

<sup>88</sup> However, the huge amount of the budget spent on *pilkada* is irrelevant as KPU as a local organising institution could probably spend efficiently on some posts, namely logistics and security allocations (Sobari, Jawa Pos, 28 December 2010). The Ministry of Home affairs released that 31.8 per cent of the 2005 *pilkada* budget was allocated for supporting allocation (security and judiciary) (in Wardani, 2005:54). Besides, the idea of simultaneous *pilkada* may save the budget. FITRA (the Indonesia Forum for Budget Transparency) counted that simultaneous *pilkada* may cut 41.17 per cent of the total budget on *pilkada* (KOMPAS, 3 September 2012).

(Dwipayana, 2008<sup>89</sup>; Tanuwijaya, 2008<sup>90</sup>). The recent high rate of *golput* was in the 2012 *Pilkada* in Jakarta. The number of absentees reached 2,555,207 votes and it was higher than most votes gained by the winning candidate (Jokowi-Ahok) obtaining 1,847,157 ballots.<sup>91</sup> Based on these arguments and data, thus, the existence of the *pilkada* is recently in a critical condition. Consequently, the proposal to revert the *pilkada* to the local legislature confirms this judgement.

#### **4.4. The *Pilkada* Regulations in Indonesia**

The enactment of the Law no. 32/2004 on Local Administration on 15 October 2004 was the legal basis for the implementation of direct elections for governor and district heads in Indonesia. It has shifted the practice of representative democracy that had been implemented for 59 years since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. There is no doubt about the importance of the *pilkada* as 64 of 240 articles of the Law No. 32/2004 specifically regulate it. Articles 56 to 119 in the law provide the legal foundation for the *pilkada*. It shares 26.7 per cent of the total articles in the Law.

As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the law had received two amendments in 2005 and 2008. The former amendment was addressed to giving a legal basis for the postponement of some *pilkada* in the regions, due to unpreparedness compelling some local election commissions to reschedule the implementation of the *pilkada*. The later amendment was addressed to respond to the Constitutional Court (MK)'s decree to accommodate individual candidates to run in the *pilkada*. Besides, the Government and the House of Representatives agreed to amend the law in order to regulate the fulfilment of the office of the deputy of the governor or district head when replacing the position of the previous governor or district head due to resignation or passing away. This section of the chapter discusses some legal aspects of the *pilkada*. These could be referred to as 'the rules of the game' of the *pilkada* in Indonesia.

On 26 October 2014, the House of Representatives (*DPR*) approved the Law No. 22/2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors. After prolonged debates, the house finally approved the bill via the voting mechanism for indirect election (elected by people or local legislators) of governors, regents and mayors. Nevertheless, due to massive protests throughout the country, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang

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<sup>89</sup> Source: <http://www.ugm.ac.id/id/berita/361-fenomena.golput.ketidakpercayaan.pada.partai.politik.dan.figur.kandidat> accessed on 23 July 2013

<sup>90</sup> Source: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/03/039golput039-what039s-worry.html> accessed on 23 July 2013.

<sup>91</sup> Source: <http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2012/07/20/05532688/Golput.Masih.Merajai.Pilkada.DKI.Jakarta> accessed on 23 July 2013.

Yudhoyono, returned the right of the people to vote directly for their local leaders. The president issued the government regulation that replaces law (*Perppu*) No. 1/2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors on 2 October 2014 to annul this controversial law that has revoked direct elections for regional heads. The President also issued the government regulation that replaces Law No. 2/2014 on the Revision of the law No. 23/2014 on Regional Government that removes the authority of provincial and district legislators to vote for regional heads.<sup>92</sup> This thesis stresses the explanation on the preceding law on the *pilkada*, as the case study of the *pilkada* in this thesis took place during the implementation of the law no. 32/2004 and the law no. 12/2008.

#### *Post-submission*

Two major amendments were taken place after the thesis submission on 10 December 2014 which is worth mentioning, although it does not directly relate to the case studies. First, The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) endorsed Law No. 1/2015 on the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors, which was legalised by President Joko Widodo on 2 February 2015. This law enacts *Perppu* No. 1/2014.

Second, DPR and government undertook 117 amendments on the Law No. 1/2015 by enacting the Law No. 8/2015. It was legalised on 18 March 2015. The Law No. 8/2015 has ten crucial points of amendments compared to the Law No. 1/2015. First, the amendment removes public audition (*uji publik*) as one of the candidacy requirements and phases. Second, it returns the election for electing a pair of candidate of regional head and the deputy, not electing a regional head candidate only. Third, the law return national, provincial and district general election commissions' authority to conduct the *pilkada* throughout the country. In a new article (10A), national general election (KPU) is stipulated to hold a final responsibility of the *pilkada* implementation undertaken by provincial and district KPU, sub-district electoral committee (PPK), poll committee (PPS), and polling station working committees (KPPS). Fourth, it returns the election supervisory agency (*Bawaslu*)'s authorities to supervise the *pilkada* implementation (article 22A-22D). In article 27, the law also stipulates the detail of duties, authorities, and obligations of the supervisor of polling station.

Fifth, the law opens better opportunity for voters to carry out their suffrage, mainly for those unlisted in the official voter list. In addition to use valid ID, this group of voter is permitted to use valid family card (KK) or passport or other valid identities recognised by law. Voters can vote in the nearest polling station to their residences. Sixth, PPS is no longer

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<sup>92</sup> As stipulated in the revision of articles 101 and 154 of the law no. 23/2014 on Regional Government.

mandated the authority to recapitulate ballots from polling stations (TPS). All counted ballots from TPS are recapitulated in PPK. Seventh, independent electoral observer is permitted to assist voter to formulate electoral related violation appeal to electoral supervisory committee. Eighth, the law mandates to establish special court for settling electoral disputes. Ninth, the law changes the winning threshold from more than 30 per cent of vote to majority vote. Finally, the law stipulates the first wave of simultaneous *pilkada* to be implemented in December 2015. KPU has stipulated nine provinces, 36 municipalities and 224 regencies to hold *pilkada* simultaneously on 9 December 2015.

#### *Eligible Candidates, Nominations, and Voters*

Article 56 clause 2 of the Law 12/2008<sup>93</sup> stipulates that a pair of candidates for governor/district head and the deputy of governor/the deputy of district head should be nominated by a political party, coalition of political parties, or individual supported by a certain number of people in the region. Article 59 of the Law stipulates the size of eligible support for a pair of candidates as shown in table 4.1.

**Table 4.1** Eligible Support of Candidates in the *Pilkada*

<b>Gubernatorial <i>Pilkada</i></b>				<b>District <i>Pilkada</i></b>			
<b>Party Nomination</b>		<b>Individual Nomination</b>		<b>Party Nomination</b>		<b>Individual Nomination</b>	
<b>Nominating Party</b>	<b>Share of seats/votes</b>	<b>Population (million)</b>	<b>Support (%)</b>	<b>Nominating Party</b>	<b>Share of seats/votes</b>	<b>Population (thousand)</b>	<b>Support (%)</b>
Single party	15 %	2	6.5	Single party	15 %	250	6.5
Coalition of parties	15%	> 2–6	5	Coalition of parties	15%	> 250-500	5
		> 6–12	4			> 500-1 million	4
		> 12	3			> 1 million	3

Source: Article 59 the Law No. 12/2008.

A political party or coalition of parties should meet a minimum of 15 per cent share in the seat in the provincial or district legislature to nominate a pair of candidates in the gubernatorial or district *pilkada*. In addition to the share in the seat, the law also allows the calculation of party/ies' support based on the size of the votes gained in the latest provincial or district legislative election in the region. The nominating party/ies should meet a minimum of 15 per cent of the vote in the last election. The party/ies should submit a letter of nomination signed by the chair/s of party/ies to nominate a pair of candidates. A coalition of parties should also submit a letter of agreement among parties to nominate a pair of candidates.

<sup>93</sup> This law is the revision of the law no.32/2004 mainly on the articles concerning the *pilkada*.



Candidates who want to pursue an individual nomination should gain a certain number of supporters, which is determined by the size of the population in the region. For instance, a pair of candidates who want to run in a gubernatorial *pilkada* should meet a minimum of 3 per cent of supporters in the total population, in a province with a population of more than 12 million. Likewise, a pair of candidates who want to compete in a district *pilkada* should meet a minimum by 6.5 per cent of supporters in the total population in a district with a maximum population of 250 thousand people. The number of supporters should be located in more than 50 per cent of the districts in the province or more than 50 per cent of the sub-districts in the district. Every single supporter should be proven by a letter of support accompanied by a copy of identity card (KTP).

In addition to the nomination requirement, a pair of candidates should meet several other criteria, namely devotion to the one and only God, and be loyal to the Pancasila, the 1945 constitution, the ideal of Independence Proclamation, and the Unitary State of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The pair of candidates should be educated; the candidates should minimally finish senior high school. The candidates for governor and deputy governor should minimally attain the age of 30 years old. The candidates for district head and deputy district head should minimally attain the age of 25 years old. The candidates should know their regions and should be known by local residents. Overall, candidates should meet 16 individual requirements to be eligible to run in the *pilkada*.

All election regulations in Indonesia stipulate that voting is a right, not an obligation. Every eligible citizen has the right to vote. For whoever does not want to use the right to vote, there is no sanction applied. Article 68 and 69 stipulate that an eligible voter in the *pilkada* is every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia who attains the minimum age of 17 years old or married/have been married on the Election Day. In order to use the right to vote, every citizen should be listed as a voter in the region. In order to be registered as a voter, every citizen should meet two requirements. Firstly, he or she is not mentally disturbed or insane. Secondly, a citizen's right to vote has not been revoked based on a court decision which already has permanent legal force.


### *Implementing Commission*

The Law No. 15/2011 on the General Election Implementers stipulates that the Local Election Commission at the provincial and district level (Provincial KPU and District KPU) organises the *pilkada*. Local election commission is an independent institution funded by the state budget (APBN) and local budget (APBD). The state budget finances all operational (routine) expenditure of the General Election Commission (KPU) at the national level and the

local election commissions at the provincial and district level. The local budget finances all expenditures relating to the implementation of the *pilkada*. This does not include operational expenditure, which is financed by the state budget. The recent legal standing of the KPU, provincial KPU, and district KPU is in the Law No. 15/2011 on the General Election Implementers.

The position of the local election commission at the provincial and district level is under the hierarchical control of KPU. The provincial KPU is accountable to the KPU. The provincial KPU submits reports on every stage of activity relating to the gubernatorial *pilkada* to the governor and provincial legislature. The district KPU is accountable to the provincial KPU. The district KPU submits reports on every stage of activity relating to the district *pilkada* to the regent/mayor and local legislature. At the sub-district and village level, the district KPU establishes a *Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan* (PPK/sub-district electoral committee) and *Panitia Pemungutan Suara* (PPS/poll committee). The PPK organises all legislative elections and the *pilkada* related activities at the sub-district level. The PPS organises all legislative elections and *pilkada* related activities at the village level. At the neighbourhood level where the poll takes place, the PPS establishes *Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara* (KPPS/ Polling Station Working Committees). The PPS organises polls at the polling stations. The Figure 4.1 shows the organisation of the general election and the *pilkada* in Indonesia.

**Diagram 4.1** Implementing Institutions of the General Election and the *Pilkada*



In order to supervise the implementation of the *pilkada*, the Law No. 15/2011 stipulates a Provincial Election Supervisory Agency (Provincial *Bawaslu*) and a district Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*). The Election Supervisory Agency (*Bawaslu*) establishes the Provincial *Bawaslu* which aims to supervise the implementation of the general election

and gubernatorial *pilkada* at the provincial level. At the district level, the Provincial *Bawaslu* establishes a *Panwaslu* in order to supervise the implementation of the general election and gubernatorial/district *pilkada* at the district level. At the sub-district level, the *Panwaslu* establishes the Sub-district Election Supervisory Committee (Sub-District *Panwaslu*) which aims to supervise the implementation of the general election and provincial/district *pilkada* at the sub-district level. The sub-District *Panwaslu* selects the Election Field Supervisors (*Pengawas Pemilu Lapangan*) who aim to supervise the implementation of the general election and provincial/district *pilkada* at the village level.

### *Campaigns and Campaigners*

Article 76 the Law No. 32/2004 stipulates that Provincial and District KPUs give 14 days for every candidate to do their campaign. All campaign activities should be completed three days prior to the Election Day. In order to run the campaign, each candidate establishes a campaign team which aims to organise all campaign activities. Each candidate should register its campaign team with the provincial KPU and/or district KPU. Every pair of candidates is responsible for its campaign activities.

Article 76 stipulates eight campaign methods, namely, closed meetings, meetings and dialogues, dissemination through printed and electronic media, radio and/or television broadcasting, the dissemination of campaign materials to the public, locating props in public places, public meetings, public debates/open debates among candidates, and other campaign activities which are in accordance with the regulations.

For creating a fair *pilkada*, each candidate is strictly prohibited from involving judges, officials of state owned/local government owned enterprises, state officials, and the heads of villages in the campaign. The incumbents or state officials who run in the race are strictly prohibited from utilizing facilities associated with their position, involving civil servants, army and police officers as campaign audiences and campaigners, and taking unpaid leave.

Each candidate is allowed to raise campaign funds from three sources, namely the candidate him or herself, the nominating party and/or coalition of parties, and donations from other parties that are not binding, consisting of individual and/or private entity's donations. Each candidate should have a specific campaign account and this must be registered with the provincial/and or district KPU. The maximum amount of individual donation is Rp 50 million (AUD 5,555.6) and the maximum amount of private entity donation is Rp 350 million (AUD 38,888.9). Each candidate is allowed to receive and/or approve non-money donations. Provincial and district KPUs publish the donation reports of each candidate in the mass media. The publication should be undertaken one day after receiving the report from each

candidate. Each candidate is strictly prohibited to receive campaign donations from foreign countries, foreign private institutions, foreign NGOs, foreign citizens, unidentified donors, the government, state owned enterprises and local government owned enterprises.

### *Monitoring*

Article 113 the Law No. 32/2004 assures the involvement of NGOs and other domestic based organisations to monitor the *pilkada*. Each observer should be independent and have an evident source of funding. Each *pilkada*'s observer should be registered and accredited by the provincial and/or district KPU. It is compulsory for each observer to submit a monitoring report to the provincial and/or district KPU by a maximum of seven days after the inauguration of the elected candidate.

### *Victory Threshold*

The Law No. 12/2008 amended the two clauses of article 107 on a candidate's victory threshold in the Law No. 32/2004. A pair of candidates who gain 50 per cent of the valid votes are appointed as the elected candidates. In the case of no candidates reaching this threshold, the local election organiser will select candidates who obtain more than 30 per cent of the total valid votes. The candidate who gains the most votes among them (who obtains more than 30 per cent) is appointed as the elected candidate. In the case of equal votes amongst candidates who obtain more than 30 per cent, the decision on the elected candidate will be based on the coverage of winning votes. For gubernatorial elections, the coverage for the winning-based decision will be decided by considering the number of larger votes at the district level. For regent or mayor elections, the coverage of the winning-based decision will be decided by considering the number of larger votes at the sub-district level.

The other possibilities, in the case of no candidates gaining a minimum valid vote of 30 per cent, are that the provincial/local election commission will organise a second round of the *pilkada*. Candidates who gain the first and the second rank are eligible to run in the second round of the *pilkada* in the region. The candidate who gains the most votes in the second round is appointed as the elected candidate.

### *Violations and Sanctions*

Chapter 7 of the Law 32/2004 regulates the Criminal Provisions in the *pilkada*. The chapter consists of 5 articles from 115 to 119.<sup>94</sup> Article 115 stipulates the violations of voter registration and candidate nomination. The article lists various possible offences, namely

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<sup>94</sup> Article 115 was amended by the Law No. 12/2008.

giving false information in the voter registration, intentional removal of voting rights, forgery of certain documents in the voter registration, committing violence or threats to obscure the voter registration, forgery of supporting documents in candidate nomination, using a false identity card to support individual candidates, and some intentional violations committed by the *pilkada*'s organisers (the members of PPS, PPK, Provincial KPU and District KPU). For these violations, the article stipulates a minimum sentence of 3 months imprisonment and a Rp 3 million (AUD 333.3) fine. The maximum sentence is 72 months imprisonment and a Rp 72 million (AUD 8,000) fine.

Article 116 stipulates the violations of campaign regulations. Some possible violations are campaigning outside of the designated schedule, committing public offences including the utilisation of religious and education facilities for campaigns and the utilisation of the state and local government budget and facilities for campaigning, committing intentional disruptions in campaigns, donating or receiving campaign donations exceeding the prescribed limits, and donating or receiving campaign donations from forbidden parties. For these violations, the article stipulates a minimum sentence of 15 days imprisonment and/or a Rp 100 thousand (AUD 11.1) fine. The maximum sentence is 24 months imprisonment and/or a Rp 1 billion (AUD 111,111.1) fine.

Article 117 stipulates the violations of voting freedom. Every eligible citizen is free to vote or to be voted for. Every individual is prohibited from intentionally committing violence (or the threats of violence) and preventing others from voting. The violations of voting freedom also include giving or promising certain amounts of money or goods to persuade voters to vote or not to vote for certain candidates (money politics), committing voting falsification, blocking eligible voters from voting, and violating the poll confidentiality of others. For these violations, the article stipulates a minimum sentence of 15 days imprisonment and/or a Rp 100 thousand (AUD 11.1) fine. The maximum sentence is 12 months imprisonment and/or a Rp 1 million (AUD 111.1) fine. The sentence for committing money politics is minimally 2 months imprisonment and/or a Rp 1 million (AUD 111.1) fine and a maximum of 12 months imprisonment and/or a Rp 10 million (AUD 11,111.1) fine.

The last article, number 118, stipulates the violations of voting manipulations. Some possible violations are committing the intentional reduction or augmentation of ballots that may harm or favour certain candidates, committing intentional or negligent acts to ruin or to omit the sealed voting results, and intentionally manipulating the voting results. The article stipulates a minimum sentence for these violations of 15 days imprisonment and/or a Rp 100 thousand (AUD 11.1) fine. Otherwise, the maximum sentence for committing these violations is 3 years imprisonment and/or a Rp 1 billion (AUD 111,111.1) fine.

All these sentences are heavier for the organiser of the *pilkada* or candidates committing these violations. Article 119 stipulates that they will be sentenced to heavier than one-third of the normal sentence stipulated in article 115, article 116, article 117, and article 118.

As the central organiser of elections with a national coverage, the general election commission (KPU) is also a regulatory body. Relating to the implementation of the *pilkada*, article 8 clause 3 of the Law No. 15/2001 stipulates that the KPU has a specific duty and authority to set and establish technical guidance for every step of the *pilkada*. The KPU has to previously consult with the government and the House of Representatives before issuing the KPU's regulations on the implementation of the *pilkada*. The KPU has issued 22 regulations to guide the implementation of the *pilkada* at the provincial and local level, such as the KPU Regulation No. 13/2010 on the Technical Guidelines of Procedures of Candidature in the *Pilkada*, the KPU Regulation No. 18/2010 on the Amendment of the KPU Regulation No. 6/2010 on the Guidelines for Reporting Campaign Funds of Participants in the *Pilkada* and some other regulations.

#### **4.5. Concluding Remarks**

Direct election of local leaders, indeed, is not a novel democratic practice. It is rooted in an old tradition of electing the head of a village in Java and some other islands in the country. However, this indigenous practice was formalised during the New Order Era, which ironically introduced an interfering democracy. The government screened and supervised almost all processes of direct election for village heads. Tracking back to the early implementation of the *pilkada* in the Post-Soeharto Era, the emergence of the idea of the *pilkada* was closely linked to the implementation of regional autonomy, which is labelled as 'big bang decentralisation' in 2001. The *pilkada* was endorsed as an instrument to directly select local leaders who would have a more local oriented vision and more local sensitive development actions for local residents. Relating to decentralisation, the *pilkada* is also expected to boost a more equal position as well as legitimacy between local executive heads and local legislatures in the regions; the *pilkada* has open opportunities for many potential citizens to run in a regular, free, and fair competition to gain office; the *pilkada* has brought the elected leaders closer to their people as well as making them more accountable to the people who have voted for them. Contrariwise, some bad practices in running the *pilkada* have sparked public criticism. The *pilkada* is blamed for flourishing pragmatism among voters, emerging conflicts among candidates' supporters, spreading corruption and favouritism, blocking open recruitment, and eroding the state and local budget. Then, these

poor practices have provided harmful judgements for the pessimist camp on the *pilkada* and arguments for the proposal of reverting the election of local leaders to local legislatures.



## Chapter 5

### **The Incumbents' Landslide Victory in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality: A Critical Ethnographic Narrative of Survival**

This chapter aims to critically narrate the case study findings concerning the logic of the incumbents' survival in the direct elections for district heads (*pilkada*) in two rural and urban districts which are rich in local history and values, namely the 2010 *Pilkada* in Blitar Regency, a rural district and the 2008 *Pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality, an urban district. Blitar is dominated by Javanese culture; Probolinggo represents a diverse or cosmopolitan municipality of *pendalungan*<sup>95</sup> with two leading cultures, namely Javanese and *Madurese*. Also, the latter culture has much in common with Islamic values.

The case study addresses similar research questions mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, namely the incumbents' policy behaviour during their first term in office, informal political practices and actors (informal politics) attached to the incumbents and the relevant logic of policy behaviour and informal politics to the victory and voters' explanations about their main reasons, for voting for the incumbent.

The presentation of the chapter is divided into six parts. The first part is the portrayal of social, cultural, and economic circumstances of both districts with the emphasis on rural and urban characteristics of society as well as the culture expressed in their daily practices. This part also presents the districts' economic conditions that will be valuable to explain the circumstances prior to the *pilkada* in 2010 and 2008. The second part is the explanation of political settings and the narrative of political tensions prior to the *pilkada* as part of the contest to attract the sympathy of voters. The third part is a complete examination of the incumbents' populist policies and popular activities as well as religious activities to gain the hearts and minds of people in both districts, which is assumed to boost their affinity amongst local people. In the case of Probolinggo Municipality, it also discusses the invitation for non-government elements to contribute to the municipality's development.

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<sup>95</sup> The concept of cosmopolitan is best to represent the existence of *pendalungan* culture in the eastern part of East Java province. Cosmopolitan is appropriate to define *pendalungan* cultural characteristics in terms of a sociological definition as "a receptive and open attitude towards the other". It is an ethical stance in which an individual attempts to see the value of the other in an inclusive way which prioritises connection and dialogue rather than shows individual identity attached to him (family, ethnic, tribe, or nation) (Kendall et.al, 2009, p. 1). The word cosmopolitan is not appropriate to translate *pendalungan* in terms of interstate or international mixed culture or to represent the Greek term, meaning 'a citizen of the world'. It represents a blend of local cultures with two dominant cultures, namely Javanese and Madurese. *Pendalungan* also includes Arabic, Chinese, and *osing* cultures which come from the Arabic and Chinese descendants in Indonesia. *Osing* is a local culture originally from the Banyuwangi Regency in East Java. The specific examination of *pendalungan* culture is discussed in the next section of the chapter.

The fourth part explains the various informal networks attached to the incumbents and the informal political practices to support them, including control over local bureaucrats. This part also presents the play of the incumbent's identity in adjusting to the characteristics of the major population. Moreover, this part examines the value of populism and informal politics to the incumbents and their possible contribution to the logic of the incumbents' survival in the re-election. The fifth part explains voters' rationales for voting for the incumbents, beginning with voters' examination concerning local government policy outputs which are credited to the incumbents, including the activities of the incumbents' victory teams. The last part concludes, as well as positions some arguments based on the whole academic evidence in the case study supporting the approximations of the incumbents' survival in the direct election for district head.

The case study in both districts reveals that populism practised by the incumbents is important to boost their popularity, affinity, and electability prior to the election. They succeeded in fitting the logic of local people concerning an ideal leader. In Probolinggo, people even labelled the incumbent as an *oreng sae* (a good person) who is able to accommodate the will of the majority of people in the municipality. More than a popular figure, *oreng sae* represents the incumbent's ideal figure, perceived as a religious and generous person. The key points concerning populism are well-liked policies, activities and ideal figure amongst local residents.

Populism does not only relate to populist policies attached to the incumbent, but it is also applied in the forms of popular activities. Two categories of policies are proposed, namely, populist policies delivering direct or tangible benefits to the residents and populist policies that do not deliver tangible or direct benefits to the residents. The former is demonstrated in tangible outputs of the policies, such as the development of roads and bridges at the neighbourhood level, selling subsidised groceries at half price, and providing death benefits. The latter is exhibited in popular services provided by local governments, such as free health service for all residents in community health centres and free health service for the poor in local government owned hospitals. The popular activities that lead to survival are the willingness of the incumbent to connect directly to the people in large scale mass events, such as attending mass religious activities at the village level, inaugurating and donating sport events at the sub-district or village level, supporting local soccer clubs, art and leisure activities inviting mass audiences, conducting charity activities and other activities directly connecting the incumbent to local residents. The incumbent in Probolinggo also performed two extraordinary activities, namely *blusukan* (visiting community meeting points or community spots) and *takziah* (visiting, delivering condolences and giving funeral aid).

These activities are the most mentioned by voters and elites interviewed in the case study. Catchy and recognisable policy outputs are arguably why voters vote for the incumbent, rather than substantive policies that may deliver long-term policy outputs, such as human development outputs in education and health.

Informal political practices and actors (informal politics) perform invisible roles to support the incumbent to stay in office. They are contributory to overcoming the low voter loyalty to their parties' decisions in nominating the incumbents. Moreover, they contribute to providing campaign funds, mobilising voters, promoting the incumbent and giving donations to support the incumbents' charity activities. In Probolinggo Municipality, party and non-government organisation networks performed defensive actions against those attacking the incumbent. Nonetheless, voters could not identify their attendances at the grass root level. Finally, the case study finds that the incumbents' capability for accommodating as well as controlling the majority of formal and informal actors, namely party networks, local businessmen, local bureaucrats and religious leaders are central for the incumbents to survive. Control over informal politics is very crucial for the incumbents in minimising potential political rivalry risk from these parties.

Based on the examination of voters' answers concerning their reasons for voting for the incumbents, firstly, the incumbents benefit from their popularity and affinity amongst local residents. Voters not only recognised both incumbents, but they also appreciated them positively for their popular appearance. Secondly, the incumbents are favoured by local government and national government programs delivering tangible outputs to voters. They feel grateful for the implementation of the programs in their neighbourhood credited to the incumbents. Moreover, the incumbent in Probolinggo succeeded in inviting local people and non-government organisations to participate in the local government programs, such as in the development of 1,000 roadside gardens and city development dialogues. The involvement of people and NGOs in the municipality's development projects had indirectly exhibited the incumbent's populist approach in governing the municipality. Thirdly, the case study in Blitar finds that the incumbent gained indirect advantage from voters' ignorance. Their imperfect knowledge concerning candidates who ran in the *pilkada* has encouraged them to adjust their preference to the majority of voters favouring the incumbent (*anut grubyuk* or fitting in). Also, the predominant Javanese value of communal relationship amongst voters in Blitar could explain the adjustment of voting decisions preferring the incumbent.

## 5.1. Introduction

The first *pilkada* in Blitar Regency took place in 2005. The official ballots counted on the 4<sup>th</sup> December 2005 stipulated that the pair of candidates, namely Herry Noegroho and Arif Fuadi had won the 2005 *Pilkada* by 42.18 per cent of votes. They gained the most votes compared to Soebiantoro-Suhardi and Harnen Sulistio-M Choirudin. Herry was the former of deputy of the regent (2001-2004). He then took the regency office in the 2005 *Pilkada*.

Five years later, Herry Noegroho and his running mate in the 2005 *Pilkada*, Arif Fuadi, separated in the 2010 *Pilkada*. Herry urged a former senior bureaucrat, Rijanto, to run the race. Arif urged a local legislator, Heri Romadhon, to challenge the incumbent in the 2010 *Pilkada*. The 2010 race in Blitar, which was undertaken on 9 November 2010, stipulated that the incumbent Herry Noegroho survived in office with 59.70 per cent of the votes.

Herry's victory in the 2010 *Pilkada* was assumed due to his advantage as the incumbent who had unlimited access to public resources. He was presumed to obtain benefits politically from the local government's expenditure. However, a critical question emerges, why did the incumbent only gain 59.70 per cent of votes? What is the political logic of incumbency as perceived by voters?

The Municipality of Probolinggo is one of the districts in East Java performing the last *pilkada* prior to the national legislative and presidential election in 2009.<sup>96</sup> Probolinggo and other municipalities in East Java, namely Malang, Kediri, Mojokerto, and Madiun held the first *pilkada* in 2008, paralleling with the first East Java gubernatorial election in the same year. Previously, the last indirect election for the local executive head in the Municipality was in 2003. In this last election, Muhammad Buchori and his pair Koentjoro Soehadi defeated the incumbent Mayor Banadi Eko and his pair Ghoisus Salim. 30 local legislators voted for these two pairs of candidates. Buchori-Soehadi gained 16 ballots out of 30 ballots and they gained the seats of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Probolinggo Municipality (2004-2009).

In the first *pilkada* in 2008, Buchori ran the race as an incumbent. He urged the former of local secretary of the municipality, Bandyk Soetrisno, to compete in the race. As an incumbent, Buchori was superior to two other challengers, namely the pair of Bayun Sarosa and Rr. Retno Suryandari and the pair of Zulkifli Chalik and Yusuf Zainal Qubro. The first *pilkada*, which took place on 30 October 2008, stipulated that the incumbent Buchori gained

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<sup>96</sup> In 2009, there were no *pilkada* throughout the country as the general election commission (KPU), government, and the house of representative agreed to conduct legislative and presidential election only.

the most votes by 72.55 per cent and he obtained the mayoral post of Probolinggo Municipality for the second term (2009-2014). Two other pairs, Bayun-Retno and Zulkifli-Yusuf gained 3.03 per cent and 24.42 per cent of the votes respectively.

The landslide of Buchori's victory in the 2008 *Pilkada* was previously predicted by many people in the municipality. In addition to being an incumbent, Buchori is a very popular leader amongst local people, especially amongst the majority of middle and low income people in Probolinggo. He is also perceived as the first mayor deriving from the majority of ethnic group in Probolinggo, namely *Madurese*. Prior to 2003, none of the *Madurese* served as the mayor in the municipality; all of the mayors were Javanese. Nonetheless, popularity is not the only factor supporting Buchori in retaining office. So, what are the other factors relating to his incumbency that supported Buchori in retaining his office? What is the political logic assumed by voters to give him a landslide triumph?

## **5.2. The History of Islam, Javanism and *Pendalungan* in Blitar and Probolinggo**

Blitar Regency is one of the most populous districts in East Java, located in the southern part of the province. According to the 2010 population census, the regency has 1,116,010 people living in an area of 1,588.79 km<sup>2</sup>. The population density was 702 per km<sup>2</sup> and it contributes by 2.98 per cent to the population in the province. Based on the cultural background category in East Java, Blitar is categorised as a Mataraman area since the major and indigenous population are Javanese (Rozuli, 2011, p. 96).<sup>97</sup> In addition, tracing the history of the regency established on 5 August 1324 shows the long history of Javanese Kingdoms governing the old area of Blitar, namely the Balitung Kingdom, the Singasari Kingdom and the Majapahit Kingdom.<sup>98</sup>

In the past, Blitar was under the strong influence of Javanese, Buddhist and Hindu traditions and religions (Ismawati, 2002, pp. 4-10).<sup>99</sup> Also, Blitar is mentioned in an important Sanskrit book "Nagarakertagama", written by Prapanca.<sup>100</sup> According to the East Java Regional Division of Culture, Blitar is categorised in the Java sub-culture of *Jawa Mataraman* (Java *Mataraman*) (Sutarto and Sudikan, 2008). In a more general categorisation, Javanese in Blitar are included in the *Mancanagari* Java Culture Area. This area is located far from the centre of Javanese culture in Yogyakarta and Surakarta Palaces, but the

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<sup>97</sup>A survey conducted by the Blitar Development Planning Board in cooperation with Airlangga University in 2009 presented the ethnic share of their respondents, chosen randomly. 99.8 per cent of 1,000 samples admit that they are Javanese. Based on this survey, I could say that almost the entire Blitar population are Javanese.

<sup>98</sup> Source: <http://www.blitarkab.go.id/?p=143> accessed on 3 September 2013

<sup>99</sup> Javanese culture and traditions existed earlier than Buddhist and Hindu. Three main symbols (*ciri*) of early Javanese are the kinship of Javanese, Javanese animism, and dynamism. Blitar is part of the East Java region.

<sup>100</sup> Source: <http://www.blitarkab.go.id/?p=143> accessed on 3 September 2013

*Mancanagari* area remains under the influence of those two palaces' culture (Gauthama, 2003, p. 24). Thus, Mataraman is the identification of the Javanese community under the influence of the Mataram Kingdom centred in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Generally, Javanese are the people with hereditary use of the Javanese language, with various dialects, in everyday life, and live in Central Java or East Java, as well as those from the two regions. *Javanism* is not included in a religious category; it refers to an ethic or a lifestyle re-inspired by the thoughts of Java (Chalik, 2011, p. 270; Ismawati, 2000, p. 3). One of the elements of the Javanese cultural system maintained and taught from generation to generation is the Javanese philosophy of life (Gauthama, 2003, p. 11).


Islam entered Java in the eleventh century and it expanded massively when the Hindu Kingdom's authority started to weaken in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.<sup>101</sup> Islam spread quickly and reduced the influence of Hinduism amongst the society, indicated by the collapse of the Majapahit Kingdom in 1478 and the establishment of the first Islamic Javanese Kingdom, Demak, in Central Java (Amin, 2002, pp. v-vi). Particularly in Blitar, until now, the traditions of Javanism, Hinduism, and Islam syncretise influence the people and government. Recent cultural festivals undertaken by the people and government show the blend of Islamic, Hindu, and Javanese traditions, such as *ruwatan* (a Javanese cleansing ritual), clean village ritual, *suroan* ritual<sup>102</sup> and the purification of Gong Mbah Pradah in Lodayo (Rozuli, 2011, p. 97). Therefore, although Islam is the major religion amongst Blitar's people, it shares with Javanese and Hindu traditions in daily practices.

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<sup>101</sup> Historical records show some artefacts that indicate the early period of Islam in Java, namely the Moslem grave of Fatimah binti Maimun bin Hibatallah who was passed away on 1 December 1082 in Gresik East Java, old mosques in Demak Central Java, Arabic epigraphs (calligraphy), and city landscapes (Anasom, 2002, pp. 28-34).

<sup>102</sup> *Suro* is the first month in the Javanese calendar which coincides with Muharam or the first month in the Islamic calendar. *Suroan* is the festival to celebrate the first day of the *Suro* month which is considered sacred by the Javanese. It symbolises the beginning of life. It is celebrated in various places in Java.

**Map 5.1** Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality



By courtesy of <http://www.nationsonline.org/> and <http://archipelagofastfact.wordpress.com/>

The recent Blitar situation contrasts with the past.<sup>103</sup> Some macro indicators demonstrate the better welfare of Blitar's population. In 2010, the regency's human development index (HDI) was far better than other regencies in East Java. Blitar was also leading in economic growth, the unemployment rate, poverty rate, and infant mortality rate, compared to other regencies and even municipalities in the province. However, Blitar was left behind in terms of per capita income of its population.

**Table 5.1** Socio-Economic Profile of Blitar Regency in 2010

Aspects	Blitar	Regencies	Municipalities	East Java	Explanation
HDI	73.62	68.99	75.85	71.55	
Life Expectancy	76.44	71.03	75.42	74.29	
Education Index	77.93	72.92	86.19	74.94	
Purchasing power parity	66.47	63.03	65.95	65.42	
Economic growth	6.81	6.46	6.53	6.67	%
Per capita income	12,492.98	12,998.86	52,136.63	20,772.11	1,000 (Rp)
Unemployment rate	2.24	3.66	7.36	4.25	%
Poverty rate	12.14	-	-	15.26	%
Infant mortality rate	24.60	38.08	27.59	29.99	Per 1,000 live births

Source: The Central Statistics Agency of East Java, 2011. The Central Statistics Agency of Blitar, 2011.

Hence, the later situation and the past history of the regency related to the cultural and religious background and the past political landscape is important in the recent political setting. Are there any explanations linking these local specific contexts of social, cultural, and political backgrounds to the incumbent's survival in the 2010 *Pilkada*? How do local

<sup>103</sup>Nevertheless, the image of South Blitar as a left behind and underdeveloped area remains. On 26 June 2013, online media reported a situation of difficulties in meeting the food needs, leading to hunger, at the Ngadipuro Village in Wonotirto Sub-district. Source: <http://daerah.sindonews.com/read/2013/06/26/23/754392/ratusan-warga-blitar-selatan-alami-kelaparan> accessed on 3 October 2013.

people explain their preferences in the 2010 *Pilkada*? What are the primary factors that may support the incumbent's survival in the regency?

Meanwhile, Probolinggo is one of the nine municipalities in East Java Province located in the north coastal area of the eastern part of the province. According to the East Java Central Statistics Agency, the population in the municipality was 226,643 in 2008. With a total area of 56,667 km<sup>2</sup>, the municipality's density was 4,000 people per km<sup>2</sup>. It is the second least dense municipality compared to other eight municipalities in East Java. The municipality is bounded on the north side by the Madura Strait. The other areas border with the Regency of Probolinggo.

As an urban district, the majority of the municipality's area is utilised for non-agricultural activities. According to the Probolinggo Central Statistics Agency, the portion of agricultural area in the municipality was 34.6 per cent in 2008. Also, based on the contribution of the economic sector at current market prices in 2008, agriculture contributed only 7.45 per cent to the total regional gross domestic product (RGDP). The majority of the RGDP was contributed by trade (37.97 per cent), transportation and communication (18.12 per cent), manufacturing industry (15.64) and finance and services (7.64 per cent).

The majority of the population in the municipality is Muslim. According to the Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Probolinggo, the total Muslim population in the municipality was 96.08 per cent in 2009. The rest are Christian, Catholic, Hindu, and Buddhist. Based on the cultural background category in East Java, the Municipality of Probolinggo is categorised as *pendalungan* (or *pandalungan* or *pendhalungan*) area. In addition to the municipality, the *pendalungan* cultural area covers Probolinggo Regency, Jember Regency, the Regency and the Municipality of Pasuruan, Bondowoso Regency, Lumajang Regency and Situbondo Regency (Rahardjo, 2007; Yuswadi, 2008; Kamal, 2010; Dewi, 2010).

Among East Java's people and academics, *pendalungan* refers to a practice of cultural mixing or acculturation amongst ethnic groups, especially between two dominant ethnic groups in East Java, namely Javanese and Madurese (Yuswadi, 2008, p. 55). From a more multicultural perspective, *pendalungan* etymologically refers to a Javanese word *dalung* or *dhalung*. The literal meaning of this word is a big pot. In a symbolic meaning, then, it is defined as a meeting place of various communities with dissimilar ethnic backgrounds and cultures. They interact with each other in a space and time until they create a new variant culture named *pendalungan*. In addition to Javanese and Madurese as the two dominant ethnic groups, in *pendalungan* areas Chinese, Arabs and Using live also (Rahardjo, 2007, pp. 200-201).



Based on the fieldwork in October and November 2012, Madurese and Javanese symbols appear more than other ethnics symbols. In my interviews with voters and elites, they spoke the Indonesian language with a coastal Madurese accent. Some voters who spoke in this accent were difficult to understand and it was necessary to translate and then explain, in order to check the meaning with them. Some participants were also interviewed in Indonesian with a Javanese dialect. Interestingly, although the government of Probolinggo municipality identifies as a region with embedded *pendalungan* culture,<sup>104</sup> under Buchori's administration, the symbols of Madurese culture appear more than Javanese.<sup>105</sup> In some local government offices, when collecting data and interviews, banners written in Madurese were seen. Previously, the local government had conducted an official ceremony to celebrate the municipality's anniversary on 17 September 2012. In this ceremony, all participants wore Madurese traditional clothes and the ceremony used Madurese (language).<sup>106</sup>

**Figure 5.1** Civil Servants wore Madurese traditional clothes in the municipality's anniversary ceremony on 17 September 2012



Source: <http://www.suryaonline.co/images/sakerah-jadi-komandan-upacara/>

Tracking the history of the municipality, Probolinggo was under the influence of the Javanese Majapahit Kingdom. Probolinggo was previously known as *Banger*. This is the name of a river that flows through the middle of Probolinggo. A prominent Majapahit master as well as poet, *Mpu Prapanca*, wrote *Banger* in a book entitled *Negarakertagama*. The book was written when Majapahit was under the administration of Prabu Radjasanagara (Sri Nata Hayam Wuruk). He was the <sup>fourth</sup> King of Majapahit who governed from 1350 to 1389. Then,

<sup>104</sup> See this link [http://probolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=401&Itemid=1](http://probolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=401&Itemid=1) accessed on 3 February 2014. The link refers to the municipality's official link. The web page of this link published a seminar as an effort to identify *pendalungan* culture in the Municipality of Probolinggo.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012.

<sup>106</sup> Source <http://www.suryaonline.co/images/sakerah-jadi-komandan-upacara/> accessed on 5 February 2014.

when the area of *Banger* was under the Dutch Colonial Government; it appointed Kyai Djojolelono as the first regent in Banger in 1746. The next appointed regent, Tumenggung Djojonegoro (Kanjeng Djimat), changed the name of the area from *Banger* to Probolinggo in 1770. *Probo* means ray; *linggo* means monument. So, Probolinggo means the ray-shaped monument. The establishment of Probolinggo as a municipality took place on 1 July 1918 under the Dutch Colonial Government. After the shift of power from the Dutch Colonial Government to the Republic of Indonesia, the Government of Indonesia issued the Law number 17/1950 to establish the Municipality of Probolinggo as an autonomous region.<sup>107</sup>

The majority ethnic group in Probolinggo is Madurese, while their predecessors are Javanese. Kuntowijoyo's study found that until 1930, new Madurese settlers were still coming to East Java. The new settlers permanently migrated from four districts in Madura Island. According to the *Volkstelling* 1930, Kuntowijoyo writes, "By 1930, more than half of all ethnic Madurese lived in Java, mostly in the eastern corner" (Kuntowijoyo, 1980, p. 87).<sup>108</sup> Meanwhile, in the regional variations of Javanese culture, the Municipality of Probolinggo and other districts in the *pendalungan* area are categorised as part of the culture of Surabaya and its environment. In addition to having a unique Javanese Surabaya dialect (*Suroboyoan*), Javanese in this area and other areas on the north coast of Java are denoted by a strong Islamic influence. They are mentioned as Muslim Javanese encouraging cultural reform movements during the past century. Surabaya is claimed to be the gateway for transferring new Muslim ideas from South-West Asia and Egypt into Javanese culture (Koentjaraningrat, 1985, p. 22).

Although the majority of the population in the municipality is Madurese and Javanese, they practice *pendalungan* culture as they have a mix of these two dominant cultures (transition). They practise the social ethics of *pendalungan* people rooted in Javanese and Madurese cultures. *Pendalungan* people who live in the centre of this acculturation (urban areas) tend to use Javanese in their daily communication. As Javanese is spoken by many non-natives, they speak Javanese from a low level of Javanese language stratification (*ngoko*) encouraging the spirit of egalitarianism amongst the *pendalungan* people. Moreover, as the Municipality of Probolinggo is an urban area as well as a melting pot, Javanese is used as a *lingua franca*. Nonetheless, since Madurese is quantitatively dominant, they influence *pendalungan* people with Madurese characters who are expressive, open, paternalistic and to

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<sup>107</sup> This is quoted from the official website of the Municipality of Probolinggo in the web page entitled *Sejarah Kota Probolinggo* (the History of Probolinggo Municipality). Source: [http://probolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=29](http://probolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=29) accessed on 3 February 2014.

<sup>108</sup> The Eastern Corner is part of East Java Province's area.

the point. Furthermore, as a transitional community, *pendalungan* people are also accommodative, tolerant, and respectful of difference. Also, Islam as a religion and tradition has a strong influence amongst *pendalungan* people by positioning Islamic religious leaders (*kiai*) as a role model (Yuswadi, 2008, p. 61). Understanding the culture and character of *pendalungan* people is crucial to help further analysis relating to the 2008 *Pilkada* dynamics, the incumbent's policy behaviour and informal politics and voting behaviour in the *pilkada*. Also, the analysis will deploy Madurese and Javanese cultural settings as part of this analysis, for certain explanations, to comprehend the empirical findings.

Compared to the other 37 districts in East Java Province, Probolinggo Municipality is one of the districts with good macro indicator performances. The municipality had better macro indicators than the East Java average macro indicator in 2008, except for unemployment and poverty rates. In fact, the municipality's socio-economic indicators were lower than the other 8 municipalities in East Java in 2008. As we can see in table 5.2, the municipality had a lower achievement in HDI, life expectancy, education index, per capita income and infant mortality rates. Probolinggo disbursed slightly higher *per capita* of the local budget than the average of other municipalities in East Java. It was slightly better in purchasing power, economic growth and unemployment as well.

**Table 5.2** Socio-Economic Profile of Probolinggo Municipality in 2008

Aspects	Probolinggo	Municipalities	Regencies	East Java	Explanation
HDI	73.29	75.05	67.88	70.38	
Life Expectancy	74.14	74.63	70.23	73.50	
Education Index	79.97	85.42	71.93	73.73	
Purchasing power parity	65.75	65.11	61.49	63.92	
Economic growth	6.39	6.20	5.78	5.94	%
Per capita income	17,767.28	41,477.22	10,525.34	16,751.43	1,000 (Rp)
Unemployment rate	9.93	10.63	5.50	6.42	%
Poverty rate	19,03	-	-	18.51	%
Infant mortality rate	30.32	27.91	39.71	31.58	Per 1,000 live births
Per capita of local budget (APBD)	1,883,355	1,852,509	777,576	-	(Rp)

Source: East Java Central Statistics Agency, 2009 and 2011. The Probolinggo Healthy City Forum.<sup>109</sup> The data *per capita* of the local budget in 2008 were processed by the researcher from the master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011.

<sup>109</sup> Data on the 2008 Probolinggo Municipality's poverty rate. Source: [http://forumkotaprobolinggosehat.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=25:indikator-tatanan-kawasan-sosial-yang-sehat-tahun-2013&catid=32:kehidupan-sosial-yang-sehat&Itemid=28](http://forumkotaprobolinggosehat.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25:indikator-tatanan-kawasan-sosial-yang-sehat-tahun-2013&catid=32:kehidupan-sosial-yang-sehat&Itemid=28) accessed on 6 February 2014.

Pertaining to the 2008 *Pilkada* in the municipality, this macro socio-economic profile is urgent to explain the incumbents' survival. This macro situation is combined with the cultural and religious background as well as the past history of the municipality to help connect to the 2008 political landscape. They probably connect with the *pilkada* political setting and the explanation of the incumbent's landslide victory. To what extent could the incumbent's profile adjust to the *pendalungan* cultural character? Why did the incumbent gain a landslide victory, whereas, the municipality's socio-economic indicators were worse than other municipalities in the province? How do local people explain their preferences in the 2008 *Pilkada*? What are the primary factors that may support the incumbent's survival in the *pilkada*?

### **5.3. The *Pilkada* Dynamics in Blitar and Probolinggo**

#### *5.3.1. The *Pilkada* Dynamics in Blitar*

The 2010 *Pilkada* in Blitar was coloured by several issues that might lead to chaotic situations prior to and after the *pilkada*. The main crucial issues were funding, conflict risk, bureaucratic unfairness, conflict of interest amongst village heads and transactional political practices. The funding issue is a major problem hampering the majority of *pilkada* in Indonesia. This issue arose even prior to the first *pilkada* in 2005. Article No. 112 of the Law No. 32/2004 stipulates that the local budget (APBD) should cover all related *pilkada* expenditures.<sup>110</sup>The Blitar Election Commission (KPUD) first proposed a budget worth Rp 35 billion (AUD 3.5 million) for two rounds of the *pilkada*. This proposal was rejected by the local government and local legislatures; they agreed to allocate Rp 8 billion (AUD 800,000) (*Radar Blitar*, 25 September 2009). KPUD protested about this, since it was not enough to cover all expenditures. Local mass media published this issue from September 2009 to January 2010. Finally, the local government and local legislature approved a budget worth Rp 10.85 billion (AUD 1.085 million).<sup>111</sup> The chair of KPUD remarked that this budget was the smallest budget compared to other *pilkada* in 17 districts in East Java in 2010. APBD covered only Rp 9,000 (AUD 90 cents) per voter (*Radar Blitar*, 18 January 2010).

The root of four other potential problems relates to the battle between two incumbents in the 2010 *Pilkada*. The incumbent regent (Herry Noegroho) and the incumbent deputy regent (Arif Fuadi) ran in the re-election bid. This competition was predicted to impede the

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<sup>110</sup>It has been revised by the Law No. 15/2011 on the General Election Implementers stipulating that the state budget finances all operational (routine) expenditure of the General Election Commission (KPU) at the national level and the local election commissions at the provincial (Provincial KPU) and district level (KPUD). The local budget (APBD) finances all expenditures relating to the implementation of the *pilkada*.

<sup>111</sup>This amount was possible because KPUD assumed there will be a round of *pilkada*.

*pilkada* implementation. Conflict amongst candidates' supporters was first anticipated by the *pilkada* implementer, especially the *pilkada* desk, police, and army. Each candidate was proposed by different parties with contrasting ideological backgrounds. Herry and his running partner Rijanto were proposed by a coalition of the majority of nationalist based parties; whereas, Arif with his partner Heri Romadhon were supported by a coalition of the majority of Islamic based parties. They were also supported by fanatical supporters who were potentially involved in conflict. Herry and Rijanto were backed up by nationalist supporters with Javanese traditions. Arif and Heri were supported by moderate Islamic communities represented by the two largest Muslim mass-based organisations, namely *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Police alerted four sub-districts which were rampant for conflict, namely Wonodadi, Udanawu, Sanankulon and Srengat (*Radar Blitar*, 9 September 2010).

Moreover, the battle between both incumbents impacted on the position of the local bureaucracy. The Community Alliance against Corruption (*Aliansi Masyarakat Anti Korupsi*, AMAK), a local NGO, warned about the bureaucratic mobilisation to support both incumbents, as they have influence amongst bureaucracies in the regency. The bureaucracy, which is ordered to be neutral in the *pilkada*, in fact, faced these competing situations.<sup>112</sup> Also, both candidates potentially abused their power to gain benefits from local government programs and the budget (*Radar Blitar*, 8 September 2010). AMAK also suggested money politics practices would be committed by candidates and their supporters. This political transaction practice was possible due to voters' lower awareness concerning the *pilkada*. They wanted to come to the polls if they received some incentives (*Radar Blitar*, 14 October 2010).

Conflicts of interest amongst village heads were closely connected also to the competition between the two incumbents. One indication is the disunity amongst the Village Heads Association (Asosiasi Kepala Desa, AKD)'s members. Mohammad Nurchamim, one of the AKD's chairs, admitted that the village heads' supporters were fragmented into two camps. He and his camp members supporting Herry undertook the "pocong" oath (*sumpah pocong*) to assure their total endorsement for Herry (*Radar Blitar*, 7 September 2010). The incident of the *pocong* oath, declared by 15 village heads on 2 October, then sparked a

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<sup>112</sup>The government issued two regulations relating to this restriction, namely the Instruction of Administrative Reform Minister No. 7/2009 concerning the Neutrality of Civil Servants in Elections and the Instruction of Home Minister No. 270/4627/SJ concerning Instruction to Governor and District Head to Assure Civil Servants' Neutrality in the *pilkada*. See footnote number 5 in chapter 1 for complete explanation and other case examples in other regions.

polemic amongst elites and society. Academics and NGO activists accused them of taking the oath as a political movement in Herry's camp (*Radar Blitar*, 6 and 7 October 2010).<sup>113</sup>

The other issue is about individual or non-party candidates. Prior to the stipulation of eligible candidates on 31 August 2010, KPUD accepted a candidature of non-party candidates, Mambaul Huda and Ali Askhab. However, KPUD officially refused their candidature as they could not meet the eligibility requirement of the number of supporters. KPUD required Mambaul Huda and Ali Askhab to submit 39,108 residents' identity cards (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk*, KTP) as proof of support; however, they were only able to submit 25,034 cards (*Radar Blitar*, 21 August 2010 and 1 September 2010). Prior to making the final decision, KPUD found several weaknesses in verifying the evidence of supporters for the non-party candidates. KPUD revealed 1,682 manipulated ID supporters. Many manipulated residents protested the candidature (*Radar Blitar*, 22 July 2010). Moreover, KPUD received reports of another mode of manipulation. The candidates and their team manipulated some IDs from residents who had died (*Radar Blitar*, 14 July 2010).

Four months prior to the *pilkada*, there was also a salient debate concerning the female candidate. *Forum Generasi Peduli Lingkungan* (Forum of Environmental Care Generation, FGPL) released a poll claiming that the majority of Blitar's residents rejected a female candidate, especially amongst *ulama* (religious leaders).<sup>114</sup> FGPL argued that people cannot accept leadership by women, particularly amongst *ulama*, who said that the leader ought to be a male. Nonetheless, some other activists denied FGPL's claims. They argued that this was blatant discrimination as all genders are equal to run in the *pilkada*. They stressed that female leadership should not be portrayed as a threat to men or as a form of emasculation. Moreover, the majority of Blitar's population is nationalist; they will accept whoever wants to be a leader as long as he or she is capable and credible. Activists presumed that this issue is propaganda to impede some female figures who were beginning to gain sympathy from local residents, such as Venna Melinda (actress and national legislator), Mulat Wiyatiningrum (businesswoman), Kristri Bakhtiar (wife of Blitar's Secretary) and Jesika Yeni Susanti (Antinarcotics activist in Kediri) (*Radar Blitar*, 30 June 2010). This denial is logical because demographically the number of female voters outnumber male voters in Blitar. According to the voters' list released by KPUD, in the 2010 *Pilkada*, female voters comprised 50.3 per cent of the total of 994,939 voters in Blitar.

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<sup>113</sup>In this context, the *pocong* oath is a symbol of agreement. It is symbolically intended to show that the commitment is not only taken amongst people, but also with the god.

<sup>114</sup>Literal meaning is Islamic scholar, but in this context it follows the social meaning of *ulama* as an Islamic religious leader.

KPUD stipulated the eligible candidates for the 2010 *Pilkada* on 31 August 2010. The incumbent Regent Herry Noegroho and his pair Rijanto were proposed by the coalition of six parties with 34 seats in the local legislature (68 percent). Meanwhile, the incumbent deputy Regent Arif Fuadi and his running mate Heri Romadhon were supported by three parties with 15 seats in the local parliament (30 percent).<sup>115</sup> In addition, Arif and Heri received support from non-parliamentary parties (PPD). Like in other regions in the country, two major political forces, nationalist and Islamic based parties, existed in Blitar in the 2010 *pilkada*. However, this division cannot be strictly applied, as the parties supporting both of the proposed candidates were a blend of these two political forces. Herry-Rijanto was supported by PDIP, PD, Golkar, Gerindra (nationalist), PKS, and PPP (Islam) and Arif-Heri is supported by PKB, PAN (Islam), and Patriot (nationalist).

**Table 5.3** Candidates and Supporting Parties in the 2010 *Pilkada* in Blitar

<b>Herry Noegroho – Rijanto (HERO OK)</b>	
Parties	Seats in Parliament
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	15
Democratic Party (PD)	9
Golkar Party (Golkar)	5
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	2
United Development Party (PPP)	2
The Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra)	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>34 (68%)</b>
<b>Arif Fuadi – Heri Romadhon (AROMA)</b>	
Parties	Seats in Parliament
National Awakening Party (PKB)	8
National Mandate Party (PAN)	5
Patriot Party (Patriot)	2
Non-parliament parties (PPD)	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>15 (30%)</b>

Source: *Radar Blitar*, 1 September 2010 as quoted from KPU Blitar.

Prior to the stipulation of the eligible candidates, the *pilkada* in Blitar was held in a political situation favouring Herry as an incumbent. He was highly popular amongst Blitar's residents. In the interviews, a local academic as well as a party activist remarked that there were a few candidates who wanted to run in the 2010 *pilkada*. Some prominent figures in Blitar were reluctant to pursue their candidacy as they were aware of the incumbent's strong popularity.<sup>116</sup> A pollster based in East Java hired by the incumbent had conducted a poll (23 June-8 July 2013) demonstrating Herry's electability of 48.65 per cent. In opposition to Herry, no other figures could reach 10 per cent. Harnen Sulistio (Herry's rival in the 2005 *pilkada*)'s

<sup>115</sup>The People's Conscience (Hanura) Party, which has one seat in the local legislature, did not join in both coalitions.

<sup>116</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

electability reached only 9.07 percent and Arif Fuadi (deputy regent)'s electability reached only 8.57 percent.<sup>117</sup> One of the factors contributing to Herry's high electability was his high popularity. He has held office in Blitar since 2001. He first took office in 2001 as the deputy regent. Herry, then, became the *ad interim* regent to replace the previous regent (Imam Muhadi) who was accused of corruption in 2004. He succeeded in retaining his office in the 2005 *pilkada*. Hence, his position and experience in leading the regency has made it impossible for other figures to compete with him. Arif Fuadi, Herry's running mate in the 2005 *pilkada*, was the only other figure who probably could compete with him.

**Table 5.4** Political Constellation in Blitar Regency 1999-2014

Parties	Seats in Parliament (Election)		
	1999-2004 (%)	2004-2009 (%)	2009-2014 (%)
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	17 (37.8)	17 (37.8)	15 (30)
Democratic Party (PD)	-	5 (11.1)	9 (18)
Golkar Party (Golkar)	7 (15.6)	8 (17.8)	5 (10)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	1 (2.2)	1 (2.2)	2 (4)
United Development Party (PPP)	1 (2.2)	1 (2.2)	2 (4)
The Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party	-	-	1 (2)
National Awakening Party (PKB)	13 (28.9)	12 (26.7)	8 (16)
National Mandate Party (PAN)	1 (2.2)	1 (2.2)	5 (10)
Patriot Party (Patriot)	-	-	2 (4)
The People's Conscience (Hanura) Party	-	-	1 (2)
Army/Police faction	5 (11.1)	-	-

Source: data on the 1999 election result quoted from Yanuarti (2005); data on the 2004 election result quoted from Blitar Regency in figures (2011); data on 2009 election result quoted from <http://dprd-blitarkab.go.id/index.php/gambaran-umum-dewan>, accessed on 8 October 2013.

Concerning the profiles of each candidate, the following explanations narrate the candidates' backgrounds and their political alignments as well as their figures amongst ordinary people in the regency. The processes and results of the 2010 *pilkada* in Blitar Regency are also discussed.

Before taking the position as the deputy regent in Blitar in 2001, Herry Noegroho was a businessman. He had been the director of PT. Harta Mulia Plantation and the Commissar of PT. BPR (rural bank) Harta Raya Cipta Mulia. Herry comes from a big family with a long tradition in business. Herry was familiar amongst business communities in Blitar as he had been involved in The Indonesian Employers Association (Apindo) (1977-2004) and The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) (1990-1995) in Blitar. He was also the chairman of Plantation Employers Association (GPP) (1990-1995). His association with

<sup>117</sup>Due to the principle of anonymity, I conceal the pollster's name.



business communities in Blitar, then, is favourable to support him during his stay in office. When he pursued his undergraduate study at Brawijaya University in Malang, he was active in the National Student Movement (GMNI). Herry has also been active as a manager and the chair of Blitar Soccer Association (PSBI) since 1998. PSBI is the only soccer team representing Blitar in the soccer national competition with massive supporters, especially the youth. He had also been active as the chairman of the Association of Indonesian Farmers (HKTI) from 2004 to 2005. His political career started in Golkar Party. Via this party, he gained a seat in the local legislature in Blitar (1999-2000). Herry accompanied his running mate Imam Muhadi to compete in the 2001 local election (elected by local legislatures) as the deputy regent nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). In the 2005 *pilkada*, PDI-P formed a coalition with National Awakening Party (PKB) to propose Herry Noegroho and his pair Arif Fuadi who, then, became his rival in the 2010 *pilkada*.

**Table 5.5** Election Results in Blitar Regency under the New Order Era (%)

Parties	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
United Development Party (PPP)	24.62	26.27	30.68	21.84	30.73
Golkar Party	73.09	70.09	60.44	63.71	66.75
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)	2.29	3.64	8.88	14.45	2.53

Source: Indonesian Election Committee as quoted by Yanuarti, 2005.

Herry co-opted Rijanto as his running mate in the 2010 *pilkada*. Rijanto was a senior respected bureaucrat in the regency with a long and successful record in many posts.<sup>118</sup> When he was the head of sub-district (*camat*) in *Kademangan*, *Nglegok* and *Wlingi*, he was publicly known as a humble figure as well as close to the local people. This reputation makes him popular amongst residents in these districts. Another rising career journey was when he became the head of the Education Office of Blitar. He is very popular amongst teachers in the regency. He also has close connections with the Indonesian Teachers Union (PGRI) of Blitar.<sup>119</sup> Rijanto's close connection with people and teachers makes him popular in Blitar. Furthermore, before holding office in 2010, Rijanto was also active as the chairman of the Golkar Party youth wing, Indonesian Reform Youth Force (AMPI) of Blitar, the management of Blitar Soccer Association (PSBI), the chairman of the Local Scouts (*Pramuka*) and some sport and social organisations.

Herry Noegroho and Rijanto ran their campaign by promoting three main issues, namely welfare, religion and justice and equity. To achieve these ultimate targets, the pair

<sup>118</sup>In the early process of candidature, both Herry and Rijanto applied as regent candidates through PDI-P (*Radar Blitar*, 22 January 2010). However, the national office of PDI-P recommended Herry as its candidate. In an interview with a Democratic Party (PD)'s official of Blitar, Rijanto, then, was claimed as the candidate for deputy regent proposed by PD. It was a compromise between PDI-P and PD (Interview on 4 July 2012).

<sup>119</sup>Interview with an activist as well as a teacher on 9 July 2012.

detailed the issues into some primary programs, namely improvement in employment opportunities, enhancing community participation and empowerment, advancing the quality of public service, particularly in education and health, improving accessibility to economic resources, and achieving qualified and sustainable economic growth under the support of adequate infrastructure development. During the campaign, the pair presented some national political figures, such as Anas Urbaningrum (the Chairman of Democratic Party), Adjie Massaid (Democratic Party politician and celebrity), Pramono Anung (Secretary-general of PDI-P), Sirmaji (East Java PDI-P's figure and the chairman of PDI-P of East Java) and some other prominent figures. In order to market their name, this pair uses an abbreviation of "Hero Oke".

The pair of Arif Fuadi and Heri Romadhon marketed their name in the campaign as "Aroma". This pair was backed by National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate Party (PAN). Including Patriot Party, their supporters represented 30 per cent of seats in the local parliament. In addition to holding office as the deputy regent of Blitar, Arif is the chairman of PKB in Blitar. Like many other PKB activists, Arif is also a cadre of Indonesia's largest mass Islamic organisation *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU). He was an activist of the Association of Nahdlatul Ulama Youth (IPNU) and the former chairman of Ansor Youth Movement (GP Ansor), a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Amongst local residents, he is also known as an Islamic scholar (*ulama*) in the region. In the interviews, it was found that Arif is very popular amongst *santri*.<sup>120</sup> Arif is also a teacher at the NU affiliated school.<sup>121</sup> Some autonomous organisations under NU, such as *Banser*, a youth wing of NU and *Muslimat* NU (for housewives) stood beyond Arif.<sup>122</sup>

After obtaining recommendations from PKB of Blitar, Arif and PKB attempted to seek another figure to be a candidate for deputy regent. Three prominent names were identified by PKB, namely the Chairman of PAN of Blitar Heri Romadhon, the Chairman of Democratic Party of Blitar Edi Masna Nurochman and Kristi Bachtiar (the Secretary of Blitar's wife) (*Radar Blitar*, 24 June 2010 and 3 July 2010). After negotiating with several parties, Arif and PKB preferred Heri Romadhon to run in the race (*Radar Blitar*, 18 July 2010). Heri is the chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Blitar and a local legislator in the regency. Like Arif, he is also a local person. Heri was born and pursued his schooling in Blitar. In

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<sup>120</sup>*Santri* is person who takes as their main pattern way of life orientation, a set of beliefs, values and expressive symbols based primarily on Islamic doctrine. Its literal meaning is a pupil of the *pesantren*. Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>121</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>122</sup>Relating to the *Muslimat* NU's support, both Herry and Arif claim this. Interview with a woman activist as well as a teacher on 9 July 2012. See also <http://kstv.co.id/berita-kstv/muslimat-dukung-cabup-arif-fuadi.html> accessed on 8 October 2013.

addition to being a politician, Heri is a cadre of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia. Therefore, this pair was very confident to gain support from NU and Muhammadiyah's followers in the region.

Unlike Herry-Rijanto, their campaign mentioned agriculture and tourism as the bases to achieve a religious, competitive, democratic, prosperous and equitable society in Blitar. Nonetheless, Arif-Heri offered similar specific programs to achieve their vision comprising social programs, culture, religion, natural resources, infrastructure, economic development, health, education and family planning, sports, tourism and community and women's empowerment. In their campaign, this pair invited some national campaigners to attract voters, such as Muhaimin Iskandar (the Chairman of PKB and Manpower and Transmigration Minister), Hatta Rajasa (the Chairman of PAN and Coordinating Economic Minister), Riski Shadiq (PKB's national legislator) and Imam Nahrowi (the Chairman of PKB in East Java). These figures were invited to deliver political speeches at a mass meeting attended by the candidates' supporters.

Concerning the programs, academic panellists involved in the candidates' debate conducted by KPUD about one week prior to the Election Day remarked that both pairs presented less specific, less innovative and very normative programs. They argued that it was absurd to find breakthroughs in developing Blitar in the future (Radar Blitar, 4 November 2010). Both candidates' programs offered similar populist programs focused more on the economy, service delivery and equity for all.

**Figure 5.2** Campaign materials showing candidates wearing PSBI's jersey



Photos: by courtesy of Aroma and Hero Oke' campaign teams.

During the campaign, both pairs sought to attract PSBI's supporters. They were aware of PSBI's popularity amongst the youth in Blitar. They wore soccer clothing, such as PSBI jerseys and included a ball in their campaign materials to attract young voters. In the

interviews, it was found that Herry's position as PSBI's manager and chairman was advantageous for him. He was more popular than the challenger amongst supporters.<sup>123</sup>

KPU Blitar held the *pilkada* on 9 November 2010. Voters came to 1,976 polls throughout Blitar. As seen in table 5.6, the contest between the two incumbents was won by Herry Noegroho. Herry–Rijanto gained 59.7 percent and was superior in 21 of 22 sub-districts. Arif –Heri only gained victory in Kanigoro Sub-district or in Arif Fuadi's residence. In this sub-district, Arif-Heri obtained 22,397 votes and Herry-Rijanto gained 14,383 ballots. According to KPU Blitar's official recapitulation, there were 19,746 invalid votes. The majority of them did not conform to the voting rules, such as voting for two candidates in one ballot and marking candidates outside of the candidate's photo boxes. Moreover, the incumbent's victory was overshadowed by the huge number of absentees reaching 44.36 per cent or 441,362 voters. The Chairman of KPUD, Miftakhul Huda, said that some factors encouraged voters not to come to the polls, namely many voters have to work and go to school in the Municipality of Blitar; Many voters also work overseas (migrant workers); and many pilgrims departed to Mecca, which coincided with the *pilkada* schedule (Kompas, 16 November 2010). This argument seems to be irrelevant because the turnouts in the previous two elections were also poor. In the 2009 legislative and presidential elections, the number of absentees reached 40 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. Indeed, the government stipulated a national holiday for both legislative and presidential Election Days.

**Table 5.6** 2010 *Pilkada* Result in Blitar Regency

No.	Candidates	Ballots	Percentage
1	Arif Fuadi and Heri Romadhon (Aroma)	215,227	40.3
2	Herry Noegroho and Rijanto (Hero Oke)	318,856	59.7
	Total	534,083	100

Source: Blitar Election Commission, 2010.

The 2010 *pilkada* in Blitar Regency was not without protests and violations. On the Election Day, police officer found a violation at Kebon Duren Village, Ponggok Sub-district. The Police Chief of East Java Badrodin Haiti released that a police officer found a photo of Arif Fuadi and Heri Romadhon attached to official voting invitations in the village. Police, then gave this finding to the local election supervisory committee (*Tempo Interaktif*, 9 November 2010).<sup>124</sup> In addition to denying any wrong doing by Arif-Heri (Aroma)'s camp, they also found some potential violations that were harmful to its potential ballots (*Radar Blitar*, 11 November 2010). In the final ballot recapitulation, Aroma wrote five statements of

<sup>123</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 1 June 2012 and a supporter coordinator on 3 July 2012.

<sup>124</sup>Source: <http://www.tempco.co/read/news/2010/11/09/180290480/Kapolda-Temukan-Dugaan-Kecurangan-Pilkada-Blitar> accessed on 8 October 2013.

objection during the *pilkada*. It found bureaucracy and heads of villages' involvement benefiting Herry-Rijanto (Hero Oke); Aroma accused that *Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara* (KPPS/ Polling Station Working Committee)'s recruitment inclined to favour Hero Oke; There were some intimidations against voters, especially bureaucracy; There were abuses of position, authority, and state facilities in the campaign. The last is the accusation of massive money politics practices throughout Blitar committed by Hero Oke to influence voters.<sup>125</sup> These protests, indeed, did not influence the decision of KPUD to announce Herry-Rijanto as the winners.

### 5.3.2. *The Pilkada Dynamics in Probolinggo*

Before explaining further the political issues and incidents pertaining to the 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality, an explanation of political constellations in the municipality prior to the *pilkada* is needed. By referring to the result of the 2004 Legislative Election, it appears that Probolinggo is a home of multiparties. In the 2004 Legislative Election, the Probolinggo Municipality General Election Commission (KPUD) stipulated that 24 parties were eligible to run in the contest. Interestingly, in the 2004 Legislative Election conducted on 5 April 2004, all parties gained votes in this race.

As seen in table 5.7, National Awakening Party (PKB), a party with Islamic traditional followers, obtained most votes in the election with 26.82 per cent of votes (30,361 ballots). Then, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) was in the second rank with 23.5 per cent of votes (26,602 ballots). Of the 24 contestants, KPUD stipulated only 7 parties that could meet the electoral threshold to gain seats in the local legislature. As the champions in the race, PKB gained more seats than other contenders. PDI-P, Democratic Party (PD), United Development Party (PPP), Golkar Party (Golkar), National Mandate Party (PAN), and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) followed PKB, to install their representatives in the local parliament.

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<sup>125</sup>These objections are written in the minutes of ballot final calculations of the 2010 *Pilkada* in Blitar. I accessed this datum from the Blitar Election Commission.

**Table 5.7** 2004 Legislative Election Result in Probolinggo Municipality


<b>Parties</b>	<b>Ballots</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>%</b>
The Marhaenism Indonesian National Party (PNI Marhaenisme)	1,633	1.44	0	0
The Social Democratic Labour Party (PBSD)	154	0.14	0	0
The Crescent Star Party (PBB)	1,292	1.14	0	0
The Freedom Party	221	0.20	0	0
United Development Party (PPP)	14,753	13.03	4	13.33
The United Democratic Party of Nationalism (PPDK)	1,729	1.53	0	0
The New Indonesia Alliance Party (PPIB)	284	0.25	0	0
Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK)	1,056	0.93	0	0
Democratic Party (PD)	7,055	6.23	4	13.33
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)	1,744	1.54	0	0
Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (PPDI)	393	0.35	0	0
The <i>Nahdlatul</i> Community Party (PNU)	960	0.85	0	0
National Mandate Party (PAN)	3,896	3.44	2	6.67
The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB)	1,282	1.13	0	0
National Awakening Party (PKB)	30,361	26.82	9	30
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	2,627	2.32	1	3.33
The Reform Star Party (PBR)	2,190	1.93	0	0
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	26,602	23.50	7	23.33
Prosperous Peaceful Party (PDS)	1,209	1.07	0	0
Golkar Party (Golkar)	11,284	9.97	3	10
Pancasila Patriot Party (Patriot)	1,094	0.97	0	0
The Indonesian Unity Party (PSI)	444	0.39	0	0
Indonesian Unity Party (PPI)	376	0.33	0	0
The Pioneer Party	580	0.51	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>113,219<sup>126</sup></b>	<b>100</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: the 2008 Probolinggo Municipality in Figures. The percentages are processed by the researcher.

Although, more parties could compete in the 2004 Legislative Election, it does not mean that there are more diverse political ideologies in the society. In fact, these parties are polarised into two main ideological mainstreams, namely Islam and nationalist camps. Based on examination of each party's basic principles and the character of its followers, parties that can be grouped into the Islamic mainstream are the Crescent Star Party (PBB), PPP, the *Nahdlatul* Community Party (PNU), PAN, PKB, PKS, the Reform Star Party (PBR), and the Indonesian Unity Party (PSI). Meanwhile, PDI-P, Golkar, PD, and the rest are nationalist parties.

<sup>126</sup> This total number of votes is a correction on the total number displayed in the 2008 Probolinggo Municipality in Figures. The total number of votes displayed in the book is 116,624 votes.

**Chart 5.1** Nationalist and Islam-based Parties' Voters in the 2004 Legislative Election in Probolinggo Municipality (%)



Source: the 2008 Probolinggo Municipality in Figures. Data are processed by researcher.

Based on this grouping, the nationalist parties' voter share appears to be slightly higher than the Islamic parties in the municipality. As seen in chart 5.1, the 2004 Legislative Election demonstrates that the nationalist parties share 0.16 per cent of votes more than the Islamic parties. However, KPUD stipulated that four Islamic parties (PKB, PAN, PPP, PKS) met the local legislative electoral threshold and they gained more seats (16 of 30 seats or 53.33 per cent) than the three nationalist parties (PDI-P, PD, Golkar). The superior seats of Islamic parties, though they are inferior in vote share, indicate that they have voters or supporters spreading evenly in all constituencies.<sup>127</sup> However, these data imply that, although the majority of the population in Probolinggo are Muslim, they do not devote their votes to Islamic parties only. This short explanation of political constellations will be important to develop a better explanation in analysing the 2008 *pilkada* result and dynamics in the municipality.

The 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality took place on 30 October 2014. Six months prior to the *pilkada*, the competition amongst elites had begun. Documentation from the two influential local newspaper publications<sup>128</sup> finds that they commenced to cover news pertaining to the *pilkada* in May 2008. The first issue was related to the individual nominations in the *pilkada*. The verdict of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia number 5/PUU-V/2007 on 3 July 2007 on the review of the Law number 32/2004 on the Local Administration revised the stipulation on candidacy in the *pilkada*. The verdict stipulates that every eligible individual can run in the *pilkada*. Consequently, a pair of

<sup>127</sup> It is possible as the Law number 12/2003 on legislative election stipulates that KPU determines constituencies for all level of legislative election (article 46). Candidates or parties who gain the most votes in each constituency will gain the seat in the legislative body.

<sup>128</sup> Radar Bromo and Surabaya Post

candidates can run via non-political party nomination. Following the verdict, the government and the House of Representatives issued the Law number 12/2008 on the revision of the Law number 32/2004, on 28 April 2008. The Probolinggo Municipality General Election Commission (KPUD) implemented this new regulation by opening the opportunity for all eligible citizens to pursue individual candidacy. By referring to the law, KPUD assigned that every individual candidate should meet the minimum support of 6.5 per cent of the total population in the municipality (14,145 supporters).

There were four people who declared to run via individual nomination. The first was Jumanto, the former local legislator in the Regency of Probolinggo and the coordinator of the ex-prisoners' forum (Fosil Maharana) (*Radar Bromo*, 29 May 2008). The three other figures were Endi Fatony (activist), Resa Bayun Sarosa (local businessman and lawyer), and Zulkifli Chalik (local businessman). Except for Jumanto, these three people took the registration form to KPUD (*Radar Bromo*, 1 July 2008). By the end of individual candidate registration on 10 July 2008, Bayun Sarosa returned the form and supporting documents to KPUD. He carried 22,317 files of support (the letter of support and copy of ID card) to the KPUD. In contrast, Zulkifli withdrew his candidacy because he decided to pursue political party candidacy. Endi did not publicly state his reason to withdraw his individual candidacy. At the same time, Bayun declared his pair to accompany him in the individual candidacy. He urged Rr Retno Suryandari, a house wife and psychology graduate, to run in the *pilkada* (*Radar Bromo*, 11 July 2014). After verifying the files of support, KPUD declared that Bayun and Retno were eligible to run in the 2008 *pilkada*. KPUD verified that 17,605 of 22,317 files of support were valid and they met the minimum support stipulated by KPUD (14,145 supporters) (*Radar Bromo*, 29 July 2008).

The second issue was about the dualism of the National Awakening party (PKB) affecting the nomination of mayoral candidate from the party. As a party with dominant seats in the local legislature, this conflict emerged from internal political dynamics that were also indirectly advantageous for the incumbent. The origin of the PKB conflict started in 2008, when the chair of *Syuro* (the highest) council of PKB, Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur), dismissed the executive chair and the general secretary of PKB, Muhaimin Iskandar and Lukman Edy. The dismissal was reacted by Muhaimin and Edy. They filed a lawsuit to the State Court of South Jakarta. The court granted the lawsuit and stipulated that the dismissal was contrary to the PKB's constitution.<sup>129</sup> At the local level, this conflict created two camps of PKB, namely the Gus Dur Camp and the Muhaimin Camp. Both camps were also established in the Municipality of Probolinggo, namely PKB under Yusuf Zainal Qubro as

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<sup>129</sup> Source: <http://m.suaramerdeka.com/index.php/read/cetak/2008/06/13/17621> accessed on 10 February 2014.



the chairman (the PKB affiliates of Gus Dur) and PKB under Hj. Muzayyanah and As'ad Anshari as the chairwoman and secretary (the PKB affiliates to Muhaimin). Both camps undertook similar political movements in the prospective mayoral candidacy. PKB under Yusuf had conducted the recruitment of the mayor and deputy mayor candidates from 13 to 20 June 2008. PKB under Hj. Muzayyanah had undertaken similar recruitment from 24 to 27 June 2008 (*Surabaya Post*, 27 June 2008). PKB under Yusuf declared Zulkifli Chalik and Yusuf Zainal Qubro as the candidates for mayor and deputy mayor (*Radar Bromo*, 29 July 2008). Meanwhile, PKB under Hj. Muzayyanah proposed the incumbent, Buchori, and As'ad Anshari as the pair of candidates (*Radar Bromo*, 15 July 2008).

The description of the internal conflict amongst PKB's elites is important as the municipality is one of the bases of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU)'s followers (*nahdliyin*) and they are loyal supporters as well as voters for PKB. In order to gain support from *nahdliyin*, the declaration of Zulkifli Chalik and Yusuf Zainal Qubro on 16 July 2008 as the pair of candidates invited more than ten thousand *nahdliyin* as well as PKB supporters in the municipality. This declaration was interpreted as a political manoeuvre of PKB under Yusuf to gain legitimation of the Zulkifli-Yusuf candidacy from *nahdliyin* in the municipality (*Radar Bromo*, 18 July 2008). Finally, KPUD stipulated Zulkifli Chalik and Yusuf Zainal Qubro as the eligible pair of candidates nominated by PKB on 20 September 2008. This pair was also proposed by the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB) (*Radar Bromo*, 21 September 2008). The next political manoeuvre to disturb the nomination of Zulkifli-Yusuf was performed by the supporters of PKB affiliated to Gus Dur, since the PKB of Probolinggo Municipality was affiliated with Muhaimin. In an interview, the deputy of *syuro* council of the *Nahdlatul Ulama* of Probolinggo Municipality remarked that NU does not consider the party nominating a candidate, but the figure of the candidate (*Radar Bromo*, 5 August 2008). This statement implied NU's support for the incumbent. It was proved when the deputy accompanied Lily Wahid, the sister of Gus Dur as well as the deputy of *syuro* council of PKB, to meet the incumbent. In this meeting, Lily Wahid stated openly her support for the incumbent. She argued that Buchori was an NU cadre and he had succeeded in developing the Municipality. Lily also committed to gain support from religious leaders and to attend Buchori's campaign on 23 October 2008. This manoeuvre was criticised by the chairman of PKB of Probolinggo Municipality, Abdullah Zabut, that PKB has officially nominated Zulkifli and Yusuf as the pair of candidates in the 2008 *Pilkada* (*Radar Bromo*, 17 September 2008; *Surabaya Post*, 17 September 2008).

**Figure 5.3** Three Pairs of Candidates in the 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality



Source: isa (*Surabaya Post*, 2008)

The incumbent also gained support from non-government organisations (NGOs). The concern of the city NGOs alliance (ALPETA)<sup>130</sup> led to a protest to the commander of 0820 Military District of Probolinggo, Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Winariyanto Sawabi on 1 June 2008, as some of the army members were not neutral. Based on ALPETA's investigation, they found three incidents of intimidation and mobilisation committed by the members of 0820 Military District of Probolinggo in order to support one of the candidates.<sup>131</sup> ALPETA's members pressed the commander to be impartial in the *pilkada* as stipulated in the law number 34/2004 and the law number 15/2008 related to the neutrality of the Indonesian National Army (TNI). ALPETA also asked the commander to investigate the involvement of his members in supporting one of the candidates (*Radar Bromo*, 12 June 2008). This case was covered by local and regional mass media and it received attention from the Commander of Military Area V Brawijaya. After conducting an investigation, the commander removed Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Winariyanto from his post. The commander considered that Winariyanto was not able to control his members from being involved in the political practices or the *pilkada*. Also, Winariyanto was judged to have violated the Army's code of conduct when he did not report to his commander about the involvement of his members in the *pilkada* (*Radar Bromo*, 10 July 2008).<sup>132</sup>

Prior to the 2008 *pilkada*, the incumbent was reported by the People's Information Centre (LIRA), a national NGO on transparency and corruption, to the East Java Policy Department (*Polda Jatim*) on 25 June 2008. LIRA revealed the corruption allegation committed by the incumbent and his staff, worth Rp 203.3 billion (AUD 20.32 million),

<sup>130</sup> The members of ALPETA are 12 local NGOs.

<sup>131</sup> In the interview, a local academic remarked that these army members committed their acts in order to support the incumbent's rival.

<sup>132</sup> See also <http://www.antaraneews.com/print/108434/> accessed on 10 February 2014.

based on the audit result of the Supreme Audit Agency (LHP BPK) in 2006.<sup>133</sup> The incumbent's supporters responded reactively to this report and they reported the chairman of LIRA Probolinggo to the Probolinggo Municipality Police Department (*Polresta Probolinggo*). The supporters accused that chairman of committing defamation by publishing the incumbent's corruption allegation (*Radar Bromo*, 2 July 2008). Another corruption allegation was also covered by local newspapers prior to the 2008 *pilkada*. The Probolinggo Prosecutor's Office (*kejari*) investigated the misappropriation of the 2006/2007 local budget (APBD). *Kejari* had interviewed the local government secretary, Bandyk Soetrisno, the assistant to the local government secretary for government and law affairs, Agus Subagiono, the former the head of general affairs division, Imam Suwoko, and the head of the politics and public security office, Muchsin, from 30 June to 1 July 2008. Moreover, *Kejari* interviewed three local businessmen alleged to be involved in the local budget misappropriation (*Radar Bromo*, 2 July 2008). On 7 July 2008, *Kejari* interviewed also three other local government officials pertaining to the allegation of local budget misappropriation 2004-2007, based on the audit result of the Supreme Audit Agency (LHP BPK) 2004-2007 (*Radar Bromo*, 8 July 2008). The last publication relating to these cases was published on 11 July 2008, reporting the interview of five contractors who implemented the local government's projects. They were instructed to return an amount of the local budget alleged to be misappropriated, based on the audit result of the Supreme Audit Agency (LHP BPK) 2007 (*Radar Bromo*, 11 July 2008). Local elites assumed that the publication of corruption allegations related to the incumbent was a political manoeuvre to destroy his image. Then, it is logical that the incumbent and PDI-P's supporters responded reactively to this issue.

The next issue is about the dynamics of candidacy. Relating to the *pilkada*, the categorisation of parties based on their ideological mainstreams did not impede the coalitions amongst them. The Islamic and nationalist parties allied to nominate a pair of candidates. In addition to the similarity of interests, the coalition could occur, since there is a principal difference in the object of preference in voting between the *pilkada* and the legislative election. In the *pilkada*, a voter devotes more consideration to the pair of candidates, particularly the candidate for mayor or regent or governor, rather than the political parties nominating them. Nonetheless, in legislative election, voters do not only consider the candidates but also the parties nominating them.

Indonesia has implemented a legislative election system called the proportional system with open candidate lists since 2004, through the stipulation of the Law number 12/2003 on

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<sup>133</sup> Source: <http://www.deliknews.com/2012/10/17/kronologis-perseteraan-presiden-lira-dengan-walikota-probolinggo/> accessed on 10 February 2014.

Legislative Election. Article 82 clause 2 stipulates that legislative election ballots contain the number and logo of political parties participating in elections and candidates for each constituency. In this system, a voter votes for one of the logos of political parties and votes for one candidate under the logo of the political party in the ballot (article 84 clause 1). In addition, due to legislative election contests having more candidates than the *pilkada*, voters also give their attention to political parties. Lastly, legislative elections asserting the role of political parties with certain ideologies create a party attachment amongst voters. They identify with one of the parties sharing a similar ideology to them. In contrast, the *pilkada* asserts more the figures of the candidates than political parties proposing them. Voters vote for a candidate by identifying the figure of the candidate who shares similar ideas and personality or the candidate who attracts voters' sympathy.

These differences had been considered by candidates and political parties who ran in the 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality. PDI-P conducted a special meeting on 21 July 2008 attended by PDI-P's elites in the municipality to decide the candidate of deputy mayor to accompany Buchori in the *pilkada*. The meeting was run in a state of tension, as the elites proposed two potential candidates, namely Bandyk Soetrisno (the local government secretary) and Sri Wahyuningsih (the chairwoman of the Democratic Party of Probolinggo Municipality). The PDI-P of Probolinggo Municipality, finally, preferred Bandyk Soetrisno to accompany the incumbent in the *pilkada*. Bandyk was judged to have better commitment than Sri. As well, Bandyk had demonstrated his good cooperation with the incumbent as a local government secretary (*Radar Bromo*, 23 July 2008). In addition to the post of local government secretary, Bandyk was a Golkar Party functionary in the municipality. Golkar proposed Bandyk to PDI-P to accompany the incumbent as the candidate for deputy mayor in the *pilkada* (*Radar Bromo*, 22 July 2008). Although Buchori and Bandyk were nominated by the two nationalist parties (PDI-P and Golkar), 12 other parties including Islamic based parties supported their candidacy. As seen in table 5.8, the incumbent was nominated by the alliance of both the nationalist and Islamic based parties. Amongst 14 parties who supported the incumbent, three of them were Islamic based parties, namely PPP, PKS, and PBR. The coalition of parties supporting the incumbent was declared officially in the *Kedopok* Stadium on 7 August 2008. In addition to these parties, 5 other parties that would run in the 2009 Legislative Election attended and supported Buchori-Bandyk in their declaration, namely National *Ulama* Awakening Party (PKNU), the United Region Party (PPD), Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (PPDI), the Freedom Party (Partai Merdeka), and the Republika Nusantara (RepublikaN) Party (*Radar Bromo*, 8 August 2008).

**Table 5.8** Candidates and Supporting Parties in the 2008 *Pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality

Parties	Votes (2004)	Seats
<b>Bayun Sarosa - Rr. Retno Suryandari (BR)</b>		
Supports from 5 sub-districts	17,605 supporters	0
<b>M. Buchori - Bandyk Soetrisno (BUDY PAS)</b>		
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	26,602	7
Democratic Party (PD)	7,055	4
United Development Party (PPP)	14,753	4
Golkar Party (Golkar)	11,284	3
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	2,627	1
Patriot Party (Patriot)	11,284	0
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)	1,744	0
The Pioneer Party	580	0
PNI Marhaenisme	1,633	0
The Reform Star Party (PBR)	2,190	0
Prosperous Peaceful Party (PDS)	1,209	0
The United Democratic Party of Nationalism (PPDK)	1,729	0
Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK)	1,056	0
The Social Democratic Labour Party (PPSD)	154	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>73,710 (65.1%)</b>	<b>19 (63.3%)</b>
<b>Zulkifli Chalik – Yusuf Zainal Qubro (KIBAR)</b>		
National Awakening Party (PKB)	30,361	9
National Mandate Party (PAN)	3,896	2
The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB)	1,282	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>35,539 (31.39%)</b>	<b>11 (36.7%)</b>

Source: the 2008 Probolinggo Municipality in Figures. Data are processed by researcher; Kuswandoro, 2009, p. 112; *Radar Bromo*, 8 August 2008.

Meanwhile, although the PKPB, supporting Zulkifli and Yusuf, is a nationalist party, indeed, this pair represents more the coalition of Islam-based parties. PKB is backed up by NU's followers and PAN is backed up by Muhammadiyah's followers. Therefore, Buchori-Bandyk and Zulkifli-Yusuf struggled to gain the sympathy of Islam-based voters in the municipality.

Concerning the profile of each candidate, it generally shows a close connection between candidates' personal background and their nomination. The first pair is Resa Bayun Sarosa and Rr Retno Suryandari (BR). They pursued individual candidacy in the *pilkada* as stipulated by the Law number 12/2008. Bayun Sarosa is a local person who was born and lived in the Municipality of Probolinggo. He comes from a military and Islamic family background with high discipline and socialisation during his childhood. When Bayun nominated in the 2008 *pilkada*, he was 55 years old and working as a lawyer and businessman. He holds a master's degree in Law. Bayun also ran a restaurant in the municipality named Reno Café and Resto and was a stakeholder in Siola Limited in Surabaya. With his law study background, Bayun was nominated as the Commissioner of the

Judicial Commission (KY) and a Supreme Court (MA) judge in 2007. During the candidacy period, he declared that his total wealth was Rp 1.8 billion (AUD 180,000). In his campaign, Bayun promised to improve the public service and the quality of civil servants. He would also cancel all related school fees and evaluate government charitable programs. (*Radar Bromo*, 24 October 2008).

When Bayun decided to run in the *pilkada* via individual candidacy, he selected one of the 11 candidates to accompany him as the candidate for deputy mayor. Finally, he urged a female, Rr Retno Suryandari, to run in the race. Bayun considered that Retno met three criteria as his deputy, namely good moral integrity, well-educated, with a psychology background, and an independent or non-political party background (*Radar Bromo*, 11 July 2008). Retno is a Javanese. She was born and spent her teenage years in Manokwari, Papua Province. Her father is the former Regent of Manokwari in Papua Province. She finished her senior high school in Manokwari and pursued her undergraduate study in banking and psychology in Surabaya, East Java. Although she has a good educational background, Retno prefers to be a housewife. Her husband is a pulmonary specialist in the municipality. During the candidacy period, Retno declared that her family wealth was Rp 2.2 billion (AUD 220,000). Retno was motivated to run in the *pilkada* since she observed the decline of economic conditions in the municipality and in the country has made people complain about the difficulties to meet daily basic needs. Women are increasingly affected by this situation (*Radar Bromo*, 24 October 2008).

The second pair was M. Buchori and Bandyk Soetrisno (BUDY PAS). Buchori was the incumbent in the 2008 *pilkada*. He is a local person with Madurese ethnic background. He comes from a low profile as well as poor family background. His father was an *abang becak* (pedicab driver) and his mother was a maid and a housewife. When pursuing his senior vocational schooling (STM) in the municipality, Buchori assisted his father, to work for his family. He has worked as an *abang becak*, construction labourer, and a mortician for Chinese people in the municipality. After graduating his vocational school, he was accepted to work in an international company, the Kutai Timber Indonesia limited (PT KTI), in 1975. Moreover, Buchori ran some businesses in construction materials supply. He decided to resign from KTI in 2000, with the last position as a manager assistant. Buchori started his political career when he joined the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) as the coordinator at Mangunharjo village in 1981. He then became the chairman of PDI under Megawati Soekarnoputri (PDI Pro-Mega) in Probolinggo Municipality in 1996. Until 1999, Buchori had to live in a risky political situation as the New Order regime did not recognise the existence of PDI Pro-Mega. In the early Reform Era, he chaired the PDI-P of Probolinggo Municipality

chapter till 2005. In the 1999 Legislative Election, Buchori was elected as a provincial legislator in East Java. In addition to being a party activist, Buchori is affiliated to *Nahdlatul Ulama*. He was one of the NU's functionaries in Probolinggo Municipality (2002-2005).

Buchori had been installed in his first term of mayoral office from 2003 to 2008. Under his leadership, the Municipality of Probolinggo frequently obtained awards in bureaucracy reform, environment, city cleanliness, public service, and local economic development. During his mayoral post, Buchori also ran two family businesses, namely the Bromo View Hotel and CV Lestari. Buchori declared his total wealth to be worth Rp 7.8 billion (AUD 780,000) prior to running for the second term in office. In his campaign, Buchori promised to prioritise the poor in local development through the alleviation of unemployment and poverty. In the implementation, he would discharge education and health fees for the poor. Also, he would prioritise infrastructure development in the southern area of the municipality in order to boost new business opportunities (*Radar Bromo*, 23 October 2008 and 3 November 2008).<sup>134</sup>

In the 2008 *pilkada*, PDI-P urged Bandyk Soetrisno as the candidate for deputy mayor to accompany Buchori. Bandyk was the local government secretary under Buchori's administration. Bandyk is not a local person. He was born in Sidoarjo, East Java. He pursued his primary schooling until senior high school in the same district. His career background was as a civil servant. He began to serve the state in 1981 as a staff member in the local development and planning agency in the Probolinggo Municipality. When the incumbent occupied his post in the first term, he proposed and appointed Bandyk as the local government secretary. Moreover, Bandyk ran a business in construction managed by his wife, named CV Ria Pembangunan. In his official wealth report prior to the *pilkada*, Bandyk declared that he has cash worth Rp 1 billion (AUD 100,000), 5 houses, and three cars (*Radar Bromo*, 23 October 2008).

The last pair was Zulkifli Chalik and Yusuf Zainal Qubro. Prior to running in the 2008 *pilkada*, Zulkifli had no experience in the political arena. He was a successful businessman and a social activist. Zulkifli comes from a family with a business background. His parent was a successful trader in Probolinggo. Zulkifli started to run his own business in 1974 when he was in the fourth semester of his undergraduate study. He first ran his business in supplying overseas musical instruments for some band groups in Jakarta. Three years later, he returned back to the municipality to begin his other businesses in construction and army

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<sup>134</sup> It also refers to [http://probolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=132](http://probolinggokota.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=132) accessed on 4 February 2014.

uniform supply. Until his candidacy in the 2008 *pilkada*, Zulkifli ran six companies in plantations, logging, and fuel stations, with 3,000 employees. As a social activist, Zulkifli chaired the Al Kubro Islamic Study Centre, the advisory board of the Communication Forum for Children of Retired Police and Military Officers (GM FKPPi) and the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Kadin*), and was the chairman of the Indonesian Employers Association (Apindo) in Probolinggo. During his campaign, Zulkifli promised to improve the quality of health and education services and to reduce unemployment by improving investment in the municipality. In his official report, Zulkifli declared that his total wealth was worth RP 13.7 billion (AUD 1.37 million) with three cars and one house (*Radar Bromo*, 28 May 2008 and 25 October 2008).

PKB paired Zulkifli with Yusuf Zainal Qubro to run in the *pilkada*. Yusuf is a local person coming from an NU and traditional Islamic family background. He has had many experiences as an activist in some NU affiliated organisations. He was the chairman of NU Students Association (IPNU) in Probolinggo and an activist in the Indonesian Muslim Students Movement (PMII). He began to be involved in politics when PKB was established in 1998. In the 2004 Legislative Election, people elected Yusuf as a local legislator. Then, he was elected as the chairman of PKB of the Probolinggo Municipality chapter in 2005 (*Radar Bromo*, 25 October 2008).

After all candidates officially registered to the KPUD on 7 August 2008, the political situation in the municipality began to lead to increasing tension, particularly between the two dominant camps, namely BUDY (Buchori-Bandyk) and KIBAR (Zulkifli-Yusuf). The chairman of KIBAR's campaign team, Abdullah Zabut, reported vandalism on KIBAR's socialisation attributes to the Probolinggo Municipality Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) and the Probolinggo Municipality Police Office (*Polresta*) on 5 September 2008. He reported that more than 750 billboards and banners were damaged. Without mentioning their identity, Zabut remarked that the executants of these vandalisms were affiliated to the other candidates' team (*Radar Bromo*, 6 September 2008; *Surabaya Post*, 6 September 2008). Eight days later, Zabut and his team reported vandalism to *panwaslu*. Also, he claimed that more than 1,000 billboards and banners were damaged and missing. He complained that these vandalisms have provoked KIBAR's supporters at the grassroots level to do similar actions (*Radar Bromo*, 14 September 2008). The indication of increasing tension seemed to be confirmed when BUDY's campaign team reported similar vandalism to *panwaslu* on 17 September 2008. Indi Januarto, the secretary of BUDY's campaign team, claimed that many of BUDY's outdoor socialisation media were damaged and missing; even, on one of the banners was written "BUDY is communist" (*Radar Bromo*, 18 September 2008). Beyond a



high tension between these two dominant camps, indeed, the actions were part of political manoeuvres in order to gain the attention of people.

Meanwhile, in order to boost their popularity, each pair of candidates promoted their profile in local influential newspapers. The frequency of advertisements displaying each candidate in *Radar Bromo* prior to the *pilkada* (from May to October 2008) showed BR was the candidate promoting its profile least in the local newspaper. BR displayed its advertisement only three times prior to the *pilkada*. Buchori was advantaged by his position as an incumbent. The local government displayed 14 advertorials in *Radar Bromo* from May to October 2008. In these advertorials, the government presented its programs and best practices by narrating the role of the incumbent and displaying his pictures. Moreover, the incumbent had displayed nine individual advertisements without mentioning his position as the mayor. Lastly, KIBAR had displayed seven advertorials promoting the pair prior to and during the campaign period.

**Figure 5.4** Candidates' Advertisements and Advertorials in *Radar Bromo*



Source: Sobari (2014); the figures are taken from *Radar Bromo* 31 July 2008, 28 October 2008; 20 October 2008 edition.

The allegation of money politics showed another tension between the BUDY and KIBAR camps.<sup>135</sup> Four days prior to the Election Day, KIBAR camp reported to the Panwaslu that it found *pilkada* violations committed by BUDY camp, namely the distribution of free rice packages to potential voters in the village of Mangunharjo, Kebonsari Kulon, Pohsangit, and Kademangan on 26 October 2008. Each package contained 5 kg of rice with BUDY's sticker on the package (*Radar Bromo*, 27 October 2008; *Surabaya Post*, 27 October 2008). One day later, KIBAR's supporters pushed Panwaslu to act impartially and to process the violations relating to money politics committed by BUDY camp. The supporters

<sup>135</sup> Relating to money politics practices, *panwaslu* refers to the Law number 32/2004 on Local Administration. Article 117 clauses 2 stipulates that every individual can be categorised to commit a crime on the *pilkada*, when he or she intentionally gives or promises money or other materials to influence someone to not vote, or to vote for a particular candidate pair, or to make his or her ballot become invalid.

demonstrated at the Panwaslu's office on 27 October morning. In the afternoon, BUDY's supporters also came to the Panwaslu's office to report campaign violations committed by KIBAR's team members. BUDY's supporters also reported that they caught a money politics offender in the Sub-district of Wonoasih. The executant was proved to have disbursed Rp 50 thousand (AUD 5) to each person as a reward to vote for KIBAR (Radar Bromo, 28 October 2008). Indeed, these two demonstrations were also part of the political manoeuvres of both camps to attract people's attention. Furthermore, in the Election Day on 30 October 2008, Panwaslu reported that there were five reports of money politics practices committed in the villages of Kedunggaleng, Jrebeng Lor, Kareng Lor, Sukoharjo and Kanigaran. Another violation was the action of three people deterring eight students of Riyadlus Sholihin Islamic Boarding School from voting. The three people, suspected as the supporters of one of the contestants, seized voting cards and voting invitations from one of the students. Panwaslu then followed up these violations by reporting them to the polresta (Radar Bromo, 31 October 2008).

**Figure 5.5** KIBAR and BUDY's Supporters Protested to *Panwaslu*



Source: Sobari (2014); the figure is taken from *Radar Bromo* 28 October 2008 edition

Although six violations were officially reported on the Election Day on Thursday, 30 October 2008, nevertheless, these incidents did not impede people from voting. Every candidate's team performed quick counts to rapidly work out the *pilkada* result. Based on quick counts performed by BR, BUDY, and KIBAR, BUDY was predicted to gain the most votes by 71.48 per cent - 72.84 per cent. KIBAR and BR were predicted to gain 23.36 per cent - 25.35 per cent and 3.04 - 3.79 per cent of votes respectively. BUDY claimed the incumbent's victory in the afternoon. Realising the huge ballot gap between BUDY and the

two contenders, Zulkifli admitted defeat in his press release in the evening. Bayun delivered a different response, that he had not been defeated yet. He waited for the official count performed by KPUD (*Radar Bromo*, 31 October 2008).

**Table 5.9** 2008 *Pilkada* Result in Probolinggo Municipality

No.	Candidates	Ballots	Percentage
1	Bayun Sarosa - Rr. Retno Suryandari (BR)	3,728	3.03
2	M. Buchori - Bandyk Soetrisno (BUDY PAS)	89,212	72.55
3	Zulkifli Chalik – Yusuf Zainal Qubro (KIBAR)	30,023	24.42
	Total	122,963	100

Source: Probolinggo Municipality General Election Commission, 2008.

KPUD conducted the official count on 1 November 2008. As seen in Table 5.9, the incumbent officially gained the victory by 72.55 per cent of votes. In addition to showing the incumbent's landslide triumph, the 2008 *pilkada* succeeded in attracting voters to vote. In the final count, KPUD officially stated that the number of absentees reached only 19.38 per cent (30,304 absentees). It was categorised as one of the *pilkada* with a high turnout in East Java (*Radar Bromo*, 2 November 2008).

#### 5.4. The Incumbents' Populist Politics

The practices of populism commonly create a close connection across the populist politics of a leader and three factors, namely, social roots or targeted population, socioeconomic background conditions and substantive policies, especially expansionary economic programs and generous distributive actions. Then, in implementing populism, a leader or government commonly pursues some expansive generous distributive policies, such as cash transfers, cheap fuel prices, and free public services addressed to targeted populations. As a political strategy, populism is depicted as a personalistic leader who governs under the massive support of the people by implementing flexible and opportunistic programs to maintain his or her survival politically (Weyland, 2001, p.5).

Populism is also assumed to have a close connection to incumbency. A person who is already in power has an adequate access to various resources attached to his or her position. In Indonesia, the close connection between populism and incumbency is widely believed to help an incumbent to maintain office. This section of the chapter focuses its discussion on the previous period prior to the 2010 *pilkada* in Blitar Regency and the 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality. It mainly examines some retrospective prominent policies pursued

by Herry Noegroho during his first period in office (2005-2010) in Blitar and M. Buchori during his first period in office (2003-2008) in Probolinggo, which are popular amongst the majority of residents, local non-government stakeholders<sup>136</sup> and local government officers.

#### 5.4.1. Herry's Populist Politics

In Blitar, Herry implemented several policies delivering direct benefits to local people during his first term in the office. Based on interviews with non-government participants, the first populist policy implemented in 2006 was death benefits. Local government gives financial aid to support residents' funeral expenses. In the first year of its implementation, this aid was addressed only to the poor. Since 2007, this policy has been addressed to all eligible residents, not only the poor. The government allocated Rp 1.2 billion (AUD 120,000) to cover all benefits in 2007 (*Tempo Interaktif*, 14 August 2007).<sup>137</sup> Another most populist policy is infrastructure development, especially roads and bridges. In front of the local legislators during his campaign, Herry claimed that under his leadership, the government succeeded in expanding 400 km of macadamised pavement. The 457 km of 1,800 km of pavement were covered by a *hotmix* (concrete asphalt) layer. Due to this initiative, Herry gained a designation amongst local journalists and newspapers as *Bupati Hotmix* (the *hotmix* regent).<sup>138</sup> In more detail, the expansion of roads during Herry's first term in the office was very massive. As seen in chart 5.2, for three categories of road (asphalt, gravel, and dirt roads), the government succeeded in expanding 3,128.4 km of new roads. The majority of them are asphalt and dirt roads. In addition, Herry claimed that under his leadership the government had developed 16 new bridges, from 2006 to 2010.<sup>139</sup>

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
<sup>136</sup>They are local civil society organisation activists, local journalists, and local academics.

<sup>137</sup>Source: <http://tempo.co.id/hg/nusa/jawamadura/2007/08/14/brk,20070814-105519,id.html> accessed on 10 October 2013.

<sup>138</sup>Interview with two local journalists on 11 June 2012 and two businessmen in construction on 26 June 2012 and on 9 July 2012.

<sup>139</sup>See the Regent's Successful Points 2006-2010. Source: <http://www.blitarkab.go.id/?p=1464> accessed on 10 October 2013.

**Chart 5.2** Length of Regency Roads in 2005 and 2010<sup>140</sup>



Source: Blitar Regency in Figures, the Central Statistics Agency of Blitar, 2006; 2011.

A local government staff member said that the local development focus on infrastructure corresponded with the residents' demands. In the annual regency development planning meeting (*musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan daerah, Musrenbang*) held by the government, residents proposed infrastructure development as the highest priority. This may reach 90 per cent of total proposals. They rarely propose education, health or other long term sustainable development programs. In order to meet this high demand, Herry had launched a program so-called *aspal mandiri* (sharing asphalt road program) from 2006 to 2009. The government disbursed a grant (for providing asphalt, road engineers, and road vehicles) for villages proposing the projects to construct village roads. The government allocated of Rp 500 million (AUD 50,000) a year within this period. Meanwhile, the residents should share the cost of the rest of the material and workers needed.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>140</sup>There are three categories of roads in Indonesia, namely state, provincial, and regency roads. Every layer of government has its own responsibility to develop and maintain the roads as well as the source of the budget.

<sup>141</sup>Interview on 15 June 2012.

**Figure 5.6** Village Road and the Incumbent's Visit to a Village



The Incumbent's attendance (middle) in the Harvest Festival in Kerjo Village in 2009

Photos: Sobari (2012)

Another popular and large scale policy is the free health service program initiated in 2006 or shortly after he took office in his first term. The government covered all residents' expenses for examinations and treatments (outpatient) in all Community Health Centres (*puskesmas*). For the poor, the government claimed that it had succeeded in covering the expense of hospitalisation for 244,669 people and provided free regional health insurance (*jamkesda*) for 12,449 people from 2006 to 2010.

Like many other regions, the government conducted an annual cheap market program; especially prior to Ramadan and *idul fitri*. The government sells groceries for a maximum of half the market price. These cheap price grocery packages are disbursed amongst the poor. Approaching the 2010 *pilkada*, the incumbent also pursued other actions to gain support from the people. One of the crucial agreements was the informal "MoU" between Herry and the Organization of Pre-school Education Facilities (Gabungan Organisasi Penyelenggara Taman Kanak-Kanak Indonesia, GOPTKI) of Blitar Regency. The organisation committed to support the incumbent to run in the 2010 *pilkada* and Herry would support GOPTKI through an annual grant of Rp 300 million (AUD 30,000) within 5 years (2011-2015). This grant was intended to support operational costs of 984 kindergartens throughout the regency.<sup>142</sup> Examination of the 2011 Blitar Local Budget (APBD) finds this MoU was implemented. The regency allocated Rp 300 million (AUD 30,000) with account code 5.1.00.00.4.05.74 of Grant Expenditures to GOPTKI of Blitar Regency.

Another action was the provision of financial incentives for the village apparatus,<sup>143</sup> especially for the heads of hamlets (*kamituwo*), throughout Blitar. Herry conveyed his commitment when he met with the heads of hamlets in Wlingi Sub-district on 6 October 2010.

<sup>142</sup>Interview with an education activist on 9 July 2012; a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>143</sup>Interview with a local academic on 4 July 2012.

In this meeting, the *kamituwo* committed to support Herry and his running mate Rijanto in the 2010 *pilkada*. Meanwhile, the chairman of PDI-P of Blitar, Marhaenis Urip Widodo, admitted that the *kamituwo*'s support is very strategic, to improve Herry's popularity amongst residents. *Kamituwo* is capable of influencing villagers and it is advantageous for supporting the pair.<sup>144</sup> The 2011 Blitar's APBD was examined to see the realisation of this commitment and the allocation was found, with account code 5.1.00.00.7.03.03 for financial aid for additional income for the villages' apparatus of Rp 15,464,689,400 (AUD 1,546,468.94).

Approaching the *pilkada* in 2010, Herry made a populist policy benefiting bureaucracies. Herry disbursed rice benefits for civil servants covering three fiscal years (2008-2010). This was not a total amount of benefits but an additional benefit in order to implement the national government's policy of increasing rice benefits for civil servants annually. Every civil servant received Rp 500 thousand (AUD 50) on average and local government spent Rp 11 billion (AUD 1.1 million) to cover benefits for all civil servants in Blitar. This policy was responded to happily by civil servants, especially teachers, who may reach 70 per cent of the total civil servants in the regency.<sup>145</sup>

The incumbent was criticised by a local NGO when local government provided 220 service motorcycles for all village heads throughout Blitar in early December 2009. Yunandri, the Community Construction Service of Blitar (*Masyarakat Jasa Konstruksi Blitar*)'s chairman, suspected that this policy was compensation for village heads to support the incumbent in the upcoming *pilkada*. He argued that this is an unnecessary policy as village heads have been provided previously with service motorcycles in 2003. At the same time, Harpiyanto Nugroho, the head of the general and equipment division of Blitar Regency, said that the procurement of service motorcycles for village heads cost Rp 4.114 billion (AUD 411,400). The budget was allocated in the 2009 revised local budget for the apparatus equipment post. Further, local government also had a plan to provide other service motorcycles for village apparatuses in 2010.<sup>146</sup> This criticism is reasonable as the village heads and apparatuses have a respected position amongst villagers. Village heads and village apparatuses can convince villagers in deciding their vote. Indeed, villagers usually ask the village apparatus who they should vote for.<sup>147</sup>

In addition to gaining credit for local government policies, Herry also gained recognition through the implementation of national and provincial government programs in

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<sup>144</sup>Source: <http://www.pdiperjuangan-jatim.org/v03/index.php?mod=berita&id=3667> accessed on 12 October 2013.

<sup>145</sup>Interview with a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>146</sup>Source: <http://surabaya.tribunnews.com/2009/12/21/motor-untuk-kades-politis-dikaitkan-suksesi-pilkada> accessed on 1 November 2013.

<sup>147</sup>Interview with a village head on 4 July 2012; a secretary of village on 4 July 2012.



the regency. People, particularly villagers, ignore the initiative and source of budget of the programs. They only know about the implementation and the tangible results of the programs. The central government's National Program for People Empowerment (PNPM) is a large scale program widely implemented throughout the regency. People participate in the programs that are mainly focused on infrastructure and the micro credits sector at the village level. This program was firstly implemented in Blitar Regency in 2007 and was totally funded by the national government. In the following years, local government also shared the funding as well as replicating the program in the non-targeted villages. Till July 2013, local government published that PNPM has succeeded in building 486 units of asphalt road, 19 units of clean water facilities, 145 units of private schools, 48 units of health buildings, and a micro credit surplus of Rp 1 billion (AUD 100,000).<sup>148</sup> As an incumbent, Herry was clever at gain credit from PNPM prior to the *pilkada*. He visited villages and symbolically inaugurated all PNPM projects in the regency.<sup>149</sup> The provincial government's program supported the incumbent prior to the *pilkada* through the establishment as well as grant disbursement to women's cooperatives. This program is directly implemented at the community level.<sup>150</sup> Prior to the *pilkada* the provincial government disbursed a grant of Rp 3.2 billion (AUD 320,000) to women's cooperatives in Blitar. Up to 2010, there were 233 cooperatives in 233 villages which were included in the program.<sup>151</sup>

As seen in table 5.10, under Herry's leadership, Blitar achieved a good performance in six development macro indicators within five years. In the health sector, Blitar succeeded in reducing the infant mortality rate from 27.51 per 1000 live births in 2006 to 24.60 in 2010. In addition, these IMR indexes are even better than the average index of other regencies and municipalities in East Java. Likewise, Blitar's inhabitants have a better life expectancy index compared to average index of other regencies and municipalities in the province within the same period.

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<sup>148</sup>Source: <http://ppid.blitarkab.go.id/?p=2659> on 17 October 2013.

<sup>149</sup>Interview with a local legislator on 26 June 2012.

<sup>150</sup>Interview with a head of local government office on 5 June 2012.

<sup>151</sup>Source <http://kim-bumipenataran.blogspot.com.au/2011/04/bentuk-tim-awasi-kopwan.html> accessed on 17 October 2013.



**Table 5.10** Macro Indicators of Development Achievement of Blitar Regency 2006-2010

<b>Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	27.51	25.32	27.16	26.99	24.60
Regencies (Average)	43.09	41.82	39.71	39.71	38.08
Municipalities (Average)	31.77	30.16	27.91	29.00	27.59
Province	35.32	32.93	31.58	31.41	29.99
<b>Unemployment Rate</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	5.63	4.54	4.26	3.00	2.24
Regencies (Average)	7.51	5.93	5.50	4.25	3.66
Municipalities (Average)	11.60	11.42	10.63	8.82	7.36
Province	8.19	6.79	6.42	5.08	4.25
<b>Economic Growth</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	5.57	5.86	6.01	5.03	6.81
Regencies (Average)	5.49	5.84	5.78	5.04	6.46
Municipalities (Average)	5.98	6.08	6.20	5.19	6.53
Province	5.80	6.11	5.94	5.01	6.67
<b>Purchasing Power Parity Index</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	64.71	64.97	66.03	66.24	66.47
Regencies (Average)	59.77	60.42	61.49	62.26	63.03
Municipalities (Average)	63.43	64.06	65.11	65.68	65.95
Province	61.46	62.56	63.92	64.74	65.42
<b>Education Index</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	76.45	76.45	76.45	77.33	77.93
Regencies (Average)	71.11	71.90	71.93	72.54	72.92
Municipalities (Average)	84.13	85.25	85.42	85.75	86.19
Province	73.40	73.61	73.73	74.53	74.94
<b>Life Expectancy Index</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	75.00	75.41	75.73	76.09	76.44
Regencies (Average)	69.39	69.89	70.23	70.65	71.03
Municipalities (Average)	73.80	74.29	74.63	75.05	75.42
Province	72.67	73.17	73.50	73.92	74.29
<b>Human Development Index (HDI)</b>					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Blitar	72.05	72.28	72.74	73.22	73.62
Regencies (Average)	66.76	67.40	67.88	68.48	68.99
Municipalities (Average)	73.78	74.53	75.05	75.50	75.85
Province	69.18	69.78	70.38	71.06	71.55

Source: the Central Statistics Agency of East Java, 2006-2010.

In the economic sector, Blitar Regency achieved better economic growth compared to other regencies in East Java within five years, except in 2009, when Blitar's economic growth was slightly lower than the average growth of other regencies. Blitar also had a lower unemployment rate than the average rate of other regencies and municipalities in the province when Herry was in office from 2006 to 2010. In 2010, Blitar's unemployment rate was included in the best of seven of 38 regencies and municipalities in East Java. Likewise, Blitar's residents had the best purchasing power parity (PPP) index amongst 29 regencies in

East Java during Herry's time in office in his first term. Also, Blitar's PPP index was even better than the average of PPP indexes of other municipalities in the same period.

Under Herry's leadership, Blitar Regency achieved good education performance within five years. Blitar's education indexes have been included in the top seven amongst 29 regencies in East Java from 2006 to 2010. Compared to East Java's education index, Blitar is better as well. Overall, based on these macro indicators of development, it is fair to say that Herry Noegroho was a successful regent. During his time in power, the regency achieved better development progress compared to other regencies in the province. The regency claims that these superior macro indicators of development were Herry's success in leading Blitar from 2006 to 2010.<sup>152</sup>

During his first term in power, Herry Noegroho was also known as a regent who was willing to be involved in several major popular activities. The involvement in some common and mass activities, such as sport, art and culture, and religious activities, is crucial as a way to unite Herry and the residents or ordinary people. Herry frequently visited villages and met with villagers in order to attend ceremonies, events, and celebrations. In some events, he also donated money to support community initiated activities. Via the involvement in these events, Herry could meet directly with people who may help to boost his popularity amongst residents. Also, Herry cleverly gained affinity with the residents, since, as a leader, he is not elitist. In contrast, Herry is very friendly to all layers of people in Blitar.

Herry is known as a *bupati seniman* (an artist regent). He does not hesitate to sing for every event which makes it possible to sound off his voice. He is able to sing *dangdut* songs, pop songs, and Javanese songs.<sup>153</sup> Furthermore, Herry was meritorious in reviving some local arts and indigenous events, namely *kuda lumping*,<sup>154</sup> purification of Gong Mbah Pradah (Rozuli, 2011, p. 97) and the revitalisation of the Penataran temple site by performing *Penataran* traditional dance.<sup>155</sup> Herry was also the manager of Blitar Soccer Association (PSBI) from 1998 to 2012. PSBI is the only and very popular soccer club in Blitar Regency, competing in Indonesian regular football competitions. Most of PSBI's supporters are youth. As a regent, Herry had close access to the local budget to finance the club.<sup>156</sup> As a manager,

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<sup>152</sup>See "POINT KEBERHASILAN BUPATI BLITAR MASA JABATAN TAHUN 2006 – 2010" (the Success Points of the Regent of Blitar 2006-2010). Source <http://www.blitarkab.go.id/?p=1464> accessed on 10 October 2010.

<sup>153</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012; local academic on 4 July 2012; businessman on 18 June 2012.

<sup>154</sup>Javanese traditional dance showing a group of soldiers who are riding horses made of woven bamboo and cut in shapes resembling a horse. Some performances also serve *kuda lumping* possessing attractions, immunity, and magical powers. Interview with a local academic on 4 July 2012 and a head of village on 4 July 2012,

<sup>155</sup>Source <http://www.blitarkab.go.id/?p=1464> accessed on 10 October 2013.

<sup>156</sup>The Minister of Home Affairs has prohibited local governments to use local budget (APBD) for financing the local soccer clubs since 1 January 2012.

Herry was very popular amongst PSBI's supporters.<sup>157</sup> He did not hesitate to support the club's supporters by providing buses to transport them when PSBI played out of Blitar.<sup>158</sup> Amongst supporters, Herry is familiar as the so-called "*Bapake Singo Lodro*" (the father of *Singo Lodro*).<sup>159</sup>

In addition to fully supporting PSBI, Herry supported other sport activities at the village and sub-district level. He was willing to attend as well as to open sport tournaments held by the community at this level.<sup>160</sup> In addition, Herry donated money to support the tournaments. Prior to the 2010 *pilkada*, he attended the community's related sport events more frequently throughout Blitar.<sup>161</sup> During interviews with voters, information was gained about Herry's activities in attending and donating to sport tournaments at the village and sub-district levels.

Herry Noegroho completely understood that the majority of Blitar's residents are Muslim. He was also aware that the majority of them are *nahdliyin* (members of Indonesia's Largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama)<sup>162</sup> and Muhammadiyah members. For this reason, it was understandable that Herry was also very supportive to Islamic religious activities. He attempted to attend every religious event invitation, such as *istighosah* (mass prayer), visiting mosques, *mushola* (small mosques) and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), and meetings with religious leader, especially *ulama*.<sup>163</sup> Herry wanted to show publicly that although he was known as a nationalist; he had a close relationship with Muslim communities and leaders. One and a half years prior to the *pilkada*, indeed, this close relationship was by design aimed at gaining affinities from the major population.<sup>164</sup>

Herry's populist policies as well as popular image amongst residents were intentionally designed. Herry prepared these constructive policies during the first year of his first term in office in 2006. He designed local government policies and programs in accordance with his orientation to maintain his office in the next *pilkada* (2010). A former head of local government office remarked clearly:

From the beginning of 2006, he had already prepared programs that lead to the next period. This can be seen in the results of a survey about the regent's programs. In 2009 and 2010 (local

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<sup>157</sup>Interview with a businessman on 18 June 2012; an activist on 23 June 2012; a PSBI's supporter coordinator on 3 July 2012.

<sup>158</sup>Interview with a PSBI's supporter coordinator on 3 July 2012.

<sup>159</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012. *Singo Lodro* (the cruel lion) is the nickname of PSBI.

<sup>160</sup>Interview with a local academic on 2 July 2012.

<sup>161</sup>Interview with one of Arif Fuadi's victory team members on 20 July 2012.

<sup>162</sup>Interview with a local academic on 2 July 2012.

<sup>163</sup>Interview with a local academic on 4 July 2012; local journalist on 11 June 2011; a local Muslim mass-based organisation leader on 23 June 2012.

<sup>164</sup>Interview with a political consultant on 16 July 2012.

government) conducted IKM studies to measure community satisfaction with the regent (performance). The result is above all (above average, very good)<sup>165</sup>

The results of five surveys measuring the community's satisfaction index conducted in 2009 and 2010 by the Blitar Development Planning Board in cooperation with Airlangga University support this claim. As seen in table 5.11, the majority of residents (81.34 per cent) are satisfied with services and development conducted by local government. The highest satisfaction index was on health services, approved by 89.4 per cent of respondents and the lowest satisfaction, on economic development, confirmed by 70.3 per cent.

**Table 5.11** Result of Community's Satisfaction Index Surveys in Blitar 2009 and 2010

Satisfaction Indicators	Sort of Services or Development					
	Infrastructure	Health	Education	Licensing and Civil Registry Services	Economic Development	Average (%)
Satisfied	81.8	89.4	87.2	78	70.3	81.34
Less Satisfied	18.2	10.6	12.8	22	29.7	18.66

Source: The Blitar Development Planning Board (in cooperation with Airlangga University), 2009; 2010.

Nonetheless, Herry's success story and his populist policy are not without critics. Interviews with non-government participants provided evaluations of his constructed good image. During his first term in office, Herry developed simple policies. There were no prominent breakthroughs that show genuine and innovative policies. A businessman who was also a member of the trade and industry chamber board in Blitar remarked, "Education and health (programs) are all national programs, such as BOS (school operational aid). About SMEs, Blitar Regency focuses on agriculture, but till today I have not seen much product innovation".<sup>166</sup> Thus, Herry was not innovative in boosting education and economic sectors in the regency. The majority of programs in these sectors just implemented routine policies and programs as well as the nationally designed programs.

An activist who is also a lawyer gave a clear illustration of Herry's performance in his first term in office,

"His first term was stagnant and no significant policy activities were undertaken. The orientation was only for gaining awards (from government and non-government institutions), not for the long term benefit of the people. If I assessed this, I would give 6 (marks). As the district head, he had no breakthroughs (for people)".<sup>167</sup>

<sup>165</sup>Interview on 18 June 2012.

<sup>166</sup>Interview on 18 June 2012. A similar opinion is also delivered by a local journalist on 6 June 2012. Another local journalist interviewed on 11 June 2012 and a Muslim Mass-based Organisation activist as well as a teacher interviewed on 23 June 2012 strengthen the argument that education programs and policies under Herry's first term in the office were less innovative. The activist as well as a teacher gave an example of a recently prominent program on the international pilot project schools (RSBI). This is a national government designed program and Local government only runs the schools.

<sup>167</sup>Interview on 23 June 2012.

As a regent, Herry was not totally clean regarding legal cases.<sup>168</sup> Herry was alleged to be involved in two cases during his first term in office. Firstly, the case of local government asset land swaps in Jatilengger, Ponggok Sub-district, which caused the state losses of Rp 1.3 billion (AUD 130,000). Secondly, the case of the issuance of Decree 173/2005 on Plantation Land Transfers Swarubuluroto in Garum Sub-district, covering an area of 200 hectares, to a company. This decree caused the state losses as the local government did not receive any profit sharing. The Blitar prosecutor's office (*Kejari*) investigated these cases and interviewed Herry on 23 September 2012 as a witness.<sup>169</sup> However, these cases only appeared to the public after the 2010 *pilkada*. During his first term in office, he was perceived as a clean regent without legal cases.<sup>170</sup>

To support his populist policies and programs, Herry and his staff pursued not only conventional budgeting processes complying with the national government guidance, but they also performed other actions to secure his personal targets relating to the *pilkada*. Budgeting processes do not solely rely on public proposals, as they were compiled through the results of *Musrenbang*, and local government offices' (SKPD) proposals accommodating national and provincial development targets.<sup>171</sup> Local legislative council (DPRD)' members also play some specific roles to secure the incumbent's interest as well as theirs. A political party activist said:<sup>172</sup>

“In every year, there is a *Musrenbang*, but the implementation is just a formality. Because, in its real implementation, there have been (compromises) certain locations \ (where the projects) are to be built, *Musrenbang* is only a (formal) requirement. It relates to *jasmas* (community aspiration net conducted by legislators). They (DPRD and government) do not put (the projects) as needed, but in the desired location by the proposer (DPRD).”

It was possible to do this, since the major faction in the Blitar Legislative council is PDI-P from which Herry mainly gained support in his first term in office. The PDI-P faction in the local legislative council totally supported Herry's populist initiatives.<sup>173</sup> Not only the PDI-P faction, indeed, all legislators supported Herry's budget proposals. This was possible due to the mutual benefits obtained by both parties. Herry's government had a guarantee to get approval for his program and budget proposals. Meanwhile, local legislators had a budget

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<sup>168</sup>Interview with an activist on 23 June 2012.

<sup>169</sup>Source: <http://news.detik.com/read/2012/11/23/215702/2099940/475/2/kejari-blitar-periksa-bupati-dua-kasus-korupsi> accessed on 14 October 2013 and <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/12/03/058445630/Warga-Tuntut-Bupati-Blitar-Dibui> accessed on 3 October 2013.

<sup>170</sup>Interview with a Muslim Mass-based Organisation activist on 23 June 2012.

<sup>171</sup>The Minister of Home Affairs Regulation 13/2006 on Local Financial Management Guidelines

<sup>172</sup>Interview on 20 July 2012 and a similar datum is also delivered in an interview with a local journalist on 6 June 2012.

<sup>173</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 6 June 2012.

ration to be allocated to their constituents mainly via physical (tangible) projects. An interview with a businessman in construction said that in 2012, each legislator had a right to disburse of Rp 500 million (AUD 50,000), and a chair of a faction disbursed Rp 750 million (AUD 75,000) and the chairman of DPRD disbursed Rp 1 billion (AUD 100,000).<sup>174</sup> As this practice is informal, these so-called *jasmās* expenditure items were unwritten in DPRD's budget posts in APBD, but they were put into the budget posts of local offices.<sup>175</sup> To implement the *jasmās* projects, each legislator informally disbursed them to local contractors without a bidding process. Each legislator "sells" these projects with 12-15 per cent of the fee from each project.<sup>176</sup> Then, the contractors execute the project in certain locations (or constituent based locations) requested by the legislator.<sup>177</sup>

In fact, the practices of budget disbursement by local legislators are illegal. They are not stipulated in the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 13/2006 concerning the Manual Local Financial Management. The regulation stipulates that local legislative councils have authority only in discussing and approving APBD proposals. Thus, this mutual support in the budgeting process is a form of compromise between the local executive and legislature. The regent wants to get approval for budget proposal from legislators to implement desired programs addressed to potential voters; local legislators approve the budget proposal to gain "rent-seeking" benefits and political credits from their constituents. Hence, it is fair to say that local budgeting processes are only addressed to meeting formality aspects.

Moreover, as a regent, Herry was normatively responsible for all fiscal management. At the same time, he was able to pursue his interest in his survival by getting political credits from the performance of APBD. A former head of the local government office and a local government staff member remarked that the local government budget team (TAPD) should consult the regent on the general budget policy (KUA) before submitting it to DPRD. He may want to include some programs as priorities.<sup>178</sup> In other words, the incumbent screens budget proposals to select self-effective policies to target segmented potential voters.

A further discussion to assess the incumbent populist politics in terms of Herry's populist policies and popular activities is necessary to know its contribution to his victory in the 2010 *pilkada*. The incumbent's policy choices which result in tangible development outputs helped him to gain political credit from potential voters, particularly the policy focusing on infrastructure developments, such as roads, bridges, and irrigation. The

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<sup>174</sup>Interview on 26 June 2012.

<sup>175</sup>Interview with a local legislator on 26 June 2012.


<sup>176</sup>Interview with a local businessman in construction on 26 June 2012.

<sup>177</sup>Interview with a local legislator on 26 June 2012.

<sup>178</sup>Interview on 18 June 2012 and 15 June 2012.

implementation of infrastructure developments approaching the *pilkada* is very effective to boost his popularity.<sup>179</sup> Furthermore, these policies are also directly addressed to the targeted people.<sup>180</sup> Then, Herry would be perceived to be successful in developing Blitar Regency, based on tangible development outputs.<sup>181</sup> These are also perceived to fit with people's demands.<sup>182</sup>

**Chart 5.3** Portion of Public Works Expenditure in Total Expenditure of Blitar Regency 2006-2010 (%)



Source: The data of public works expenditure from 2006 to 2010 are quoted from master tables of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. The data of public works expenditures from 2011 to 2012 are quoted from the Regency of Blitar's APBD.

As seen in chart 5.3, the portion of infrastructure (public works) expenditure shows an improving trend prior to the *pilkada*. This increasing expenditure resulted in better infrastructure developments credited to the incumbent. In 2010, local government spent 14.33 per cent of the local budget on public works. This portion is higher than the average expenditure of 29 regencies in East Java, which reached only 9.29 per cent. Convincingly, the average expenditure on public works in the period prior to the *pilkada* (2006-2010) was higher, compared to two years (2011-2012) after the *pilkada*. Prior to the *pilkada*, the regency spent 15.13 per cent on public works; this is higher than the post-*pilkada* expenditure which reached only 12.88 per cent. Moreover, the average regency expenditure on public works within the pre-*pilkada* period is higher compared to the average of other districts, which reached only 11.75 per cent. Hence, this infrastructure expenditure trend supported the

<sup>179</sup>Interview with a local academic on 2 July 2012; a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>180</sup>Interview with a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>181</sup>Interview with a head of local government office on 18 June 2012; a former of local government office on 18 June 2012; a businessman on 9 July 2012; a local academic as well as the challenger's consultant on 24 July 2012; the incumbent's consultant on 16 July 2012.

<sup>182</sup>Interview with a head of local government office on 5 June 2012; a construction businessman on 26 June 2012.

important contribution of infrastructure policies to the incumbent's victory in the *pilkada*. Herry gained credit from his populist policies by allocating an increasing budget prior to the *pilkada*. Conversely, the regency reduced the public works budget after the *pilkada* as the incumbent no longer employed infrastructures issues to gain support from the people. The Law No. 32/2004 stipulates that the maximum period a regent or mayor or governor can stay in office is only for two periods.

In addition, Herry's efforts to be close to local people contributed to marketing his popular image. People easily met with Herry, with less bureaucratic and protocol procedures. He was an acceptable figure amongst the majority of people.<sup>183</sup> Herry wanted also to meet with community leaders, especially religious leaders.<sup>184</sup> Moreover, during his first term, the incumbent was perceived as a clean person. There were no legal cases alleged against him.<sup>185</sup> Therefore, Herry's populist policies and popular image were a good combination, contributing to his survival in the 2010 *pilkada*.

#### 5.4.2. Buchori's Populist Politics

For Probolinggo Municipality's residents, the 2008 *pilkada* was the first moment to directly elect their local executive head. They previously voted directly for parties and legislators in the legislative election at the national, provincial and district level. Then, they had to change their voting orientation from party orientation to personal orientation. For the incumbent, this first *pilkada* was not an easy race since he had to face the two most challenging situations. First, the political party gaining most votes in the 2004 Legislative Election (PKB) did not support him. Indeed, the majority of the population in Probolinggo is traditional Muslim, affiliating with *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), which has historical as well as cultural connections to PKB. Moreover, the challenger (Zulkifli-Yusuf) was also nominated by PAN that had similar characteristics of loyal voters. PAN has historical as well as cultural connections to *Muhammadiyah*.<sup>186</sup> Hence, the incumbent had to contest against a challenger supported by two Islam-based parties with loyal followers. Another challenge was that the incumbent was publicly known to be affiliated to PDI-P, a nationalist party and PDI-P nominated him as the mayoral candidate in the *pilkada*. As seen in table 5.8, in addition to PDI-P, the majority of other supporters were also nationalist-based parties. Consequently, the incumbent's nationalist image had to adjust to the majority of traditional Muslims in the municipality.

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<sup>183</sup>Interview with the incumbent's consultant on 16 July 2012.

<sup>184</sup>Interview with a local academic as well as the challenger's consultant on 24 July 2012.

<sup>185</sup>Interview with a head of local government office on 5 June 2012.

<sup>186</sup> Muhammadiyah is claimed as the second largest Muslim Mass-based organisation in Indonesia after NU.



The incumbent, indeed, had anticipated this situation during his first term in office (2004-2009). Buchori was clever at setting local development policy choices that could advantage him in improving his popularity and sympathy amongst local residents. In the first year of his first term in office (2004), the incumbent recognised that one of the main problems in the municipality is poverty. According to the central statistics agency, in this year, the number of the poor reached 32,042 people (17.37 per cent).<sup>187</sup> In addition to prioritising poverty alleviation in his local development mission (2004-2009), the incumbent promised to improve the accessibility and quality of education and health services, economic growth acceleration, city cleanliness, people participation in local development, and bureaucracy professionalism (Probolinggo, 2005, p. 5). In order to implement these medium term development missions, local government implemented some leading programs and policies credited to the incumbent.

In the first term, local government ran some leading programs in health services. The secretary of the local health office remarked that local government implemented the subsidised health service program in all community health centres (*puskesmas*) to enhance people's accessibility to health services. In 2006, local government began to set a social tariff for all medical services in *puskesmas*.<sup>188</sup> Local government covered all fees for basic services in *puskesmas*, such as general practitioners and dental services, including medicines. In addition, the government set a cheaper tariff for non-basic services compared to other health facilities. For instance, at the *Puskesmas Wonoasih*, the tariff for a four dimension ultrasonography (USG) service was set from Rp 80,000 to Rp 100,000 (AUD 8-10) per service. In private health facilities, to get a similar service, a patient would pay from Rp 400,000 to Rp 500,000 (AUD 40-50) per service. In order to improve the quality of health services, local government began to improve the quality of services and supporting facilities in all *puskesmas* in 2006.<sup>189</sup> Every *puskesmas* has a different leading service specialisation, such as *Puskesmas Wonoasih* is designed as a reference in obstetric and gynecology services; *Puskesmas Jati* is specialised in acupuncture services; *Puskesmas Kedopok* is specialised in elderly services; *Puskesmas Sukabumi* is specialised in eye health. In the same year, local government also started to improve the quality management services of *puskesmas*. In addition to meeting the national government service standard, *puskesmas* were also

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<sup>187</sup> The number of the poor is quoted from the incumbent's speech in front of local legislators on 13 October 2008. The speech is part of the campaign during the 2008 *pilkada*. Source: <http://pdiperjuangan-jatim.org/v03/index.php?mod=berita&id=1893> accessed on 13 February 2014. I processed the percentage of the poor by comparing the number of the poor and the total population in the municipality in 2004 as it is reported in the Probolinggo Municipality in Figures 2007.

<sup>188</sup> Interview on 24 October 2012

<sup>189</sup> Interview with the secretary of local health office on 24 October 2012; interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012.

encouraged to meet the standards of the international organization for standardization (ISO) in quality management systems (ISO 9001: 2000).<sup>190</sup> For example, *Puskesmas Wonoasih* was recognised as meeting the ISO 9001: 2000 standard in 2007 from the World Quality Assurance (WQA), with certificate number QS 6202.<sup>191</sup>

**Figure 5.7** Facilities and Services Improvement and ISO 9001:2008 Certificate awarded to *Puskesmas Wonoasih*



Source: *Puskesmas Wonoasih* (2010).

In education services, local government initiated improvements in the literacy rate by supporting the establishment and operation of community learning activity centres (PKBM). Local government provides teachers, books, and funds to support PKBM in reducing illiteracy amongst local residents.<sup>192</sup> The other education programs that directly impact on the residents are scholarships for poor students (elementary school and junior and senior high school students) worth Rp 2,299,333,000 (AUD 229,933.3) for 5 years, and the improvement in operational support for non-state (temporary) teachers and administrators who work in pre-school institutions, elementary schools, and junior and senior high schools. A teacher could receive an additional monthly allowance from Rp 250,000 to Rp 300,000 (AUD 25-30) from local government. Indeed, the operational support policy was implemented by the previous mayor (Banadi Eko). The incumbent increased the total amount of support to RP 5 billion (AUD 500,000) per year. In addition, the education budget share increased every year while the incumbent occupied office in the first term.<sup>193</sup>

On many formal occasions, the incumbent did not hesitate to tell about his personal background, that he comes from a poor and less educated family. He frequently mentioned openly that in the past he and his father were pedicab drivers.<sup>194</sup> In his personal profile

<sup>190</sup> Interview with the secretary of local health office on 24 October 2012.

<sup>191</sup> It has been recertified by WQA in December 2009 by implementing ISO 9001:2008.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012.

<sup>193</sup> Interview with the head of program division of the Probolinggo Education Office on 24 October 2012.

<sup>194</sup> Interview with a commissioner of Probolinggo municipality general election commission (KPUD) on 11 October 2012; a local academic on 8 October 2012; a member of Probolinggo Municipality Election

published prior to the *pilkada* day in *Radar Bromo*, the incumbent showed as well as told of his close relationship with pedicab drivers, through his personal history and his closest group of people (*Radar Bromo*, 23 October 2008). Due to his personal and family background, the incumbent addressed some social policies to help pedicab drivers, such as the program of pedicabs for tourists, change professions for pedicab drivers, and certain assistance for pedicab drivers.<sup>195</sup>

The incumbent also targeted his social policy to assist street vendors (PKL). Prior to his post, the Municipality stipulated the Local Regulation number 16/2002 for Street Vendors. Unlike many other cities, the incumbent did not pursue demolitions to control PKL. He enforced control as well as empowerment. The municipality gave spaces and time limitations (09.00 a.m.–11 p.m.) for PKL to vend in some strategic places located in *aloon-aloon* (city square) and nine main roads. In order to control the PKL population and ensure fair competition amongst them, the municipality’s civil police (Satpol PP) issued a control card for every PKL, containing the vendor’s identity and photograph, with a different coloured card for every main road where the PKL was located (*Jawa Pos*, 29 June 2009). Also, the incumbent implemented a program to train PKL in hygiene, business management, and capital support.

**Figure 5.8** The Incumbent, pedicab driver, and PKL cart with a Sticker of the Incumbent’s Picture



Source: Sobari (2014 and 2012); the pedicab driver photograph is taken from *Radar Bromo* 23 October 2008 edition.

Another recognisable program is the improvement of infrastructure at the neighbourhood units (RT) level. The incumbent initiated covering all neighbourhood roads with asphalt and paving blocks. This project was carried out during the incumbent’s first term

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Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 17 October 2012; a local NGO activist on 17 October 2012; a local businessman on 4 November 2012; a head of local government office on 12 October 2012.

<sup>195</sup> Interview with a businessman in construction as well as the chairman of construction employers association on 4 November 2012; a member of Probolinggo Municipality Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 17 October 2012;

in the office.<sup>196</sup> Based on the 2008 local government report (LPPD), the municipality spent Rp 12,446,673,750 (AUD 1,245 million) on the rehabilitation, maintenance, and construction of roads and bridges. It shared 27.4 per cent of the total capital expenditure<sup>197</sup> disbursed by the local public works office.

In addition to specific programs for these targeted groups; the incumbent was publicly known to have a close relationship, particularly with pedicab drivers and PKL. He frequently visited them during his first term. An NGO activist remarked:<sup>198</sup>

The evidence of closeness (between the incumbent, pedicab drivers, and PKL) is demonstrated by his generosity. When he strolls with his friends and passes street vendors, he treats all his friends. It helps the street vendors. When he meets pedicab drivers, he gives Rp 20 thousand (AUD 2) to each of them. When he attended a reception and met the street vendors; he gave them Rp 20 thousand (AUD 2) for each. These examples could bring him close to the community.

Moreover, the incumbent routinely visited bereaved families. After praying *shubuh* (early Morning Prayer), he visited 10 families every day to deliver condolences and donations to help with funeral costs.<sup>199</sup> This activity has created an image of closeness between the incumbent and his people. As seen in table 5.11, the municipality spent more on health, public works, small, micro and medium business development, and social assistance than the average of municipalities and regencies in East Java in 2008. Also, the municipality spent much higher in terms of per capita expenditure on public works and micro, small, and medium business development. In total, every individual in the municipality gained better per capita expenditure of APBD compared to the average of municipalities and regencies in the province in the last year of the incumbent's first term (2008). This better expenditure was assumed to support the incumbent in performing some populist programs in 2008. As reported in the 2008 local government report (LPPD), the municipality conducted mass circumcisions for the poor's children, worth Rp 60 million (AUD 6,000), constructed new *puskesmas* and *pustu* (subsidiary *puskesmas*) worth Rp 1,520,704,100 (AUD 152,070,410) and improvements *puskesmas* and *pustu*'s medical devices worth Rp 3,466,512,200 (AUD

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<sup>196</sup> Interview with the secretary of public works office on 19 October 2012; a commissioner of KPUD on 11 October 2012.

<sup>197</sup> Capital expenditure is used in order to obtain or increase the fixed assets and other assets that benefit more than one accounting period and exceeds the minimum limit capitalization of fixed assets or other assets stipulated by the national government.

<sup>198</sup> Interview on 17 October 2012.

<sup>199</sup> Interview with a commissioner of Probolinggo municipality general election commission (KPUD) on 11 October 2012; a local academic on 8 October 2012; a member of Probolinggo Municipality Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 17 October 2012; a local NGO activist affiliated to the incumbent on 17 October 2012; a businessman in construction as well as the chairman of construction employers association on 4 November 2012; a head of local government office on 12 October 2012; a female local journalist on 24 October 2012; a secretary of local trade and industry chamber on 19 October 2012; two local legislators on 18 October 2012; a head of local government office on 12 October 2012; the secretary of public works office on 19 October 2012.

346,651,220). Furthermore, for micro and small business, the municipality spent Rp 951,700,000 (AUD 95,170,000) on the development of product marketing means for micro, small, and medium enterprises. The chairman of the municipality's forum of small and medium enterprises (FORDA UKM) said that the incumbent has given high attention to the small and medium enterprises (UKM) in the municipality, both in policy and its implementation. The local government supported providing production means, management training, and capital for UKM and cooperatives.<sup>200</sup>

These expenditures raise the question, does this better expenditure have relevant links to the survival of the incumbent? This question will be answered latter by comparing this with the other case study in the Municipality of Madiun.

**Table 5.12** 2008 Probolinggo Municipality Expenditures Compared to other Municipalities and Regencies

Expenditures	Probolinggo		Other Municipalities (Av.)		Other Regencies (Av.)	
	%	Per capita (Rp)	%	Per capita (Rp)	%	Per capita (Rp)
Education	23.6	445,951	29.40	532,378	36.65	306,790
Health	9.71	182,892	9.30	191,103	9.59	75,142
Public Works	12.61	237,475	10.56	198,135	12.35	100,032
Small, Micro and Medium Business	5.38	97,831	3.88	70,832	3.97	3,646
Social assistance	3.20	-	2.21	-	2.26	-
Total Expenditure	-	1,883,355	-	1,852,509	-	777,576

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher.

As founded by Huub de Jonge, almost all Madurese are Muslim. Outsiders consider that they are very religious in appreciating and disseminating Islam (Jonge, 1989, p. 239). Not only the Madurese, but Javanese in the municipality and other Javanese living in the north coastal area of Java are devout Muslims (Koentjaraningrat, 1985, p. 22). In general, *pendalungan* people in the municipality are very close to Islamic influences. According to Sutarto (2006), amongst *pendalungan* people, a *kiai* or religious teacher is a role model as well as a political leader. Then, *pendalungan* people are paternalistic; to some extent they follow their role models in their decision making (Yuswadi, 2008, p. 62). The incumbent is aware of the character of the majority population in the municipality. Then, in addition to being identical with his popular image and populist policies, Buchori is also publicly known as a religious person.

The incumbent had a close relationship with religious leaders, especially those affiliating to NU. This closeness is possible as the incumbent admitted that he was a

<sup>200</sup> Interview on 29 October 2012.

*nahdliyin* and he is one of the functionaries of NU in the Municipality of Probolinggo.<sup>201</sup> Buchori is not only close to influential religious leaders with many followers; but he also approaches religious leader's *kampongs* in many villages and neighbourhoods.<sup>202</sup> His closeness with religious leaders was openly demonstrated when he declared his candidacy on 7 August 2008. Habib Hadi, the head of *Riyadlus Sholihin* Islamic Boarding School and *Kiai* Hajj Romli Bakir, the chairman of Indonesian *Ulama* Council (*MUI*) of Probolinggo Municipality chapter, attended the declaration (*Radar Bromo*, 8 August 2008). Furthermore, prior and during his campaign, the incumbent displayed two advertisements in *Radar Bromo* showing 8 male religious leaders and a wife of a religious leader (*bu nyai*) pictured with the incumbent and his running mate in a large photograph on 4 September and 30 September 2008 respectively.

Interestingly, the incumbent also acted as an Islamic preacher amongst society. He regularly broadcast his religious speeches in a local government owned radio named the *Suara Kota* 101.7 FM Radio.<sup>203</sup> During fieldwork in the municipality, his speech was recorded from 06.00 a.m. to 06.30 on 29 and 30 October 2012. In the speech broadcasted live, the incumbent delivered a specific theme in Islam guided by a female announcer. He also interacted with audiences by answering questions relating to religious matters. By listening directly the incumbent's speech, he appears capable of delivering a speech. It was said that he can recite the Quran fluently, interpret its meaning, and link it to the current situations as well as answering the audiences' questions. Moreover, during fieldwork in the municipality from October to November 2012, it was noted that the incumbent held two Islamic lectures inviting *kiai*, local government officials, and local residents to his service residence located at Panglima Sudirman Street.

The incumbent's closeness with *kiai* and his willingness to perform religious speeches were part of his strategy to market his image as a devout Muslim. Amongst local people, the incumbent was known as the central figure of a nationalist-based political party (PDI-P). In order to win over the hearts and minds of the majority of Muslim, the incumbent reconstructed his image as a nationalist person by declaring that he was a religious and nationalist person. Moreover, his willingness to be a functionary in NU was another strategy to gain support from *nahdliyin* and *kiai*.

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<sup>201</sup> Interview with the secretary of a Muslim mass-based organisation on 24 October 2012; a local journalist on 16 October 2012; a local academic on 8 October 2012; a commissioner of Probolinggo Municipality general election commission (KPUD) on 11 October 2012; a businessman in construction as well as the chairman of construction employers association on 4 November 2012.

<sup>202</sup> Interview with the secretary of a Muslim mass-based organisation in the municipality on 24 October 2012.

<sup>203</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist on 29 October 2012.

A local academic remarked that the incumbent is known as an *oreng sae* (Madurese meaning a good person) due to his generosity in helping his people, especially the poor.<sup>204</sup> However, the incumbent's attributes as an *oreng sae* amongst local residents was not merely as a generous person. People gave the incumbent credit for carrying out populist policies and popular activities and religious activities. Therefore, *oreng sae* is recognition for the incumbent as both a popular and religious figure.

In leading the municipality, the incumbent was also given credit for his participatory approach. The incumbent welcomed all residents to participate in developing the municipality. The first and the most populist and tangible program was the participatory development of small gardens, begun in 2006. It was an initiative of local government to beautify the city by making small gardens in almost all of the roadsides throughout the municipality.<sup>205</sup> Some local government offices pioneered in building the gardens, which are then followed by non-government institutions, such as businesses, political parties, professional organisations, schools, and universities. Every institution making a garden added to its identity. The head of the local environmental agency remarked that until 2011, the local government and non-government institutions had developed 405 small gardens (*Koran Madura*, 10 February 2014). Previously, Probolinggo was known as the city of mangoes and grapes. Following the implementation of this initiative, local residents introduced a new appellation, namely *Kota Seribu Taman* (the city of a thousand gardens). A secretary of the local trade and industry chamber testified that this is a symbiotic program between local government and business. By developing a garden, a company can also promote its business.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Interview on 8 October 2012.

<sup>205</sup> Interview with a head of local government office on 12 October 2012. Some other interviews confirm about this program, namely interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012; a member of Probolinggo Municipality Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 17 October 2012; a local NGO activist on 15 October 2012; a secretary of local trade and industry chamber on 19 October 2012; a female local journalist on 24 October 2012.

<sup>206</sup> Interview on 19 October 2012.



**Figure 5.9** Three Gardens made by Local Government, a Political Party, and Business at Brantas Street and Soekarno-Hatta Street in Probolinggo Municipality



Source: Sobari (2012)

In order to involve local people in development planning, the incumbent introduced two programs in 2007 or one year prior to the *pilkada*, namely *Cangkru'an* (hanging) and *Walikota Menjawab* (the mayor answers). *Cangkru'an* is a medium for local people to deliver their aspirations and demands at the neighbourhood level. The event was held in a relaxed atmosphere entertained by *ludruk* (traditional drama from East Java) on the veranda of a resident's house or in a neighbourhood's hall. The mayor and his staff became involved in a dialogue with the people. They discussed local issues such as street lighting problems, revolving funds for micro business, neighbourhood road construction, house improvement for the poor, and the explanation of licensing services. *Walikota Menjawab* is a weekly on air dialogue between the mayor and his people in the local government owned radio *Suara Kota* 101.7 FM. The dialogue discussed local government policies and current city situations, such as city infrastructure and public services. The mayor responded directly all questions from local people, either by being in the studio or via telephone.

**Figure 5.10** *Cangkru'an* and *Walikota Menjawab*



Source: Local Development Planning Agency (2009); Sobari (2010)



Another on air program in the *Suara Kota* 101.7 FM is *Laporo Rek* (Just Report Mate). Local government began this program in 2007 as a medium for communicating public complaints related to services and public facilities. Public deliver their complaints via telephone to the radio which is directly connected to the related local government offices. *Suara Kota* also invites the head of local government offices to come to the studio and dialogue directly with the people to respond to their complaints or suggestions. The radio broadcasts *Laporo Rek* five days a week (Monday to Friday) for two hours (09:00 to 11:00 a.m.). *Laporo Rek* was recorded on 29 October 2012. In this dialogue, the mayor responded to people's complaints via telephone for 30 minutes. They complained about municipality hospital services, social problems caused by some cafes in the city, and some infrastructure problems. In answering people's complaints and questions, the incumbent quoted also some verses in the Quran to support his answers. The secretary of the local health office and the head of the program division of the local education office confirmed that via *Laporo Rek* people can monitor as well as complain about local government's programs in health and education.<sup>207</sup>

In order to implement all of these policy choices, the incumbent was strongly supported by his party's colleagues in the local legislative body. The PDI-P faction with 7 seats in the local legislature was the main force securing his policy choices in the budgeting processes.<sup>208</sup> The legislature even requested the incumbent to improve budget allocations for prioritised sectors, such as the health budget.<sup>209</sup> Furthermore, the incumbent was lucky to have some local office heads who had creative ideas in arranging local development policies. A local NGO activist mentioned the head of the environmental office had some creative ideas to arrange participatory programs that may attract residents to participate. Even local legislators had difficulty finding any weaknesses in these programs.<sup>210</sup> Also, some young creative bureaucrats were clever in translating the incumbent's ideas to develop the municipality.<sup>211</sup>

The majority of elites and people agreed to say that the incumbent was successful in developing the municipality. Nonetheless, the incumbent did not succeed in improving the municipality's macro indicators of development outputs. During his first term (2004-2008), the municipality could not achieve an equal or better index in four macro indicators compared to the average index of municipalities in East Java. As seen in table 5.12, in the middle of the incumbent's administration (2006), the municipality achieved better in three

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<sup>207</sup> Both interviews were conducted on 24 October 2012.

<sup>208</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 16 October 2012; a local NGO activist on 15 October 2012; a local academic on 8 October 2012.

<sup>209</sup> Interview with the secretary of local health office on 24 October 2012.

<sup>210</sup> A local NGO activist on 15 October 2012.

<sup>211</sup> Interview with a female local journalist on 24 October 2012.

economic macro indicators, namely economic growth, unemployment rate, and purchasing power parity (PPP) index than the average of nine municipalities in East Java. At the end of the first term in office (2008), the municipality was able to maintain a similar performance for these indicators. Nevertheless, the municipality could not achieve better in health and education. Both in the middle and in the end of the incumbent's first term in office, the municipality had lower achievements in reducing the infant mortality rate (IMR) and increasing life expectancy and the education index. Overall, until the end of the incumbent's first term administration, the municipality achieved a lower human development index (HDI) compared to other municipalities.

**Table 5.13** Macro Indicators of Development Achievement of Probolinggo Municipality  
2006-2008

<b>Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	33.09	31.58	30.32
Regencies (Average)	43.09	41.82	39.71
Municipalities (Average)	31.77	30.16	27.91
Province	35.32	32.93	31.58
<b>Unemployment Rate</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	10.25	10.42	9.93
Regencies (Average)	7.51	5.93	5.50
Municipalities (Average)	11.60	11.42	10.63
Province	8.19	6.79	6.42
<b>Economic Growth</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	6.40	6.45	6.39
Regencies (Average)	5.49	5.84	5.78
Municipalities (Average)	5.98	6.08	6.20
Province	5.80	6.11	5.94
<b>Purchasing Power Parity Index</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	64.61	64.85	65.75
Regencies (Average)	59.77	60.42	61.49
Municipalities (Average)	63.43	64.06	65.11
Province	61.46	62.56	63.92
<b>Education Index</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	76.91	79.77	79.97
Regencies (Average)	71.11	71.90	71.93
Municipalities (Average)	84.13	85.25	85.42
Province	73.40	73.61	73.73
<b>Life Expectancy Index</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	73.00	73.67	74.14
Regencies (Average)	69.39	69.89	70.23
Municipalities (Average)	73.80	74.29	74.63
Province	72.67	73.17	73.50
<b>Human Development Index (HDI)</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Probolinggo	71.51	72.76	73.29
Regencies (Average)	66.76	67.40	67.88
Municipalities (Average)	73.78	74.53	75.05
Province	69.18	69.78	70.38

Source: the Central Statistics Agency of East Java, 2006-2010.

Some critical voices also appeared among participants. A local academic assumed that to finance some populist programs there should be non-budgetary funds which are not planned in the local budget. He discovered that some local office heads complained about budget cutting in their offices to fund these populist programs.<sup>212</sup> Moreover, the incumbent was partial and biased in allocating local budgets. He favoured several preferred

<sup>212</sup> Interview on 8 October 2012.

organisations to receive funds from the local budget.<sup>213</sup> A local NGO activist delivered his critical review that some populist programs are camouflage, intended to build the incumbent's image and to lull laymen.<sup>214</sup>

Moreover, the State Administrative Supervision Agency (LPPNRI) of Probolinggo chapter reported some corruption allegations committed by the incumbent. This is similar to LIRA's actions which revealed the incumbent's corruption allegations in 2008. LPPNRI reported some corruption allegations after the incumbent gained his post for the second term. LPPNRI reported a corruption allegation worth Rp 53 billion (AUD 5.3 million), committed by the incumbent, to the corruption eradication commission (KPK) on 21 October 2011. The incumbent was suspected of committing power abuses in the development of a particle board factory by Kutai Timber Indonesia limited (PT KTI) and a corruption allegation in the implementation of the Specific-Purpose Grant (DAK) on education (*Surabaya Post*, 22 October 2011). LPPNRI revealed also that the incumbent was involved in the misappropriation of the 2011 Infrastructure Development Acceleration Program (PPID) implemented by the local public works office, local health office, local marine and fisheries office, and local traffic and land transportation office (DLLAJ).<sup>215</sup>

Generally, during the first term in office, the incumbent was perceived as succeeding in implementing several populist programs directly benefiting local people. This success was very important in boosting his popularity amongst local people. The incumbent's willingness to interact with the majority of local people was also crucial to build his well-liked image among them. The incumbent did not only perform as mayor, but he also performed as a religious figure adjusting to the socio-religious background of the majority of people in the municipality.

Up to this stage, the descriptive explanations of both incumbents' populist policies and popular activities (populism) demonstrate the importance of recognition of the incumbents prior to their re-election bids (the *pilkada*). The *pilkada* offered a challenge for Herry and Buchori to create political credits with local residents in terms of populist policy choices with direct benefits and tangible outputs. To obtain these credits, these types of policy choices are more memorable for local people than long-term policies to address social, economic and environmental challenges which give benefit indirectly to the people and which are less tangible in demonstrating outcomes. In addition, the incumbents' willingness to interact, to visit directly as well as to give donations and aid to the commoners in villages, events and

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<sup>213</sup> Interview with a chair of mass organisation on 25 October 2012.

<sup>214</sup> Interview on 29 October 2012.

<sup>215</sup> Source: <http://news.liputan6.com/read/381703/kejagung-diminta-usut-dugaan-korupsi-ppid-probolinggo> accessed on 29 October 2012.

community spots and their 'clean legal case record' or religious appearance were important points in constructing the incumbents' well-liked image. In the *pilkada* process, this recognition could be calculated by the incumbents to help them gain victory in the re-election bid. When they are able to count that people's recognition of their work in the first term covers more than 50 per cent (+1), then, the incumbents can predict their possibility for maintaining office.

In order to know the impact of the programs credited to the incumbents and their personal image amongst voters, the next section of the chapter on the voters' explanations will discuss this. The next section will also explain the informal networks related to the incumbents during their first terms in office.

### **5.5. Informal Politics and the Politics of Identity**

An incumbent holding office in democratic countries is normatively under the limitation of formal state regulations. Under his or her leadership, the government must allocate all resources and benefits equally to all people and all parties in the society. However, this normative prescription is inadequate to understand the real picture of recent Indonesian local politics. Prior to the implementation of the *pilkada* in 2005, indeed, the play of incentives amongst local leaders is common practice. Due to their position as well as the authority attached to them, the incumbents could gain benefits from local government policies, especially through the implementation of local developments financed by the local budget (APBD).

The disbursement of APBD is not solely intended to carry out the policies and mission statements of local government. Local budget implementation also reflects the personal interests of the incumbents. The play of local government incentives, then, becomes a common practice pursued by the incumbents in order to gain backing from potential supporters in their re-election bid. Local government incentives, in terms of financial and service benefits, are not merely disbursed and played out amongst formal persons. Indeed, the majority of them are performed amongst informal players. These benefit exchanges, as well as the informal actors involved, are part of the informal politics that will be discussed in this section of the chapter.

In Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality, informal politics, in terms of informal political practices and the involvement of informal actors, was pursued by both incumbents prior to the 2010 and 2008 *pilkada*. Informal politics emerges in the form of the politics of particularism, which consists of actors, relationships, practices and policies favouring the incumbent and aimed at gaining maximum support in the re-election bid. The politics of

particularism in this section means the politics of prioritising one more than another. The process of policy priority-making to deliver benefits is not based on a merit system that carefully selects a choice from all possible options. Rather, it is based on mutual benefits or transaction of benefits shared between the incumbents and their supporters, particularly informal or non-government actors.

#### *5.5.1. Mr Big and the Role of Informal Political Networks in Blitar*

To perform the politics of particularism, the incumbent in Blitar Regency utilises local the budget (APBD) as the main instrument to provide incentives for mainly informal actors. Eight categories of actors were found to be involved in supporting as well as gaining benefits from the incumbent prior to the *pilkada*. These informal actors' activities to support the incumbent may impact on his electability. For example, the donation and disbursement of campaign funds or campaign materials by businessmen has an impact on the improvement of the incumbent's electability. At the same time, businessmen have put the incumbent into a transactional contract to return what they have already spent by demanding rewards in terms of project implementation. Furthermore, the actors support the incumbent by influencing policy-making processes, providing individual benefits for the actors. Or, the actors could also get advantages by getting individual benefits from the policy implementation without influencing policy formulation. The actors barter with the incumbent through financial or non-financial donations, addressed to supporting the incumbent's activities, to improve his affinities amongst residents. The actors also gain particular benefits from the incumbents, in terms of material or immaterial incentives, such as obtaining grants from local government to run organisations; at the same time, the incumbent expects that the actors will mobilise their members or followers to support him in the *pilkada*.

It is important to explain that, indeed, not all informal actors are non-government persons. There are partisan bureaucrats who support the incumbent. They are categorised as informal actors due to their role in supporting the incumbent by using formal institutions. However, their activities are not only intended to implement local government policy, but they also intentionally design policies favouring the incumbent. Thus, the term informal politics, rather than informal actors, is used to refer to these facts.

Businessmen<sup>216</sup> are the informal actors who are most frequently mentioned in the interviews. The study found that the so-called "construction team" is very familiar amongst non-government participants and some government participants. They are construction

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<sup>216</sup>I prefer to use the word "businessmen" as all business background actors identified in my fieldwork in four districts are male.

employers or contractors implementing local government (Blitar)'s projects and they have close connections with Herry and his staff as well as with DPRD. The majority of businessmen support Herry individually, or they do not support the incumbent on behalf of their business association. Prior to the *pilkada*, they donated for Herry individually or under coordination of a big contractor who is frequently mentioned in interviews; he is given the pseudonym of "Mr Big".

In order to support Herry, a local businessman who has gained a project from local government does not donate cash to him. Prior to the *pilkada*, the businessman spent his own money to "market" Herry. For instance, he displays the incumbent's campaign banners and distributes free shirts with the incumbent and his pair's picture during the campaign.<sup>217</sup> The most common practice is that businessmen donate individually to support the incumbent when Herry and his team conduct charity services by distributing free groceries for the residents. Businessmen donate packages of groceries to be distributed in the charitable service events.<sup>218</sup> In another manner, a businessman donates individually to support the shadow puppet show (*wayangan*) conducted by the incumbent. A large audience is invited to the show held on the village's soccer fields. The incumbent is invited to attend the event and to meet directly with the villagers.<sup>219</sup>

In Javanese tradition, *wayang* is the main identity as it has a big role in Javanese life. The fiction figures in *wayang* are references to Javanese in their daily activities (Hardjowirogo, 1984, p. 33). *Wayang* is a medium to learn and socialise the Javanese philosophy of life (Moehtadi, 2003, p. 210). Since 1990s, *Wayang* have functioned also as an amusing show, especially favoured by the majority of lower class Javanese. In each show, the puppeteer gives more time to an entertaining segment attracting more viewers. The *wayang* observers name so-called *goro-goro* and *limbuk cangik* scenes, which present songs requested by the audiences, sensitive (porn content) humour, and satires (Soetarno, 2011, pp. 317-318). In these scenes the political agendas of the campaign can also be presented. The puppeteer can deliver some messages to the audiences to promote a candidate, by giving him the main job.

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<sup>217</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012.

<sup>218</sup>Interview with a businessman on 9 July 2012. The majority of charity service events is organised by Family Welfare Movement (PKK) of Blitar Regency chaired by Herry's wife. Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012.

<sup>219</sup>Interview with a party activist as well as a businessman on 26 June 2012.

**Figure 5.11 Campaign Banners**



By courtesy of [www. surya.com](http://www.surya.com)

Mr Big's name is familiar amongst contractors, government and non-government persons in Blitar. He is a contractor or a builder who has five companies with a specialisation in the construction business, especially road and bridge construction.<sup>220</sup> Mr Big is an invisible person. Although his name is frequently mentioned by participants in the interviews, he is a covert individual. It is not easy to trace his records, both in newspapers or online mass media. His company name can only be traced via some websites announcing electronic procurement bidding results. Based on electronic procurement data from several local governments, Mr Big's company has succeeded in gaining projects not only in Blitar Regency, but also in other districts in East Java, namely Trenggalek Regency, Tulungagung Regency, Blitar Municipality, Madiun Municipality, Madiun Regency, Kediri Regency, and Bojonegoro Regency. Outside East Java, Mr Big's company has also gained some projects in Tegal Regency and Kebumen Regency (Central Java), and Sleman Regency (Yogyakarta).

Mr Big had a dominant role in financially supporting the incumbent to stay in office. He coordinated a group of local businessmen and collected money from them. He gave the money to Herry's victory team to finance the campaign.<sup>221</sup> He also personally donated money to support the incumbent's campaign.<sup>222</sup> In addition, Mr Big did not only donate money, but he also allowed his trucks to be used to transport people to attend Herry's campaign in 2010. Moreover, Mr Big wanted to spend his money to finance the Blitar Soccer Association team (PSBI) when the Home Minister banned the utilisation of APBD for financing local soccer clubs in 2011.<sup>223</sup>

<sup>220</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012.

<sup>221</sup>Interview with a local academic and party activist on 4 July 2012; an activist and lawyer on 23 June 2012; a local journalist on 6 June 2012; a party activist as well as a businessman on 26 June 2012; a women activist as well as teacher on 9 July 2012; an anticorruption activist on 23 June 2012; a party activist and member of Herry's victory team on 23 June 2012.

<sup>222</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012; a local journalist on 6 June 2012; a contractor on 26 June 2012;

<sup>223</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012.



"There's no such thing as a free lunch", or, it is impossible to get something for nothing.<sup>224</sup> This proverb may represent the contractual transaction relationship between the incumbent and businessmen prior to and after the *pilkada* in Blitar Regency. Businessmen who are involved in supporting Herry prior to the *pilkada* obtained projects when he was re-elected in 2010, especially infrastructure projects. A local academic and party activist remarked:

After the *pilkada*, they will wait for rationing infrastructure (projects) that could be a project of DPID, DAK, and DAU for infrastructures. There is bidding (undertaken), but there are adjustments for the victory team who participated and were sweating (working hard) prior to the *pilkada*.<sup>225</sup>

Adjustment in bidding for local government project procurement was remarked upon by non-government participants. A local anticorruption activist said, "So he (businessman) wanted to return the capital, and the way to do is by setting up the bidding committee to make it difficult for other competitors to compete".<sup>226</sup> Especially for Mr Big, he gained more priorities for implementing local government projects by making it easier for him to compete in the bidding process.<sup>227</sup> Online tracking of the Blitar Regency's electronic procurement documents found that Mr Big's company won the bid for a huge construction project worth Rp 24,5 billion (AUD 2,45 million) in 2011. It was part of a multiyear project which was begun in 2010. One year later, Mr Big's company carried out three Blitar construction projects worth Rp 11,556,141,000 (AUD 1.155.614.1). In 2013, his company also won the bids for three local government construction projects worth Rp 20,116,215,000 (AUD 2.011.621.5).<sup>228</sup> However, there is no adequate evidence to prove whether these projects gained by Mr Big's company are part of the realisation of transactional contracts with the incumbent prior to the *pilkada* in 2010, or are a result of fair bidding. Indeed, in some meetings with businessmen prior to the *pilkada*, Herry promised to maintain a good relationship with businessmen if he won the race. Although there was no formal contract between the incumbent and businessmen, they believed that Herry would meet his commitments.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>224</sup>Quoted from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There\\_ain't\\_no\\_such\\_thing\\_as\\_a\\_free\\_lunch](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_ain't_no_such_thing_as_a_free_lunch) accessed on 29 October 2013.

<sup>225</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012. Note: DPID is the regional infrastructure adjustment fund; DAK is a special allocation fund; DAU is general allocation funds.

<sup>226</sup>Interview on 23 June 2012.

<sup>227</sup>Interview with two local journalists on 6 June 2012 and 11 June 2011.

<sup>228</sup>Data from the official site of Blitar's electronic procurement at <http://lpse.blitarkab.go.id/eproc/>. However, I cannot trace Mr Big's company projects in this website. I traced via google search engine by typing in Mr Big's company name.

<sup>229</sup>Interview with a businessman on 9 July 2012.

A survey conducted by Indonesia Procurement Watch (IPW) in 2010 strengthens this finding that transactional local government project procurement between local governments and affiliated businessmen are probably undertaken. The survey was conducted in Jakarta and four other surrounding cities, namely Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi. The number of respondents was 792 companies frequently participating in the local and national government project bids. Their business sectors are in construction, consultancy services, goods supply, and other service supplies. Although this survey focused on the inquiry into bribery practice in procurement, it can also explain the practices of transactional public procurement relating to the *pilkada*. The transactional procurement practice is non-competitive bidding as the bids committee intentionally arranges the procurement process to favour the affiliated businessmen who support a candidate in the *pilkada*. The survey found that 92.7 percent of the companies gave kickbacks to the providers of goods/services in government agencies. Worse, 97.3 per cent of the companies answered that they could not win the bid without a bribe. Relating to the *pilkada*, the form of bribery was already given in advance when businessmen spent some amount of money on *pilkada* related donations to support a candidate prior to the *pilkada*. When the winning candidate occupies office, the affiliated businessmen will be prioritised to obtain the government's projects. It is very logical as 72.3 per cent of unfair procurements are initiated by government officials and officers who are responsible for procurement (Indonesia Procurement Watch, 2010, pp. 6-7). The last survey finding is closely related to the transactional procurement following the *pilkada*. The partisan bureaucrats supporting the incumbent in the *pilkada* will shape the tender processes to intentionally favour the affiliated businessmen donating funds and other related *pilkada* favours for the incumbent. Based on the study's findings, the partisan bureaucrats are proactive in setting the local government procurements. They could gain two advantages, namely, the loyalty of the incumbent for gaining his post and probably kickbacks from businessmen.

The national Government issued two regulations to restrict the involvement of the bureaucracy in the *pilkada*, namely the Instruction of Administrative Reform Minister No. 7/2009 on the Neutrality of Civil Servants in Elections and the Instruction of Home Minister No. 270/4627/SJ on Instruction to Governor and District Head to Assure Civil Servants' Neutrality in the *Pilkada*. According to these regulations, the bureaucracy should be impartial; in other words, the bureaucracy is strictly forbidden to take sides amongst candidates in the *pilkada*. Also, they are strictly prohibited from using the state's facilities to support candidates in the *pilkada*. In fact, many bureaucracies violate these regulations. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) revealed 54 cases of bureaucracies' involvement in the

2009 Pilkada in four districts (Jawa Pos, 18 May 2010). The General Elections Supervisory Board (*Bawaslu*) also found 1,751 violations in 16 *pilkada* in 2010<sup>230</sup> and 1,221 violations in the 2011 *pilkada*.<sup>231</sup> ICW and *Bawaslu* found that the involvement of bureaucracy in the *pilkada* is in abusing state facilities and mobilising the bureaucracy to support candidates.

In Blitar, the involvement of the bureaucracy in the *pilkada* to support the incumbent was found, especially the incumbent regent. Based on these findings, the bureaucracy is a part of the actors that supported the incumbent. Bureaucracy, indeed, is a formal actor; however, it performs outlawed informal activities by supporting the incumbent in the *pilkada*. A local legislator called it “under the table” support. Bureaucracies, especially the education office and teachers, were involved in supporting the incumbents, Herry and Rijanto.<sup>232</sup> In a strategic office, three bureaucrats were active in supporting the incumbent by setting specific policies favouring Herry, such as the decision to give grants for early childhood education centres (PAUD),<sup>233</sup> the Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (KORPRI), and the Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI).<sup>234</sup> These policies were a follow-up to the previous surveys conducted by the office, to find out the incumbent’s performance, and the result of a comparative study in the neighbouring regency where the incumbent had succeeded in maintaining office in the 2008 *Pilkada*. The three bureaucrats also were involved in designing campaign materials for Herry. Moreover, some heads of local government offices were active in supporting the incumbent.<sup>235</sup> Herry was also supported by the heads of sub-districts in Blitar.<sup>236</sup> Therefore, the involvement of bureaucracies or civil servants in Blitar to support Herry is quite visible. They backed the incumbent up to evaluate previous policy performances and to set specific favoured policies as well. They deployed specific information to design specific policies to boost Herry’s popularity and affinity amongst local residents. They also helped to build the incumbent’s image in their family and neighbourhood.

What was the incentive for bureaucracy in Blitar to support the incumbent? The answer appears to be that the main motivation was to gain and maintain their posts in local government. To meet this incentive, the incumbent committed regulation violations in the rank order in the bureaucracy. He put his “formal supporters” into certain posts in the local

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<sup>230</sup>Source: <http://us.nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/195259-2010--ada-1-751-pelanggaran-di-pilkada> accessed on 31 May 2013.

<sup>231</sup>Source: <http://news.detik.com/read/2011/06/16/175735/1662013/10/bawaslu-terima-1221-pelanggaran-selama-pilkada-2011> accessed on 31 May 2013

<sup>232</sup>Interview on 26 June 2012.

<sup>233</sup>Interview with a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>234</sup>Interview with a local legislator on 26 June 2012 and a Muslim Mass-based Organisation’s activist as well as a teacher interviewed on 23 June 2012.

<sup>235</sup>Interview with a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>236</sup>Interview with a women activist as well as teacher on 9 July 2012 and a party activist as well as local legislator on 20 July 2012.

government structure and to some extent disobeyed the merit system stipulated in the apparatus' related regulations.<sup>237</sup>

In Javanese culture, there is a feudalistic attitude to the head and the subordinate. It is called as *ngunjuki* or, in a literal meaning, to give a drink to the boss, by giving praise and flattery. A subordinate or an employee will always seek to make the boss happy. In a practical meaning, it is the way of staffs to secure their positions (Hardjowirogo, 1984, pp. 13-14). Thus, the bureaucrats' behaviour in the *pilkada* has its cultural connection in Javanese tradition.

Included in the partisan bureaucrats are the heads of villages. The incident of a “*pocong*” oath undertaken by 15 village heads on 2 October 2010 (*Radar Blitar*, 6 and 7 October 2010), is clear evidence of village heads' alignment to support Herry. During the fieldwork, one of the initiators of the “*pocong* oath” was interviewed. He remarked that the Village Head Association (AKD) succeeded in recruiting 134 village heads to support Herry. The oath is an effective method to bond the commitment of village heads to support the incumbent. The initiator clearly remarked:

One month prior to the campaign, the *pocong* oath was undertaken to support Herry Noegroho and Rijanto to become the Blitar's regent and vice-regent. The *pocong* oath is a better choice than a blood thumb print. The *pocong* oath is a strategy to anticipate (village head) standing on 2 feet (double support). The *pocong* oath is also to give shock therapy to the heads of villages. If they have been “*dipocong*” (sworn) they won't be traitors, they will be real *pocong*...About 22 heads of villages representing all districts were “*dipocong*” (sworn). The content is, by the name of Allah to support Mr Herry-Rijanto and so on...<sup>238</sup>

The alignment of heads of villages to support Herry was very visible. They openly promoted Herry and his pair, Rijanto, to the villagers. Partisan village heads attempted to invite Herry to visit their village and promote him in a large scale mass program, such as shadow puppet shows (*wayangan*) and single electronic piano concerts (*elektonan*). In the southern part of Blitar, the incumbent was invited to the traditional *jaranan* dance performance. In addition to Herry, his rival Arif was also pursued with the similar effort, to come to villages, by inviting him to attend the same programs.<sup>239</sup> The efforts to facilitate the incumbent to promote his image were also recognised by the non-village heads. They stated that it was an advantage for the incumbent to stay in power. He had opportunities to deliver

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<sup>237</sup>Interview with a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>238</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012. *Pocong* is a kind of ghost which has the shape of a bolster. The belief in the existence of *pocong* exists only in Indonesia, especially in Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and other islands where Muslim inhabitants live. The *pocong* oath is done by a person in a state of the shroud, swathed like a person who has died (*pocong*). This oath is intended to prove an accusation or a case that little or no evidence at all. As a consequence, supposed the statement or promise is not true, it is believed that the person who performs the oath will get punishment or a curse from God. I received similar information about the incident of the “*pocong*” oath in 2010 from a party activist as well as a local legislator interviewed on 20 July 2012.

<sup>239</sup>Interview with a village head as well as one of the initiators of “*pocong*” oath on 4 July 2012.

speeches to village heads to support his candidature as well as to facilitate the incumbent to connect directly to villagers.<sup>240</sup> The incumbent's political consultant remarked that prior to the *pilkada*, Herry visited villages every weekend. Herry attempted to maximise the village head's functions in order to help him to meet with villagers.<sup>241</sup>

The incentives for village heads supporting Herry were mainly physical infrastructure projects implemented in their villages. It is important to demonstrate their leadership performance and it would be a credit for a village head amongst villagers. Prior to the *pilkada*, the incumbent promised partisan village heads to build infrastructure in their villages, especially roads and bridges.<sup>242</sup> After the *pilkada* was a time for bargaining with the incumbent to gain project priorities from local government in developing their villages. It was a kind of reward for them after supporting Herry during the *pilkada*. A village head as well as an AKD activist admitted that there was a difference in terms of development priorities between the villages in which the village head supported the incumbent prior to the *pilkada* and the villages in which the village head did not support Herry prior to the *pilkada*. As the supporting villages had emotional closeness to the incumbent, the majority of village development proposals were easily accepted. In 2012, a village head admitted that his village received a total allocation for project development of Rp 850 million (AUD 85,000), consisting of a village meeting hall development project, the Rural Infrastructure Development Program (PIIP), the National Program for People Empowerment (PNPM), and a *jasmas* (community aspiration net delivered by Blitar's legislators) project for constructing a gravel road in the village.<sup>243</sup>

Like the bureaucracy, politicians in the local council (DPRD) played important roles in supporting Herry to maintain office. They were mainly partisan politicians who represented political parties supporting Herry's candidature. As for legislators representing non-incumbent supporting parties, although they did not support Herry directly, still they were involved in the budgeting process and obtained benefits from their bargaining "budget approval" power with Herry and his assistance during the budgeting process in the allocation of *jasmas* funds.<sup>244</sup> They were indeed formal actors, but they pursued informal agreements to develop mutual support with the incumbent.

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<sup>240</sup>Interview with a party activist as well as a local legislator interviewed on 20 July 2012; a Muslim Mass-based Organisation's activist as well as a teacher interviewed on 23 June 2012.

<sup>241</sup>Interview on 16 July 2012.

<sup>242</sup>Interview with a party activist as well as local legislator interviewed on 20 July 2012; a local academic as well as a party activist on 4 July 2012.

<sup>243</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>244</sup>The explanation of the mechanism and sharing benefits gained by local legislators has been explained in the previous section of the chapter. See section 5.4.1.

There are four other categories of actors who supported Herry in the *pilkada*, namely the Blitar supporters foundation (YSB), professional associations, Muslim Women's organisations, partisan mass media and NGOs. These informal actors played roles to boost Herry's electability. At the same time, they gained group benefits distributed in their communities. YSB was established in 2001. The initial goal to establish YSB was to create an organisation binding groups of PSBI supporters in Blitar. In 2009 or one year prior to the *pilkada*, Herry's son was requested to chair YSB. One of the YSB leaders explained that he initially urged Herry's son to be active in PSBI prior to the *pilkada* in order to help his father gain support from PSBI supporters. YSB, then, positioned him as the chairman in 2009.<sup>245</sup>

YSB is a PSBI supporter coordinator aimed at bridging between PSBI's management and supporters. As the manager of PSBI, Herry had a harmonious relationship with YSB. In the YSB's organisational structure, Herry was positioned as a founder. He always attempted to support all YSB's activities, especially when YSB coordinated supporters to accompany PSBI when it played out of its home base in Blitar. The number of YSB official members is about 3,000. However, in many home games, PSBI are supported by more than 10,000 supporters. Approaching the *pilkada*, the supporter coordinator who was interviewed remarked that his intention in urging Herry's son to join YSB was aimed at gaining support for Herry's candidature in the *pilkada*. YSB could hold programs inviting Herry to attend to facilitate him to meet with large numbers of supporters.<sup>246</sup>

The initiative to direct YSB and supporters to favour the incumbent was due to continuity reasons. YSB was aware that Herry's rival in the *pilkada* was not a soccer lover. Thus, supporting Herry in the *pilkada* would maintain the commitment of local government to support PSBI in the domestic soccer league. In every meeting with supporters at the sub-district level (area coordinators), this argument was always delivered. Moreover, during the campaign period prior to the *pilkada*, the supporter coordinator motivated supporters to attend the incumbent's campaign. He and Herry's son spent voluntarily about Rp 7 million (AUD 7,000) to finance PSBI supporters' participation in the campaign. YSB also requested the area coordinators at the sub-district and village level to join the victory team in supporting Herry in the *pilkada*. The coordinators would be proud to be part of Herry's victory team, as well as meeting directly with Herry.<sup>247</sup>

The totality of supporters to support the incumbent had two main purposes. First was the intention to sustain Herry's commitment to support PSBI in the national soccer league.

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<sup>245</sup>Interview on 3 July 2012 and Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012.

<sup>246</sup>Interview with a supporter coordinator on 3 July 2012.

<sup>247</sup>Interview with a supporter coordinator on 3 July 2012 and a local journalist on 11 June 2012.

PSBI needed support to finance all of its competition activities. Herry was regarded as the proper person who could find financial solutions to sustain PSBI to stay in the league. The other was the individual goal to maintain this relationship with the incumbent and gain benefits from the implementation of local government projects. In the interviews, it was found that the coordinator was, indeed, a contractor who implemented the Blitar government's infrastructure projects.

The involvement of the Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI) of Blitar to support the incumbent was also important. An activist as well as a lawyer said that prior to the *pilkada* there was a movement of the association to encourage its members to support the incumbent.<sup>248</sup> In addition, Herry gained advantage by recruiting Rijanto as his running mate. Rijanto was the former of the head of education office who had close relationships with the association and the teachers.<sup>249</sup> As seen in table 5.14 teachers were potential supporters for the incumbent. In 2010, there were 13,215 teachers and 86.7 per cent of them (11,460) are PGRI members.

**Table 5.14** Number of Teachers in Blitar Regency in 2010

Classification	Kindergarten	Elementary school	Junior high school	Senior high school	Total Teachers
State teachers	-	7,362	1,935	656	9,953
Private Teachers	-	312	641	554	1,507
Not classified	1,755	-	-	-	1,755
Total	1,755	7,674	2,576	1,210	13,215

Source: The Central Statistics Agency of Blitar, 2011.

Moreover, Herry could gain support from kindergarten teachers. His informal MoU with the Organization of Pre-school Education Facilities (GOPTKI) prior to the *pilkada* strengthened the coalition of educational professional associations to support him. The MoU had invited the support of 984 kindergartens including their teachers and families.<sup>250</sup>

The involvement of Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslimat), the women's wing (for housewives) of the country's largest Islamic organization, in the 2010 *pilkada* is relatively debatable. Both Herry and the challenger's camp claimed this largest Muslim women's organisation's support. As the cadre of Nahdlatul Ulama, Arif claimed that he was fully supported by Muslimat after receiving a visitation of Muslimat's members and administrators from all the organisation's branches in Blitar on 20 September 2010 in his official residence.<sup>251</sup> In contrast, Herry was convinced that Muslimat had given its support to him

<sup>248</sup>Interview on 23 June 2012.

<sup>249</sup>Interview with a Muslim Mass-based Organisation activist as well as a teacher on 23 June 2012

<sup>250</sup>Interview with a woman activist as well as a teacher on 9 July 2012.

<sup>251</sup>Source: <http://kstv.co.id/berita-kstv/muslimat-dukung-cabup-arif-fuadi.html> accessed on 1 November 2013.

after the attendance of the Chairwoman of Muslimat, Khofifah Indarparawansa, at his invitation to meet in the *pendopo* (pavilion) of his official residence in Blitar prior to the *pilkada*.<sup>252</sup>

The significance of Muslimat's support is very important in supporting a candidate in Blitar. Muslimat is a grassroots organisation for housewives with a large scale membership throughout the regency. Muslimat has 22 branches in 22 sub-districts and more than 550 branches at the neighbourhood level.<sup>253</sup> The support of Muslimat's cadres to the pair of Harnen Sulistio-M Choirudin in the 2005 *pilkada* in Blitar was proven when this pair competed closely with Herry.<sup>254</sup> Herry's victory in the 2010 *pilkada* was also supported by Muslimat cadres' movements at the grass root level.<sup>255</sup> This assumption is logical since Herry's victory team members attempted to revive Muslimat's political networks supporting Harnen-Khoiruddin in the 2005 *pilkada*.<sup>256</sup>

The exploration of incentives gained by Muslimat after its involvement in supporting the incumbent is not an easy task. A local academic said that Muslimat gained organisational incentives (operational support) from local government covering all branches of Muslimat and other NU affiliated organisations in Blitar. In addition, local government also financially supports every activity performed by Muslimat and other NU affiliated organisations.<sup>257</sup> Nevertheless, examination of the 2011 and 2012 local budget of Blitar Regency did not find any specific budget items to support all NU's affiliated organisations, including Muslimat. Indeed, an explanation from a woman activist was that Muslimat's support to Herry in the *pilkada* was not merely endorsed by material transactional incentives. Muslimat considered the profile of Herry's running mate, Rijanto, rather than him. Rijanto paid more attention to education in the Regency. This woman activist testified that "I conveyed Rijanto's achievements when he was positioned as the head of sub-district and the head of the education office to the Muslimat networks and others". She also added that Rijanto is considered to be the prospective regent in the next *pilkada* (2015).<sup>258</sup>

Later, an answer was received to the question of why the involvement of Muslim women's organisations in supporting the incumbent was not sufficiently visible. It is because Muslimat NU has a policy that at the organisational level, Muslimat is neutral, or it is strictly

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<sup>252</sup>Interview with a women activist as well as teacher on 9 July 2012.

<sup>253</sup>Source: <http://www.nu.or.id/a.public-m.dinamic-s.detail-ids.2-id.42957-lang.id-c.daerah-t.Muslimat+NU+Blitar+Terus+Kawal+Kadernya-.php> accessed on 1 November 2013.

<sup>254</sup>In the 2005 *Pilkada* in Blitar Herry-Arif gained 223.099 votes and Harnen-Khoiruddin gained 213.419 votes. Source: <http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=131631> accessed on 1 November 2013.

<sup>255</sup>Interview with a local academic on 2 July 2012.

<sup>256</sup>Interview with a woman activist as well as a teacher on 9 July 2012.

<sup>257</sup>Interview with a local academic on 2 July 2012.

<sup>258</sup>Interview on 9 July 2012.



prohibited from involvement in politics and taking sides in political contests. Nonetheless, the central committee of Muslimat allows its cadres to engage in practical politics individually, such as to be active in political parties and run in political contests such as *pilkada* and other political races (Auliya, 2011, pp. 178-179). Thus, invisible engagement of Muslimat in supporting the incumbent is understandable. Although Muslimat did not officially support the incumbent, still it did not limit its cadres in Blitar Regency from being aligned to the incumbent. It would also be possible that some cadres would support the challenger.

Like Muslim women's organisations, the backing of "partisan" mass media and non-government organisations (NGOs) for the incumbent was also invisible as it was not supported by adequate evidence. It is hard to trace the link between favourable mass media and the incumbent. However, during Herry's first term in office from 2006 to 2011, there was no bad news relating to his personal leadership performance published in mass media, especially in local mass media. A Muslim mass-based organisation activist remarked clearly that there was no legal issue addressed to the incumbent during his first term in office. The public perceived that the incumbent was a clean leader.<sup>259</sup> Thus, to examine the role of mass media as an informal actor supporting the incumbent is not sufficiently relevant.

Yet, two years after the *pilkada*, mass media covered two legal cases linked to Herry.<sup>260</sup> The silence of the mass media prior to the *pilkada*, indeed, was part of running a campaign to sustain his well-liked image amongst residents. The incumbent prevented critical mass media by delivering advantages through media placements in local mass media, especially in local newspapers. A local NGO activist used the term "conditioning" to explain the local government's efforts to adjust unpleasant news in order to build good opinions about local government and the incumbent's leadership.<sup>261</sup> The incumbent is aware that the press cannot be silenced, but it is possible to be softened. By actively "delivering benefits" via media placements in local mass media, this helped the incumbent to prevent bad news concerning local government. Mass media would first confirm the news with the local government before being conveyed to public.<sup>262</sup>

One year after the 2010 *pilkada*, Herry issued the Regent of Blitar's decree No. 5/2011 providing grants to the Indonesian Journalists Forum. The decree stipulated that grants to communities and community organizations were aimed at increasing the participation in the implementation of local development or functionally related to the support of the regional

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<sup>259</sup>Interview on 23 June 2012.

<sup>260</sup>See footnote number 60.

<sup>261</sup>Interview on 23 June 2013.

<sup>262</sup>Interview with a local political observer on 16 July 2012.

administration. As mentioned in the 2011 local budget expenditure report, the amount of this grant was Rp 50 million (AUD 5,000) with the account code of 5.1.00.00 .4.05.06. The title of this expenditure was grant expenditure to the Blitar Journalists Forum under the coordination of the Public Relations and Protocol Division. No supporting evidence was found that the allocation of this grant was part of the agreement between the incumbent and journalists in Blitar to adjust local government and the incumbent's related news prior to the *pilkada*. Also, this grant was only allocated in 2011. No similar budget item was found in the 2012 local budget.

According to the data released by the Office of Religious Ministry in Blitar, the majority of the population in the regency is Muslim, covering 93.6 per cent (1,186,324) of the total population in 2010 (Central Statistics Agency of Blitar Regency, 2011, p. 138). Accordingly, Muslim people are potential voters contested for by both candidates in the *pilkada*. One of the strategies to gain support from Muslim voters is by approaching Islamic religious leaders (*kiai*). The *kiai* is assumed to be a person who has many followers. Every *kiai*'s suggestion will be considered as a reference for followers actions, including in voting. In addition, the majority of *kiai* chair *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools). In 2009, there were 148 *pesantren* with the total of 26,577 *santri* (pupils of the *pesantren*) (central statistics agency of Blitar Regency, 2011, p.191).

Hence, it is logical to see the efforts of both candidates to approach *kiai* since they represent religious leaders with many followers amongst Blitar Muslim society. Herry was perceived as a regent who has a close relationship with *kiai*.<sup>263</sup> Prior to the *pilkada*, Herry frequently visited mosques and *pesantren*. Accordingly, Herry had a close relationship with *kiai* and *pesantren* in some sub-districts, especially in Sanankulon, Udanawu, Wonodadi, and Srengat.<sup>264</sup>

Like the incumbent, the challenger Arif Fuadi was known as a NU cadre who also had a close relationship with *kiai*. Such a position would possibly challenge Herry's sympathy amongst *kiai*'s followers and other Muslim communities. In order to anticipate Arif's closeness to *kiai*, the incumbent undertook transactional relationships with *kiai*. Nonetheless, two participants who were interviewed were reluctant to clearly mention the rewards for *kiai* who supported the incumbent. They just mentioned that every *kiai* has "a price". This is a

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<sup>263</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012; a Muslim Mass-based Organisation activist as well as a teacher on 23 June 2012; a party activist as well as a local legislator on 20 July 2012; a woman activist as well as teacher on 9 July 2012.

<sup>264</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012; a women activist as well as teacher on 9 July 2012.

symbol of the financial incentives received by *kiai*.<sup>265</sup> By referring to the relationship between *kiai* and the regent in Bojonegoro (another regency in East Java), Fahman used the term “*kiai saba pendapa bupati*” (*kiai* visits the regent’s official residence) to depict the fact of the poor behaviour of *kiai* who visit the regent’s house, aiming at gaining donations from the regent. The impact of this particular relationship is the permissiveness of religious leaders towards the regent’s acts and the local government’s policies. *Kiai*, then, become less critical of the regent’s policies (2004, pp. 84-85).

The other practice is the role of a *kiai* as a vote getter amongst Muslim voters as well as vote mobiliser for his followers. A *kiai*’s alignment to a certain candidate in the *pilkada* implies a price for support. As a strategic vote getter, a *kiai* possibly bargains his respected position amongst Muslim voters with a candidate in the *pilkada* (Umam, 2006, p. 124). Research in Sumenep Regency, East Java, revealed that a *kiai* can mobilise his followers or people who have a close relationship with him, as well as those who frequently participate in the *kiai*’s initiated activities (Rasyid, 2010, p. 88). In fact, the motive of a *kiai* to support a candidate in the *pilkada* cannot be generalised because of materially related benefits. A case study in Pekalongan Regency, Central Java revealed that the role of a *kiai* is to guide and control preferred candidates in the *pilkada*. The *kiai* plays the function of mediation between candidate and voters. Hence, the elected candidate gives more space to hear the voters’ voices (Assayuti, 2013, p. 73). Therefore, the *kiais*’ involvement in favouring the incumbent in the 2010 *pilkada* in Blitar remains unclear.

Having explained the informal politics attached to the incumbent, it is important to examine their contribution to the incumbent’s survival in the *pilkada*. One of the indicators to see the visible significance of informal actors and informal practices in supporting Herry is through the comparison between legislative election results at the local level in 2009 and the 2010 *pilkada*’s results. There is a gap between both election results, indicating the role of informal actors as well as informal political practices in supporting the incumbent to stay in his post. As seen in table 5.2, Herry and his pair Rijanto were supported by the coalition of six parties controlling 34 of 50 seats in the local parliament or equivalent to 68 per cent of votes in the 2009 legislative election. This proportion, indeed, is not equal to the incumbent’s votes in the 2010 *pilkada* as he gained only 59.7 per cent of votes. The gap of 8.3 per cent of votes indicates the less significant role of parties’ support for Herry’s success. At the same time, this gap also shows the possible explanation of the crucial contribution of informal political practices and actors in supporting the incumbent.

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<sup>265</sup>Interview with a Muslim Mass-based Organisation activist on 23 June 2012; a party activist as well as a local legislator on 20 July 2012.

At the national level, the mismatch between legislative election results and the *pilkada* results has been identified since 2006, or one and a half years after the first *pilkada* was implemented in June 2005. The Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) compared 296 *pilkada* results (up to December 2006) and the 2004 legislative election results. The number of winning parties in the 2004 legislative election which sustained their victory in the *pilkada* only reached 43.1 per cent. In other words, the majority of winning parties in the 2004 legislative election were unsuccessful in gaining victory in the *pilkada* (LSI, 2007: 2). LSI found that the *pilkada* is a competition of individuals, which is different from the legislative election, which is a contest of parties. Thus, the marketable proposed party figure has most probability of winning the *pilkada*. Also, the performance of the party machine at the grass roots level and the support of loyal party voters determine the triumph of a party's candidate in winning the race (LSI, 2008, p. 27). In support of LSI's conclusion, a local academic in Malang commented on the low performance of parties who supported Herry in the *pilkada*. Supposing the coalition succeeded through their political machine and maintained their voters' loyalty, Herry should have gained minimally 70 per cent of votes in the re-election bid.<sup>266</sup>

As part of the informal actors, businessmen are effective in supporting the incumbent by providing funds for the campaign, distributing logistics independently, such as free groceries and shirts, and providing facilities to support Herry's campaigns, such as providing trucks to transport people to attend his campaigns.<sup>267</sup> A local academic as well as a party activist also remarked that informal actors contributed to Herry's victory in the *pilkada*. One of the contributions was the action of a businessman distributing "logistics" to influence voters. These logistics are particularly addressed to 25 – 30 per cent of potential swinging voters (undecided voters).<sup>268</sup> The distribution of logistics committed by businessmen was effective because the majority of the population in Blitar is less educated. Thus, they are easily influenced by vote-buying or pork-barrelling incentives.<sup>269</sup>

The weakness of party coalitions in supporting Herry was substituted by the role of informalities performed by informal and formal actors. In this study, it was found that the contribution of businessmen in delivering incentives to potential swinging voters was vital to support Herry's victory as well as a compensation for the lack of loyalty of voters to political

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<sup>266</sup> He is also the challenger's consultant, interview on 24 July 2012.


<sup>267</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012; a construction businessman on 26 June 2006; a local journalist on 6 June 2012; a party activist as well as a construction businessman on 26 June 2012.

<sup>268</sup> Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>269</sup> Interview with a construction businessman on 26 June 2006.

parties.<sup>270</sup> Regarding the political party machine, to some extent, this possibly worked, though it did not fully succeed in encouraging voters to vote for Herry, as he was proposed by the coalition. A party activist as well as a member of Herry's victory team argued that his party had issued an edict that all cadres should vote for the candidate supported by the party, if not, they would be fired.<sup>271</sup> However, the significant contribution of the party coalition to support Herry is also arguable. The coalition was not effective as there was no solid interest amongst them to support the incumbent. Herry was ideally supported by PDI-P and PKS which had good party machines as well as loyal voters.<sup>272</sup>

**Chart 5.4** Votes for the Incumbent based on Party Choice in the 2009 Legislative Election



Source: Poll result conducted by a pollster employed by the incumbent.<sup>273</sup>

Chart 5.4 shows a poll result conducted two weeks prior to the *pilkada*. The poll says that the average of voters who votes for six allied parties proposing Herry-Rijanto reached only 71.32 per cent. The highest contribution to the incumbent's ballots came from PKS's voters. Those voting for PKS in the 2009 Legislative Election and who voted for Herry-Rijanto as the pair nominated by PKS in the *pilkada* reached 85.71 per cent. The second most loyal voters are PDI-P voters that reached 75.17 per cent. With the average of 71.32 per cent of voters' loyalty, the incumbent was predicted to gain 48.95 per cent of votes in the *pilkada*

<sup>270</sup>Party loyalty is also similar to party tie or party identification or party alignment. This assumption is also supported by a party activist as well as a local legislator who said that party loyalty is only effective amongst party cadres, especially for those who hold party posts at the sub-district level. Interview on 20 July 2012.

<sup>271</sup>Interview on 26 June 2012.

<sup>272</sup>Interview with a local government staff on 15 June 2012.

<sup>273</sup> Poll was conducted on 18-28 October 2010. Due to the principle of anonymity, I covered the pollster's name.

(71.32 per cent x 68 per cent of accumulated party coalition's votes). Herry-Rijanto, indeed, gained a better vote of 59.7 per cent in the 2010 *pilkada*. Thus, it is reasonable to say that informalities attached to the incumbent contributed to improving his electability in the *pilkada*.

In addition to businessmen, the contribution of informal actors, as performed by partisan bureaucrats was involved in the play of incentives to support Herry. They set certain policies delivering direct benefits to the residents, approaching the *pilkada*. Local government disbursed APBD to certain organisations to create programs delivering direct benefits to local residents, such as PKK (family welfare movement). A local TV station broadcast PKK's social services in Wates Sub-district on 7 October 2010 or one month prior to the *pilkada*. Herry's wife as well as the chairwoman of PKK of Blitar Regency organised this activity and directly contacted local residents, especially women, children, and elderly people. In this charity activity, PKK provided free medical and nutritional services and free groceries for all participants. The local TV station also reported that the similar activities were carried out in other sub-districts.<sup>274</sup>


In addition to PKK, other supporting organisations also accepted contributions from the local budget, namely the Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (KORPRI), the Organization of Pre-school Education Facilities (GOPTKI), and the Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI).<sup>275</sup> In the APBD, budget allocations for PKK and other organisations were put in the post of grant expenditures. Interestingly, in the pre-*pilkada* period the amount in this post showed an increasing trend and in the post-*pilkada* period, it showed the opposite trend. As seen in chart 5.5, the top-upsurge in grant expenditure was budgeted in 2010 or along with the *pilkada* and reached Rp 27.72 billion (AUD 2.772 million). It was almost tripled more than one year prior to the *pilkada*. On the contrary, the grants decreased drastically to Rp 15.51 billion (AUD 1.551 million) one year after the *pilkada*. In the following years, the grants also showed a declining trend. Thus, the role of partisan bureaucrats in the allocation of grant expenditure to certain organisations supporting the incumbent is fairly visible.

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<sup>274</sup> Source: <http://kstv.co.id/berita-kstv/pkk-blitar-kunjungi-balita-dan-lansia.html> accessed on 5 November 2013.

<sup>275</sup> Interview with a local legislator on 26 June 2012.

**Chart 5.5** Grant Expenditure of Blitar Regency 2007-2013 (Rp billion)



Source: The data of grant expenditures from 2007 to 2010 are quoted from a master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. The data of grant expenditures from 2011 to 2013 are quoted from the Regency of Blitar's APBD.

In addition to delivering incentives or direct benefits to local residents, informal and formal actors contributed to Herry's survival in building his good image amongst residents. The village heads who were in favour of the incumbent actively involved Herry in social contact with villagers in many villagers' forums. They even directly connected the incumbent with the villagers by inviting him to attend some villages' ceremonies.<sup>276</sup> Moreover, the role of teachers and civil servants contributed to creating social contact for Herry with local residents. As teachers are respected amongst local residents in Blitar, especially amongst villagers, their suggestions were possibly followed by the villagers.<sup>277</sup>

The last contribution of informal politics to the incumbent's survival in the *pilkada* was in minimising rivalry risk. Herry succeeded in embracing both informal and formal actors to support him in the *pilkada*. Indeed, businessmen showed both risky and supportive behaviour relating to the *pilkada* as they frequently pursued opportunistic strategies in supporting candidates in the *pilkada*. Businessmen usually support more than one candidate so as to anticipate all possible results of the *pilkada*. They will donate more funds to a candidate who has a better chance to win the race. Amongst businessmen, this strategy is known as "to stand

<sup>276</sup>Interview with a village head on 4 July 2012; a local academic as well as a party activist on 4 July 2012.

<sup>277</sup>Interview with a Muslim Mass-based Organisation activist as well as a teacher interviewed on 23 June 2012; a local journalist on 11 June 2012; a party activist as well as a construction businessman on 26 June 2012.

in two legs”.<sup>278</sup> At the same time, businessmen could also prevent disliked candidates from running or winning in the *pilkada*, such as, they might pay some people to protest about a candidate, which can lead to the decline of trust in the candidate.<sup>279</sup> Or, they can also do negative or black campaigns to destroy the candidate’s image. On the other hand, Herry succeeded in minimising the destructive behaviour of businessmen, relating to his post, in the regency.

Furthermore, instead of inviting resistance amongst bureaucrats, Herry succeeded in gaining support from them. His strategy of employing his staff to set policies favouring civil servants was effective in gaining their sympathy as well as minimising the risk of civil servants’ alignments to his rival, Arif Fuadi, who was also well known amongst them.

### *5.5.2. The Strong Support of PDI-P’s Networks in Probolinggo*

The case study in Probolinggo Municipality revealed similar practices of informal politics pursued by the incumbent. In an interview with a local businessman, he made a crucial statement to portray Buchori’s relationship with informal actors in the municipality. The businessman remarked, “He embraces all people and political parties”.<sup>280</sup> This statement implies a literal meaning that the incumbent attempts to make a close relationship with common people, elites, and all political parties in the municipality. It also implies the incumbent’s leadership style in seeking to gain support from all potential supporters.

The first non-formal network linked to the incumbent is the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). He was the chairman of the party in the municipality until 2005. Due to his position, the incumbent has strong support from PDI-P both in the local legislature<sup>281</sup> and at the grassroots level. Based on the fieldwork findings, PDI-P’s support to the incumbent does not characterise PDI-P as a political party only. More than that, two local journalists mentioned it as “PDI-P networks”<sup>282</sup> covering also non-PDI-P supporters. During his first term in office, the incumbent gained strong support from the PDI-P’s faction in the local legislature. Also, a legislator from PDI-P (Mr Kusnan) chaired the legislature. Therefore, the incumbent was able to secure his policy choices at the local legislature.<sup>283</sup> Not only in securing the incumbent’s policy choices, PDI-P apparently supported the incumbent to ward off some negative issues addressed to him. For instance, PDI-P’s activists reported

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<sup>278</sup>Interview with anticorruption activist on 23 June 2012; a construction businessman on 26 June 2012; a Blitar election commissioner on 4 June 2012; a women activist as well as teacher on 9 July 2012.

<sup>279</sup>Interview with a local journalist on 11 June 2012.

<sup>280</sup> Interview on 19 October 2012.

<sup>281</sup> Interview with a local legislator on 18 October 2012.

<sup>282</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 16 October 2012; a female local journalist on 24 October 2012.

<sup>283</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 16 October 2012.



the People's Information Centre (LIRA)'s activists to the Probolinggo Municipality Police Office (*Polresta*) and accused them of defamation when LIRA published corruption allegations committed by the incumbent in 2008 (*Radar Bromo*, 2 July 2008). During fieldwork in the municipality (16 October 2012), there was a banner posted on the fence of the PDI-P' office in Brantas Street of Probolinggo Municipality. The banner said “*GANGGU WALIKOTA SAMA DENGAN GANGGU PDI PERJUANGAN... JANGAN ASAL NGOMONG... BUKTIKAN*” (Destabilising the mayor is equal to bothering PDI-P... Don't just scandalise... Prove it). When asked, a local journalist said that this banner related to the conflict between LIRA and the incumbent, as LIRA revealed the corruption accusations against the incumbent.<sup>284</sup> This was similar to banners posted at LIRA's office by PDI-P activists when they protested against LIRA on 1 October 2012. About 1,000 of PDI-P's sympathisers held a demonstration in front of the LIRA office in Probolinggo Municipality to react to the LIRA president's statement concerning the accusations of corruption against the incumbent in 2008.<sup>285</sup>

**Figure 5.12** A banner to support the incumbent



Source: Sobari (2012)

PDI-P networks include also support from other actors, namely business and non-government organisations (NGOs). Local business actors supported the incumbent through PDI-P.<sup>286</sup> They supported the incumbent's activities or programs. A local businessman testified that entrepreneurs gaining projects from local government mostly supported the incumbent. Relating to the incumbent's campaign, entrepreneurs donated banners and

<sup>284</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 16 October 2012.

<sup>285</sup> Source: <http://surabaya.tribunnews.com/2012/10/01/massa-pdip-geruduk-kantor-lira-probolinggo> accessed on 16 October 2012.

<sup>286</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 16 October 2012; a female local journalist on 24 October 2012.

campaign billboards promoting the incumbent. They also donated shirts during the campaign, which were distributed to the campaign participants. Moreover, entrepreneurs donate rice to support the incumbent's social service activities. They met with the incumbent informally when he performed duties outside the town. Or, the incumbent called entrepreneurs to chat with them to gain inputs. At the same time, entrepreneurs lobbied the incumbent to gain projects. The local businessman also admitted that he was active as an administrator in a PDI-P wing organisation with the incumbent.<sup>287</sup> In addition to gaining projects from local government, businesses also carried out national government projects implemented in the municipality. To gain the projects, similar to practices in the Regency of Blitar and Trenggalek, local businesses performed the practice of *nyenggek* or brokering activities between local businessmen, the national legislators, and the ministry officials.<sup>288</sup> Some local businessmen sponsored the incumbent to "pick-up" some national government projects to be implemented in the municipality.<sup>289</sup>

In addition to joining the PDI-P networks, some other businesses had different interests in supporting the incumbent. A local businessman interviewed during fieldwork described the relationship between business and the incumbent in a proverb, "Without entrepreneurs, the ruler will not be successful. Also, entrepreneurs will not be successful, if they are not close with the ruler".<sup>290</sup> The businessman, then, explained that both business and the incumbent have a reciprocal relationship. In order to run their businesses smoothly, entrepreneurs needed to approach the incumbent. In addition to obtaining a business licensing permit, entrepreneurs would also ask for protection for their activities. Entrepreneurs play roles to support the incumbent, which then benefit the people. He mentioned two prominent companies in the municipality running such relationships with the incumbent.<sup>291</sup> Furthermore, entrepreneurs participated to succeed in local government programs, such as the program to build the city gardens.<sup>292</sup> For local employers who frequently implement local government projects, the reason to support the incumbent is very rational. They assume that the incumbent has offered a certainty to their businesses in terms of a mutual relationship. If the incumbent is not re-elected, it would be costly for local employers, as they have to face

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<sup>287</sup> Interview on 4 November 2012. The information about local businesses' donations is also supported by a political party activist affiliated to the incumbent in an interview on 30 October 2012, a member of *panwaslu* in an interview on 17 October 2012, and a local female journalist on 24 October 2012. The information about businesses' lobbying is also confirmed in an interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012.

<sup>288</sup> I have explained about *nyenggek* in the previous chapter.

<sup>289</sup> Interview with a local businessman on 4 November 2012; a female local journalist on 24 October 2012.

<sup>290</sup> Interview on 4 November 2012.

<sup>291</sup> Interview on 4 November 2012. A female local journalist also confirmed this statement (interview on 24 October 2012).

<sup>292</sup> Interview with a local businessman as well as the secretary of local trade and industry chamber (Kadin) on 19 October 2012.

uncertainty in terms of a different relationship with the new mayor.<sup>293</sup> The term “rational status quo” represents the employers’ motives to support the incumbent for his survival.

PDI-P networks also cover NGO alliances in the municipality. The support of concern for the city alliance (ALPETA) for the incumbent appeared publicly. A chairman of a local NGO included in ALPETA’s network was also, indeed, a PDI-P activist. Moreover, the other chairman of a similar NGO in the alliance gained a post in a local government owned company due to his consistent support to the incumbent.<sup>294</sup> ALPETA and its local NGO networks supported the incumbent by making some movements to counter negative issues addressed to the incumbent. Prior to the 2008 *pilkada*, ALPETA protested to the commander of 0820 Military District of Probolinggo since they found some army members’ involvements in the *pilkada*, which were likely to harm the incumbent’s camp (*Radar Bromo*, 12 June 2012). Furthermore, ALPETA was involved in the demonstration led by PDI-P of Probolinggo chapter to protest at LIRA on 1 October 2012.<sup>295</sup> Hence, it is very clear that local NGOs affiliated with the incumbent were also part of the PDI-P’s networks.

The demonstration which took place on 1 October 2012 was also supported by the association of street vendors (*Paguyuban PKL*).<sup>296</sup> The involvement of PKL in this mass action shows the grass root support for the incumbent. A previous section of the chapter explained that some local government programs were giving direct benefits to micro and small business, including PKL. A local female journalist remarked that PKL is grateful to the incumbent for his supportive policies for PKL. These policies, then, encouraged PKL to support the incumbent in the *pilkada*.<sup>297</sup> A local businessman used a term *mengayomi* (to protect) to depict the relationship between the incumbent and PKL. As a result, it is logical for PKL to support the incumbent.<sup>298</sup>

Similar to PKL, pedicab drivers (*abang becak*) strongly supported the incumbent. In the 2008 *pilkada*, pedicab drivers were amongst the most effective supporters who encouraged the incumbent’s landslide victory.<sup>299</sup> The incumbent’s generous actions and policies were

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<sup>293</sup> Interview with a local businessman on 4 November 2012.

<sup>294</sup> Interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012. See also an article authored by Djuni Pristiyanto in *Surabaya Post*, 19 August 2000. In the article the author mentions that these NGOs affiliated to PDI-P and PAN.

<sup>295</sup> Source: <http://surabaya.tribunnews.com/2012/10/01/massa-pdip-geruduk-kantor-lira-probolinggo> accessed on 16 October 2012.

<sup>296</sup> Source: <http://surabaya.tribunnews.com/2012/10/01/massa-pdip-geruduk-kantor-lira-probolinggo> accessed on 16 October 2012.

<sup>297</sup> Interview on 24 October 2012

<sup>298</sup> Interview on 4 November 2012

<sup>299</sup> Interview with a commissioner of Probolinggo municipality general election commission (KPUD) on 11 October 2012. According to the Local Development and Planning Agency, the number of *pedicab driver* was 1,313 people in 2008. Two years later, the Community Empowerment Office of Probolinggo Municipality released that this number increased to 5,075 people. The local government does not issue a local regulation to

appreciated by pedicab drivers. In an interview, a pedicab driver expressed his gratitude to the incumbent as he received a benefit from a local government program to support his micro business. His wife was one of the beneficiaries of this program. He added, “residents gained benefits (local government’s programs), perhaps, 80 per cent of the residents had received aid”.<sup>300</sup> A commissioner of KPUD said that while the incumbent was in office, especially in the first term, he cleverly developed a personal touch in some local government programs. For pedicab drivers, he donated tyres and paint to repair their pedicabs.<sup>301</sup> Moreover, the association of pedicab drivers committed to supporting the incumbent when LIRA linked some corruption cases to the incumbent. On the same day, when PDI-P, PKL, and ALPETA held mass actions to protest at LIRA on 1 October 2012, the association of pedicab drivers reported Jusuf Rizal, the president of LIRA, to *Polresta* for insulting and defaming the mayor. An NGO named Red and White Troop (*Laskar Merah Putih*) accompanied the association of pedicab drivers to report to *Polresta*.<sup>302</sup>

The incumbent also actively sought to gain support from Islamic religious leaders (*kiai*) and the most influential Muslim mass-based organisations in the municipality, namely *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU). In addition to being an NU member, the incumbent had been one of the chairs in the NU of Probolinggo chapter from 1997 to 2002. Due to his position in NU, the incumbent had a close relationship with religious leaders and Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), mainly those affiliated to NU.<sup>303</sup> Then, there is a claim that NU and religious leaders’ support contributed to the incumbent’s success in leading the municipality.<sup>304</sup> Amongst Madurese people, religious leaders have a respected position. Prior to the Independence Era, Kuntowijoyo found that religious leader were one of the village elites with specialisation in religious rituals. The religious leaders were considered to be the most learned men in the village (Kuntowijoyo, 1980, p. 311). In the New Order Era (1966-1998), a *kiai* is considered to be a respected person with a strong influence amongst *santri* (a pupil of the *pesantren*), *bindhereh* (a *kiai*’s descendants), *santri*’s parents, and the community around and attached to an Islamic boarding school. In this era, religious leaders were vote getters who could direct their followers to vote for certain political parties which have a close relationship with religious leaders. In the Reform Era (after 1998), the religious leaders

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limit the number of pedicab drivers. Thus, the number of pedicab drivers increased very significantly within two years [Municipality, 2011, p. 2].

<sup>300</sup> Interview on 15 October 2012.

<sup>301</sup> Interview on 11 October 2012. The aid is disbursed by the Social Office of Probolinggo Municipality. The incumbent gives the aid symbolically to the representative of *pedicab driver*.

<sup>302</sup> Source: <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2012/10/01/2024376/Merasa.Wali.Kota.Difitnah.PDIP.Demo.LIRA> accessed on 16 October 2012.

<sup>303</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 16 October 2012.

<sup>304</sup> Interview with a secretary of Muslim mass-based organisation on 24 October 2012.

extended their roles as politicians and political brokers, relying on their religious influence with their followers to support a certain candidate (Zamroni, 2007, pp. 174-175). Hence, it was reasonable for the incumbent to seek to develop a close relationship with religious leaders and Islamic boarding schools since they have special places amongst society or their followers.

The incumbent personally sponsored *kiai pesantren* (who chair an Islamic boarding school) and *kiai langgar* (who teach the Qur'an recitation in neighbourhoods) to perform the *Umrah* and *Haj* pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca.<sup>305</sup> He began this charity in 2006. Every year, the incumbent despatched 5-8 religious leaders to perform the *Umrah* and *Haj*.<sup>306</sup> Furthermore, the incumbent would visit and stay overnight in *kiais'* residences. This activity was unusual for the previous mayors in the municipality.<sup>307</sup> Approaching the *pilkada*, the incumbent published news of some activities involving religious leaders in *Radar Bromo*, the most influential local newspaper in the municipality. For example, he published news about the anniversary of *Isra Mikraj*<sup>308</sup> conducted in his residence on 30 June 2008. The anniversary was attended by two chairmen of NU of the East Java chapter, the chairman of Indonesia's *Ulema* council (MUI) of the Probolinggo chapter and orphans and pupils from a big Islamic boarding school in the municipality (*Radar Bromo*, 2 July 2008). The incumbent also attempted to involve religious leaders in political activity. For example, the incumbent invited the chairman of MUI of the Probolinggo chapter and the highest leader (*rais syuriah*) of NU of the Probolinggo chapter to the PDI-P's cadre meeting with the Chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri on 14 July 2008 (*Radar Bromo*, 15 July 2008). The incumbent also utilised the local government's programs in celebrating *Isra Mikraj* to invite religious leaders and pupils of a big Islamic boarding school. The celebration took place in the incumbent's residence on 3 August 2008, attended by religious leaders, local government officials, MUI leaders, local legislators, and *kejari* (*Radar Bromo*, 4 August 2008). Based on signs put in these publications, they are categorised as advertorials (adv.) or advertisements presented in journalistic language.

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<sup>305</sup>Umrah and Haj are journeys to the Holy City of Mecca, particularly in the Haram Mosque. However, Umrah and Haj are performed differently in time and place. A Muslim can perform *Umrah* at any time (every day, every month, every year) and it is performed only in Mecca. The Haj can only be carried out in several days in the Dzulhizzah Islamic month. The Haj is also performed out of the City of Mecca.

<sup>306</sup>Source: <http://www.nu.or.id/a.public-m.dinamic-s.detail-ids.2-id.27006-lang.id-c.daerah-t.Memahami+Hakikat+Dzikir-.php> accessed on 4 March 2014. I first got information about this activity through some interviews with a political party activist affiliated to the incumbent on 30 October 2012; a local journalist on 16 October 2012; a commissioner of Probolinggo municipality general election commission (KPUD) on 11 October 2012; an activist of Muslim mass-based organisation on 25 October 2012;

<sup>307</sup> Interview with a member of *panwaslu* on 17 October 2012

<sup>308</sup>This is one of the important events for Muslim. In the *Isra Mikraj* the Prophet Muhammad was ordered by God to perform prayers five times a day.

**Figure 5.13** Religious leaders in Advertorials



Source: Sobari (2012); the photographs are taken from *Radar Bromo* 15 July and 4 August 2008 editions.

Similar to the incumbent's networks in Blitar Regency, the incumbent gained strong support from bureaucrats. The incumbent had some heads of local offices performing think tank functions to create programs directly affecting the local residents. For example, the program of 1,000 city gardens was designed by the head of the environmental office.<sup>309</sup> The incumbent also gained benefit from his position as an incumbent. Local government offices frequently promote their programs in outdoor media, such as banners and billboards. An activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation testified that he saw the local education office display banners picturing the incumbent.<sup>310</sup> Moreover, in order to control bureaucrats, the incumbent carefully oversaw the local government's promotion policies. To fill some important positions, the incumbent appointed those who were close to him.<sup>311</sup>

Having explained the incumbent's policy behaviour and the informal networks attached to him, the next discussion attempts to link the logic of both factors to the incumbent's survival in the 2008 *Pilkada*. The source of this explanation refers to the government and non-government participants' answers concerning the logic of the incumbent's survival. Comparing tables 7.3 and 7.4 shows that the incumbent succeeded in obtaining more votes than the number of party alliance ballots supporting his candidacy. The incumbent was nominated by the alliance of 14 parties with 73,710 (65.1 per cent) share of the votes in the 2004 Legislative Election at the municipality level. In the 2008 *pilkada*, the incumbent's votes exceeded (89,212 votes or 74.55 per cent) the accumulation of the coalition's ballots.

<sup>309</sup> Interview with a member of *panwaslu* on 17 October 2012; a local academic on 8 October 2008; a local NGO activist on 15 October 2012; a local journalist on 16 October 2012.

<sup>310</sup> Interview on 25 October 2012.

<sup>311</sup> Interview with a local businessman on 4 November 2012.

To explain the logic of this landslide triumph, some points based on explanations from the government and non-government participants are needed.

The incumbent's populist policy choices contributed to constructing political credits for the incumbent. These policy choices were responsive to the needs of the majority of people in the municipality. A local legislator remarked that the incumbent's key success in surviving was his responsive policy choices and budgeting. He succeeded in arranging a responsive local budget that fitted people's needs and current problems, with the assistance of his staff.<sup>312</sup> For example, infrastructure development policy was emphasised at the neighbourhood level, as were pro-poor health and education services, and other material aid.<sup>313</sup>

These tangible policy outputs were combined with some philanthropically biased programs and activities. The incumbent put his interest into giving aid to residents who needed assistance due to their disadvantageous situations, such as funeral aid, tier aid for pedicab drivers, and free groceries. Also, his extraordinary activities of *blusukan* (visiting community meeting points or community spots) and participatory dialogues and complaint handling, such as *Cangkru'an*, *Walikota Menjawab*, and *Laporo Rek* have sparked people's admiration for him. A member of KPUD remarked that the incumbent was clever in combining popular leadership and communication styles.<sup>314</sup> As a result, people perceived that the incumbent was a good mayor and he was worthy to be re-elected.<sup>315</sup> A political consultant strengthened this logic. The consultant mentioned several populist local government policies credited to the incumbent, namely health policy, education policy, and the empowerment of street vendors (PKL). To support these policies, the incumbent had created a local budget to sponsor pro-people policies for two years prior to the *pilkada*. The consultant also added that the incumbent carried out two popular activities that were preferred by local residents. He wanted to receive feedback from the people. Moreover, the incumbent attempted to develop a close relationship with the people. He was not reluctant to attend all the community's invitations and activities.<sup>316</sup>

In addition to inviting people's sympathy, the incumbent succeeded in developing supportive networks from informal actors, local legislators, and bureaucrats. To some extent, the loyalty to the incumbent created intolerance towards critics and opposition addressed to the incumbent. PDI-P and its networks were very reactive when there was an individual or

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<sup>312</sup> Interview on 18 October 2012.

<sup>313</sup> Interview with the secretary of local health office on 24 October 2012; the secretary of public works office on 19 October 2012; the head of program division of the Probolinggo Education Office on 24 October 2012.

<sup>314</sup> Interview on 11 October 2012.

<sup>315</sup> Interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012.

<sup>316</sup> Interview on 16 July 2012.

group opposing the incumbent. The demonstration to protest against LIRA undertaken by PDI-P, the association of PKL, ALPETA, and the association of pedicab drivers is an example of a defensive reaction from the incumbent's supporters. Even, Safri Agung Sugiharto, the secretary of LIRA of the Probolinggo chapter had HCL (chloride acid) thrown in his face by two unknown people on 5 December 2012 or one month after the demonstration. Police could not identify the people committing this action and their motives.<sup>317</sup>

The incumbent's mutual relationship with local elites, namely religious leaders, *pesantren*, NU, employers, NGOs, and party elites succeeded in preventing the emergence of rivals who could undermine his influence. As a result, they were controllable and the incumbent could minimise the risk of political rivalry to him. Also, the incumbent did not receive challenges from non-government institutions. Thus, based on the fieldwork findings, in addition to LIRA, there was only one NGO which was courageous enough to publicly criticise the incumbent, namely LPPNRI.

Finally, during his first term in office, the incumbent was able to control bureaucrats' and legislators' support. Some creative bureaucrats supported the incumbent to create and implement populist programs which were credited to him. Moreover, his party colleagues in the local legislature succeeded in supporting his populist policies although PDI-P was not the winning party in the 2004 Legislative Election at the Municipality level. PDI-P legislators made a strong coalition with PD, PPP, PKS, and Golkar party in the local legislature to support the incumbent.<sup>318</sup> Nevertheless, in the last three years of his first term in the post, the municipality's HDI was lower compared to the HDI average of nine municipalities in the province. In the last year (2008) of his first term, the municipality's HDI reached 73.29, which was lower than the average HDI of nine municipalities, which reached 75.05. The underscoring indexes were particularly in the education and life expectancy indexes.

Another possible factor supporting the incumbent's landslide victory was his expertise playing the politics of identity. As the first mayor with a similar ethnic background (Madurese) to the majority of the population in the municipality, the incumbent was clever in exploiting his identity. He frequently introduced and spoke Madurese in both formal and informal forums,<sup>319</sup> including in the radio talk shows. Furthermore, the incumbent frequently declared that he was a poor person and a pedicab driver. Not only did he make this

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<sup>317</sup> Source: <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2012/12/05/10315028/Anggota.LSM.Lira.Disiram.Air.Keras>. Accessed on 5 March 2014; <http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2012/12/06/anggota-lsm-lira-disiram-air-keras> accessed on 5 March 2014.

<sup>318</sup> Interview with a local legislator on 18 October 2012

<sup>319</sup> Interview with a local academic on 8 October 2012; a female local journalist on 24 October 2012.



declaration, the incumbent also carried out populist policies and activities addressed to the poor, including pedicab drivers and the PKL. This open declaration and generous policies and image succeeded in attracting sympathy from the poor, pedicab drivers, the PKL, and the majority of the population in the municipality. The incumbent was able to win over the hearts and minds of the people with his personal stories of his past.

Finally, the incumbent succeeded in accentuating his identity as a religious person who has a close relationship with religious communities, namely religious leaders, *pesanteren*, and NU. He was also known as a person who is capable of performing religious knowledge and practices. With his religious identity, the incumbent minimised his ideological and party background as a nationalist amongst the Muslim community and elites in the municipality. Consequently, the incumbent's multi-identity created a widespread recognition from all layers of people in the municipality as an *oreng sae* (a good person).

This identity personally adhered to the incumbent. A political party activist affiliated to the incumbent explained that to vote for the incumbent in the *pilkada*, people considered his popular image and the real local development outputs credited to him. People did not consider the political parties nominating him.<sup>320</sup> Also, a secretary of a local office added that populist policies and programs were favourable for the incumbent. People thought that they would get benefits from these policies and programs. They then viewed the incumbent as a pro-people figure.<sup>321</sup> Therefore, the well-liked multi-identity image of the incumbent (popular, religious, generous) and the practical development outputs attributed to him contributed to persuading people to vote for him. Likewise, the people's praise of the incumbent contributed to the minimal risk of rivalry that he experienced. The incumbent gained few challenges from formal and informal actors in the municipality that could undermine his popularity, likeability and electability prior to the *pilkada*.

At this stage, the incumbents' experiences in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality show the importance of the support and encouragement of informal politics in dealing with the re-election bid. Informal politics 'strategically employs the politics of particularism to lure the support of informal and partisan formal actors, at the local level. The incumbents in both districts were brave to distribute local budget and local office posts as incentives to these actors, to minimise the risk of political rivalry. Rivalry could undermine the incumbents' efforts to maintain their posts. Both incumbents, who were particularly backed by nationalist parties, sought to adjust their identity to fit in with the majority of

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<sup>320</sup> Interview on 30 October 2012. Concerning the strong figure of the incumbent and local development outputs benefiting people as two factors encouraging people to vote for the incumbent are also corroborated by a member of *Panwaslu* in an interview on 17 October 2012.

<sup>321</sup> Interview on 24 October 2012.

Muslim voters. In Blitar, the incumbent attempted to make a close relationship with *kiai* and *pesantran*. In Probolinggo, the incumbent even performed as an Islamic scholar as well.

## 5.6. Voters' Rationales to Vote for the Incumbents

The final judgement of the logic of the incumbents' political survival was truly the voters' decision. They confirmed their reasons to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada* in Blitar and Probolinggo. This section of the chapter explains the three main findings, namely voters' knowledge and experience of local government policies prior to the *pilkada*, voters' knowledge and experience of informal politics prior to the *pilkada* and voters' rationales for voting for the incumbents. Before explaining how voters responded concerning these three questions, this thesis first explains the government and non-government participants' assumptions concerning voters' reasons to vote for Herry and Buchori. This presentation is crucial to provide a comparative assessment of voters' confirmations and non-voters' assumptions concerning the logic of the incumbents' survival in the 2010 *pilkada* in Blitar Regency and the 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo Municipality.

### 5.6.1. Voters' Explanation in Blitar

In the first case study in Blitar Regency, both government and non-government participants assumed that as the incumbent regent, Herry had a competitive advantage compared to his rival. Herry was well known as the regent who delivered direct policy benefits to the residents, particularly in infrastructure developments.<sup>322</sup> Voters also recognised that Herry had served in office in the first term and it is risky to find another leader who could assure them of similar achievements to the incumbent. A Blitar Election commissioner quoted a Javanese proverb to express his assumption, "*timbanganne nggolek wong nembel or timbang bakal aluwung nambal*" (rather than finding a new leader).<sup>323</sup> It means that voters are assumed to play safe or to avoid risky choices. Voting for the incumbent is better than finding another person who does not have a proven performance yet. Voters want to continue to gain policy benefits as good as they received in the first term.

As an incumbent, Herry was also advantaged by media coverage. People recognised Herry's name and face. Also, he frequently visited villages and met with villagers during his first term in office. He was open to all people and he also attempted to accept all invitations

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<sup>322</sup>Interview with a head of local government office on 18 June 2012; a former head of local government office on 18 June 2012; a party activist as well as the incumbent's victory team member on 23 June 2012.

<sup>323</sup>Interview on 4 June 2012. Another commissioner interviewed on 4 June 2012 also agreed with this assumption. A similar reason was delivered in the interview with a businessman on 18 June 2012; a construction businessman on 26 June 2012; the incumbent's political consultant on 16 July 2012; a local legislator on 26 June 2012; a local Muslim mass-based organisation leader as well as a teacher on 23 June 2012.

from people and institutions, such as sports events, religious events, and cultural events. He did not only accept these invitations, but also gave donations to support the events. The incumbent was also popular amongst the youth, especially amongst PSBI's supporters. A supporter coordinator claimed that Herry gained most votes in PSBI's supporter bases, except in Kanigoro and Wonodadi Sub-districts.<sup>324</sup> Then, compared to his rival as well as his former deputy, Arif Fuadi, Herry was more recognisable.<sup>325</sup> Herry's high popularity was also supported by his good apparent image. He had never been connected to any legal cases that could harm his image.<sup>326</sup> Therefore, the second logic of Herry's survival in the *pilkada* is due to his ability to promote a popular appearance and invite people's sympathy to persuade them to vote for him.

The last advantage was the figure of his running mate in the *pilkada*, Rijanto. Some important explanations were gathered about Rijanto's role as a significant vote getter for Herry, especially amongst teachers, who dominate the proportion of civil servants in Blitar. In 2010, the total number of state teachers in Blitar reached 9,953 people. This comprised 78.18 per cent of the total civil servants in the regency. Then, in addition to political parties, teachers as well as their union were a potential "political machine" for Herry and Rijanto. Rijanto's previous post as the head of Blitar's education office, with a notable performance, made him popular amongst teachers. Moreover, his previous position as the head of a sub-district in three regions helped him get sympathy amongst village heads who knew his good record.

As a former patron, Rijanto easily gained support from teachers<sup>327</sup> and village heads as his vote getters in the *pilkada*. Both of these actors had an emotional tie to him. The figure of Rijanto was trusted more by people, as stated by a party activist as well as by a member of the incumbent's victory team, "Some village heads conveyed the view that supposing there was no Rijanto (Rijanto did not run with Herry), they would not vote for the incumbent".<sup>328</sup> Another member of the incumbent's victory team emphasised "the Rijanto factor". He remarked that many voters saw Rijanto's image as that of a good man, a hard worker, performing well, and someone who started his career from below (a low ranking level of the bureaucracy).<sup>329</sup> Accordingly, the non-government participants assumed that the incumbent's victory would be marginal without the figure of Rijanto.

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<sup>324</sup>Interview on 3 July 2012.

<sup>325</sup>Interview with a head of local government office on 18 June 2012; a party activist as well as the incumbent's victory team member on 23 June 2012; party activist as well as a local legislator on 20 July 2012.

<sup>326</sup>Interview with a local Muslim mass-based organisation leader as well as a teacher on 23 June 2012.

<sup>327</sup>Interview with a Blitar Election Commissioner on 4 June 2012.

<sup>328</sup>Interview on 23 June 2013.

<sup>329</sup>Interview on 26 June 2012. The interviewee is also a party activist as well as a businessman.

Before continuing the discussion of voters' explanations concerning their votes, the procedure for selecting them should be described. Two sub-districts were selected, based on the criterion of their distance to the centre of government of Blitar Regency. Accordingly, Srengat Sub-district was selected as it met the criterion of a sub-district which is close to the centre. The other one was Wonotirto Sub-district, representing the opposite criterion from the former. Due to the limitation in this study in gaining official data from the 2010 *pilkada* result, one of the villages in each sub-district was chosen, based on a limited assessment through a short discussion with local government officers.<sup>330</sup> The assessment was based on the assumption of villages where the incumbent gained votes which were above the sub-district's average vote.

In Srengat Sub-district, Tempur Village (pseudonym) was chosen as the location for in-depth interviews. The village is located 10 km South East of the capital of Srengat Sub-district and 8 km west of the capital of Blitar Regency. The Tempur Village is composed of four hamlets. About 40 per cent of Tempur's territory is rice fields, 20 per cent residential, 35 per cent dry fields and 15 per cent for other purposes. Residents in this village mostly work as farmers, and some are traders, stock farmers, clerks and factory workers.

According to the voter list issued by Blitar Election Commission, the village has 4,957 eligible voters composed of 2,472 male voters and 2,485 female voters. These voters were distributed into nine polling stations (TPS). On the Election Day on 9 November 2010, voting participation in this village reached 58.2 per cent, or there were only 2,885 voters who used their right to vote in the *pilkada*. From nine polling stations, one station was selected where the incumbent gained most votes compared to the rival. Polling station number 7 was then chosen as the location of interviews. The incumbent gained 75.3 per cent of 352 votes in that station. In this area, in-depth interviews were conducted with 6 female voters and 5 male voters from various social backgrounds.

In Wonotirto Sub-District, Kerjo Village (pseudonym) was selected as the location of in-depth interviews. The village is located in Southern Blitar at a distance of 25 km from the central government of Blitar Regency. In 2011, the size of the population was 3,962 people composed of 51 per cent females and 49 per cent males. The composition of the education background in the village is dominated by elementary school graduates (68 per cent) and those who did not graduate from elementary school (12 per cent). The majority of the population are farmers (58.1 per cent). Chili or red pepper is a prominent agriculture product

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<sup>330</sup>I got the data of *pilkada* result from Blitar Election Commission after gaining research permit from the regency. Consequently, I did not use these data for selecting villages where I will conduct interviews with voters. Still, I use the data for selecting the specific location in each village where I interviewed voters.

of the village. This village is also known as one of the migrant worker contributors in Blitar. According to the Indonesian migrant workers union (SBMI) Branch of Blitar Regency, the village had 257 migrant workers in 2013. (Rahayu, 2013:2).

In the 2010 *pilkada*, the village had 3,340 eligible voters comprising 1,651 male voters and 1,689 female voters. According to the *pilkada* result issued by Blitar Election Commission, 39 per cent of voters were absent in the *pilkada*. Contrasted with Tempur Village, in Kerjo Village Herry ran in a tough race with the challenger. At the final count, the incumbent gained 51.13 per cent of votes. Then, from 7 polling stations in the village, polling station number 4 was chosen, where Herry gained most votes (98.4 per cent), to conduct in-depth interviews. In this area, in-depth interviews were conducted with 5 female voters and 5 male voters. Those interviewed were farmers, traders, the head of the hamlet, and the leader of farmer group.

The first and the foremost answers on local government policy implementation or programs identified by participants were policies with tangible outputs, especially infrastructure. These are roads, bridges, irrigation, and drainage built at the neighbourhood level. The voters could easily identify these when asked about local government programs addressed to their village. Although participants only had limited information concerning the projects, they knew that the programs were developed by local government and the incumbent received the credit for them.

This is not surprising, as Herry once visited Tempur Village prior to the *pilkada*, when villagers built a bridge. He donated some sacks of cement to support the bridge project. Participants also said that the local government cooperated with villagers to develop village roads prior to the *pilkada*. Interestingly, participants ignored the sources of the budget as well as the initiatives for infrastructure developments. They only recognised that these were local government programs and they are credited to Herry. The head of the hamlet added that the neighbourhood road has not been completely improved yet, but still the villagers accepted it as the incumbent's contribution to the village.<sup>331</sup>

In addition to infrastructure Tempur village's residents also recognised free health service programs, free tuition fees for elementary and junior high schools, free immunisation, childbirth benefits, revolving fund programs for women, seed aid for farmers, and cheap groceries and subsidised rice for the poor. The majority of participants recognised these programs as local government programs provided for them. However, there was also ignorance concerning local government programs implemented in the neighbourhood. The first participant in Tempur Village conveyed her ignorance about what has been done by

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<sup>331</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

local government in the village. She used a metaphor to represent her ignorance, “I am much in the kitchen”. Another participant, a female farmer, also showed similar ignorance, that she did not know about health and education benefits, as well as roads, from local government programs. She focused only on her living.<sup>332</sup>

Surprisingly, some critical answers from participants in Tempur Village were expressed. A religious leader as well as a chicken farmer said that he individually did not get any benefit from local government programs. He recognised that village roads are the output of the National Program for People Empowerment (PNPM). A young housewife also added, “Schools in the district (state schools) still have fees, even though the news in the media said they were free. Whatever its name, the school still has fees”.<sup>333</sup>

In Kerjo Village, there were similar answers concerning the benefits of local government programs. The majority of participants pointed to the neighbourhood roads as the most easily identified local government outputs program. In addition, prior to the *pilkada*, the local agriculture office built a pond for farming in the village. The office also gave tractors and goats as aid for the farmers group and free bean and corn seeds for farmers. In service delivery, participants recognised cheap education for elementary and junior high schools, free immunisation, and cheap health services in the community health centre. In addition, participants also gained benefit from the revolving fund of the sub-district development program (PPK),<sup>334</sup> cheap groceries and monthly rice benefits for the poor. Prior to the *pilkada*, Herry visited the village twice. A farmer as well as a wood trader testified about the incumbent’s visit, “Mr Herry came when the farmers group conducted a chili harvest festival and inaugurated the operation of the pond in 2010”.<sup>335</sup>

In contrast to the answers on local government policies and programs, the majority of participants did not recognise the informal actors and informal practices approaching the *pilkada*. Both participants in Tempur and Kerjo village could only identify some people who visited the village prior to the *pilkada*; the visitors were said to be the candidates’ campaign team members. In Tempur Village, the incumbent’s campaign team members promised the villagers that they would donate asphalt to improve the road. Indeed, the promise has not been met, up to now or the day of the interview.<sup>336</sup> A housewife as well as a chicken farmer clearly identified that a campaign team member once distributed free uniforms to the male

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<sup>332</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>333</sup>Both participants are interviewed on 4 July 2012

<sup>334</sup>PPK is the national government program

<sup>335</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>336</sup>Interview with a young housewife on 4 July 2012.

*yasinan* group in the village. She was not sure whether the clothes were distributed by Herry's campaign team members or the challenger.<sup>337</sup>

In Kerjo Village, the attendance of both candidates' campaign teams was clearly visible. The challenger's campaign team attended the weekly *yasinan* meeting. The challenger also distributed free groceries in the neighbouring hamlet. The leader of the farmer's group in the village remarked, "Approaching the election, Mr Arif visited here before Herry's victory team's visit. He promised that he would build a road; even Mr Arif gave free groceries and herbs for villagers. All the sick were called for treatment". He also added that the meeting with the challenger was held in the hamlet hall and it was attended by more than 100 people.<sup>338</sup>

The incumbent's campaign team used similar methods to attract the sympathy of voters in the village. The chairman of Herry's campaign team (Mr Z) met with the villagers in the hamlet's hall one month prior to the *pilkada*. In this meeting, the chairman promised to build the hamlet's roads if Herry won in the *pilkada*.<sup>339</sup> In addition, a young housewife also conveyed that prior to the *pilkada*; Herry came to the neighbouring village to open a volley ball tournament in Wonotirto Sub-district. She attended the opening ceremony and saw that all villages in the sub-district participated in this tournament. Herry donated some money for the tournament prize.<sup>340</sup>

After the *pilkada*, Herry's people met their promise to the villagers. The head of the hamlet testified that after the *pilkada*, one of the Herry's victory team members visited the hamlet and donated a goat and cash of Rp 1 million (AUD 100) to support the hamlet's activities.<sup>341</sup> Furthermore, Mr Z also met his promise to the villagers. The leader of the farmer's group testified that local government carried out the development of the hamlet's roads. It is predicted that all roads will be built by 2014. In addition, Mr Z. wanted to donate some materials to the farmers' group when it built the farmers' group's hut. Mr Z also helped to support the group's proposal to gain agribusiness development funds (PUAP) from local

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<sup>337</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012. The *yasinan* group is a communal male or female religious group at the neighbourhood level. The main activity of this group is weekly meetings and reciting the *yasin* epistle in the Koran. This group does not perform religious activity only, but it also acts as a social medium or meeting point for male or female villagers. In Blitar and Probolinggo, the *yasinan* activity is usually conducted every Thursday evening for male and other days for female. Up to this stage, I cannot explain the fact that female voters were not given inducements as indicative of the attitude of candidates to female voters. Are they expected to vote along the same lines as the males in their households? The specific following chapter on gender and the *pilkada* explain that adjusting their husband voting preference is one of the reasons for women to vote in the *pilkada*. Nonetheless, I do not see any relevance that vote-buying incentives for male voters induced them to request their wives to follow their preference in the *pilkada*.

<sup>338</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>339</sup>Interview with the leader of farmer group in the village on 5 July 2012.

<sup>340</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>341</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

government. In fact, before gaining Mr Z's support, the group found it was difficult to access the funds. After gaining support, the group has regularly obtained funds of Rp 100 million (AUD 10,000) per year from 2010 to 2012.<sup>342</sup> After interviews, the hamlet roads remarked on by the participants were inspected. A new concrete rebate road had been built. The project information board mentioned that this was a "PNPM Mandiri Perdesaan" project which cost Rp 57,482,800 (AUD 5.7482). The road, 1.6 km in length, was built after the *pilkada* from 3 July to 25 September 2011. The project was proposed by women and the villagers shared the project funding of Rp 2 million (AUD 200).<sup>343</sup> The pond for farming built prior to the *pilkada* in 2010 was also observed. The project information board at the pond edge mentions that this project was funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Blitar government. The pond's function is to catch water for the chili gardens. It was inaugurated in 2010.

The following discussion relates to the participants' explanations concerning their reasons for voting or not voting for the incumbent in the *pilkada*. In Tempur Village, there were two dissimilar reasons for participants to vote for the incumbent. A head of hamlet in Tempur village said his personal reason for voting for Herry was because the incumbent was well-grounded or experienced as he led the regency in the first term. He had succeeded in managing the regency and gave benefits to society, such as through the free health service policy. The head of the hamlet preferred Herry as some local government programs were not finished during the first term in office. The last explanation is to minimise the uncertainty risk for the regency's future. The head of the hamlet remarked, "I do not like to easily change the leader. We also do not know if changing the leader would be better or worse. So, it is preferable for the incumbent to serve two terms".<sup>344</sup>

The majority of participants did not have specific reasons to vote for the incumbent. They just followed the major emerging opinion in the village to vote for the incumbent. A brick craftsman in the village remarked that he just followed his village mates in voting for Herry. He did not have any specific reason to vote for the incumbent.<sup>345</sup> The owner of the brick factory delivered a similar and simple answer, "My wife and I share voting. I voted for Mr Herry and my wife voted for Mr Arif". He added, "There is no reasoning, I just voted for number 2 (Herry-Rijanto)". Before closing the interview, the latter also complained that there was not much contribution by the regent to improving his life. He said that whoever the regent was not important because his livelihood did not depend on him, and there was no

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<sup>342</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>343</sup>PNPM *Mandiri Perdesaan* is the national project for rural poverty alleviation started on 30 April 2007. Infrastructure development is one of the activities in the project. The source of the project's funds derives from the national budget, local budget, and villagers, and possibly from private funds.

<sup>344</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>345</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.



contribution from the elected regent. His brick business is supported by a loan from the bank and there is no facilitation from local government.<sup>346</sup> A female farmer delivered a similar answer, “I hear (that) many people voted for (candidate) number two (Herry-Rijanto). I just followed friends”.<sup>347</sup> A housewife as well as a chicken farmer gave similar reason for voting for the incumbent in the *pilkada*, “I do not know all (candidates); I just follow others. I just vote, because I do not know”.<sup>348</sup> A religious leader as well as chicken farmer commented on Herry’s victory in his village, “Here, many people voted for Mr Herry as they are not religious, red base. If (they are) religious (they) voted for Mr Arif”. This comment refers to the division of Javanese religious beliefs and political ideologies. The non-religious people referred to the Javanese religious belief which is syncretic with Islam. The attribute of red base attached to the majority of voters in the village shows the symbolic colour of the nationalist-based party, namely PDI-P, as in the end of the interview he said that the legislative election in the village was won by PDI-P.<sup>349</sup> Finally, another female voter did not remember who she had voted for in the *pilkada*. She stressed that she had voted for a candidate but she had forgotten who she voted for.<sup>350</sup>

In Tempur Village, information was gathered about voters’ reasons to vote for the challenger. Interestingly, they delivered critical reasons not to vote for the incumbent. A religious leader as well as a chicken farmer based his vote on religious reasons. Arif is perceived as a religious person since he is active in *Nahdlatul Ulama*.<sup>351</sup> A couple who voted for the challenger were also interviewed. The husband said, “My wife is blind (did not understand) to vote for (candidate) number 1 or number 2. I suggested that my wife vote for Mr Arif, because (he is) my ex-teacher. Besides, I know the second term (for the incumbent) was to gain profit. The first post, that was serious”. The wife agreed that she voted for the challenger to follow her husband’s suggestion, because the challenger was her husband’s teacher in the Islamic vocational high school in Blitar.<sup>352</sup> An employee of a chicken farm also critically delivered his reason, “The reason (to vote for the challenger) is just because we want a change (leadership). The district needs an improvement and the challenger is capable for that (change). I want a change. Indeed, the incumbent’s leadership did not result in better economic changes for the community”.<sup>353</sup>

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<sup>346</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>347</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>348</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>349</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>350</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>351</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>352</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

<sup>353</sup>Interview on 4 July 2012.

In Kerjo Village, there were similar participants' explanations concerning their preferences to vote for the incumbent. Voters who were categorised as leaders in their community had several reasons for their voting preferences. A head of hamlet in the village remarked that prior to the *pilkada* his neighbourhood was frequently helped to build roads and ponds, get free seeds, and Herry visited the hamlet twice for the chili harvest festival. Furthermore, the incumbent was also willing to communicate with common people. The last reason was that, since Herry served in office in his first term, all heads of hamlets in Blitar received financial allowances.<sup>354</sup> A farmers' group leader explained similar information concerning his reasons to vote for the incumbent. He also added another reason, stating that Herry was a clean leader, "'So far, (he) has no problem".<sup>355</sup>

In contrast to the experience of participants in Tempur Village, voters in Kerjo Village argued about their reasons to vote for Herry. Many direct policy benefits disbursed in the village, particularly in the hamlet, were rationales for voters to vote for Herry. In addition, the incumbent's visit to the hamlet has made an emotional relationship with them. Thus, it is reasonable that Herry gained 98.4 per cent of votes at the polling station attached to the hamlet. A housewife remarked that she voted for Herry as he improved villagers' economic wellbeing and he wanted to donate groceries prior to the *pilkada*. She also said that she did not really know the challenger.<sup>356</sup> Another housewife as well as a female farmer clearly explained her reason to vote for the incumbent, "Because of number two (candidate), there is an agreement to build the hamlet's road. Because of the agreement, so automatically I keep voting for Mr Herry".<sup>357</sup> The promise to build the hamlet's road was delivered by Mr Z, one of the incumbent's campaign team members, when he visited the hamlet prior to the *pilkada*. This promise, then, encouraged voters to vote for Herry. A male farmer confirmed, "Vote for Mr Herry as (we are) promised a road will be built in the hamlet. The agreement can be considered (from) the person, as Mr Herry is reliable to realise his promise".<sup>358</sup>

Moreover, there was a female farmer who did not have specific reasons to vote for the incumbent. She just followed communal preference in her neighbourhood. She remarked clearly in polite Javanese language, "*Namung Nyoblos nomer kalih, soale katah sing nyoblos sing niku. Nggih kirangan, nyoblos, nggih nyoblos*" (Only voted for number two (candidate), as many (others) were voting for him. I don't know, voted, yes I voted).<sup>359</sup> I also met There was another female farmer who did not remember her preference in the *pilkada*. She

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<sup>354</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>355</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>356</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>357</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>358</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>359</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

remarked, “Forget, completely forget, I do not remember. It's been so long thus I forget. But, I am sure I voted, I came to the poll station indeed”.<sup>360</sup>

### 5.6.2. Voters' Explanation in Probolinggo

As in Blitar Regency, the case study in Probolinggo Municipality found voters' explanations concerning three main related themes in this thesis, namely the incumbent's populist policies benefited them, informal actors attached to the incumbent working around their neighbourhood, and voters' decisions to vote for the incumbent, which were based mainly on Buchori's popular appearance, his philanthropic bias programs and tangible policy outputs. Previously, this section of the chapter presented the government and non-government participants' explanations concerning voters' rationales to vote for the incumbent.

The government participants in Probolinggo assumed that voters voted for the incumbent due to several reasons. Firstly, the incumbent implemented policies and programs with practical outputs directly benefiting the majority of people, especially the weak and the vulnerable, such as infrastructure programs at the local level, death benefits, and the provision of some social aid for pedicab drivers and business opportunities for PKL.<sup>361</sup> A female secretary of a local office mentioned a term, *berjuang* (Struggle). It is an acronym of *beras, baju, dan uang* (rice, shirt, and money) to show popular items distributed by candidates to win potential votes. Like many other candidates, she implied the incumbent distributed these materials.<sup>362</sup> Secondly, the incumbent succeeded in building a well-liked image amongst people in the municipality. He was known as a low profile and communicative person as he interacted directly with ordinary people, so he was non-elitist. He is a genuine local person (Madurese); due to his incumbency, the incumbent was also more popular amongst voters than the challengers. The government participants mentioned an extraordinary activity performed by the incumbent during his first term in office, namely *takziah* (to visit, to deliver condolences, and to give funeral aid) to all bereaved families.<sup>363</sup> The last reason, as a local legislator affiliated to the incumbent remarked, an interesting assumption was that the incumbent also benefited from the social setting of the majority of people in the municipality, who are culturally *Nahdliyin* (NU's followers). In contrast, his challenger was supported by the other Muslim mass-based organisation, namely

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<sup>360</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>361</sup> Interview with a PDI-P's local legislator on 18 October 2012; a secretary of local public works office on 19 October 2012;

<sup>362</sup> Interview on 24 October 2012

<sup>363</sup> Interview with a PDI-P's local legislator on 18 October 2012; a secretary of local public works office on 19 October 2012; a female secretary of a local office on 24 October 2012.

*Muhammadiyah*. The incumbent's team utilised this sentiment of difference to gain support from the majority of *Nahdliyin*.<sup>364</sup>

The non-government participants corroborated the government participants' assumptions. The incumbent's populist policies, which are tangible in terms of outputs and gave direct benefits to the people, such as the improvement of city gardens and the revitalisation of the traditional market at Sukabumi Street (*Bremi* Traditional Market), have shaped people's preferences to vote for the incumbent.<sup>365</sup> In a different expression, a secretary of a Muslim mass-based organisation was convinced that in the 2008 *pilkada* in the municipality, both the ruler and the people were pragmatic. The ruler was pragmatic for the sake of power and the people were pragmatic to gain tangible benefits. "In other words, whoever gave something and it could meet people's needs, that (candidate) would be elected".<sup>366</sup>

A political party activist affiliated to the incumbent stated also that during the incumbent's first term in office, the municipality situation was very harmonious. There were no riots, demonstrations, and conflict destabilising the municipality.<sup>367</sup> Moreover, under the incumbent's leadership, local government transformed its administrative style. Local government invited people's participation to contribute to the development of the municipality. A local NGO activist affiliated with the incumbent used a Javanese term "*diwongke*" (to be appreciated or respected) to portray the relationship between local government and the people. The incumbent was the first mayor performing this leadership style in the municipality.<sup>368</sup>

Finally, the other factor that may shape voters' preferences is money politics. An activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation asserted that the incumbent's camp (BUDY PAS) disbursed money and distributed rice to the people.<sup>369</sup> A member of *Panwaslu* corroborated that the challenger's camp (KIBAR) reported 22 allegations of money politics practices committed by BUDY PAS.<sup>370</sup> Nonetheless, based on examination of the 2008 *pilkada* supervisory reports in five sub-districts in the municipality, there were no official reports that mentioned money politics practices in terms of cash disbursements committed by the incumbent's camp (BUDY PAS). *Panwaslu* could only prove the distributions of some

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<sup>364</sup> Interview on 18 October 2012

<sup>365</sup> Interview with a member of *panwaslu* on 17 October 2012

<sup>366</sup> Interview on 24 October 2012

<sup>367</sup> Interviews on 30 October 2012.


<sup>368</sup> Interview on 17 October 2012.

<sup>369</sup> Interview on 25 October 2012.

<sup>370</sup> Interview on 17 October 2012.

packets of rice (@ 2.5 kg) with BUDY (Buchori-Bandyk)'s picture inside the packets in the sub-districts of Mayangan, Kademangan, Kanigaran, Wonoasih and Kedopok.

**Figure 5.14** Money Politics Reports Committed by BUDY (left) and KIBAR (right)



Source: Sobari (2013). Photographs are taken from the 2008 *Pilkada* Supervisory Report of Mayangan and Wonoasih Sub-districts.

The incumbent's camp (BUDY) also reported 11 allegations of money politics practices committed by the challenger's camp (KIBAR or Zulkifli-Yusuf).<sup>371</sup> Based on examination of the 2008 *pilkada* supervisory reports in five sub-districts, official reports of cash disbursements committed by KIBAR were found in four sub-districts, namely Wonoasih, Kademangan, Kanigaran, and Kedopok. The reports mentioned that KIBAR's camp disbursed money worth Rp 50,000 – Rp 100,000 (AUD 5 – AUD 10) each for some families in these sub-districts.

Based on these reports, this study argues that money politics issues colouring the *pilkada* are not dominant factors that may shape voter preferences to vote or not to vote for the incumbent. These practices appear to influence only a small number of voters. It is unfair to conclude that this small number of money politics practices had a significant contribution to the incumbent's landslide triumph. Hence, money politics issues were only part of the political game played by both camps in order to manipulate voters' perceptions concerning the incumbent's and the challenger's images.

Having explained about government and non-government participants' answers, the next discussion considers voters' knowledge and experience concerning the incumbent's populist policies, the informal actors working amongst voters, and voters' rationales to vote

<sup>371</sup> Interview with a member of *Panwaslu* on 17 October 2012.

for the incumbent. First, the procedures to select them need to be explained. Before choosing two neighbourhood units (RT) as the location to conduct interviews with voters, two sub-districts were chosen, based on their distance to the centre of government. The first was Wonoasih Sub-district which has a distance to the centre of 4.5 km. The second is Kademangan Sub-district which has the farthest distance to the centre of 7 km. In selecting a village in each sub-district, there is a limitation to gaining the 2008 *pilkada* results as the data cannot be accessed before a research permit from the Politics and Public Security Office of Probolinggo Municipality is issued. A discussion was held with two officers in this office, to help choose one village in every sub-district based on the criteria of the incumbent's largest landslide victory in each village. Finally, the officers recommended *Glagah* Village (pseudonym) in Wonoasih Sub-district and *Kuto* Village (pseudonym) in Kademangan Sub-district.

In selecting certain locations where interviews with voters in these two selected villages would be conducted a similar procedure to Blitar Regency could not be applied, that is, using the *pilkada* result at the polling station level. The Probolinggo Municipality General Election Commission (KPUD) did not have the 2008 *pilkada* results at the polling station level. KPUD just gave the *pilkada* results at the sub-district level. Then enquiries were made at the village office to find out the *pilkada* results in all polling stations in each village. However, the officers in the two village offices could not recommend any neighbourhood units (RT) in each village as they did not hold the *pilkada* results anymore. Consequently, two neighbourhood units with different characteristics were selected. In *Glagah* Village, one neighbourhood unit located in a settlement developed by a property business (*perumahan*) was selected. The majority of the population in this settlement is well educated, with middle incomes. In *Kuto* Village, one neighbourhood unit located in a settlement developed autonomously by the people (*perkampungan*) was chosen. The population in the *perkampungan* is more diverse in education and income.

*Glagah* Village is located in the northernmost part of the Wonoasih Sub-district. The village covers an area of 1.870 km<sup>2</sup> with a total population of 9,132 people in 2010. The proportion of males in this village is slightly higher (50.2 per cent) than females. Compared to the other 5 villages in the sub-district, *Glagah* Village is the densest village with 4,883 people per km<sup>2</sup>. The number of people above 10 years old in this population working as civil servants, police, army, and private employees, comprised 2.84 per cent of the population in the village, which is the highest proportion compared to other villages in the sub-district. Muslims dominated with 91.96 per cent of the population and the rest are Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, and Buddhist. According to the 2004 Legislative Election result in this

village, Islam-based parties dominated the votes by 62.42 per cent (2,287 votes) with nationalist parties at 37.58 per cent (1,377 votes). In the village, interviews were conducted with participants in the neighbourhood unit (RT) 02, which is part of the community unit (RW) 07.

*Kuto* Village is located in the southern part of Kademangan Sub-district bordering the Regency of Probolinggo. The village covers an area of 2.130 km<sup>2</sup> with a total population of 7.094 people in 2010. The proportion of females in the village is slightly higher (50.76 per cent) than males. The majority of land in *Kuto* Village is used for settlement (45.37 per cent) and farming (37.2 per cent). Amongst 6 villages in the sub-district, the village is the third densest village with 3,331 people per km<sup>2</sup>. The number of people working as civil servants, police, army, and private employees (10.56 per cent) is lower than farmers, peasants, and traders, covering 28.78 per cent. There are only two religious groups in this village, namely Muslims covering 99.87 per cent and Protestants covering 0.13 per cent. In the village, interviews with participants were held in the neighbourhood unit (RT) 04, which is part of the community unit (RW) 03.

Participants in *Glagah* Village recognise some local government policy outputs were credited to the incumbent. Infrastructure was the first output conveyed by participants, especially neighbourhood roads. A head of a neighbourhood unit (RT) remarked, under Buchori's administration, local government improved all neighbourhood roads in the village. There are no longer dirt roads in the village as they have already been covered by asphalt and paving blocks.<sup>372</sup> Also, all city roads have already been covered by asphalt. Compared to other districts, the quality of roads in the municipality is better.<sup>373</sup> Moreover, people credit some infrastructure developments to the incumbent, such as better drainage that may reduce the risk of floods.<sup>374</sup> Nonetheless, according to the data released by the local public works office, there was no expansion of the municipality's road length during the first term of the incumbent in office. The length of the municipality's roads remained stagnant at 173.475 km from 2004 to 2008 (Agency, 2008, p. 282)(Agency, 2010, p. 302).

Another tangible development output was the development of city gardens and the improvement of city cleanliness. People recognised the development of 1,000 gardens along the roadsides covering almost the entire main roads in the municipality. Local government also put in lights to beautify the city square (*aloon-aloon*) and some city gardens located on

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<sup>372</sup> Interview with the head of neighbourhood unit 02 on 30 October 2012; a *pedicab driver* on 15 October 2012.

<sup>373</sup> Interview with a female school teacher on 31 October 2012.

<sup>374</sup> Interview with a businessman on 30 October 2012; a retired staff of the government owned company on 30 October 2014.

the main roads. These programs have beautified and cooled the city.<sup>375</sup> In service delivery, a participant recognised the improvement of licensing services, as he remarked, “the eight pillars of public services have been good. For instance, the licensing service has implemented a one gate system (integrated system)”.<sup>376</sup>

The tangible policy outputs credited to the incumbent cannot be separated from his popular image and activities. Participants in *Glagah* Village recognised the incumbent as a down to earth person, humble, and generous. The incumbent was very popular, with his *takziah* activity to deliver condolences and funeral aid. Participants testified about their colleagues’ experiences, who were visited by the incumbent when one of their family members passed away. Every family received Rp 450,000 – 500,000 (AUD 45-50) from the incumbent. Amongst participants, *takziah* is an extraordinary activity performed by a mayor who is apparently very busy.<sup>377</sup> Furthermore, a participant praised some generous programs credited to the incumbent, especially addressed to the poor and the vulnerable. Before the incumbent’s administration, local government rarely performed these programs.<sup>378</sup> Two participants in *Glagah* village also recognised that the incumbent would come to attend *cangkru’an* initiated by people. He also frequently greeted local people via the local government owned radio station (*Suara Kota* 101.7 FM Radio).<sup>379</sup>

Participants in *Kuto* Village affirmed similar policy outputs as those explained by participants in *Glagah* Village. Participants corroborated that local government has improved roads in the municipality and the neighbourhoods, including the improvement of city gardens and road lights.<sup>380</sup> Under the incumbent, local government also gives financial incentives for civil servants, the head of RT and RW, cemetery caretakers, and voluntary Islamic teachers (*guru ngaji*). In his first term, local government gave Rp 1.2 million (AUD 120) per year for

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<sup>375</sup> Interview with a businessman on 30 October 2012; a student on 30 October 2012; the head of neighbourhood unit 02 on 30 October 2012; an accounting and tax consultant on 31 October 2012; a young housewife on 1 November 2012.

<sup>376</sup> Interview with an accounting and tax consultant on 31 October 2012. The licensing reform in the municipality was started on 18 July 2008 by implementing *Unit Pelayanan Perijinan Terpadu Satu Pintu* (One Stop Service / OSS). The mayor has delegated 29 authorities of licensing service to the local investment and licensing service agency. The agency has also acquired the certificate of the ISO 9001:2000 since 2008. Source: <http://pelayananperijinan.probolinggokota.go.id/latarbelakang.php> accessed on 11 March 2014.

<sup>377</sup> Interview with a *pedicab driver* on 15 October 2012; a student on 30 October 2012; and the head of neighbourhood unit 02 on 30 October 2012; a female state school teacher on 31 October 2012; a civil servant working in the Regency of Probolinggo on 31 October 2012.

<sup>378</sup> Interview with a young housewife on 1 November 2012.

<sup>379</sup> Interview with the head of neighbourhood unit 02 on 30 October 2012; an accounting and tax consultant on 31 October 2012.

<sup>380</sup> Interview with a headmaster of state vocational school on 31 October 2012; a businessman in transportation on 31 October 2012; a female state school teacher on 31 October 2012; a state school teacher on 31 October 2012; a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012; a businessman as well as an activist in the *Forda UKM* on 1 November 2012; a female state school teacher on 31 October 2012; a civil servant working in the Municipality of Probolinggo on 1 November 2012.



the head of RT and RW.<sup>381</sup> A headmaster of a state vocational school clearly remarked, “I know personally, as a civil servant, Mr. Mayor (the incumbent) cares about civil servants. We received cash welfare or incentives every three months”.<sup>382</sup> A female teacher corroborated, “Mr. Buchori, especially to me as a civil servant, gives a little attention to our welfare. Especially for teachers, there is a food and beverage allowance. It was Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) per month. Now, all civil servants receive Rp 150,000 (AUD 15) per month”.<sup>383</sup>

**Figure 5.15** Neighbourhood Roads



Source: Sobari (2012)

The incumbent is also given credit for his populist policies to empower PKL. A street vendor living in *Kuto* Village remarked that the incumbent gave opportunities for micro vendors to sell in some specific places, such as at the city square (*aloon-aloon*) and at the *Gotong Royong* traditional market.<sup>384</sup> Similar to participants in *Glagah* Village, participants in *Kuto* Village recognised several popular and generous activities performed by the incumbent. Participants knew that the incumbent regularly performed *takziah* and delivered funeral aid to all people, whatever their social status.<sup>385</sup> They also recognised that the incumbent consistently performed *blusukan* and donated groceries for low income people.<sup>386</sup> Participants believe that these populist policies and activities closely pertain to the incumbent’s past story as a pedicab driver. They know that Buchori was a pedicab driver and

<sup>381</sup> Interview with the head of RT 04 RW 03 on 31 October 2012; a civil servant working in the Municipality of Probolinggo on 1 November 2012.

<sup>382</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012.

<sup>383</sup> Interview on 1 November 2012.

<sup>384</sup> Interview on 1 November 2012. This is also confirmed by a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012.

<sup>385</sup> Interview with the head of RT 04 RW 03 on 31 October 2012; a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012; a street vendor living in *Kuto* Village on 1 November 2012; a civil servant working in the Municipality of Probolinggo on 1 November 2012.

<sup>386</sup> Interview with the head of RT 04 RW 03 on 31 October 2012; a civil servant working in the Municipality of Probolinggo on 1 November 2012; a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012.

his generous policies for low income people are encouraged by his personal background.<sup>387</sup> The incumbent regularly strolled in the morning. If he met with pedicab drivers, he spontaneously gave money to them (*ngelungi duit*).<sup>388</sup>

Having explained policy outputs and popular activities credited to the incumbent, the next explanation discusses the non-formal actors attached to the incumbent who were working around the neighbourhoods. Unlike policy outputs and popular activities, participants in both villages could not identify certain persons performing actions to persuade voters to vote for the incumbent. They could only identify the incumbent's campaign team members working under the party's control. They were also registered by KPUD. The most recognisable activity performed by the campaign team members was the installation of banners and billboards prior to and during the campaign period. Participants testified that all candidates installed banners and billboards in some visible and strategic places near to their neighbourhoods.<sup>389</sup>

Participants recognised also that some people identified as the incumbent's campaign team members (BUDY) distributed shirts to the people in their neighbourhood. However, KIBAR and BR's campaign team members distributed shirts picturing the candidates to the people.<sup>390</sup> A participant in *Kuto* Village testified, "Mr Buchori's team distributed groceries. I received them, (but) with no purpose to vote for anyone. PDI-P gave them, just gave".<sup>391</sup> Another participant confirmed that the incumbent distributed groceries in the Ramadan month and prior to *Idul Fitri*.<sup>392</sup> The incumbent's activity of distributing free rice to the people was covered by *Radar Bromo*. The local newspaper reported that the incumbent, accompanied by some local government officials, distributed 200 packets of rice (@ 5 kg) for 200 poor people in the community unit 05 of Kanigaran Village on 8 September 2008. Interestingly, in every packet of rice, the incumbent put BUDY's (Buchori-Bandyk) picture. The incumbent argued that these packets were his personal donation for the poor. About the picture inside the packet, he answered the journalist that it was a form of introduction to the people (*Radar Bromo*, 9 September 2008). Lastly, the incumbent's victory team approached

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<sup>387</sup> Interview with the head of RT 04 RW 03 on 31 October 2012; a civil servant working in the Municipality of Probolinggo on 1 November 2012; a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012; a businessman as well as an activist in the *Forda UKM* on 1 November 2012; a state school teacher on 31 October 2012.

<sup>388</sup> Interview with the head of RT 02 RW 03 *Glagah* Village on 30 October 2012; the head of RT 04 RW 03 *Kuto* Village on 31 October 2012.

<sup>389</sup> Interview with a female state school teacher working in the Regency of Probolinggo on 30 October 2012; the head of RT 04 RW 03 *Kuto* Village on 31 October 2012; a businessman as well as an activist in the *Forda UKM* on 1 November 2012.

<sup>390</sup> Interview with the head of RT 04 RW 03 *Kuto* Village on 31 October 2012.

<sup>391</sup> Interview with a street vendor living in *Kuto* Village on 1 November 2012.

<sup>392</sup> Interview with a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012. *Idul Fitri* is a Muslim feast celebrated on every 1<sup>st</sup> day of Shawwalin Hijri calendar.

people via some community activities. The team attended *pengajian* (Islamic teaching and praying) and sport activities in the neighbourhood.<sup>393</sup> An interesting confession was revealed from a state school teacher who also manages a dance studio in *Kuto Village*. He admitted that he received some money from Mr G (pseudonym), a person identified as the incumbent's victory team member. Mr G said that this money derived from the incumbent was intended to support his studio.<sup>394</sup>

**Figure 5.16** A Packet of Rice Distributed by the Incumbent



Source: Sobari (2014); the rice photograph is taken from *Radar Bromo* 9 September 2008 edition.

Connected to the previous explanation, the following discussion examines voters' rationales to vote for the incumbent in the *pilkada*. A young housewife in *Glagah Village* stated, concerning her reason to vote for the incumbent: “*Pokoknya Buchori itu paling mantap. Orangnya baik, bisa dibanggakan, is the best*” (Principally, Buchori is the steadiest. He is a good person, to be proud of, is the best). Her judgement said that Buchori is a good person as she recognised that the incumbent does not think of himself. He thinks of little people or the poor and the vulnerable.<sup>395</sup> The incumbent's good image shaped this participant's decision to elect him. A retired staff member of a government owned company mentioned clearly some indicators that the incumbent is a good person. The incumbent wanted to mix with ordinary people. He was not reluctant to give money to the people when he strolled in the morning. He performed *takziah* and donated some money for bereaved families.<sup>396</sup> A student added that the incumbent also accepted invitations from the people. He

<sup>393</sup> Interview with a businessman as well as an activist in the *Forda UKM* living in *Kuto Village* on 1 November 2012.

<sup>394</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012.

<sup>395</sup> Interview on 1 November 2012.

<sup>396</sup> Interview on 30 October 2012.

appreciated whoever invited him.<sup>397</sup> These ideal indicators were attributed to the incumbent; and they may shape the participants' decisions to vote for him.

Furthermore, participants in *Glagah* Village considered local government's policy outputs should be credited to the incumbent. An accounting and tax consultant considered two tangible policy outputs to be credited to the incumbent, namely good quality roads at the neighbourhood level and the improved condition of city gardens.<sup>398</sup> These policies were considered to directly address the people's needs. Overall, participants considered that visible policy outputs indicated the incumbent's successful leadership. Consequently, participants contended that the incumbent's leadership in the municipality should be continued for the second term.<sup>399</sup> Finally, a businessman living in *Glagah* Village remarked that when the incumbent served in office for the first term, the municipality's situation was peaceful and under control, although people living in the municipality are from multi-ethnic origins.<sup>400</sup>

The incumbent's superior character was also considered by participants in *Kuto* Village. He was not only regarded as a successful leader, the incumbent was also considered to be a person of good character, a good person and a popular leader. A headmaster of a state vocational school in the municipality said, "My reason is that he is the only leader who blends into the lower class community (ordinary people). That's it. I think he is someone who can interact with elites and the people".<sup>401</sup> In *Kuto* Village, the study also found party-based reasons. The head of RT 04 RW 03 said that he preferred the incumbent since Buchori was proposed by PDI-P. The head admitted that his parent was an Indonesian National Party (PNI)'s activist and he follows his parent's nationalist ideology which is similar to the current PDI-P's ideology.<sup>402</sup> He, then, voted for the incumbent due to the similar ideological

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<sup>397</sup> Interview on 30 October 2012. In *Glagah* village the similar impressions that the incumbent is a good person were delivered by the head of RT 02 RW 03 *Glagah* Village on 30 October 2012; female state school teacher working in the Regency of Probolinggo on 30 October 2012; an accounting and tax consultant on 31 October 2012.

<sup>398</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012.

<sup>399</sup> Interview with the head of RT 02 RW 03 *Glagah* Village on 30 October 2012; a female state school teacher working in the Regency of Probolinggo on 30 October 2012; a civil servant working in the Regency of Probolinggo on 31 October 2012.

<sup>400</sup> Interview on 30 October 2012

<sup>401</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012. The similar answers are also delivered by a businessman in transportation on 31 October 2012; a businessman as well as an activist in the *Forda UKM* living in *Kuto* Village on 1 November 2012; a female state school teacher on 31 October 2012; a female state school teacher on 1 November 2012; a street vendor living in *Kuto* Village on 1 November 2012; a housewife on 1 November 2012; a civil servant working in the Municipality of Probolinggo on 1 November 2012.

<sup>402</sup> PNI or the Indonesian National Party is the oldest political party in Indonesia. Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo and his three colleagues founded the party on 4 July 1927. Soekarno, the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, joined the party with his student association (*Algemeene Studie Club*) in 1927. In the first establishment, the party was named *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* (the United National Indonesia). PNI attempted to spread the idea of nationalism and independence when Indonesia was under the Dutch colonialisation. Many PNI activists, including Soekarno, were arrested by the Dutch colonial government. Soekarno, as the father of nationalism is very identical with PNI. Later, the nationalist followers viewed that Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Soekarno, founding PDI-P in 1999, is a biological as well as

foundation with PDI-P.<sup>403</sup> Another participant remarked, “The party (PDI-P) is appropriate as far as I am concerned. I am not active in the party, but I am a sympathiser of PDIP, especially to Mrs. Mega (Megawati Soekarnoputri)”.<sup>404</sup>

Participants in *Kuto* Village identified similar policy outputs credited to the incumbent and leading them to re-elect the incumbent. A female state school teacher explained that the local government, under Buchori’s administration, has improved the roads in her neighbourhood. In the past, the roads were *becek* (poor).<sup>405</sup> Interestingly, the incumbent’s capability of delivering tangible policy outputs and developing a popular image can also influence a participant who has a different ideological stance to the incumbent. A state school teacher remarked, “I am actually a native PPP follower (the United Development Party). It was hereditary from my parents. Yes, when I see his policy; I changed (to vote for the incumbent)”. This change happened due to the incumbent’s policy of giving special benefits for teachers, disbursed quarterly. He also added that the dance studio he manages received financial support from the incumbent prior to the *pilkada*.<sup>406</sup>

In *Glagah* Village, the study also found a female participant who voted for the challenger (Zulkifli). She remarked that she expected a different situation in the municipality if Zulkifli won the *pilkada*. She testified that the contender performed a good campaign. He wished to come to help the poor and widows in the municipality. Nonetheless, the participant realised that the majority of people in her neighbourhood voted for the incumbent.<sup>407</sup>

At this stage, the narrative data show that voters in both districts memorised clearly the tangible policy outputs credited to the incumbents, mainly infrastructure at the neighbourhood level, such as roads, bridges and city gardens. In addition to tangible outputs, voters remembered exactly the direct benefits of local government policies, such as free seeds, free health and education services, death benefits, financial incentives for civil servants

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ideological descendant of Soekarno, bringing the spirit of nationalism into PDI-P. Thus, PNI as a nationalist party in the past is identical to PDI-P at present. People may argue that PNI is not only identical with PDI-P since in the post-Soeharto era, some parties admitted a similar ideological identity, such as PNI Marhaenisme chaired by the other Soekarno daughter named Rachmawati Soekarnoputeri. In fact, PNI Marhaenisme does no longer exist since it could not meet the electoral threshold in the 2009 Legislative Election. In contrast, PDI-P obtained the third most votes in the 2009 Legislative election with 14.03 per cent of votes (95 seats) at the national level.

<sup>403</sup> Interview on 31 October 2014.

<sup>404</sup> Interview with a businessman as well as an activist in the *Forda UKM* living in *Kuto* Village on 1 November 2012.

<sup>405</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012.

<sup>406</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012. The United Development Party (PPP) was founded on 5 January 1973 as the fusion of four Islam-based parties, namely the *Nahdlatul Ulama Party* (NU), the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), the Islamic Educational Movement (*Perti*), and the Indonesian Muslims Party (*Parmusi*). PPP consistently maintains Islam as its ideology. In the 2009 Legislative Election, PPP obtained 5,533,214 votes (5.3%) or 38 seats in the national legislature. Approaching the 2014 Legislative Election, PPP declared its tagline as “*Rumah Besar Umat Islam*” (the great house of Muslims).

<sup>407</sup> Interview with a female teacher of state school in the Regency of Probolinggo on 31 October 2012, but she is a Probolinggo Municipality resident.

including for teachers and assistance for street vendors and pedicab drivers. Moreover, voters strongly memorised the incumbents' popular appearances in their neighbourhoods, particularly via the practices of *blusukan*, *takziah* and grocery donations. Furthermore, the case study in the rural district of Blitar found voters who were ignorant and did not know local government populist policies and the incumbent's popular activities.

Finally, voters' recognition of tangible policy outputs credited to the incumbents and popular appearances of the incumbents in both districts were the main references for voters to make voting decisions. Voters with better education argued by applying the logic of giving a reward in voting for both incumbents. Those who have received the benefits of policy outputs considered the possibility of continuity in receiving these benefits. Also, a minority of voters considered parties nominating the incumbents (party identification). In Probolinggo, the case study also found that direct benefits and tangible policy outputs received by voters can change party identification in voting. The voters preferred to vote for the incumbent since they gained specific direct policy benefits from the incumbent, even though they previously had had a specific attachment to a party which did not nominate the incumbent in the 2008 *pilkada*. Specifically in rural districts (Blitar), the case study found the practice of *anut grubuyuk* or fitting in. Voters adjust their voting decisions to the major decisions in their neighbourhood. A minority of voters also do not remember for whom they voted in the *pilkada*.

### **5.7. Additional Explanations and Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has explored the *pilkada* in Blitar Regency, which took place on 9 November 2010 and Probolinggo Municipality, which took place on 30 October 2008. It has undertaken a comparative assessment of the socio-political setting in the districts prior to the *pilkada*, the incumbents' policy behaviour during their first terms, the informal politics attached to the incumbents, the logic of the incumbents' survival and voters' explanations concerning their preferences for voting for them. The comparative assessment of the logic of the incumbents' survival in the re-election bid in both rural and urban districts leads into a concluding discussion of the typology of factors that can contribute to the incumbents' political survival.

Populism is clearly practised by both incumbents during their first terms in office. From all of the populist policies initiated by local government and credited to the incumbents, the policy to develop infrastructure at the neighbourhood level, especially roads, bridges, agriculture related facilities, financial incentives for civil servants, the program of 1,000 roadside gardens and other material aids for farmers, PKL and pedicab drivers, is sufficient to attract voters' sympathy. These tangible policy outputs delivering direct benefits to voters are

credited to the incumbents. In addition, local government policies that may impact on their economic or income improvement is also appreciated by voters, such as the development of ponds for farming. Their explanations have also confirmed that not all populist policies, such as cheap education and health services, are referred to by voters to explain voting for the incumbent. The success of Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality in accomplishing better macro development indicators during the incumbents' first term in office, such as the improvement of the human development index and local economic growth, is not considered as well. Participants give more attention to the policies providing tangible outputs and practical benefits to their daily lives.

Complementary to populist policies with direct benefit for society are popular activities that may connect the incumbents to local people. The incumbents' activities of frequently visiting villages or community meeting points (*blusukan*) and meeting directly with villagers may help to boost their popularity amongst participants. In Probolinggo, the incumbent's willingness to perform *takziah* also strongly contributes to winning people's sympathy. They strongly remembered this practice. Prior to the *pilkada*, the incumbents attempted to accept all people's invitations to visit and meet with local people in the villages and neighbourhoods, such as in religious events, sport events, harvest festivals and other events inviting large masses of people. In Probolinggo, even, the incumbent created programs to intentionally meet the people, such as *cangkru'an*, *walikota menjawab* and *Laporo Rek*. Participants in the interviews confirmed that both incumbents had visited their villages and neighbourhoods. The majority of voters recalled the occasion of gathering with the incumbents.

Based on interviews with participants, these popular activities gave two advantages to the incumbents. Firstly, they can identify both incumbents' physical appearance which is important to recognise when voters enter the polling station. Voters may easily recognise the incumbent's photograph in the ballot. Secondly, the incumbents' willingness to interact directly with the masses constructs their popular image amongst voters. Popular appearances reflect the down-to-earth image of the incumbent. To the best of participants' knowledge, the incumbents were also perceived as clean persons who had never been involved with any crime. The incumbents' clean record, then, became a matter for participants' evaluations that may convince people to vote for them. The overwhelming image of the incumbents contributed to their landslide triumphs in the *pilkada*. In Probolinggo, even, voters labelled the incumbent as an *oreng sae* (a good person). This represents his popular leadership style, combining populist policy choices for the poor and the vulnerable, extraordinary activities by doing *takziah*, and his closeness with all layers of people in the municipality. Also, the incumbent's popular activities in supporting PSBI are possibly popular amongst supporter



communities. Every PSBI supporter knows that Herry is the manager of this soccer team. Moreover, the incumbent's attendances and support in many local cultural events and art performances could probably contribute to his popular appearance amongst voters.

The incumbents' clean records and their willingness to interact with commoners are a positive credit considered by voters. By referring to Javanese principles, the clean record is the manifestation of the principle of *ora neko-neko* (always obey religious and community's norms and law). As a leader, the incumbent is perceived to have met this principle or it could be said that they are the *ora neko-neko* persons. The latter is the manifestation of the *andhapasor* (humble) principle. The incumbents' willingness to visit villages and interact directly with the people is appropriate with this principle. In Madurese cultural values, the label of *oreng sae* covers both principles. Therefore, the integration of these principles into the incumbents' leadership style during their first term in office has touched the hearts and minds of voters; then, it would be a basis for voters to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*.<sup>408</sup>

Rivalry is the attempt to block the resistance of informal and partisan formal actors to the incumbents. The actors particularly represent elites at the local level who perform informal political practices. The degree of resistance to the incumbents is the risk of political rivalry that is visible to the incumbents and local elites. Therefore, the case study revealed that the contribution of informal political practices and actors to the incumbents' survival are actually in minimising the risk of political rivalry. Informal actors, including partisan bureaucrats, potentially have resources to prevent a disliked candidate from staying in office. Informal actors also want to have a mutual relationship with the incumbent. Furthermore, considering the network is very crucial in the analysis of the political survival of the incumbents in both districts. A network is not merely a system of support for Buchori to maintain his office. A network is also a form of influence of the incumbents over informal actors and partisan formal actors. By embracing these actors, the incumbents are able to minimise the risks of political rivalry that may undermine their populist policies, activities and images. Furthermore, the strong support of these actors may symbolise the power of the incumbents against their potential challengers in the *pilkada* contest and at the grassroots level.

In Blitar, during his first term, the incumbent was able to manage this mutual relationship. Thus, he minimise resistance from businessmen, bureaucracy, political parties, religious leaders and organisations, mass organisations and mass media. Then, the role of

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<sup>408</sup> The understanding of Javanese principles of *ora neko-neko* and *andhapasor* is quoted from Yana MH, 2012, p. 158.



informal politics supporting the incumbent replaced the role of political parties. The *pilkada* system in Indonesia encourages voters to give more of their attention to the candidates, rather than the political parties nominating them, in their voting decisions. This is also possibly due to low trust in political parties.<sup>409</sup> Then, informal actors and informal political practices replace the position of political parties in attracting voters' orientation to the incumbent. In Probolinggo, the incumbent was fully backed by PDI-P's networks that succeeded in embracing party activists, local legislators, entrepreneurs, local NGOs, PKL and pedicab drivers in a mutually transactional benefit relationship. The incumbent provided local government projects and philanthropically biased policies to be accessed by the actors included in the networks. At the same time, the networks not only supported the incumbent, but they also pursued defensive actions to deal with negative campaigns addressed to the incumbent prior and after the *pilkada*. The incumbent also succeeded in expanding his informal networks into the religious community, especially amongst NU, religious leaders, and *pesantren*. Consequently, the incumbent gained support from them and blended his nationalist background with his expanded identity as a religious person, adhering to the majority beliefs of the population. Finally, the incumbent could not marginalise the role of bureaucracy in supporting as well as helping his "brand". In order to support his incumbency, the incumbent preferred capable and controllable bureaucrats who could design particular policies to boost his popularity and affinity amongst local people.

In contrast, the role of informal politics supporting the incumbents is invisible to participants or voters. They cannot identify specific informal actors interacting with them. Participants also did not mention the role of informal actors that shaped their voting decisions. Participants only recognised the incumbent's campaign team who visited their neighbourhoods and did some campaign related activities.

The other insight from the case study of the *pilkada* in Blitar and Probolinggo is the functions of populist policies and activities that may provide a shortcut for voters about their reasons for voting for the incumbents. Amongst eight populist policies credited to the incumbents, two policies in health and education received the least mention. They are in contrast to the local governments' policies that are very recognisable, namely, the development of infrastructure at the neighbourhood level and city gardens, the provision of aid for farmers, PKL and pedicab drivers, and popular activities, namely *blususkan*, attending

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<sup>409</sup> In the national surveys conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (the Indonesia Survey Institute) in 2006 and 2011, political party gained the lowest trust by 41.9 per cent (2006) and 43 per cent (2011) to perform an expected performance compared to Army, legislature, president, police and court. See LSI's release on "*Pemilih Mengambang dan Prospek Perubahan Kekuatan Partai Politik*" (Floating Voters and the Prospect of Change of Political Party Constellation) released on 29 May 2011.

harvest festivals, *takziah*, on air dialogues and *cangkru'an*. Unlike Blitar, under the incumbent's administration, Probolinggo's accomplishment in the human development index (HDI) was lower than the average HDI of municipalities in the province, particularly in the health and education indexes. From these contrasting facts, it can be concluded that populist policies and popular activities performed by the incumbent have succeeded in simplifying and providing arguments to vote for the incumbent, rather than substantive policies and policy outputs that are less catchy as well as less recognised. This situation might be a test for local democracy transformation in the country. Hence, another factor that may contribute to the incumbent's survival in the *pilkada* is proposed, namely tangibility, to complete the aspects of populism and rivalry. Tangibility is the capacity of the incumbent to deliver tangible and direct benefits of policy outputs to voters.

Moreover, the case study cannot neglect the crucial finding of the contribution of party alignment (party ID) to voters' decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*. A few participants adjusted their decisions, in not voting for the nominated candidates of the parties they were attached to, in the *pilkada* in both districts. Thus, party identification is not a particular fact that is relevant to rural or urban districts only.

Specific to the practice of voting in rural areas, especially in Blitar, the case study found a practice of *anut grubyuk* in voting. Some participants in two rural neighbourhoods did not take individual stands in voting for the incumbent, or they just followed the major preferences in their neighbourhood. The explanation for this may be found in Javanese cultural aspects, namely the Javanese philosophy of life. This includes assumptions, ideas, and mental attitudes that belong to the Javanese. These elements of philosophy of life are a foundation as well as giving meaning to every single Javanese person's attitude to life (Gauthama, 2003, p. 11). Javanese culture has two principal dimensions which influence everyday life, namely communality and hierarchy (Mulder, 1978, p. 58). Relevant to the research findings is the nature of human relationships in the Javanese philosophy of life, namely *rukun*. This represents the predominant value of communality. Javanese require the principles of *rukun* (harmony) in human relationships at the household and community level. Javanese are taught to prioritise harmony in life rather than conflict. Javanese society demands the prevention of all behaviour that may lead to conflict (Mulder, 1978, pp. 57-59; Handayani and Novianto, 2004, pp. 67-68). The spirit of togetherness, leading to a similar preference between individual voters and the majority of voters in Tempur and Kerjo Villages could be explained by the principle of *rukun*. Individual voters attempt to adjust their preferences to the major preference in order to achieve harmony. However, the implementation of *rukun* does not tolerate the practice of coercion. Javanese culture allows

the existence of individuality as it is aware that every individual has different problems, rights and interests. To support individual freedom in voting, a head of hamlet in Kerjo Village clearly explained, “I did not direct my people (in the hamlet). They are also thinking, voting individually”.<sup>410</sup> Still, individuality must obey the principle of *rukun*. The adjustment of individual preference to the major preference in the neighbourhood is understood as an individual voter’s effort to achieve harmony in society as well as to gain collective benefits from local government policies credited to the incumbent.

Another possible explanation of voting adjustments by individual voters is due to their limitations in gathering adequate information to support individual voting decisions. Adjustment is an efficient manner or a shortcut to support voting decisions. Indeed, the application of the *rukun* principle to explain the practice of individual voting adjustment is also reasonable. The individual voter considers gaining benefits from communal facilities promised by the incumbent. Hence, adjusting individual voting preferences to the major preference is a contribution to collective choice. Then, the practices of adjustment are understandable in both possible explanations. Firstly, an individual voter expects to gain benefits from collective voting decisions, as promised by the incumbent. Secondly, an individual voter could overcome his or her limitation in gaining adequate information to support his or her individual voting decision. In terms of democratic process, this remains a critical question in the ongoing democratisation of the country, as equal power relationships in democracy are challenged by communality.

The other principal value is *hormat* or *aji* (respect), representing the value of hierarchy. The traditional Javanese view says that “all social relationships are hierarchically ordered, and on the moral imperative to maintain and express this mode of social order as a good in itself”. In any social behaviour, respect is guidance in many different contexts, towards government officials, in the school, in relationships amongst neighbours, amongst others (Geertz, 1961, p. 147).

Having reviewed participants’ answers gathered during the fieldwork, a concept of “engagement” is proposed to create a typology of reasons delivered by voters. Engagement is a degree of contact between voters and local political issues as well as policy implementation prior to the *pilkada* that may shape voters’ reasons for choice-making. There are two categories of engagement to cover all contacts between voters and local political issues and policy implementation, namely simple engagement and intensive engagement. Simple engagement is a typology covering voters who pay less attention to the *pilkada* issues, with whatever degree of experience they have in gaining the benefits of local government policies.

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<sup>410</sup>Interview on 5 July 2012.

The majority of these voters are the masses who have a less educated background. In contrast, voters who give attention to the *pilkada* issues can argue relatively about their reasons for choice-making. They have intensive engagement in the issues as well as gaining the benefits of policy implementation.

In rural districts, voters who are categorised into intensive engagement are those having structural or cultural positions in the village, such as village heads, hamlet heads, the heads of farmer groups and religious groups and those having better education (at least senior high school graduates). These voters are able to argue about their rationales to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. In urban districts, the case study found that all participants or voters interviewed are categorised into intensive engagement. They could explain the incumbent's popular policies and the benefits of these policies. Then, they have clear arguments for their reasons to vote for the incumbent or the challengers.

Afan Gaffar (1992) applied three main cultural types (*abangan, santri, priyayi*) explained by Geertz as the basis to analyse Javanese voting behaviour or "Javanese Voters". This study in Blitar Regency to some extent adapted this work in understanding the Javanese political logic to vote for local leaders in the *pilkada*. Nevertheless, the application of "engagement" as a basic argument to understand as well as to categorise rural Javanese political logic in the *pilkada* needs to be expanded. Moreover, it is important to consider the role of Javanese culture in terms of philosophy of life that could also shape rural Javanese voting behaviour in the post-Soeharto Era.

Finally, the narratives of surviving incumbents in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality in maintaining their posts demonstrate the importance of populism, rivalry and tangibility in local democracy. To survive in their re-election bids, the incumbents established popular policies with tangible outputs and direct benefits that are remembered by local people. In implementing these policies, the incumbents attempted to interact directly with people at the neighbourhood level. This helped the incumbents to build their popular image as down-to-earth figures amongst local people. Crucial for the incumbents' survival is also the capacity to minimise the rivalry risk of local elites, mainly informal and formal partisan actors, as explained in section 5.5.

Furthermore, voters' narratives tell about the level of their democratic awareness in the *pilkada*. Voters make their critical assessment of the incumbents' performances on the recognition of tangible policy outputs and appearances; they consider much less the macro improvement of the regency, in terms of social, economic and environmental progress. This situation is more favourable for the incumbents to survive in the *pilkada*.

## Chapter 6

### The Incumbents' Crushing Defeat in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality: A Critical Ethnographic Narrative of Failure

...penampilannya (Soeharto) selama menjabat Bupati cukup "mempesona" bagi rakyat kecil utamanya di pedesaan. Tokoh kelahiran Trenggalek, 09 Desember 1949, ini disebut-sebut cukup bijaksana dan merakyat. (...his (Soeharto) performance during his tenure as the regent is quite "fascinating" for ordinary people, especially in rural areas. This figure, who was born in Trenggalek, 9 December 1949, is mentioned as fairly wise and popular).<sup>411</sup>

"HINDARI MONEY POLITICS, PILIH YANG TERBAIK. Ingat Hari Kamis 23 Oktober 2008 Milih Walikota dan Wakil Walikota Madiun. Pesan ini disampaikan oleh DPRD Kota Madiun" (AVOID MONEY POLITICS, VOTE FOR THE BEST. Remember to vote for the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor of Madiun on Thursday, 23 October 2008. This message is delivered by the House of Representative of Madiun Municipality)<sup>412</sup>

This chapter aims to present the findings of case studies in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality, inquiring into the logic of the incumbents' crushing defeat in the re-election bid. Trenggalek Regency represents a rural district where the incumbent experienced a crushing defeat in the 2010 *pilkada* and Madiun Municipality denotes an urban district where the incumbent failed to retain the mayoral office in the 2008 *pilkada*. Both Trenggalek and Madiun are characterised by Javanese as a dominant culture, mainly referring to the courts of Javanese culture in Yogyakarta and Surakarta.

Like the previous two case studies in Blitar and Probolinggo, these case studies address similar research questions to those stated in the first chapter of the thesis, namely the incumbents' policy behaviour during their time in governing their districts, the informal actors and informal political practices (informal politics) attached to the incumbents, the relevant logic of the incumbents' crushing defeat from the aspects of policy behaviour and informal politics attached to them and voters' explanations of their reasons, mainly, for not voting for the incumbents.

The presentation of this chapter combines the explanations of the districts' 'social, political, and economic situations prior to the *pilkada* and the answers to four main research questions in the thesis. The first part explains the past and the current socio-economic situation prior to the *pilkada*. The majority of the population in both districts live under the

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<sup>411</sup> This quotation is excerpted from an article published in local online newspaper, namely *prigibeach.com* on 28 February 2010 or 3 months prior to the 2010 *Pilkada* implementation in Trenggalek. The author is Hamzah Abdillah. He is an editor in chief of *Memo Trenggalek Online* a local online newspaper. He is also a local NGO activist as well as one of the officials in the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) of Trenggalek. Prior to the 2010 *Pilkada* in Trenggalek, he was a member of PDI-P's candidate verification team.

<sup>412</sup> This is an advertisement initiated by the Madiun Municipality Legislature in *Radar Madiun*, the most influential newspaper in the city, on 16 October 2008 or one week prior to the *pilkada*.

influence of Javanese Culture and Islam, which came later to these regions. The second part discusses the political setting in the districts dominated by the nationalist and Islamic camps and the narrative of the political dynamics prior to the *pilkada*. The third part elucidates the details of some of the salient policy choices, policy outputs and popular activities credited to the incumbents, including macro achievements of local development and some corruption scandals. Moreover, it presents various critical views of the incumbent's performance.

The next part explains the informal politics linked to the incumbents, mainly businessmen and political parties' networks. The fifth part discusses voters' reasons, particularly, not to vote for the incumbents, with some links to Javanese cultural expressions, including the logic of the incumbents' failure. Specific to Madiun, this part also presents the mechanism and impact of money politics in the municipality, which is assumed to be the dominant factor leading to that incumbent's crushing defeat in the election.

The case study in Madiun Municipality finds that the incumbent was credited with several salient policies and populist policy outputs, such as empowerment of the poor, infrastructure provision, social and economic populist programs, and some leading macro achievements of local development

The detailed discussion puts forward some controversial findings explaining both incumbents' crushing defeats in the re-election bids. They are, indeed, credited with several salient policies and populist policy outputs, as outlined above, such as better sanitation for villagers, empowerment of the poor, social and economic programs and achievements in local development. Both incumbents frequently also performed *blusukan* (visiting community meeting points or community spots). The incumbent in Madiun combined this with *takziah* (visiting to deliver condolences and give funeral aid). These activities have constructed their image as popular leaders who will interact with the ordinary people. However, in the last year of the first term (2010), the incumbent in Trenggalek Regency was unpopular due to the poor performance of infrastructure development outputs. Also, the incumbent was attacked because of the disclosures of corruption cases committed by his staff during his administration.

Relating to informal politics practised during the first term, both incumbents had different approaches to deal with this, but it had a similar impact on their failure in the *pilkada*. The incumbent in Trenggalek showed poor management of power, that segregated him from informal actors. He was not able to minimise the risks of political rivalry, as the opposing political party and its networks, entrepreneurs, farmer-based organisations (LMDH) and bureaucrats undermined the incumbent's influence and image amongst local people. This is also a consequence of his difficult stance of pursuing clean government throughout his

tenure. Conversely, the incumbent in Madiun had good relationships with non-government entities, including local employers. He was known as a fair person who placed his position as a mayor in an equal relationship with informal entities in the municipality. This good relationship, then, succeeded in reducing the risk to the incumbent of political rivalry from informal actors. However, the incumbent relied on inadequate networks which are supported only by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)'s communities, his family and relatives. Finally, the case study found that these networks could not block the money politics practised by the winning challenger's camp, leading to the incumbent's failure to maintain his office.

Amongst voters in Trenggalek, the incumbent's performance and image were controversial. Voters blamed the incumbent for poor infrastructure development in the regency. Other voters credited him with some successful policies in health and education services. Nonetheless, the incumbent was disadvantaged by the practices of fitting in (*anut grubyuk*), when voters just follow the major opinion in the neighbourhood, to vote for the winning challenger. In Madiun, money politics was effective in shaping voters' preferences to vote for those giving the cash. At the same time, the money disbursed near to the Election Day succeeded in undermining the populist policy choices, practical policy outputs and popular image attributed to the incumbent.

## 6.1. Introduction

The Direct Election for district head (*pilkada*) in the Regency of Trenggalek was a unique race for democratic contenders, as it was a battle between two incumbents. In the first *pilkada* in 2005, the incumbent Soeharto<sup>413</sup> (2005-2010) defeated the former incumbent Malady WR (2000-2005). Then, in the second *pilkada* in 2010, the incumbent Soeharto was defeated by the former incumbent Malady WR. This thesis only researches the incumbent's failure to stay in office in the 2010 *pilkada*. Accordingly, the focus of discussion in this chapter is on the 2005-2010 local government period under the incumbent Soeharto's leadership.

In the 2005 *pilkada*, Soeharto ran in the race with Hamsun Ismail, the former deputy regent (2000-2005) or the former deputy of Malady WR, who had governed the Regency of Trenggalek from 2000 to 2005. Soeharto and his pair Hamsun Ismail won the first *pilkada* in the regency by 51.54 per cent of the votes (187,592). Malady WR, who ran with his running

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<sup>413</sup> The incumbent has exactly the same name with the former Indonesian president Soeharto. So, the name Soeharto throughout this thesis refers to the former regent of Trenggalek (2005-2010).

mate Joke Oriento Outran, the former sub-district head in Trenggalek, gained 48.46 per cent of the votes (176,407).

In the second *pilkada* held on 2 June 2010, the incumbent competed in a tighter race. He faced the former incumbent Malady WR and the deputy regent as well as his running mate in the 2005 *pilkada*, Hamsun Ismail. Sadly, the incumbent and his running mate Samsuri gained the least votes, only 22.4 per cent of the votes (71,818). Malady WR, who ran with his running mate Kholo, won the race by gaining 174,656 ballots (54.4 per cent). Meanwhile, Hamsun Ismail, who ran with his pair Joko Irianto Soetran achieved the second position by obtaining 74,611 votes (23.2 per cent) (Commission, 2010, p. 79).

Like Probolinggo Municipality, Madiun Municipality was one of the districts in East Java holding the last direct election for mayor prior to the national legislative and presidential election in 2009.<sup>414</sup> Previously, the last indirect election for mayor in the municipality took place on 27 December 2003 in the local legislature's hall. 25 local legislators voted for three pairs of candidates, namely Jatmiko Raya Saputro (Kokok Raya) and his pair Gandhi Yoeninta, Achmad Ali and his pair Sujikat and Wuye Ria Andayani and her pair Cahyono Suharmadi. Kokok and Gandhi who were nominated by the faction of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the faction of the Army/Police (*TNI/Polri*) unexpectedly defeated the incumbent Achmad Ali and Sujikat who were nominated by the faction of Golkar Party and Wuye and Cahyono who were proposed by the great faction (*Fraksi Akbar*). Kokok and Gandhi were voted by 13 of 25 local legislators to gain the seat of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor of Madiun Municipality (2004-2009).<sup>415</sup>

Five years later, Kokok Raya ran in the first direct election for mayor in 2008 as an incumbent. He urged Suparminto, the secretary of local government, to compete in the race. In the election, the incumbent competed with four pairs of contenders, namely Hari Sutji Kusumedi and his pair Hartoyo, Gatut Supriyoga and his pair Kus Hendrawan, Bambang Irianto and his pair Sugeng Rismiyanto and Wisnu Suwanto Dewa and his pair Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto. As an incumbent, Kokok Raya did not succeed in maintaining his office. In the first direct election for mayor conducted on 23 October 2008, he gained 22,521 ballots (25.69 per cent). It was a crushing defeat for the incumbent as the winning challenger, Bambang Irianto and his pair Sugeng Rismiyanto, gained the most votes, 53.51 per cent (46,900 ballots).

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<sup>414</sup> In 2009, there were no direct election for mayor throughout the country as the general election commission (KPU), government, and the house of representative agreed to conduct legislative and presidential election only.

<sup>415</sup> Source: <http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=21486> accessed on 22 March 2014.



Soeharto's failure to maintain office in Trenggalek Regency is a paradox, as he was supported by the majority of political parties in the regency. In addition, during his term in office, Soeharto, like other incumbents, had more access to local government resources and more control of local bureaucracy, compared to the challengers. Also in Madiun Municipality, when Kokok Raya decided to run in the race for the second term, he was predicted to succeed in maintaining his post. In addition to an incumbent, he was also supported by the leading party in the local parliament (PDI-P). As an incumbent with a nationalist party background, Kokok was actually a popular figure amongst local people, especially amongst the majority of low income people in the municipality. These failures, then, raise questions as to why and how the incumbents lost in a landslide defeat. Indeed, they were in a more favourable position during their tenure, compared to the challengers. What are the political dynamics in both districts that may explain the incumbent's failure to stay in power? Why did the winning challengers gain landslide triumphs, whereas they faced the incumbents? Why did the voters not vote for the incumbents in the re-election bid?

## **6.2. Islam and Javanism in the Outer Region**

Trenggalek is one of the regencies located in the southern coastal area of East Java. The regency covers an area of 1,261.40 km<sup>2</sup>. Two thirds of the area is mountainous land. According to the national population census in 2010, Trenggalek's inhabitants are 674,521 people, comprising 334,769 males and 339,752 females (Trenggalek, 2010, p. 6). The population live in 14 sub-districts and 157 villages. The majority of the population is Muslim, covering 99.25 per cent of the regency's inhabitants (Java, 2010, p. 22).

Although the majority of the population is Muslim, they are also Javanese. Like Blitar Regency, Trenggalek's culture is categorised as Java *mataraman* in the East Java Regional Division of Culture (Sudikan, 2008). According to the history of the regency, the area of Trenggalek was part of the *Kasunanan Surakarta Hadiningrat* or the Kingdom of Surakarta centred in Central Java or Surakarta.<sup>416</sup> In the regional diversity of Javanese culture, Trenggalek is included in the *Mancanagari* or 'outer region'. The features of *Mancanagari*'s culture are similar to the central Javanese court culture of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, which are characterised by syncretism in religious life, unifying elements of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The folk culture and art in Trenggalek also favour the two centres of Javanese culture (Koentjaraningrat, 1985, pp. 21-22).


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<sup>416</sup> Source:

[http://www.trenggalekkab.go.id/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=319](http://www.trenggalekkab.go.id/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=319)  
accessed on 19 November 2013. This is the official website of the Regency of Trenggalek.

In the past, the Trenggalek area was controlled by the authority of *Mpu Sindhok*. The first evidence was found in the *Kampak* epigraph, made in 929, demonstrating the era of *Mpu Sinddhok*. The other important evidence is the *Kamulan* epigraph, which is referred to as the date of Trenggalek's establishment on 31 August 1194. The epigraph says that the origin of Trenggalek was in *Kamulan*. This was a gift from Prabu Kertajaya, the King of Kediri Kingdom, as the people of *Kamulan* helped the king when he had to evacuate from Kediri due to an invasion by the kingdom's enemy. Prabu Kertajaya, then, won the war and returned to Kediri. From the day of this award, Trenggalek was granted self-government. After the Hindu era, Trenggalek was under Islamic influence, shown by historical evidence, namely the *Sumbergayam* old Islamic boarding school and the *Minak Sopal* tomb, which was made in 1568. This shows the era of Islam in the regency. In 1700, Trenggalek was part of the *Kasunanan Surakarta*'s control, especially after the *Gianti* Treaty in 1755 which split the influence of *Kasultanan Yogyakarta* and *Kasunan Surakarta* in Java. After the Independence Era, Trenggalek's status was stipulated in the Law No. 12/1950 as one of the regencies in East Java Province.<sup>417</sup>

**Map 6.1** Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality



By courtesy of <http://www.nationsonline.org/> and <http://archipelagofastfact.wordpress.com/>

The incumbent (Soeharto) was the 15<sup>th</sup> regent after Indonesian Independence. He was also the first regent who was elected directly by the people in 2005. He took the office from Mulyadi WR, who was the last regent elected by local legislators in 2000. The 2010 *pilkada*, then, was the race for selecting the 16<sup>th</sup> regent after independence or the 2<sup>nd</sup> regent in the Reform Era.

<sup>417</sup> Source:

[http://www.trenggalekkab.go.id/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=319](http://www.trenggalekkab.go.id/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=319) accessed on 19 November 2013.

The Municipality of Madiun is located in the western part of East Java Province. The distance from Surabaya, the capital of the Province, is 172 km. From Trenggalek, Madiun Municipality is located about 85 km to the North. The municipality is surrounded by the area of Madiun Regency. According to the Madiun Municipality Central Statistics Agency, the population was 201,619 people in 2008. Females were 51.74 per cent of the population (104,321). The area of the municipality covers 33 km<sup>2</sup> which is divided into three sub-districts and 27 villages. Thus, the density of population reached 6,067 people per km<sup>2</sup> in 2008. The majority of the population is Muslim, covering 88.78 per cent (179,006 people). The rest are Catholic (8,606 people), Protestant (12,543 people), Hindu (268 people), and Buddhist (1,196 people).

As an urban district, the contribution of the non-agricultural sector dominates the municipality's gross regional domestic product (GRDP). According to the Madiun Municipality Central Statistics Agency, the sectors of manufacturing industry, construction, trade, hotels and restaurants, transportation and communication, banking and other financial intermediaries and other services contributed 82.53 per cent of the municipality's GRDP in 2007. In addition to being a city of trade and industry, Madiun is also known as the city of education. The municipality has 16 tertiary education institutions.

The history of Madiun Municipality cannot be separated from the establishment of Madiun as an autonomous region in East Java. Like other municipalities in East Java, namely Pasuruan, Malang, Probolinggo, Blitar, Mojokerto, Kediri, and Batu; Madiun was part of the Madiun Regency. According to the Government of Madiun Regency's historical records, the history of Madiun began on 18 July 1568, when the Sultanate of Demak mandated the Prince of Timoer to lead the region. In the past, this region was known as Kadipaten Purbaya. When the region was under the leadership of the Princess Raden Ayu Retno Djumilah, the daughter of the Prince of Timoer, it was attacked by the Kingdom of Mataram (1586-1587). This kingdom succeeded in controlling Kadipaten Purbaya from 1590 to 1830. Also, the kingdom changed the name of the region from Purbaya to Madiun.<sup>418</sup>

The control of Mataram Kingdom in the region was ended in 1830 when the Dutch Colonial Government succeeded in defeating Mataram. Under the Dutch control, Madiun was set as the centre of government of Madiun Residency, covering the regions of Madiun, Ngawi, Ponorogo, Pacitan, and Magetan. Later, the Dutch government established the Municipality of Madiun by issuing the government regulation number 326 on 20 June

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<sup>418</sup> Source: Source: <http://www.madiunkab.go.id/> accessed on 25 March 2014

1918.<sup>419</sup> Finally, under the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Madiun Municipality was legalised in 1950 when the government stipulated the Law number 16/1950 on the Establishment of Cities in the Province of East Java, Central Java, West Java, and the Special Region of Yogyakarta.

In East Java's sub-division of cultures, Madiun was included in the *Mataraman* sub-culture. Like Trenggalek Regency, Koentjaraningrat categorises Madiun Municipality as part of the *Mancanagari* (outer region) of regional diversity of Javanese culture. The Javanese culture in the municipality is similar to that of the Central Javanese court culture of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Madiun's people speak Javanese and perform arts, which are similar to Javanese people who follow Central Javanese court culture. An exception is the *warok* folk dance of *panaraga*, which is not popular in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. *Warok* is a dance with a magical character. As in the Central Javanese court, in Madiun numerous *kebatinan* or spiritual cultural movements also exist (Koentjaraningrat, 1985, p. 22).<sup>420</sup> Madiun Municipality is also known as the home of martial arts. There are 12 martial arts groups in the Martial Arts Community of Madiun (*Paguyuban Pencak Silat Madiun*).<sup>421</sup> Two groups which have wide networks and membership in the municipality are the martial arts group of *Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate* (PSH Terate) and *Persaudaraan Setia Hati Winongo Tunas Muda* (PSH Tunas Muda Winongo). The headquarters of both martial arts groups are located in the Madiun Municipality. They have many members and branches in the Regency of Madiun, Magetan, Trenggalek, Pacitan, Ponorogo, Ngawi, and some other regencies in East Java.

In the early independence era, Madiun was known as one of the bases of communist forces in East Java. In the country's historical records, Madiun Municipality is widely known as the centre of the Madiun Affair in 1948. Some literature written by military-based authors and sources mention this incident as a revolt initiated by a communist dominant organisation named the Front Democratic People (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat, FDR*). FDR and its military forces occupied government offices, police offices, banks, post and communication offices, and Pro-Soekarno and Hatta military offices on 18 September 1948. FDR also flew the red flag at the Madiun City Hall. FDR and its military forces succeeded also in occupying

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<sup>419</sup> Source: [http://www.madiunkota.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=115:sejarah-kota-madiun](http://www.madiunkota.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=115:sejarah-kota-madiun) accessed on 24 March 2014.

<sup>420</sup> The concept of *kebatinan* is different from religion. *Kebatinan* is spiritual culture or inner culture created by humans. Religion is the product of God (Suwarno, 2005, pp. 87-88). Mulder defines *kebatinan* as the cultivation of one's inner being and deep self (*batin*) (Mulder, 1992, p. 17). *Kebatinan* is also identified as mysticism. It is similar to religions that emphasise the direct relationship between human and God (Suwarno, 2005, p. 90). Mulder, then, defines "*kebatinan* is the practice of the mystical way (Mulder, 2006, p. 76).

<sup>421</sup> The community membership covers martial arts groups in Both Madiun Municipality and Madiun Regency. Source: <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/10/03/058518882/Kapolda-Jatim-Damaikan-12-Perguruan-Silat> accessed on 26 March 2014.


Magetan, Ponorogo, Pacitan, Trenggalek, Ngawi in East Java Province and Purwantoro, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Blora, Pati, Cepu, and Kudus in Central Java Province (Soetanto, 1995, p. 144)(Soetanto, 2006, p. 128)(Maksum et.al, 1990, p. 22).<sup>422</sup> Moreover, some Indonesian and overseas academics use various terms to mention the incident, such as the Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 (Swift, 1989), the Madiun Affair (Efimova, 2003)(Mortimer, 2006), the mistimed communist rebellion at Madiun (Hindley, 1962) and the abortive Madiun rebellion of 1948 (Lubis, 1954).

Relevant to this thesis, the Madiun Affair is important to portray the influence of communism in the city. However, most of the literature in Indonesian and English examining the affair seems to just focus on the history of this incident. The literature rarely discusses the activities of communist activists and the communist influences amongst people in Madiun. Prior to and after the independence of the country in 1945, Central Java and East Java were the heartland of the communist movement in the country. The Madiun Affair in 1948 was one of the great moments demonstrating the existence of a communist movement in Indonesia (Aveling, 1975, p. v).

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<sup>422</sup> The authors and sources mention FDR as a communist dominated coalition rather than a socialist coalition. It was previously called *sayap kiri* (left wing) established in September 1946. FDR was first introduced on 26 February 1948 to replace the left wing in a rally in Surakarta, Central Java. The members of FDR were the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI), the Socialist Party (PS) under Amir Sjarifoedin as the Chairman, the Indonesian Labour Party (*PBI*) under Setiadjud as the chairman, the armed paramilitary Indonesian Socialist Youth Organisation (*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, *Pesindo*), the Central Organisation of Indonesian Labour Unions (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, *SOBSI*), and the Indonesian Peasants League (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*, *BTI*). Amir Sjarifoedin was elected as the chairman of FDR. In the first book (1995) Soetanto mentioned that Madiun Affair took place on Saturday, 18 September 1948 at 03.00 p.m. In the second book (2006) Soetanto revised that the affair took place on Sunday, 19 September 1948 at 03.00 p.m.

**Chart 6.1** General Election Results for National Legislative Body (1955) and Municipal Legislative Body (1957) in Madiun Municipality (%)



Source: <http://www.pemilu.asia/?opt=1&s=82&id=4> accessed on 31 March 2014.

A better explanation of communist influence in Madiun Municipality may be given from the results of two general elections during the Old Order Era.<sup>423</sup> In this era, two general elections took place in different years. In 1955, the government conducted a general election to elect the national legislators (DPR). From 1957 to 1958, the government conducted general elections to elect district legislators (DPRK) and provincial legislators (DPRP), especially for regions in Java, South Sumatra, and Borneo. Some other local general elections were conducted prior to 1955, namely Yogyakarta (1948), Minahasa dan Sangihe Talaud (1951), Makassar (1952), Papua (1961, under Dutch administration). As seen in chart 6.1, the Indonesian Communist Party (*PKI*) was the most dominant party in the national and local election in Madiun Municipality. In 1957, *PKI* gained the most votes, with 56 per cent at the municipality level. Meanwhile, the Indonesian National Party (*PNI*), *Nahdlatul Ulama* (*NU*), the *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (*Masyumi*, the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) and other parties gained 44 per cent of votes accumulatively in 1957. From these data, it appears that the influence of communism in Madiun Municipality was strong during this era.

In the New Order Era, like other districts in Indonesia, the influence of the national government was very strong in Madiun, especially in determining the mayor. In this era, all

<sup>423</sup> In Indonesian political history, *Orde Lama* (the old order) refers to period of Soekarno's administration (1945-1965). This term was created by Soeharto's administration (1966-1998) that claims to be the *Orde Baru* (the new order).

appointed mayors had military or bureaucracy backgrounds. The last mayor with a bureaucratic background elected by local legislators was Achmad Ali (2003-2008). Then, in 2008, the municipality began to directly elect its mayor.

The current socio-economic condition of Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality are better compared to other regencies and municipalities in East Java. In Trenggalek, coinciding with the *pilkada* implementation in 2010, some indicators of macro development outcomes demonstrated better achievements. The regency's HDI and its three components (life expectancy, Education index, and PPP) are better than the average indexes of 29 regencies in East Java. However, Trenggalek was left behind in economic development indicators, especially economic growth, per capita income and poverty rate. Especially, Trenggalek's per capita income reached only one third of the average provincial per capita income.

**Table 6.1** Socio-Economic Profile of Trenggalek Regency in 2010

Aspects	Trenggalek	Regencies	Municipalities	East Java	Explanation
HDI	73.21	68.99	75.85	71.55	
Life Expectancy	77.69	71.03	75.42	74.29	
Education Index	78.15	72.92	86.19	74.94	
Purchasing power parity (PPP)	63.78	63.03	65.95	65.42	
Economic growth	6.10	6.46	6.53	6.67	%
Per capita income	7,171.66	12,998.86	52,136.63	20,772.11	1,000 (Rp)
Unemployment rate	2.24	3.66	7.36	4.25	%
Poverty rate	15.98	-	-	15.26	%
Infant mortality rate	22.55	38.08	27.59	29.99	Per 1,000 live births

Source: The Central Statistics Agency of East Java, 2011. The Central Statistics Agency of Trenggalek, 2011.

Like Trenggalek Regency, Madiun Municipality accomplished better macro development achievements than other municipalities and regencies in East Java. The municipality has a better HDI than the average of nine municipalities and 29 regencies in East Java. In some more specific development indicators, Madiun Municipality achieved above average life expectancy and education indexes, infant mortality rate and economic growth. These achievements were supported by a better per capita local budget (APBD), worth Rp 1,979,940 (AUD 197.994) in 2008. Nevertheless, the municipality had lower per capita income (Rp 14,669.89 or AUD 1,466.989) compared to the average of nine municipalities in East Java. Also, unemployment was a problem in Madiun Municipality. The number was almost double the average of unemployment in East Java.

**Table 6.2** Socio-Economic Profile of Madiun Municipality in 2008

Aspects	Madiun	Municipalities	Regencies	East Java	Explanation
HDI	75.89	75.05	67.88	70.38	
Life Expectancy	76.01	74.63	70.23	73.50	
Education Index	87.74	85.42	71.93	73.73	
Purchasing power parity	63.93	65.11	61.49	63.92	
Economic growth	6.76	6.20	5.78	5.94	%
Per capita income	14,669.89	41,477.22	10,525.34	16,751.43	1,000 (Rp)
Unemployment rate	12.72	10.63	5.50	6.42	%
Poverty rate	8.5 (2009) <sup>424</sup>	-	-	18.51	%
Infant mortality rate	25.35	27.91	39.71	31.58	Per 1,000 live births
Per capita of local budget (APBD)	1,979,940	1,852,509	777,576	-	(Rp)

Source: the East Java Central Statistics Agency, 2009 and 2011. The data of per capita of local budget in 2008 are processed by researcher from master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011.

Some macro data presented in table 6.1 and 6.2 are important to explain the general existing conditions of both districts prior to and at the time of the *pilkada* which took place in 2010 and 2008. Indeed, the incumbents' failures to maintain their posts are paradoxical. Except for economic indicators in Trenggalek which are lower than other regions in East Java, the incumbents succeeded in effectively lifting the districts' macro conditions. The paradox, then, sparks some questions; why could both incumbents not gain credits from the improving situation in the districts? Could the political dynamics in each district during the incumbents' stay in power provide adequate explanation to reveal the political logic of their failures to retain their offices? Moreover, an explanation of the socio-cultural background of the districts dominated by Islamic and Javanese culture and the history of communism is needed to find alternative explanations of the incumbents' failures in the re-election bid. The next section of the chapter will explain the political setting prior to the 2010 *pilkada* in Trenggalek Regency and the 2008 *pilkada* in Madiun Municipality, which could strengthen as well as test the empirical findings during the fieldwork.

### 6.3. The *Pilkada* Political Setting in Trenggalek and Madiun: From Corruption to Money Politics Issues

#### 6.3.1. The *Pilkada* Political Setting in Trenggalek

Before explaining some issues emerging prior to the 2010 *pilkada* in Trenggalek, some data related to the political constellation of the regency, both during the Soeharto Era and Post-

<sup>424</sup>Source: [http://www.madiunkota.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=209:perubahan-itu-nyata&catid=1:berita](http://www.madiunkota.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=209:perubahan-itu-nyata&catid=1:berita) accessed on 30 March 2014. There is no valid poverty rate for Madiun Municipality in 2008.



Soeharto, are presented. As seen in table 6.3, in the last 17 years prior to the Indonesian political reform in 1998, the regency was under the Golkar party's control. During the four terms of the legislative election, Golkar occupied 57.65 per cent of the seats in the local parliament, on average. Moreover, the party's control was also strengthened by the support of the Army faction in the legislative body, which had the privilege of installing their representative in all layers of the legislative body.<sup>425</sup>

**Table 6.3** Political Constellation in Trenggalek Regency in the Soeharto Era 1982-1999


Parties	Seats in Parliament (Election)			
	1982-1987 (%)	1987-1992 (%)	1992-1997 (%)	1997-1999 (%)
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)	1 (2.5)	2 (4.4)	7 (15.6)	-
Golkar Party (Golkar)	22 (55)	31 (69)	22 (48.8)	26 (57.8)
United Development Party (PPP)	9 (22.5)	3 (6.6)	7 (15.6)	10 (22.2)
Army/Police faction	8 (20)	9 (20)	9 (20)	9 (20)

Source: Trenggalek Regency in figures (2007; 2012).

The alliance between Golkar and the Army faction gave more power to Golkar to control the regency. As seen in chart 6.2, the alliance between Golkar and the Army faction in the local legislative body controlled 77.65 per cent of seats in the local parliament on average within the four terms. The period of 1987-1992 was the top of the ruling party's control, with 89 per cent of the seats.

<sup>425</sup>In the Soeharto era (1966-1998), the government used the term "Dwi Fungsi ABRI" (the Dual Army's Functions) in order to stabilise the Indonesian political system. The government considered that the appointment of members of the assembly and parliament from the Armed Forces was based on its function as a stabilizer and dynamist. Thus, the army could install its representative without competing in the election.

**Chart 6.2** Trenggalek's Political Constellation in the Soeharto Era (1982-1999) (%)



Source: Trenggalek Regency in figures (2012)

However, in the post-Soeharto era, the Indonesian political system has come into a more democratic situation. The government gave more space for citizens to establish new political parties in 1998 and 1999. In the first post-Soeharto election in 1999, 48 political parties contested in the race. Not all parties gained adequate votes to install their representative in the 1999 Legislative Election. In the Regency of Trenggalek, there were 6 political parties and an Army faction that installed their representatives in the local legislature. In the last election in 2009, 12 parties put their representatives into the local legislative body. It is interesting that, as more parties have seats in the parliament more diverse political ideologies have developed in the society.

**Table 6.4** Political Constellation in Trenggalek Regency in the Post-Soeharto Era (1999-2014)


Parties	Seats in Parliament (Election)		
	1999-2004 (%)	2004-2009 (%)	2009-2014 (%)
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	14 (31.1)	13 (51.1)	8 (17.6)
Democratic Party (PD)	-	3 (6.6)	5 (11.1)
Golkar Party (Golkar)	6 (13.4)	7 (15.6)	5 (11.1)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	-	1 (2.2)	5 (11.1)
United Development Party (PPP)	1 (2.2)	-	1 (2.2)
National <i>Ulema</i> Awakening Party (PKNU)	-	-	4 (8.8)
National Awakening Party (PKB)	16 (35.6)	14 (31.1)	7 (15.5)
National Mandate Party (PAN)	2 (4.4)	4 (8.8)	4 (8.8)
Pancasila Patriot Party (Patriot)		2 (4.4)	2 (4.4)
National Care for People Party (PPRN)	-	-	1 (2.2)
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)	1 (2.2)	1 (2.2)	1 (2.2)
Reform Democracy Party (PDP)	-	-	2 (4.4)
Army/Police faction	5 (11.1)	-	-

Source: Trenggalek Regency in figures (2012)

Nonetheless, it is not easy to say that each party has different political ideologies. Based on examination of the basic principles of each party, these parties can be divided between two main ideological poles, namely nationalist and Islamic. Parties with a nationalist ideology mention Pancasila (the five principles) as the basis principle, which are PDI-P, PD, Golkar, Patriot, PPRN, PKPI, and PDP, PKB and PAN. Parties with an Islamic ideology mention Islam as the basis principle, namely PKS, PPP and PKNU.<sup>426</sup>

<sup>426</sup> PAN mentions normatively that Pancasila is the basic principle of the party. PKB mentions five pillars in Pancasila as the basic principle. Nevertheless, I categorised these two parties as Islamic parties. Although they attempt to become inclusive parties by allowing non-Muslim to join the parties, they are very close to the two biggest Muslim Mass-based organisations' followers. PAN is closely linked to the Muhammadiyah's members and PKB is closely linked to *Nahdlatul Ulama's* members.

**Chart 6.3** Local Parliament seats and Political Configuration in the Post-Soeharto Era (%)



Source: Trenggalek Regency in figures (2012)

By incorporating PAN and PKB as part of the Islam-based parties, the political constellation in the regency in the post-Soeharto era shows increasing support for Islam-based parties. As seen in chart 6.3, in the first post-Soeharto election in 1999, Islam-based parties in the regency gained 42.2 per cent of the local parliament's seats. Even though they had been stagnant in the 2004 election, Islam-based parties improved their seats in the 2009 election to 46.4 per cent. Based on these data, the political constellation in the regency shows a tight contest between nationalist based parties and Islamic based parties.

Nevertheless, a party's ideology is not relevant as a basis to explain the alliances of parties in nominating a candidate in the *pilkada*. The similarity of interests and the chance to gain victory in the *pilkada* are relevant to explain the composition of parties in supporting a pair of candidates in the *pilkada*. As seen in table 6.5, Soeharto and his running mate Samsuri (HARSAM) were nominated by a coalition of Islamic (PKS, PAN, PKNU) and Nationalist (PD, Golkar, PDP, Patriot, PKPI, PPRN) based parties, with a 59.24 per cent share of votes in the 2009 legislative election. Also, the pair of Mulyadi WR and Kholiq was proposed by three parties with different ideological bases and received a 34.25 per cent share of votes. The last pair, Mahsun Ismail and Joko Irianto Soetran, ran the race via individual nomination. They succeeded in gaining 57,247 individual supporters, to meet the limit stipulated by Trenggalek Election Commission of 4 per cent of the total population in the regency.

**Table 6.5** Candidates and Supporting Parties in the 2010 *Pilkada* in Trenggalek

<b>Soeharto – Samsuri (HARSAM)</b>		
<b>Parties</b>	<b>Votes (2009)</b>	<b>Seats in Parliament</b>
Democratic Party (PD)	47,231	5
Golkar Party (Golkar)	43,515	5
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	29,444	5
National Mandate Party (PAN)	24,442	4
Democratic Reform Party (PDP)	14,483	2
Patriot Party (Patriot)	14,186	2
The Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)	11,570	1
The National <i>Ulema</i> Awakening Party (PKNU)	21,589	4
The National Care for People Party (PPRN)	7,313	1
Non-parliament party coalition		
<b>Total</b>	213,833 (59.24%)	29
<b>Mahsun Ismail – Joko Irianto Soetran (MAHIR)</b>		
Supports from 14 sub-districts	57,247	0
<b>Mulyadi WR – Kholiq (MK)</b>		
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	58,913	8
National Awakening Party (PKB)	56,353	7
United Development Party (PPP)	8,418	1
<b>Total</b>	123,648 (34.25%)	16

Source: Trenggalek Election Commission, 2010.

The table also demonstrates that Soeharto-Samsuri was the strongest pair in the *pilkada* candidacy. The incumbent was supported by the majority of parties as well as the majority of votes in the 2009 legislative election. According to the Trenggalek Election Commission (KPUD), the incumbent and his running mate were supported by nine parties in the local parliament with a 59.24 per cent share of votes in the 2009 legislative election. On the other hand, Mahsun-Joko was the pair with the least supporters in the candidacy. KPUD stipulated an official requirement for candidates taking individual candidacy or without party support. They should meet the minimum number of 31,843 supporters, as evidenced by the number of supporters' IDs (KTP). After being verified, Mahsun-Joko was eligible to stand for the *pilkada* with 57,274 IDs and signatures to evidence support for the pair from the electorate.

Concerning the profile of candidates, the first pair, the incumbent (Soeharto) and his running mate Samsuri, created an acronym of "HARSAM" to market their candidacy in the *pilkada*. Before serving in office, Soeharto was an IT expert who worked in the state owned enterprise of PT Telkom. During his career in PT Telkom, he was involved in many vital telecommunication projects in the country and out of the country. The last prestigious project was a fibre optics marine cable connecting Batam (Indonesia), Singapore, and Thailand in 2003. Indeed, Soeharto is a local person from within the regency. He spent his childhood and adolescence in Trenggalek. He left the regency in 1971 when he pursued his diploma in IT in

the Telecommunication Education Centre of Telkom in Bandung. He retired from PT Telkom in 2004. Relating to his organisational life, Soeharto was not active in any mass-based or professional organisation prior to serving office in 2005. The majority of his achievements related to his background as an IT engineer in PT Telkom. Soeharto's running mate in the 2020 *pilkada* was Samsuri. He was a career bureaucrat in the Regency. His last position was as a staff member of the Regency of Trenggalek in Government affairs.

The second pair was Mahsun Ismail and Joko Irianto. Prior to nominating in the 2010 *pilkada*, Mahsun was the former deputy regent of Trenggalek for two terms. In the first term (2000-2005), Mahsun accompanied Mulyadi WR as the deputy regent. In the second term (2005-2010), he accompanied Soeharto as the deputy regent. Mahsun is a cadre of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU). He was active in NU as well as its wing organisations. His last position in the organisation was the Chairman of Ansor Youth Movement (GP Ansor), a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). He was also a migrant worker (1996-1998), working in Malaysia. As an NU cadre, Mahsun had a close relationship with NU's followers in the regency. He was also popular amongst *ulama* in Trenggalek. His pair, Joko Irianto was an engineer as well as a career bureaucrat in the regency. He is the son of Mr Soetran who served as the regent of Trenggalek from 1968 to 1975. Joko had held several posts in the regency. He was a head of sub-district when he accompanied Mulyadi WR to run in the 2005 *pilkada*. His last position in the regency was as the head of the local office of youth, sport, tourism, and culture under Mulyadi WR's and Kholiq's administration. During the 2010 *pilkada*, Mahsun and Joko used the abbreviation of their name "MAHIR" to promote their candidacy to the voters.

The last pair was Mulyadi WR and his running mate Kholiq. Mulyadi's education background was in civil engineering, graduating from the Faculty of Engineering of Brawijaya University in 1980. He previously spent his childhood and adolescence in Trenggalek and Nganjuk Regency, East Java, before staying in Malang to pursue his undergraduate study. After graduating with a bachelor's degree in civil engineering, Mulyadi pursued his career as a bureaucrat in public works. He began his career in the department of public works, assigned to Malang as a staff member of the Brantas River Basin Development Project in Malang from 1980 to 1986. Next, he moved to the Regency of Pasuruan, East Java. His last position in Pasuruan was the Head of Public Works Office in 1988. In the same year, then, Mulyadi moved to Trenggalek; his position was the head of Public Works Office of the Regency of Trenggalek from 1988 to 2000. His last position in the regency was the head of the local development planning agency until 25 July 2000. He was then elected by local legislators as the Regent of Trenggalek with his running mate Mahsun Ismail in 2000. In the first *pilkada* in 2005, Mulyadi no longer maintained his office and acknowledged the

victory of Soeharto-Mahsun Ismail in a tight competition. Mulyadi and his pair Joko Irianto gained 48.46 per cent of the votes (176,407). Their challenger, Soeharto and his pair Mahsun Ismail won the *pilkada* by 51.54 per cent of the votes (187,592).

After his narrow defeat in the 2005 *Pilkada*, Mulyadi continued his career in the bureaucracy at the provincial level. He first held the post of special staff of the East Java Governor from 4 October 2005. The last post prior to nominating in the 2010 *pilkada* in Trenggalek Regency was as the Head of the East Java Provincial Inspectorate. Mulyadi also was active as an adjunct lecturer in four private universities in Malang, East Java.

Mulyadi's running mate in the 2010 *Pilkada* was Kholiq. He is a local person who has spent the majority of his life in Trenggalek. He pursued his schooling in Trenggalek until 1986. He then pursued his undergraduate and master's study in Law at Darul Ulum University in Jombang, East Java. Kholiq is a cadre of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the regency who has a close relationship with some NU *kiais*. Before starting his political career, Kholiq was a lecturer in his first college in Jombang until 1997. As an NU cadre, he started his political career by joining the NU's identical political party, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB). Kholiq's first position in PKB was as the chairman of PKB of Gandusari Sub-district from 1998 to 2007. He started to be active in the party at the regency level in 2002 when he became the Chairman of the Division of Law and Human Rights Advocacy of PKB in Trenggalek. Next, he was elected as the Chairman of PKB of Trenggalek in 2007. Kholiq was first elected as a local legislator in the 1999 Legislative Election, nominated by PKB. He was re-elected as a local legislator in the 2004 and 2009 legislative election, nominated by the same party. His last post in the local legislative body was as the vice chairman of the local legislative council of Trenggalek from 2009 to 2010. In 2010, PKB nominated him as the candidate for deputy regent to run in the *pilkada* with his running mate Mulyadi WR, proposed by PDI-P. Kholiq has also remained in his position as the Chairman of PKB of Trenggalek until now (2013).

After explaining the political constellation in the regency and all profiles of candidates in the 2010 *pilkada* in Trenggalek, this section of the chapter explains about some political issues prior to the *pilkada* which were covered by local mass media. Not all of the issues are related directly to the *pilkada* implementation, but they are part of the local political dynamics relating to the incumbent's and challenger's candidacy prior to the *pilkada*. Several corruption cases committed under Soeharto and Mahsun's administration were the most challenging issue linked to Soeharto as an incumbent. The first case is the graft in IT devices procurement in the Electronic Data Centre (PDE) of Trenggalek Regency in 2007. The IT procurement graft scandal was widely published in local mass media in 2008 when the

Trenggalek Prosecutors' Office (*Kejari*) began to investigate this case. *Kejari* found a potential state loss of Rp 618.176 million (AUD 61,800) in procurement as some IT devices did not meet the appropriate specifications demanded in the project. One businessman and eight local government staff members were charged in the district court within 2009-2010.<sup>427</sup>

The next case is the corruption pertaining to the procurement of cows in 2008, committed by the Head of the Local Livestock Office, with a state loss of Rp 350 million (AUD 35,000). The procurement of 310 cows did not meet appropriate specifications and it did not meet the scheduled contract (*Antara Jatim*, 25 April 2011).<sup>428</sup> The third case was committed by the Director of Local Government Owned Enterprise of *Aneka Usaha* (PDAU) in the ice plant development project in 2007. The director was accused of committing abuse of authority. As a director, he intervened in the bidding committee to influence the ice plant bidding process. The director also committed poor planning and assessments prior to the plant's construction. The plant, then, could not be operated in time due to the lack of electricity supply. He was also alleged to have received illegal fees from contractors constructing the plant.<sup>429</sup> The failure of the ice plant development also occurred in another fishing area in the Munjungan Sub-district. The fishermen in the Blado Beach of Munjungan Sub-district urged the local government to operate the plant which was built in 2007. The incumbent responded that the problem was inadequate electricity supply to operate the plant and the local government was attempting to seek a specific budget for gaining the electricity supply (*Radar Tulungagung*, 22 January 2009). In addition, the director of PDAU was also accused of committing a corruption case in the Web printing machine procurement in 2007. The director was alleged to have marked up the printing machines by Rp 4 billion (AUD 400,000) (Memo Kediri, 27 August 2009).<sup>430</sup> The *Suara Nusantara plus* Tabloid reported that the incumbent disbursed some money (from this mark up money) to the broker of this project and bought three new cars for the three chairmen in the local legislative body.<sup>431</sup> The

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<sup>427</sup> Source: <http://prigibeachdotcom.blogspot.com.au/2009/11/trenggalek-korupsi-jaringan-ti-hamid.html> accessed on 19 November 2013; <http://infokorupsi.com/id/korupsi.php?ac=3825&l=lima-pns-trenggalek-siap-disidangkan-kasus-korupsi-ti-bagian-ii> accessed on 26 November 2013 (this is quoted from *Jawa Pos*, 30 October 2009); *Radar Tulungagung*, 14 June 2010.

<sup>428</sup> As quoted from <http://infokorupsi.com/id/korupsi.php?ac=8918&l=korupsi-pengadaan-sapi-mantan-kepala-dinas-peternakan-trenggalek-divonis-1-tahun> accessed on 26 November 2013.

<sup>429</sup> Source: [http://www.beritajatim.com/detailnews.php/4/Hukum\\_&\\_Kriminal/2012-03-12/129344/Dirut\\_PDAU\\_Trenggalek\\_Dimedakan](http://www.beritajatim.com/detailnews.php/4/Hukum_&_Kriminal/2012-03-12/129344/Dirut_PDAU_Trenggalek_Dimedakan) accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>430</sup> As quoted from <http://jarandawuk.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/korupsi-apbd-rp-8-m-di-trenggalek-dipetieskan/> accessed on 19 November 2013.

<sup>431</sup> As quoted from <http://www.beritajatim.com/citizenjournalism.php?newsid=450> accessed on 11 September 2012.



incumbent denied these allegations to local media who interviewed him in his official residence on 27 August 2009.<sup>432</sup>

The other two cases directly mentioned the allegation of the incumbent's involvement and his deputy Mahsun Ismail. The first case was about the allegation of the *Baiturrahman* Great Mosque development. The People's Consortium of Trenggalek (KRT) reported the regent and the deputy regent to the East Java Prosecutors' (*Kejati*) in Surabaya on 18 May 2010. Based on the audit result of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) in 2008, KRT claimed that there had been a potential local budget abuse of the mosque grant in 2007. The grant of Rp 3.87 billion (AUD 387,000) was not supported by complete and valid expenditure evidence. In addition, the regent and his deputy were also blamed for misusing their power by directly appointing the Sasmito Surabaya Ltd to do the mosque renovation project. The procedure of non-bidding to select the contractor is inappropriate within the existing regulations.<sup>433</sup> Two weeks prior to this report (6 May 2010), KRT reported the same case to the district prosecutors' office (*Kejari*). Also, KRT reported the allegation of corruption by the incumbent. Soeharto was blamed for seeking loan funds from a third party (Jatisono Multi Konstruksi Ltd.), which amounted to Rp 1.75 billion (AUD 175,000), without receiving approval from the local parliament.<sup>434</sup> These reports were controversial as they were undertaken and widely published less than one month prior to the 2010 *pilkada*.

Prior to the *pilkada*, Trenggalek was hit by two huge floods and landslides. The first flood happened on 5-6 May 2010 in 38 villages. On Wednesday night, 5 May 2010, the incumbent visited two locations in Gembleb village in Pogalan Sub-district and Karangrejo Village in Kampak Sub-district. He instructed the local health office to establish a temporary health post in the village. In addition, Soeharto instructed all civil servants in the regency to help the flood victims by doing community service to clean up the debris from flood in Gembleb Village.<sup>435</sup> More than two weeks later (23 May 2010), the flood hit 19 villages in four sub-districts in the regency. The local government responded to this calamity by establishing some soup kitchens in three villages. The government also distributed free rice

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<sup>432</sup> Source: <http://www.trenggalekjelita.web.id/2009/08/korupsi-apbd-rp-8-m-di-trenggalek.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>433</sup> Source: <http://www.harianbhirawa.co.id/kasus/9610-bupati-dan-wakil-bupati-trenggalek-dilaporkan-ke-kejati-> accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>434</sup> Source: [http://beritajatim.com/kabaranda/573/Bupati\\_Soeharto\\_dan\\_Mahsun\\_Dilaporkan\\_ke\\_Kejaksaan.html](http://beritajatim.com/kabaranda/573/Bupati_Soeharto_dan_Mahsun_Dilaporkan_ke_Kejaksaan.html) accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>435</sup> Source: <http://prigibeachdotcom.blogspot.com.au/2010/05/trenggalek-pemkab-trengginas-tangani.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

packets for the flood victims in two villages.<sup>436</sup> These two huge floods with wide coverage of the disaster had impacted on the people's psychological preparedness for participating in the *pilkada*.

Concerning the party alliances prior to the *pilkada* in which the incumbent ran demonstrates a similar pattern. The number of alliances tends to be small. Also, there is a tendency for rivalry among parties with a big number of votes in the legislative election. The coalition dynamic in Trenggalek was similar to the dynamic in Blitar. The incumbent was nominated by a coalition of parties with dominant shares of seats in the local legislative body. The incumbent in Trenggalek was supported by the Coalition of *Trenggalek Maju Mapan* (Trenggalek Developed-Established) which consisted of nine parties with a 64.4 per cent share of seats in the local parliament. The coalition was launched in the regency on 2 February 2010 or four months prior to the *pilkada*.<sup>437</sup> Moreover, Soeharto was supported by the so-called the *Guyub Rukun* (Involved in Harmony) Alliance composed of seven non-parliamentary parties. The alliance was launched on 14 March 2010.<sup>438</sup> In addition to gaining support from these parties, the incumbent also previously sought to gain a candidacy ticket from two other big parties. The incumbent participated in the candidate selection conducted by PDI-P. He delivered a speech about his vision and mission as a regent candidate in the PDI-P of Trenggalek's convention on 23 December 2012.<sup>439</sup> In the final decision, the national board of PDI-P decided to nominate Mulyadi WR as the regent candidate on 5 January 2012.<sup>440</sup> Furthermore, the incumbent also participated in the selection of the regent candidate conducted by PKB. Soeharto registered with the PKB's selection committee on 16 February 2010. The incumbent said that he wished to participate in the selection as he was nominated by PKB in the 2005 *pilkada* (*Radar Tulungagung*, 17 February 2010). Finally, PKB preferred to align with PDI-P and nominated Kholiq to accompany Mulyadi WR to run in the race.

The Trenggalek Election Commission scheduled a campaign period for all candidates from 16 to 29 May 2010. Within 14 days, each pair of candidates presented their vision and mission in the local parliament, attended public debates on a regional TV (JTV) channel, displayed banners and flyers in some strategic locations throughout the regency, and

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<sup>436</sup>This news is quoted from the office of Public Relation of Trenggalek Regency. Source: <http://prigibeachdotcom.blogspot.com.au/2010/05/trenggalek-lagi-banjir-landa-empat.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>437</sup> Source: <http://seputartrenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2010/03/Soeharto-mantap-koalisi-trenggalek-maju.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>438</sup> Source: <http://seputartrenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2010/03/aliansi-guyub-rukun-dukung-Soeharto.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>439</sup> Source: <http://prigibeachdotcom.blogspot.com.au/2009/12/trenggalek-dua-bakal-calon-bupati.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

<sup>440</sup> Source: [http://berita-trenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2010\\_02\\_01\\_archive.html](http://berita-trenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2010_02_01_archive.html) accessed on 11 September 2012.

conducted rallies in two sub-districts by inviting large masses of people. During the campaign period, Soeharto and Samsuri (HARSAM) promoted a vision to improve the Trenggalek residents' welfare through the implementation of "Excellent Service" in all aspects. In order to achieve this vision, HARSAM nominated five aspects for development, namely health, education, local economy, government apparatus, and religion. In the local economy, the incumbent promised to achieve surplus rice production, fostering farmer groups, making Trenggalek a production and training centre of '*mocaf*' (modified cassava flour), and forming agro-regions in the regency. Next, Mahsun and Joko (MAHIR) marketed a vision of "to serve better". This vision refers to the major function of government, to serve the people better. MAHIR proposed the mission to improve services to meet people's needs, particularly in health and education, through the improvement of service quality and access. Mahsun and Joko also offered a mission to strengthen rural development and to optimise agricultural development. The last pair, Mulyadi and Kholiq (MK) offered a vision of "reform" to achieve a more society welfare, with excellent morality. In order to realise this vision, MK marketed the mission of pro-people development by adopting pro-people development policies. To realise this vision and mission, MK proposed one of the programs for strengthening village government's capacity through the stimulation of financial balance and infrastructure development acceleration in the villages (Commission, 2010, p. 64).

To hold the 2010 *pilkada*, KPUD spent Rp 11, 687 billion (AUD 1.1687 million) on logistics, honorariums, security and other costs. Funding was not a problem in the *pilkada*, yet KPUD needed to deal with a potential conflict in a campaign program. The commission cancelled a peaceful campaign program inviting all candidates and their supporters to the Sumbergedong football pitch on 15 May 2010. The chairman of the commission, Patna Sunu, said that this decision was made suddenly after observing the last situation prior to the campaign, which would potentially lead to conflict amongst supporters. Upon the recommendation of the local police, this campaign program was finally moved to the commission's hall.<sup>441</sup> One day prior to the Election Day, the Chief Police of Trenggalek warned the candidates' sympathisers and victory teams not to raid in anticipating money politics practices on the election eve. The police responded to the actions committed by Mulyadi-Kholiq's supporters by searching strangers from outside the regency. They searched every stranger in the neighbourhood who they suspected would commit money politics practices (*Surabaya Post*, 2 June 2010). Two sub-districts were categorised to be rampant

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<sup>441</sup> Source: <http://www.antaraneews.com/print/186967/deklarasi-kampanye-damai-pilkada-trenggalek-dibatalkan> accessed on 11 September 2012.

with conflict, namely Munjungan and Watulimo sub-districts. In order to keep the election secure, the local police office deployed 750 police throughout the regency.<sup>442</sup>

**Table 6.6** 2010 *pilkada* result in Trenggalek Regency

No.	Candidates	Ballots	Percentage
1	Soeharto and Samsuri (HARSAM)	71,818	22.4
2	Mahsun Ismail and Joko Irianto (MAHIR)	74,611	23.2
3	Mulyadi WR and Kholiq (MK)	174,656	54.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>321,085</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Trenggalek Election Commission, 2010.

In the Election Day on 2 June 2010, there were no incidents hampering people from exercising their right to vote. An incident of ballot shortage compared to the number of registered voters in three sub-districts was easily tackled.<sup>443</sup> Finally, the incumbent failed to maintain office and he came last amongst three pairs of candidates. As seen in table 6.6, Soeharto gained only 22.4 per cent of the ballots. It was the most crushing defeat compared to the two other incumbents' defeats in East Java in 2010.

In addition to showing a surprising result, the 2010 *pilkada* in Trenggalek Regency was characterised by poor voter participation. According to the commission's final report, the number of absentees reached 237,824 (41.4 per cent). In addition, there were 14,984 invalid ballots that were ineligible to be counted. The highest number of absentees was in Dongko Sub-district reaching 54.5 per cent (Commission, 2010, pp. 79-81). The commission's chairman, Patna Sunu, argued that people felt bored with many elections in the country. He also mentioned bad weather or the rainy season as a factor contributing to low levels of participation in *pilkada*. However, the chairman of the District Election Supervisory Committee, Sunarno, said that the high absenteeism in the *pilkada* was caused by the low performances of the commission, sub-district electoral committee (PPK), and poll Committee (PPS) in persuading people to participate in democracy through the *pilkada*. They performed boring public education lectures that did not increase the voters' interest in coming to the polling stations.<sup>444</sup>

<sup>442</sup> Source: <http://berita-lampung.blogspot.com.au/2010/06/menjelang-pilkada-trenggalek-masyarakat.html> accessed on 19 November 2013.

<sup>443</sup> Source: <http://berita-lampung.blogspot.com.au/2010/06/pasangan-mulyadi-wr-kholiq-mengklaim.html> accessed on 19 November 2013.

<sup>444</sup> Source: <http://www.surabayapost.co.id/?mnu=berita&act=view&id=cfe44f1b8cda9f97385b07824ef4efe3&jenis=1679091c5a880faf6fb5e6087eb1b2dc> accessed on 19 November 2013.

### 6.3.2. The Pilkada Political Setting in Madiun

As in Trenggalek Regency, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) held more seats in the local legislature compared to seven other parties prior to the 2008 *pilkada* in Madiun Municipality. As seen in table 6.7, PDI-P gained six seats in the 2004 Legislative Election at the municipality level.


**Table 6.7** 2004 Legislative Election Result in Madiun Municipality

Parties	Seats in Parliament	%
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	6	24
Democratic Party (PD)	3	12
Golkar Party (Golkar)	5	20
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	3	12
National Awakening Party (PKB)	3	12
National Mandate Party (PAN)	2	8
The Prosperous Peace Party (PDS)	2	8
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)	1	4

Source: the 2009 Madiun Municipality in Figures. The percentages are processed by researcher.

The nationalist camp had more supporters than the Islamic camp in Madiun Municipality prior to the *pilkada*. As seen in chart 6.4, the classification of parties that succeeded to install their legislators in the local parliament (2004-2009) was dominated by the nationalist camp with 68 per cent. The Islamic camp consisted of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party (PAN), and National Awakening Party (PKB), who could only occupy 32 per cent of the seats. Hence, candidates who were supported by the nationalist camp had a greater chance to gain victory in the election.

**Chart 6.4** Nationalist and Islam-based Parties' Seat Share in the 2004 Legislative Election in Madiun Municipality (%)



Source: the 2009 Madiun Municipality in Figures. The percentages are processed by researcher.

The Madiun Municipality General Election Commission (*KPUD*) held the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor (*pilkada*) on Thursday, 23 October 2008. Five pairs of candidates ran in this first *pilkada* in the municipality. Prior to the election, the commission officially stipulated these eligible contenders on 22 September 2008 (*Radar Madiun*, 22 September 2008). As seen in table 6.8, four pairs of candidates were nominated by parties and party coalitions. Furthermore, one pair of candidates ran via individual or non-party candidacy, namely Gatut Supriyoga and Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN). This pair succeeded in collecting 14,527 valid items of support evidence (IDs and letters of support) from the municipality's residents.

Concerning their profiles, the majority of candidates were politicians. The first pair, Kokok Raya and Suparminto (KOMIT), was a combination of a politician and a bureaucrat. Kokok was a successful entrepreneur in the municipality and party activist of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Prior to serving in the post of mayor, he was the speaker of the Madiun Municipality Legislature from 1999 to 2003. Meanwhile, his pair in the 2008 election, Suparminto, was a career bureaucrat. He was the secretary of municipal government when Kokok served in his post. During the fieldwork, information was received from non-government participants that Suparminto was also an activist of the Indonesian Islam Propagation Institute (*LDII*) of Madiun chapter. Hari Sutji Kusumedi and Hartoyo (HAYO) were politicians. Hari was the chairman of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) of Madiun chapter. When he ran in the election, Hari was a local legislator. Hari and his family also ran a small restaurant in Serayu Street, Madiun Municipality. Hartoyo was the chairman of the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Madiun chapter until 2010. He was also a lawyer. Like HAYO, Wisnu Suwanto Dewa and Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto (WANGI) were also

politicians. Wisnu was the chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) of Madiun chapter until 2004. He was also a Madiun Municipality Legislator from 1999 to 2004. Wisnu and his family ran a butcher's shop. Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto was also a local legislator. He was known as a critical legislator in the municipality. When he decided to run in the 2008 election, Ngedi was also the Chairman of the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Madiun chapter.

The winning challengers, the pair of Bambang Irianto and Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS), were a combination of entrepreneur as well as politician and academic. Bambang was an owner of five energy related companies. He was also the commissar of Antawiryo Adhi Guna, Ltd., a Charging and Transportation Station of Liquid Petroleum Gas in Ngawi Regency, East Java. Bambang was also active in some employer associations at the district and provincial level, namely The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Kadin*), the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association (*HIPMI*) and the Association of National Oil and Gas Entrepreneurs (*Hiswana Migas*). In 2012, Bambang was elected as the Chairman of the Democratic Party (PD) of Madiun chapter. Meanwhile, Sugeng Rismiyanto was an academic with a master's degree in law. Prior to running in the 2008 election, Sugeng was the Rector of Merdeka University of Madiun. The last pair who ran via individual nomination was Gatut Supriyoga and Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN). Both candidates were civil servants. Gatut's last post was the head of the education office of Madiun Municipality. He was also the director of Madiun's city-owned tap water company (*PDAM*). Kus Hendrawan was a civil servant in the regency of Madiun. He was also an activist of a national NGO. He chaired the People's Information Centre (*LIRA*) of Madiun chapter.

In their campaign, education issues became the central platform of all candidates. Kokok Raya and Suparminto (KOMIT) promised to set up national schools with international standards (*SNBI*) and the establishment of a state higher education institution in the municipality. KOMIT also declared they would provide better infrastructure and services in order to support economic development (*Radar Madiun*, 7 October 2008). A controversy emerged when KOMIT performed an outdoor campaign which was designed as a walkathon activity. The Madiun Municipality Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) warned KOMIT, due to two main violations in this campaign. *Panwaslu* found the campaign was attended by civil servants, which is strictly prohibited. The supervisory body also revealed that KOMIT was alleged to engage in money politics during the campaign. KOMIT distributed many door prize coupons to persuade voters. In their campaign, KOMIT reminded voters to vote for reliable candidates who have the experience to lead the municipality government and who want to struggle for people's interests (*Radar Madiun*, 12 October

2008). Hari Sutji Kusumedi and Hartoyo (HAYO) pledged to enhance the quality of education in the municipality through education related infrastructure development and the improvement of teachers' capability. This pair also committed to improving public services in the municipality (*Radar Madiun*, 7 October 2008). In their outdoor campaign, HAYO criticised the incumbent government that devoted less attention to the small and micro economy. They promised to empower the small and micro economy and provide better job opportunities and public facilities (*Radar Madiun*, 9 October 2008). Wisnu Suwanto Dewa and Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto (WANGI) considered the strategic geographical position of the municipality, to offer a focus on municipal development in education and trade. This pair also promised to improve health services for all residents (*Radar Madiun*, 7 October 2008). In their outdoor campaign, WANGI visited traditional markets in the municipality. When they met with small and micro traders in these markets, WANGI promised to provide better technical assistance and capital support for them. Furthermore, in their platform, this pair offered enabling policies for investment, small and micro business empowerment, the improvement of cooperatives and micro credit institutions, women's empowerment, the development of local products, and the disbursement of special grants for all villages (*Radar Madiun*, 11 October 2008).

Bambang Irianto and Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS) offered a populist program to provide free education for the poor and the improvement of information technology infrastructure in education (*Radar Madiun*, 7 October 2008). Moreover, during the outdoor campaign, this pair stated that they had signed a "political contract" in a notary's office. In the contract, if BARIS gained victory in the election, the elected mayor and deputy mayor would donate 50 per cent and 25 per cent of their salaries for social activities. The contract also mentioned a promise to create free education for the poor, the improvement of health services and job opportunities, and open access to all public facilities for all people, including the city stadium (*Radar Madiun*, 10 October 2008). The last pair, Gatut Supriyoga and Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN), promised to prioritise education policy. GAWAN would also improve public infrastructure in the municipality, particularly in the eastern part of the municipality, which is frequently threatened by flooding (*Radar Madiun*, 7 October 2008). Like WANGI, Gatut Supriyoga and Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN) targeted small traders in their outdoor campaign. This pair visited traditional markets in the municipality. When they met with the traders, this pair promised to focus municipal developments on trade and service businesses. They would allocate from the local budget to support small and medium enterprises by disbursing soft loans. They also promised to pursue licensing reform in the municipality in order to attract investors (*Radar Madiun*, 13 October 2008).



**Table 6.8** Candidates and Supporting Parties in the 2008 *Pilkada* in Madiun Municipality

<b>Parties</b>	<b>Total Seats (2004)</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Kokok Raya – Suparminto (KOMIT)</b>		
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	6	24
<b>Hari Sutji Kusumedi – Hartoyo (HAYO)</b>		
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party (PAN)	5	20
<b>Wisnu Suwanto Dewa - Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto (WANGI)</b>		
National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP), Prosperous Peaceful Party (PDS), Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK), the Indonesian <i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> United Party ( <i>PPNU</i> )	5	20
<b>Bambang Irianto - Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS)</b>		
Democratic Party (PD), The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB), The Reform Star Party (PBR), <i>Golkar</i> Party (Golkar), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI)	9	36
<b>Gatut Supriyoga - Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN)</b>		
Supports from 5 sub-districts	14,527 supports	

Source: Madiun Municipality General Election Commission, 2008.

Returning to the political dynamics prior to the 2008 election, the incumbent, Kokok Raya, was shocked by a corruption report alleged to him in his first term in the mayoral office. The coordinator of Madiun Corruption Watch (MCW), Dimiyati Dahlan, reported the graft allegation committed by the speaker and the deputy speaker of Madiun Municipality Legislature and all legislators (the term of service, 1999-2004) to the Madiun Regional Police Office (*Polwil*) on 14 April 2005. MCW counted the state's loss to be worth Rp 9.6 billion (AUD 960,000) over 3 years (2002-2004).<sup>445</sup> This allegation was widely published in local newspapers since the incumbent was the speaker of the local legislature during this term. Also, his deputy, Gandhi Yoeninta, who was the deputy speaker of the local legislature, was alleged to be involved in this case. The disclosure of this case was negative for the incumbent for campaigning in the last three years prior to the election in 2008.

However, the police could not touch the incumbent and his deputy because it did not obtain an official approval from the President, as stipulated in article 36 the Law number 32/2004 on Local Government Administration.<sup>446</sup> The police investigated the incumbent and his deputy in early 2010 after they completed their posts. In the first trial on 9 February 2010, the Madiun Prosecutor indicted that the incumbent as the speaker of local legislature and two deputies of the speaker and 16 legislators had misappropriated funds from the local budget

<sup>445</sup> Source: <http://www.lawupos.net/tiga-tersangka-dugaan-korupsi-apbd-kota-madiun/> accessed on 22 March 2014.

<sup>446</sup> This article, then, was aborted by the constitutional court on 26 December 2012 in the court's verdict number 73/PUU-IX/2011

(2002-2004) worth Rp 8,342,241,300 (AUD 834,224.13). They could not account for the utilisation of some local budget expenditures, such as health care costs, service residence rents, fuel purchase costs, and service travel costs (*Koran Tempo*, 10 February 2010).

During fieldwork, non-government participants explained the internal conflicts amongst PDI-P's cadres prior to the election. Then, in addition to the incumbent, Wisnu Suwanto Dewa, the former chairman of PDI-P of Madiun Municipality chapter, ran in the race. Wisnu's decision to run in the election was believed to be part of his tension with the incumbent. He first attempted to run in the election via individual nomination. However, he gained supports from the National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP), Prosperous Peaceful Party (PDS), Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK), and The Indonesia United Nahdlatul Ummah Party (*PPNUI*). Wisnu, then, urged Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto, a local legislator from PKB, to run in the race.

The tension between Wisnu and his colleagues in PDI-P was related to the failure of Wisnu's candidacy in the 2004 Legislative Election. Wisnu's PDI-P fellow members in the local legislature reported him to the Madiun Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) and the Madiun Police Office as Wisnu was alleged to use a faked certificate in his nomination in the 2004 Legislative Election. *Panwaslu* and the police succeeded in proving this allegation. Then, Madiun Municipality General Election Commission (*KPUD*) aborted his candidacy on 12 February 2004. In the district trial, the Judge found him guilty and sentenced Wisnu to prison for three months and a fine of Rp 600 thousand (AUD 60), on 1 April 2004.<sup>447</sup>

One month prior to the Election Day or after *KPUD* stipulated five candidates were eligible to run in the election on 22 September 2008, political tension amongst candidates began to increase, especially between the two strongest camps, namely the incumbent camp, Kokok Raya-Suparminto (KOMIT), and the strongest challenger camp, Bambang Irianto-Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS). Both camps attacked each other by using similar issues, namely money politics. KOMIT was alleged to commit money politics when this pair held an outdoor campaign on 11 October 2008. KOMIT conducted a *jalan sehat* event (walkathon) by offering a house and a motorcycle as the grand door prizes for participants. The Madiun Municipality Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) considered that the door prize attraction was categorised as a money politics. Also, the committee reported that some civil servants were involved in this campaign activity (*Radar Madiun*, 12 October 2008). Four days later (15 October 2008), *Koalisi Pemuda Madiun* (the Madiun Youth Coalition) came to the committee's office. They pushed *panwaslu* to seriously follow up violations committed

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<sup>447</sup> Source: <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2004/04/01/05841257/Ketua-PDIP-Madiun-Divonis-Tiga-Bulan-Percobaan> accessed on 1 April 2014 and <http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=24433> accessed on 1 April 2014.

by KOMIT. The coalition brought some proofs of violations, such as visual records and prize coupons distributed by KOMIT's team in its walkathon event (*Radar Bromo*, 16 October 2008). Finally, the committee reported KOMIT to the Madiun Municipality Police Office (*Polresta*) on 17 October 2008. KOMIT was accused of committing money politics in its outdoor campaign (walkathon) on 11 October 2008 (*Radar Madiun*, 18 October 2008).

One day after *panwaslu* reported KOMIT's violation to the police office, the chairman of the Madiun Parliament Watch (MPW), Nono Jati Subagio, reported BARIS to *Panwaslu* for money politics allegations on 18 October 2008. MPW reported that BARIS's campaign team had distributed money and stickers picturing BARIS to influence voters. Nono handed over some proof, namely money worth Rp 10 thousand (AUD 1) and two stickers. He also brought two witnesses who knew the money politics actions committed by BARIS's campaign team. Moreover, Nono reported to *panwaslu* about the political contract declared by BARIS in their campaign on 14 October 2008. BARIS was alleged to commit money politics as they promised to cut their salary for social activities if they gained victory in the election. Nono argued that this political contract is a form of material persuasion or money politics to influence voters (*Radar Madiun*, 15 and 19 October 2008).

The issue of money politics was also warned about by the pair, Hari Sutji Kusumedi-Hartoyo (HAYO). In their last campaign on 16 October 2008, this pair reminded their campaign participants about the danger of money politics in the election. HAYO stated that money politics would ruin the future of the municipality since the elected candidates, who won the election by buying people's ballots, would attempt to charge this back during their tenure, such as via rent seeking behaviour. HAYO suggested taking the money disbursed by candidates' team. However, voters were recommended to ignore the money-based balloting directions; they suggested voters should vote for their best candidate (*Radar Madiun*, 17 October 2008).

In addition to being coloured by tension and competition, the 2008 direct election for mayor was shocked by the incident of the *Pasar Besar Madiun* (Madiun central market) fire on 23 October 2008 at 02.00 a.m. or 5 hours prior to the official election hour. *Radar Madiun* (24 October 2008) reported that 1,616 stalls were burned and more than 3,000 traders lost their assets in the market. Some speculations concerning the cause of the fire spread amongst local people. Relating to the election, people assumed that the incident was intended to distract the people's and police's attention from the election.<sup>448</sup> A trader at *Pasar Besar*

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<sup>448</sup> Source:

<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/10/23/2112516/Penyebab.Kebakaran.Pasar.Besar.Madiun.Masih.Diselidiki> accessed on 14 May 2013.

Madiun testified that he saw some people wearing black clothes passing inside the market three hours prior to the fire. Another trader also testified that it was strange that on the night of the fire incident, there were no police officers standing guard in the market.<sup>449</sup>

**Figure 6.1** Madiun Central Market: Fire and after Renovation



Source: Sobari (2012). The picture of the Madiun Central Market fire was taken from *Radar Madiun* 24 October 2008 edition.

A trader, Supandi, said that he met two strangers when he went to see his stall. The strangers asked him to pack his wares. Three minutes later, he saw smoke and fire emerge from the stall at D block in the market.<sup>450</sup> However, the incumbent mayor (Kokok Raya) disagreed with these speculations. He assumed that there was no direct link between the fire incident and the election (*Radar Madiun*, 24 October 2008). Meanwhile, the Forensic Laboratory (*Labfor*) of the East Java Police suspected a possible intentional motive for the fire. The police revealed that open flame had triggered the fire. However, the cause of the emerging open flame could not be ascertained. In other words, the market was probably intentionally or unintentionally burned.<sup>451</sup>

The effect of the central market fire, indeed, was predicted to reduce the election turnout. The Chairman of the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (*KIPP*) of Madiun chapter, Handono, remarked that the majority of traders in the central market did not come to the polling stations as they focused more on saving their livelihoods (*Radar Madiun*, 24

<sup>449</sup> Source: [http://apindonesia.com/new/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=2145](http://apindonesia.com/new/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2145) accessed on 14 May 2013.

<sup>450</sup> Source: <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/10/23/2112516/Penyebab.Kebakaran.Pasar.Besar.Madiun.Masih.Diselidiki> accessed on 14 May 2013.

<sup>451</sup> Source: <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2009/01/21/18212562/Pasar.Besar.Madiun.Bisa.Dibakar.Bisa.Terbakar> accessed on 11 April 2014.

October 2008). This incident was disadvantageous for the incumbent as it reduced the incumbent's opportunity to gain votes from the traders. Among the non-government participants, the incumbent was known to have a close relationship with them. He was even one of the board members of the Madiun Central Market Traders Association.

Finally, the election took place on 23 October 2008 and resulted in a crushing defeat for the incumbent. As seen in table 6.9, Kokok Raya and his pair Suparminto (KOMIT) gained only 22,521 ballots out of a total of 87,654 ballots. In contrast, Bambang Irianto and his pair Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS) succeeded in gaining a landslide triumph with 53.51 per cent of the votes. However, this election result was coloured by the high number of absentees, reaching 51,702 voters (36.13 per cent) of 143,111 eligible voters. It exceeded the number of ballots gained by the winning challenger.

**Table 6.9** 2008 *Pilkada* Result in Probolinggo Municipality

No.	Candidates	Ballots	Percentage
1	Kokok Raya – Suparminto (KOMIT)	22,521	25.69
2	Hari Sutji Kusumedi - Hartoyo (HAYO)	5,022	5.73
3	Wisnu Suwanto Dewa - Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto (WANGI)	5,354	6.11
4	Bambang Irianto - Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS)	46,900	53.51
5	Gatut Supriyoga - Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN)	7,857	8.96
	<b>Total</b>	<b>87,654</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Madiun Municipality General Election Commission, 2008.

Unlike the tensions related to the elections in the three other districts covered in this study, the high tension in Madiun Municipality occurred in the post-election period. The issue of money politics accusations to the winning challenger was the main cause of these tensions. One day prior to the election, *Radar Madiun* (22 October 2008) reported the confession of a voter in Nambangan Kidul Village who received money worth Rp 10 thousand (AUD 1) from a candidate on 21 October 2008. Another voter in Rejomulyo Village admitted to receiving Rp 20 thousand (AUD 2) from two different candidates. Moreover, a member of the Madiun Elections Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*), Asistriadi, admitted that he detected the hints of money politics, though it was difficult to prove. Even the methods of cash disbursement were changed to voucher distributions which can be exchanged for cash or a packet of groceries after voting.

**Figure 6.2** Mass Demonstration in the Madiun Elections Supervisory Committee's Office



Source: Sobari (2012); the photograph is taken from *Radar Madiun* 28 October 2008 edition.

One day after the election, some activists of *Koalisi LSM Peduli Madiun* (the Care for Madiun NGO coalition) came to the local legislature to recommend the postponement of the election declaration. They revealed some alleged violations, especially money politics practices, committed by the winning (BARIS)'s camp, who were leading in the temporary counting (*Radar Madiun*, 25 October 2008). Two days later (26 October 2008), hundreds of residents accompanied by the Madiun Legal Aid Institute (*LBH*)'s activists came to the *Panwaslu*'s office to report the alleged money politics practices committed by BARIS's camp. During the meeting, two residents from Mangunharjo and Kauman Villages testified that they received Rp 50 thousand (AUD 5) each from a BARIS team member in their neighbourhood. After disbursing the money, the BARIS team member requested that they vote for BARIS in the election (*Radar Madiun*, 27 October 2008). Mass demonstrations to protest money politics practices committed by BARIS's camp reached a peak on 27 October 2008. Thousands of people came to the *panwaslu*'s office. They protested that the *panwaslu* could not handle money politics reports committed by BARIS's camp. These people also came to the local legislature's office to press local legislators to postpone the election result declaration by the Madiun General Election Commission (*KPUD*). They accused that the election result was invalid as they found many examples of fraudulence and violations, particularly money politics, committed by BARIS's camp. On the same day, some activists of the People's Information Centre (*LIRA*) of Madiun chapter reported similar allegations to the Madiun Municipality Police (*Polresta*). Lastly, Wisnu Suwanto Dewa - Ngedi Trisno Yhusianto (*WANGI*)'s camp came to *Panwaslu*'s office. Like other mass actions, *WANGI*'s

camp reported some money politics allegations committed by BARIS's camp in Mangunharjo and Taman Sub-districts (*Radar Madiun*, 28 October 2008).

The Madiun Municipality General Election Commission (*KPUD*) declared Bambang Irianto - Sugeng Rismiyanto (BARIS) as the winning candidates in the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor on 28 October 2008. On the same day, masses of people on behalf of the Pro-Peace Forum of Madiun City (*Forum Pro-Damai Kota Madiun*) came to the local legislature's office. They demanded all parties respect the election result in order to create a peaceful situation in the municipality. They also delivered a similar demand to the legislature (*Radar Bromo*, 29 October 2008). One day later, hundreds of people from the Concern for Madiun (*Masyarakat Peduli Madiun*) came to the Madiun Municipality Police (*Polresta*). They pressed the police to process money politics allegations. These people continued the rally to the local legislature (DPRD)'s office. In this office, they petitioned the legislature to cancel the declaration of the election result which was won by BARIS (*Radar Madiun*, 30 October 2008).

Prior and during the election, the Madiun Elections Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) received 23 reports on election crime. Based on the election supervision final report, 22 violations were categorised as money politics practices. BARIS's camp was reported to commit 17 money politics practices and KOMIT's camp was reported to commit one money politics practice. After carefully verifying the reports, *Panwaslu* had reported 8 money politics practices committed by BARIS's camp to the Madiun Municipality Police (*Polresta*) on 30 October, 10 November, and 11 November 2008. *Panwaslu* also reported one money politics allegation committed by KOMIT's camp to *Polresta* on 14 October 2008. Furthermore, Gatut Supriyoga - Kus Hendrawan (GAWAN)'s camp filed a lawsuit to the Madiun District Court (*Pengadilan Negeri*) to revoke the declaration of the election result declared by the Madiun Municipality General Election Commission (*KPUD*) on 30 October 2008. This lawsuit was proposed in response to the violations during the election, mainly money politics practices (*Radar Madiun*, 31 October 2008).

## **6.4. Controversy on the Incumbents' Good Performance and Image**

### *6.4.1. Controversy on Soeharto in Trenggalek*

In the 2010 *pilkada*, Soeharto as an incumbent was in a tough contest. He had to compete against the former regent Mulyadi WR and his deputy Regent Mahsun Ismail. Soeharto had to deal with three challenging situations. Firstly, when he succeeded in taking up the post of regent in the 2005 *pilkada* by defeating the incumbent Mulyadi WR, Soeharto was widely expected to bring change to the regency. It was assumed that Soeharto would make a better

contribution, compared to Mulyadi WR, in leading the regency. This expectation by the people was indeed a great challenge for Soeharto throughout his term in office. Secondly, Mulyadi ran in the 2010 *pilkada* by bringing up people's memories of his leadership, when he governed the regency during the pre-Soeharto leadership. Soeharto had to face local residents' evaluations during his term in office and he was probably compared to Mulyadi's previous leadership. Thirdly, when his deputy Mahsun Ismail decided to run in the race, Soeharto had to deal with the loss of support from Mahsun's followers who previously supported him in the 2005 *pilkada*. As one of the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Chairman of Ansor, the youth wing of NU, Mahsun has many loyal followers at the grass root level in the regency.

During his term in office, Soeharto succeeded in branding some policies and programs and taking credit for them. The incumbent's first notable policy was the effort to develop a home-based industrial centre for modified cassava flour (*mocaf*).<sup>452</sup> The inspiration to exploit the economic benefit of cassava was started when he first took on his post as a regent. He was aware that one of the potential agricultural commodities in the regency is cassava. However, Soeharto knew that this commodity was very low in value and was not economical for farmers to rely on. Worse, in the harvest period, the farmers could only sell cassava for Rp 100 (AUD 0.01) per kilogram. Afterwards, he met with the pioneer of *mocaf*, namely Dr Achmad Subagio, who found a formula for fermentation to transform cassava into flour. In 2005, Soeharto invited Dr Subagio to present information about *mocaf* in the regency. Soeharto, then, committed to promoting *mocaf* in the regency. In 2006, the regency began to incorporate *mocaf* into local economic development programs. Local government provided grants for community groups and a cooperative to produce *mocaf* through the provision of slicers and oven/driers for them. Also, local government promoted *mocaf* in many trade promotion events in the country. As a result, the demand for cassava increased and this lifted its price. In 2012, one kilo of cassava reached Rp 1,000 (AUD 0.1).<sup>453</sup>

The best achievement of the *mocaf* industry in Trenggalek was on 24 November 2009 when the Minister of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia undertook "the Launching of Fermented Wheat Production Acceleration and the Declaration of National Independence of

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<sup>452</sup>*Mocaf* is a product of cassava flour (*manihot esculentacrantz*) which is processed using the principle of modifying the cells in the fermentation of cassava (Bambang Susilo, Aji Sutrisno, Indria Purwatiningrum, 2011, p. 1)

<sup>453</sup> Interview with the incumbent on 24 September 2012; a *mocaf* businessman on 3 October 2012.



Flour” in the regency. Trenggalek is, then, well known as the centre for *mocaf* production and development.<sup>454</sup>

The success of the *mocaf* policy is credited to the incumbent.<sup>455</sup> In a TV talk show, by referring to the data released by the Central Statistics Agency of Trenggalek, the incumbent remarked that within three years (2005-2008) the number of poor people in the regency decreased by 20.86 per cent. He claimed that the development of a *mocaf* home industry supported by local government has contributed to poverty reduction in the regency as the *mocaf* program can improve cassava farmers and producers’ income and provide a new labour market.<sup>456</sup> *Mocaf* can also encourage the emergence of other related business opportunities, such as business for cassava basket containers, cassava knife peelers and cutting machines and transport services. (*Kompas*, 15 October 2010).<sup>457</sup>

**Figure 6.3** A Container of *Mocaf* Cake and a Kilo of *Mocaf* and a Healthy Latrine in a House



Source: Sobari (2012) and Sobari (2009)

Another successful local government program credited to the incumbent is the sanitation program. Soeharto was known as the regent who cared about the importance of

<sup>454</sup> Interview with a *mocaf* businessman on 3 October 2012. See also <http://gakoptri.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/mentan-canangkan-percepatan-produksi-tepung-fermentasi-dan-deklarasi-kemandirian-tepung-nasional/> accessed on 30 November 2013. For visual source of *mocaf*'s success see in YouTube. Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WWf-HTHb7aI> accessed on 30 November 2013.

<sup>455</sup> Interview with an NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012; a *mocaf* businessman on 3 October 2012; a community activist as well as the incumbent's volunteer in the 2005 *pilkada* on 5 September 2012; a female local journalist on 12 September 2012; a party activist on 17 September 2012; a male local journalist on 21 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012; a party activist on 13 September 2013.

<sup>456</sup> Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WWf-HTHb7aI> accessed on 30 November 2013.

<sup>457</sup> Source: <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/10/15/02570744> accessed on 30 November 2013.

sanitation for local public health.<sup>458</sup> A non-government activist recognised this program, labelled “one house one latrine”, as promoted by the local government.<sup>459</sup> Coincidentally, this researcher conducted fieldwork on sanitation program implementation in the regency in 2009 under the project implemented by the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP) funded by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). The regency first began the program in November 2007 after it agreed to be one of the ten regencies in East Java committing to the implementation of the total sanitation and sanitation marketing (TSSM) program initiated by WSP.<sup>460</sup> In the first stage of program implementation, the regency applied community-led total sanitation (CLTS) methods to open people’s minds about the importance of having access to safe sanitation that promotes health through preventing water and sanitation related illnesses such as typhoid or cholera. The main initial target of the program is the reduction of open defecation habits among local people and finally to become open defecation free (ODF) at the hamlet level up to the regency level. Within 5 months of the program’s implementation, the regency succeeded in creating 8 ODF villages out of 30 villages that have implemented CLTS. One of the most successful ODF achievements is at the *Tumpuk* village in *Tugu* Sub-district. The village was the centre for the village ODF declaration on 14 May 2008 which was attended by the director of environmental health of the Ministry of Health, the officials of the National Planning and Development Agency, the officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the World Bank. According to the data released by the Trenggalek Health Office, up to January 2009, the program succeeded in encouraging people to build 16,783 healthy latrines and 1,653 communal latrines.

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<sup>458</sup> Interview with a local secretary office on 13 September 2012.

<sup>459</sup> Interview on 5 September 2012.

<sup>460</sup> The Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) is a multi-donor partnership administered by the World Bank to support poor people in obtaining affordable, safe, and sustainable access to water and sanitation services.

**Figure 6.4** Incumbent (in the middle) in A Live Talk Show on Sanitation at JTV<sup>461</sup>



Source: By Courtesy of JTV and JPIP (2009)

To implement the sanitation program, the incumbent was involved directly in the program and connected with the people in the villages. In the interview, the incumbent remarked:

I also participated in the program for promoting the sanitation program, such as in the *Jumat* (Friday) Prayers and the housewives' recitation forums. I also did the same (cooperation) with the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. As a result, Trenggalek was assessed rather quickly at the time, to be given the attention of the World Bank. I also gave a financial incentive; I gave every (ODF) village of Rp5million (AUD 500) to encourage people to have healthy latrines.<sup>462</sup>

The effect of sanitation success in the regency is acknowledged by government and non-government participants in this study, the national government, and the World Bank. A secretary of a local office said that as a popular program, the success of the sanitation program has lifted the image of other health programs. In Javanese he used a term "*nunut kamukten*". It means that other Local Health Office's programs just enjoy the fame of the sanitation program's success.<sup>463</sup> According to WSP, Trenggalek is one of the leading districts in sanitation progress. While the incumbent was in office, the regency was classified as the district with above-average performance of community-led total sanitation (CLTS) implementation (Robinson, 2011, p. 4;15). The World Bank gave an award to Soeharto as one of the regents who succeeded in encouraging local people to be aware of sanitation as well enabling local government policies to support the implementation of sanitation in the

<sup>461</sup> As a researcher conducting fieldwork in the regency, I also participated in this live talk show conducted on 9 August 2009 themed "Sanitation, what does it mean?"

<sup>462</sup> Interview on 24 September 2012. The recitation forum is not only a religious forum discussing and reciting Koran and other Islamic matters. It is also a social forum in a neighbourhood inviting all house wife (or husband) to gather. The incumbent attended the forum to socialise about sanitation directly to them.

<sup>463</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

Regency. The Bank invited Soeharto to Washington D.C to receive the award as well as to present the regency's success story of achieving a large scale ODF situation in a relatively short period of program implementation.<sup>464</sup> Soeharto also enjoyed wide coverage in the mass media on the sanitation success when he was invited to a regional TV live talk show '*CANGKRU'AN*' on 9 August 2009. In the Show, Soeharto and Taufiqurrahman, the Regent of Nganjuk Regency of East Java, presented the sanitation best practices in their region (figure 6.2).

The other program attributed to the incumbent is the promotion of a gifts centre located in the main road of the Regency at the Kranding Hamlet of Bendorejo Village in Pogalan Sub-district. During fieldwork, this researcher frequently passed this location. There are about 40 stores in the centre. The majority of them sell typical foods from Trenggalek, such as *alen-alen* (fried salty crackers made from cassava flour), *manco* (sticky rice caramel), and *kripik tempe* (soybean chips). The stores stand in a row along 300 metres of the main road. The idea to start this business came from a neighbourhood leader named Mujito. He encouraged the residents to start a micro business in order to improve their income. In 2008, this business started to show progress. The incumbent, then, was involved in supporting the promotion of this business. He initiated making these community businesses into a centre for typical food businesses. A local legislator remarked that the idea to develop the gift food store centre derived from the incumbent. This initiative was one of the incumbent's populist policies in local economic development, especially in home industry development.<sup>465</sup> In 2012, the total transactions in the centre reached Rp 16 million (AUD 1,600) per day. In a holiday season the total transactions could reach Rp 60 million (AUD 6,000) per day.<sup>466</sup>

In terms of macro development achievements, the incumbent succeeded in improving the regency's human development index (HDI) during his term in office (2006-2010). Trenggalek was included in the top eight regencies with the best HDI shortfall reduction from 2006 to 2010. According to the East Java Central Statistics Agency, the regency reduced the shortfall by 1.62 index points within this period. As seen in table 6.7, the regency's HDI index was always higher than the average of regencies as well as provincial indexes. In 2010, Trenggalek's HDI index reached 73.21 points. It was higher than the average index of regencies in the province, which reached 68.99 points and the provincial HDI that only reached 71.55 points. A secretary of a local office confirmed that the regency's HDI

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<sup>464</sup> Interview with an official at the local government office on 7 September 2012; a secretary of local office on 13 September 2012; a female local journalist on 12 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012.

<sup>465</sup> Interview on 14 September 2012; interview with an NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012.

<sup>466</sup> Source: <http://www.antarajatim.com/lihat/berita/93495/omzet-penjualan-pujasera-trenggalek-capai-ratusan-juta> accessed on 30 November 2013.

increased significantly while the incumbent was in office. The incumbent, then, used this issue for his campaign in the 2010 *pilkada*.<sup>467</sup>

Table 6.10 also demonstrates better achievements of the regency during the incumbent's time in office. The regency achieved a better quality of life with a lower infant mortality rate and unemployment rate compared to other regencies and municipalities in the province. The regency also performed better in the education and life expectancy indexes compared to other regencies and the provincial education and life expectancy indexes. However, the regency did not perform as well in economic indexes, with lower economic growth and purchasing power parity indexes compared to the provincial index. In 2010, Trenggalek Regency's economic growth only reached 6.10 per cent. It was lower than the provincial growth that reached 6.67 per cent.

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<sup>467</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

**Table 6.10** Macro Indicators of Development Achievement of Trenggalek Regency 2006-2010

<b>Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	26.47	24.51	23.93	23.79	22.55
Regencies (Average)	43.09	41.82	39.71	39.71	38.08
Municipalities (Average)	31.77	30.16	27.91	29.00	27.59
Province	35.32	32.93	31.58	31.41	29.99
<b>Unemployment Rate</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	6.05	4.91	3.73	3.91	2.15
Regencies (Average)	7.51	5.93	5.50	4.25	3.66
Municipalities (Average)	11.60	11.42	10.63	8.82	7.36
Province	8.19	6.79	6.42	5.08	4.25
<b>Economic Growth</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	4.95	5.47	5.64	5.00	6.10
Regencies (Average)	5.49	5.84	5.78	5.04	6.46
Municipalities (Average)	5.98	6.08	6.20	5.19	6.53
Province	5.80	6.11	5.94	5.01	6.67
<b>Purchasing Power Parity Index</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	60.47	61.34	62.44	63.13	63.78
Regencies (Average)	59.77	60.42	61.49	62.26	63.03
Municipalities (Average)	63.43	64.06	65.11	65.68	65.95
Province	61.46	62.56	63.92	64.74	65.42
<b>Education Index</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	77.17	77.17	77.17	77.77	78.15
Regencies (Average)	71.11	71.90	71.93	72.54	72.92
Municipalities (Average)	84.13	85.25	85.42	85.75	86.19
Province	73.40	73.61	73.73	74.53	74.94
<b>Life Expectancy Index</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	76.00	76.52	76.85	77.27	77.69
Regencies (Average)	69.39	69.89	70.23	70.65	71.03
Municipalities (Average)	73.80	74.29	74.63	75.05	75.42
Province	72.67	73.17	73.50	73.92	74.29
<b>Human Development Index (HDI)</b>					
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Trenggalek	71.22	71.68	72.15	72.72	73.21
Regencies (Average)	66.76	67.40	67.88	68.48	68.99
Municipalities (Average)	73.78	74.53	75.05	75.50	75.85
Province	69.18	69.78	70.38	71.06	71.55

Source: the Central Statistics Agency of East Java, 2006-2010. All of data showing the regency and municipality on average are processed by researcher.

In an interview, the incumbent implied that he succeeded in increasing the regency's macro indicators and local government revenue during his term in office. He remarked that:

“Thanks to god, (when I was in office) the HDI increased. If I am not mistaken, the previous HDI was above 30s (in East Java). In 2010, it was already in the Top 5, which is under

Sidoarjo, Gresik, and Tulungagung. Poverty index also fell from 71,000; it decreased by 21 per cent in three years. (Local government) Revenue improved from Rp 20 million to Rp 50 million (From AUD 200,000 to 500,000).<sup>468</sup>

A local party activist affiliated to the incumbent in the 2010 *pilkada* confirmed that there was a significant increase in HDI during the incumbent's time in the office, especially the improvement of the education and health indexes. In fact, this achievement was only recognised by a limited number of people in the regency.<sup>469</sup>

In the last year of his service, Soeharto succeeded in accomplishing the development of *Minak Sopal* Stadium in 2010. This was a multiyear project started in the first year of the incumbent's time in office. In the Plenary Session on 14 June 2009, local legislators questioned the incumbent concerning his commitment to complete the development of *Minak Sopal* Stadium.<sup>470</sup> The project costing Rp 20 billion (AUD 2 million) was finally accomplished on 27 June 2010 and it was credited to Soeharto, as he succeeded in finishing the project in the last year of his term in office.<sup>471</sup> However, this achievement did not help the incumbent's campaign as the stadium development was completed after the *pilkada* day on 2 June 2010. Indeed, the stadium is the home base of *Persiga* (the Trenggalek Soccer Association), a local semi-professional soccer club, which is very popular amongst local residents, especially the youth.

**Figure 6.5** *Minak Sopal* Stadium



Source: Sobari (2012)

In addition, under Soeharto's administration, the number of schools slightly increased from 2006-2010. As seen in table 6.11, the number of elementary schools diminished by 16

<sup>468</sup> Interview on 24 September 2012.

<sup>469</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>470</sup> The plenary session report was released by the public relations division of Trenggalek Regency on 21 June 2010. Source: <http://humas-trenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2010/06/fraksi-fraksi-sampaikan-pandangan-umum.html> accessed on 4 December 2013.

<sup>471</sup> Interview with a local female journalist on 12 September 2012.



schools. This was better than under Mulyadi's administration, which reduced the number of elementary schools by 34. In addition, the increase in the number of junior high schools is better under Soeharto's administration than under Mulyadi's administration. However, the increase in senior high schools, including senior high vocational schools, is better under Mulyadi's administration than Soeharto's.

Meanwhile, both Soeharto and Mulyadi did not make changes in the number of health facilities. Although, Mulyadi's administration reduced community health centres (*pusat kesehatan masyarakat, puskesmas*) by two, he also added two Subsidiary Community Health Centres (*puskesmas pembantu*). Soeharto did not provide both new *puskesmas* and *puskesmas pembantu* during his time in office.

**Table 6.11** Education and Health Facilities under Soeharto's Administration

Facilities	Mulyadi's Administration						Soeharto's Administration					
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Change	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change
Elementary School	490	476	456	453	456	-34	456	458	438	438	440	-16
Junior High School	-	32	35	38	38	6	38	41	47	50	50	12
Senior High School	-	10	14	15	16	6	16	16	17	17	17	1
<b>Health</b>												
Community Health Centre	-	24	24	22	22	-2	22	22	22	22	22	0
Subsidiary Community Health Centre	-	64	65	66	66	2	66	66	66	66	66	0

Source: Local Education Office of Trenggalek and Local Health Education Office of Trenggalek.<sup>472</sup>

Note : For the number of elementary schools, these data are included private elementary schools. The rest of facilities are under local government management and funding.

Furthermore, under Soeharto's administration, the regency showed better expenditure, compared to the average of 29 regencies in East Java, on health, education and the micro and small economy,<sup>473</sup> except for expenditure on public works. As seen in table 6.12, the average expenditure on education is the highest compared to other expenditures. Within 5 years, local government spent 44.42 per cent of the local budget on education; it even reached 52.26 per cent in 2010. Under Soeharto's leadership, the orientation of the regency was focused on human resource development with intangible outputs. This can be seen from lower expenditure on public works than health and education expenditure. Within his five years in

<sup>472</sup> Quoted from Trenggalek Regency in Figures 2007; 2011 published by the Central Statistics Agency of Trenggalek.

<sup>473</sup> Micro and small economic expenditures are aggregates of expenditures on cooperative and small and micro enterprises, agriculture, marine and fisheries, trade, and industry.



office, the regency's expenditure on public works declined considerably. In 2010, the local budget allocated only 4.61 per cent of the budget on public works; on the contrary, the average expenditure of 29 regencies in East Java was more than double on public works. A local journalist confirmed that under the incumbent's leadership, local government expenditure emphasised more on people's welfare.<sup>474</sup>

**Table 6.12** Public Expenditure under Soeharto's Administration

	Health	Regencies Average	Education	Regencies Average	Micro and Small Economy	Regencies Average	Public works	Regencies Average
<b>2006</b>	7.68%	8.39%	43.21%	33.21%	5.00%	3.81%	7.58%	11.68%
<b>2007</b>	9.47%	8.94%	43.11%	33.07%	4.88%	4.16%	12.03%	13.25%
<b>2008</b>	8.49%	9.59%	42.84%	36.65%	5.70%	3.97%	13.47%	12.35%
<b>2009</b>	12.32%	11.11%	40.71%	35.72%	8.29%	3.58%	9.54%	12.19%
<b>2010</b>	12.02%	10.68%	52.26%	40.90%	3.29%	3.16%	4.61%	9.29%
<b>Average</b>	10.00%	9.74%	44.42%	35.91%	5.43%	3.73%	9.45%	11.75%

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher

Concerning local development policy, Soeharto addressed the human development approach. He claimed that the regency had undertaken better policies in the human development sectors, such as in health development. In an interview, he remarked:

Now experts have formulated human development index (HDI), so if we hold to HDI, then those human needs consist of education, health, and the economy. I refer to human development (in developing the regency). From the health aspect, I increased the procurement of doctors and nurses. The facilities were also developed. Now there is no poor community health centre in Trenggalek.<sup>475</sup>

Specifically on education policies, a secretary of the local education office mentioned several prominent policies when the incumbent was in office, namely the establishment of inclusive classes at elementary and junior high school level in each sub-district to accommodate students with special needs. He expanded the access to pre-school education by providing education, training, and workshops for pre-school education teachers. He also improved the access of junior high school age children by establishing primary and junior high schools in one location (*sekolah satu atap*) and issued a scholarship policy for poor students from elementary to senior high schools. The budget was shared with the provincial government, with free tuition fees for elementary and junior high schools, and the establishment of new schools was simplified, to improve access to education.<sup>476</sup> An official in

<sup>474</sup> Interview on 21 September 2012.

<sup>475</sup> Interview on 24 September 2012.

<sup>476</sup> Interview on 6 September 2012.

the local development and planning agency supported the view that the regency achieved some advancement in the education and health sectors. For example, the regency succeeded in sending a representative to the International Mathematics Olympiad (IMO) in Spain in 2008 and there were improvements in students' access to education. In health sector, the regency succeeded in becoming one of the regions with a high ODF achievement in the province.<sup>477</sup>

Nonetheless, the incumbent's and local government's claims on education progress are challenged by non-government activists. A local NGO activist as well as a teacher argued that since the former incumbent (Mulyadi) was in office, the policies on education were just implementation of centralist policies (the national government's policies); there was no breakthrough in education.<sup>478</sup> Moreover, a chairman of a mass-based organisation in the regency as well as a principal in a state school criticised that, compared to other districts, there were no excellent achievements in education during both the incumbent's and the former incumbent's (Mulyadi) time in office. He critically addressed the low commitment of local government to funding education. He gave a comprehensive comment:

Even if it is a failure, for example, the education sector, Mr. Mul (Mulyadi) and Mr. Soeharto' (policies) can be compared with other regions; (they) were lacking courage. (For example), regarding the problem of BOS (school operational aid), the majority of schools (relied on school) income sources. So, there is a BOS from central government. If it is from the district, it existed before the (national) BOS. However, it continued to go down, because there is a (national) BOS. It is real; (that) the BOS was not enough to finance the real needs of all schools without subsidy from the regency. Whereas, community participation (in school funding) was practically neutered (limited).<sup>479</sup>

In order to clarify the complaints on the regency's achievements in education, the analysis of the local budget series during the incumbent's time in office can be referred to. As seen in chart 6.5, the majority of local budget expenditures on education were allocated for salaries<sup>480</sup> and honorariums for teachers and education office staff. Over five years, the average salary and honorarium components in education expenditure were 90 per cent of total expenditures. It was greater than the average of similar expenditures of 29 regencies in East Java. Hence, the criticism is understandable that although local government spent most of the budget on education, the major share of the budget did not directly benefit students and parents in the regency. The dominant proportion of salary and honorarium payments reduced other allocations that potentially could enable spending on programs to directly support

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<sup>477</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012; also, a secretary of the advisory board of construction businessmen association in the regency as well as a contractor affirmed the government's claim on education progresses. Interview on 6 September 2012.


<sup>478</sup> Interview on 5 September 2012.

<sup>479</sup> Interview on 6 September 2012.

<sup>480</sup> The components of salary consist of basic salary, allowance, and benefits.

student learning, for example, allocation for building new schools, contributions to school operational assistance funds, subsidies for poor students' tuition fees and other programs covering the improvement of accessibility to education in the regency. In addition, the limited allocation to non-salary and honorarium expenditure has impeded the education office from making breakthrough policies that could accelerate the education development sector in the regency.

**Chart 6.5** Component of Salaries and Honorariums in Trenggalek's Budget 2006-2010



Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher.


Another criticism of health services addressed the low service quality of the Local Government Owned Hospital (RSUD). In the plenary session conducted on 14 June 2010, local legislators addressed this issue, as they received complaints from patients.<sup>481</sup> In the interviews with voters, there were also complaints about the RSUD's services. Nevertheless, a local party activist affiliated to the incumbent in the *pilkada* argued that the completion of the RSUD's development was in the incumbent's era. The people being served felt comfortable with the service from the hospital.<sup>482</sup> As seen in chart 6.6, the criticisms addressed to RSUD are arguable. Instead of gaining low numbers of patients, due to complaints addressed about the low quality of service, RSUD served greater numbers of patients on average during Soeharto's administration compared to Mulyadi's. Within 5 years (2006-2010) the average number of inpatients and outpatients served by RSUD was almost

<sup>481</sup> Source: <http://humas-trenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2010/06/fraksi-fraksi-sampaikan-pandangan-umum.html> accessed on 4 December 2013.

<sup>482</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

double compared to the average number of patients in the previous four years (2002-2005) when the regency was under Mulyadi's administration.

Chart 6.6 Average of Inpatient and Outpatient Served by RSUD (2002-2010)



Source: Trenggalek Regency in Figures 2007; 2011 published by the Central Statistics Agency of Trenggalek.

Prior to the *pilkada*, Soeharto was disadvantaged by the implementation of the Law number 23/2006 on Civil Administration. The law stipulates the centralisation of civil registry services, such as ID (KTP) and family card (KK) services, at the district level. Indeed, all residents previously could obtain KTP and KK in each sub-district, which is closer to them. The Ministry of Home Affairs issued the letter number 471/1688/MD on Guidelines Signing Family Card (KK) and the Identity Card (KTP) on 8 April 2009. The letter has been effectively implemented since October 2009. It stipulates that the head of a sub-district is no longer eligible to sign KTP and KK. They must be signed by an official at the district level, namely the head of the civil and registry office.<sup>483</sup> The centralisation of KTP and KK services was problematic in many districts in the country, particularly in large districts. People had to spend higher costs on transportation to gain KTP and KK services. In addition, people had to wait longer to gain a KTP or KK than prior to the implementation of the law. In Trenggalek, the implementation of this law has sparked protests from local people. People assumed that the local government made the KTP and KK services more

<sup>483</sup> The name of the office is possibly different in each district.

complicated. These protests were used by the challengers to create a negative campaign about the incumbent.<sup>484</sup>

Returning to discussion about infrastructure development in the regency, as can be seen in table 6.12, local government allocated a smaller local budget (APBD) for public works than the average expenditure of 29 regencies in East Java over 5 years (2006-2010). The smallest portion of public work expenditures was allocated in 2010, which was only 4.61 per cent of the total APBD. It was equal to 49.62 per cent of the average expenditure of 29 regencies in the province. This incumbent's policy choice was unpopular amongst local residents. The low commitment to infrastructure development, especially roads, was complained about by local residents. This led to the poor performance image of the incumbent. An NGO activist as well as a businessman clearly remarked. "(The development of) infrastructure was poor, the development program is nothing more than maintenance, no expansion, and often left the road damaged."<sup>485</sup> In addition, a local government official in public works supported these data, saying that the incumbent's policy in infrastructure focused more on the development of village roads. This policy neglected the expansion as well as the maintenance of the regency roads. As a result, the majority of the regency roads are in poor condition.<sup>486</sup>

Infrastructure provision is an important development indicator in Trenggalek. Good quality as well as good provision of infrastructure, particularly roads, is demanded by the people.<sup>487</sup> Soeharto could not meet this expectation, as, during the incumbent's time in office, there was only a small improvement in road quality and provision. However, it was not enough to meet people's expectations.<sup>488</sup> A party activist affiliated to the incumbent confirmed that Soeharto did not give much attention to infrastructure (road) development.<sup>489</sup> The most underdeveloped sub-districts in infrastructure development were in Munjungan and Kampak Sub-districts.<sup>490</sup> In addition, a party activist affiliated to the winning challenger added that the incumbent made mistakes in deciding development priorities in the regency.

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<sup>484</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012; a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 September 2012; a party activist affiliating to the incumbent on 13 September 2012; an NGO activist who supported the winning challenger in the 2010 *pilkada* on 21 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012; a head of local office on 13 September 2009.

<sup>485</sup> Interview on 4 September 2012.

<sup>486</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>487</sup> Interview with a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 September 2012.

<sup>488</sup> Interview with an activist as well as a teacher on 5 September 2012; an official in local development and planning office on 13 September 2012.

<sup>489</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>490</sup> Interview with a secretary of the advisory board of construction businessmen association in the regency as well as a contractor on 6 September 2012.

Soeharto did not prioritise infrastructure development; rather he preferred to support the cassava home industry (*mocaf*).<sup>491</sup>

**Table 6.13** Regency's Road Condition and Progress under Soeharto's Administration (km)

Road Condition	Mulyadi's Administration					Soeharto's Administration					
	2002	2003	2004	2005	Change	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change
Good	317.46	368.83	457.96	173.00	-45.50%	151.21	226.23	253.34	302.29	228.14	50.88%
Fair	225.74	251.28	220.97	239.85	6.25%	223.10	230.92	228.18	208.08	208.46	-6.56%
Minor damaged	207.89	158.19	126.87	152.40	-26.69%	251.60	244.95	229.58	213.13	220.39	-12.40%
Severely damaged	91.61	64.40	53.49	321.45	250.89%	260.79	192.90	186.80	174.40	292.94	12.33%
Total	842.70	842.70	859.29	886.70	5.22%	886.70	895.00	897.90	897.90	949.93	7.13%

Source: Local Public Works Office, 2010.<sup>492</sup>

As seen in table 6.13, in fact, the progress of road development under Soeharto's administration is better than under Mulyadi's administration. During Soeharto's time in office, local government was able to improve to 50.88 per cent of good roads. On the other hand, within four years of Mulyadi's leadership (2002-2005), the length of good roads decreased by 45.5 per cent. Worse, during Mulyadi's leadership the length of severely damaged roads increased greatly by 250.89 per cent. These data are seemingly paradoxical as Soeharto performed better in road development progress than Mulyadi; but, Soeharto failed to maintain office in the 2010 *pilkada*.

Additional analysis may explain this paradox by focusing attention on the infrastructure conditions in the last year of both Soeharto's and Mulyadi's time in office. The regency suffered from severely damaged roads in the last year of both Mulyadi's and Soeharto's administration. In 2005, the length of severely damaged roads reached 321.45 km. People, then, had an expectation that Soeharto would tackle this infrastructure problem. Nonetheless, Soeharto did not meet this expectation in the last year of his leadership; the problem of poor conditions of infrastructure was not solved. In 2010, there were 292.94 km of severely damaged roads and 220.39 km of minor damaged roads in the regency. It is assumed that people have limited and inaccurate memories as well as incomplete information concerning the progress of infrastructure conditions throughout Mulyadi's and Soeharto's time in power. People just made their decision not to vote for both incumbents based on recent knowledge and/or experience, especially relating to the actual poor conditions of the infrastructure approaching the implementation of the *pilkada*.

<sup>491</sup> Interview on 20 September 2012.

<sup>492</sup> Quoted from Trenggalek Regency in Figures 2007; 2011 published by the Central Statistics Agency of Trenggalek. The data in the "Change" column are processed by researcher.

In addition to criticisms of his policies, the incumbent had the burden of a negative campaign relating to corruption cases which emerged while he was in office. Corruption cases in IT procurement and cow procurement committed by local office staff and a head of a local office in 2007, corruption cases in web machine printing procurement committed by the director of PDAU in 2008, and the allegation of corruption in the *Baiturrahman* Great Mosque renovation all harmed the incumbent's image.<sup>493</sup> A local NGO activist as well as a former local legislator said, "The disclosure of Mr Gatot's (the director of PDAU) corruption case cannot be separated from him (the incumbent)".<sup>494</sup> Another explanation was that corruption cases have impacted on the incumbent's image. These are some of the issues played out amongst elites prior to the *pilkada*.<sup>495</sup>

Therefore, Soeharto's policy choices, emphasising more on human resource development, impacted on the low commitment to local development with tangible outputs, especially infrastructure development. At the same time, people probably recognise more tangible outputs of development. Then, the disclosure of corruption cases committed by the incumbent's staff could possibly distort his image.

#### 6.4.2. Controversy on *Kokok Raya* in Madiun

In Madiun Municipality, the incumbent mayor (*Kokok Raya*) was previously elected by the local legislators in 2003. For the incumbent, who was proposed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the 2008 election was an unfavourable race. At the national level, PDI-P had to deal with a downward trend in votes in the last legislative election in 2004. As the winning party, PDI-P succeeded in gaining 33.74 per cent of the votes in the 1999 Legislative Election. Five years later, it dwindled to 18.53 per cent. At the municipal level, PDI-P dealt with a similar trend. In the 1999 Legislative Election, PDI-P gained 10 seats out of 25 seats in the local legislature. Then, PDI-P obtained only 6 seats in 2004. Although PDI-P gained the most seats at the municipal legislature, this is only a slight victory. Golkar Party, Democratic Party (PD), the National Awakening Party (PKB), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party (PAN), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), and Prosperous Peaceful Party (PDS) gained 19 other legislator seats. Thus, during the incumbent's office for the first term (2004-2009), he had to deal with a majority of non-party colleagues in the local legislature (76 per cent).

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<sup>493</sup> Interview with a party activist affiliating to the incumbent in the 2010 *Pilkada* on 13 September 2012; interview with a local academic on 10 September 2012; interview with an NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012.

<sup>494</sup> Interview on 4 September 2012.

<sup>495</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012.

In the midst of unfavourable political support in the municipal legislature, the incumbent, indeed, was recognised to have some salient policies credited to him. The first well-known policy, recognised both amongst government and non-government participants, is the Community Empowerment Program in Alleviating Poverty (*Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dalam Mengatasi Kemiskinan, PMDMK*).<sup>496</sup> This is a local government initiated program which had been implemented from 2004 to 2008. This program was intended to accelerate the poverty alleviation in the municipality through the application of three empowerment efforts (*tribina*), namely human empowerment, business empowerment, and infrastructure empowerment. The implementation of *PMDMK* directly addressed the poor at the village and neighbourhood level. Human empowerment covers health and education improvements for the poor, for instance, nutrition support for infants, groceries support for poor families, free school equipment for poor pupils, and courses and training for job seekers. Business empowerment focuses on capital support for the poor's micro businesses through the disbursement of revolving funds. In order to disburse the funds, local government established village financial institutions (*lembaga keuangan kelurahan, LKK*) in 27 villages in 2004. *LKK* is responsible for managing the fund as soft loans for the poor. The board members of *LKK* are recruited from local residents. According to the mayor's end of term accountability report (*LKPJ*), municipal government had succeeded in disbursing revolving funds worth Rp 12.384 billion (AUD 1.2384 million) for 9,788 people from 2004 to 2007. Infrastructure empowerment was addressed to support the poor's house renovations and slum neighbourhood infrastructure improvements, such as covering neighbourhood roads with paving blocks, drainage and sewerage improvements, and the provision of communal bathing, washing and toilet facilities (*MCK*). According to *LKPJ*, local government succeeded in renovating 529 homes unfit for habitation (*RTLH*), improving neighbourhood roads in 664 locations, and developing 59 *MCKs*.

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<sup>496</sup> Interview with an academic and activist of Muslim mass-based organisation on 21 November 2012; a member of Madiun Municipality Elections Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 21 November 2012; a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012; a secretary of local office on 23 November 2012; a secretary of local office on 7 December 2012; a secretary of local office on 7 December 2012; a head of local office on 14 December 2012; a businessman as well as a member of the National Contractors Association (*Gapeknas*) on 27 November 2012.



**Figure 6.6** Improved Neighbourhood Roads



Source: Sobari (2012)

Under the incumbent's leadership, local government succeeded in maintaining municipal roads.<sup>497</sup> Based on the *LKPJ*, it is very clear that the incumbent's administration focused more on maintenance than the extension of municipal roads. In the first year of his tenure (2004), the length of municipal roads was 268.617 km. This only extended 7.58 per cent (20.352 km) up to 2008. The length of good quality roads also increased from 76 per cent in 2004 to 81.56 per cent in 2008. Also, *LKPJ* shows that under the incumbent's administration, local government succeeded in constructing six new bridges. In 2008, the total length of bridges in the municipality was 1.799 km.

In addition to the roads and bridges, the incumbent was credited with successfully developing several huge public facility projects in the municipality.<sup>498</sup> According to *LKPJ*, the incumbent succeed in accomplishing the development of a west ring road along 5 km in Mangunharjo Village (2005), the Wilis Sport Building (*GOR Wilis*) (2004), the Hajj Dormitory (*Asrama Haji*) (2004), the local government integrated office (2004-2006), and the west ring road flyover (2006).

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<sup>497</sup> Interview with a secretary of local office on 7 December 2012; a commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission (*KPUD*) on 20 November 2012; a secretary of local party on 12 December 2012.

<sup>498</sup> Interview with a secretary of local office on 7 December 2012; a local journalist on 21 November 2012; a chairman of local party as well as local legislator on 12 December 2012; an activist of anti-corruption NGO on 12 October 2012; an activist of local NGO on 19 December 2012; a coordinator of local NGO Forum on 20 December 2012; a political consultant on 21 January 2013.

**Figure 6.7** Wilis Stadium and the Hajj Dormitory



Source: Sobari (2012) and <http://www.panoramio.com/photo/73857374>

In economic development, the incumbent's administration claimed to improve the total investment in the municipality, particularly in trade investment. The most noticeable investment was the presence of big retail business networks in the municipality, namely Carrefour and Hypermart.<sup>499</sup> In the *LKPJ*, the incumbent reported that there was significant improvement in trade investment in the municipality. In 2004, the total amount of trade investment was Rp 87.621 billion (AUD 8.762 million). In March 2008, this amount had almost tripled to Rp 238.41748 billion (AUD 23.842 million).

The incumbent was also an initiator of the implementation of regional health insurance (*Jamkesda*) in the municipality. The secretary of the local health office remarked that Madiun Municipality is one of the pioneers in implementing *Jamkesda*, covered by the local budget (APBD), in the country in 2008. In his last year in office, the incumbent agreed to cover health insurance for people who were not covered by the national health insurance (*Jamkesmas*).<sup>500</sup> The government allocated Rp 4.8 billion (AUD 480,000), covering 20 thousand people. This policy was first implemented in September 2008 or one month prior to the election.

In terms of service, the municipal health office claimed that during the incumbent's time in office (2004-2008), the community satisfaction index (IKM) on health services constantly increased.<sup>501</sup> Based on the 2008 IKM survey result conducted by the local health office, the index reached a total score of 77.972 points, which means the performance of health services in six community health centres and licensing health related services in the municipality were categorised as good (*baik*). Nevertheless, compared to eight other


<sup>499</sup> Interview with an activist of anti-corruption NGO on 12 December 2012; an activist of local NGO in policy studies on 19 December 2012.

<sup>500</sup> Interview on 23 November 2012.

<sup>501</sup> Interview with the secretary of local health office on 23 November 2012

municipalities in East Java, the commitment in Madiun's health budget was lower. As seen in chart 6.7, the per capita expenditure of the local budget on health was lower by 13.5 per cent than the average per capita expenditure of nine municipalities in the province in 2006. Two years later, this gap increased to 19.56 per cent.

**Chart 6.7** per capita of Local Budget Expenditure of Madiun and the Average of per capita of Local Budget Expenditure of Municipalities and Regencies in East Java (Rp)



Source: The data of per capita of local budget were processed by the researcher from a master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011.

In education sector, the incumbent also implemented several populist policies. The secretary of the local education office said that local government implemented a subsidy for minimal cost of elementary education (*SBMP*) from 2004. The government strictly prohibited schools from collecting school fees from students in the state elementary and junior high schools, except for the international pilot project school (*RSBI*).<sup>502</sup> According to *LKPJ*, the government also disbursed scholarships for students in elementary schools (*SD*), junior high schools (*SMP*), and senior high schools (*SMA*). Specifically for private schools, local government disbursed an operational grant to support all schools (from kindergarten to senior high school) in the municipality. Every school received Rp 10 million (AUD 1,000) per year. For poor students, the government supported their school equipment via the Community Empowerment in Alleviating Poverty (*PMDMK*) program.<sup>503</sup>

Unlike per capita expenditure of the local budget for the health sector, per capita expenditure for education was better. As seen in chart 6.7, Madiun Municipality allocated 71.9 per cent more of per capita education expenditure than the average of similar expenditure of nine municipalities in East Java in 2006. Local government maintained this

<sup>502</sup> Interview on 7 December 2012.

<sup>503</sup> Interview with the secretary of local education office on 7 December 2012.

high education expenditure in 2008, which reached 70.14 per cent higher than the average of per capita education expenditure of nine municipalities in the province.

**Table 6.14** 2008 Madiun Municipality Expenditures Compared to other Municipalities and Regencies

Expenditures	Probolinggo		Other Municipalities (Av.)		Other Regencies (Av.)	
	%	Per capita (Rp)	%	Per capita (Rp)	%	Per capita (Rp)
Public Works	7.93	156,964	10.56	198,135	12.35	100,032
Small, Micro and Medium Business	3.58	70,849	3.88	70,832	3.97	3,646
Social assistance	1.56	-	2.21	-	2.26	-
Total Expenditure	-	1,979,940	-	1,852,509	-	777,576

Source: Master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011. Data are processed by researcher.

Amongst local bureaucrats, the incumbent is also credited for initiating giving financial rewards in order to encourage their performance. The majority of teachers in the municipality received this incentive, which ranged from Rp 500 thousand to Rp 700 thousand (AUD 50 – AUD 70) per month.<sup>504</sup> According to *LKPJ*, the incumbent stipulated the Mayoral Decree number 03/2007 on the disbursement of additional income allowances for civil servants and non-civil servants (temporary employees) in the municipality. Every civil servant or non-civil servant received an additional monthly allowance which ranged from Rp 300 thousand (AUD 30) to Rp 700 thousand (AUD 70). The higher the position of the civil servant is, the higher the amount of this allowance.

In the last three years of the incumbent's term (2006-2008), the municipality achieved better macro development indicators than the average of municipalities and regencies in East Java. As seen in table 6.12, the municipality had better indicators, such as lower infant mortality rate, higher economic growth, higher education index, higher life expectancy index, and higher human development index, than the average of other municipalities and regencies in the province. However, the municipality attained a lower performance in the unemployment rate and purchasing power parity index. Overall, under the incumbent's administration, the municipality achieved a better attainment in the majority of macro development indicators compared to the average achievement of other municipalities and regencies in East Java.

<sup>504</sup> Interview with an activist of local legal aid institute (*LBH*) on 14 December 2012.

**Table 6.15** the Macro Indicators of Development Achievement of Madiun Municipality (2006-2008)

<b>Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	28.63	27.92	25.35
Regencies (Average)	43.09	41.82	39.71
Municipalities (Average)	31.77	30.16	27.91
Province	35.32	32.93	31.58
<b>Unemployment Rate</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	15.38	15.45	12.72
Regencies (Average)	7.51	5.93	5.50
Municipalities (Average)	11.60	11.42	10.63
Province	8.19	6.79	6.42
<b>Economic Growth</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	5.64	6.35	6.76
Regencies (Average)	5.49	5.84	5.78
Municipalities (Average)	5.98	6.08	6.20
Province	5.80	6.11	5.94
<b>Purchasing Power Parity Index</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	61.50	62.76	63.93
Regencies (Average)	59.77	60.42	61.49
Municipalities (Average)	63.43	64.06	65.11
Province	61.46	62.56	63.92
<b>Education Index</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	86.22	87.74	87.74
Regencies (Average)	71.11	71.90	71.93
Municipalities (Average)	84.13	85.25	85.42
Province	73.40	73.61	73.73
<b>Life Expectancy Index</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	75.33	75.76	76.01
Regencies (Average)	69.39	69.89	70.23
Municipalities (Average)	73.80	74.29	74.63
Province	72.67	73.17	73.50
<b>Human Development Index (HDI)</b>			
	2006	2007	2008
Madiun	74.35	75.42	75.89
Regencies (Average)	66.76	67.40	67.88
Municipalities (Average)	73.78	74.53	75.05
Province	69.18	69.78	70.38

Source: the Central Statistics Agency of East Java, 2006-2010.

Similar to the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) which declares itself to be the party of *wong cilik* (a Javanese term for the poor and disadvantaged), the incumbent performed this role as well. He was known as a popular figure who had a close relationship with the people.<sup>505</sup> He interacted with all levels of people in the municipality. In implementing local government programs, the incumbent was not reluctant to be involved

<sup>505</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 21 November 2012; a secretary of local party on 12 December 2012.

and interact with the grassroots.<sup>506</sup> A businessman as well as a member of the Indonesian National Contractors Association (*Gapeknas*) of Madiun chapter also said, “Mr Kokok has good human relations. He also respects his staff. His behaviour when he ruled the office was very good, he was approachable by people”.<sup>507</sup> Also, a former commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission added that “He is a sociable, nice, friendly and popular person”.<sup>508</sup> A secretary of a local office added that the incumbent also visited and delivered condolences to bereaved families in the municipality (*takziah*). The incumbent would even be an usher and help carry a corpse to the cemetery.<sup>509</sup> Therefore, amongst local people, the incumbent was well-known as a down-to-earth person.

In addition to his populist policies and popular figure, in fact, non-government participants delivered several criticisms. During the incumbent’s time in office, the municipal government just pursued simple policies, or there were no prominent policies showing the incumbent’s outstanding attainments.<sup>510</sup> Although he interacted directly with the grassroots, the incumbent’s leadership was less creative. For example, in some policy breakthroughs in education policy, he just adopted the national and provincial policies.<sup>511</sup> Also, education and health policies during the incumbent’s administration were not better than the current policies under Bambang’s administration (the winning challenger).<sup>512</sup>

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<sup>506</sup> Interview with an activist of local legal aid institute (*LBH*) on 14 December 2012.

<sup>507</sup> Interview on 27 November 2012.

<sup>508</sup> Interview on 22 November 2012.


<sup>509</sup> Interview on 7 December 2012.

<sup>510</sup> Interview with a former commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission on 22 November 2012; a businessman as well as a member of the National Contractors Association (*Gapeknas*) on 27 November 2012; an academic as well as activist of Muslim Mass-based Organisation in the municipality on 21 November 2012.

<sup>511</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 21 November 2012; a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012;

<sup>512</sup> Interview with a secretary of local party on 12 December 2012.

**Figure 6.8** Incumbent's Accountability Report (*LKPJ*)



Source: Sobari (2012)

Moreover, non-government participants disagreed with the claim about the incumbent's achievements in implementing some huge infrastructure development projects. The incumbent just continued the previous mayor's (Achmad Ali) development policies, particularly in the developments of the western ring road and flyover, the hajj dormitory, the Wilis Sport Buildings, and the city bus terminal.<sup>513</sup> Thus, the credit should also be given to the previous mayor who first initiated the projects.

Regarding the implementation of the Community Empowerment in Alleviating Poverty (*Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dalam Mengatasi Kemiskinan, PMDMK*) program, the incumbent was not able to ensure that it ran smoothly. Some corruption cases emerged in the management of soft loans that involved the village financial institution (*lembaga keuangan kelurahan, LKK*)'s boards.<sup>514</sup> The municipality prosecutor's office (*kejari*) investigated poor credit performance worth Rp 2 billion (AUD 200,000), which was alleged to be embezzled by LKK's boards. Moreover, 50 per cent of LKK managed the soft loan poorly (*Radar*

<sup>513</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 21 November 2012; a member of Madiun Municipality Elections Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 21 November 2012; a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012; a secretary of local party on 12 December 2012; a chairman of local party as well as local legislator on 12 December 2012; a businessman as well as a member of the Indonesian Builders Association (*Gapensi*) of Madiun chapter on 20 December 2012.

<sup>514</sup> Interview with a secretary of local office on 23 November 2012; a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012.



*Madiun*, 24 May 2010). In 2011, the municipality prosecutor's office prosecuted Eko Harianto, the chairman of the board of the LKK of Demangan Village, for the misappropriation of LKK funds worth Rp 179,756,012 (AUD 17,975.01).<sup>515</sup> In 2013, the Madiun Municipality Police Office (*Polresta*) handled the misappropriation of LKK funds worth Rp 87 million (AUD 8,700), committed by the board of LKK of Oro-Oro Ombo Village in Kartoharjo Sub-district.<sup>516</sup> Therefore, the incumbent's good policy performance during his term in office, to some extent, is debatable, particularly among the non-government participants.

At this stage, the case studies show that although both incumbents' performance invited criticisms from participants, the incumbents generally were popular in terms of populist policies and popular activities during their periods in office. The public recognised that the incumbents were down-to-earth figures with notable achievements in policy outputs. Under the incumbents' leadership, both districts succeeded in achieving better macro development outputs and outcomes, though these were not recognisable for the majority of local people. However, compared to the surviving incumbents in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality, the defeated incumbents in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality were more controversial, in terms of their leadership performances. Non-government participants were more critical of the incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun. Nevertheless, both incumbents were credited for their populism while in office, mainly for their popular appearances amongst local people and their populist policy outputs.

## **6.5 Informal Politics Attached to the Incumbents**

The presence of informal actors in local politics is similar to many regions in Indonesia, particularly after the big bang decentralisation begun in 2001. The large amount of authority transferred from the national to the local governments has created larger opportunities for local government actors to gain personal benefits from programs and projects managed autonomously. This means that, prior to the *pilkada* implementation in 2005, informal actors have been involved in collaborating with formal actors (district heads, governors, bureaucracies, and local/provincial legislators), to practise rent-seeking behaviour. Hidayat revealed this practice in the Province of Banten through "private governments" who intervene in tender processes to practise a monopoly in project execution. In addition, in the

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<sup>515</sup> Source: <http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/infoperkara.php?sec=sd&det=NDUwMQ==&idsu=15&bc=> accessed on 17 April 2014.

<sup>516</sup> Source: <http://surabaya.tribunnews.com/2013/12/13/setahun-polres-madiun-kota-hanya-ungkap-2-kasus-korupsi> accessed on 17 April 2014.



Province of Jambi, Hidayat explained that there was collusion between provincial government officials and entrepreneurs as soon as the first *pilkada* in 2005 elected the new governor and deputy governor (Hidayat, 2009, pp. 135-138).

The case studies in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality identified the presence of informal actors and informal political practices (informal politics) in the midst of the incumbents and their circles. Informal actors have a different degree of involvement in the incumbents' administrations in both districts.

#### 6.5.1. Soeharto's Poor Management of Power

During fieldwork in Trenggalek Regency, a great deal of information was passed on, concerning informal actors who had close relationships with the incumbent. Businessmen are the first informal actors frequently mentioned by government and non-government participants in the interviews. The incumbent had a confidant who was frequently mentioned by non-government and government participants in the study, named Mr J (pseudonym). He was an emerging successful local businessman in the regency, who had multi businesses in construction, poultry, and property.<sup>517</sup> Amongst local businessmen, Mr J is a newcomer in the construction and property business.<sup>518</sup> Mr J undertook many local government projects during the incumbent's time in office. At the same time, he also supported the incumbent by providing "the tactical fund" (non-budgeted fund) to meet the incumbent's personal interests which could not be covered by the local budget (APBD). A local NGO activist as well as a businessman used a Javanese term "*ngopeni wong-wong*" for this.<sup>519</sup> In its literal meaning, this term means to maintain the people or to keep being close to the people. Relating to the context of the incumbent's relationship with his supporters, the fund was needed to maintain support or to keep securing patrons and client relationships, such as for donating to certain organisations, donating for community activities, and some other donations. In addition, Mr J supported the incumbent during the campaign in the 2010 *pilkada*. A female activist said that

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<sup>517</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012; a young party activist affiliated to the winning challenger on 17 September 2012; a local academic as well as a lawyer on 19 September 2012; a secretary of an employer association and the association of construction employers in the regency on 20 September 2012; a local activist affiliated to the winning challenger in the 2010 *pilkada* and supported the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada* on 21 September 2012; a local female journalist on 12 September 2012; a local NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012; A secretary of local office on 13 September 2012; An official in the Local Office of Cooperative, Industry, and Trade on 7 September 2012; An official in local development and planning agency on 13 September 2012; a secretary of local office on 6 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012.

<sup>518</sup> Interview with a secretary of an employer association and the association of construction employers in the regency on 20 September 2012.

<sup>519</sup> Interview on 4 September 2012.

Mr J was the incumbent's confidant and he provided material support for the incumbent during the campaign.<sup>520</sup>

Mr J had a role in performing local government projects. However, he did not execute the projects under his company flag, but he distributed them to other businessmen by taking a fee of between 7 and 10 per cent per project.<sup>521</sup> Thus, Mr J actually acted as a project broker.<sup>522</sup> Furthermore, he was a coordinator of local businessmen who wanted to gain projects from the national government to be implemented in the regency.<sup>523</sup> In Javanese, this practice is called "*nyenggek*". The literal meaning of this word means to pick fruit by using a long bamboo pole. The term *nyenggek* is an allegory of a verb, meaning brokering activities between local businessmen, the national legislators, and the ministry officials. *Nyenggek* is the action of picking up the projects from the national government by bribing certain national legislators and certain ministries' officials. A certain local businessman collects some money from other businessmen to meet the certain percentage of the fee, in accordance with the arranged proportion of the budget allocated for a national project that will be implemented at the local level. This practice is an illegal practice; it is categorised as a crime of corruption. One of the examples of this practice was brought to trial on 18 October 2012. A female legislator named Wa Ode Nurhayati was sentenced to 6 years in jail as she was proved to have received Rp 6.2 billion (AUD 620,000) from Fadh El Fouz (a businessman) as a reward for influencing the DPID (the regional infrastructure adjustment fund) allocations for the regency of Bener Meriah, Aceh Besar, and Pidie Jaya in Aceh Province.<sup>524</sup> Another method is that a businessman connects to a broker who can connect to national legislators. *Tempo* Magazine reported the involvement of a businessman named Yudi Setiawan in attempting to bribe the Deputy Speaker of The House of Representatives, Priyo Budi Santoso, via the speaker's broker. The broker was Heppy Dwi Bayu Wahono. He was the deputy treasurer of the Mutual Assistance Consultative Organisation (MKGR), a mass organisation affiliated to Golkar Party. Priyo was the Chairman of MKGR. In the report, Yudi gave Rp 1.2 billion (AUD 120,000) to Heppy to obtain a project under the 2011 DPID and Regional incentive funds budget. The fund would be forwarded to Priyo who had control over the 2011 DPID and Regional incentive funds budget.<sup>525</sup> Therefore, the practice of *nyenggek* is actually practised through involving businessmen and decision makers at the national and local level.

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<sup>520</sup> Interview on 7 September 2012.

<sup>521</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012.

<sup>522</sup> Interview with a local legislator on 14 September 2012.

<sup>523</sup> Interview with a local academic as well as a lawyer on 19 September 2012.

<sup>524</sup> Source: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita\\_indonesia/2012/10/121018\\_waode\\_vonis.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/10/121018_waode_vonis.shtml) accessed on 26 November 2013.

<sup>525</sup> See *Tempo* Magazine 16 June 2013.

In addition to businessmen, Soeharto was also close to Islamic religious leaders (*kiai*). He began to connect with *kiai* when he ran in the 2005 *pilkada*. During his term in office, he maintained a good relationship with *kiai*.<sup>526</sup> Many *kiais* connected to the incumbent were the chairmen of *pesantren* (Islamic Boarding School).<sup>527</sup> Nevertheless, the closeness between *kiais* and the incumbent could not help him to maintain his post. A local journalist argued that, in addition to being close to Soeharto, *kiais* also had a good relationship with Mulyadi WR and Mahsun Ismail. During the campaign in the 2010 *pilkada*, both Soeharto and Mulyadi visited many *pesantren* in Trenggalek. The journalist also testified that near to the *pilkada* he interviewed an influential *kiai* in Trenggalek. He chaired a prominent *pesantren* in Durenan Sub-district. The *kiai* said that the three candidates visited his *pesantren* and he welcomed them all.<sup>528</sup> Therefore, it is clear that *kiais* in the regency did not only have special relationship of support for the incumbent in the *pilkada* as the *kiais* also greeted the challengers.

Amongst the bureaucracies, Soeharto, in fact, did not have adequate support during his term in office. A secretary of a local office remarked that, during the incumbent's time in power, there was a private *Baperjakat* (a rank and position consideration agency) or informal *Baperjakat* which recommended "eligible" posts for bureaucrats in local offices. The private *Baperjakat* consisted of local legislators and local political party officials who influenced the incumbent by recommending a certain bureaucrat to occupy a post in a local office. Then, in deciding some positions, the incumbent accommodated more inputs from the private *Baperjakat* than the formal *Baperjakat* chaired by the local secretary in the regency. A secretary of a local office testified that "I have been bypassed on two occasions with my staff, to be the head of the local office".<sup>529</sup> This statement was also strengthened by a local party activist affiliated to the winning challenger, who said that he saw that the official appointment processes in the local offices were inappropriate for the capability of appointed officials. There were officials obtaining promotion without having appropriate rank.<sup>530</sup> The involvement of private *Baperjakat* disappointed some officers and caused some resistance to the incumbent. This situation benefited Mulyadi WR as the previous regent in the regency, to gain support from bureaucracies. A local party activist affiliated to the incumbent said:

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<sup>526</sup> Interview with a young party activist affiliating to the winning challenger on 17 September 2012; a secretary of the advisory board of construction businessmen association in the regency on 6 September 2012; a chairman of local political party affiliating to the incumbent on 6 September 2012; a secretary of local office on 6 September 2012; an official of local office on 7 September 2012.

<sup>527</sup> Interview with a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 September 2012.

<sup>528</sup> Interview on 21 September 2012.

<sup>529</sup> Interview on 6 September 2012.

<sup>530</sup> Interview on 20 September 2012.

The bureaucracy was divided between Mr Harto (Soeharto) and Mr Mul (Mulyadi), even (divided) in some groups. The heads of local offices who used to support Mr Harto are put in the box (did not occupy posts under Mulyadi's administration). Whatever the reason, the bureaucracy has a voice. Supposing there are 500 civil servants who do not like Mr Harto; they will urge their family or relatives to campaign not to vote for him.<sup>531</sup>

Then, during the *pilkada*, bureaucracy was not solid in supporting the incumbent. A local journalist estimated that 60 per cent of bureaucrats probably supported Mulyadi and the rest of them supported the incumbent.<sup>532</sup>

Although the incumbent was supported by the majority of parties in the local legislature, they were not effective in supporting the incumbent in the *pilkada*. Firstly, there was a conflict amongst the nine parties nominating the incumbent. The conflict was caused by Soeharto's decision to choose Samsuri as his running mate in the *pilkada*. Samsuri was an official in the regency and he was Golkar Party's official during the New Order Era. This decision was not approved by other supporting parties, particularly PD, PKPI, and PAN.<sup>533</sup> In addition, there was an internal conflict amongst cadres of two supporting parties, namely PD and PAN. The chairman of PAN of Trenggalek supported Soeharto in the Coalition of *Maju Mapan* (developed, established). On the other hand, other PAN officials supported Mulyadi. They attended the declaration of *Laskar Pelangi* (Rainbow Troops) coalition nominating Mulyadi on 28 February 2010. The secretary of PD of Trenggalek and a PD local legislator attended the declaration. In fact, the chairman of PD of Trenggalek agreed to join in the Coalition of *Maju Mapan*, nominating the incumbent (*Radar Tulungagung*, 2 March 2010). A party activist who was affiliated to the incumbent and a secretary of a party affiliated to the incumbent admitted that when the *pilkada* the alliance supporting the incumbent was broken, there were parties that did not mobilise their political machines at the grass roots level.<sup>534</sup> Also, a party chairman affiliated to the incumbent added that political parties in Soeharto's camp were inconsistent in supporting the incumbent. At the regency level, they supported Soeharto; in contrast, at the sub-district and village level, they supported the other candidate.<sup>535</sup>

In addition to conflict, there was also the problem of financial support at the grass roots level. The incumbent has promised to give an honorarium of Rp 100,000 (AUD 10) for every election witness in all polling stations. Nonetheless, the incumbent could not keep his

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<sup>531</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>532</sup> Interview on 21 September 2012. Two interviewees strengthened that "the loyalty" of bureaucracies was divided between Mulyadi WR and the incumbent. Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2011; a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 December 2012.

<sup>533</sup> Interview with a female local journalist on 12 September 2012.

<sup>534</sup> Interview with party activist on 13 September 2012; Interview with a secretary of local political party on 6 September 2012.

<sup>535</sup> Interview on 6 September 2012.

promise. These problems reduced the solidity of the incumbent's political forces. Practically, only PKS and Golkar Party supported Soeharto at the grass roots level.<sup>536</sup>

In the 2005 *pilkada*, the pair of Soeharto and Mahsun Ismail was nominated by PKB, PKS, PAN, *Partai Merdeka* (the Freedom Party), and the Patriot Party of *Pancasila* with vote sharing of 51.53 per cent (187,592 votes) in the 2004 local legislative election. In the 2010 *pilkada*, PKB no longer supported the incumbent; it preferred to nominate the pair of Mulyadi WR and Kholiq. In the second year of Soeharto's administration (2007), the incumbent's relationship with PKB began to be distant. Some of Soeharto's policies were considered inappropriate with the *Nahdliyin* (Nahdlatul Ulama's followers)'s aspirations. Soeharto tended to consider PKS's aspirations more. Indeed, the majority of PKB supporters are *Nahdliyin*. One of the examples was the policy to promote *mocaf* home industries in the regency. A party activist remarked that 90 per cent of cassava farmers are NU's people (*Nahdliyin*), but the management of the *mocaf* factory (*mocaf* cooperative) was handed to PKS's people.<sup>537</sup> This policy was disappointing to PKB's elites; they regarded the incumbent as having forgotten the party who supported him in the 2005 *pilkada*. Then, the poor relationship between Soeharto and PKB became a weak point, negating his potential supporters in the 2010 *pilkada*.<sup>538</sup> This situation, then, benefited Mulyadi, as PKB aligned with PDI-P to nominate him and his running mate Kholiq in the 2010 *pilkada*.

The other important non-government organisation which has a large scale membership in Trenggalek is the Forest Village Community Institute (LMDH). This is an institution established by the forest villagers in the framework of cooperation in forest resource management. LMDH is an implementing organisation of Community-Based Forest Management (PHBM), initiated by the state-owned forestry company (*Perhutani*). *Perhutani* cooperates with forest villagers to share in managing and utilising the state forests under partnership principles (Awang et.al, 2008, pp. 1-5). Each forest village has one LMDH. According to the Central Statistics Agency of Trenggalek, forest covers 64.3 per cent (81,108 acres) of the total land use in the regency. The majority of the forests are under state control (state forests), that is, 75.13 per cent. The rest is community forest covering 20,172 acres in 2010 (Trenggalek, 2010, p. 15; 252). Of 157 villages in Trenggalek, 75 per cent are categorised as forest villages with the total number of members about 104,000 people, consisting of youth and adults.<sup>539</sup>

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<sup>536</sup> Interview with a party's chairman affiliated to the incumbent on 6 September 2012.

<sup>537</sup> Interview on 17 September 2012.

<sup>538</sup> Interview with a party activist affiliated to the winning challenger on 20 September 2012.

<sup>539</sup> Source: <http://www.kabarbisnis.com/aneka-bisnis/2815165->

[Libatkan LMDH untuk optimalkan potensi ekonomi hutan.html](#) accessed on 10 December 2013 and

With the huge numbers of members as well as wide networking, LMDH is a potential political force in the *pilkada*. The incumbent was supported as well as challenged by LMDH in both *pilkada*. In 2005, LMDH's networks supported Soeharto to gain victory in the *pilkada*. There was an informal agreement between the incumbent and LMDH's leaders prior to the 2005 *pilkada*. LMDH supported Soeharto with the expectations of gaining direct benefits during his term in power, namely infrastructure (roads), fertiliser donations and seeds. Nevertheless, the incumbent did not keep his promises during his term in office. Then, in the 2010 *pilkada*, LMDH's networks diverted their support to Mulyadi WR.

When finally Mr Harto was elected (as the regent) the promise was not fulfilled. When he came here (visited the village) he also never greeted us and (LMDH) administrators. Finally, the LMDH board was not needed anymore by Mr Harto. So, the promise was violated, he gave assistance to fishermen, we farmers were not taken care of. We (LMDH) decided not to support Mr Harto.<sup>540</sup>

Similar to Soeharto, prior to the *pilkada*, Mulyadi and his running mate Kholiq met with LMDH networks in Nglongsor Village. The decision to support Mulyadi in 2010 was also influenced by an informal agreement to support LMDH's members. Mulyadi promised to subsidise fertiliser and farming tools for LMDH. Mulyadi's first attempt to meet his promise was the inauguration of the LMDH Association of Trenggalek on 23 March 2011. In the inauguration, Mulyadi also conducted a dialogue with LMDH's representatives to hear their aspirations.<sup>541</sup>

The effort to divert LMDH's support from Soeharto to Mulyadi prior to the *pilkada* actually was planned. An actor who encouraged LMDH to withdraw their support from the incumbent was Mr K (Pseudonym). He was a timber businessman who had a close connection with LMDH networks. In 2005, he supported Suharto to run in the *pilkada*. In the 2010 *pilkada*, Mr K had registered to be the candidate for regent through PKB. Finally, he changed his support to Mulyadi in the 2010 *pilkada* by directing LMDH networks' support to Mulyadi.<sup>542</sup> In the LMDH Association of Trenggalek's structure, Mr K was the advisor.

Despite the controversy over policies as well as the negative campaign addressed to the incumbent, non-government participants also admitted that Soeharto was a good, honest, and clean person. A local NGO activist as well as a businessman said that during the incumbent's

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<http://www.antarasumbar.com/id/berita/berita/j/21/175988/ibas-safari-kunjungan-kerja-di-lima-kabupaten.html> accessed on 10 December 2013.

<sup>540</sup> Interview with a chairman of LMDH forum at the sub-district level on 18 September 2012.

<sup>541</sup> Interview with a chairman of LMDH forum at the sub-district level on 18 September 2012. See also the inauguration news in <http://humas-trenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2011/03/bupati-kukuhkan-paguyuban-lembaga.html> accessed on 27 November 2013

<sup>542</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 21 September 2012; a local activist affiliated to the winning challenger on 21 September 2012; a local academic as well as a lawyer on 19 September 2012; a young party activist affiliated to the winning challenger on 17 September 2012.

time in office, he did not seek financial benefits. The activist added, “Mr Harto was an honest and good person, but in the wrong place”.<sup>543</sup> As an honest regent, the incumbent was very careful in governing the regency. Due to his consistency, the incumbent was also known as too rigid in implementing the regulations.<sup>544</sup> In addition, a *mocaf* businessman testified that the incumbent was a good and serious person. However, he was low performing in “his management” of power.<sup>545</sup> By referring to these statements, Soeharto was a good person who wanted to build a good record during his leadership. During his administration, the incumbent wanted to create a clean government. He did not want to receive any fees from local government projects. As a consequence of his personal choices in governing in local government, the incumbent experienced a great deal of resistance, especially from the bureaucracies.<sup>546</sup> A chairman of a local party affiliated to the incumbent testified, “When Mr Harto served as the regent, he was innocent. Consequently, he was tricked by his staff. The regent’s image was disfigured by his staff. Mr Harto did not want to receive shares from the projects, but his staff wanted this. He always said it is up to the Mighty Allah”.<sup>547</sup> Several corruption cases bringing some of the incumbent’s staff to trial are clear evidence of these facts.

Prior to the 2010 *pilkada*, Trenggalek Election Commission released the state officials wealth report (LHKPN) for each candidate. As seen in table 6.16, during his term in office, the incumbent’s wealth increased 13.04 per cent per year. When Soeharto defeated Mulyadi in the 2005 *pilkada*, Mulyadi continued his career as an official in East Java Provincial Government. His last post in the province was the head of provincial inspectorate. Mulyadi’s wealth increased sharply within five years by 38.578 per cent per year. Mahsun Ismail had the lowest wealth compared to other candidates. His wealth only increased by 0.006 per cent per year during his time as the deputy regent from 2005 to 2010.

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<sup>543</sup> Interview on 4 September 2012.

<sup>544</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a teacher on 4 September 2012; a secretary of employer association and the association of construction employer in the regency on 20 September 2012.

<sup>545</sup> Interview on 3 October 2012.

<sup>546</sup> Interview with a party activist affiliated to the winning challenger on 17 September 2012.

<sup>547</sup> Interview on 6 September 2012.

**Table 6.16** the State Officials Wealth Report (LHKPN) in 2010

<b>Candidates</b>	<b>2005 (Rp million)</b>	<b>2010 (Rp million)</b>	<b>Change</b>
Soeharto	1,013.80	1,674.80	65.20%
Mahsun Ismail	507.45	507.6	0.03%
Mulyadi WR	1,352.38	3,961	192.89%

Source: The Trenggalek General Election Commission, 2010.<sup>548</sup>

By referring to the valid regulations, it can be said that the incumbent's formal wealth report is reasonable. According to the Government Regulation Number 59/2000 on the Financial/Administrative Rights of the Regional Head/the Deputy Regional Head, article 4, it stipulates that the basic salary of a regent is Rp 2.1 million (AUD 210) per month. In addition, a regent receives an office allowance regulated in the Presidential Decree number 68/2001. Article 1 clause (2) stipulates that a regent has a right to receive an office allowance Rp 3.78million (AUD 378). A regent also has a right to manage an operational allowance regulated in the Government Regulation number 109/2000 on the Financial Position of Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads. The operational allowance is to support the implementation of the tasks of the regional head, such as the costs of service residence maintenance, service car maintenance, official travel, uniforms, and four other cost items. Finally, a regent receives the incentive of local tax and levy collection, depending on the annual size of local government revenue from taxes and levies. The incentive is regulated in the Government Regulation number 69/2010 on the Procedure of Giving and Utilising of the Incentive of Local Tax and Levy Collection. Overall, a regent has a right to receive a basic salary and office allowance of Rp 5.88 million (AUD 588) per month. The Minister of Home Affairs estimates that the total take home pay for a regent could reach Rp 60 million (AUD 6,000) per month. This is the accumulation of basic salary and office allowance and other official incomes.<sup>549</sup> Based on these legal foundations, Soeharto could receive a maximum income of Rp 3.6 billion (AUD 360,000) in the five years he was in office. As seen in table 6.16, his wealth had increased to Rp 661 million (AUD 6,661) over 5 years. This wealth increase was far below his total accumulation of income as a regent over five years.

Other important data which supports the incumbent's leadership profile is the role of Soeharto's key staff during his term in office. Non-government and government participants underestimated the incumbent as his personal background had no connection with politics and bureaucracy. Soeharto was an IT engineer who had no previous experience in local bureaucracy and politics. Thus, to some extent, Soeharto was steered by his staff in the

<sup>548</sup> The percentage of change is processed by researcher.

<sup>549</sup> The minister of Home Affairs' statement is quoted from <http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/gamawan-gaji-bupati-rp-62-juta-pendapatan-bisa-rp-60-juta.html> accessed on 11 December 2013.



bureaucracy. Government participants were unwilling to give the real name of the actor. In contrast, non-government participants mentioned an actor who was steering local government policies, especially in implementing local government projects. The actor had the highest rank in the local bureaucracy of the regency. Non-government participants called him Mr L (pseudonym).

Mr L played a crucial role in the budgeting process as he formally chaired the executive budgeting committee.<sup>550</sup> He dominated the decision-making process, especially in local government project implementations. He was involved in setting local government project tenders as he had a close relationship with businessmen, as well as lobbying local legislators.<sup>551</sup> Indeed, Mr L was perceived to have better political instincts than the incumbent. He was clever and agile in playing his position that did not fully favour the incumbent.<sup>552</sup> From his actions, non-government participants assumed that Mr L had a political plan to run in the 2010 *pilkada*. Mr L made a statement in local mass media that he would run in the *pilkada*. Then, he rectified his statement on 12 December 2009 that he would not run in the race. He just wanted to concentrate on his post and to serve Trenggalek's people.<sup>553</sup> The Chairman of the Local Legislature of Trenggalek protested about Mr L, as Mr L was alleged to be not neutral, related to the *pilkada*. The chairman accused Mr L of accompanying the incumbent to a meeting in Malang Municipality on 25 February 2010, attended by political party leaders and senior bureaucrats. The chairman also threatened to report Mr L's actions to the East Java Governor. Mr L denied this accusation and said that he accidentally attended the meeting as he had other business in Malang (*prigibeach.com*, 1 March 2010). Finally, the Governor of East Java transferred Mr L to another post in the provincial government on 7 October 2011.<sup>554</sup> Relating to the incumbent, Mr L's performance did not always support his position as he recommended some policies which sparked resistance amongst senior bureaucrats.<sup>555</sup> Hence, this lack of unity among bureaucrats advantaged the winning challenger in gaining support from them.

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<sup>550</sup> Interview with a local female journalist on 12 September 2012; a local journalist on 21 September 2012; a local academic as well as a lawyer on 19 September 2012.

<sup>551</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012.

<sup>552</sup> Interview with a local female journalist on 12 September 2012; a party activist affiliated to the winning challenger on 20 September 2012.

<sup>553</sup> Source: <http://berita-trenggalek.blogspot.com.au/2009/12/pernyataan-politik-sekdakab-trenggalek.html> accessed on 11 December 2013.

<sup>554</sup> Source: <http://blokbojonegoro.com/read/article/20111025/mantan-sekda--trenggalek-jabat-kepala-bakorwil-ii.html> accessed on 11 December 2013.

<sup>555</sup> Interview with a local journalist on 21 September 2012.

### 6.5.2. Kokok Raya's inadequate Networks

Like the incumbent in Trenggalek, the incumbent in Madiun Municipality did not have a wide informal network to support him prior to the *pilkada*. In the first interview with a secretary of a local office, a question was asked about informal actors attached to the incumbent. An interesting answer was given: “*Setahu saya beliau itu single fighter*” (As far as I know he is a single fighter).<sup>556</sup> This statement implied that during his time in the mayoral office, the incumbent relied strongly on his position as mayor. This confidence was reasonable as the incumbent had a good relationship with all communities in the municipality. He perceived that as an incumbent he was well-known and well-liked amongst local residents.

In other interviews, similar perceptions were expressed. Government and non-government participants had no doubts about the incumbent's popular image. Kokok Raya was known as a person without boundaries when he ruled the municipal government. A secretary of a local office remarked, “All bureaucrats could meet the AE1. It was not limited to the head of the local office, everyone could meet with him”.<sup>557</sup> An academic as well as activist from a Muslim mass-based organisation also added that the incumbent had a good relationship with local people, including religious people. The incumbent frequently was involved in sport activities conducted by local communities. He also frequently attended religious activities organised by Muslim associations, mosques, and churches.<sup>558</sup>

The incumbent's closeness with all levels of people in the municipality made him very confident during his time in office. He did not make a massive effort to recruit diverse networks to support him in running the government. The incumbent felt confident as he had loyal supporters from his party (PDI-P)'s colleagues. Non-government participants stated that the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the PDI-P's faction in the local legislature were the incumbent's main supporters during his time in office.<sup>559</sup> In addition to

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<sup>556</sup> Interview with a secretary of local office on 23 November 2012. The similar remark was also delivered by a local journalist on 21 November 2012 and a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012.

<sup>557</sup> Interview on 23 November 2012. The AE 1 is an official plate number of the mayor's vehicle. AE 1 is indirect term addressed to the mayor. AE is a regional code for motor vehicles which are registered in the region of Madiun covering Madiun (regency and municipality), Ponorogo Regency, Pacitan Regency, Ngawi Regency, and Magetan Regency.

<sup>558</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012.

<sup>559</sup> Interview with a commissioner of *KPUD* on 20 November 2012; an academic as well as activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation on 21 November 2012; the other academic as well as activist of Muslim mass-based organisation on 21 November 2012; a member of Madiun Municipality Elections Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) on 21 November 2012; a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012; a secretary of local party on 12 December 2012; an activist of anti-corruption NGO on 12 December 2012; an activist of local legal aid institute (*LBH*) on 14 December 2012; an activist of local NGO in policy studies on 19 December 2012; a coordinator of local NGO Forum on 20 December 2012.

gaining support from party members in the local legislature, the incumbent had also a harmonious relationship with other local legislators from different parties.<sup>560</sup>

Relationships between the incumbent and PDI-P's loyalists were portrayed as the ruler and the ruled. PDI-P via its local legislators supported the incumbent in ruling the municipality. Also, PDI-P at the grassroots level supported local government in implementing its programs. PDI-P was not noticeably involved in influencing the incumbent in running the municipal government. An activist of a local anti-corruption NGO observed that the incumbent was the central figure controlling the government. There were no PDI-P related figures or groups who drove the incumbent.<sup>561</sup> However, a businessman as well as a member of the Indonesian National Contractors Association (*Gapeknas*) preferred to say that PDI-P and its legislators still had a say in the policies, although the incumbent and his staff remained dominant in decision-making.<sup>562</sup>

It was not easy to explore the informal networks attached to the incumbent during his time in office. During fieldwork in the municipality, it was not possible to gather adequate information concerning the incumbent's connections with the non-PDI-P political networks at the elite and grassroots level. Sufficient information and documents about local NGOs, mass-based organisations, religious groups, professional organisations, and other community-based organisations that affiliate to the incumbent was not available. A logical explanation from an academic as well as an activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation was that the domination of PDI-P as a nationalist party in supporting the incumbent had sparked a reluctance from religious (Islamic) organisations to mix with the incumbent and PDI-P. Consequently, the academic added, "Then, the bond (between the incumbent and his informal supporters) was formed amongst PDI-P's communities only".<sup>563</sup> A coordinator of a local NGO emphasised that the incumbent relied only on his party (PDI-P)'s supporters. He did not have any particular link with local NGOs.<sup>564</sup>

The next possible link that was explored was the business communities. Empirically, the incumbent had a good relationship with business communities in the municipality, particularly construction business communities. He was recognised to have good relationships with two associations, namely the National Contractors Association (*Gapeknas*) and the Indonesian Builders Association (*Gapensi*). Amongst contractors, the incumbent was known as a good leader who did not really set up transactional relationships with construction

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<sup>560</sup> Interview with a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012.

<sup>561</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

<sup>562</sup> Interview on 27 November 2012; an academic as well as activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation on 21 November 2012.

<sup>563</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012.

<sup>564</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

businessmen. A businessman as well as a member of *Gapeknas* of Madiun chapter testified that the incumbent was a leader who did not target a huge amount of contributions (kickbacks) when local contractors performed local government projects. In an analogy, the businessman remarked that the incumbent was a bulldozer type of leader who did not dominate all local government projects through his personal links. He was not a vacuum cleaner type of leader who greedily controlled the projects exclusively within his circle or his connections. The businessman also added, “His relatives are also employers, but there was no special priority, they just handled small projects”.<sup>565</sup>

An interview with a contractor as well as a member of *Gapensi* of Madiun chapter strengthened the previous information. He stated,

“Mr Kokok distributed the projects evenly. I was the coordinator to bridge the relationship between the local executive head and the association. It can be said, there was no party who was superior to others”.<sup>566</sup>

These statements are approved by a secretary of local government from the office that performed many local government projects. He said, “the incumbent had no special relationship with certain employers”.<sup>567</sup> Non-government participants delivered similar statements concerning the incumbent’s relationship with local employers. A secretary of a local party who is also a businessman clearly remarked, “During Mr Kokok’s leadership (his) relationship with employers was fair, the bidding system was fair. During Mr Kokok’s administration, this was better”.<sup>568</sup> Comparing the relationship between the incumbent and employers in the neighbouring district, a chairman of a local party as well as a local legislator implied, “the relationship between employers and the incumbent in Madiun Regency is very obvious. In the municipality, I did not see this was as strong as in the regency”.<sup>569</sup>

In addition to businessmen and politicians, ordinary relationships between the incumbent and employers were affirmed by NGO activists. An activist had more specific information. “Mr Kokok did not have any defect amongst business communities. If Mr Kokok conducted project biddings, they were conveyed in a meeting with the associations concerning the fee”. The activist added that a good relationship with the associations was encouraged by a low project fee (kickback). In every project, the fee was 7.5 per cent.<sup>570</sup> A contractor as well as a member of *Gapensi* of Madiun chapter affirmed about the fee. He mentioned that the fee was a form of gratitude, although he disagreed about the fixed amount

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<sup>565</sup> Interview on 27 November 2012.

<sup>566</sup> Interview on 20 December 2012.

<sup>567</sup> Interview on 7 December 2012.

<sup>568</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

<sup>569</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

<sup>570</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

of the fee, as mentioned by the activist. He also reminded that project fees shared with a ruler cannot always be transparent.<sup>571</sup> In other interviews, two activists delivered similar observations about non-privileged relationships between the incumbent and employers who performed local government projects during his time in office.<sup>572</sup>

A crucial point emerging in the discussion about the incumbent and employers in the municipality is a form of equal relationship between both parties. The incumbent and local employers showed a non-exploitative attachment. The employers perceived that the incumbent's demand concerning the project fee was easily met. At the same time, the incumbent was also confident in running for election without demanding any material or financial support from employers. This non-interdependence relationship, consequently, encouraged the employers to think it was unnecessary to support the incumbent in running for election. A contractor as well as a member of *Gapensi* of Madiun chapter testified, "There were no supporters approaching the election in Madiun. We, as employers, acted normally, both during Mr Kokok's and Mr Achmad Ali's administration".<sup>573</sup> This statement was confirmed by a businessman as well as a member of *Gapeknas* of Madiun chapter that there were no particular supporters from among employers for the incumbent. Unlike in other districts, he also added that, there is no "big boss" in the municipality who usually supports candidates to run in the election.<sup>574</sup>

At this stage, this chapter demonstrates the lack of solid and strong support for informal politics attached to the incumbents in both districts. Firstly, both incumbents were relatively reluctant to play the politics of incentives, which give certain benefits to particular informal and formal actors, mainly local businessmen and bureaucrats. Consequently, both incumbents could not gain adequate logistics support from businessmen and "biased policies" designed by bureaucrats for marketing their images amongst local people. Secondly, they had poor relationships with local politicians from political parties. The incumbent in Trenggalek was formally supported by the majority of parties in the 2010 *pilkada*. In fact, the incumbent was unable to control local parties' elites from diverting their support to the winning challenger prior to the *pilkada*. The incumbent in Madiun was overconfident in relying only on single party support (PDI-P), which had minor support compared to the other four contenders in the 2008 *pilkada*. Then, this poor support for his party led to the incumbent's camp being unable to prevent the money politics pursued by the winning challenger.

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<sup>571</sup> Interview on 20 December 2012.

<sup>572</sup> Interview with a coordinator of local NGO forum on 20 December 2012; a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012.

<sup>573</sup> Interview on 20 December 2012.

<sup>574</sup> Interview on 27 November 2012.

The reluctance for practising informal politics, which led to poor support from informal networks as well as local bureaucrats, contributed to the incumbents' inability to minimise the risks of political rivalry both from informal actors and local bureaucrats. In Trenggalek, the incumbent failed to maintain the support of a farmer-based organisation (LMDH) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) elites and followers who had previously supported the incumbent strongly to gain the post in the 2005 *pilkada*. The incumbent was accused of being reluctant to disburse local government assistance for the LMDH and PKB grassroots during his office. LMDH and PKB, then, shifted their support to the winning challenger who promised to give more benefits to their followers. Also, resistance from local bureaucrats to the incumbent led to the shift of their support to the winning challenger who previously had governed the regency. In Madiun, although the incumbent experienced minimum political rivalry from businessmen, bureaucrats and local NGOs, in fact, they also did not effectively support the incumbent to maintain his post in the re-election bid. They were powerless to protect people from money politics attacks disbursed by the winning challenger's camp. This half-hearted commitment to informal politics, then, made both incumbents gain only weak support from informal actors and local bureaucrats prior to the *pilkada*.

As both incumbents' performances in policy and informal politics have been explained, the logic of these two factors in the incumbents' failure in the 2010 *pilkada* in Trenggalek Regency and the 2008 *Pilkada* in Madiun Municipality becomes clear. Throughout his leadership in Trenggalek Regency, Soeharto committed to implementing human development improvements in the regency's medium-term development plan. In order to alleviate poverty as well as to improve the poor's purchasing power in the regency, he strongly supported the development of *mocaf* home industries. The incumbent claimed that the development of *mocaf* home industries contributed to the significant reduction of the poverty rate in the regency. Also, a national newspaper reported that the *mocaf* development created other related business opportunities (*Kompas*, 15 October 2010). As a result, Trenggalek became well known as the home of the *mocaf* industry in the country. Nevertheless, this policy was challenged by a political party (PKB) that nominated and devoted its support to the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada*. The party argued that this policy just favoured another supporting party (PKS) in its implementation. This policy, then, was politically weighted by legislators, as it only accommodated as well as potentially popularised PKS amongst the people. Consequently, every *mocaf* related budget proposal was rejected by the local legislative body. During the incumbent's time in office, the *mocaf* related budget which was disbursed to the *mocaf* home industry groups and the *mocaf* cooperative was less than Rp 1

billion (AUD 100,000).<sup>575</sup> From the *mocaf* policy it can be concluded that, for the incumbent to survive, a populist policy must not only be devoted to the people, but it must also give benefits to the supporting political parties and elites as well as certain people attached to the parties. This will help the incumbent to secure the policy, particularly in financing its implementation.

The success of the safe sanitation program was also credited to the incumbent. His commitment to implementing the program in the regency succeeded in raising people's awareness and improving their access to healthy toilets. The local government succeeded in encouraging people to build 16,783 healthy latrines and 1,653 communal latrines within two years of the program's implementation. Not only local people, the national government, a non-government organisation (JPIP), and the World Bank also recognised this achievement. The success also boosted Soeharto's popularity. Amongst local residents as well as elites, the policy of "one house, one latrine" was credited to him. In addition, the incumbent was credited with the promotion of the gifts centre in the regency. The involvement of local government in promoting the centre improved the daily turnover in the centre. Under Soeharto's leadership, the regency succeeded in enhancing its human development index (HDI). During the incumbent's time in office, the regency reduced the HDI shortfall by 1.62 index points. In 2010, Trenggalek's HDI index reached 73.21 points, which was higher than the average index of regencies in the province and the provincial index. The HDI achievement transformed the description of the regency from under developed region to developed region, positioning it as number 8 amongst 29 regencies in East Java on HDI achievements.

Nonetheless, the incumbent suffered from a poor image as a result of his lack of emphasis on infrastructure development. During the incumbent's administration, local government might have undertaken more road construction than during Mulyadi's administration. However, the proportion of damaged roads at the end of the incumbent's administration (2010) was slightly higher (0.6 per cent) than at the end of Mulyadi's administration (2005). Soeharto was already considered a failure because he did not provide better infrastructure in the regency. Two other issues that affected the incumbent's image were corruption cases committed by some local government officials and the centralisation of civil registry services. People perceived that the incumbent was involved in the corruption cases, as the bureaucrats work under the regent's control. Concerning the registry service, the withdrawal of the services from sub-district offices to the population and civil registry office

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<sup>575</sup> Interview with a *mocaf* businessman on 3 October 2012.

sparked some protests from local residents. They had to spend more money and time to gain ID and family card services.

The issues of poor infrastructure development, corruption, and civil registry services were considered to be the incumbent's weaknesses in governing the regency. They contributed to the incumbent's failure to maintain his post. These policy failures are believed to emerge from the "Mulyadi effect", when people compared the situation of the regency under Soeharto's administration and Mulyadi's administration. The "Mulyadi Effect" aroused people to subjectively remember their previous experience when Mulyadi was in office. It motivated people not to vote for the incumbent.<sup>576</sup> This effect, indeed, was not voluntarily believed by the people. It was constructed by the winning challenger's victory team to negate the incumbent's image as well as to favour the winning challenger.<sup>577</sup>

Relating to the role of informal politics in contributing to the incumbent's failure to maintain his office, this study reveals several findings centring on the inability of the incumbent to minimise rivalry risks amongst informal as well as formal actors connected to him. Firstly, Soeharto was not able to convince political parties to remain affiliated to him. Some officials from local parties supporting the incumbent were accused of supporting the winning challenger. In other words, the supporting parties, indeed, negated the alliance and favoured the rival. The conflict in determining the incumbent's running mate let some elites of affiliated parties down and diverted their support to the winning challenger. Moreover, the incumbent could not provide adequate funds to finance affiliated parties' cadres to negotiate coalition strategies. The cadres could not travel without sufficient logistical supports. The incumbent admitted that the affiliated parties could not carry out all the agreements and strategies needed to support him. He suspected that some party people embezzled some financial support. He also assumed that people have a high distrust of political parties. Then people would not follow the parties' suggestion to vote for him in the *pilkada*.<sup>578</sup> Secondly, the bureaucracy's resistance increased the risk of rivalry. Some officials who were disadvantaged by the incumbent's unacceptable policies supported the winning challenger. These included the promotions policy influenced by private *baperjakat* and the appointment of the wrong man in the wrong place, due to partisan loyalty considerations. Thus, many

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<sup>576</sup> Interview with a chairman of mass-based organisation in the regency as well as a principal in a state school on 6 September 2012; a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 September 2012; a young *kiai* as well as the chairman of a youth Islamic movement organisation on 21 September 2012.

<sup>577</sup> Interview with a local party activist affiliating to the winning challenger on 20 September 2012; a young *kiai* as well as the chairman of a youth Islamic movement organisation on 21 September 2012; a local activist affiliating to the winning challenger in the 2010 *Pilkada* and supported the incumbent in the 2005 *Pilkada* on 21 September 2012; a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012; A local party activist affiliating to the incumbent on 13 September 2012.

<sup>578</sup> Interview on 24 September 2012.



bureaucrats felt that they were treated unfairly. This situation triggered resistance from many bureaucrats who had sufficient capacity and rank to occupy certain posts. The bureaucrats, in fact, had staff and families that could be mobilised to challenge the incumbent.<sup>579</sup> Then, some bureaucrats supporting the winning challenger expected to strengthen their position if the winning challenger gained office.<sup>580</sup>

Thirdly, business communities could not provide adequate support for the incumbent. The local businessman (Mr J) who supported the incumbent could not provide sufficient funds to finance the incumbent in the race. As a businessman executing local government's projects, Mr J was a newcomer.<sup>581</sup> He did not have sufficient experience to deal with business and political matters. Besides, in supporting a candidate in the *pilkada*, businessmen play the pragmatic strategy of "stand in two feet". They support both the incumbent and the challenger. Their all-out support is devoted to the most promising candidate.<sup>582</sup> Hence, it was possible that the businessmen supporting the incumbent were at the same time also supporting the challenger. Moreover, other businessmen in the regency complained that local government projects were distributed unfairly and many of them were neglected. Worse, businessmen who were close to the incumbent did not have good networks and influence at the grassroots level.<sup>583</sup> Then, it was reasonable that businessmen in the regency favoured the winning challenger as they knew that he had a better chance to gain victory in the *pilkada*. Also, in the focus group interview (FGI) attended by 12 non-government participants on 29 September 2012, additional data showed that many local legislators were businessmen who were also involved in the local government project procurements. This could explain that the perception of exclusive closeness between the incumbent and Mr J in executing the projects increased the risk of rivalry from local legislators, particularly from those who have companies that usually execute local government projects.

Fourthly, the incumbent did not maintain his patronage connection with LMDH networks. The networks that fully supported the incumbent when he gained victory in the 2005 *pilkada* changed their support to the winning challenger prior to the 2010 *pilkada*. The incumbent could not meet his promise to favour these networks during his term in office. For a similar reason, an influential person (Mr K) in the networks diverted his support to the

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<sup>579</sup> Interview with a secretary of local office on 6 September 2012; an official in a local office on 7 September 2012; an official in a local office on 7 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012.

<sup>580</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012; a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 September 2012.

<sup>581</sup> Interview with a local academic as well as a lawyer on 19 September 2012; a secretary of employer association and the association of construction employer in the regency on 20 September 2012.

<sup>582</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012; a local journalist on 21 September 2012.

<sup>583</sup> Interview with a secretary of employer association and the association of construction employer in the regency on 20 September 2012.

winning challenger. The dissatisfaction of these networks with more than 100,000 members was the biggest loss to the incumbent prior to the *Pilkada*.

Finally, the incumbent also was abandoned by parties and figures supporting him in the 2005 *pilkada*. PKB no longer nominated the incumbent in the 2010 *pilkada*. As the party with culturally rooted supporters (*nahdliyin*) in the regency, PKB has many followers. It has at least 15 per cent of loyal voters in the regency, by referring to the 2009 Local Legislative Election results. Furthermore, Mahsun Ismail's decision to run via individual candidacy in the 2010 *pilkada* diminished the incumbent's potential supporters. Mahsun was a crucial vote getter when he ran in the 2005 *pilkada* with the incumbent. He was a figure representing the majority of people in Trenggalek. As an intellectual Muslim, Mahsun had many loyal followers since he was active in social and mass organisations. In the regency, he was the chairman of the scout movement, the Indonesian Red Cross, and Ansor Youth Movement (GP Ansor), a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The evidence is Mahsun's achievement in the 2010 *pilkada*. Although he was supported by 57,274 people for his candidacy via individual nomination, Mahsun and his pair Joko gained 74,611 votes (23.2 per cent). Consequently, the discord in the alliance between the incumbent and PKB and Mahsun drastically reduced the incumbent's supporters in the 2010 *pilkada*. A chairman of a local political party affiliated to the incumbent remarked that the only party machines supporting the incumbent effectively in the 2010 *pilkada* were Golkar Party and PKS.<sup>584</sup> This last claim is rational as the incumbent's vote of 22.4 per cent in the 2010 *pilkada* is almost equal to the accumulation of PKS and Golkar votes in the 2009 Local Legislative Election, which was 22.2 per cent. Accordingly, the effect of the PKB's and Mahsun's withdrawal is arguable in judging the votes the incumbent obtained in the 2010 *Pilkada*.

Unlike in Trenggalek, government and non-government participants in Madiun municipality mainly presumed that money politics practices were the main factors that led to the incumbent's crushing defeat in the election. The winning challenger employed this strategy by disbursing cash to the voters in order to influence people's preferences. Government and non-government participants assumed that money politics negated the incumbent's policy choices when he chaired the municipality. People considered the cash which was disbursed approaching the election rather than the policy benefits distributed by local government. In reflecting on the election result in Madiun Municipality, a female secretary of a local office openly remarked,

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<sup>584</sup> Interview on 6 September 2012.

“It is not necessarily that a local executive head who pursues good policies could win in the recent *pilkada*. Frankly speaking, money politics was more influential (to shape voters’ preferences). Thus, the success of a leader cannot be a reference for citizens to vote for”.

She also added that the incumbent’s failure was not caused by his poor policy performance. She acknowledged that some programs were good and well performed.<sup>585</sup>

In other interviews, a secretary of a local office assumed that local government policies should actually have contributed to the incumbent’s survival. He then implied that transactional politics probably undermined the policy effects in the election.<sup>586</sup> A head of a local office agreed that people did not consider policy outputs and outcomes in their voting preferences. He made an interesting statement, “If we say (the winning challenger) deployed money, it could not be proven, but those who received (money) also said this”. This participant also added that he heard that some people disbursed money with the candidates’ image in the early morning of the Election Day (*serangan fajar*). He clearly stated that the incumbent disbursed Rp 20,000 (AUD 2) per voter and the winning challenger disbursed Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) per voter. In the last statement he concluded in a mixture of Indonesian and Javanese, “*Siapa yang nyukani katah, iku sing tak pilih*” (Whoever gave more, he was voted for).<sup>587</sup> Another secretary of a local office admitted that people get direct benefits from local government policies. However, he could not explain why the incumbent did not survive. He suggested an X factor that undermined the incumbent’s policy effects.<sup>588</sup>

The majority of non-government participants were also convinced that the money politics effect was more dominant than the policy effects in leading to the incumbent’s crushing defeat. An academic as well as an activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation analysed that money politics was more effective than local government policies in influencing voting preferences in the election.<sup>589</sup> Another academic as well as an activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation further explained,

“I see the main problem was not there (policy). The main problem is precisely in the society. Our society continues to be a ‘sinuwun’ society; whoever gives, he/she will be voted for. Thus, what a great (the incumbent) policy, but he was not voted for”.<sup>590</sup>

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<sup>585</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012.

<sup>586</sup> Interview on 7 December 2012. To show the symbol of money or money politics, the participant moved and tightened his thumb and forefinger in this interview.

<sup>587</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>588</sup> Interview on 7 December 2012.

<sup>589</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012.

<sup>590</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012. The ‘*Sinuwun* or *sinuhun*’ is a Javanese term means sire or maharaja. The academic mentioned the term ‘sinuwun’ society as the group of people who are faithful to a Javanese sire or maharaja. However, this is only an analogy to a society who is loyal to whoever gives them money.

The superior influence of money politics rather than the incumbent's policy choices was also confirmed by a chairman of a local party as well as a local legislator,<sup>591</sup> an anti-corruption NGO's activist,<sup>592</sup> a local journalist,<sup>593</sup> an activist of a local NGO in policy studies,<sup>594</sup> a businessman as well as a member of *Gapensi* of Madiun chapter,<sup>595</sup> a coordinator of a local NGO forum,<sup>596</sup> a PDI-P activist as well as a local legislator,<sup>597</sup> a local journalist,<sup>598</sup> and a commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission.<sup>599</sup>

A former member of Madiun Municipality Elections Supervisory Committee (*panwaslu*) confirmed the money politics practices in the election. The committee officially investigated 24 violations on money politics during the election. 11 cases were reported to the local police and the municipal court; whereas the rest were aborted as they did not meet the money politics category. He also added that the majority of money politics practices reported to the committee were committed by the winning challenger's camp (BARIS). Also, the incumbent's camp (KOMIT) was once reported to commit money politics in an outdoor campaign activity.<sup>600</sup>

Money politics, indeed, is a planned practice. The winning challenger deployed certain strategies to apply this. A political consultant remarked that the challenger hired another political consultant and conducted a survey six months prior to the election. The challenger used the recommendations taken from survey results as his winning strategy.<sup>601</sup> The results were used to map people's voting preferences. Based on this mapping, the incumbent, then, determined his money politics strategy, which was mainly carried out in the suburban areas.<sup>602</sup> A secretary of a local party emphasised that, in the previous surveys, the incumbent was leading the other candidates. However, at the grassroots level, voters considered more the cash disbursed by the winning challenger than the incumbent's image.<sup>603</sup>

Another rationale that may lead to the incumbent's crushing defeat is his overconfidence as an incumbent. He thought that people knew him better than other candidates. Also, the incumbent felt that he had contributed many things to the local people.

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<sup>591</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

<sup>592</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

<sup>593</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>594</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>595</sup> Interview on 20 December 2012.

<sup>596</sup> Interview on 20 December 2012.

<sup>597</sup> Interview on 16 January 2013.

<sup>598</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012.

<sup>599</sup> Interview on 20 November 2012.

<sup>600</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012. In the final report of supervision of the 2008 Madiun Municipality Direct Election for Mayor, I find 23 criminal violations on the election committed by candidates' camps during the campaign and quiet periods. 11 cases were reported to the Madiun Municipality Police (*Polresta*).

<sup>601</sup> Interview on 21 January 2013.

<sup>602</sup> Interview with a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012.

<sup>603</sup> Interview on 12 December 2012.

Prior to being the mayor, the incumbent was the speaker and the deputy speaker of the local legislature for two periods. Thus, he felt that he had enough knowledge and experience in politics and government. He did not need any inputs from bureaucrats.<sup>604</sup> Overconfidence made the incumbent underestimate other candidates. Then, he gave less attention to the appropriate winning strategies in running the race.

The inadequate network attached to the incumbent, as discussed in the beginning of this section of the chapter, negated the incumbent's competitive opportunity to win the race. The incumbent mainly relied on the PDI-P's networks, which have only 24 per cent of seats, or possibly loyal followers. At the same time, the incumbent had to deal with three pairs of candidates supported by 76 per cent of seats in the local legislature and one pair of candidates supported by 14,527 people via individual candidacy. Furthermore, the incumbent was also confident about not embracing employers to support his candidacy.

Worse, the incumbent had to contest with his party colleague, namely Wisnu Suwanto Dew (WANGI). He was a PDI-P local legislator and the former chairman of PDI-P of Madiun chapter. Wisnu ran in the race by gaining support from other parties. Moreover, Wisnu had loyal followers in the municipality who were also PDI-P's followers.<sup>605</sup> To run in the race, the incumbent relied on the support of a non-professional campaign team chaired by his daughter. Also, the majority of his team's members were his family members, relatives, and certain party elites. They had no adequate political experience and capacity to run the campaign.<sup>606</sup> A PDI-P activist as well as a local legislator admitted that there was distrust from the acting chairman of PDI-P of Madiun chapter towards PDI-P's cadres prior to the election. Thus, he did not involve party cadres much in the incumbent's victory team.<sup>607</sup>

The last possible factor was the downward trend of PDI-P's turnout in the legislative election and the emerging trend of the Democratic Party (PD)'s image at the national and local levels. In the 1999 Legislative Election, PDI-P was the winning party, obtaining 33.74 per cent of votes at the national level. PDI-P's ballots dwindled to 18.53 per cent in the 2004 Legislative Election. At the municipal level, PDI-P's share of seats decreased by 4 seats (16 per cent) in 2004 as well. This declining trend, at least, was assumed to impact on the image of PDI-P in the election. At the same time, the Democratic Party, which first participated in

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<sup>604</sup> Interview with a secretary of a local office on 23 November 2012. A similar opinion was also delivered by a businessman as well as a member of *Gapensi* of Madiun chapter on 20 December 2012; a former of commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission on 22 November 2012; a PDI-P activist as well as a local legislator on 16 January 2013.

<sup>605</sup> Interview with a PDI-P activist as well as a local legislator on 16 January 2013; an activist of anti-corruption NGO on 12 December 2012.

<sup>606</sup> Interview with a commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission on 20 November 2012; a former commissioner of Madiun Municipality General Election Commission on 22 November.

<sup>607</sup> Interview on 16 January 2013.

the 2004 Legislative Election, began to gain sympathy from voters. The winning challenger was nominated by the Democratic Party in the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor. This situation was unfavourable for PDI-P.<sup>608</sup>

Nevertheless, the logic of money politics undermining the incumbent's opportunity to win the election was stronger than the internal conflict within PDI-P, the internal PDI-P colleagues' contest, and the number of candidates who ran in the race. The winning challenger gained 53.51 per cent of votes, which exceeded the total votes gained by four other contenders. In other words, the winning challenger had bought the majority of ballots prior to the election.<sup>609</sup>

## **6.6 Voters' Explanations for Not Voting for the Incumbents**

### *6.6.1. Voters' Explanation in Trenggalek*

Non-government and government elites interviewed in both districts delivered several logical explanations for the incumbents' failure to maintain office. To some extent, elites' arguments cannot cover all possible reasons considered by voters. This section of the chapter provides voters' arguments, especially about the incumbents' failure in the re-election bid. The results of in-depth interviews with voters conducted in both districts are probably able to clarify assumptions expressed by elites in the regency. This is important to strengthen or to weaken elites' assessments of the logic of the incumbents' failure in the *pilkada*. This section discusses three findings concerning voters' experience and knowledge relating to the local government policies, informalities attached to the incumbent and voters' particular reasons not to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*. Prior to discussing voters' answers, this section presents both government and non-government participants' perceptions concerning the logic of voters not voting for the incumbent in the re-election bid.

The government and non-government participants in Trenggalek agreed that Soeharto's failure to meet his promises in bettering the regency encouraged voters not to vote for him. Poor performance in infrastructure development was the most important complaint during the incumbent's time in office.<sup>610</sup> It was fatal to the incumbent's image as infrastructure is very crucial to open economic access for several remote sub-districts, such as in Munjungan and Watulimo.<sup>611</sup> According to the final count reported by the Trenggalek Election Commission,

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<sup>608</sup> Interview with an activist of local legal aid institute (*LBH*) on 14 December 2012.

<sup>609</sup> Interview with a chairman of local party as well as local legislator on 12 December 2012.

<sup>610</sup> Interview with an official in the local development and planning agency on 13 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012.

<sup>611</sup> Interview with a local academic on 10 September 2012; a female activist as well as a teacher on 7 September 2012; a local journalist on 21 September 2012; a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012.

the incumbent obtained 25.7 and 38.6 per cent of votes in both sub-districts respectively. These are far below the winning challenger, who gained 56.4 and 48.6 per cent of votes in both sub-districts. In addition to infrastructure, the policy to withdraw the ID card and family card services from sub-district offices to the local population and civil registry offices was protested by local residents. The withdrawal of ID and family card services favoured the winning challenger, as it did not happen during the winning challenger's time in office (2000-2005). People ignored that the withdrawal was a national policy. Then, this issue was deployed by the winning challenger's team in the campaign. They promised to return the service back to sub-district offices.<sup>612</sup>

As the incumbent contested with the former incumbent, it is logical for voters to compare their achievements during their periods in office. An official in the local development and planning agency said that people compared the incumbent's achievements and Mulyadi's achievements during their regencies.<sup>613</sup> A secretary of a local office added that people had similar attitudes when the incumbent and Mulyadi controlled the office. In fact, in the macro achievements, the incumbent succeeded in improving the regency's conditions, namely in bettering the human development index (HDI).<sup>614</sup> Still, voters considered that Mulyadi was better than the incumbent.

In addition to some policy failures, the incumbent was also tested by the issues of corruption. There were four corruption cases committed by bureaucrats during the incumbent's time in office and they were widely published in local mass media. Although there were no allegations that the incumbent was involved in the cases, to some extent this reduced people's trust in the incumbent. When local mass media interviewed him to confirm about the allegations of his involvement in the corruption cases committed by his staff in the local government owned company (PDAU), he denied, by mentioning the name of god, that he knew about or received benefits from the PDAU's corruption.<sup>615</sup> Non-government participants were convinced that these cases reduced the incumbent's good image as well as likeability amongst voters.

Relating to the incumbent's responses to the cases, bureaucrats had their own opinions. They considered that the incumbent was less sympathetic in responding to the staff who alleged this corruption. This response did not make bureaucrats happy as they wanted to get

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<sup>612</sup> Interview with a head of local office on 13 September 2012; a local legislator on 14 September 2012; a local NGO activist as well as a commissioner of the Trenggalek Election Commission on 30 August 2012; a party activist affiliating to the incumbent on 13 September 2012.

<sup>613</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012; a local NGO activist as well as a businessman Interview on 4 September 2012; a female local journalist on 12 September 2012.

<sup>614</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>615</sup> Source: <http://prigibeachdotcom.blogspot.com/2009/08/korupsi-apbd-rp-8-m-di-trenggalek.html> accessed on 11 September 2012.

support in dealing with this problem. A head of a local office remarked that, in implementing policies, bureaucrats frequently have to deal with potential corruption problems. When they asked for support from the incumbent, he just said that the problem should be solved by the bureaucrats themselves. In contrast, Mulyadi was willing to assist bureaucrats to face problematic situations, such as corruption cases. Bureaucrats disliked the incumbent's responses since they compared his with Mulyadi's cooperative response.<sup>616</sup> Also, amongst local government officials, they had different interests relating to the incumbent. Senior officials or the heads of local offices, who were more favoured by the incumbent, supported the incumbent. However, middle officials supported Mulyadi by expecting that leadership reform from Soeharto to Mulyadi would advantage them to gain senior positions.<sup>617</sup> Hence, bureaucracy played politics in the *pilkada* although the regulations are very strict, to limit the bureaucracy's involvement in supporting candidates. Bureaucrats' resistance as well as competition among them increased the risk of rivalry to the incumbent; and, at the same time, they favoured the winning challenger to gain support from him. Furthermore, the decision of the former deputy regent who accompanied the incumbent in the 2005 race to run via individual nomination was widely believed to reduce his supporters. Both government and non-government participants were convinced that this decision was disadvantageous for the incumbent, as Mahsun Ismail had loyal supporters, especially among *Nahdliyin*. Consequently, the *Nahdliyin* voters diverted their support to Mahsun Ismail and reduced Soeharto's potential voters.

Finally, the incumbent admitted that people might think there was no significant change during his time in office. People did not experience greater impact from his leadership compared to Mulyadi's leadership. The incumbent used the Javanese term "*ngono wae*" to describe people's opinions concerning his achievements. In its literal meaning this term means "no change". The incumbent also argued that his political rivals pursued many strategies to diminish his image amongst local people. In addition, he suspected that money politics practices influenced voters. In the interview, he remarked, "The society recently votes for who gave (something) in the last few minutes. The previous policies are forgotten, whichever comes later is remembered". He was convinced that, without money politics practices, it would not have been easy to gain victory in the 2010 *pilkada*, as the challengers did not carry out the programs delivered to local society. Nonetheless, he realised that it was not easy to prove these practices.<sup>618</sup> Nevertheless, money politics practices were also accused

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<sup>616</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>617</sup> Interview with a local NGO activist as well as a businessman on 4 September 2012.

<sup>618</sup> Interview on 24 September 2012.



against the incumbent by the challenger. Mulyadi-Kholiq's sympathisers even conducted "the money politics raid" to prevent unknown residents to disbursing money in all villages in the regency. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) of Trenggalek, supporting Mulyadi's nomination, established a team with 1,000 members named the *Sapu Jagat* Task Force to prevent money politics practices at the village and neighbourhood levels. The task force operated on the election eve (*Antara*, 2 June 2010). The allegations of money politics practices were, indeed, part of the strategies of each team that probably would have influenced voters.

Having explained government and non-government elites' views concerning voters' reasons for not voting for the incumbent, this section continues the discussion of voters' explanations concerning their votes. The procedure in selecting voters to be interviewed will be described. As in Blitar Regency, two sub-districts were selected, based on the criterion of their distance to the centre of government or the capital of Trenggalek Regency. Then, Trenggalek Sub-district was selected, based on the criterion of the sub-district which is closest to the Centre of Government in Trenggalek. The distance from Trenggalek Sub-district to the centre is one kilometre. The other was Watulimo Sub-district representing, the opposite criterion. The distance of Watulimo Sub-district from the centre is 48 kilometres. In each sub-district, one village was selected, based on the criterion of the lowest number of votes gained by the incumbent in the 2010 *pilkada*. Due to the limitations in this study in gaining official data from the 2010 *pilkada* result, the selection of villages in each sub-district was based on limited assessment. A discussion with an NGO activist and two local government officials in the National Unity, Politics and Community Protection Office was conducted to choose one of the villages in each sub-district, based on the above criteria.<sup>619</sup>

In the Sub-district of Trenggalek, Joyo Village (pseudonym) was chosen as the location to conduct in-depth interviews with voters. The village is exactly located in the centre of the regency as the regency office is included in the area of the village. Many local government offices are also located in the village. Interestingly, the village is also the location where Soeharto and Mulyadi were born. They still have their childhood homes in the village, located in different hamlets. The majority of the population in the village are Javanese Muslims. This is a typical urban Javanese village. The Joyo Village Government regularly conducts an annual ritual of *bersih desa* (village purification). The ritual is intended to keep preserving the Javanese culture as well as to respect their ancestors as the founders of the

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<sup>619</sup> I got the data of *pilkada* result from Trenggalek Election Commission after gaining research permit from the regency. Consequently, I did not use these data for selecting villages where I will conduct interviews with voters. Still, I use the data for selecting the specific location in each village where I interviewed voters.

village. The origin of the village derives from the history of a fountain surrounded by wall. As an urban village, the majority of people's occupations in the village are civil servants, traders, entrepreneurs, and clerks. Observations in the village found that most of the neighbourhood infrastructure has been well developed; the distance between houses is very close, and almost all of the houses have vehicles.

According to the voter list issued by Trenggalek Election Commission, in the 2010 *pilkada*, there were 5,449 voters in the village, comprising 2,612 male voters and 2,837 female voters. The number of absentees in the *pilkada* was 1,559 (28.6 per cent). Nevertheless, the incumbent gained the most votes in the village by 1,557 votes. Mahsun Ismail gained 915 votes and Mulyadi obtained 1,288 votes. In deciding on the village where the in-depth interviews with voters would be conducted, an administrative procedure was needed, to gain a research permit from the National Unity, Politics and Community Protection Office. In order to gain the permit, it was necessary to decide in which village the interviews with voters would be conducted. However, the *pilkada* related data from the Trenggalek Election Commission could not be accessed without a permit. Consequently, discussions with two officials in the office and a local NGO activist were needed, to find out two villages where the incumbent was significantly defeated by challengers. Finally, Joyo Village was chosen as one of the two study sites. Indeed, according to the 2010 *pilkada* result obtained later, the incumbent obtained the most votes compared to two other contenders. However, in conducting in-depth interviews, one of the 14 polling stations in Joyo Village where the incumbent gained the least votes compared to the winning challenger was chosen, namely, in the area of polling station number 10. In this station, Soeharto and his pair Samsuri gained 104 votes, Mahsun Ismail and his running mate Joko Irianto obtained 50 votes, and Mulyadi and his pair Kholiq gained 197 votes, and 107 people did not use their right to vote (absentees). In this location, 6 male and 4 female voters were interviewed from 12 to 13 September 2012.

As previously mentioned in the first part of section 6.3, as an incumbent Soeharto had to compete with Mulyadi, who was not only a candidate for regent. He also had to encounter people's memories concerning Mulyadi's leadership. Voters interviewed in the area of polling station number 10 in Joyo Village thought in a comparative manner. They evaluated the incumbent's achievements by comparing these with Mulyadi's. The first good program credited to the incumbent was the micro and small economy program. Participants remarked that local government succeeded in renovating *Peken Sonten* (the evening traditional market) and *Pasar Pon* (the *Pon* traditional markets) and encouraged the development of cassava home industries (*mocaf*). Moreover, during the incumbent's time in office, the situation of the

regency was peaceful. There was no mass demonstration to protest against local government policy.<sup>620</sup> Two participants compared this situation with an anarchist demonstration on 2 April 2012, which destroyed some public facilities in the area of the regent's office. More than 1,000 people from Munjungan Sub-district protested about poor infrastructure conditions connecting Munjungan and Kampak Sub-district to the winning regent in the 2010 *pilkada* (Mulyadi). They insisted Mulyadi to meet his promise delivered during campaign in the 2010 *Pilkada*. He promised to prioritise the improvement of severely damaged roads in Munjungan Sub-district as the roads disrupted economic development in the sub-district. People could not transport commodities they produced. The last dramatic incident triggering a mass demonstration was when an ambulance could not transport an emergency patient in Munjungan due to severely damaged road conditions.<sup>621</sup>

Interestingly, there was a participant who was a head of a hamlet in the village who recognised macro progress in the regency under Soeharto's administration. He said; "Based on official reports I have heard that Trenggalek was categorised as an underdeveloped region. But then it turned into a good ranking, in terms of HDI, after Soeharto held office".<sup>622</sup> The rest of the participants said that there were no changes in health and education services in the regency during Soeharto's administration and Mulyadi's administration (2000-2005). A female participant complained about dental services in the health community centre when the incumbent was in office. She also said that health services in the local government owned hospital were worse than other districts, as she had a bad experience when her mother was hospitalised in the regency's hospital. She then moved her mother to a provincial government owned hospital in Malang.<sup>623</sup>

Next, infrastructure conditions, especially roads, were most complained about by participants. They did not refer to the road conditions in their neighbourhood but to other areas of the regency. Participants perceived that infrastructure conditions during Soeharto's time in office were worse than under Mulyadi's administration.<sup>624</sup> Nonetheless, participants' perceptions concerning road conditions in the regency were subjective, because under Soeharto's administration road development was better than under Mulyadi's administration. As seen in table 6.10, during the incumbent's time in office, local government increased roads in the regency by 7.13 per cent. This was longer than during Mulyadi's time in office,

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<sup>620</sup> Interview on 12 and 13 September 2012.

<sup>621</sup> Source <http://www.antarajatim.com/lihat/berita/85337/warga-munjungan-duduki-pendopo-kabupaten-trenggalek> accessed on 17 December 2013 and <http://www.surabayapagi.com/index.php?3b1ca0a43b79bdfd9f9305b812982962888b937f787d02332e5b693c1a6ee279> accessed on 17 December 2013.

<sup>622</sup> Interview on 12 September 2012.

<sup>623</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>624</sup> Interview on 12 and 13 September 2012.

when local government only increased roads by 5.22 per cent. Also the length of severely damaged roads in Trenggalek was longer during Mulyadi's time in office, reaching 36.25 per cent, compared with Soeharto's time in office, which was 30.83 per cent. Overall, participants in Joyo Village perceived that during the incumbent's stay in office, there was no radical progress in the regency compared to the previous period when Mulyadi governed Trenggalek. They mainly referred to the condition of infrastructure which was perceived as poorer than in the previous period of administration.

Participants in Joyo Village could easily identify local government policies and programs attached to the incumbent. However they could not identify informal actors as well as informal practices performed by the incumbent's camp during his time in office. They only recognised that both Soeharto's and Mulyadi's campaign teams carried out several activities prior to the *pilkada*. A participant in Joyo Village admitted that the incumbent's campaign team had rented his house, to use for the team's base camp, for three months.<sup>625</sup> In fact, the incumbent's campaign team was not very intensive in promoting him, compared to his campaign prior to the 2005 *pilkada*. In 2005, Soeharto and his team distributed free uniforms for community religious groups. Prior to the 2010 *pilkada*, the incumbent did not carry out similar methods of campaigning.<sup>626</sup> Also, Soeharto's campaign team distributed free groceries and shirts. The team also invited residents living surround the camp for breakfast.<sup>627</sup> Mulyadi's campaign team carried out similar activities to promote his candidature in Joyo Village. The team distributed free shirts picturing the pair of candidates to the residents. It also called on pedicab drivers (*abang becak*) for a sympathetic campaign and gave them parcels. In addition, Mulyadi's team conducted a fishing contest in a small river in the village.<sup>628</sup>

The next discussion presents participants' explanations concerning their reasons to vote or not vote for the incumbent. As the focus question of the study is addressed to inquiring the incumbent's failure to maintain office, the first discussion was focused on the participants' explanations about their decision to not vote for the incumbent. The first reason was related to the incumbent's performance during his time in office. Under Soeharto's administration, local government did not make progressive changes in the regency. Soeharto focused more on religious activities, such as *istighosah* (mass prayers).<sup>629</sup> A participant working in a construction company remarked that under Soeharto's administration, there were not many

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<sup>625</sup> Interview on 12 September 2012.

<sup>626</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>627</sup> Interview on 12 and 13 September 2012.

<sup>628</sup> Interview on 12 September 2012.

<sup>629</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

projects that the company could undertake. He suspected that the projects were executed by certain people who had a close relationship with the incumbent.<sup>630</sup> The second reason related to the individual image and issues connected to the incumbent. Three female participants perceived that Soeharto was not really a local person. They knew that he was originally from Trenggalek, but he had lived a long time in Jakarta.<sup>631</sup> In addition, a female participant remarked that during the incumbent's time in office, his wife did not always accompany him in the regency. Thus, she did not socialise enough with the people.<sup>632</sup> Also, a young female participant considered that there were issues of corruption cases during the incumbent's government.<sup>633</sup> The third reason attempted to compare the achievements of the regency under the incumbent's administration and Mulyadi's administration, who governed the regency prior to the incumbent. As a regent, Mulyadi was more experienced than Soeharto. He was also known as a local person. Interestingly, both Mulyadi and his wife were perceived as down-to-earth people who wanted to socialise with ordinary people. Finally, during Mulyadi's time in office, local government always conducted a grocery sale prior to *Eid* day. Participants recorded that during Soeharto's time in office, local government never conducted a similar activity.<sup>634</sup>

The interviews in Joyo Village also succeeded in revealing some voters' reasons for voting for the incumbent. Participants perceived that during Soeharto's time in office, the regency was peaceful; there were never riots. In addition, participants referred to the good personal image of the incumbent. A participant remarked, "His figure is commanding, responsible, disciplined; and his charisma is good".<sup>635</sup> In addition, a head of a hamlet said "Because Soeharto is nice, not only (good in) his appearance, but also his religion. He is not only nice to me, but also to all residents. He assisted many Islamic boarding schools".<sup>636</sup> From the last three interviews, the incumbent's image amongst participants in Joyo Village is arguable. Participants perceived him differently, especially relating to the incumbent's personal image.

In Watulimo Sub-district, one of 12 villages, namely Laksono Village (pseudonym), was chosen for conducting in-depth interviews with voters. This is a rural village located in the South coastal area of Trenggalek. The journey from the centre of Trenggalek to the village is 53 kilometres. In addition to fishermen, the majority of the population in the village

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<sup>630</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>631</sup> The incumbent was actually lived in Bogor. It is a city near to Jakarta.

<sup>632</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>633</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>634</sup> Interview on 13 September 2012.

<sup>635</sup> Interview on 12 September 2012.

<sup>636</sup> Interview on 12 September 2012.

relies for their livelihoods on the forest-based agricultural sector. According to the data from the Forest Village Community Institute (LMDH) in the village, it has 6,269 members. The LMDH working area of the village covers 4,271 hectares. In cooperation with the state-owned forestry company (*Perhutani*), LMDH manages forest areas in the village through Community-Based Forest Management (PHBM). As a village-based association with large scale of membership, LMDH has a strong bargaining position in the village. Moreover, some key persons in LMDH at Laksono village also hold important positions in the association of LMDH in Watulimo Sub-District. Consequently, LMDH networks also have a great influence in the sub-district as well as in the regency.

This village was chosen as a study site by considering the 2010 *pilkada* result. Based on the recommendation of two local officials in the National Unity, Politics and Community Protection Office and a local NGO activist, amongst 12 villages in Watulimo Sub-district the incumbent experienced the greatest landslide defeat in Laksono Village. This information was obtained after gaining the research permit, which mentioned Laksono Village as one of the study sites. In fact, according to the 2010 *pilkada* result issued by Trenggalek Election Commission, Laksono Village was in the third rank of villages in Watulimo Sub-district where the incumbent experienced a crushing defeat in the *pilkada*. Laksono Village has 5,601 eligible voters comprising 2,774 male voters and 2,827 female voters. The incumbent and his pair, Samsuri, obtained 29.46 per cent of votes (1,089), whereas Mulyadi won the poll in the village by gaining 59.3 per cent of votes (2,192). The number of absentees reached 32.4 per cent of voters (1,815). In-depth interviews were conducted in the area of polling station number 8, where the incumbent obtained the most crushing defeat amongst 20 polling stations. In this polling station, the incumbent and his pair Samsuri gained 39 votes (13.2 per cent); Mahsun Ismail and his running mate Joko Irianto obtained 41 votes (13.9 per cent); Mulyadi and his pair Kholiq won the race by obtaining 215 votes (72.9 per cent). The number of absentees in this polling station was 190 people (38.15 per cent). In this area, 7 male voters and 3 female voters were interviewed.

The majority of participants identified positive and beneficial programs credited to the incumbent. The development of infrastructure, especially roads, was the first mentioned by participants when they were asked about prominent policy benefits delivered by local government during Soeharto's time in office. There was an improvement in the neighbourhood road in the area of polling station number 8.<sup>637</sup> Local government also improved the village road in front of the village office. During fieldwork, it was observed that the neighbourhood road is not a permanent asphalt road. It is a semi-permanent road covered

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<sup>637</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

by mortar. In contrast, the village road is better as it is covered by asphalt. A participant added that during the incumbent's time in office, many road development proposals from people were fulfilled by local government.<sup>638</sup> The Division of Public Relations of Trenggalek Regency released that on 7 May 2010, less than one month prior to the 2010 *pilkada*, Soeharto symbolically inaugurated the development of a new road connecting Laksono Village to another village in Watulimo Sub-district.<sup>639</sup>

**Figure 6.9** Neighbourhood and Village Roads



Source: Sobari (2012)

A village officer who is responsible for water and irrigation management (*jogo tirta*) remarked that under Soeharto's administration, local government also built dams and irrigation to irrigate rice fields in Laksono Village. The farmers' groups in the village were well developed when Soeharto governed the office. He said, "Mr Mulyadi just continues Mr Harto's programs". Soeharto was also regarded as paying attention to village officers by distributing free uniforms for them.<sup>640</sup>

During the incumbent's time in office, local government was perceived as providing good public services. Health services in the community health centre and local government owned hospital were accessible. Parents could also afford school fees for their children.<sup>641</sup> Two female participants confirmed also about government programs to support as well as to empower the poor in the village. A housewife testified that during the incumbent's government of the regency, they could buy cheap rice. Meanwhile, a micro businesswoman received a revolving fund loan of Rp 2 million (AUD 200) from the National Program for

<sup>638</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>639</sup> Source: <http://humas-trenggalek2.blogspot.com.au/2010/05/bupati-buka-akses-jalan-tembus.html> accessed on 18 December 2013.

<sup>640</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>641</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

People Empowerment (PNPM). She testified that the loan was very supportive for improving her micro business. To pay back the loan, she had to pay in instalments within 11 months.<sup>642</sup>

A LMDH member confirmed local government's support for farmers in Laksono Village. He testified that farmers in the village received free seed distributions from local government. This was credited to the incumbent.<sup>643</sup> Finally, Soeharto was also known as a figure who paid attention to social activities and problems. A religious leader (*kiai*) in the village remarked that the incumbent was willing to attend religious activities in the village. He remembered that in the Ramadan month, Soeharto once attended the *tarawih* prayers in the village mosque.<sup>644</sup> A female participant added that Soeharto paid attention to the poor. He was not reluctant to give cash to the poor when he met them. Local government also had a program to assist the poor in renovating their houses. The poor were also not charged when they gave birth in local government owned health facilities.<sup>645</sup> Therefore, the majority of participants confirmed that the incumbent's policies benefited them in social programs, the economy, and infrastructure.

Nonetheless, a dissenting opinion was expressed concerning the incumbent's policies. A community leader in the village who supported the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada* remarked that Soeharto did not meet all the promises delivered during his campaign in 2005. The incumbent did not entirely meet his promise to provide better roads and subsidised fertiliser and free seeds for farmer groups in the village. As a community leader, the participant was an informal leader who had an influential opinion amongst villagers. He also claimed that he mobilised community organisation members based in the village, with wide networks in Watulimo Sub-district.<sup>646</sup>

After asking about the incumbent's populist policies, interviewees were asked a question about informal actors and informalities practised in the village prior to the 2010 *pilkada*. Indeed, participants only recognised the campaign teams of all candidates engaged in campaign activities in Laksono Village. All campaign teams displayed banners picturing candidates in strategic places in the village. Soeharto's and Mulyadi's campaign teams also distributed free shirts picturing the candidates.<sup>647</sup> However, not all participants interviewed during the fieldwork recognised the campaign team activities. Although the informal actors' activities supporting the incumbent in the village were not easy to identify, an interview with

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<sup>642</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012. The cheap rice provision for the poor and PNPM are the national government programs. Participants could not differ between national and local government programs.

<sup>643</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>644</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012. *Tarawih* is a special voluntary prayer performed only in Ramadan. *Tarawih* is commonly performed in congregation in the mosques.

<sup>645</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>646</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>647</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.



a community organisation leader revealed that, prior to the *pilkada*, the chairman of the local legislature and a timber businessman (Mr K) visited the village. To both these influential people in the regency, this leader conveyed his disappointment with the incumbent, who did not meet his promises during his time in office. He committed to supporting the winning challenger by mobilising his people, on the terms that the chairman and Mr K would pay attention to his people's proposals in the future.<sup>648</sup> Therefore, from these interviews specific actors (non-campaign team) operating in the village to support the incumbent was not able to be identified. In fact, actors supporting the winning challenger attempted to obtain support from the villagers by approaching as well as bargaining with community elites.

Even though participants could identify some populist policies credited to Soeharto as well as providing benefits to them, they did not automatically vote for the incumbent in the *pilkada*. These populist policies did not encourage participants to have a rational reason to not vote for the incumbent. A participant who was also a trader as well as a farmer conveyed a simple reason for not voting for the incumbent, in Javanese, “*Nggih mboten nopo-nopo sedoyo sae, sami sedoyo, sae dadhos milih niki mawon, nggih ngoten*” (well there is not any reason, they all are good, all (candidates) are similar, it is good to vote for him (Mulyadi), that is it). He then continued his answer, saying that he voted for the winning challenger, “*Insya Allah Pak Mul, namung manut grubyuk, namung manut konco-konco. Dukho ketokne, nopo himbauan*” (*Insya Allah* (voted for) Mr Mul (Mulyadi), just fitting in, just following friends. I am not sure, it seems like an appeal).<sup>649</sup> Two other participants delivered similar reasons. They fitted in their decision to not vote for the incumbent with the majority opinion in the village. A female participant admitted that she voted for the winning challenger due to Mulyadi's victory team distributing free *yasinan* uniforms for all *yasinan* group members in her hamlet. She also argued that there was no mobilisation of support for the winning challenger.<sup>650</sup>

Also, a community leader argued that he did not vote for the incumbent because the incumbent did not meet his promises during the campaign. Prior to the 2005 *pilkada*, the leader and his community organisation members supported the incumbent as he promised to assist in providing subsidised fertiliser and seeds. In fact, the incumbent did not keep his

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<sup>648</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>649</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>650</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012. The *yasinan* group is a communal male or female religious group at the neighbourhood level. The main activity of this group is weekly meeting and reciting the *yasin* epistle in the Koran. This group does not perform religious activity only, but it also acts as a social medium or meeting point for male or female villagers. In Trenggalek, the *yasinan* activity is usually conducted every Thursday evening for male and other days for female.

promises. Then, he diverted his support to the winning challenger.<sup>651</sup> Finally, two other participants had different reasons. A participant who was active in the PDI-P task force voted for Mulyadi. He argued that he just followed the party's policy in nominating Mulyadi.<sup>652</sup> The other was a participant voting for Mahsun Ismail. The participant remarked that when he was young he had been active as a member of Ansor Youth Movement (GP Ansor) in Watulimo Sub-district. Although he did not personally know Mahsun, he voted for him because Mahsun was the Chairman of Ansor Youth Movement (GP Ansor) in the regency.<sup>653</sup>

Interestingly, "fitting in" behaviour was also a reason for voting for the incumbent. Two female participants conveyed that their reasons for voting for the incumbent were in order to follow their friends in the neighbourhood. In Javanese terms, they mentioned a reason "*manut wong-wong*". The literal meaning of these words is following people or matching other people's decisions. A female participant also added in Indonesian, "*Ya, saya ini cuma orang kecil, cuma ikut-ikutan. Saya tidak tahu cuma ikut-ikutan saja*" (Yes, I am only a little person, just following on. I do not know, just following (others)).<sup>654</sup> Furthermore, a religious leader in the hamlet conveyed that he voted for the incumbent as Soeharto is a religious figure.<sup>655</sup> Finally, a participant who performed as one of the polling station committee members in the *pilkada* conveyed clearly that Soeharto was appropriate in his feelings. He added a clearer answer in Indonesian, "Yes, I wish that I vote for (Suharto), that he would be able to make the people in my region (village) better. All developments, including schools, are all good".<sup>656</sup>

Relating to the phenomenon of fitting in performed by voters, this was confirmed by a participant, an NGO activist as well as a former of local legislator, in a focus group interview (FGI) conducted on 29 September 2012. The participant used a Javanese term, "*anut grubyuk*". In its literal meaning, this term means follow the majority of others or always follow anywhere people go. From the interview, *anut grubyuk* was understood as the practice of fitting in. Individual voting decisions for the incumbent are not the result of individual assessments of the candidates. Rather, individuals refer to mainstream opinion in their neighbourhood. This explanation, then, raises the issue of independence in voting. It seems to be in contrast to voting as an individual right ensured by the constitution.

Nevertheless, *anut grubyuk* is not an exclusive practice emerging only in Trenggalek. There was also a similar practice in Blitar, which is a society with a similar cultural

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<sup>651</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>652</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>653</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>654</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>655</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

<sup>656</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

background, namely Javanese culture. In order to understand *anut grubyuk*, one needs to refer to the Javanese conception of the relationship of the individual and society. Based on these findings, as the phenomenon of *anut grubyuk* particularly appears at neighbourhood level, it is useful to refer to the Javanese philosophy guiding relationships amongst people in a neighbourhood. It is stated in a proverb “*sing sapa ora seneng tetanggan kalebu wong kang ora becik*” (whoever is not a lot like his/her neighbour is not a good person) (Rachmatullah, 2011, p. 80). A Javanese lives under a concomitant or coexistent norm in relating to his or her neighbour. An individual as well as a family should live in harmony with their neighbour. In a wider context of relationships between individual and society, Mulder refers to a Javanese perspective on the relationship between man, world, and cosmos emphasised as one of the core ideas of communal relationship among Javanese, namely the concept of the unity of existence. In terms of the individual and society relationship, the appropriate explanation of this concept is that people should accept and respect order and inevitability; adapting themselves to its requirement; fulfilling the obligations required in the place where they live in order to achieve good order in communal relationships (*rukun*). In order to maintain a *rukun* relationship, a person should suppress his or her individual will, emotions, and self-interest (Mulder, 1992, pp. 143-145).

By referring to this ideal conception of Javanese living in harmony, *anut grubyuk* finds its context in a cultural Javanese explanation. As a member of a community, an individual intentionally respects communal opinion to vote for a candidate in the *pilkada*. The instrument to implement respect is the adjustment of individual ballots in accordance with majority opinion in the neighbourhood. Consequently, the practice of *anut grubyuk* amongst participants in Laksono Village is comprehensible. By having similarity in voting decisions, voters will achieve two situations, namely communal peacefulness and fulfilment of individual rights as voters.

The next discussion in this section seeks to compare all participants’ perceptions and explanations concerning voters’ reasons not to vote for the incumbent. Government and non-government participants assumed that the incumbent’s failure to meet people expectations led voters not to vote for him. The failure to provide better infrastructure, especially roads, is most complained about by voters. Also, voters think in a comparative manner to assess the incumbent’s achievements during his time in office, compared to Mulyadi’s administration’s achievements. Next, they assumed that voters considered that the corruption cases committed by bureaucrats affected the incumbent’s image amongst voters. Moreover, they perceived that Mahsun Ismail’s decision to run in the race via individual nomination reduced the

incumbent's supporters. Finally, resistance to the incumbent amongst bureaucrats reduced support for the incumbent as they diverted their support to the winning challenger.

In comparing government and non-government elites' assumptions concerning voters' explanations for not voting for the incumbent, it is necessary to differentiate between urban and rural voters' explanations. There was a distinction in voters' explanations between urban and rural villages where the in-depth interviews were conducted. Voters in Joyo Village (urban) assessed the incumbent more critically than in Laksono Village (rural). They critically evaluated the local government's performance under Soeharto's administration. They mentioned the stagnation of education and health service provision during the incumbent's time in office. They recognised also that poor infrastructure provision, especially roads, was most complained about by the majority of people in the regency. Voters in Joyo Village also argued that local government's achievements under Soeharto's administration were not better than under Mulyadi's administration. The critical assessment of the incumbent's performance, then, led to similar arguments by voters for their preference in the *pilkada*. Voters in Joyo Village argued that they did not vote for the incumbent because, during his time in office, local government did not make progressive changes in the regency, such as in health and education services, compared to the previous term (2000-2005) when Mulyadi was in office. In addition, they also heard some negative issues involving local government officers, especially in corruption cases and tendering influence. Interviews with voters in Joyo Village corroborated the government and non-government elite's assumptions of two main arguments, namely, a comparative assessment undertaken by voters concerning the incumbent's performance during his time in office; and negative issues connected to the incumbent which reduced the incumbent's image among voters. These voters' arguments contributed to their decision not to vote for the incumbent.

Nevertheless, participants in Laksono Village perceived differently, concerning Soeharto's performance. They could identify positive and beneficial programs credited to the incumbent, for instance accessible health and education services, the development of dams, irrigation, neighbourhood and village roads, free uniforms for village officers, and the provision of subsidised fertiliser and free seeds. The incumbent was also perceived as a generous and religious person. A dissenting opinion concerning the incumbent pertains to the incumbent's failure to meet all promises delivered when he campaigned in the 2005 *pilkada*. A community leader involved in supporting the incumbent felt disappointed as the incumbent did not meet these promises. The incumbent experienced the most crushing defeat in polling station number 8 where the participants were interviewed. The incumbent's better performance did not automatically encourage participants to vote for him. Interestingly,

participants, decided not to vote for the incumbent for the reason that they matched their preference with the majority opinion in their neighbourhood. Also, participants had similar preferences because of following up party policy nominating the winning challenger and emotional connection to another challenger (Mahsun). The fitting in reason was also satisfied by voting for the incumbent. From the findings in Laksono Village, three important points are clear. Firstly, participants perceived differently concerning the incumbent's performance during his time in office compared to participants interviewed in Joyo Village. Nevertheless, a better perception of the incumbent's performance did not automatically persuade participants to elect him. The cultural phenomenon of *anut grubyuk* (fitting in) could both disfavour or favours the incumbent. Secondly, party attachment and personal connection to the contenders could encourage voters to disfavour the incumbent. Finally, the support of an informal leader in Laksono Village was important, as he could also act as an opinion leader who probably provided guidance for voters to disfavour or favour the incumbent. This could possibly explain the phenomenon of *anut grubyuk* among participants in the village; participants matched their decisions with majority opinion in the neighbourhood which was probably under the influence of an informal leader favouring or disfavouring the incumbent. Participants in Laksono Village also demonstrated a different acceptance of local government policies and programs credited to the incumbent. This acceptance is not similar to the non-government and government elites' opinions in the regency inclining to disfavour the incumbent. They also did not deliver poor perceptions as well as gossip about the incumbent, as propagated by the local mass media.

#### 6.6.2. Voters' Explanation in Madiun

Unlike in Trenggalek, money politics practices carried out by the winning challenger's camp approaching the Election Day on 23 October 2008 undermined possible arguments to explain the incumbent's failure in Madiun Municipality. All non-government participants<sup>657</sup> interviewed during the fieldwork agreed that local government's policy performances under the incumbent's administration are irrelevant to explain the majority of voters' preference in the *pilkada*. The majority of voters considered cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp more than policy benefits credited to the incumbent. Moreover, money politics changed voters' orientation to the incumbent's image. Although the incumbent is a well-known as well as well-liked figure, indeed, this was not adequate to resist the disorientation of the majority of voters, sparked by financial incentives disbursed prior to the *pilkada*. Also,

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<sup>657</sup> The question of voters' explanation not to vote for the incumbent in the election is set to be addressed to non-government participants only. However, during the fieldwork, two officials voluntarily addressed the question.

the incumbent's inadequate informal networks provided an opportunity for money politics to easily influence voters. It is assumed that informal networks could probably be an effective defence for the incumbent, to warn voters directly or indirectly about money politics manoeuvres. For instance, the incumbent and informal networks attached to him could probably conduct a public campaign to watch out for or refuse cash disbursements intended to buy their ballots. Informal networks could also take action at the grassroots level to block or catch cash dispersers.

The question, then, emerges, why is money politics effective in influencing voters not to vote for the incumbent? Some explanations were provided in interviews with non-government and government participants. Firstly, the obedience feature of the '*sinuwun*' society makes money politics effective in influencing voting behaviour. An academic as well as activist of a Muslim mass-based organisation explained that Madiun people feel indebted to those giving money. They would feel guilty if they did not vote for those giving them cash.<sup>658</sup> In a similar expression, a secretary of a local office assumed that those receiving money felt '*sungkan*' (feel shy) if they did not vote for the grantor.<sup>659</sup>

In other words, this social characteristic can also be interpreted as a less critical society, which is relevant to the second explanation, that the winning challenger's camp had previously conducted a survey to map the social, economic, and political profiles of municipal residents. The research recommended money politics as a winning strategy for the challenger.<sup>660</sup> This survey classified each neighbourhood in the municipality into three categories, namely pro-incumbent neighbourhood, neutral, or contra-incumbent neighbourhood. Based on these classifications, the camp could decide the amount of cash that should be disbursed in each targeted neighbourhood.<sup>661</sup> However, the former commissioner of *KPUD* argued that money politics was only carried out in the pro-incumbent neighbourhoods.<sup>662</sup> Moreover, cash disbursement was only addressed to low income and less educated people in the municipality.<sup>663</sup> In the interview, a local journalist revealed that the winning challenger admitted to him that he spent Rp 17 billion (AUD 170,000) on cash disbursements.<sup>664</sup>

Thirdly, regardless of the genuine characteristics of local people, the winning challenger's camp intimidated voters to ensure the effectiveness of money politics. The

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<sup>658</sup> Interview on 21 November 2012.

<sup>659</sup> Interview on 7 December 2012.

<sup>660</sup> Interview with a political consultant on 21 January 2013.

<sup>661</sup> Interview with an academic as well as activist of Muslim mass-based organisation on 21 November 2012.

<sup>662</sup> Interview on 22 November 2012.

<sup>663</sup> Interview with a coordinator of local NGO on 12 December 2012.

<sup>664</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

money disbursers told those receiving money that they would be watched by certain persons when they entered the poll stations. These persons are thugs employed by the winning challenger's camp to oversee those receiving money at the polling stations. A thug confessed to a coordinator of a local NGO forum that he was paid Rp 300,000 (AUD 30) for a half day to carry out that task.<sup>665</sup> An online local mass media organisation reported intimidation at the polling station VII of Josenan Village, Taman Sub-district on the Election Day. Two people wearing certain paraphernalia stood in the polling station entrance. They reminded some voters who entered the station by saying two Javanese words '*ojo lali*' (don't forget). They were strongly suspected as the winning challenger's camp's people overseeing those receiving money.<sup>666</sup>

Lastly, relevant to the examinations of voters' explanations to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the previous chapters, it is also argued that the cash driven voting behaviour in Madiun Municipality is part of the tangible incentive-based voting that is similar to the findings of three other case studies in this thesis. Financial incentives are effective to sharpen voters' preferences to vote for those giving the cash. Therefore, it is relevant to explain the incumbent's failure to maintain his post in the election.

In order to verify these assumptions, the next part of this chapter will examine voters' knowledge and experience concerning the incumbent's policy choices, the informal actors working around their neighbourhoods prior to the election, and voters' rationales not to vote for the incumbent. In selecting two neighbourhood units (RT) where interviews were conducted with voters, similar procedures to the other three case studies in this thesis were applied. Two sub-districts were selected, based on their distances to the centre of government. The first is Taman Sub-district, which has the closest distance to the centre, 1.1 km. The second is Mangunharjo Sub-district that has the farthest distance to the centre, 9.5 km. As with the three other case study sites, There were limitations in gaining access to the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor Result as the basis for selecting a village in each sub-district to conduct interviews. A research permit was needed from the Politics and Public Security Office of Madiun Municipality. Discussions with three officers in this office took place, to identify a village in every sub-district where the incumbent experienced the most crushing defeat in the election. The officers recommended *Semono* Village (pseudonym) in Taman Sub-district and *Sengkali* Village (pseudonym) in Mangunharjo Sub-district.

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<sup>665</sup> Interview on 20 December 2012. This statement is also strengthened by a secretary of local office interviewed on 7 December 2012.

<sup>666</sup> Source: [http://apindonesia.com/new/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=2149](http://apindonesia.com/new/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2149) accessed on 1 April 2014.

As in Probolinggo Municipality, the Madiun Municipality General Election Commission (*KPUD*) did not have complete data of the election result at the polling station level. The only complete data was at the sub-district level. Then, the village offices were visited to access the election results. In *Semono* Village Office, the head of the village provided access to the data where the incumbent experienced the most crushing defeat in the village, namely in the neighbourhood unit 27, which is part of the community unit 09. In *Sengkali* Village Office, the head of village warmly welcomed this fieldwork and gave access to the data where the incumbent gained the most crushing defeat in the village, namely in the neighbourhood unit 04, which is part of the community unit 02. Based on these data, in-depth interviews were conducted with 12 people in the neighbourhood unit 27 of *Semono* Village and 10 people in the neighbourhood unit 04 of *Sengkali* Village.

*Semono* Village is located in the northernmost area of Taman Sub-district. This village covers an area of 1.59 km<sup>2</sup>. The village is divided into 15 community units (*RW*) and 51 neighbourhood units (*RT*) with a total population of 9,520 people on 26 May 2008. Females dominated, with 51.44 per cent of the population. Based on the latest municipal statistics, the number of households in the village was 3,494 households in 2012. The number of poor families in the village was 13.85 per cent (484) families. They are regular beneficiaries of the rice-for-the-poor (*Raskin*) program. The majority of the population in this village is Muslim, comprising 84.64 per cent (8,789 people) in 2012. The rest are Catholic (426 people), Christian (1,016 people), Hindu (7 people), and Buddhist (104 people) and others (6 people). According to the *KPUD*, the number of eligible voters in *Semono* Village in the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor was 7,375 people or 77.47 per cent of the total population.

*Sengkali* Village is located in the Southern part of Mangunharjo Sub-district. The area of this village is smaller than *Semono* Village. It covers only 0.90 km<sup>2</sup> that is divided into 16 community units (*RW*) and 69 neighbourhood units (*RT*). Prior to the election, the population in this village was 11,156 people in 2008. Females comprise 50.43 per cent of the population. Based on the latest municipal statistics, the population was 13,304 people. Thus, this village is very dense. Moreover, the number of poor households that receive the rice for the poor (*Raskin*) program in *Sengkali* Village is 16.36 per cent (570) of a total of 3,483 households in 2012. The majority of people in the village are traders. They comprise 49.57 per cent of the total trader population (10,620) in Mangunharjo Sub-district. Based on observations and interviews, the majority of traders in the village are street vendors. According to the *KPUD*, the number of eligible voters in *Sengkali* Village in the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor was 8,774 people or 78.65 per cent of total population.



Compared to policy outputs and outcomes, participants in *Semono* Village better recognised the incumbent's popular image. The incumbent was praised for his down-to-earth character when he chaired the municipality. A head of a neighbourhood unit as well as a state teacher remarked "Mr Kokok is popular and familiar with the ordinary people. In other words, the ordinary people are happy to communicate with Mr Kokok". He also testified that he has performed the *Tarawih* prayer with the incumbent. After praying, people could chat with him without any protocol boundaries. The incumbent also frequently performed *blusukan* alone, to visit people in neighbourhoods.<sup>667</sup> A housewife as well as a draper in the Madiun Central Market also testified that the incumbent frequently visited the market on Friday at 10.00 a.m. and wore sportswear. He chatted with vendors about the current situation in the market.<sup>668</sup> A retired civil servant also affirmed that the incumbent was a popular leader. He had a close relationship with the people.<sup>669</sup>

Participants in *Semono* Village recognised some policy outputs credited to the incumbent. A retired civil servant who worked in the military institution (*pegawai sipil TNI*) said that during the incumbent's time in office, the municipality was developed evenly in all areas up to the neighbourhood level. He showed the lane in his neighbourhood which was developed during the incumbent's time in office.<sup>670</sup> The other tangible policy outputs credited to the incumbent were the development of the city stadium, the presence of Carrefour Supermarket in the municipality, and the renovation of *aloon-aloon* (city plaza).<sup>671</sup> The incumbent was also given credit for the merchant's friendly management of the Madiun Central Market. Local government did not impose an expensive levy on merchants. They were also able to access the stalls in the market equally.<sup>672</sup> Finally, during the incumbent's time in office, local government regularly distributed *raskin* and set up cheap markets for groceries at the village office.<sup>673</sup>

Not all participants in *Semono* Village praised the incumbent for his policy outputs. The incumbent was criticised for his basic level of performance. There were no significant breakthroughs while he held office. Some huge infrastructure developments, such as the city

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<sup>667</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012. *Tarawih* Prayer is a special voluntary prayer performed only in Ramadan month. *Tarawih* is commonly performed in congregations in the mosques. *Blusukan* is a Javanese term meaning visiting community meeting points or community spots.

<sup>668</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>669</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>670</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>671</sup> Interview with a small trader in the Madiun Central Market on 13 December 2012. The participant was also the former chair of a polling station in the neighbourhood in the 2008 Direct Election for Mayor in the municipality.

<sup>672</sup> Interview with a small trader in the Madiun Central Market on 13 December 2012.

<sup>673</sup> Interview with a female street vendor on 14 December 2012. The rice-for-the-poor (*Raskin*) program is actually a national program funded by the national government.

stadium, were initiated by the previous mayor (Achmad Ali).<sup>674</sup> Another participant clearly mentioned that he does not remember what local government did during the incumbent's time in office. He closed his remarks by saying that local government had not made any contribution to him.<sup>675</sup> Moreover, there were ignorant participants who did not know about local government policy outputs. A young female street vendor admitted that she does not care about government related matters. She just cares about securing her and her family's livelihood.<sup>676</sup>

Participants in *Sengkali* Village confirmed several tangible policy outputs credited to the incumbent. A head of a neighbourhood unit as well as a janitor in a state-owned enterprise remarked that people easily proposed neighbourhood development proposals to local government. During the incumbent's time in office, his neighbourhood proposed two proposals for neighbourhood road improvement to local government. Local government agreed to share more than half of the budget proposed by the people. The participant also testified that the incumbent initiated a program to improve homes unfit for habitation (*RTLH*). He added that one of the homes in his neighbourhood gained benefit from this program. As a head of a neighbourhood unit (*RT*), he also received a monthly allowance Rp 100,000 (AUD 10) from local government during the incumbent's administration.<sup>677</sup>

Micro and small trade was another recognised policy when the incumbent governed the municipality. In the neighbourhood where the interviews were conducted, the majority of residents are street vendors in the city plaza and small vendors in the Madiun Central Market. They appreciated the incumbent since his policy was very friendly towards street vendors. Local government did not stipulate strict rules limiting their vending activities in the city plaza. They compared this to the recent policy (the winning challenger's administration) that prohibits street vendors to vend before 12 a.m. Under the incumbent's leadership, local government allowed street vendors to begin their vending activities in the city plaza from 08.00 a.m. This policy benefited the participants as they could run their activities for longer. They could also gain better income because of this friendly regulation.<sup>678</sup> Two participants who have stalls in the Madiun Central Market confirmed the local government's friendly policies on stalls ownership and rent, especially a female draper in *Semono* Village. As

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<sup>674</sup> Interview with a state teacher who works in the neighbouring regency on 14 December 2012.

<sup>675</sup> Interview with a young butcher on 14 December 2012.

<sup>676</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>677</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>678</sup> Interview with a street vendor selling food on 19 December 2012; a street vendor selling fruity ice on 19 December 2012; a female street vendor selling fruity ice on 19 December 2012; a parking officer on 19 December 2012.

tenants, they could easily meet the stalls fee stipulated by local government.<sup>679</sup> Moreover, one of the participants in the neighbourhood was also a beneficiary of local government's revolving fund program (*LKK*). He gained benefit from this soft loan program to support his micro business.<sup>680</sup> Another participant also recognised some huge local government projects credited to the incumbent, namely the development of the city stadium and the Hajj Dormitory. He also recognised the improvement of homes unfit for habitation (*RTLH*) commenced during the incumbent's time in office.<sup>681</sup> Nevertheless, there was also a participant who delivered a critical opinion on the recent situation. He said that there were no different impacts of local government policies on the people, both during the incumbent's and the recent mayor's administration. He added that there is no significant improvement in the municipality, whoever the mayor is.<sup>682</sup>

As in *Semono* Village, participants in *Sengkali* Village recognised the incumbent as a down-to-earth figure. A participant testified about his experience,

“Based on my experience, I like him. The incumbent will come down, to meet the ordinary people. Mr Bambang (the winning challenger) never comes here. When Mr Kokok occasionally made a pilgrimage to the *Sobrah Moyo* Cemetery (near to the neighbourhood), he wished to give money”.

The participant, then, concluded that the incumbent was a polite and humble person.<sup>683</sup> A female *Rujak Cingur* seller confirmed that although she never met the incumbent, she heard from her neighbours that the incumbent was a good person. He gave money if he met with children. The incumbent was also close to ordinary people, respected them, and was never distant towards them.<sup>684</sup> Among the street vendors in the city plaza, the incumbent was also known as a good person due to his friendly policy that benefited the vendors.<sup>685</sup> Accordingly, the majority of participants in *Sengkali* Village recognised several policy outputs credited to the incumbent, particularly those directly delivering benefits to them. Furthermore, participants perceived the incumbent as a popular and good person. They judged their perception based on the incumbent's popular activities, including being willing to meet with ordinary people and the incumbent's policy of opening the city plaza area for street vendors.

Having examined the policy outputs credited to the incumbent and his popular image amongst participants, this section also examines the informal networks working around their

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<sup>679</sup> Interview with a trader in the Madiun Central Market on 19 December 2012; a female draper in the Madiun Central Market on 19 December 2012.

<sup>680</sup> Interview with a street vendor selling fruity ice on 19 December 2012

<sup>681</sup> Interview with a street vendor selling food on 19 December 2012.

<sup>682</sup> Interview with a private company employee on 19 December 2012.

<sup>683</sup> Interview with a street vendor selling food on 19 December 2012.

<sup>684</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012. *Rujak cingur* is vegetables salad with cow's nose.

<sup>685</sup> Interview with a female street vendor selling fruity ice on 19 December 2012.

neighbourhoods. As with the case study finding in Probolinggo Municipality, participants recognised only the victory teams attached to candidates, mainly the winning challenger (BARIS)'s camp. The majority of participants in *Semono* Village testified about "the stealth teams" operating in the neighbourhood approaching Election Day. The former chair of a polling station in the neighbourhood testified that he was familiar with some of the field coordinators in the team. The teams disbursed money, including in his neighbourhood. Referring to the winning challenger's stealth team, the participant remarked, "The victory team gave directly (the cash), but the amount was different. The highest amount was Rp 100,000 (AUD 10) per person delivered twice. If I am not mistaken, the first disbursement was Rp 50,000 (AUD 5), the second was Rp 50,000 (AUD 5)".<sup>686</sup> A young female participant received money from her younger brother who also received money from the winning challenger's victory team. She testified that when her brother gave her the money he said, in Javanese, "*Iki loh Daryani (pseudonym) duit anu pemilu miliho Pak Bambang*" (this is election money for you, Daryani, vote for Mr Bambang).<sup>687</sup> A participant (a young butcher) added that he recognised his neighbour as the winning challenger's victory team member. His neighbour gave him a shirt and money. The participant clearly testified, "We got Rp 100,000 (AUD 10) for two people (me) and my wife. (It was) given, I just accepted it". The participant also added that he did not receive money from the incumbent's victory team. As far as he knew, the team that worked in his neighbourhood was only the winning challenger's victory team.<sup>688</sup>

In addition to disbursing money, the victory teams also donated some communal funds to the neighbourhood unit. It was intended to support communal activities.<sup>689</sup> The team also treated the residents with food.<sup>690</sup> The rest of the team's activities were distributing stickers picturing the candidates, displaying campaign banners, and holding parades.<sup>691</sup>

The fieldwork in *Sengkali* Village revealed similar money politics practices performed by the winning challenger (BARIS)'s victory team members. A head of a neighbourhood unit who is also a field supervisor for the election (*Pengawas Pemilu Lapangan, PPL*) at the village level recognised the victory teams working in his neighbourhood. He mainly recognised the team from the Democratic Party (the winning challenger's team). The

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<sup>686</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>687</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>688</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>689</sup> Interview with the head of neighbourhood unit's wife as well as a micro trader on 14 December 2012; a state teacher who works in the neighbouring regency on 14 December 2012.

<sup>690</sup> Interview with a retired civil servant who worked in the military institution (*pegawai sipil TNI*) on 13 December 2012.

<sup>691</sup> Interview with a retired staff of a private company on 14 December 2012; a female draper in the Madiun Central Market on 14 December 2012.

participant remarked that the winning challenger's victory team members disbursed cash in his neighbourhood when he left the neighbourhood to perform his duty as the election field supervisor.<sup>692</sup> A female participant as well as a street vendor selling fruity ice testified about her experience,

“In the last election, someone gave money. Some (residents) received Rp 30,000 (AUD 3); some other (residents) received Rp 50,000 (AUD 5). I got Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) from Mr Bambang's victory team. A house received (money) for two persons. I got Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) in the morning; I got Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) in the afternoon. Many others (residents) in this neighbourhood received (money) as well, it was from Democratic Party”.<sup>693</sup>

Shortly after interviewing the participant, her husband arrived home. The husband affirmed,

“At that time, all Mr Blandong (the winning challenger)'s team (members) operated in almost the entire community unit (*RW*). The amount disbursed was the same, Rp 50,000 per person. I got this twice, indeed, they knew that I was a person of (affiliated to) Mr Warto (Wisnu Suwanto Dewa)”.<sup>694</sup>

A female *rujak cingur* seller frankly admitted that she received Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) disbursed by a winning challenger's victory team member.<sup>695</sup> There was similar confirmation by a staff member of a private company that every voter in the neighbourhood received Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) from the winning challenger's victory team members. In addition, they also distributed shirts and displayed stickers picturing the winning challenger at the residents' houses.<sup>696</sup> Another participant who was a trader in the Madiun Central Market admitted that he did not receive money. However, he knew that the people who disbursed money in the neighbourhood were the winning challenger's victory team members. Every person (voter) received Rp 50,000 (AUD 5).<sup>697</sup> People who admitted to being part of the winning challenger's victory team members carried out similar actions in the Madiun Central Market. A female draper in the market recognised the winning challenger's victory team members who surrounded the market. Every trader received Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) from the team.<sup>698</sup> In contrast, a parking officer living in the neighbourhood testified that the incumbent's victory team members also worked in his neighbourhood. He received a shirt and sticker picturing the incumbent from the team.<sup>699</sup>

Money politics practices mainly performed by the winning challenger's camp dominated participants' memories concerning the political dynamics at the grassroots level

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<sup>692</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>693</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>694</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012. Mr. Blandong is the popular nickname of the winning challenger (Bambang Irianto) amongst the municipal residents.

<sup>695</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>696</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>697</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>698</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>699</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

near to the election. At the same time, they could not easily identify the similar networks attached to the incumbent working in their neighbourhood. The next discussion will examine voters' reasons not to vote for the incumbent, which may confirm or reject several assumptions delivered by non-voter participants.

In *Semono* Village, cash disbursement amongst voters shaped their preference not to vote for the incumbent. Their main reasons were directed to the cash disbursed by the winning challenger (BARIS)'s victory team members in the neighbourhood. A housewife clearly stated her reason, "I voted for Mr. Bambang, (because) I was given the money. We (received) Rp 50,000 per person, not per house".<sup>700</sup> Two other female participants gave similar reasons that they did not vote for the incumbent, but they voted for the winning challenger. The cash received from the winning challenger's camp shaped their preference.<sup>701</sup> Moreover, a former chair of a polling station in the neighbourhood admitted that "the cash attack" had influenced his preference to vote for the winning challenger.<sup>702</sup> A butcher admitted also that he received cash and he voted for the winning challenger. He explained that the winning challenger's victory team was the only team that visited his neighbourhood and they disbursed the cash. In contrast, the incumbent's victory team members did not give cash to him. Thus, he did not vote for the incumbent.<sup>703</sup>

As in *Semono* Village, three participants in *Sengkali* Village affirmed that they did not vote for the incumbent due to the cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp. A female *rujak cingur* seller clearly stated her voting decision and the reason.

"Of course (I voted for) Mr. Bambang who gave the money. It would sin (if I did not vote for him), I am consistent. I do not want to be inconsistent, I am afraid). She also added her reason, "My reason is because I was given that money. I was scared if I did not vote (for Mr. Bambang). I was given (the money), I voted for him, because I am a stupid person".<sup>704</sup>

Two other participants delivered similar reasons. They did not vote for the incumbent because they admitted to receiving money from the winning challenger's victory team member. Thus, they voted for the winning challenger.<sup>705</sup>

Money politics strategy was effective in sharpening voters' preferences not to vote for the incumbent. A simple interpretation is that the cash disbursed by the candidate's victory team members legitimated participants' preferences to vote for the winning challenger in

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<sup>700</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>701</sup> Interview with the head of neighbourhood unit's wife as well as a micro trader on 14 December 2012; a young female street vendor on 14 December 2012.

<sup>702</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>703</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>704</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>705</sup> Interview with a female street vendor selling fruity ice on 19 December 2012; a parking officer on 19 December 2012.

both villages. Firstly, money politics has morally bound voters to be consistent and vote for the candidate. They would feel guilty if they did not vote for those giving them money. Secondly, money politics has legitimated voters' powerlessness to voice their dissatisfaction on the impact of the election result on their lives. They consider that whoever the elected candidate is will not make significant improvements to their lives. Then, for voters, money politics presents an alternative short term benefit to cure their dissatisfaction. For the candidate, money politics takes advantage of voters' disappointments. A female participant, as well as a wife of the head of the neighbourhood unit said,

"I vote for those giving money. (The money) has given me a moral obligation. Also, whoever gains the victory, it is less influential. Thus, it is because of the money only. We have been given the money; no reason not to vote for (the winning challenger)".<sup>706</sup>

In addition to the influence of money politics, participants gave other reasons not to vote for the incumbent. In *Semono* Village participants critically assessed the incumbent's performance when he ruled the municipality. They concluded that they voted for the winning challenger expected a change. A state teacher working in the neighbouring regency stated,

"I voted for Mr. Bambang, it was for the sake of change. Mr. Kokok has no salient programs; all (programs) came from Mr. Ali (the previous mayor). He (the incumbent) was the speaker of local legislature, thus, he just imitated Mr. Ali (programs)".<sup>707</sup>

The head of a neighbourhood unit gave a similar reason that he voted for the winning challenger because he wanted to try the other leader. In addition to the mayoral office, the incumbent was also the speaker of the local legislature.<sup>708</sup> Moreover, a retired civil servant who worked in the military institution offered a different reason. He did not vote for the incumbent since he followed the Indonesian military (*TNI*) line. The winning challenger was nominated by the Democratic Party which is chaired by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the President of the Republic of Indonesia, who was a military general. As a retired civil servant who worked in the military institution, the participant preferred the candidate nominated by the Democratic Party. He also admitted that he was attached to SBY or the SBY minded people.<sup>709</sup> In *Sengkali* Village, a critical participant, a staff member of a private company, stated that he was dissatisfied with the incumbent's performance. However, he did not want to vote for the winning challenger as he knew his unfavourable background. He, then, perfunctorily voted for one of the three other candidates.<sup>710</sup>

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<sup>706</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>707</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>708</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>709</sup> Interview on 13 December 2012.

<sup>710</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

Although the winning challenger gained a landslide victory in the election, the incumbent still had loyal voters, as reflected by 25.69 per cent of ballot. They particularly considered the incumbent's popular image and activities, which shaped their preference to vote for the incumbent. In *Semono* Village, a female draper in the Madiun Central Market convincingly remarked,

“I voted for Mr. Kokok because he seems to be sociable towards people. He seems to care about people around him, (especially) the common people. He wishes to respond to people's complaints. Principally, if there is a complaint, he will address it”.

This female participant probably reflected on her experience of interacting with the incumbent in the market. She also knew the incumbent's attention to the merchants when the market caught on fire. Moreover, she also credited the incumbent, when he, via the *Semono* Village office, once donated a *hadrah* uniform for housewives who participated in the family welfare movement (*PKK*).<sup>711</sup> A female street vendor considered similar experiences that may have led her to vote for the incumbent. During the incumbent's time in office, she frequently participated in the cheap market program set up in the village office. She testified that she could buy cheap cooking oil in the market. After that, she could shake hands with the incumbent. As she and her family are categorised as the poor, local government also frequently give her family some packages of eggs and milk.<sup>712</sup>

In *Sengkali* Village, a more rational explanation for a participant's reason to vote for the incumbent was given. A head of a neighbourhood unit as well as an election field supervisor in the village openly explained,

“My first reason is we have enjoyed the works of Mr. Kokok. Based on my experience, what I demanded, thank God, it could be realised. Supposing there is corruption (committed by the incumbent), I do not know. Secondly, I did not want to vote for a cat in the sack (vote for someone who is unreliable or inexperienced). Thirdly, I did not want to vote for Mr. Bambang because he is a businessman. I do not wish that he and his businesses will occupy the Municipality of Madiun”.<sup>713</sup>

Another head of a neighbourhood unit and a trader in the Madiun Central Market identified as having a similar background to the incumbent. The incumbent originally came from their neighbouring village. They, then, voted for the incumbent because they are neighbouring village colleagues. The trader also elected the incumbent as he likes and trusts him.<sup>714</sup> Finally, a party attachment was found, beyond the participant's preference. A young parking

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<sup>711</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012. *Hadrah* is a tambourine dance originated from Persian incorporating Islamic values, especially in the form of song and poetry.

<sup>712</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>713</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>714</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.



officer explained simply, “I kept my vote for Mr. Kokok. My line is still PDI-P. The most important is not the candidate”.<sup>715</sup>

The fieldwork also found ignorant voters. Two senior citizens in *Semono* Village did not remember who they voted for in the election. A retired staff member of a private company remarked that he just remembers that he did not vote for the incumbent. He also argued that as an ordinary person, he did not think too much about the election.<sup>716</sup> Moreover, a retired civil servant delivered a little joking answer, “I do not remember that (the ballot) anymore Sir, because I am an elderly person. I am a PDI person or person with memory degradation”.<sup>717</sup>

Finally, in the fieldwork, a participant was found who was absent in the election in *Sengkali* Village. A female draper in the Madiun Central Market admitted that she did not come to the polling station since she was busy evacuating her merchandise when the market caught on fire on the Election Eve. She simply remarked, “I was absent. I first prioritised to think of my livelihood, which is uncertain, rather than thinking about the elites”.<sup>718</sup>

Based on the knowledge and experience of voters in both districts, they mainly remembered tangible and directly benefiting policy outputs delivered by local governments when the incumbents governed both districts, such as infrastructure, accessible public services, agriculture related infrastructure, farming related assistance, home renovations for the poor and other programs. Moreover, amongst participants, both incumbents were widely recognised as down-to-earth figures. They were not reluctant to interact directly with ordinary people in these districts. In the case of Soeharto, some participants criticised his wife for being less sociable with local people. In terms of macro development achievements, both districts succeeded in achieving better development compared to other regencies and municipalities in East Java during the incumbents’ periods of office. Nonetheless, Soeharto was controversial as he was perceived to have failed to provide better infrastructure in Trenggalek. Voters blamed him for poor infrastructure in the regency throughout his leadership period. Kokok Raya was also perceived to get credit over some huge infrastructure projects in Madiun whereas the preceding mayor previously initiated the projects.

Tangible and directly benefiting policy output is the major consideration of voters not to vote for the incumbents. Participants who live in urban Trenggalek punished the

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<sup>715</sup>Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>716</sup> Interview on 14 December 2012.

<sup>717</sup>Interview on 14 December 2012. PDI is a popular acronym of the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*). In this interview, the participant used a similar acronym to admit that he is a PDI’s person. However, he changed the acronym as *penurunan daya ingat* or person with memory degradation not the Indonesian Democratic Party.

<sup>718</sup>Interview on 19 December 2012.

incumbent for his poor performance in providing tangible and directly benefiting policy outputs, particularly infrastructure and poor public services. Nevertheless, participants who live in rural Trenggalek practised *anut grubyuk* in voting. They preferred to adjust their ballots to the majority opinion in their neighbourhood, while they recognised some policy outputs credited to the incumbent. Meanwhile, the majority of participants in Madiun Municipality decided not to vote for the incumbent due to the influence of cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp. Those receiving money had to be consistent and vote for those disbursing the cash. This political bribery has negated all favourable policy outputs credited to the incumbent. Finally, these findings demonstrate that voters recognised and considered the tangible and direct material benefits that they received and decided not to vote for the incumbents, which led to the crushing defeat of both incumbents in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality.

## 6.7 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined the *pilkada* in Trenggalek Regency that took place on 2 June 2010 and Madiun Municipality that took place on 23 October 2008. It has addressed similar questions as well as performed similar comparative assessments concerning the socio-political setting in the districts prior to the *pilkada*, the incumbents' policy behaviour during their first term and the informal politics attached to the incumbents. It has also inquired into the logic of the incumbents' failure and voters' explanations concerning their preferences not to vote for them. The comparative assessment of the logic of the incumbents' failure to maintain their offices in the *pilkada* in both rural and urban districts arrived at a concluding discussion of the typology of factors that contributed to the incumbents' political failure.

Both incumbents practised populism when they governed the districts. They were well-known as down-to-earth figures who interacted directly with local people. They visited community meeting spots via *blusukan*. The incumbent in Madiun Municipality was also known as a distinguished figure by performing *takziah* and visiting the bereaved families in the municipality. This feature of his popular image was combined with some populist policies credited to both incumbents.

The incumbent in Trenggelek was praised for his policy in improving neighbourhood and farming infrastructure mainly in rural areas. Participants also credited the incumbent for local government initiatives to promote health sanitation throughout the regency and the economic well-being improvement of farmers via the development of modified cassava flour (*mocaf*) and the promotion of a souvenir market centre in Pogalan Sub-district. The incumbent in Madiun Municipality received credit for a familiar poverty alleviation program

named the Community Empowerment in Alleviating Poverty (*Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dalam Mengatasi Kemiskinan, PMDMK*). It was implemented in all villages with intensive implementation in the neighbourhoods where poverty problems needed to be addressed. The incumbent was also credited for his consistent policy of maintaining the good quality of roads and bridges in the municipality and building some huge infrastructure projects, namely the city stadium, city ring road and the Hajj Dormitory. Moreover, the incumbent was credited with some breakthroughs in the health and education sectors by pioneering the implementation of regional health insurance (*Jamkesda*) and disbursing a subsidy for minimal cost of elementary education (*SBMP*).

Nonetheless, both incumbents' populist policies invited controversies amongst government, non-government participants and voters. The incumbent in Trenggalek was mainly criticised for the poor quality of the regency's roads during his time in office. The incumbent in Madiun was particularly criticised for his less innovative policies as he just continued some of the policy initiatives of the preceding mayor (Ahmad Ali), mainly the development of huge infrastructure projects. In fact, under both incumbents' leadership, Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality achieved better macro development outcomes, mainly in the human development index, compared to the average achievement of regencies and municipalities in East Java.

Rivalry remains the major concern of the incumbents' failure in Trenggalek and Madiun. Non-government participants and businessmen in both districts agreed that both incumbents were reluctant to engage in informal political practices and build transactional networks with informal and partisan formal actors (informal politics) during office. The incumbent in Trenggalek was unenthusiastic about gaining support from powerful businessmen. He was relatively less frequent in performing philanthropically biased activities, which are particularly supported by business actors. Moreover, the incumbent was disinclined to play the politics of incentives favouring his supporters who encouraged him in the 2005 *pilkada*. The support conversion of the Forest Village Community Institute (LMDH) from the incumbent to the winning challenger was sparked by the incumbent's hesitancy to set favourable policies for LMDH during his time in office. Moreover, the incumbent experienced strong resistance from local bureaucrats who were dissatisfied with the incumbent's controversial policies in post promotions. Conversely, the incumbent in Madiun experienced relatively less rivalry risk from informal actors and bureaucrats. In fact, his overconfidence in relying only on single party support (PDI-P), his family and relatives, was unable to prevent cash disbursement by the winning challenger's camp to bribe voters not to vote for the incumbent. Therefore, the case study in Madiun Municipality demonstrates the

importance of informal political practices and networks for the incumbent to survive in a re-election bid.

In a more detailed explanation, limited and conflicting informal and partisan formal actors attached to Soeharto in Trenggalek raised the risk of political rivalry. Resistance amongst bureaucrats and local legislators led to the difficulties for the incumbent to pursue some populist policies addressed to potential supporters. Also, the poor support of informal politics impacted on the high risk of negative campaigns addressed against the incumbent. As a regent, Soeharto demonstrated a better performance compared to other regents in East Java, including the incumbent in Blitar Regency, indeed, especially in bettering macro indicator achievement, such as the regency's HDI. However, fewer supportive informal political practices and actors attached to Soeharto meant that there was little opportunity for the existing informal networks in the regency to promote his best performances and to downplay his poor performances. Meanwhile, massive money politics practices seem to support the logic of the incumbent's failure in Madiun. Money politics succeeded in negating practical policy outputs credited to the incumbent. Then, the cash disbursement shaped voters' preference to vote for the winning challenger. In fact, the incumbent in Probolinggo also dealt with similar practices undertaken by the challenger's camp. Yet, informal networks' supports were able to negate the effect of money politics amongst people by carrying out counter movements at the grassroots level. Hence, money politics practices are less relevant to explain the incumbent's survival, rather than the strong support of informal political practices and actors or networks, which can develop counter strategies and actions against money politics practices.

Tangibility or tangible and direct benefits of policy outputs delivered to voters were also the incumbents' weaknesses that contributed to the incumbents' failure, mainly in Trenggalek. The first is the importance of practical policy outputs. Voters pay more attention to tangible policy outputs, praised to the incumbent, which are easily identified and used, such as infrastructure. In other words, voters think reflexively to consider some recognisable policy outputs directly benefiting them that are micro, pragmatic, and practical in nature. The infrastructure factor could explain Soeharto's failure in Trenggalek to stay in office. Voters in urban Trenggalek expressed their disappointment in the incumbent's poor performance during his time in office. They also referred to the poor quality of services in the local government owned hospital and community health centres. These experiences contributed to the decision not to vote for the incumbent amongst voters in urban Trenggalek.

In addition to considering recognisable policy outputs, voters also examined the incumbent's personal image. The term 'reflexive image' is useful, as voters spontaneously

consider individual appearances relating to the incumbent as a voting reference. Voters can easily judge the incumbent's personal attributes by referring to three characteristics, namely well-known, well-liked and sympathetic. Soeharto suffered from his poor personal image. Local people recognised him easily (well-known), but, Soeharto had to deal with a poor image amongst people in urban Trenggalek since he was connected to several corruption cases committed by his staff (unwell-liked). In addition, Soeharto was disfavoured by his personal attribute, as he was perceived as not completely a local person, since the majority of his career was spent in another region. Nevertheless, Soeharto's personal spontaneous impression amongst local residents was also arguable, as there were also participants interviewed in the case study, mainly in rural Trenggalek, who perceived that he is a good, clean, religious and honest person,.

In Madiun, voters actually could recognise local government's tangible policy outputs and direct benefits of services and assistance, nonetheless, tangible and direct benefits of cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp were considered more by voters. They preferred to vote for the winning challenger or to be consistent with their decision to receive the money. This means political bribery via cash disbursement has negated the tangible aspects of policy outputs credited to the incumbent. Indeed, the cash received by voters is also a tangible good which provides a direct nominal benefit for voters.

Lastly, the practice of *anut grubyuk* in voting decisions and voters' ignorance concerning evidence-based local government performance and the *pilkada* related issues can explain the paradoxical facts between the incumbent's performance and related issues during his time in office, and the result of the *pilkada*. The practices of *anut grubyuk* or fitting in amongst rural voters in Trenggalek may lead voters to ignore their individual choices as they adjust their voting decision to the majority opinion in the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, voters' ignorance may block positive or negative campaigns about the incumbents' performances, which could be referred to by voters in making voting decisions. Voters determine their decisions based on the popular appearance of the incumbents or tangible policy outputs without considering the costs or benefits of the incumbents' leadership in terms of long term social, economic or environmental costs or benefits. This behaviour, indeed, disfavoured the incumbent in Trenggalek.

The narratives of the defeats of the incumbents in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality in re-election bids challenge the logic of the importance of populism, rivalry and tangibility as these three aspects succeeded in contributing to the incumbents' survival in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality. To survive in a local democratic contest, populism and tangibility are crucial for the incumbents. Nonetheless, the capability for

minimising political rivalry risks from informal actors and bureaucrats in the region is evidently more important. The case study in Madiun Municipality also shows that poor informal networks supporting the incumbent may lead to his inability to counter money politics attacks on voters performed by the winning challenger's camp. Accordingly, the case studies in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality corroborate the importance of informal politics that can contribute to the incumbents' survival and failure in the local democratic contest in contemporary Indonesia.

## **Chapter 7**

### **The Role of Women in Local Elections, their preferences and Implications for the political survival of District Heads**

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role of women in direct elections for district head (*pilkada*)<sup>719</sup> and to make a case that local elections are particularly important for enhancing the strategic opportunities for women. The discussion in this chapter is divided into six parts. The first part introduces the legal foundation for women's political citizenship in Indonesia, both at the national and local level. The second part explains a theoretical review on political citizenship with specific links to women's suffrage and acceptance in the public sector. A gender sensitive lens is applied to government policies. The next part discusses gender-related development achievements in four districts, gender-related platforms and women's role as voters in supporting the incumbents' survival in four districts. This discussion attempts to find out whether better gender-related development achievements contribute to the success of local government incumbents, irrespective of their gender.

The fourth part examines the political activities of women and the extent of their engagement in the local political arena which is male dominated. It also initially assesses the potential impacts of informal politics practices dominated by the incumbents and other male actors on women's strategic needs. Then, the fifth part examines women's preferences and factors shaping their voting preferences in selecting which candidate they would support in the *pilkada*. It, then, arrives at an academic explanation confirming the logic of the incumbents' survival in terms of female voters' preferences. Finally, the last section concludes by summing up the challenges associated with enhancing opportunities for women to be involved through participation as candidates, public education to enhance awareness of practical and strategic gender needs and legal frameworks to ensure gender mainstreaming to support opportunities for women as candidates and to support women's preferences in the *pilkada*. Also, a policy recommendation to incorporate better gender-specific issues in the *pilkada* bill and decentralisation regulatory regime would support greater social inclusion of women in the *pilkada* as candidates and better women's inclusion in local developments.

#### **7.1 More than Women's Suffrage**

The foundation for women's inclusion in Indonesian politics and government can be found in the 1945 Constitution. There is no single word in the constitution's texts mentioning gender identities, such as male or female or man and woman, to refer to Indonesian citizens. Of the

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<sup>719</sup> Women's roles as voters and a little discussion of women as candidates and women as elected candidates in the *pilkada* in Indonesia.

37 articles and a preamble, the constitution specifically stipulates two articles on citizenship. Article 27 assures equal political citizenship in the country by mentioning that all citizens have equal positions in the law and government. Without declaring gender identities, the article also states that every citizen deserves decent employment and a good life. Article 28 stipulates that the state assures individual freedom of speech, thought, and to share in organisational life. In other words, women's suffrage and opportunities to hold office have been guaranteed in the constitution.

One of the people's demands in the 1998 political reform was constitutional amendment. People called for more a democratic constitution which emphasises people's sovereignty more, as the real owners of power. To meet these demands, the people's consultative assembly (MPR) had performed four series of amendments from 1999 to 2002. MPR had succeeded in making 75 revisions within this period without adding an additional article to the constitution. MPR preferred to make additional clauses in 34 of 37 articles.<sup>720</sup> The amendments were able to strengthen Indonesians' political citizenship. Firstly, the constitution stipulates election as the main mechanism to elect executive and legislative office holders at all levels of government.<sup>721</sup> Every eligible citizen has the right to vote and the chance to compete in direct elections. Secondly, the amendments strengthened the principle of equality to all citizens. Moreover, the amendment stipulated certain sub-chapters (X, A) and 10 sub-articles on human rights (28A-28J). Article 28D clause 3 clearly stipulates that every citizen deserves an equal opportunity to hold office in the government.

Following the amendment of the constitution, the government and the House of Representatives stipulated several laws to better regulate political citizenship. Specifically for women, the Law number 22/2003 on Legislative Election (article 65) requires every eligible political party to nominate a minimum 30 per cent quota of female legislator candidates in the 2004 Legislative Election at national, provincial, and district levels. The stipulation of the Law number 10/2008 on Legislative Election amended the Law Number 22/2003. It strengthened women's political citizenship in the 2009 Legislative Election. The law stipulates a minimum 30 per cent quota of women' posts in the political party's boards at the national level, a minimum 30 per cent quota of female legislator nominees at all levels and the implementation of a zipper system encouraging more chances for women to be elected. This is an affirmative action system which requires eligible political parties to include at least

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<sup>720</sup> Articles 10, 12, and 35 are not amended. To find out the article changes in three series of amendments, Ahmad Junaidi's article source was referred to: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/08/01/indonesia039s-constitutional-history-minefield-confusion.html> accessed on 30 May 2014. Individual analysis was also conducted on the most updated 1945 constitution and the changes on the fourth series of amendment.

<sup>721</sup> National, provincial, and local legislators (*DPR/DPD*); regional representative council (*DPD*); president; governor, district head.



one woman amongst three candidates in the candidacy list. Nevertheless, these affirmative actions are not followed in regulating the *pilkada*. Both government and the house have not showed serious policy considerations to reduce the gender gap in executive heads at the provincial and local levels (Satriyo, 2010, p. 243).

To assess the impact of women's political citizenship and office holding in 190 nations, McDonagh does not only assess women-friendly political structures in government organisations. She also measures state policies affirming particularly women's maternal group differences associated with care-work. State policies should provide protections, privileges, or protection to individuals due to their group differences (McDonagh, 2002, pp. 538-539). In addition, Kabeer specifically classifies three types of institutional gender policies in a social relations gender-based framework, namely gender-blind policies, gender-aware policies (gender-neutral policies and gender-specific policies), and gender-redistributive policies (March et. al, 1999, pp. 108-109).

In the Indonesian case, the affirmation of women's group difference in local government policies is sufficiently strong. In 2000, the Government, under Abdurrahman Wahid's administration, issued the Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development. The instruction ordains all national government institutions, governors and district heads including Army and Police to implement gender mainstreaming in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating national development. The Instruction also provides a manual on gender mainstreaming. At the local level, the Law number 32/2004 on Local Government provides similar affirmation. Article 26 stipulates that one of the duties of a deputy governor or deputy district head is to assist the governor or district head in the implementation of women's empowerment. The government, then, stipulates the government regulation No. 38/2007 on the devolution of authority between central and local governments. Articles 2 and 7 of the regulations stipulate that women's empowerment and child protection are delegated authorities which are compulsory implemented by provincial and district governments. Also, the government regulation No. 41/2007 on Local Government Organisation (article 22) stipulates that provincial and district governments are required to establish an agency for women's empowerment and family planning. Hence, provincial and district governments are required to affirm women's empowerment issues in terms of local government structure and local policies.

## **7.2 Gender Sensitive Lens**

The libertarian concept of political citizenship entails the element of the right to vote and exercise political power (Marshall, 1992, p. 8). In a more general sense, a liberal perspective

affirms equal citizenship that requires an identical position for every citizen, to have rights and liberties under the principles of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 2005, p. 97). As citizens, then, women have equal rights to men as electors and office holders.

In fact, such equal citizenship is not a given situation for women. From the standpoint of inequality, especially to women, Kabeer explains gender relations as aspects in social relations that may create and reproduce differences in women's and men's positions, especially in institutional processes (decision-making) and outcomes (March et. al, 1999, pp. 108-109). The inequality of women is signified by five interrelated dimensions in social relations, namely rules (constraining official and unofficial norms), resources (distinct patterns of resource distribution), people (categories of individuals affecting production and distribution processes), activities (unfair division of tasks and activities in achieving institutional objectives) and power (relations of authority and control) (Kabeer, 2004, pp. 281-283). In order to address gender inequality, women must have a say in decision-making and policy outputs and outcomes utilisation. She proposes empowerment or the ability to exercise choice to meet the capacity of women for tackling inequality. Empowerment has three interrelated dimensions, namely resources (enhance the ability to exercise choice), agency (the ability to define one's goals and act upon them, or decision making), and achievements (well-being outcomes that people have for living the lives they want) (Kabeer, 1999, pp. 437-438).

Like Kabeer, Moser (1989, 1993) introduced another gender sensitive lens to integrate gender-planning in all development work in the third world, concentrating on the power relations between men and women. She introduced three main tools of the gender planning process (policy-making, planning and the organisation of implementation), namely women's triple role, practical and strategic gender needs and categories of integrated (gender and development, GAD) or separated (women in development, WID) gender policy approaches (March et. al, 1999, pp. 108-109). The triple role reflects on three women's (from low-income households in the third world) roles in society, namely reproductive work (the childbearing and rearing responsibilities), productive work (often as secondary income earners) and community managing work (the provision of items of collective consumption undertaken in the local community). In addition to playing three different roles, women also have different needs since women and men have dissimilar positions within households and different control over resources. In identifying planning needs, then, women have two different needs which should be accommodated in the long-term goals of development, namely practical and strategic gender needs. The former is "the needs women identify in their socially accepted roles in society". These needs are immediate necessities that will help

women in performing their current activities, such as water provision, health care and employment. To meet the practical gender needs, the planning process has to focus on the domestic arena, income earning activities and community-level requirements of housing and basic services. The latter is “the needs women identify because of their subordinate position to men in their society”. By meeting these needs, women will have more say in transforming their subordinated status from men, such as via the recognition of legal rights, freedom from violence and equal wages and women’s control over their bodies (Moser, 1993, pp. 27-28; 37-40). Complementary to the careful identification of women’s roles in society and the completion of their gender needs, gender planning process needs to examine certain approaches that fit with the gender planning process. This could also be an evaluation to examine the preceding gender-related work. Moser identified five policy approaches to third world women, namely the welfare, equity, anti-poverty, efficiency and empowerment approaches (Moser, 1989, p. 1808).

In accomplishing equal political citizenship between men and women, liberal democratisation is assumed as a panacea. Democracy assumes individual equality to every citizen. Democracy endorses individual sameness and disfavours difference. Then, gender differences and also class and race are irrelevant to democracy, which requires an equal chance to vote and to run for office both for males and females. Specific to women’s political citizenship, democratisation is challenged by the facts of gender relations in 190 countries. Via quantitative cross-national analyses, McDonagh (2002) ascertains that women office holders do not only exist in countries holding the principle of individual equality. Countries founded on the principle of kinship group difference, such as monarchical systems, also open similar opportunities for women to hold office, particularly in monarchical countries open to women. Besides, the finding challenges the standpoint of democratic states’ policies. Individual equality is not the only referred principle which is women-friendly, in democratic states’ policies. Paradoxical combinations of the policies, referring to the principles of individual equality and the constitutionalised affirmation of the value of women’s maternalistic group difference are also women-friendly. Accordingly, this gender paradox revises a theory of political citizenship and democratisation. Paradoxical combinations of sameness (women’s equality to men) and difference (affirming women’s group difference from men) have both strengthened women’s political citizenship. Both principles cannot work on their own to strengthen women’s political inclusion as electors and office holders (McDonagh, 2002, pp. 546-547).

In the Indonesian case, women’s political citizenship is not a new endowment. One day after the independence declaration on 17 August 1945, Indonesia stipulated the 1945

Constitution ensuring women's political citizenship. Indonesia's early government, under Amir Sjarifuddin's cabinet, appointed SK Trimurti as the first female cabinet official, to the post of Manpower Minister. At the local level, Indonesia has opened better opportunities for all eligible citizens to run in the local executive head (governor and district head) contest since 2005 via direct election for local executive head (*pilkada*). According to the People's Voter Education Network (*JPPR*)'s data base, 3.8 per cent of female candidates (134) ran in 466 *pilkada* at the provincial and district levels from 2005 to 2008. Of that number, one (3 per cent) female candidate was elected as governor and eight (1.7 per cent) women candidates were elected as regent or mayor (Satriyo, 2010, pp. 245-246). Therefore, Indonesia has had an experience of women's political citizenship at all levels of government.

However, better inclusion of women actually was just begun in 1998 or after the end of 32 years of the authoritarian regime era. Particularly at the local level, the inclusion was embarked upon in 2005 when the state initiated opening more opportunities for all citizens to elect and hold local executive head offices. Then, this equal citizenship initiative raises several questions on gender relations related to the *pilkada*: Does equal political citizenship at the local level create a better impact on gendered development outputs? To what extent do the directly elected local district heads incorporate institutional gender policies? What is the effect of informal politics manoeuvres in the elections on women? What factors shape women's preferences?


The previous research connecting gender issues and the *pilkada* is quite scarce. It appears that the first published study was conducted by Tri Ratnawati. She assessed the landslide victory of an incumbent woman regent in Kebumen Regency, Central Java, in the 2005 *Pilkada*. The case study concluded that it remains too early for deciding whether this female incumbent's survival shows a significant achievement of women as office holders. The study finds that the female regent was re-elected not due to her different gender's competitive advantage, rather she gained benefit from her outstanding popularity as an incumbent regent and a local party leader compared to the contenders. The female incumbent even was challenged over her lower contribution to local governance and political reform. She was accused of abusing local bureaucracy and alleged to have committed corruption, collusion and nepotism (Ratnawati, 2009, pp. 187-188). The other published study was conducted by Hana A. Satriyo who researched women office holders and the *pilkada* (2005-2008). She revealed that women office holders face many challenges, both technically as local executive heads and as politicians. Unequal gender relations in local politics and local social circumstances have hampered women office holders from contributing more in local development. Also, within four years of the *pilkada* implementation (2005-2008), there was

no significant increase in the number of women office holders at the provincial and district levels (Satriyo, 2010, pp. 261-262). Nonetheless, a case study of women representatives in Bangladesh finds an empowerment effect of direct election in reserved seats at the local level on women local legislators. Despite many challenges, women representatives are able to perform decision-making roles in local government institutions. Women representatives also change the gender equity after being elected. In the wider community, women representatives can help discriminated and abused women in the community and be involved in the projects and training programs to improve income generating activities for women (Aktar, 2014).

Considering the previous studies both in the international and Indonesian contexts, this research attempts to fill several academic gaps, particularly in assessing institutional gender policies at the local level after the *pilkada* implementation; in exploring the impact of informal politics manoeuvres in the *pilkada* on women; in researching women's logic in voting and in explaining the possible link between women voters and incumbency in the *pilkada*.

### **7.3 Gender-related Development Achievements**

To find out the specific development achievement for women in four districts, this section of the chapter refers to the gender-related development index (GDI) and gender empowerment measure (GEM) published by the Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry. GDI is the human development index (HDI) adjusted for gender inequality. Meanwhile, GEM examines women's participation in economic and political life and decision making as the outcome of women's expanded capabilities, signified by the GDI (UNDP, 1995, p. 73). According to the report published by the Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry, Indonesia began to measure GDI and GEM (up to district level) in 2004. Chart 7.1 shows the change in national and East Java's GDI from 2004 to 2012. East Java's GDI was always under the national GDI over nine years. In 2012, the national index was 68.52 and East Java scored 66.56.



Source: The Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, 2013.

Relating to the *pilkada* result in four districts, this section seeks to scrutinise the relevance of gendered development achievements to the incumbents' survival in the re-election bid. Prior to comparing gender development achievements, it begins the discussion with the examination of local development policies in each district, which refers to Kabeer's framework on gender institutional policies and inequality and Moser's framework on the gender planning process. These examinations are based on the district heads' accountability reports (*LKPJ*) published at the end of their tenures.

The incumbent in Blitar Regency governed for the first term from 2006 to 2010. Based on the *LKPJ*, under the incumbent's administration, the regency government was limited in addressing gender difference in seven agendas of local development. Over five years, Blitar Regency reported two kinds of gender-specific programs,<sup>722</sup> namely the establishment of a counselling centre for women and children domestic violence victims and implementing socialisation and a seminar on gender mainstreaming in development (Noegroho, 2010, pp. IV-41).<sup>723</sup> The other gender-related programs are not specifically founded on the knowledge of gender difference. In the health sector, the government developed health insurance for the poor (*Askeskin*). The government claimed to improve *askeskin* coverage from 64,783 poor people in 2006 to 257,070 in 2010. For women, this claim is not directly beneficial. There was an increasing trend in the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in the regency from 57.7 women per 100,000 live births in 2006 to 83.92 in 2010. Mothers in the regency also suffered

<sup>722</sup> The author of the report is Herry Noegroho, the incumbent regent of Blitar Regency (2006-2010).

<sup>723</sup> Intended to meet targeted needs of women/men, within the existing distribution of resources and responsibilities (March et.al, 1999, pp. 108-109).



from the decrease in the rate of childbirth helped by medical professionals from 98.4 per cent in 2006 to 66.40 per cent. Besides, pregnant women's immunisation coverage decreased from 24.99 per cent in 2006 to 14.83 per cent in 2010.

The rest of the programs, especially in education and local economic development, are gender-blind. Blitar Regency makes no distinction between male and female in the programs by neglecting gender-related constraints on women's capacity for agency. To improve the mean years of schooling, for example, the incumbent's administration did not mention specific programs addressed to female pupils' improvements in access to primary and intermediary education (Noegroho, 2010, pp. IV-11-IV-12). However, according to the Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry, Blitar Regency has a good record in gender development achievement. As seen in chart 7.2, the regency's GDI increased by 1.44 points when the incumbent was in office (2006-2010). In this term, the regency's GDI was also higher than the national and provincial indexes. Moreover, chart 7.3 demonstrates also a better achievement of the regency's GEM compared to the provincial and national indexes.

Like the incumbent in Blitar Regency, the incumbent in Trenggalek Regency pursued a similar pattern of institutional gender policies during his time in office (2006-2010). Under his administration, local government implemented two programs, namely the improvement of gender participation and equality in development and institutional strengthening in gender and child mainstreaming. From 2006 to 2009, the government had succeeded to conduct two awareness raising programs of gender mainstreaming for women, to handle 22 domestic violence cases, and to conduct eight training sessions on gender participation and equality in 2007. The other gender-specific policy is a family planning program that is especially addressed to increasing the number of male participants. There was a slight increase in active male participants using contraception from 900 participants in 2006 to 1,616 in 2009. These male participants were 1.1 per cent of 146,577 fertile couples in the regency in 2009 (Soeharto, 2010, pp. IV-77-IV-78).<sup>724</sup>

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<sup>724</sup> The author of the report is Soeharto, the incumbent regent of Trenggalek Regency (2006-2010).



Source: the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, 2013.


In the education sector, the incumbent reports that local government succeeded in improving the accessibility to pre-school, primary, and elementary education. However, there were no specific education programs targeted either for men or women. For example, local government did not have specific gender assessments of the downward trend of transition rates in elementary and intermediary education. Pupils pursuing their education after graduating from elementary education decreased from 96.7 per cent in 2006 to 90.42 per cent in 2009; pupils graduating from junior high school and pursuing their study to senior high school decreased from 79.32 per cent in 2006 to 76.64 in 2009. There was no specific gender-related effort by local government to assess whether this declining transition rate affects more female or male pupils. Specific to female health programs, local government implemented maternal-related programs, namely medical professional coverage improvement to help childbirth and to visit pregnant women. Like Blitar Regency, gender-related development achievements in Trenggalek Regency improved when the incumbent chaired the office. Chart 7.2 and chart 7.3 demonstrate that there was improvement by 1.92 points of GDI and 4.49 points of GEM when the incumbent chaired the regency (2006-2010).

The Government of Probolinggo Municipality implemented similar approaches in gender-related development programs when the incumbent held office for the first term (2004-2008). Based on the mayor’s accountability report (*LKPJ*), it appears that the majority of local development programs were gender-blind. Although it cannot be justified that local development policies tended to exclude women, the policies do not recognise the distinction between males and females. In the education sector, local government’s initiatives to disburse scholarships for poor pre-school, elementary, and intermediary schools’ pupils and to



subsidise elementary and junior high schools' operational costs did not consider gender difference. The non-gender difference-based programs were also not implemented in labour participation improvement programs, cooperatives, small and medium enterprises programs, and trade and industry programs. In the health sector, of the 10 primary programs, local government addressed only one women-specific program, in public health. The specific activity was maternal-related healthcare, namely medical professional coverage improvement to help childbirth and to visit pregnant women, especially those having high pregnancy risk (Buchori, 2008, pp. IV-17-IV-74).<sup>725</sup>

Moreover, local government implemented six women's empowerment programs from 2004-2008. Local government conducted three awareness raising programs on gender equality and women, teenager, and child empowerment. For example, in 2007, local government conducted awareness raising programs on gender equality for 250 women, children, and teenagers. The Government spent Rp 158,586,000 (AUD 15,586) on this activity. In 2008, the government spent Rp 67,480,000 (AUD 6,788) on a similar activity [Buchori, 2008, pp. IV-141-IV142). During the incumbent's time in office, the municipality succeeded in increasing both GDI and GEM. As seen in charts 7.4 and 7.5, the municipality's GDI and GEM increased by 4.31 points and 3.44 points respectively within five years.



Source: Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry, 2013.

Likewise in Probolinggo, the Government of Madiun Municipality implemented inadequate gendered policies, especially in education, health, and economic policies, when

<sup>725</sup> The author of this report is M. Buchori, the mayor of Probolinggo Municipality.

the incumbent held the mayoral office from 2004 to 2008. In the education sector, local government implemented two main goals, namely the improvement of accessibility and quality of pre-schools, primary, and intermediary education. To achieve these goals, there was no assessment made to recognise distinction between sexes, so it is not known if there were policy biases favouring men. For example, to prevent the dropout rate, local government disbursed subsidies to minimise the cost of elementary education in 2004 without allocating more for female pupils. A similar subsidy was disbursed in 2005 for elementary and junior high school pupils. Also, the government disbursed scholarships for elementary, junior and senior high school pupils (Raya, 2008, pp. IV-2-IV-7).<sup>726</sup> In the health sector, one of the two main local development goals (2004-2008) was to reduce the infant mortality rate (IMR) and maternal mortality rate (MMR). In 2004, local government implemented immunisation services for women in their fertile years, the provision of A vitamins for women in their confinement period, and iron tablet provision for pregnant women. In 2005, the government continued immunisation services for women in their fertile years (Raya, 2008, pp. IV-22-IV-27). To improve labour participation, there was no program recognising a distinction between the sexes, especially in job training and job placement programs. These gender-blind policies are also found in cooperative, small, and medium enterprise advancement programs and small industry and trade empowerment programs (Raya, 2008, pp. IV-108-IV-109; IV-113-IV-116; IV-186-iv-191).

Madiun Municipality set a women-specific policy goal to enhance gender equality. Local government provided operational grants for women's organisations (2004-2007), supported a family welfare movement (PKK) (2004-2007), conducted gender statistics and analysis training and published a gender profile book (2005-2006), disbursed disclosed reserves for women itinerant grocery merchants (2005), conducted management training and provided production equipment for micro businesses managed by women (2006-2007) and conducted training of trainers (ToT) for activists of integrated service centres for women and children's empowerment (*P2T-P2A*) (2006) Local government also set up awareness raising programs on domestic violence and *P2T-P2A* (2006) and awareness raising programs on women's and children's protection and gender justice and equality, implemented women's and children's health (KIA) programs (2004, 2008), evaluated family welfare movement (PKK)'s programs (2005-2007), conducted catering business training for beginners (2007), facilitated *P2T-P2A* establishment (2008), and conducted ToT for counsellors and assistance for domestic violence victims (2008) (Raya, 2008, pp. IV-93-IV-95). Furthermore, Madiun Municipality succeeded in enhancing gender-related development achievements during the

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<sup>726</sup> The author of this report is Kokok Raya, the Mayor of Madiun Municipality.

incumbent's time in office (2004-2008). Chart 7.4 and chart 7.5 show that the municipality's GDI and GEM improved 6.61 points and 5.57 points within this term. However, the GEM was lower than the provincial and national measures.

Having examined all district development reports provided in *LKPJ*, this study does not show that, under the incumbents' administration, all district governments did not implement gender-mainstreaming policies in local developments. There is no gender-specific assessment and consideration in designing local development policies (gender-blind planning). Therefore, there is no specific recognition of distinctions between men and women in many areas of development policies, particularly in education and economic policies. The only gender-specific policy considering the practical needs of women is related to women's maternal group difference, such as reproductive health programs. The other women specific policies are women's protection from domestic violence programs and the establishment of local organisation to assist women who are domestic violence victims.

All local governments also implemented "artificial" gender-redistributive policies by setting interventions to raise women's awareness on gender equality and empowerment via social programs and training. Besides, gender-redistributive policies are implemented sporadically, such as through the disbursement of disclosed reserves and micro-business equipment for micro-businesswomen individuals and groups. Thus, the effort to redistribute gender imbalance in development planning is focused only on one sex interventions (female). Moreover, all districts show gender disparities in development achievements (GDI relative to HDI).

Complementary to Kabeer's social relations gender-based framework, the application of Moser's framework concentrating on the power relations between men and women is also relevant to examine local development policies. From the three main tools, the implementation of practical and strategic gender needs and policy approaches in the gender planning process are relevant to examining local development policies implemented in four districts. The first tool of women's triple role is not easy to apply since most programs had already been implemented, not planned. Also, the tool overlaps with the identification of practical and strategic gender needs in assessing local development programs and policies. Some local governments' programs and policies can be categorised as addressing both women's roles and gender needs.

During the incumbents' periods in office, the majority of local development programs related to women were addressed to meet practical gender needs. They did not address the importance of disaggregating women's needs, as the majority of programs and policies do not recognise the distinction between men and women and focus only on meeting women's

immediate necessities, not long-term goals. For example, there is no specific program in education to improve female pupils' participation in education. All districts performed similar programs and policies in education. Moreover, local governments enabled the completion of strategic gender needs. They were mainly adopted in the health sector in all districts, namely those relating to the provision of reproductive and maternal health services. Local governments also performed programs intended to transform the power imbalance between men and women, such as the familiarisation of the need for women's empowerment and gender mainstreaming and handling violence. All local governments have established counselling centres for women and children domestic violence victims and/or integrated service centres for women's and children's empowerment (*P2T-P2A*).

The evaluation of existing programs and policies in four districts demonstrates that local governments applied a mixed policy approach in planning. Since the majority of programs aggregate women's and men's needs, local governments minimally applied empowerment and equity approaches that foster women's self-reliance and participation in development. They emphasised more on welfare, anti-poverty and efficiency approaches via the implementation of programs aimed to meet women's practical gender needs, addressing women's poverty and harnessing women's economic contribution. For example, Blitar Regency delivered health insurance for the poor (*askeskin*); Probolinggo Municipality and Trenggalek Regency improved medical professional coverage to help childbirth and to visit pregnant women, especially those having high pregnancy risk; Madiun Municipality provided immunisation services for women of fertile year, A vitamins for women in their confinement period, and iron tablets for pregnant women. The municipality also disbursed disclosed reserves for women itinerant grocery merchants, conducted management training, provided production equipment for micro businesses managed by women and held catering business training for beginners, especially for women.

This disadvantageous development setting for women is related to the decentralisation regulatory regime. The Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government and the two implementing regulations (the government regulation No. 38/2007 and No. 41/2007) set women's empowerment as part of the devolution.<sup>727</sup> Therefore, local governments implement their delegated authority for women's empowerment as a gender-redistributive authority, not a gender mainstreaming of local development planning, to better meet practical and strategic gender needs. In addition, national government regulates local budgeting by issuing Home

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<sup>727</sup> This law has been amended by the law No. 23/2014 on Regional Government on 2 October 2014. The new law is better in addressing strategic gender needs by requiring provincial and district governments to incorporate strategic gender needs, such as setting up new provincial/local institutions for gender mainstreaming and empowerment and preventing violence against women and children

Affairs Minister's regulation No. 13/26 on the Manual of Local Financial Management. The regulation determines local financial account codes and local expenditure classification codes based on local government's functions or delegated authority. The regulation does not employ gender mainstreaming or gender differences in local budgeting. It rather applies the principle of alignment and integration of state financial management. The gender-redistributive function is accommodated as one of the sub-functions of social protection. In addition, this regulation determines programs that can be created by local governments in five divisions of program, namely the program of policy harmonization on children's and women's quality improvement, institutional strengthening of gender and child mainstreaming, the improvement of women's quality of life and protection, the improvement of gender participation and equality in development, and institutional strengthening of gender and child mainstreaming.

Based on the examinations of all LKPJ in four districts, the incumbents and local governments have complied with the Home Affairs Minister's regulation No. 13/26 from 2007 (fiscal year). Local government programs on gender equality and women's empowerment have followed program items determined in the regulation. The regulation actually provides practical and good gender difference knowledge-based program items. Nevertheless, the regulation has hampered local government in incorporating gender difference knowledge to address gender disparity in all development sectors at the local level. Therefore, the decentralization regulatory regime has directed local government to implement a devolution-based approach in local development. Specific to gender-related development, it has given no room for local government to mainstream gender-aware policies in local development planning and budgeting. This regulatory regime is contradictory to the Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development.

Another impediment to pursuing better gender sensitive policies at the local level relates to the district heads' knowledge and awareness of gender differences as well as gender imbalance. To assess district heads' knowledge and awareness on gender-related development issues, three mid-term local development plans (RPJMD) in three districts are examined.<sup>728</sup> The reason for analysing these documents is because RPJMD is a translation of vision, missions, and programs promised by district heads and the deputy district heads in the *pilkada*. Also, RPJMD considers provincial and national development agendas and planning.

The 2006-2011 mid-term regional development plan (RPJMD) of Blitar Regency considered low participation of women in decision making and the increase in women and

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<sup>728</sup> I did not examine Madiun Municipality's RPJMD since I did not succeed in gaining the document during the fieldwork.

children trafficking cases. To address these problems, the incumbent and local government initiated the formulation of local development policies which are more sensitive to gender problems and prioritise women. However, local government did not put gender-specific considerations in all local development policies. The government rather decided to place women's empowerment policy partially under the social development agenda. Then, the incumbent and local government partially set up local development programs focusing on women only, not a gender balance orientation. These programs performed policy harmonisation related to women's and children's quality improvements and women's quality of life and protection improvement (Blitar, 2006, pp. IV-7; VI-34-VI-36). The 2006-2010 mid-term local development plan (RPJMD) of Trenggalek Regency pursued a similar approach on gender-related issues. Over five years, the incumbent and local government set up the policy of women's role improvement in development. To implement this policy, local government developed a women's quality of life and protection improvement program which was implemented in two activities, namely women's institutions reinforcement and policy harmonisation on women and child quality improvement (Trenggalek, 2006, pp. IV-21).

The 2004-2009 mid-term local development plan (RPJMD) of Probolinggo Municipality did not mention gender and women in the incumbent's vision and missions on local development. Among four local development agendas, gender-specific differences are accommodated in the agenda number 2 of the local development focus number 8 emphasising the empowerment of youth, women, and sport. To implement this development focus, local government implemented women's quality of life improvement and empowerment programs (Probolinggo, 2005, pp. III-14-III-50).

The examinations of mid-term local development plans (RPJMD) of these three districts show the poor and sectoral commitment of district heads on gender-related development and gender differences. These district heads did not have any specific development visions and missions to address gender disparity in the three crucial development sectors, namely education, health and local economy. They set up local development planning that considered gender differences or women's practical needs in one area of development, namely women's empowerment. The district heads and local government did not incorporate the situation of the gender imbalance between men and women in development planning and budgeting.

**Table 7.1** Gender Disparity and Inequality

					Gender Disparity		Gender Inequality	
	Rural Districts							
	Blitar		Trenggalek		Blitar	Trenggalek	Blitar	Trenggalek
HDI	GDI	HDI	GDI					
2006	72.1	69.9	71.2	66.4	2.2	4.8	3.05%	6.74%
2007	72.28	70.3	71.68	67.5	1.98	4.18	2.74%	5.83%
2008	72.74	70.7	72.15	67.77	2.04	4.38	2.80%	6.07%
2009	73.22	71.03	72.72	67.86	2.19	4.86	2.99%	6.68%
2010	73.67	71.34	73.24	68.32	2.33	4.92	3.16%	6.72%
Average					2.15	4.63	2.95%	6.41%
Change (2006-2010)	1.57	1.44	2.04	1.92	0.13	0.12	0.11%	-0.02%
	Urban Districts							
	Probolinggo		Madiun		Probolinggo	Madiun	Probolinggo	Madiun
	HDI	GDI	HDI	GDI				
2005	71.3	60.7	73.9	65.7	10.6	8.2	14.87%	11.10%
2006	71.5	62.4	74.4	69.9	9.1	4.5	12.73%	6.05%
2007	72.76	63	75.42	70.4	9.76	5.02	13.41%	6.66%
2008	73.29	63.31	75.89	70.91	9.98	4.98	13.62%	6.56%
Average					8.86	4.12	12.45%	5.40%
Change (2005-2008)	9.42	4.31	13.69	6.61	-0.62	-3.22	-1.25%	-4.53%

Source: The Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, 2013. These data are processed by the researcher.

Unfavourable decentralisation regulatory regimes and the lack of the incumbents' awareness of gender differences and imbalance probably endorsed gender disparity and an increase in gender inequality in rural districts. As seen in table 7.1, although HDI and GDI increased in Blitar and Trenggalek, their gender disparities (HDI - GDI) also mounted (0.13 points and 0.12 points) during the incumbents' periods in office (2006-2010). Then, gender inequalities ((HDI-GDI)/HDI) in Blitar also increased, but it decreased very slightly in Trenggalek. Conversely, the similar regulatory regime and unaware gender leadership did not result in an increase in gender disparities and inequalities in the two urban districts. There was an improvement in gender-related development achievements in Probolinggo and Madiun, indicated by the decline (minus points) of both gender disparity and inequality indexes.

**Table 7.2** Per capita Average of Local Budget (APBD) Expenditures on Education and Health in East Java (Rp 0)

	Urban districts		Rural districts	
	Education	Health	Education	Health
2006	345,269	119,513	206,065	48,584
2007	408,931	152,805	237,477	58,856
2008	532,378	191,103	306,790	75,142
2009	553,877	349,437	334,006	85,590
2010	759,500	348,433	449,725	100,521
Average	519,991	232,258	306,813	73,739
Urban to rural districts (%)	169.5	315	59	31.75

Source: The data of per capita of local budgets are processed by researcher from master table of public expenditure analysis (PEA) conducted by the World Bank, PKDSP Brawijaya University, the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), 2011.

The possible explanation of the opposite trend of gender disparity and inequality in these urban and rural districts refers to the comparison of per capita average of local budget (APBD) expenditures on education and health in East Java. Table 7.2 demonstrates that urban districts allocated much higher amounts to education and health per person per year over five years (2006-2010) than rural districts. The average APBD allocation of urban districts, which was worth Rp 519,991 (AUD 52) per resident per year on education, is 169.5 per cent higher than rural districts. Even, urban districts' average allocation on health is triple that of rural districts. Hence, budget disparity on health and education between urban and rural districts in East Java possibly contributes to the opposite trend of GDI and GEM rates between both categories of district.

This budget trend was also similar in the cases of Probolinggo and Madiun (urban districts) and Blitar and Trenggalek (rural districts). As seen in table 7.1, over three years (2006-2008), the higher decrease in gender disparity and inequality in Madiun Municipality was possibly contributed by the higher average per capita allocation (28.3 per cent larger) on education than in Probolinggo. However, the average per capita allocation on health is 27.8 per cent higher in Probolinggo than in Madiun. Furthermore, local budget allocation on education and health in Blitar and Trenggalek is linear to gender disparity and inequality trends in both districts. Over five years (2006-2010), Blitar allocated lower budgets on education (22.2 per cent lower) and health (30.8 per cent lower) than Trenggalek. Although gender disparity and inequality in both regencies remained stable in that term, Trenggalek performed slightly better in reducing these gender-related development achievement gaps.

Pertaining to the incumbents' survival in these four districts, better gender-related development achievements are inadequate to support the incumbents staying in their posts. Table 7.2 shows that Blitar Regency, where the incumbent gained a landslide victory in the



re-election bid, has greater gender disparity and less equality than Trenggalek Regency, where the incumbent experienced a crushing defeat, after the first term. In fact, Trenggalek Regency succeeded in reducing slightly its gender disparity and improving equality compared to Blitar Regency. A similar situation is also found in the two urban districts. Madiun Municipality, where the incumbent experienced a crushing defeat in the 2008 *Pilkada*, had much better gender-related development achievements than Probolinggo Municipality, where the incumbent gained a landslide victory, over four years (2005-2008). Madiun had a lower average of gender disparity and inequality indexes than Probolinggo (4.12 versus 8.86 point and 5.40 versus 12.45 per cent) during the incumbents' periods in office. Moreover, Madiun showed better achievements in decreasing gender disparity and inequality than Probolinggo. Madiun decreased gender disparity by 2.6 points and gender inequality by 3.28 points than Probolinggo from 2005 to 2008.

Overall, the examinations of local development programs and the incumbents' platforms in these four districts demonstrate poor commitments to addressing gender differences and to reordering gender unbalance. The decentralisation regulatory regime has restricted local governments in incorporating specific considerations of gender differences and gender imbalance in local development planning, particularly in education and the local economy. At the same time, the incumbents in four districts have limited recognition of gender issues. They seemed to gain a legitimate way to hide from the national regulations and not to consider gender-related issues in local development. Besides, gender-related development achievements, indeed, have an irrelevant effect on the incumbents' survival in these four districts. In the next section, the examination of women's reasons for their preferences in the *pilkada* will provide another insight into the importance of gender-related issues on the incumbents' political survival.

Concerning the application of gender-related frameworks, the three main tools in Moser's framework, overall, are relevant to the Indonesian context. This research also suggests introducing religion or beliefs to complete the compatibility of the triple role concept, since it is embedded in the dynamic of many aspects of life, both in rural and urban Indonesia. Nevertheless, the combination of this framework with Kabeer's will be better in understanding gender planning processes (policy-making, planning and the organisation of implementation) in a developing country such as Indonesia.

#### 7.4 Women and Informal Politics Manoeuvres

Although the law number 12/2008 on Local Government<sup>729</sup> allows individual candidates to run in the *pilkada*, political parties remain the most determinant players deciding eligible candidates to run in the race. Parties set certain skills and resources for a nominee, such as politically well-connected business people, bureaucrats, and incumbent politicians. For women, these criteria are hard to fulfil as there are very few who have the political networks, experience or wealth to gain a party's mandate (Satriyo, 2010, pp. 247-248). The case studies in four districts find that of 13 pairs of candidates ran in the *pilkada*; only one female candidate participated in the race as the candidate for deputy mayor in Probolinggo Municipality. In addition, the case studies show that a male dominated local political arena is unfavourable for the majority of women at the grassroots level. By emphasising the exploration of the incumbents' informal networks and practices, the case studies revealed several informal politics manoeuvres performed by the incumbents prior to the *pilkada*.

Collusion between the incumbents and local businessmen is the most common practice. Local businessmen provide support (financial and non-financial) for the incumbent, namely, providing tactical funds to finance non-budgetary expenditures, giving funds for campaigns, distributing logistics independently on behalf of the incumbents, such as free groceries and shirts, and providing facilities to support the incumbents' campaigns, such as banners, and providing transport to mobilise campaign participants. Also, businessmen actively promote the incumbents' good achievements in their neighbourhoods via shadow puppet shows (*wayangan*) attended by the incumbents and among communities where they implement local government projects. As a return, the incumbents and their staff make adjustments in local government projects' bidding, favouring these businessmen. Moreover, local businessmen and local government, including the incumbent, cooperate to actively lobby certain ministries' officials and national legislators to allocate national projects in their regions (*nyenggek*).<sup>730</sup> Local businessmen usually collect some funds to meet the fee demanded by the national officials who will allocate the projects. The incumbents or certain local government officials come to Jakarta to meet certain national officials and legislators who authorise the projects and deliver some demanded fees collected by businessmen. If those projects are approved, the businessmen implement the projects.

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<sup>729</sup> It amended articles on the *pilkada* in the Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government.

<sup>730</sup> *Nyenggek* is a Javanese verb. In literal meaning it means to pick fruits by using a long bamboo. The term *nyenggek* is an allegory of a verb meaning brokering activities between local businessmen, the national legislators, and the ministry officials. *Nyenggek* is an active action to pick the projects up from the national governments by bribing certain national legislators and certain ministries' officials.

The incumbents also gain assistance from partisan local bureaucrats. The bureaucrats previously evaluate policy performances and set specific favoured local development policies to benefit the incumbent. They, then, set the local budget (*APBD*) to finance some populist programs delivering direct benefits to people or village heads and sub-village heads. Such as, budget provision for neighbourhood infrastructures, subsidised or free seeds for farmers, additional financial incentives for the majority of local bureaucrats, and the provision of service motorcycles for village heads and hamlet heads. For certain bureaucrats who are involved in policy-making, the incumbents secure their posts in local government. Nonetheless, the incumbent in Trenggalek Regency experienced resistance from local bureaucrats due to his controversial policies to promote ineligible bureaucrats to certain positions. The fieldwork revealed that the incumbent was influenced by local politicians and legislators in deciding promotion policies.

Populist policies pursued by an incumbent are rewarded by those gaining direct policy benefits. The incumbents' friendly policies in Probolinggo Municipality delivered direct benefits for street vendors (*PKL*) and pedicab drivers. Local government provides several strategic locations in the municipality for *PKL*. Local government also allows pedicabs to operate in the municipality and provides several aids for pedicab drivers, such as free pedicab tyres and free groceries. When the incumbent was attacked by corruption issues, the *PKL* association and the pedicab drivers' association defended the incumbent by rallying against organisations disclosing this issue. Local NGOs also defended the incumbent when local army officers, who should be neutral in the *pilkada*, took sides with the contender. Meanwhile, the incumbent in Blitar Regency made an informal agreement (MoU) with the Organization of Pre-school Education Facilities (GOPTKI) in the regency to gain support in the *pilkada*. As a reward, every kindergarten under GOPTKI received operational grants after the *pilkada* (2011).

To secure their policy choices, the incumbents are supported by party colleagues in the local legislative body. It is not free to gain back up from them. The incumbents barter their support by allocating budgets in the *APBD* to finance certain projects implemented in the legislators' constituencies. In addition to gaining credit from constituents, legislators also received kickbacks from local contractors implementing the projects. The majority of constituents demand infrastructure projects from the legislators. Conversely, poor relationships with local legislators meant the incumbent in Trenggalek Regency could not secure his populist policy to develop the micro-industries of modified cassava flour (*mocaf*).

The incumbent also utilises *APBD* as a policy instrument to expand his support among the grassroots, especially local soccer club's supporters. The incumbent in Blitar Regency

fully supported the local soccer club (PSBI) by allocating APBD to finance PSBI's participation in the national soccer league. In 2009, local government allocated Rp 4 billion (AUD 400,000) to support the club.<sup>731</sup> These amounts is more than double the local environment affairs budget, worth Rp 1,943,456,836 (AUD 194,345,683.6) or almost double the local social affairs budget, worth Rp 2,604,493,404 (AUD 260,449,340.4) in 2009.

The incumbents also attempt to gain sympathy from local people by approaching *kiais* (Islamic religious leaders). The incumbents in Blitar, Trenggalek, and Probolinggo are known to have close relationships with *kiais*. The incumbents assume that *kiai* could help them to mobilise their followers to support them. However, there was not sufficient academic evidence to corroborate transactional relationships between the incumbents and *kiais*, except in Probolinggo Municipality. *Kiais'* attendance at the incumbent's campaign is publicly recognised by local people. The incumbent also publicly admitted that he personally sponsors *kiai pesantren* (who chair an Islamic boarding school) and *kiai langgar* (who teach the Qur'an recitation in neighbourhoods) to perform *Umrah* and *Haj* pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca. He has despatched annually 5-6 *kiais* to perform *Umrah* and *Haj* since 2006.

The incumbents use another method to gain local people's sympathy by attending community activities and giving donations to support them, such as religious activities and sport activities. The incumbents usually use social aid funds to donate to these activities. However, the disbursement of this fund is mainly under personal consideration. The incumbents also disbursed grant assistance funds to donate to certain organisations, especially mass organisations.

The case studies in four districts point out a lack involvement of women candidates in the *pilkada*. Also, women actors are rarely involved in informal politics carried out by the incumbents. The study only reveals one active woman actor's involvement in Blitar. A female teacher as well as Islamic female organisation's activist involved in brokering informal agreements between the incumbent and GOPTKI prior to the *pilkada*. Nevertheless, she did not attempt to voice a better gender-related approach in local development planning. Rather, she was involved in a transactional manoeuvre to gain local budget support for all kindergartens in the regency after the incumbent was re-elected.

Furthermore, the case studies reveal that informal politics linked to the *pilkada* is a male dominated arena. Women have to bear the loss of these practices. Men's political manoeuvres disregard women's interests as women actors are rarely and hardly involved in informal politics. The case study in Trenggalek Regency asserts that factional political

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<sup>731</sup> See <http://www.goal.com/id-ID/news/1387/nasional/2010/09/21/2129278/resmi-ghusnul-yakin-besut-psbi-blitar> accessed on 8 October 2013.

conflict between the incumbent and local legislators, especially from the national awakening party (FPKB)'s faction, neglects women's interests in local budgeting. For example, budget cutting for *mocaf* micro-industry development by local legislators has marginalised women's opportunities to gain income from the flourishing of these micro-industries. This was triggered by the disappointment of PKB's politicians towards the implementation of the *mocaf* policy which gave more advantage for the prosperous justice party (PKS)'s cadres. Indeed, PKB was the main backbone for the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada*. As reported by *Kompas* (national newspaper), the majority of the labour in *mocaf* micro-industries is women who seek to gain additional income for their family.<sup>732</sup> Consequently, gender-blind policies are boosted by male dominant informal politics manoeuvres, discounting women's interests in local development.

### 7.5 Women's Preferences in the *Pilkada*

The national population census calculates East Java's inhabitants as 37,476,757 in 2010. Females are 50.63 per cent of the population. In four districts where the case studies were undertaken, females are 50.24 per cent of 2,179,076 inhabitants. In the 2008 *pilkada* in Probolinggo and Madiun Municipality and the 2010 *pilkada* in Blitar and Trenggalek Regency, eligible female voters also exceeded males. Female suffrage averages reached 51.14 per cent in all districts (1,867,861 eligible voters). Female voters are also more active in participating in the *pilkada*, both in rural and urban districts. As seen in table 7.3, the average female turnout in four districts was 34.57 of total voters. It is 4.49 per cent higher than the average male turnout.

**Table 7.3** Female and Male Turnouts in the *pilkada* in Four Districts

	$\Sigma$ Voters	Female Voters (%)	Female Turnout/Female Voters (%)	Male Turnout/Male Voters (%)	Female Turnout/Total Voters (%)	Male Turnout/Total Voters (%)
<b>Rural Districts (2010)</b>						
Blitar	994,939	50.29	58.05	53.20	29.19	26.45
Trenggalek	573,197	50.12	62.84	54.35	31.50	27.11
<b>Urban Districts (2008)</b>						
Probolinggo	156,614	51.41	83.49	77.28	42.92	37.56
Madiun	143,111	52.76	65.69	61.84	34.66	29.22
Average		51.14	67.52	61.67	34.57	30.08

Source: the District General Election Commission of Blitar, 2010; Trenggalek, 2010; Probolinggo, 2008; Madiun, 2008.

<sup>732</sup> Source: <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/10/15/02570744> accessed on 30 November 2013.

The higher turnout of female voters demonstrates a better contribution of women to local democracy. It indicates that women are not merely major stakeholders in local democracy, but they are also active backers to ascertain regular change in local leadership. This situation should normatively be understood by candidates who run in the *pilkada*, to better recognise women's practical needs as well as their strategic needs in local policies. Nonetheless, the previous sub-chapters reveal that women are disregarded both in terms of national decentralisation scheme policies and the local political arena. This section examines women's logic in voting both for the incumbents and challengers in four rural and urban districts in East Java. The explanation begins with women's recognition of the incumbents' populist policies during the periods they ruled the districts.

Female participants in both rural and urban districts can identify several popular policies credited to the incumbents during office for the first term. Female participants in Blitar and Trenggalek Regency (rural districts) recognise as well as gain direct benefit from several local government policies or programs, namely the rice-for-the-poor (*Raskin*),<sup>733</sup> free seed distribution for farmers, cheap staple foodstuff (*sembako*) market programs, neighbourhood road construction, city market development, school operational assistance (BOS),<sup>734</sup> free or cheap health services at the community health centre (*puskesmas*), free immunisation for infants in the integrated health services posts (*posyandu*) at the neighbourhood level, accessible health services in local general hospitals (RSUD), free health services for the poor (*jamkesmas*), and free childbirth care programs (*jampersal*).<sup>735</sup> Particularly in Blitar and Trenggalek Regency, three female participants remarked that they are the beneficiaries of women's savings and loans (SPP) under the National Program for People's Empowerment (PNPM) and the Urban Poverty Alleviation Program (P2KP). Of those programs, female participants could identify two women-specific programs, namely *jampersal* and women's savings and loan programs under PNPM and P2KP. The participants testified that they gained direct benefit from those programs. For instance, a female participant in Blitar said that she received a soft micro-loan worth Rp 4 million (AUD 400) from SPP PNPM to finance her chili farm. In addition, a female participant in Trenggalek admitted that she gained a similar loan worth Rp 2 million (AUD 200) to run her small café. Indeed, they did not know that SPP PNPM is actually a national program. Conversely, three female participants in Trenggalek criticised the incumbent's achievements. They complained

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<sup>733</sup> It is actually a national government program.

<sup>734</sup> It is also a national government program.

<sup>735</sup> The last two programs are attached to the national government.

about poor health services in RSUD and *puskesmas*, less innovative local government programs, and poor infrastructure (roads and bridges) triggering local people's protests.

**Figure 7.1** Integrated Health Services Post (*Posyandu*) in Karangbendo Village Ponggok Sub-district Blitar Regency



Source: [yatinem.wordpress.com](http://yatinem.wordpress.com)2048 accessed on 17 June 2014

However, the case studies also find female participants who do not know and do not remember the incumbents' policies (ignorance). Their reason for not knowing about local government programs is that they do not care about them. They just focus on their livelihood and domestic related matters. In a typical expression, these female participants said that they spend more their time in the kitchen or looking after their family.

Although the majority of participants recognise the incumbents' populist programs, their reason to vote or not to vote for the incumbents is not always related to the programs. Firstly, female participants in these two rural districts adopted the practices of fitting in (*anut grubyuk*) in voting. They just followed the majority opinion in the neighbourhood to vote for the incumbents or the challengers. A female participant in Blitar Regency remarked clearly in polite Javanese language:

*“Namung Nyoblos nomer kalih, soale katah sing nyoblos sing niku. Nggih kirangan, nyoblos nggih nyoblos”* (Only vote for number two (candidate), as many (others) are voting for him. I don't know, but yes I vote).<sup>736</sup>

Besides, a female participant in Trenggalek Regency stated about her reason to vote for the incumbent, *“Ya, saya ini cuma orang kecil, cuma ikut-ikut. Saya tidak tahu cuma ikut-ikut saja”* (Yes, I am only an ordinary person, just following on. I do not know, just following on (others)).<sup>737</sup> Secondly, there are also female participants in both regencies who not who they

<sup>736</sup> Interview on 5 July 2012.

<sup>737</sup> Interview on 18 September 2012.

voted for. They found it difficult to remember their ballot as they focus more on their livelihood. Thirdly, there is also a female participant in Blitar Regency who admitted that she followed her husband, in voting for the challenger in the *pilkada*. Moreover, the case studies found two male participants who admitted that their wives followed them when deciding their preferences in the *pilkada*.

Fourthly, female participants also consider the incumbents' personal characteristics in voting. Humble, generous, and down-to-earth characters are most favoured by female participants. Finally, female participants recognise and refer to the incumbents' achievements when deciding who to vote or not to vote for. They consider the direct benefits of local government programs, such as cheap groceries market programs, neighbourhood infrastructure, free seeds, and the incumbent's donations to the people. In Trenggalek Regency, the case study also found a female participant who was absent in the *pilkada*. She argued that she was disappointed with the leaders' promises. Both the incumbent and the challenger are inconsistent in meeting their promises.

Therefore, the various incumbents' populist programs do not always shape female voters' preferences, including women-specific programs related to their practical needs, such as childbirth care and women's savings and loan programs. In these two rural districts, female participants also considered the incumbent or the challenger's image, the majority opinion in their neighbourhood, and their husband's preferences.

As in the two rural districts, female participants in Probolinggo and Madiun Municipality recognised the incumbents' populist programs, namely school operational assistance (*BOS*) for elementary and junior high schools, cheap health services in community health centres (*puskemas*), free health services for the poor (*jamkesmas*),<sup>738</sup> good infrastructure at the municipality and neighbourhood levels, friendly policy for street vendors (*PKL*) and pedicab drivers, the rice-for-the-poor (*Raskin*),<sup>739</sup> and the cheap staple foodstuff (*sembako*) market program. Three female participants in Probolinggo credited the incumbent with giving additional financial incentives for civil servants. Moreover, female participants in Probolinggo appreciated the incumbent for the improvement of city cleanliness and city gardens. In both urban districts, female participants delivered similar perceptions concerning the incumbents' good personal characters. They are known as popular, humble, generous, and down-to-earth leaders. Both incumbents frequently performed *blusukan* (visiting community meeting points or community spots) and *takziah* (to visit, to deliver condolences, and to give funeral aid) when they governed the municipality for the first term. The case study in Madiun

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<sup>738</sup> Both programs attached to the national government.

<sup>739</sup> It is actually a national government program.



Municipality also found two female participants who did not know about the incumbent's populist policies. They do not pay much attention on the local government-related matters. However, they knew about the incumbent's personality as a down-to-earth leader. Unlike in Blitar and Trenggalek, female participants in Probolinggo and Madiun Municipality did not mention t women-specific programs.

Female voters who vote for the incumbent in both urban districts refer to the incumbents' capability to deliver tangible and direct benefits of local government policies. Female voters mentioned several programs credited to the incumbents, namely accessible education for primary and intermediary schools, cheap health services in *puskesmas*, good infrastructure at the neighbourhood level, and friendly-policies for *PKL* and pedicab driver. They also admitted that they voted for the incumbents as both incumbents frequently distributed free groceries and donations for community activities. Female participants also consider the incumbents' good personal character as humble, popular, generous, and down-to-earth leaders. They perform *blusukan* and *takziah* to meet their people. In Probolinggo, the case study found a female participant who followed her husband's decision to vote for the incumbent. She remarked, "My husband follow the red, I follow the red as well".<sup>740</sup> In Probolinggo, the case study also found a female participant who voted for the challenger. The participant admitted that she expected a new situation in the municipality by voting for the challenger. She also considered that the challenger was a good and generous person.<sup>741</sup>

In Madiun Municipality, money politics (political bribery) shaped female participants' preferences to vote for the winning challenger. Six of nine female participants admitted that they received cash ranging from Rp 30 thousand to Rp 100 thousand (AUD 3-10) per person. They accepted this money from the people who admitted they were part of the winning challenger's camp and their relatives received money from the similar party. The participants preferred to be consistent and vote for the winning challenger as they had received the cash. A female participant as well as a street vendor selling fruity ice testified about her experience,

"In the last election, someone gave me money. Some (residents) received Rp 30,000 (AUD 3); some others (residents) received Rp 50,000 (AUD 5). I got Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) from Mr. Bambang's victory team. A house received money for two people. I got Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) in the morning; I also got Rp 50,000 (AUD 5) in the afternoon. Many others (residents) in this neighbourhood received money as well; it was from Democratic Party".<sup>742</sup>

The participant also added that she finally voted for the winning challenger as she was committed, because of her choice to receive money from the winning challenger's camp.

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<sup>740</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012. The red is a symbol of nationalist-based party, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).

<sup>741</sup> Interview on 31 October 2012

<sup>742</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

Another female participant, a female *rujak cingur*<sup>743</sup> seller clearly gave her voting decision and the reason.

“Of course I voted for Mr. Bambang who gave the money. It would be a sin (if I did not vote for him), I am consistent. I do not want to be inconsistent, I am afraid”. She also added her reason, “My reason is because I was given that money. I was scared if I did not vote (for Mr. Bambang). I was given (the money), I voted for him, because I am a stupid person”.<sup>744</sup>

Lastly, the case study found a female participant in Madiun Municipality who was absent in the election. A female draper in the Madiun Central Market admitted that she did not come to the polling station since she was busy evacuating her merchandise when the market was caught on fire on the Election Eve.<sup>745</sup>

Unlike in Blitar and Trenggalek Regency, female participants in Probolinggo and Madiun Municipality did not mention women-specific programs as the incumbents’ populist policies. They recognised policies that delivered direct and tangible outputs to all local people. They were also concerned about the incumbents’ popular image during office. The policies and the incumbents’ good image shaped female participants preferences. Furthermore, money politics practices also persuaded the majority of female participants in Madiun Municipality to vote for the winning challenger. The participants argued that they have to commit to their decision to receive cash from the winning challenger’s camp.

Overall, the case studies assert that there is no gender driven consideration in voting for the incumbents and the challengers in the *pilkada*. Although they recognised several policies that pertain to women’s practical needs, female voters did not assess women-related issues as their reason to vote. Indeed, some women were money politics practice victims, which probably could harm their future. Money politics practices pursued by a candidate who, then, wins the *pilkada* will probably direct local government policies not to be more sensitive on women-specific and strategic interests in local development.

## 7.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined gender-related themes in the *pilkada* of four rural and urban districts in East Java that took place in 2008 (Probolinggo and Madiun Municipality) and 2010 (Blitar and Trenggalek Regency). It has discussed women’s political citizenship in Indonesia, gender-related development policies and achievements in four districts, women’s position in the local political arena and women’s explanations of their preferences in the *pilkada*. The exploration of the legal foundations of women’s political citizenship in the

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<sup>743</sup> *Rujak cingur* is vegetables salad with cow's nose.

<sup>744</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

<sup>745</sup> Interview on 19 December 2012.

country asserts that the state has ensured women's suffrage and right to hold office since one day after the country's independence declaration.

Pertaining to the *pilkada*, better political citizenship is not automatically equal to better recognition and development outputs for women. The *pilkada* does not encourage the incumbents who run in the re-election bid to promote gender-aware policies. During in office, they did not perform gender-mainstreaming policies. The incumbents just addressed partial women-specific policies, particularly in maternal health and women's empowerment and protection programs. In addition to the lack of the incumbents' commitment, gender-related local development is also hampered by a decentralisation regulatory regime that restricts local governments from creating better gender-related development policies. Local governments do not have sufficient policy space to accommodate gender-aware policies, since the Home Affairs Minister determines local development items and account codes that do not incorporate gender mainstreaming approaches in local budgeting, particularly in education and local economic development. Moreover, better or worse gender disparity in four districts was irrelevant to the incumbents' survival in the re-election bid. Those who had better performance in reducing gender disparity were, indeed, unsuccessful in maintaining their posts.

The *pilkada* is not an easy race for women candidates. The amendment of the *pilkada* law does not ensure more women will have an opportunity to participate as candidates in the *pilkada*. Political parties as dominant players in candidacy favour more male than female candidates. Parties stress the political calculation rather more than gender equity in nominating candidates. Meanwhile, female candidates who have superior popularity, electability, and financial resources are very rare compared to male candidates. Thus, parties prefer men to run in the *pilkada* as they have more chances for winning the race.

Moreover, there are rarely women actors who are involved in political manoeuvres linked to the *pilkada* arena. Male dominated informal politics, mainly collusion between the incumbents and their informal supporters, marginalised women in the *pilkada*. At the same time, female voters were less critical in reviewing the incumbents' performances during the time they governed the districts. Although they recognised some populist policies, female voters paid more attention to policy outputs addressing practical gender needs with direct and tangible benefits rather than their strategic needs. The case study in Madiun Municipality revealed that the majority of female participants' voting preferences were driven by cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp. Accordingly, based on these case studies, women's preferences in the *pilkada* are still far from ideal to improve the quality of local

democracy and to further encourage better adjustment of gender relations in local developments.

To address better gender-related issues in the *pilkada*, there should be an affirmative legislative action to open more opportunities for women to participate in the *pilkada* as candidates. The new *pilkada* law<sup>746</sup> should be amended to encourage political parties to propose female candidates as the candidates for head of provincial/district government. Consequently, this legal framework will ensure women's opportunities as candidates.

Moreover, to ensure gender mainstreaming in local development, the *pilkada* law should be amended to assure that every candidate running in the *pilkada* incorporates gender mainstreaming in their platforms. Then, whoever wins the race will accommodate practical and strategic gender needs in the mid-term regional development planning (RPJMD). Also, the government and general election commission (KPU) should encourage fair elections for women in the *pilkada* implementation. It is important to assure all *pilkada* are free from informal politics that may harm women's interests. Furthermore, national government and legislators should encourage the implementation of the new regional government law to affirm better local gender-related policies, planning and budgeting. Finally, the government needs to harmonise the Home Affairs Ministry and Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry in addressing gender-related issues. This correction is expected to encourage the better recognition of practical and strategic gender needs in national and local developments.

Finally, the government and civil society organisations (CSOs) could cooperate to perform public education to enhance the awareness of practical and strategic gender needs. The Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry could conduct public campaigns via national media placements, conduct discussions with community and religious leaders about the importance of gender mainstreaming in national and local developments and disseminate gender-related development measurements amongst provincial and local governments. CSOs could perform supervisory functions on gender mainstreaming in national and local developments, such as gender sensitive budget monitoring and gender-specific knowledge assessment in national and local planning processes. At the same time, CSOs could perform supporting functions to enhance local governments' awareness of practical and strategic gender needs in local developments, especially in health, education and the local economy, such as initiating gender-related development ratings at the national and provincial level. The published ratings would be expected to encourage local

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<sup>746</sup> The government regulation that replaces law (*perppu*) No. 1/2014 on Election for Governor, Regent and Mayor.

governments to incorporate practical and strategic gender needs in the local development planning process.

Another interesting issue to mention is the unique phenomenon relating to women district office holders and political dynasties. Over 5 years (2010-2015), four women were successful to gain district head offices in East Java, namely Tri Rismaharini (Surabaya Municipality in 2010), Haryanti (Kediri Regency in 2010), Puput Tantriana Sari (Probolinggo Regency in 2012), and Rukmini (Probolinggo Municipality in 2013). It shows an important change of women participation in the *pilkada*, as office holders, compared to the previous period (2005-2010) in which only a woman candidate was elected in the 2005 *pilkada* in Banyuwangi Regency, namely Ratna Ani Lestari. In fact, except Tri Rismaharini in Surabaya, the three other female district heads gained the post to replace their husband who are no longer eligible to run in the *pilkada*. Thus, it is hard to conclude a better participation of women office holders in the *pilkada* as their accomplishment strongly relate to male incumbents.

**Table 7.4** Human and Gender Related Development Achievements in Surabaya and Kediri

<b>HDI</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
Surabaya	74,60	75,11	75,87	77,28	78,33	78,97
Kediri	68,67	69,34	70,39	71,75	72,72	73,09
<b>GDI</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
Surabaya	65,9	68,9	70	71,43	71,93	72,46
Kediri	60,2	61,5	61,9	63,55	64,31	64,72
<b>GEM</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
Surabaya	54,8	57,40	57,60	77,53	77,09	78,02
Kediri	55	56,20	56,60	70,86	72,20	72,24

Source: East Java Central Statistics Agency, 2013; the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, 2013. These data are processed by the researcher.

Nonetheless, the discussion on woman office holder and political dynasty is also a puzzle. Woman dynastic district head does not always demonstrate poorer performance. Comparative assessment of human and woman related development achievements between Surabaya and Kediri under women leaderships discovers interesting findings (Table 7.4). Surabaya under Tri Rismaharini reaches better HDI achievement in the first two years (2010-2012) of her leadership than Haryanti. Compared to the same period of the previous administration (2005-2007), Surabaya's HDI performance under Tri Rismaharini is better than Kediri under Haryanti. Surabaya succeeds to increase its HDI of 0.42 point compared to the previous administration (head to head between 2005-2007 and 2010-2012). In contrast, under Haryanti's leadership, Kediri's HDI decreased of 0.38 point. Interestingly, Kediri

under Haryanti's administration achieved better gender related development achievements (GDI and GEM) than Surabaya under Tri Rismaharini's office. This distinctive comparative result shows a need for further research on women leadership and political dynasties in the *pilkada*, in terms of socio-political dynamics, development output and outcomes, gendered policies, and other related indicators.

## Chapter 8

### Analysis

#### **Populism, Rivalry and Tangibility: Relevance to the Political Survival and Failure of District Heads in the *Pilkada***

##### **8.1 Summing up**

The thesis discusses the direct election of the district head (*pilkada*) in the context of current attempts to cancel the policy by means of Law 22/2014 on the election of Governors, Regents and Mayors. The thesis can be seen as making a contribution to understanding the importance of participation in enabling participants to comprehend the democratic process at the local level.

The thesis demonstrates the importance of engagement in understanding democracy and stresses the importance of both freedom and democracy. The extent of corruption, patronage and some of the populist approaches has resulted in criticism, which is part of the democratic process. In conversations with my supervisor it was stressed that what is needed is ‘more democracy’ and more participation by those who are affected by the decisions. This plea is echoed in the work of Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009, p. 30) on ‘Deepening Democracy in Indonesia: Direct Election for Local Leaders (*pilkada*)’. The argument is that the *pilkada* play a role in supporting the emergence of better local leaders through the active participation of local people. People may form alliances with media and the academic community to extend the size of the coalition of active citizenship. McIntyre-Mills (2014, p. 6) stresses that the essay ‘on liberty’ by Berlin, discussed by Xolela Mangcu (2013) in ‘The arrogance of power’ in South Africa explores the need to ensure that democratic engagement is fostered, rather than enabling elected leaders to forget the platform of issues on which they were elected. She stresses that the issue is that without engagement in thinking about *who to vote for* and *why and who not to vote for and why* at the local level, men and women of all ages do not engage in public education for democracy. Instead, they become distant from the democratic process, as she stresses that: “learning to engage with diverse people is becoming increasingly challenging as urbanisation increases”. In Indonesia she stresses that 75 % of the population will live in cities. In South Africa, 65% live in cities. This means that “enabling democratic engagement to foster co-creation and co-determination will become ever more important”. The argument for engagement is also relevant to the research findings discussed in section 5.7.

The importance of this research on the *pilkada* underlines that democracy is indeed still the ‘best worst option’. Democracy gives people equal freedom to determine their political preference. Besides, democracy relatively succeeds in providing legitimate spaces for people to voice their opinions concerning the running of government and its performance. The challenge, then, is how to motivate people, who have voted freely for an elected leader, to ensure that the leader pays attention on democratic accountability in governing in the office and serving them.

Taking a cue from the comparative logic of the incumbents’ survival and failure, the thesis also contributes to providing a different view on the democratic processes. Patronising leadership carried out by the surviving incumbents calls for collective efforts of CSOs, academics, mass media, government, legislature and political parties to amplify the urgent need for democratic accountability of elected local leaders and their backers. These efforts should be targeted to boost a better image of democracy, particularly in the *pilkada*, which is heavily burdened by the embarrassing behaviour of local leaders as well as pragmatic informal and formal actors.

## **8.2 The Search for Political Credits: the Incumbents’ Populist Politics in the First Term in Office**

The case study in four rural and urban districts points out that all incumbents performed populist politics during the first term in office. Populist politics is divided into two categories, namely populist policies and popular activities which are familiar amongst local elites and people. In the former category, the incumbents pursued similar policies delivering direct and tangible benefits, such as, death benefits, free or cheap health services, free or cheap education fees, scholarships for poor pupils, infrastructure developments, mainly roads, at the neighbourhood level, city garden improvements, friendly policies for street vendors (PKL) and pedicab drivers (*abang becak*), cheap groceries markets, and huge infrastructure projects. The incumbent in Madiun Municipality even first initiated the implementation of a local government-funded program of regional health insurance (*Jamkesda*) in East Java in 2008. The insurance covers the poor in the municipality who are not covered by the national health insurance (*Jamkesmas*). However, local people ignore the initiatives and the source of budgets. They just emphasise the tangible results and direct benefits of local development. For example, they ignore the national program of community empowerment (*PNPM*), which is largely initiated and funded by the national government. Nonetheless, the incumbent in Blitar Regency was praised for this program since he frequently inaugurated the projects in many villages.



To finance these policy choices, the incumbents and local governments allocate higher budgets for education, health and public works compared to other regencies and municipalities in the province. Trenggalek Regency is an exceptional district, allocating a lower local budget (*APBD*) that reached 9.45 per cent on average within five years (2006-2010) on public works than the regencies' average by 11.75 per cent, when the incumbent was in office.

Populist policies are not merely intended to benefit the majority of local people. The incumbents also delivered direct benefits to bureaucrats. All incumbents disbursed additional financial incentives and rice benefits for bureaucrats, except the incumbent in Trenggalek, who did not disburse similar incentives during his time in office. In addition, financial benefits were distributed to the heads of villages and the heads of hamlets in Blitar Regency and Madiun and Probolinggo Municipalities (heads of neighbourhood units and community units). The incumbent in Blitar also provided service motorcycles for all heads of villages.

The impact of local development can be measured by human-related development achievements. The case study in four districts found a similar trend towards better infant mortality rate (IMR), better life expectancy index, economic growth, purchasing power parity (PPP) index and finally human development index (HDI). Nevertheless, these similar or even better wellbeing conditions did not assist the incumbent to survive. Comparative assessments of HDI in the regions where the incumbents failed in the *pilkada*, indeed, were better than the regions where they survived. Blitar Regency under the surviving incumbent's leadership even reduced the regency's HDI shortfall by 1.54 within 5 years (2006-2010), that is lower than Trenggalek Regency, which achieved 1.62. Nonetheless, the incumbent in Trenggalek Regency failed to maintain his post in the re-election bid. Also, in the last year of the incumbent's office (2008), Madiun Municipality had a better HDI (75.89) than Probolinggo Municipality (73.29). However, this better wellbeing indicator could not help the incumbent to maintain his post in the 2008 *pilkada*.

In addition to carrying out populist policies, all incumbents, in fact, were burdened by corruption cases alleged against them or their staff. An exception was the incumbent in Blitar, as corruption allegations were disclosed in 2012 or two years after he was re-elected for the second term. Thus, corruption cases are less likely to affect the incumbents' survival.

*Blusukan* was the most common popular activity performed by the incumbents in four rural and urban districts. They frequently visited community meeting points to directly connect with ordinary people in the districts, such as at traditional markets, mosques, and neighbourhoods. The incumbents directly interacted with local people to hear their problems and complaints on local government services or people's aspirations to develop their

neighbourhoods. The incumbent in Probolinggo Municipality performed *blusukan* almost every day, accompanied by a village head from where he visited. After praying *shubuh* (early morning prayers), he visited community spots to interact directly with local people. The incumbent in Madiun Municipality also performed *blusukan*, especially at traditional markets and neighbourhoods. Local people interviewed in both urban districts testified that both incumbents seemed to blend in with ordinary people. The incumbents removed all protocol attributes; they even frequently wore sportswear when interacting with ordinary people. This regular activity was easily performed since the size of the municipalities is small and accessible compared to the regencies. The incumbents in Blitar and Trenggalek Regency were also publicly known as down-to-earth figures. They interacted directly with villagers in non-formal activities, such as *pengajian*,<sup>747</sup> *wayangan* (the shadow puppet show), sports events, harvest festivals, fishermen's festivals, and some other popular activities. The incumbent in Blitar Regency even took on the post of manager and chair of PSBI (Blitar Soccer Association). This activity made him very popular amongst the youth or PSBI's supporters. They called the incumbent "*Bapake Singo Lodro*" (the father of cruel lion).<sup>748</sup>

*Takziah* (to visit, to deliver condolences) was also another popular activity which is well known amongst local people in Probolinggo and Madiun. In addition to paying condolence calls to the bereaved families, both incumbents also gave donations. This donation was, then, legalised in a local regulation on *santunan kematian* (death benefit/funeral aid) in Probolinggo in 2010.<sup>749</sup> *Blusukan* and *Takziah* are two of the most prominent popular activities amongst local people in the two municipalities.

Popular activities performed by the incumbents in all districts are one of the methods to market the incumbents' well-liked images amongst ordinary people. It could be called "egalitarian marketing". These local leaders attempted to counter the preceding elitist leadership style adopted by leaders under the new order (Soeharto)'s regime. In addition, by their willingness to interact directly with ordinary people, the incumbents sought to blend their personal identities with the communal identity. This was expected to attract voters' sympathy.

These popular activities also had the function of personalising local government's policy outputs. For example, by inaugurating the government's infrastructure projects in the neighbourhoods and attending harvest festivals in the villages, the incumbents gained credit

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<sup>747</sup> A gathering at which Islam is discussed (Stevens and Schmidgall-Tellings, 2010, p. 238)

<sup>748</sup> *Singo Lodro* is the nickname of PSBI.

<sup>749</sup> in Blitar Regency, a similar regulation was stipulated in 2007.

or praise over the tangible outputs and benefits of the projects. The other function was to adapt the incumbents' political identities to the majority of local voters. The incumbent in Probolinggo was widely known as an authentic cadre of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a nationalist-based party. He succeeded in gaining sympathy from local people, who are a majority of pious Muslims, since he formed a close relationship with *kiai*, *pesantren*, and *Nahdlatul Ulama* in the municipality. Moreover, his ability to perform Islamic speeches made him recognised as an Islamic preacher. This adaption was able to minimise people's resistance over his nationalist identity. The incumbent in Blitar who was also known as a nationalist as well as a Javanese, succeeded in gaining sympathy from the majority of Muslims in the regency as he would visit *kiai*, *pesantren*, mosques and *mushala* (small mosque in the neighbourhood).

Finally, populist policies and popular activities do not only attract local people's sympathy. For certain groups in the community, they can also call people to defend the incumbent when a harmful issue attacks the incumbent. For instance, the incumbent's beneficial policies and his willingness to interact with street vendors (PKL) and pedicab drivers in Probolinggo called the associations of PKL and pedicab drivers to defend him when a non-government watch dog (LIRA) disclosed the corruption allegations against the incumbent. PKL and pedicab drivers demonstrated at LIRA's office and reported LIRA to the police for defamation. Nevertheless, graft allegations addressed to the incumbent's staff in Trenggalek Regency burdened him in the re-election bid. The incumbent had to deal with this harmful issue alone, as local mass media and NGOs attacked him.


### **8.3 Minimising Political Rivalry Risks: the Incumbents' Informal Politics and Networks**

To perform the politics of particularism, the incumbents particularly utilised the local budget (APBD) as the main instrument to provide incentive mainly for informal actors. As seen in diagram 8.1, case studies in four districts found six categories of actors involved in supporting as well as gaining benefits from the incumbents prior to the *pilkada*. These categories are based on two main indicators. Firstly, a vertical line demonstrates the impact of relationships between the incumbents and informal actors on the incumbents' survival. Informal actors' activities to support the incumbents may impact on their electability. These include the donation and disbursement of campaign funds, campaign materials, and philanthropically biased activities by businessmen, which have an impact on the improvement of the incumbents' electability. At the same time, businessmen have put the incumbents in transactional contracts to return what they have already spent by demanding

rewards in terms of project implementation. Next, a horizontal line shows the degree of relationship between the incumbents and informal (or partisan formal) actors. A good relationship impacts on the low political rivalry risks for the incumbents. Conversely, a poor relationship impacts on the high political rivalry risks for the incumbents.

Relating to the *pilkada*, the vertical line shows the impact of informal politics on voters (grassroots effect). This means that the electability effect is the result of informal politics played by the actors for the incumbents' popularity as well as likeability amongst local people. The horizontal line shows the impact of informal politics on elites (elite effect). Rivalry risk is the result of informal connections between the incumbents and the actors. Supporting relationships between both parties could minimise the risks of political rivalry from the informal actors to the incumbent. In this situation, the incumbents could prevent potential resistance from the actors as well as their impacts on the grassroots. As part of the elites, the actors have resources to discourage people to vote for the incumbents or to undermine the incumbents' electability.

**Diagram 8.1** Actors, Electability and Rivalry



Businessmen<sup>750</sup> are the most common informal actors connected to the incumbents pertaining to the *pilkada* in four districts. They are particularly local contractors who implement local governments’ physical projects, such as infrastructure and local government funded buildings. The case study in four districts recognises these businessmen as *tim konstruksi* (the construction team). In Blitar, Trenggalek, and Probolinggo the case studies reveal a prominent businessman in each district performing the function of coordination to connect the incumbents and local businessmen. The coordinators play important roles in

<sup>750</sup> It is rare to find any businesswoman involved in supporting the incumbents in the four districts.

sharing the projects amongst local contractors and collecting fees to support the incumbents in their campaigns and philanthropically biased activities. In Madiun, this brokering activity was performed by the chairs of local contractor associations. The coordinator in each district also played a mediatory role between the incumbents, local governments, and local businessmen to “pick up” the national projects implemented in each district (*nyenggek*).

Local businessmen also donated individually by participating in some charitable programs, both conducted by the incumbents and local governments, such as, cheap markets for groceries, incidental free health services, sports events, and religious events. In Blitar, local businessmen donated some fund to support *wayangan* (shadow puppet shows) conducted by the incumbent close to the *pilkada*. To return the local businessmen’s contributions, the incumbent and local government provide incentives via bidding adjustments to execute local government projects and *nyenggek*.

Although all incumbents in four districts have special connections to local businessmen and they also provide similar incentives, nonetheless, the degree of relationship between both actors is different. Comparative assessment of the case studies in four districts points out that the degree of informal relationship between the surviving incumbents and local businessmen in Blitar and Probolinggo is stronger than the similar relationship between the failed incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun. The incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun were reluctant to intensify their relationship with local businessmen. The case study in Madiun, indeed, reveals that local government requested smaller fees (kickbacks) from every project performed by local contractors. Also, local contractor associations were engaged to negotiate in bidding processes. Moreover, the influence of local businessmen attached to the incumbent amongst them is also crucial. The case study in Trenggalek asserts that Mr J, a local contractor linked to the incumbent and local businessmen, was a less established businessman. He was incapable of handling other local businessmen, who then affiliated with the winning challenger.

The second crucial actors are local bureaucrats. It is actually inappropriate to categorise bureaucrats as informal actors relating to the *pilkada*. Nonetheless, the case study asserts that not all informal actors are non-government persons. Partisan bureaucrats who supported the incumbents were found. They are categorised as an informal actors due to their role in supporting the incumbent by using formal institutions. However, their activities are not only intended to implement local government policy, but they also intentionally design policies favouring the incumbents. Thus, bureaucrats are included as formal actors playing informal politics to support or undermine the incumbents.

Control over bureaucrats is very important for the incumbents to minimise the risk of political rivalry. The surviving incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo succeeded in demanding bureaucrats' loyalties during office. The incumbents were able to direct some "loyal" senior bureaucrats to perform think tank functions. They performed policy evaluations and designed certain policies that may boost the incumbents' popularity and likeability amongst local people. For example, several bureaucrats in Blitar initiated community satisfaction index (IKM) surveys in the public service, infrastructure, and economic development one year prior to the 2010 *pilkada*. The survey results were, then, utilised to make policies and programs to deliver direct and tangible benefits to local people. In addition, the incumbent succeeded in attracting 134 heads of villages to support him in the *pilkada*. These village heads clearly asserted their alignment when they performed the "pocong" oath as a symbol of loyalty to the incumbent. Meanwhile, the incumbent in Probolinggo gained support from some clever bureaucrats to design several participatory programs, inviting people's engagement and connecting the incumbent directly with local people, such as a roadside garden development program and on air and off air talk show programs conducted in the neighbourhood (*Cangkru'an, Walikota Menjawab, and Laporo rek*).

In contrast, the incumbent in Trenggalek was not able to assert effective control over bureaucrats. Firstly, the merit system policy, to promote bureaucrats who were not thought to be qualified in some local offices, sparked resistance from many bureaucrats. Secondly, the incumbent's image was damaged by five graft cases committed by his staff. Meanwhile, the incumbent mayor of Madiun underestimated his staff. The incumbent's preceding experiences as the speaker and the deputy speaker of the local legislature for two periods made him overconfident. He felt that he had enough knowledge and experience in politics and government. He thought that he did not need any inputs from bureaucrats.

Comparative assessments also explain a convergent fact that local legislators<sup>751</sup> play an important role in supporting the incumbents in maintaining their office. The legislators secure the incumbents' policy choices in the local legislative body. They particularly support the incumbents' policy proposals in the budgeting process. The incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo gained strong support from, mainly, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)'s faction in the local legislature. Furthermore, both incumbents obtained similar supports from other factions, especially in the budgeting process.

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<sup>751</sup> Like local bureaucrats, local legislators are formal actors who play incentives (local budget) to negotiate with the incumbent.

In Blitar Regency, this strong support was bartered with the allocation of a so-called *jasmās* (community aspiration net) budget, approved and disbursed by legislators. The budget is usually deposited in the local offices' posts in the local budget (*APBD*) because legislators are ineligible to expend *APBD*. The legislators, then, will ask local offices to disburse the budget into projects implemented in certain locations demanded by the legislators. These locations are usually the constituencies that received the legislators' promises during campaign. A similar budget was also disbursed by local legislators in Trenggalek. In fact, it did not help the incumbent to survive in the re-election bid. The incumbent's poor relationship with local legislators, especially with the national awakening party (*PKB*)'s faction, undermined the incumbent's populist policy choices, such as policy and budget support for the development of modified cassava flour (*mocaf*) micro-industries. Nevertheless, legislators' support for the incumbent in Madiun, particularly from PDI-P's faction, could not secure the incumbent's post. This is mainly not related to the poor relationship between the incumbent and local legislators. The incumbent's crushing defeat in the *pilkada* was due to massive money politics influencing voters' choices not to vote for the incumbent.

Partisan NGOs or grassroots organisations are also important informal actors that may support or undermine the incumbent in office. In order to counter critics, the incumbent's party backbone (PDI-P) in Probolinggo expanded its network to cover local NGOs, the street vendors' (*PKL*) association and the pedicab drivers' association. They collaborated to perform counter movements for every issue or organisation seeking to undermine the incumbent. To make these networks work, the incumbent created certain policies and programs which delivered direct advantages for them, such as friendly and charitable policies for PKL and pedicab drivers and opening opportunities for partisan NGOs to implement local government's social projects (project assistance). These networks were also effective in hampering the money politics undertaken by the challengers in the 2008 *pilkada*.

The incumbent in Blitar succeeded in forming alliances with the local soccer club (PSBI) association and professional organisations (teachers' and kindergarten teachers' associations) to mobilise voters and partisan mass media and a local journalists' association to filter publications related to local government and the incumbent. Operational grants for supporting pre-schools and teachers' associations were the incentives provided for them. Local mass media benefited from advertorials ordered by local government. For the local journalists' association, local government also provided certain grants for supporting the association's operational budget. Nonetheless, the incumbent in Trenggalek did not apparently have support from local NGOs. Conversely, local NGOs in Trenggalek initiated



the disclosure of corruption scandals involving bureaucrats. Moreover, the incumbent was also challenged by the Forest Village Community Institute (LMDH)'s networks that shifted their support to the winning challenger. LMDH perceived that the incumbent had broken his promises, during his campaign in the 2005 *pilkada*, to distribute free seeds and fertiliser for LMDH's members.

The incumbent in Madiun was very confident in mainly relying on the support of party (PDI-P)'s networks from municipal to neighbourhood level. There is no adequate evidence to show that the incumbent was supported by local NGOs and grassroots organisations during office. This poor informal network, then, was unable to resist the money politics attacks on his potential voters. The incumbent gained the ballot in the 2008 *pilkada*, which was equal to PDI-P's votes in the 2004 legislative election. In other words, the incumbent's party network did not expand support for him in the *pilkada* as well as defending supporter bases against money politics practised by the winning challenger's camp.

Finally, solid party's support was also important for the incumbents prior to the *pilkada*. Less conflicting coalitions of parties succeeded in backing up the incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo. Nevertheless, internal conflict amongst coalition party members in Trenggalek undermined the incumbent's control over parties' elites. The conflict, then, led to the shift of the party elite's support to the winning challenger. Less supportive coalition party members also reduced the strength of the party machine to mobilise their followers to vote for the incumbent. In addition, limited party support (PDI-P only) for the incumbent in Madiun was not adequate to promote the incumbent's well-liked image amongst voters. A non-coalition party, such as in Madiun, also limited its capacity to detect and prevent the money politics disbursed by the winning challengers. Therefore, political parties' roles are not only limited to meeting candidacy requirements, but are also important to expand supporter bases and to maintain their loyalties, through implementing parties' policies to support the incumbents.

In addition to these five categories of actors, the case study also identified other actors supporting the incumbents in the *pilkada*, namely *kiais* (Islamic religious leaders), *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), and PKK (family welfare movement). Except in Madiun, all incumbents in Blitar, Trenggalek, and Probolinggo had close relationships with *kiais* and *pesantren*. Nonetheless, not all incumbents could secure their posts. Except in Probolinggo, the relationship between the incumbents and *kiais* is not publicly apparent. There is insufficient academic evidence to support claims about transactional relationships between the incumbents and *kiais* as well as *pesantren*.

#### **8.4 Fast Food Politics: Voters' Reasons to Vote or not to Vote for the Incumbents**

Success in implementing policies delivering direct and tangible benefits to voters was crucial to support the incumbents' survival in the *pilkada*. The case study in four districts found that the incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo, who were better in delivering these policy benefits, succeeded in surviving in the re-election bid. In contrast, the incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun, who succeeded in achieving better human development achievements, were unsuccessful in maintaining their posts in the re-election bid. An exception was in Madiun Municipality, where, under the incumbent's administration, local government was able to deliver direct and tangible policy outputs, such as neighbourhood infrastructure and charitable programs. Nevertheless, money politics negated this policy effect as voters preferred candidates giving out cash. This shows that the incumbents' policy choices are supporting factors for the incumbents to survive.

Complementary to populist policies delivering direct and tangible policy outputs, the incumbents needed to be skilful in performing popular activities to boost their popularity and likeability amongst local people. The incumbents with good images (clean and good people) are likely to have greater popularity and likeability. The case studies assert that all incumbents are popular figures who interact with ordinary people. All incumbents were also publicly known as religious people or to have close relationships with *kiai*, except for the incumbent in Madiun Municipality. However, disclosure of five corruption cases aggravated the incumbent's image in Trenggalek. Meanwhile, money politics attacks negated the popular incumbent in Madiun Municipality.

Hence, the case study points out that populist politics or populism demonstrates two capacities attached to the incumbents. First is their capacity to develop good policies that provide direct and tangible policy outputs. Second is their moral capacity as good people who care and interact mainly with ordinary people (*wong cilik*), such as street vendors, pedicab drivers, the poor and other underdogs in society.

Concerning the support of informal politics to the incumbents' survival, it is important to consider figure 8.1. Low rivalry risks from local elites, namely businessmen, bureaucrats, local legislators, political parties, partisan mass media and NGOs possibly impacted on the incumbents' high electability in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo Municipality. The incumbents succeeded in controlling these elites, so that they did not make potential rivalry movements that may undermine the incumbents' popularity and likeability amongst local people as well as voters. Moreover, specific to the urban district case studies, support from street vendors and pedicab drivers' associations, PDI-P, and local partisan local NGOs in

Probolinggo were strategic to help ward off issues and movements potentially undermining to the incumbent's well-liked image as an *oreng sae* (good person), when the incumbent was alleged to commit corruption by a national networking government watchdog (LIRA) prior to the *pilkada*.

In contrast, poor support from these five categories of local elites in Trenggalek enhanced the rivalry risks against the incumbent. Weak local businessmen's support, conflicting political parties, resistant bureaucrats and local legislators, and critical NGOs undermined the incumbent's influence over local people. In addition, opinion makers at the village level linked to a local farmers' organisation directed rural voters not to vote for the incumbent (*anut grubyuk*) in the 2010 *pilkada*. Consequently, the incumbent who was nominated by nine parties with 59.24 per cent of votes in the 2009 Legislative Election or equal to 29 seats in the local legislature experienced a crushing defeat by gaining only 22.4 per cent of votes in the 2010 *pilkada*. Similarly, poor support from local businessmen and NGOs and the incumbent's overconfidence in relying only on party support (PDI-P) meant the incumbent in Madiun Municipality was unsuccessful in maintaining his post. This poor informal network was unable to prevent money politics persuading voters not to vote for him in the 2008 *pilkada*. Moreover, although the incumbent was well-known and well-liked amongst street vendors and pedicab drivers (*wong cilik*) in the municipality, the case study found that their voting preferences were distorted by money politics disbursed by the winning challenger's camp. Thus, the majority of these *wong cilik* voted for who gave them cash in the 2008 *pilkada* in Madiun Municipality.

Voters' reasons to vote or not to vote for the incumbents can verify the logic of populism and informal politics for their survival. However, the case study points out that these voter's corroborations are mainly addressed to reasons pertaining to the tangible aspects of the policies and image of the incumbents. Voters mostly could recognise informal actors attached to the incumbents, who performed supporting movements for the incumbents in their neighbourhood.

The case studies in four rural and urban districts found five categories of motives that shaped voters' preference to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the re-election bid. As seen in table 8.1, firstly, voters referred to the tangible policy outputs credited to the incumbent. Better infrastructures (roads) at the neighbourhood level were mostly recognised by voters in the four districts. In Trenggalek, voters also considered rural infrastructure constructed during the incumbent's time in office, such as irrigation for rice fields, as a reason to vote for the incumbent. Nevertheless, the incumbent in Trenggalek was also regarded as not improving the regency's roads during his incumbency. This opinion was

widely believed amongst voters though the official data show that under the incumbent's administration, Trenggalek Regency performed better development of the regency roads compared to the previous administration. In addition, as the incumbent was regarded as not committed to his promise to provide some benefits and subsidies for the Forest Village Community Institute (LMDH)'s members, the LMDH's boards shifted their support and mobilised their members not to vote for the incumbent. Moreover, the majority of voters in Madiun Municipality did not vote for the incumbent because they considered the cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp more. The cash ranged from Rp 30,000 to Rp 100,000 (AUD 3-10) per voter shaped voters not to vote for the incumbent. At the same time, money politics negated tangible and direct policy outputs delivered by the incumbent's administration.

**Table 8.1** Voter's Considerations

Reasons	Vote or not to Vote for the Incumbents		Tangible Aspects (or notes)
	Surviving	Non-surviving	
Tangible policy outputs	Yes	Yes	- Infrastructure - Goods - Money politics (undermines policy effects)
Popular image (clean and good person)	Yes	Yes	- Donations - Direct interaction or appearance
Competitive advantage	Yes	Yes (minus Madiun Municipality)	- To sustain tangible and direct policy benefits
Party ID/figure alignment	Yes	Yes	- PDIP and Democratic Party's loyalists - Emotional connection
<i>Anut grubuyuk</i> and ignorance (rural districts)	Yes	Yes	To give both advantage and disadvantage to the incumbents

Secondly, complementary to the tangible and direct policy outputs are the popular images of the incumbents. The incumbents' activities of so-called *blusukan* and *takziah* in Probolinggo Municipality were clearly remembered by voters. They frequently mentioned them as extraordinary activities performed by a person who held the most honourable and prominent position in the municipality. This admiration persuaded voters to vote for the incumbent. Besides, the frequent visitation of the incumbent in Blitar Regency to villages was appreciated by voters. Moreover, voters in both districts considered tangible aspects of the incumbents' popular activities, namely donations and appearance. In addition to physical attendance amongst ordinary people, the incumbents delivered donations to communities or

bereaved families at every visitation. Nonetheless, similar activities performed by the incumbent in Madiun Municipality did not encourage the majority of voters to vote for him since money politics practices strongly shaped voters' preference to vote for the winning challenger. Also, some voters in Trenggalek Regency perceived that the incumbent was not really a local person compared to the winning challenger. Although the incumbent was known as a religious person, some voters considered that the half-hearted local identity attributed to the incumbent would discourage him to optimally struggle for the regency's interest if he regained control of the mayoral post.

Thirdly, voters compared the incumbent and the challenger before making decisions. The basis of comparison was the competitive advantage between candidates. This argument was mainly delivered by voters who possessed leadership positions in the community, namely hamlet heads, neighbourhood unit (RT) heads, community unit (RW) heads and village heads. They voted for the incumbents in Blitar Regency and Probolinggo because they perceived that the incumbents were more experienced and well-grounded than the challengers. Many of the incumbents' programs were not yet completed in the first term. They voted for the incumbents because they considered that the previous advantageous programs should be continued in the second term. By voting for the incumbents, these elite voters sought to minimise the uncertainty risks. The case study in Blitar found a Javanese proverb to express this consideration, "*timbanganne nggolek wong nembel or timbang bakal aluwung nambal*" (rather than finding a new leader). Voters are assumed to play safe or to avoid risky choices. In other words, to vote for the incumbent is better, rather than to vote for the challenger who has not proven his performance yet. Voters want to continue to gain policy benefits equal to those they received in the first term. In an Indonesian proverb, this consideration is expressed as "*ibarat membeli kucing dalam karung*" (to buy a cat in a poke) or to avoid a mistake by not voting for a candidate who has no previous record, or voters do not want to gamble on their decision to vote for the challenger as they have no adequate information about the preceding challenger's performance. In Trenggalek, voters decided to vote for the winning challenger as he was the former regent (Mulyadi) (beaten by the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada*). Voters considered that the winning challenger showed better leadership compared to the incumbent. This could be called the "Mulyadi Effect".

Fourthly, some voters considered party loyalty (party ID) when deciding whether to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. Voters' alignment to a certain party that nominated the candidate shaped their preference. Voters obeyed the party's decision and voted for the nominated candidate. Voters' alignment to the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in Probolinggo encouraged them to elect the incumbent proposed by PDI-P.

Conversely, a voter did not vote for the incumbent in Trenggalek since he followed his paternal party (PDI-P) who nominated the winning challenger. A similar party ID was also found in Madiun Municipality, both for voters who voted for the PDI-P nominated incumbent and for the Democratic Party which proposed the winning challenger.

Finally, the case study in two rural districts (Blitar and Trenggalek) found voters practising *anut grubyuk* (fitting in) in voting. Voters adjusted their preference to the majority or growing opinion in the neighbourhood. Voters in Blitar mainly practised *anut grubyuk* to vote for the incumbent. Voters in Trenggalek performed *anut grubyuk* to vote or not to vote for the incumbent. Thus, *anut grubyuk* both favoured and disfavoured the incumbents. The practice of *anut grubyuk* is related to Javanese cultural practice. This is part of the construction of individual-community relationships in Javanese communities. Every individual should contribute to the harmony of society. In the *pilkada*, an individual intentionally respects communal opinion to vote or not to vote for a candidate. To achieve respect and harmony or to avoid conflict in the community, a voter adjusts his or her ballot in accordance with the majority opinion in the neighbourhood.

These five categories of voters' explanations corroborate the logic of the incumbents' survival as explained by elites (local government officials, NGO activists, journalists, party activists, businessmen, political consultants and the former regents and mayors) interviewed in the case studies in four districts. Populist policies and activities giving direct and tangible benefits to voters shaped their decision to vote, including money politics disbursed by the winning challenger's camp in Madiun Municipality. Nevertheless, voters could not identify the informal politics and actors who delivered benefits or goods to them. The benefits were usually distributed by the intermediary or in the name of the incumbent. Voters, then, praised the benefits given by the incumbents.

In these case studies, decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada* are mainly encouraged by the tangible aspects of policy outputs. Voters were not likely to consider intangibles with long-term benefits or policy outcomes, such as the human development achievements of health, education, and economy (well-being). To develop a more abstract conception of this sort of voting behaviour, the analogy of consuming fast food can be applied. The food is usually served in a comfortable place, modern, of eye-catching appearance, put into a clear menu and creatively wrapped. Then, the main reason to buy fast food is because most of it tastes pretty good, is inexpensive and convenient (giving a distorted sense of how much it actually costs), "without giving it much thought, rarely considering where this food comes from, how it was made, what it is doing to the community

around them”. The consumer “just grabs their tray at the counter, finds a table, takes a seat, unwraps the paper, and digs in” (Schlosser, 2002, pp. 9-10).

The analogy of consuming fast food is plausibly appropriate to explain voting behaviour (to vote or not to vote for the incumbents) in the *pilkada* in these four rural and urban districts. The two main indications were performed by voters. Firstly, the majority of voters quickly judged their decision to vote or not to vote for the incumbents, without much thought of their preference, based on superficial policy outputs (visible, noticeable, direct and short-term benefits). Secondly, they considered the eye-catching appearance of the incumbents, such as their generosity and humility. This demonstrates the importance of the incumbents’ personal marketing (image) and personalisation of policy outputs (political credit).

### **8.5 Gender and the *Pilkada***

Women’s political citizenship, as equal to men’s, has been granted since the country’s independence in 1945. Greater inclusion of women, indeed, was initiated in 1998 after the end of 32 years of an authoritarian regime. More than suffrage, women deserve to hold public offices, particularly in the legislative bodies. Since the 2004 Legislative Election, women have greater chances to gain legislative seats under the quota allocation and the affirmative policy of zipper system in legislator candidacies both at the national and local level. However, similar affirmative legal action for women’s candidacy in the *pilkada* is still poor.

At the national level, women still have to deal with the loss of gender-related development achievements. According to Indonesia’s Gender-Based Human Development 2013, the country’s gender development index reached 68.52 in 2012. It was indeed an improvement over the last 10 years, but Indonesia’s gender deficit remains high. In the case studies of four rural and urban districts in East Java, local governments make no distinction between males and females in local development policies and programs, particularly in education and economic development. Local governments disregard gender-related constraints on women’s capacity in decision-making (agency). They rarely use gender-specific knowledge to assess women’s different and gender-specific needs in local development planning.

Also, a decentralisation regulatory regime regulating the national and local governments’ share of authority likely encourages gender-blind planning. Decentralisation-related policies hamper local governments to implement gender-mainstreaming in local development. Consequently, local government authority is confined to implementing “artificial” gender-redistributive policies, such as gender awareness programs for women via familiarisation and

training for gender equality and empowerment and sporadic gender-redistributive programs to empower micro-businesswomen.

Women's participation in the *pilkada* has demonstrated its connection with the electoral accountability of the incumbents. Firstly, better or worse gender-related development achievements do not impede women to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the re-election bids. In the case studies, the incumbents who succeeded in improving better gender-related development outcomes should leave the office. The incumbent in Trenggalek Regency who succeeded in encouraging slightly less gender disparity and greater equality than in Blitar regency experienced a crushing defeat in the 2010 *pilkada*. As in Trenggalek, the incumbent in Madiun Municipality succeeded in maintaining lower gender disparity and inequality and performed greater accomplishments in reducing gender disparity and inequality than Probolinggo Municipality, within five years (2004-2008). In fact, the incumbent in Madiun tragically had to leave his post after a crushing defeat in the 2008 *pilkada*.

Secondly, the irrelevant logic between the incumbents' survival and gender-related development achievements is comprehensible as female voters are not driven by women-related issues in deciding their ballots. The examinations of female participants' answers in the case studies in four districts reveal the absence of gender-related considerations when women decided to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. There are no distinctive answers on voting reasons between female voters and the majority of voters in the case studies. The tangible aspects of policy outputs and popular appearance credited to the incumbents shaped female voters' preferences in the *pilkada*.

Thirdly, women have to bear the potential loss caused by the informal politics manoeuvres of political actors in the *pilkada*, which is male-dominated. Transactional politics and political conflicts between the incumbents, local legislators, and informal actors potentially cause losses for women. Nevertheless, women's participation in informal political manoeuvres is very limited. The case study only found an involvement of a female activist in Blitar. However, her support for transactional contracts with the incumbent did not pursue a gender-mainstreaming orientation in local development planning. She just pursued a goal with limited connection to gender issues.

Accordingly, women have limited opportunities and choices in the *pilkada* as they have to face complex challenges. Legal frameworks related to the *pilkada* disfavour women candidates to compete. Furthermore, a decentralisation regulatory regime has restricted the elected local leaders (governor/regent/mayor) from pursuing better gender-related policies in local budgeting and policy planning. Worse, the *pilkada* provides less encouragement for




local leaders to implement better gender-related policies as women do not have any distinct consideration of their preferences, pertaining to their strategic interests. Finally, although legal foundations in Indonesian political citizenship do not discriminate against women being elected and holding public office, Indonesian women, who cover more of the population in the case studies, are actually powerless and captured in the local political arena and the logic of tangibility in voting.

### **8.6 The Comparative Logic of the Incumbents' Survival and Failure in the *Pilkada***

After examining, analysing as well as comparing all data gathered from relevant participants in four districts, mainly local elites, voters, and official documents, this thesis arrives at a final finding concerning the logic of the incumbents' survival and failure in the district *pilkada*. The study asserts three interrelated themes in this logic. First is populism. This is not only about political ideas which are intended to represent ordinary people's needs and wishes. This also covers populist policies and popular activities which the incumbents were praised for. Populism works to construct a well-liked image of the incumbents amongst local people. In detail, populist ideas, policies and popular activities are personal marketing for the incumbents to make them appear as popular figures. They act apparently as figures who care or give very much attention to common people's concerns (problems, needs, and wishes). In addition, populism functions as the result of the personalisation of policy outputs. The incumbents attempt to personalise every policy output, particularly populist policy outputs, to take credit for them. The successful incumbents do solo runs to maximise public praise and develop their well-liked image.

Second is rivalry. Embracing informal actors and partisan formal actors was very crucial for the incumbents to survive. They are a group of local elites consisting of businessmen, partisan bureaucrats, legislators, party elites, and partisan NGOs (and media) providing support for the incumbents to stay in office. They operate to particularly minimise political rivalry risks to the incumbents. This concept is adaptable to represent the operation of the actors playing informal politics, with the assurance of transactional relationships as incentives. These actors could perform either encouraging or undermining activities to the incumbents. The incumbents' capacity to manage these actors via mutual transactional relationships is central to discouraging counter-movements that may undermine the incumbents' influence amongst local people.

**Diagram 8.2** Logic of the Incumbents' Survival in the District *Pilkada*



The last theme is tangibility or the ability to deliver tangible policy outputs. It represents the tangible aspects of policy outputs and appearances credited to the incumbents during governed the office. Tangible and direct policy outputs are remembered and shaped voters' preferences to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*, such as infrastructure at the neighbourhood level, city gardens, subsidised or free groceries and other donations praised to the incumbents. Not only in deciding to vote for the surviving incumbents, the case studies in Trenggalek Regency and Madiun Municipality pointed out that voters considered these policy outputs when deciding to vote for the non-surviving incumbents, including female voters. To be specific, in Madiun Municipality, the cash disbursed by the winning challenger's camp also shaped voters' preferences not to vote for the incumbent.

Complementary to tangible policy outputs are noticeable appearances of the incumbent amongst local people. *Blusukan* and *takziah* are the two most popular activities remembered and adored by voters. These activities contributed to the improvement of voters' likeability or affinity with the incumbents. The incumbents' attendance amongst ordinary people shows their care and closeness to the governed. Voters' interpretation of these activities may omit the distance between the elite and the people. Also, the incumbents' willingness to inaugurate both local and national government projects in the neighbourhood contributed to making people easily recognise them. As the majority of the population in East Java is Muslim, the

attendance of the incumbents at religious activities as well as connection with *kiai* and *pesanteren* is pivotal to constructing their religious image.

The existence of these three factors attached to the incumbents is crucial to explain the logic of their survival or failure. The comparison shows that the incumbent in Blitar and Probolinggo succeeded in performing populism and tangibility and in managing the low rivalry risks from informal and partisan formal actors prior to the *pilkada*. The incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun actually succeeded in promoting populism and tangibility to the local people. Nonetheless, their failure to control informal politics and actors compelled the incumbents to leave their posts. Conflicting political parties and LMDH's movement to divert their support from the incumbent to the winning challenger undermined the incumbent's electability amongst voters. The incumbent's poor networks and his over confidence in depending only on the party (PDI-P) network made the incumbent in Madiun unable to defend against money politics attacks. Moreover, both the incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun did not fully control the bureaucrats, which is actually strategic to setting local government policies favouring the incumbents. In the case studies, the low rivalry risks from informal politics and actors can explain the logic of the incumbent's survival and failure in the *pilkada*. Good populism and tangibility fulfilment will support the incumbents to gain credit from local people. Nevertheless, the politics of particularism via incentives, playing between the incumbents and five categories of local elites, are sufficiently strong to minimise the risks of political rivalry that may undermine the incumbents' influence (populism and tangibility) and to block money politics attacks on potential voters. Thus, the rivalry risks from informal and partisan formal actors, which depend on the degree of informal politics manoeuvres played between the incumbents and these actors, are likely to determine the incumbents' survivability, even though the incumbents have similar competitive advantages of populism and tangibility.

The comparative logic of the incumbents' survivals and failures demonstrates the centrality of actors, electability and rivalry as demonstrated in diagram 8.1. The interconnections of these three fundamental concepts are the centrality of arguments above all. In particular, good relationship between the incumbents and five categories of protectors and defenders (actors), namely businessmen, partisan bureaucrats, political parties, legislators, and partisan NGOs, contribute to keep the low degree of rivalry risk between the incumbents and these parties. Low rivalry risk can encourage these backers to act in accordance with the incumbents' interest to maintain their electability amongst local people. In contrast, poor relationship between the incumbents and the actors can lead to the reluctance of these groups of elite to create activities that can promote the incumbents amongst grassroots. Then, it can

raise the risk of political rivalry and undermine populism and tangibility praised to the incumbents. Nevertheless, the incumbents cannot neglect populism and tangibility credited to them since all incumbents in four districts performed both interrelated elements, although not all incumbents can survive in the re-election bids.

As this thesis applies inductive logic to qualitative research, the value of the thesis can be acknowledged by comparing and contrasting the research findings to the existing relevant literature (Creswell, 2009, p. 28). As a matter of comparison, this research refers to the political survival of leaders as explained by the *selectorate* theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). This is a very outstanding work in researching the political survival of national leaders in many countries.

De Mesquita examines the groups which exist in all polities, namely the *selectorate* (the set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a prospect of gaining access to special privileges doled out by leaders), the *winning coalition* (the subgroup of the *selectorate* who maintain incumbents in office and in exchange receive special privileges), leadership (the smallest set of individuals which actually makes decisions about gathering and allocating resources), and the challenger (a national leadership and prospective substitute leaders). The position of these groups is changeable related to the leader's political survival (de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 38). Moreover, the relationship between leaders, followers, and supporters is connected by *affinity* or the bonds between leaders and followers that both can use to anticipate each other's future loyalty. The bonds can be influenced by several clustered factors, namely ethnic or religious preferences, personality, ideology, political-party identification, experience, family ties and charisma (de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 60-61).

The dynamics of leader tenure in office are the reflections of selection institutions driven by the provision of public and private goods. The first argument of survival as explained by the *selectorate* theory is the impact of the vagaries of the economy on the available resources allocated by the leader. Complete or incomplete information about the available resources, possessed by followers, determine the level of goods that the leader can produce. Thus, economic downturns can lead to leader succession or immunity to this economic threat, depending on the ability of people to observe the available resources and the leaders' ability to hide actual information on the resources which are potentially diverted to their own use. The second argument focuses on the leaders as well as politicians' and challengers' competence in producing goods from the given resources. More competent leaders will produce more goods in the future for members of their winning coalition. Then, the contest for leadership is focused on the leaders' competence. The third and fourth arguments assume affinities between leaders and followers. The third argument assumes

interactions between both parties can reveal their bonds and the future loyalties of the *selectorate*, based on the possibility of being included in or excluded from the winning coalition and the benefits of private goods for the winning coalition. The *selectorate* can predict their future position in the winning coalition, supposing the incumbent maintains office. At the same time, the current winning coalition members assess the possible risk of exclusion from the private goods delivered by the incumbent. The fourth argument assumes that all affinities are known by the *selectorate*, the winning coalition, the incumbent, and the challenger. The *selectorate* can calculate their chances of being included in the winning coalition of the challenger if it comes to power. The winning coalition will leave the current leader for the challenger if they have a stronger affinity with the challenger. The incumbent enlarges the coalition to anticipate the winning coalition's exodus as well as to secure the number of loyal supporters in order to retain power. Therefore, a leader needs to offer at least a benefit equal to the greatest possible benefit offered by a potential challenger to survive in office (de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 277-279).

According to this research study, the *selectorate* theory is the most complete explanation of the logic of political survival compared to other works. Beasley and Case (1995) focus on the incumbent's vote-seeking behaviour in the USA by using tax-setting policies; Keefer (2005) discusses the policy choices of young democratic countries by employing *clientelism* and credibility concepts; Alonso (2005) provides an analysis of the incumbent's ethnic identity in western democracies; de Mesquita and Smith (2009) examine the political survival, domestic revolutionary threats and the incumbents' policy choices; Campbell and Dettrey (2009) provide an analysis of the strategy of the incumbent to respond to the political climate in a presidential campaign; Clarke and Stone (2006) criticise de Mesquita et al.'s work by arguing that democracy is an essential variable in identifying the logic of political survival; Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2003) examine the politics of public spending for vote-buying of the poor in Mexico. Thus, this research has compared and contrasted the central phenomena gathered from the case studies in four rural and urban districts with the *selectorate* theory.

Particular to the *pilkada* case in Indonesia, Erb and Sulistiyanto elaborate several factors that may lead to the incumbents' survival and failure based on collective works covering Indonesia and specific works in six provinces and 13 districts. For the incumbents to survive, they need to do very well in their first term in office; gain support from a coalition of major political parties; organise campaign teams and grass-roots supportive groups during the campaign period; offer the best programs and visions to the voters and achieve a level of popularity and trust in the eyes of local people. The non-surviving incumbents are considered

to be punished by voters for failing to deliver in their first term; voters vote in a “rational” manner; major political parties’ support did not guarantee a large number of votes for contenders; voters look to the leadership personality and quality of the candidate and voters voted for local leaders whom they knew best and who had delivered something back to society (Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 20).

Firstly, concerning the existing groups in a polity, which are related to the political survival of leaders, this research study confirms the existence of the incumbents (leaders), challengers, voters (*selectorates*), informal and formal partisan actors (winning coalition), and incentives (affinity). The study accepts the conceptual similarity of leader, and challenger. The study finds the conceptual similarity of *selectorates* as voters. Voters had a say and made demands to the incumbents and gained tangible benefits from the incumbents’ policies and activities, which are similar to a *selectorate*. However, not all voters recognised the incumbents’ populist policies and popular activities; some voters even intentionally ignored them. The thesis enriches the concept of tangibility to comprehend *selectorate* voting behaviour. Tangibility represents the concrete aspects of policy outputs and appearances credited to the incumbents during office. Concrete and direct policy outputs can adequately shape voters’ preferences to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the re-election bid. About the winning coalition, this study enriches the details of group members, consisting of informal and partisan formal actors supporting and sharing benefits with the incumbents. The study, then, introduces the concept of rivalry to represent the operation of the actors playing informal politics with the assurance of transactional relationships as incentives. These actors are able to perform either encouraging or undermining activities for the incumbents. The high risk of political rivalry played by informal and partisan formal actors may undermine the incumbents’ electability in the *pilkada*.

The study augments the concept of affinity to bond the incumbents and their supporters (voters and winning coalition) as informal politics. In a more comprehensive explanation, informal politics is the play of the politics of particularism, consisting of actors, relationships, practices, and policies favouring the incumbent, aiming at gaining maximum support in the re-election bid. The politics of particularism prioritises one more than another in the process of policy-making and delivering benefits. Particularism involves the transaction of benefits shared between the incumbents and their supporters, mainly the groups of informal and formal elites as well as the leaders of grassroots organisations. The politics of particularism is a form of transactional relationship between the incumbents and informal and partisan formal actors. This relationship works to minimise the potential rivalry risks (or to enhance loyalty)

of these actors, that may support the incumbents' efforts to retain their office, or at the same time to block any effort to undermine the incumbents.

Secondly, the *selectorate* theory argues that the provision of public and private goods is the driving factor of the leaders' political survival. The case studies in four rural and urban districts reveal that for the incumbents to survive or be removed from office, they play the politics of particularism with the provision of tangible policy outputs or philanthropically biased activities. By referring to voters' reasons to vote or not to vote for the incumbents, the concept of public goods, provided for all people with minimum rivalry for access, is reduced, as the majority of voters did not consider them when they decided their voting preferences. Voters recognised and counted more the tangible public goods, such as infrastructure, than intangible well-being aspects, such as the improvements in health, education, and the local economy. In addition, the politics of particularism played by the incumbents and informal and partisan formal actors makes the concept of public goods become blurred. Voters favoured the conversion of public to private goods, delivered exclusively by the incumbents and informal actors. They easily recognised gifts, donations, subsidies, discounted groceries funded by the local budget or donated by businessmen, which, then were praised to the incumbents.

Thirdly, concerning the four main arguments of the *selectorate* theory, the thesis challenges each argument based on the case study findings. The main argument of critics is that the theory assumes the possession of information about economic downturns, leaders' competence, and the competitive advantage of the incumbents and challengers amongst voters. The *selectorate* theory assumes voters possibly have complete or incomplete information about economic downturns under the incumbent's administration. The case studies found that the majority of voters neglected the district economic performance during the incumbents' periods in office. The non-surviving incumbents did not even show much poorer local economic performance than the survivors. Voters strongly recognised and considered tangible aspects of policy aspects and the popular appearance of the surviving and non-surviving incumbents.

Lack of information is also an impediment for voters to compare the competence of incumbents, challengers, and politicians in producing goods. Unequal information about the incumbents' and challengers' competence in Blitar and Probolinggo meant that the incumbents had superior images amongst local people. In Trenggalek, however, equal information about the winning challenger's competence<sup>752</sup> compared to the incumbent's

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<sup>752</sup> Because he was the former regent defeated by the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada*.

competence, gave the former an advantage in the *pilkada*. Voters considered the preceding records of the winning challenger. Nonetheless, inadequate information about the winning challenger's competence in Madiun Municipality was replaced by cash disbursed by his camp to influence voters not to vote for the incumbent. This means that money politics distorted the information about the winning challenger's competence in providing goods. Thus, the thesis considers the importance of equal information about the competence of incumbent and challenger in providing goods prior to the *pilkada* rather than the contest of competence.

The third argument of the *selectorate* theory assumes the competitive advantage of the incumbent amongst the *selectorate* and the winning coalition. As the incumbent has previously governed in office, the *selectorate* and winning coalition know and can predict their future positions as well as possible exclusion from the group and the utilisation of private goods provided for the winning coalition. Compared to the study's findings, this argument is appropriate to assess the behaviour of informal and partisan formal actors and certain groups of voters. The loyalties of village heads, hamlet heads, community leaders and five or six categories of informal and partisan formal actors to the incumbents were driven by exclusive public goods or private goods or positions (for partisan bureaucrats). Nonetheless, not all of the voters had adequate information to compare and predict the advantages that would be delivered by the incumbent if he or she retains power in the re-election bid. Moreover, the third argument of the *selectorate* theory does not consider ignorant voters, who are mainly found in rural districts. The thesis confirms about the factors that influence the bond between the incumbent and voters, which cover also immaterial aspects of influential factors, namely popular and religious images attributed to the incumbent (a good person) and the similarity of cultural identity.

The last argument assumes all actors (*selectorates*, winning coalition, incumbent, and challenger) know about the affinities or the bonds between leader and followers. This makes it possible for voters and the winning coalition to compare the challenger's competitive advantage to the incumbent in order to calculate their possible support in the leadership selection. The case study in Trenggalek Regency corroborates this argument. It is possible, as the winning challenger is the former regent defeated by the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada*. When the challenger decided to run in the 2010 *pilkada*, voters and winning coalition members, previously supporting the incumbent, diverted to the challenger. The case study reveals that voters compared local government performance and the incumbent's image with the winning challenger's preceding achievements. In addition, the winning challenger succeeded in urging two groups from the winning coalition (LMDH and PKB) to divert their



support from the incumbent to him. The case studies in Blitar and Probolinggo are not adequate to affirm this argument. Meanwhile, money politics practised by the winning challenger's camp in Madiun Municipality succeeded in persuading voters to vote for the winning challenger and disregard the incumbent.

The research supports the previous findings by Erb et al. (2009) about factors contributing to the incumbents' survival or failure in the *pilkada*. The study could also contribute to the literature about local elections in Indonesia, in some aspects. The previous studies mainly view specific aspects of the incumbent's survival and failure. This study enriches the narrative explanation of voting behaviour (preferences and reasons) in the *pilkada*, mainly pertaining to populism and tangibility. It explains voters' decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbent in detail. These narratives may encourage a better explanation of voters' logic in the *pilkada*. The case studies in four rural and urban districts assert five main reasons that shape voters' preferences to vote or not to vote for the incumbents, namely tangible policy outputs, such as infrastructure and goods, including money politics; popular image, presenting the incumbents popular appearance as a good and clean person and willing to interact with ordinary people, including donations disbursed to the people as one of the instruments to build this image; competitive advantage, or the incumbent as a reliable leader who can continue to give benefits or goods to the people and certain groups of supporting elites; party alignment to the political party nominated the incumbent or challenger; and *anut grubyuk* (fitting-in) and ignorance in rural districts that gives both advantages and disadvantages for the incumbent.

The study assesses factors leading to the incumbent's survival and failure as well as voters' explications about their preferences for the incumbent by employing a comparative method and covering cases in urban and rural districts in one province. The comparison results in a better explanation and narrative. A previous study argued that the *pilkada* is a local specific phenomenon (Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 205). Arguably, this study finds that similar factors could contribute to the incumbent's survival or failure in many *pilkada*, namely populism, rivalry and tangibility. This study also expands the explanation of the importance of informal politics and networks in the *pilkada*. Informal politics and networks are not only providing or supplying the needs of the incumbent to boost populism and to provide tangibility aspects related to the *pilkada*. They are also instruments to minimise the risks of political rivalry to the incumbent, mainly from informal and partisan formal actors.

This study also confirms as well as argues in some detail about possible factors and actors that may lead to the incumbents' survival or failure. Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) remarked that the surviving incumbents had done very well in their first term in office. The

case studies confirm this argument with specific measurements of policy outputs that shaped voters' preferences, namely tangible and direct beneficial policy outputs. Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) argued that the surviving incumbents were supported by a coalition of major political parties. This study shapes this argument, that a group of solid or harmonious political parties supporting the incumbent is effective to retain the incumbents in office in Blitar and Probolinggo. In contrast, poor party alliance and conflicting political parties failed to maintain the incumbents in office in Madiun and Trenggalek. Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) explained that the surviving incumbents succeeded in organising campaign teams and grassroots supportive groups during the campaign period. This study corroborates this explanation with a crucial finding that there is an involvement of non-campaign teams to support the incumbent, mainly businessmen. They support the incumbents by practising vote-buying (distributing free groceries and shirts credited to the incumbents) and displaying banners promoting the incumbents. This non-campaign team's support is not easily controlled and potentially violates campaign rules.

Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) understand that the surviving incumbents offer the best programs and visions to the voters. Nonetheless, the majority of voters neglected the incumbents' platforms in the re-election bids. Voters paid more attention to the tangible aspects of policy outputs and the popular appearance attributed to the incumbents. Lastly, Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) explicate that the successful incumbent achieved a level of popularity and trust in the eyes of local people. This study confirms this finding, with a more detailed explanation that the surviving incumbents succeed in building a well-liked image as good and clean persons amongst local people. Not only recognized as popular figures, the incumbents succeeded also in personalising policy outputs and benefits.

Erb and Sulistiyanto propose five arguments on the factors discouraging the incumbents' survival in the *pilkada*. They are considered to be punished by voters for failing to deliver in their first term; voters vote in a "rational" manner; major political parties' support did not guarantee a large number of votes for contenders; voters look to the leadership personality and quality of the candidate; and voters vote for local leaders who they know best and who have delivered something back to society (Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009, p. 20). This study confirms two assumptions that the failure to unite major parties' support led to the incumbents' failures to maintain office in Trenggalek and Madiun. Even the incumbent in Trenggalek, who was nominated by nine parties with 59.24 per cent of the votes in the 2009 Legislative Election, experienced a crushing defeat. Poor and limited support from informal networks negated the incumbent's potential voters, who were, indeed, diverted to the winning challenger. The study also confirms the importance of high popularity and

likeability if the incumbents are to survive. The propaganda mentioning the incumbent in Trenggalek as a half-hearted local person succeeded in decreasing the incumbent's electability. The case study found such reasons not to vote for the incumbent.

Concerning the three other arguments proposed by Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009), this study argues that partial information explained the incumbent's performance and personal and professional qualification that led to voters' decisions not to vote for him. The incumbent's personality was strongly remembered by voters, but they neglected the incumbent's professional achievements as a district head who was able to boost local progress, such as through better education, health, and economic achievements. Also, voters' judgements about the incumbents' failure to deliver in the first term were not totally confirmed. This shows that voters think in a rational manner to judge as well as punish the incumbents' failure. Nevertheless, the case studies reveal those voters' reasons to vote and not to vote for the incumbents were mainly based on practical arguments of noticeable evidence of policy outputs or the popular appearance of the incumbents. The study, then, applies an analogy of consuming fast foods to describe voting behaviour. Superficial policy outputs (visible, noticeable, direct and short-term benefits) shaped the majority of voter decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbents, without much thought. The incumbents' personal marketing (image), such as generosity and humility and the personalisation of policy outputs (political credit) also shaped voters' preferences. The case studies also explain the money politics effect which led to the crushing defeat of the incumbent in Madiun, although he succeeded in delivering convincing performance and policy outputs for local people.

### **8.7 Making Democracy Valuable: Proposing Electoral Accountability as a Complementary Perspective to Democratisation**

For those studying local politics and democracy in Indonesia, the implementation of direct elections for provincial/district heads (*pilkada*) in 2005 sparked critical concern about serious challenges for the emerging democracy in the country, following a democratic reform just begun seven years earlier (1998). The dramatic end of the 32 years of an authoritarian regime, followed by rapid political change, still leaves questions about democratic consolidation thereafter. A logical question mainly addressed by political scholars pertains to the change in democracy in the country, including at the local level. Does the *pilkada* encourage the progress of local democracy? What are the enabling or preventing factors for local democracy to move on? The previous collective works provide a clue that the *pilkada* is a step taken that will help to deepen democracy (Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009). Nonetheless, other works find difficulty in generalising local politics in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, as there

are various democracy outputs in diverse regions (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010). Also, a local democracy study in four provinces (East Java, West Sumatera, South Sulawesi and Bali) asserts that local elites' interests focusing only on gaining power have undermined the positive contribution of the *pilkada* to democratic institutionalisation (Zuhro et.al, 2011). Essentially, there is no single explanation on the progress of local democracy in post-Soeharto Indonesia. This thesis adds more detailed content on the incumbents' political survival (district heads) in an electoral democracy. Moreover, it seeks to assert that certain parties have a strong interest in playing local democracy.

In addition, the development of the *pilkada* as part of the country's major democratisation scheme since 1998 has been debated from two particular viewpoints, namely comparative and isolation perspectives. The former views Indonesian democracy in a more optimistic way. The country's democratic achievement is better compared to other countries with a similar and comparable stage of democratisation. The latter viewpoint sees the country's democratisation in detail and partly focuses on certain pillars of democracy (*Indonesianists* and activists). It states that Indonesia's democratic progress should be reconsidered, as there are many structural defects in its implementation, namely, imperfect competitive elections, weak parties and parliament, undermining civil society, women's persistent obstacles in politics and some elitist local politics. Particular to the *pilkada*, democratisation at the local level is still captured by entrenched local elites (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010, pp. 3-17).

By referring to Freedom House's measure of democratisation, based on the assessment of the quality of civil rights and civil liberties, Aspinall and Mietzner have put the country's democracy into the consolidation perspective (2010, p. 46). Other works in the same publication edited by these *Indonesianists* apply a similar perspective. The consolidation of Indonesia's democracy still has a struggle to deal with the acceptance of democratic constitutional order amongst sharia state's supporters, worrying levels of behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional commitment to democracy from key elites, poor performance of corruption and the rule of law and the combination of presidentialism and a multi-party system that may lead to unstable democracy (Diamond, 2010, pp. 46-48). From the examination of voting behaviour data in a series (1999-2009) of legislative and presidential elections, Mujani and Liddle explain the country's democracy consolidation and quality with both positive and negative aspects of voting behaviour (2010, pp. 95-97). Specific to reviewing the *pilkada* in the regions, other collective works<sup>753</sup> concluded that the implementation of local elections in Indonesia is problematic in terms of democratic

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<sup>753</sup> The majority of works assess the results and dynamics of the first round *pilkada* in 2005.

consolidation. The *pilkada* is coloured by some weaknesses, namely a lack of impartiality and independence of local general election commissions, some violence, huge numbers of absentees and domination by political parties (Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009, pp. 17-20).

The consolidation of democracy perspective is also applied by Zuhro et al. to construct a model of local democracy in Indonesia. By employing the conceptual category of deepening democracy, she and her colleagues assess three main pillars of local democracy in four provinces in the country, namely local cultural values compatible or incompatible to democracy, constructive or constraining roles of actors and functional or dysfunctional roles of local political institutions, both government and non-government institutions (2011, pp. 86-88).

Nevertheless, consolidation as a perspective to ‘measure’ democratisation of a country or countries is not without criticism. As a cluster concept, consolidation is structurally understandable but without a core. The division of democratic types, liberal and electoral democracy, to classify either democratic survival or democratic progress in democratic consolidation does not have common ideas. As a result, the consolidation of democracy seems to act as a catch-all concept, lacking a core meaning to unite all modes of usage. Thus, “consolidology” is only a label for the study of new democracies. However, academic communities on democratic consolidation deploy this term in whatever ways best fit for research, funding needs, and advertising strategies (Schendler, 1998, pp. 97-98). The consolidation perspective is also very formally oriented. It sets the criterion of formality based on “a close fit between formal rules and actual behaviour”. In fact, some countries with long traditions of democracy, such as Italy, Japan and India are rampant with the practices of *particularism* which are informal in character (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 40).

From the examination of political survival and failure at the district levels, this study found three main interrelated elements playing important roles in local democratic competition, namely populism, rivalry, and tangibility. The incumbents’ survival in district elections was supported by the play of incentives and tangible presents. Nonetheless, an incumbent’s skilful management of political rivalry risks from some categories of local elites is essential. The study asserts that rivalry is a cross-cutting factor that may support the incumbents’ survival or failure in the *pilkada*. In other words, the good incumbents’ performance in delivering populist policy outputs and appearance with tangible and direct benefits is not adequate without obtaining backing and protection from informal and partisan formal actors.

This finding, then, arrives at a crucial argument that the *pilkada* is captured predominantly by local elites. The degree of political rivalry on the incumbents, as an explanatory aspect of

the incumbents' survival and failure, is assumed to have a poor impact on the *pilkada* outcomes. The *pilkada* has not yet delivered its main mission as a competitive mechanism of democracy to encourage better local leadership, with positive effects on local development achievements. The domination of elites and less critical voters, indeed, possibly became one of the factors that potentially caused local development losses. Informal and partisan formal actors transacted their influence and resources to gain individual and constituent-based benefits. They amused local people with short-term, practical and populist development outputs.

Firstly, the study finds that the logic of the incumbents' survival is less determined by good electoral accountability. The incumbent with better local development achievements prior to the *pilkada* cannot maintain office; he even experienced a crushing defeat, such as in Trenggalek. Worse, voters in Madiun Municipality were influenced by money politics disbursed by the winning challenger's camp and removed the incumbent from the office. As seen in tables 8.2 and 8.3, after the incumbents' removal, local development performance declined. Despite the fact that under the incumbent's leadership, Madiun Municipality had lower achievements in HDI, health index and education index than Probolinggo Municipality, these local development achievements deteriorated under the winning challenger's administration. In Blitar and Probolinggo, the incumbents who succeeded in maintaining office in the re-election bid had lower development achievements after gaining their positions for the second term. Hence, successful or unsuccessful incumbents do not always reflect local development performance during and after their tenure.

**Table 8.2 Pre- *pilkada* Development Achievements (annual change)**

Development Achievements	Rural Districts (2002-2005)			Urban Districts (2004-2008)			East Java (2002-2005)
	Blitar	Trenggalek	Av.	Probolinggo	Madiun	Av.	
HDI	0.98	0.66	1.04	0.69	0.59	0.62	1.44
Health Index	0.56	0.33	0.53	0.57	0.29	0.47	1.37
Education Index	0.45	0.75	0.80	0.99	0.51	0.64	0.77
Per capita Spending (Rp)/AUD	8,200/0.82	3,800/0.38	7,700/0.77	1,450/0.145	3,675/0.3675	3,170/0.317	9,500/0.95
PPP Index	1.91	0.88	1.79	0.34	0.85	0.73	2.19

Source: the East Java Central Statistics Agency. Processed by researcher

**Table 8.3** Post- *pilkada* Development Achievements (annual change)

Development Achievements	Rural Districts (2009-2012)			Urban Districts (2008-2012)			East Java (2006-2009)
	Blitar	Trenggalek	Av.	Probolinggo	Madiun	Av.	
HDI	0.39	0.50	0.60	0.54	0.40	0.48	0.63
Health Index	0.36	0.43	0.42	0.58	0.34	0.41	0.31
Education Index	0.16	0.13	0.56	0.25	0.18	0.16	0.38
Per capita Spending (Rp)/AUD	2,970/0.297	3,530/0.353	3,570/0.357	3,400/0.34	2,950/0.295	3,370/0.337	4,730
PPP Index	0.69	0.81	0.83	0.79	0.68	0.78	1.09

Source: the East Java Central Statistics Agency. Processed by researcher

Secondly, the downward trend in development achievements also happened at the provincial level, particularly in East Java. The composite of provincial development attainments is not better in the post-*pilkada* than the pre-*pilkada* period. In the post-*pilkada* period (after 2005) the provincial indexes of human development (HDI), education, health, purchasing power parity (PPP) and per capita spending decreased by more than a half than in the pre-*pilkada* period. Indeed, in 2005, there were 18 district *pilkada*. The other 20 districts had conducted the *pilkada* from 2006 to 2008. Local leadership and local government are not the most determining factors which are responsible for the effective running of local development, as decentralisation arrangements that regulate the shares of national and local authorities should also be counted. However, the policy arguments for the *pilkada* following the implementation of direct presidential election in 2004 are mainly intended to elect more responsive local leaders who can lead effective local developments. Hence, this decline in local development achievements demonstrated a poor electoral accountability in the post-*pilkada* period in the districts and East Java. The elected district leaders cannot be electorally accountable to the public who elected them.

Democracy is not solely about election concerns. However, electoral accountability or democratic accountability is the crucial idea of the democratic spirit.<sup>754</sup> Election and succession are mechanisms to select better leaderships that are able to deliver equal advancement and benefits for all people. Schumpeter clearly states that democracy is institutional competition for political leadership by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. He adds that effective competition presents people who have voices to verify the government and leaders. He also fundamentally contends that the classical doctrine of democracy is about the common good and the will of the people. "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common

<sup>754754</sup> This study uses the concept of electoral accountability and democratic accountability interchangeably. Both concepts have identical meanings.

good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1950, pp. 250; 269-270). Therefore, aside from a competitive method, democracy is a method to amass collective interest aggregated in political decisions (policies) and mandated to the elected leaders. This doctrine clearly underlines the idea of electoral accountability of the elected leader to carry out the common good and the will of the people.

Meanwhile, Dahl warns that people should not ask too much of any government, including democratic government. Also, democratic government cannot avoid defects. However, democracy carries out the mission of realising the ten advantages of democracy, ranging from avoiding tyranny to creating prosperity, that are more desirable than any non-democratic governments (Dahl, 1998, pp. 60-61). In the viewpoint of this researcher, as a popular government, democratic government under elected competitive leadership is accountable for translating these advantages into realities.

Based on these quantitative and grounded data from the field relating to the *pilkada* and its impacts, this thesis proposes an alternative idea to review democratisation not from the perspective of inquiring into the facts and reasons for what makes democracy work, in terms of the consolidation of democracy. As a country in the emerging age of democracy, especially at the local level, democratic progress should be viewed from the outcome perspective, to shape the will of the people. In the early age of democracy in the country, democracy as a constitutional choice needs to gain a quick win or impressive effect as a better alternative than any other form of non-democratic government. The confidence and trust of the people in local democratic government can only be obtained through the better performance and outcomes of democratic government under competitive elected leadership.

Here, then, it is assumed that electoral accountability is appropriate and complementary to other existing perspectives of democratisation, particularly the consolidation of democracy. Electoral accountability is arguable to analyse democratic progress, particularly to assess the democratic effects of political survival in a re-election bid, such as in the *pilkada*. The conceptual foundation of electoral accountability as a complementary perspective for analysing local political competition refers to Schumpeter’s classical doctrine of democracy. A leader elected competitively would chair a democratic government to carry out the common good and the will of the people.

The logic to endorse democratic accountability to measure democratic progress in the *pilkada*, complementary to democratisation, firstly, relies on the argument of institutional arrangement and accountable and democratic local government. The *pilkada* follows the logic of the presidential government system (*presidentialism*) in electing a leader. Under



*presidentialism*, asking the government to be accountable to voters is more possible. An incumbent leader is an easy target for voters to evaluate the leader's performance (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008, p. 69).

Secondly, democratic accountability is important to consider as a complementary perspective to democratisation, since Indonesian democracy is not sufficiently understood through institutionalism only. In other words, institutional arrangements matter in shaping behaviour and policy, such in the first argument; nevertheless non-institutional or informal factors have crucial roles in performing similar functions as formal institutions. Thus, to comprehend Indonesian political dynamics should rely both on formal institutions (law, constitution, formal institutions, institutional arrangements) and informal factors (non-codified norms, value, actual praxis, beliefs). This thesis demonstrates the importance of informal politics, which determined more significantly the political survival of district heads in the *pilkada*. Democratic accountability as a complementary perspective is appropriate to comprehend democratic progress, as it may identify to whom an elected leader gives more response, whether to the large number of constituents or the small number of loyal and supportive elites.

The conceptual root of democratic accountability is adopted from the concept of electoral accountability in assessing an incumbent government. Electoral accountability holds officeholders accountable since periodic election provides a challenge to respond to voters' demands and needs in selecting policies (Prewitt, 1970, p. 7). The basic argument of electoral accountability is grounded on a belief that elected leaders will answer back to electoral incentives. Then, the leader's performance is the basis of reward and punishment possibly addressed by voters (Svolik, 2013, p. 686). Similarly, other scholars explain the concept as the voters' capacity to reward or sanction incumbent politicians (Samuels, 2004, p. 425; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008, p. 68).

The preconditions needed to conceptually operationalize electoral accountability pertain to voters' capacity to assess performance outcomes. Firstly, voters' capacity to ask for the responsibility of the incumbents based on their performance outcomes. Secondly, voters are able to perform this task. Also, there are three institutional designs that can make electoral accountability assessment possible, namely the separation of legislative and executive elections or presidential or semi-presidential systems, concurrent election of both branches of government offices and the possibility of cohabitation between the major and minor political forces in semi-*presidentialism* (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008, pp. 68-70). Another important requirement is transparent government or incumbents who allow voters to access a government's performance-related information (Samuels, 2004, p. 426).

Based on the case study findings of three interconnected elements that contributed to the incumbents' survival or failure in the district *pilkada*, democratic or electoral accountability requires also critical non-government and party elites that may supervise the incumbents' performance. Independent non-government performance auditors with good integrity are needed to support less critical people and laypersons in the regions. They would create a balance to political rivalry that may monitor the incumbents and supporter relationships, including bureaucrats. Also, Indonesia has established semi-government organisations performing accountability audits, such as the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI), the National and Local Information Commission and the Presidential Working Unit for the Supervision and Management of Development (*UKP4*). These institutions could cooperate with local non-government organisations to perform democratic audits of incumbent politicians.

Therefore, democratic accountability is valuable to enrich the perspective of democratisation and democratic progress, particularly in assessing the contribution of the *pilkada* to democratic progress, as discussed in the thesis.

### **8.8 The Incumbents' Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis**

A simple comparative SWOT analysis is intended to compare internal strengths and weaknesses and the external opportunities and threats of the surviving and non-surviving incumbents during their first tenure. By adopting Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005, p. vii)'s framework, the former focuses on what the incumbents can do related to policy choices (internal resources) and the latter assesses what the incumbents might choose to do pertaining to informal politics (external supports).

The surviving and non-surviving incumbents in all districts succeeded in branding populist policies that were credited to them. These policies were able to deliver direct and tangible benefits of policy outputs to the people. The surviving incumbent in Blitar Regency succeeded in branding six populist policy choices as credited to him, namely, the death benefit policy, infrastructure development at the neighbourhood level (with higher budget allocation in public works), free health services, annual cheap market programs (cheap groceries), rice benefits for civil servants, and the provision of service motorcycles for all village heads prior to the *pilkada*. Moreover, the incumbent was also favoured by National Program for People Empowerment (PNPM) for accelerating the development of infrastructure at the neighbourhood level. The surviving incumbent in Probolinggo Municipality also succeeded in delivering infrastructure developments and city gardens, the provision of aid for *PKL* and

pedicab drivers, and the four most mentioned popular activities and populist policies (*blusukan, takziah, on air dialogues and cangkru'an*).

In fact, the non-surviving incumbents succeeded also in branding similar policies and they were also able to accomplish better human development achievements compared to the surviving incumbents. Some populist policies credited to the non-surviving incumbent in Trenggalek are the home-based industrial centre for modified cassava flour (*mocaf*), total sanitation and sanitation marketing (TSSM), the promotion of gift centres, and the implementation of a human development approach, such as better expenditure on health, education, and the micro and small economy, the establishment of inclusive classes at elementary and junior high school level, the establishment of primary and junior high schools in one location (*sekolah satu atap*), scholarships for poor students from elementary to senior high schools and the establishment of new schools. Meanwhile, the non-surviving incumbent in Madiun was credited for good performance of health services in the community health centres, implementing regional health insurance (*Jamkesda*), disbursing operational grants for private schools, disbursing soft loans to support the poor's businesses, inviting big retail business network investments, renovating homes unfit for habitation (*RTLH*) and developing some huge municipal infrastructures. Better achievements in the human development index (HDI) during their tenure than the surviving incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo were other strengths credited to the non-surviving incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun. In the interview, the incumbent in Trenggalek stated his commitment to applying a human development orientation in local development.

**Table 8.4** Comparative SWOT Analysis

<b>Incumbents</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Surviving</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brand populist policies</li> <li>• Populist &amp; tangible policy outputs</li> <li>• Popular activities and images</li> <li>• Favoured by national programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lower HDI, life expectancy index, education index</li> <li>• Few policy breakthroughs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong support of party networks, businessmen, Islam-based entities, CSOs</li> <li>• Strong support from bureaucrats</li> <li>• Supported by local legislators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Money politics (by challenger in urban districts)</li> <li>• Corruption allegation (urban district)</li> </ul>
<b>Non-surviving</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brand populist policies</li> <li>• Populist &amp; tangible policy outputs</li> <li>• Popular activities and images</li> <li>• Better HDI, economic growth, PPP index</li> <li>• Implemented human development orientation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performing plain policies (few breakthroughs)</li> <li>• Over confidence as an incumbent</li> <li>• Better education policies, but delivered intangible outputs</li> <li>• Smaller local budget (APBD) for public works (rural district)</li> <li>• Poor government owned hospital services (rural)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Solid party networks (urban district)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor informal networks' support (from local businessmen, <i>kiai</i> and CSOs)</li> <li>• Poor support from bureaucrats and legislators</li> <li>• Massive money politics (by challenger in urban districts)</li> <li>• The diversion of party support (rural district)</li> <li>• The diversion of Farmer-based organisation (LMDH)'s support (rural district)</li> <li>• Conflict amongst supporting political parties (rural district)</li> <li>• Tainted by corruption cases</li> </ul>

Both the surviving and non-surviving incumbents have similar strengths, in terms of policies credited to them, which rest on the characteristics of policy outputs. The outputs meet the will of the major population and deliver direct and tangible or recognisable benefits to local people. Also, the surviving and non-surviving incumbents have similar weaknesses of poor performance on policy breakthroughs. The surviving incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo were complained about for few education policy breakthroughs.

The non-surviving incumbent in Trenggalek was also weakened by the controversy of the *mocaf* policy. The implementation of this policy was perceived to benefit more PKS than the PKB which supported the incumbent in the 2005 *pilkada*. This tension, then, led to the shift of the PKB's support from the incumbent to the winning challenger prior to the *pilkada*. In addition, the incumbent had some weaknesses in policy choices. He allocated a smaller local budget (APBD) for public works than the average expenditure of 29 regencies. This policy was unpopular amongst local people as they perceived that there was no significant improvement in infrastructure development under the incumbent's administration. Local

people also complained about the low quality of the local government owned hospital (RSUD)'s services. Meanwhile, the non-survivor in Madiun had to deal with critical voices mentioning that the incumbent implemented basic policies throughout his time governing the municipality. He was also criticised for claiming the huge infrastructure projects which were, in fact, initiated by the previous mayor. Nonetheless, during their first terms, the surviving incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo accomplished lower district HDI improvements than the non-surviving incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun.

Regarding external opportunities, the surviving incumbent in Blitar Regency succeeded in implementing and marketing these policies due to the strong encouragement of informal actors, namely business communities, *kiai*, local political parties, supporters of the local football club (PSBI), teachers, women's associations and partisan mass media. To fund these policies, the incumbent was supported by local legislators in the budgeting process. Moreover, the incumbent succeeded to set up and implement these policies due to strong support from bureaucrats. The incumbent was able to control bureaucrats who could implement policies which were praised by local people. In the case study in Blitar Regency, it was difficult to find external threats that may undermine the incumbent's populist policies and well-liked image.

The incumbent in Probolinggo was also able to utilise external opportunities encouraged by informal networks. The incumbent gained benefits from the strong support of PDI-P's networks, including local employers and Islam-based entities. They provided essential support in encountering issues and movements that were potentially harmful for the incumbent, providing logistics for supporting the incumbent's popular activities and adjusting the incumbent's nationalist identity in order to be accepted by Muslim communities, who make up more than 90 per cent of the total population in the municipality. Moreover, the strong support and loyalty of bureaucrats provided other opportunities endorsing good policy implementations and outputs credited to the incumbent. During his first term of government in the municipality, the external threat was a corruption allegation addressed to him and his administration. LIRA, a non-government watchdog organisation, revealed the corruption allegation committed by the incumbent four months prior to the election. In addition, money politics performed by a challenger's camp also threatened the incumbent close to the election. Nevertheless, the incumbent and his party networks succeeded in countering the issue without damaging his image as a good person amongst local people. The networks succeeded also in carrying out some contra movements undermining the money politics effects.

The non-surviving incumbents in Trenggalek and Madiun had to face different external opportunities and threats during their tenure and close to the *pilkada*. The incumbent in

Trenggalek actually gained support from local businessmen, *kiai* and bureaucrats. However, these external opportunities could not adequately support the incumbent since they are not solid. Moreover, the weak support created some external threats for the incumbent. In the local legislature, the incumbent was mainly supported by PKS' legislators, while the rest just gave weak support and opposed the incumbent's policies. Worse, the former incumbent (the winning challenger) succeeded in undermining the influence of informal networks attached to the incumbent. He succeeded in diverting a local farmer-based organisation (LMDH)'s support from the incumbent to him. Likewise, conflict among supporting political parties prior to the *pilkada* eroded the incumbent's external support. The incumbent was also tainted by five corruption cases committed by his staffs, which were discovered during his tenure.

The incumbent in Madiun, indeed, had strong support from his party's networks (PDI-P) during his government of the municipality. Moreover, the incumbent had a good relationship with the majority of local residents which, then, regarded him as a down-to-earth leader. These are reliable external opportunities for the incumbent, preceding the election. However, although the incumbent gained solid support from his party colleagues, the incumbent did not utilise his position as the mayor to extend the informal networks attached to him. His overconfidence as a single fighter created external threats, as he relied on a poor network. At the same time, he had to compete with many strong challengers in the election. The other threat was the massive money politics practices performed by the winning challenger's camp. The cash disbursed close to the election negated the incumbent's populist and tangible policy outputs and his popular image, which had been constructed over 5 years. Finally, the corruption case alleged against the incumbent created another threat that damaged his image amongst local people.

The SWOT analysis of policy choices made by the incumbents supports an argument that an incumbent's survival in the *pilkada* is not simply understood as the strengths of policy choices exceeding the weaknesses. Or, it cannot also just be assumed that the surviving incumbents are better in confirming policy strengths and addressing weaknesses than the non-surviving incumbents. More than that, an incumbent's survival also depends on external opportunities and threats that may support or undermine the incumbent's policy choices. The SWOT analysis shows those informal actors or networks and informal political practices (between the incumbents and both informal and formal actors) could contribute to or undermine the incumbents' survival. In other words, tangible and directly advantageous policy outputs do not purely show the outstanding performance of the incumbents throughout their periods in office; but they are also constructed by supporting informal networks, as well

as the play of incentives between the incumbents and both informal and formal actors and the use of patronage.

In other words, the relevant explanation of the logic of the incumbents' survival and failure in four districts derives from the analysis of external opportunities and threats, which is based on the comparative analysis of informal politics attached to all incumbents. Extensive networks attached to the incumbents are external opportunities that may support the incumbents in Blitar and Probolinggo to retain their posts in the re-election bids.

Specific to the case study in Madiun Municipality, the poor networks attached to the incumbent are external threats that undermined the incumbent's good achievements in office, as well as his popular image. Both incumbents in Probolinggo and Madiun actually had to deal with money politics performed by the challenger's camps. This external threat did not work to prevent the incumbent's landslide victory in Probolinggo, since the incumbent gained support from solid informal networks in the municipality. They succeeded in countering money politics' movements and effects. Conversely, poor networks attached to the incumbent in Madiun were powerless to counter external threats sparked by massive money politics performed by the winning challenger's camp.

## **8.9 Thesis Contribution: Theory, Methodology and Policy**

### **8.9.1. Theory**

The thesis makes contributions to theory, methodology and policy. To the literature on the theory of political survival (*selectorate* theory) by de Mesquita et al. (2003), the thesis, first, enriches the concept of tangibility to better understand the *selectorate's* voting behaviour. The thesis argues that not all voters can identify the incumbents' populism (policies and activities); some voters even intentionally ignore it. Thus, tangibility that delivers the concrete aspects of policy outputs and popular appearance which are credited to the incumbents contributes to shaping voters' preferences to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the re-election bid. Also, the thesis introduces the concept of rivalry to represent the operation of the actors who play informal politics that may encourage or undermine the incumbents' survival in the *pilkada*. Informal politics is the play of the politics of particularism that can bond the incumbents and informal and partisan formal actors and voters.

Secondly, the thesis revised the concept of provision of public goods that can contribute to the leaders' survival. The thesis finds specific goods were considered by voters in deciding to vote or not to vote for the incumbents in the *pilkada*, namely tangible goods, such as infrastructure; not intangible wellbeing aspects, such as improvements in health, education

and local economy. The concept of public goods also becomes blurred as the result of the politics of particularism played by the incumbents and informal and partisan formal actors. The politics of particularism converts public to private goods delivered exclusively by the incumbents and informal actors; they are favoured by voters. Voters easily recognise gifts, donations, subsidies, discounted groceries funded by the local budget or donated by businessmen that are credited to the incumbents.

Thirdly, the thesis criticizes the rational assumption of the *selectorate* theory about the possession of information on economic downturns, leaders' competence and the competitive advantage of the incumbents and challengers amongst voters. In fact, the majority of voters neglected these aspects. They strongly recalled and considered tangible aspects of policy outputs and the popular appearance of the incumbents. This included the role of money politics, as performed by the winning challenger, which distorted the information on the incumbent's competence in providing goods in Madiun Municipality.

The thesis also enriches narrative explanations of voting behaviour (preferences and reasons) in the *pilkada*, mainly pertaining to populism and tangibility, namely tangible policy outputs, the incumbents' well-liked image and the reliability of the leader to deliver tangible benefits or goods.

Specific to the preceding literature on the *pilkada* in Indonesia, Sulistiyanto (2009) argues that factors leading to the incumbent's survival in the *pilkada* are different in each district. Arguably, this study finds that populism, rivalry and tangibility are similar factors that could contribute to the incumbent's survival or failure in many *pilkada*. This thesis also expands Erb and Sulistiyanto's (2009) arguments about local leaders' survival in the *pilkada*. It proposes the significance of informal politics and networks in the *pilkada* as instruments to minimise the risks of political rivalry to the incumbent, mainly from informal and partisan formal actors.

To the literature on democracy, this thesis offers a complementary perspective to measure the progress of democracy by inserting electoral or democratic accountability. The concept further develops the inquiry into democracy in the emerging democratic countries that emphasises more on democratic consolidation (making democracy work). Electoral accountability offers countries in the emerging age of democracy an outcome perspective of democracy in shaping the will of the people (making democracy valuable). The thesis argues that, in addition to sustained democratic progress, an emerging democratic country needs impressive effects of democracy as a better alternative government than any other forms of non-democratic governments. Democratic accountability shows that a leader who is elected



competitively would chair a democratic government, to meet the common good and the will of the people.

Thus, based on the case study findings, the thesis recommends further practical work to examine the possibility of the inclusion of democratic or electoral accountability in composing the Indonesia Democracy Index (IDI). IDI is a provincially based measurement of democratic progress focused on three main aspects, namely civil liberties, political rights, and institutions of democracy. The first two aspects represent the essence of democracy and the last aspect represents developing structures and procedures to make democracy work (Rauf et.al, 2011, p. 13). The composite index of the three aspects results in the three categories of the level of democracy, namely poor, medium and good. From this principle of measurement, IDI applies a consolidation perspective to measure irreversible progress of democracy. Thus, this thesis recommends that IDI needs to incorporate electoral accountability, as complementary to this perspective, in order to broaden the assessment, which does not only ensure making democracy work, but also making democracy valuable. IDI could probably add a new aspect of measurement, to assess people's perceptions of the performance of local elected leaders as well as legislators. Thus, IDI may contribute not only to accomplishing democratic government, but also accountable government.

To study further the possibility of the application of democratic accountability as a complementary perspective in assessing democracy is another academic challenge. This would be relevant to analysing democratic progress in a country such Indonesia where informal politics notoriously colour the country's democratisation. Further literature and field research will be useful to strengthen the argument of this complementary perspective. Finally, since informal politics as a determiner of support in democratic competitions is not only an Indonesian exclusive phenomenon, there should be a further study to compare the similar phenomenon in other comparable democratic countries, both in advanced and developing countries. This comparative study will open up the case study from isolation of its analysis. It will also help to test the arguments of the incumbents' survival and failure in local political contests.

To the literature on voting behaviour, mainly for Javanese voters, this thesis reveals a genuine concept of *anut grubyuk* (fitting-in) in voting decisions in rural Java. The preceding theory on Javanese voters states that norms and values shape partisan choices amongst Javanese villagers. Rural Javanese voters express these norms and values mainly in two of three prominent *aliran* (mainstreams), namely *abangan* (who follow the Hinduistic element in Javanese tradition) and *santri* (who take as their main pattern a way of life orientation, a set of beliefs, values and expressive symbols based primarily on Islamic doctrine) (Gaffar,

1992). The study found different rural Javanese voting behaviour in Blitar and Trenggalek Regency. Voters consciously adjusted their decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbent to the majority of voting preferences in the neighbourhood. *Anut grubuyuk* demonstrates, firstly, a rational behaviour of voters to gain benefit from collective voting decisions in the neighbourhood that could be bartered for particular incentives from the incumbents and to overcome the limitation of information to support voters' decisions to vote or not to vote for the incumbents. Secondly, it also shows the level of democratic processes in the country that have not yet been able to provide equal freedom to vote independently for every voter. In other words, communality challenges equal power relationships in voting.

### **8.9.2. Methodology**

The thesis combines critical ethnography and narrative methods to provide detailed insights into the arguments and logic of the incumbents' survival and failure in the re-election bid. The thesis, then, succeeded in utilising critical ethnographic narratives of the survival and defeat of the incumbents in the *pilkada*. Critical ethnographic narratives provide detailed firsthand knowledge and experience of the socio-political dynamics beyond the landslide victory and crushing defeat of the incumbents. In addition to exploring normative stories related to the incumbents' populism, critical ethnographic narratives scrutinise the hidden stories of informal political practices and actors that encourage or undermine the incumbents' influence amongst local people. This research approach is also able to confirm the voters' logic in voting or not voting for the incumbents in the re-election bids, including the political lobbies and briberies that shape voters preferences for the incumbents, through their narrated experiences. Then, to this research approach, this thesis provides an additional practice of complementary qualitative research via the combination of case study, critical ethnography and narrative methods. Finally, the thesis recommends accommodating a better perspective of researching the *pilkada* and other democratic events, which is not merely an institutionally driven perspective, but also applies non-institutional lenses to scrutinise non-formal aspects that can shape the socio-political dynamics of the *pilkada*, the incumbents' survival or failure and voters' preferences. The combination of case study, critical ethnography and narrative methods is entirely appropriate for carrying out this research.

### **8.9.3 Policy context**

In the context of policy, the thesis expands the understanding of the dynamics of success and failure. Based on the academic findings and actual implementation of the *pilkada* in four rural and urban districts, the thesis opens the possibility of undertaking further academic work to

expand the coverage of the studies in different districts, to test the three interconnected conceptual elements (populism, rivalry and tangibility) that may support or undermine the chance of the incumbents to survive in re-election bids. Although, the implementation of the *pilkada* in all regions is directed by the same regulatory regime, the socio-political dynamics of each district are possibly different.

Furthermore, with reference to policy and governance, the expansion of the area of study is also critical, to research whether the downward trend in local development achievements in the post-*pilkada* period occurred only in East Java or in many parts of Indonesia. Why does this trend take place in a democratic government? Are there any structural factors outside local government and local leadership influencing the worse local development achievements in the post-*pilkada* period, such as the decentralisation regulatory regime and the existence of strong informal politics? Based on the case study findings, the thesis recommends beginning with the inquiry into informal politics and governance attached to the district heads as an academic entry point. Further study could focus on related particular motives attached to informal politics, such as *family-ism*, *party-ism*, *primordial-ism*, *faction-ism*, *group-ism*, *constituent-ism*, cronyism, and other partisan interests.

To understand gender related issues pertaining to the *pilkada*, the thesis provides an additional view that the *pilkada* has not yet generated a positive impact on women at the local level. Women deal with limited choices related to the *pilkada* and local development. Firstly, the *pilkada* law discourages women candidates from running in an equal competition. Secondly, the decentralisation regulatory regime has restricted the elected local leaders (governor/regent/mayor) from pursuing better gender-related policies in local budgeting and policy planning. As a result, local development is less sensitive to women's needs and demands. Thirdly, the thesis provides an interesting finding that women rarely consider gender-related strategic interests in voting. It is, then, understandable that the *pilkada* provides less pressure for local leaders to implement better gender-related policies. Finally, the thesis provides an empirical picture of women's engagement in the *pilkada*. Although women cover a greater population than men in the country and they are not discriminated against in standing for election and holding public offices, they are actually powerless and captured in the local political arena and the logic of tangibility in voting.

Indonesia has a new law on the election of governors and district heads (*pilkada*), as the House of Representatives (DPR) passed the bill on the *pilkada* on 26 September 2014. In stipulating the law, the DPR pursued a voting mechanism, since there were two different options on the *pilkada* mechanism, whether governors and district heads are elected directly by the people or by provincial and district legislators. Finally, the coalition of five political

parties (*Golkar, PKS, PAN, Gerindra* and *PPP*) that proposed the *pilkada* via provincial and district legislative bodies won the voting by 226 legislators' ballots. They stipulated the Law No. 22/2014 on the Election for Governors, Regents and Mayors. One day after the stipulation of the law, people and other parties supporting direct election for governors and district heads protested against the new law, since it undermines the country's democracy. The protesters argue that the law is a setback in Indonesian democracy. More than 30 civil society organisations (CSOs) plan to propose a judicial review to the constitutional court (MK) to cancel the law (*Jawa Pos*, 27 September 2014). Protests against the law spread across the country. Students, local CSOs and even governors, regents and mayors rallied to reject the law. To respond to these massive protests and this rejection, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, issued the government regulation that replaces Law (*Perppu*) No.1/2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors on 2 October 2014. The *Perppu* repealed the Law No. 22/2014 as well as bringing back direct election for governors and district heads. Also, the President issued the *Perppu* No.2/2014 on the Amendment of the Regional Government Law, to repeal the authority of provincial and district legislators to vote for governors and district heads.

This thesis, then, performs a simple SWOT analysis of the *Perppu* No.1/2014 based on the focus of this study. It assesses five aspects in the regulation pertaining to the thesis, namely incumbency, informal politics and campaigns, voters' education, bureaucracy and women. Table 8.5 shows a simple SWOT analysis of the *Perppu*.

**Table 8.5** SWOT Analysis on the Government Regulation that replaces Law (*Perppu*) No.1/2014 on the Election of Governor, Regent and Mayor

<p><b>Strengths:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One man one vote (article 1-2)</li> <li>• Regular and simultaneous (article 3)</li> <li>• Professional and Independent election organiser (KPUD) (article 8-22)</li> <li>• Assure formal and independent supervisory committee (<i>panwas</i>) (article 23-36)</li> <li>• Accommodate non-party candidates (individual) and open competition (article 39-43)</li> <li>• Assure political citizenship/ equal suffrage for eligible voters (article 56)</li> <li>• Detail campaign methods and schedules (article 63-68)</li> <li>• Campaign materials and methods encouragement for smart voters (article 64-65)</li> <li>• Detail anticipation of campaign violations and fund (article 69-76)</li> <li>• Impartial campaign (article 70-71)</li> <li>• Money politics is regulated as an election crime (article 73)</li> <li>• Regulates specific restrictions for incumbents within six months prior to the election (fairness) (article 71)</li> <li>• Impartial campaign (article 70) (strict prohibition to involve government officials, state owned companies' officials Army, Police, state employees, village heads and staffs)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Weaknesses:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender-blind (no-quota for female candidates) (article 40-41)</li> <li>• Gender-blind candidate platforms (article 64)</li> <li>• Formal perspective in regulating campaign (article 63)</li> <li>• Campaign funds regulations do not fully anticipate transactional volunteers supporting certain candidates (article 74, 76)</li> <li>• No specific sanction on money politics and political bribery (disburser and receiver) (the violation of article 73)</li> <li>• Incomplete in regulating campaign teams (the absence of specific articles regulating campaign teams)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Opportunities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accommodate independent monitoring (article 131-133)</li> <li>• Assure people's participation for socialisation, surveys and quick counts (article 131-133)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Threats:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does not anticipate the candidates' supporters outside the official campaign team</li> </ul>

The simple SWOT analysis suggests that the regulation does not adequately anticipate informal politics in the *pilkada*. In regulating campaigns, it seems to capture the formal perspective that campaigning is an exclusive right of the *pilkada* organizers (provincial and district general election commissions) (article 63). Consequently, there is an incomplete regulation of the campaign teams attached to candidates. Also, the regulation does not anticipate candidates' supporters who may possibly perform campaigning activities. In fact, the case studies reveal that the activities of the candidates' supporters outside the official campaign teams are much larger and potentially create conflicts of interest for the incumbents. These informal supporters are mostly local businessmen who gain benefits from local government projects or mutual transactional benefits from the incumbents.

The regulation forbids candidates and/or campaign teams to disburse and/or pledge money or other materials to persuade voters (article 73). Nevertheless, it does not specifically regulate sanctions for those disbursing or receiving money or other materials. Consequently,

it may encourage candidates and/or campaign teams to carry out political bribery of voters prior to the *pilkada*.

Policy options for women candidates in this regulation are also poor. First, the regulation does not determine a specific quota for female candidates to run in the *pilkada*. Secondly, the regulation does not accommodate gender and women related platforms for every candidate running in the race. The absence of women-specific issues in the regulation will continue to marginalize women-specific needs and demands in provincial and district policies. It may also impact on the poor participation of women in holding public office.

In order to anticipate these loopholes, the thesis recommends some improvements. Firstly, the government and DPR need to accommodate informal reviews on campaigning. These should not only be limited to formal related election activities which are exclusively performed by KPUD, since informal actors aligned to candidates may be involved in persuading voters prior to the *pilkada*. As a result, informal politics potentially captures elected local leaders, to favour their supporters. Secondly, to accommodate women and gender-related issues, the regulation should be amended by stipulating new articles to accommodate specific quotas for female candidates and pro-women platforms for every candidate. Thirdly, the government and the DPR should stipulate specific sanctions to whoever is involved in the practices of political bribery in attempting to persuade voters.

Finally, to reduce the risks of the plays of particularism by the incumbents, the government and DPR, assisted by the corruption eradication commission (*KPK*), needs to synchronise the regulation with the Anti-Corruption Law (*UU Tipikor*), the law on regional administration and the presidential regulation on procurement. This effort is crucial to anticipate any “insider trading” performed by elected local leaders and businessmen as well as other informal actors that may gain benefits from local and/or national government projects implemented in the regions.

Moreover, this thesis recommends applying the measurement of electoral accountability index across regions in Indonesia. The national government can measure electoral accountability of 34 governors and deputies, 412 regents and deputies, and 93 mayors and deputies. The measurement can cover regional development performances under the elected regional heads’ administrations. The last, the national government and universities can cooperate to conduct the measurement of predatory government risk. It will address three main predatory indicators in a day-to-day basis of regional government practices, namely corruption, inefficiency, and power abuse. The government can publish the rank of predatory risk of each region and use reward and punishment mechanism to create a positive pressure for district and provincial governments. In particular, the risk assessment is addressed to

minimise the practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism amongst the elected regional heads, informal actors, and the victory teams attached to the elected regional heads. In the long term, it will promote the implementation of good and clean regional governance.

For political parties, the Law No. 8/2015 has provided a legal framework as well as limitation in recruiting candidates for competing in the *pilkada*. Article 47 stipulates that political party or a coalition of political parties is strictly prohibited to receive compensation from candidates in exchange for nomination in the *pilkada*. However, in a patronage driven democracy, it is not easy for candidates to avoid transactional politics in gaining endorsement for candidacy from political parties. At the same time, political parties are also pragmatic to prioritise competitive candidates who have strong financial resource and adequate electability. In addition, Indonesian party system is much centralised in nominating candidates to run in the *pilkada* and other elections. Thus, it opens opportunities for candidates to lobby the national board of political party (DPP) for gaining ‘ticket’ in candidacy. Nevertheless, the DPP’s privilege to make final decision in nominating candidates is also a screening to assure good political recruitment. DPP can set specific terms and conditions for carrying out political recruitment, particularly in selecting proper candidates as mentioned in the Law No. 2/2011 on Political Party. However, article 29 of the law should be amended in order to incorporate capacity, integrity, and network aspects in recruiting and selecting candidates to run for public legislative and executive offices. As a result, in the near future parties will prioritise capable and clean candidates, particularly for running in the *pilkada*.

## Chapter 9

### Conclusion

The thesis researched direct elections for the district head (*pilkada*) that took place in four rural and urban districts in East Java where the incumbents were re-elected or were unsuccessful in retaining their posts as a result of the election.<sup>755</sup> It found three typological interrelated elements colouring the socio-political dynamics of the *pilkada* in contemporary Indonesia, namely *populism*, *rivalry* and *tangibility*.

To sum up:

*Populism* refers to the strategies that emphasise winning through making populist policies and popular activities, rather than effective or relevant policy that has medium and long term implications.

*Rivalry* refers to the capability to manage support and opposition both from formal and informal actors through fair or unfair means.

*Tangibility* refers to the ability to deliver tangible policy outputs for the electorate, by building tangible infrastructures or distributing goods that will support the incumbents' re-elections.

In particular, this comparative case study in four urban and rural districts affirms that the capability for minimising rivalry risks is a cross-cutting factor that may contribute to the incumbents' survival or failure in the re-election bid. In other words, obtaining backing and protection from informal and partisan formal actors in the region is probably more essential than a worthwhile performance by the incumbents in delivering populist policy outputs, demonstrating a popular appearance and improving the macro development achievements of the districts.

Taking a cue from the case study in four districts, the surviving and non-surviving leaders' strategies have implications for the way democracy works in an emerging democratic country:

1. Leaders who practise populist democracy which delivers relatively equal benefits of local development have been defeated in re-election bids. The leaders actually succeeded to implement populist policy choices and the worthwhile benefits of policy outputs and outcomes to all people, and make relatively impartial connections to all people in the regions.

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<sup>755</sup> The thesis took the case of the 2010 *pilkada* for rural districts and the 2008 *pilkada* for Urban Districts. The detailed explanation is presented in chapter 3 on Methodology.



2. However, leaders who play patronage driven democracy by relying on the support of certain informal and partisan formal backers and have lower accomplishments in local development regain their posts for the next term.

Reflecting on the Indonesian democracy “big bang” since 1998, the importance of informal backers (protectors and defenders) for the incumbents’ survival in a so-called competitive election demonstrates one of the vital indicators to read working democracy in the third largest democratic country. One cannot adequately review Indonesian liberal democracy practices from merely institutional or formal change, such as the enactments of laws on direct presidential election and the *pilkada*. Blatant patronage between the surviving incumbents and informal political actors is evidence negating the working democracy. In other words, the strong presence of informality, via legalised transactional policies and practices between the incumbents and their supporters, must be considered in examining Indonesian democracy. Particularly, businessmen and partisan bureaucrats are no less important than political parties in supporting as well as facilitating the incumbents’ winning in re-election bids.

Consequently, the leaders who survive are consummate strategists who strengthen patronage driven democracy, because the regular succession of a leader demands the major support of the people; in fact, it is determined by much fewer numbers of vital protectors and defenders. These backers attach themselves to the incumbent leaders who can control the dynamics of support and opposition.

Moreover, it gives an academic lesson that democracy big bang is not merely about authoritarian regime removal and institutional change. It also covers essential actions about better political recruitment as well as the prevention of old interest to contaminate new democratic institutions and platforms.

In addition, the relatively absence of civic spirit amongst voters is another great challenge for functioning democracy. Ignorance, pragmatism, and manipulated group-oriented voting (*anut grubyuk*) are poor examples following democracy big bang. They will not help democracy to hold local elected leaders accountable for pursuing long-term interest of the people, rather than short-term self-political interest. Accordingly, democracy does not only need equal liberty for every citizen to vote for leaders, but also democratic behaviour or a developed civic spirit (Rothstein, in Goodin and Klingeman (eds.), 1996, p. 150). Furthermore, democracy requires accountable elected leaders who run the office under the collective control of the goodwill of the people. This may tell us that the recent debates in Indonesia, on whether governor and district heads should be elected directly by the people or

indirectly by legislators, are not relevant without considering the democratic accountability of elected leaders.

What, then, the prospect of Indonesian democracy? In the middle term, there will be some incremental improvements, mainly in the *pilkada*. However, informal politics will remain occur and capture the *pilkada* and democracy. The recent enacted Law No. 1/2015 and 8/2015 on Direct Election for Governor, Regent and Mayor seeks to minimise several loopholes in candidacy and preventing political dynasty. In fact, the law less anticipate the danger of informality colouring the *pilkada*. Some vulnerable articles appear, namely in regulating campaign, election related criminal acts including money politics, and the sanction.

In the long term, Indonesian democracy will hinge its future on the support of civil society organisations (CSOs) to realise fair and competitive democracy. The initiatives of non-profit organisations<sup>756</sup> to oversee the 2014 Presidential Election by carrying out real quick-count, which is openly published to public, has given a new expectation of public engagement for fair and competitive election. The similar organisation will probably occur at the local level to watch the *pilkada* since the law No. 1/2015 and 8/2015 on the *pilkada* open spaces for CSOs to observe the *pilkada* implementation and invite people to participate in supervising the *pilkada*, conducting quick count and polling, familiarisation, and voter education.

The new law regulates also the simultaneous *pilkada* or *pilkada serentak* in all regions and provinces. The first wave of joint *pilkada* will be held on 9 December 2015 in nine provinces, 36 municipalities and 224 regencies. The simultaneous *pilkada* will contribute to endorse fair and competitive election in Indonesia. In the long term, this concurrent *pilkada* probably gives opportunity to public for setting a concurrent starting point in evaluating the performance and capacity of elected leaders. Furthermore, the simultaneous *pilkada* gives chance to public for comparing the performance of elected leaders as well as parties proposed the leaders. The performance comparison will provide public with better and objective basis of inter-regional evaluation.

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<sup>756</sup> Such as *kawalpemilu.org* (an IT-based election watchdog)

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#### **4. Laws and Regulations**

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The Law 12/2008 on the Second Amendment of the Law No 32/2004 on Regional Government.

The Law No. 2/2011 on the the Amendment of the Law No. 2/2008 on Political Party.

The Law No. 15/2011 on the General Election Implementers.

The Law No. 1/2015 on the the Election of Governor, Regent and Mayor.

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The monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) 9<sup>th</sup> edition - January 2008.  
The monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) 10<sup>th</sup> edition - February 2008.  
The monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) 11<sup>th</sup> edition – March 2008.  
The monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) 12<sup>th</sup> edition – April 2008.  
The monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) 15<sup>th</sup> edition – July 2008.  
The monthly review of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) 24<sup>th</sup> edition – November 2010.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1. Introduction letter



Associate Professor Janet McIntyre

Department of Politics and Public Policy  
School of Social and Policy Studies  
GPO Box 2100  
Adelaide SA 5001

Tel: + 61 8 82012075

Fax: + 61 8 82015111

[janet.mcintyre@flinders.edu.au](mailto:janet.mcintyre@flinders.edu.au)

<http://www.flinders.edu.au/people/janet.mcintyre>

CRICOS Provider No. 00114A

Adelaide, 20 April 2012

#### LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Dear Sir or Madam

This letter is to introduce Mr Wawan Sobari who is a PhD Student in the Department of Politics and Public Policy at Flinders University.

He is undertaking research leading to the production of a PhD thesis on the subject of **"Exploring Policy Behaviour, Informal Governance, and the Political Survival of District Heads in Indonesia (A Case of Four Districts in East Java, Indonesia)"**

He would be most grateful if you would volunteer to assist in this project, by granting an interview which covers certain aspects of this topic. No more than one hour on two occasions would be required.

Be assured that any information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and none of the participants will be individually identifiable in the resulting thesis, report or other publications. You are, of course, entirely free to discontinue your participation at any time or to decline to answer particular questions.

Since he intends to make a tape recording of the interview, he will seek your consent, on the attached form, to record the interview, to use the recording or a transcription in preparing the thesis, report or other publications, on condition that your name or identity is not revealed.

Any enquiries you may have concerning this project should be directed to me at the address given above or by telephone on + 61 8 82012075 (office hour) or by e-mail to [janet.mcintyre@flinders.edu.au](mailto:janet.mcintyre@flinders.edu.au).

Thank you for your attention and assistance.

Yours sincerely

Assoc. Prof Janet McIntyre  
Principal Supervisor  
Department of Politics and Public Policy

*This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project Number 5595). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on 8201 3116, by fax on 8201 2035 or by email [human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au](mailto:human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au).*

## Appendix 2. Ethic Approval

**From:** [Human Research Ethics](#)  
**To:** "[Wawan Sobari \(soba0001@flinders.edu.au\)](mailto:Wawan Sobari (soba0001@flinders.edu.au))"; "[Janet McIntyre](mailto:Janet McIntyre)"; "[Craig Matheson \(craig.matheson@flinders.edu.au\)](mailto:Craig Matheson (craig.matheson@flinders.edu.au))"  
**Subject:** 5595 SBREC - Final approval  
**Date:** Tuesday, 29 May 2012 4:34:00 PM  
**Importance:** High

---

Dear Wawan,

The Chair of the [Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee \(SBREC\)](#) at Flinders University considered your response to conditional approval out of session and your project has now been granted final ethics approval. Your ethics final approval notice can be found below.

---

### FINAL APPROVAL NOTICE

Project No.:

Project Title:

Principal Researcher:

Email:

Address:

Approval Date:

Ethics Approval Expiry  
Date:

The above proposed project has been **approved** on the basis of the information contained in the application, its attachments and the information subsequently provided.

---

### RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESEARCHERS AND SUPERVISORS

#### 1. Participant Documentation

Please note that it is the responsibility of researchers and supervisors, in the case of student projects, to ensure that:

- all participant documents are checked for spelling, grammatical, numbering and formatting errors. The Committee does not accept any responsibility for the above mentioned errors.
- the Flinders University logo is included on all participant documentation (e.g., letters of Introduction, information Sheets, consent forms, debriefing information and questionnaires – with the exception of purchased research tools) and the current

Flinders University letterhead is included in the header of all letters of introduction. The Flinders University international logo/letterhead should be used and documentation should contain international dialling codes for all telephone and fax numbers listed for all research to be conducted overseas.

- the SBREC contact details, listed below, are included in the footer of all letters of introduction and information sheets.

*This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project Number 'INSERT PROJECT No. here following approval'). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on 8201 3116, by fax on 8201 2035 or by email [human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au](mailto:human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au).*

## **2. Annual Progress / Final Reports**

In order to comply with the monitoring requirements of the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (March 2007)* an annual progress report must be submitted each year on the **29 May** (approval anniversary date) for the duration of the ethics approval using the [annual progress / final report pro forma](#). *Please retain this notice for reference when completing annual progress or final reports.*

If the project is completed *before* ethics approval has expired please ensure a final report is submitted immediately. If ethics approval for your project expires please submit either

(1) a final report; or (2) an extension of time request and an annual report.

Your first report is due on **29 May 2013** or on completion of the project, whichever is the earliest.

## **3. Modifications to Project**

Modifications to the project must not proceed until approval has been obtained from the Ethics Committee. Such matters include:

- proposed changes to the research protocol;
- proposed changes to participant recruitment methods;
- amendments to participant documentation and/or research tools;
- extension of ethics approval expiry date; and
- changes to the research team (addition, removals, supervisor changes).

To notify the Committee of any proposed modifications to the project please submit a [Modification Request Form](#) to the [Executive Officer](#). Please note that extension of time requests should be submitted prior to the Ethics Approval Expiry Date listed on this notice.

### Change of Contact Details

Please ensure that you notify the Committee if either your mailing or email address changes to ensure that correspondence relating to this project can be sent to you. A modification request is not required to change your contact details.

## **4. Adverse Events and/or Complaints**

Researchers should advise the Executive Officer of the Ethics Committee on 08 8201- 3116 or [human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au](mailto:human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au) immediately if:

- any complaints regarding the research are received;
- a serious or unexpected adverse event occurs that effects participants;
- an unforeseen event occurs that may affect the ethical acceptability of the project.

Andrea Fiegert (nee Mather) Executive  
Officer

Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee

c.c A/Prof Janet McIntyre-Mills, [janet.mcintyre@flinders.edu.au](mailto:janet.mcintyre@flinders.edu.au)  
A/Prof Craig Matheson, [craig.matheson@flinders.edu.au](mailto:craig.matheson@flinders.edu.au)

---

**Andrea Fiegert (nee Mather)**

Executive Officer, Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee Research  
Services Office | Union Building Basement  
Flinders University  
Sturt Road, Bedford Park | South Australia | 5042 GPO  
Box 2100 | Adelaide SA 5001  
P: +61 8 8201-3116 | F: +61 8 8201-2035 | Web: [Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee](#)

CRICOS Registered Provider: The Flinders University of South Australia | CRICOS Provider Number 00114A  
This email and attachments may be confidential. If you are not the intended recipient,  
please inform the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message.

## Appendix 3 Letter of Permission from Blitar Regency



**THE GOVERNMENT OF BLITAR REGENCY**  
**THE NATIONAL UNITY AND POLITIC OFFICE**  
Jalan Dr. Soetomo No. 53 Telephone/Facsimile (0342) 801243  
BLITAR 66133

### **LETTER OF STATEMENT**

To conduct survey/research  
No:072/127/409.202/2012

To read: Introductory letter from Flinders University dated 20 April 2012  
To refer: 1. The Instruction of Minister of Internal Affairs 1972 No. 3  
2. The Letter of East Java Governor dated 17 July 1972 No. Gu/187/1972

Hereby state that the The National Unity and Politic Office of Blitar Regency **HAS NO OBJECTION** of survey/ research to be conducted by:

Responsible Person : **Assoc. Prof. JANET MCINTYRE**  
Address : Social Science South Building room 312, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Science, Flinders University, Sturt Road, Bedford Park, SA 5042 GPO Box 2100, Adelaide 5001, South Australia  
Theme of research : **"Exploring Policy Behaviour, Informal Governance and the Political Survival of District Heads in Indonesia (A Case of Four Districts in East Java, Indonesia)"**  
Location of survey/research : DPRD (Local House of Representative), KPUD (local election Commission ), Education Office, Health Office, Cooperative, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Office, Industry and Trade Office, Public Works Office for Road and Watering, Public Works Office for Housing and Area Planning, People Welfare Office, The Village of [redacted] of Srengat Sub-District, The Village of [redacted] of Wonotirto Sub-District of Blitar Regency.  
Period of Survey/Research : From June 2012 to January 2013  
Surveyor/research follower/participant : **WAWAN SOBARI**


With the following stipulations:

1. To obey valid regulations within the legal area of the local government
2. Within 1 x 24 hours after arriving in the targeted area, the participant is obliged to make report to the local head of sub-district/ head of village
3. To maintain the order, security, politeness, and decency as well as to avoid making statements, both spoken and written, that may disturb feelings or insult religion, nation, and state from one of community groups.
4. The Participant is forbidden to do activities out of activities stated above.
5. **By the end of survey/research**, the researcher is obliged to report to the regent through the Head of National Unity and Politic Office concerning the end final result of the survey/ research prior to leave the survey/ research site.
6. Within 1 month after completing survey/research, the participant is obliged to submit the research result to:



- a. Offices that are stated in this letter
  - b. The Regent
7. This letter of statement will be withdrawn and invalid if the holder of the letter does not commit to the stipulations stated above.
  8. The abuse of this letter of statement that has detrimental consequences for other parties are out of the responsibility of the Head of National Unity and Politic Office of the Blitar Regency.

Blitar, 30 April 2012  
 Head of National Unity and Politic Office  
 Blitar Regency



**Drs. MUJIANTO**  
 Senior Officer Level I  
 NIP 19620815 199303 1 005

Copy carbon:

1. The Head of Local House of Representative (DPRD) of Blitar Regency
2. The Head of Local Election Commission (KPUD) of Blitar Regency
3. The Head of Development and Planning Office (BAPPEDA) of Blitar Regency
4. The Head of Health Office of Blitar Regency
5. The Head of Education Office of Blitar Regency
6. The Head of Cooperative, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Office of Blitar Regency
7. The Head of Industry and Trade Office of Blitar Regency
8. The Head of Public Works Office for Road and Watering of Blitar Regency
9. The Head of Public Works Office for Housing and Area Planning of Blitar Regency
10. The Head of People Welfare Office of Blitar Regency
11. The Head of Srengat Sub-District
12. The Head of Wonotirto Sub-District



for:  Manager,  
*[Signature]*  
**Prof. Dr. Ir. Loekito Adi Soehono, M.Agr.**  
 Jl. Galunggung 39 Malang, East Java – Indonesia  
 Phone: +62 341 568133  
 Fax: +62 341 582124

This translation was done specifically for institutional reference only

## Appendix 4 Letter of Permission from Trenggalek Regency

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THE GOVERNMENT OF TRENGGALEK REGENCY  
THE NATIONAL UNITY, POLITIC, AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION OFFICE  
Jl. HOS Cokroaminoto No. 1 Telephone (0355) 796547  
TRENGGALEK Postcode 66316

Trenggalek, 26 April 2012

To:

1. The Head of Education and Culture Office
2. The Head of Health Office
3. The Head of Cooperative, Industry, Trade, Mining and Energy Office
4. The Head of Public Works Office for Road and Watering
5. The Head of Housing, Settlement, and Cleanliness Office
6. The Secretary of Local Council
7. The Chair of Local Election Commission
8. The Chair of Local Election Inspector Committee
9. The Head of Trenggalek Sub-district
10. The Head of Watulimo Sub-district

### **THE LETTER OF STATEMENT TO CONDUCT SURVEY/ RESEARCH**

No:072/269/406.043/2012

To read : Introductory letter from Flinders University dated 20 April 2012

Person who is responsible : **Prof. Janet McIntyre**

Theme of research : **"Exploring Policy Behaviour, Informal Governance and the Political Survival of District Heads in Indonesia (A Case of Four Districts in East Java, Indonesia)"**

Purpose : To conduct research for doctoral thesis

Period of Survey/Research : From June 2012 to January 2013

Location of survey/research : Education and Culture Office, Health Office, Cooperative, Industry, Trade, Mining and Energy Office, Public Works Office for Road and Watering, Housing, Settlement, and Cleanliness Office, Local Council, Local Election Commission, Local Election Inspector Committee, the Village of [REDACTED] of Trenggalek Sub-district, the village of [REDACTED] of Watulimo Sub-district

Surveyor/research follower/participant : **WAWAN SOBARI**

Address : Kol. Sugiono X Perum Kota Lama Indah Kav. 16 Ciptomulyo, Sukun, Malang

Others

1. The researcher is obligated to obey existing regulations where he/she conduct research
2. Activities being conducted should be in accordance with the proposed research proposal
3. After completing the activities, the researcher has to report the written result to the regent through the Head of National Unity,

- Politic, and Community Protection Office of the Regency of  
Treggalek.
4. This letter of statement will be withdrawn and invalid if the  
holder of the letter does not commit to the stipulations stated  
above.

On Behalf of the Head of National Unity, Politic,  
and Community Protection Office  
The Regency of Treggalek  
The Deputy of Ideology Building



**MUHRODJI**  
Junior Administrator Level I  
NIP 19580817 198508 1 002


Copy carbon:  
1. Researcher



Manager,  
  
Prof. Dr. Ir. Loekito Adi Soehono, M.Agr.  
Jl. Galunggung 39 Malang, East Java – Indonesia  
Phone: +62 341 568133  
Fax: +62 341 582124

This translation was done specifically for institutional reference only

Appendix 5 Letter of Permission from Probolinggo Municipality



**THE GOVERNMENT OF PROBOLINGGO MUNICIPALITY**  
**THE NATIONAL UNITY, POLITIC, AND**  
**COMMUNITY PROTECTION OFFICE**  
Jalan Mawar No. 39 Telephone/Facsimile (0335) 426 436  
PROBOLINGGO 67211

**LETTER OF APPROVAL OF HEAD OF THE NATIONAL UNITY, POLITIC,**  
**AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROBOLINGGO**  
**MUNICIPALITY**

No: 072/274/425.206/2012

CONCERNING

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Legal basis : The Regulation of the Major of Probolinggo Municipality No. 39 year 2008 concerning Core Task and Function of the National Unity, Politics, and Community Protection Office of Probolinggo Municipality.

In regards with Letter from the Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Brawijaya University dated 24 April 2012 No: 1787/UM.10.11/11/2012 concerning Letter of Research Statement, hereby.

TO APPROVE:

To :  
Name/NIP : **WAWAN SOBARI, S.IP, MA/ 19740801 200801 1 009**  
Address : Kol. Sugiono X Perum Kota Lama Indah Kav. 16 Ciptomulyo, Sukun Subdistrict, Malang City  
Purpose : Permission to conduct research  
Title of research : "Exploring Policy Behaviour, Informal Governance and the Political Survival of District Heads in Indonesia (A Case of Four Districts in East Java, Indonesia)"  
Location of survey/research : 1. Education Office of Probolinggo Municipality  
2. Health Office of Probolinggo Municipality  
3. Cooperative, Energy, Mining, Industry, and Trade Office of Probolinggo Municipality  
4. Public Works Office of Probolinggo Municipality  
5. People Welfare Office of Local Secretariat of Probolinggo Municipality  
6. Secretary of Local House of Representatives of Probolinggo Municipality  
7. Local Election Commission of Probolinggo Municipality  
8. The Village of Kademangan Probolinggo Municipality  
9. The Village of [REDACTED] of Probolinggo Municipality  
10. The Village of [REDACTED] of Probolinggo Municipality  
Duration of Research : 3 (three) months from 1 October 2012 to 31 December 2012  
Other researchers : -

With the following stipulations:

1. Researcher is obligated to report his/her arrival to the head of sub-district and the chief of sub-district police office within 1 x 24 hours;
2. To obey existing regulations within the legal area of the government and avoid to behave that may disturb feelings or insult individual and group dignity, religion, and ethnic;
3. The researcher is forbidden to do other activities out of research purposes;
4. By the end of survey/research, the researcher is obliged to report to the officer at the sites prior to leave the research sites;
5. Within 1 month after completing survey/research, the researcher is obliged to submit the research report and to the Major of Probolinggo Municipality through the Head of National Unity, Politics, and Community Protection Office;
6. This letter of statement will be withdrawn and invalid if the holder of the letter does not commit to the stipulations stated above.

Enacted in Probolinggo  
Dated 30 April 2012  
On behalf of the Head of National Unity,  
Politic, and Community Protection Office  
The Municipality of Probolinggo  
Secretary

Stamp

**SUHARI WASIS ISMOYO, SH, MH,**  
Senior Officer Level I  
NIP 19601031 198103 1 006

**Copy carbon:**

1. The Major of Probolinggo Municipality (as a report);
2. The Head of Health Office of Probolinggo Municipality;
3. The Head of Cooperative, Energy, Mining, Industry, and Trade Office of Probolinggo Municipality
4. The Head of Public Works Office of Probolinggo Municipality;
5. The Head of People Welfare Office of Local Secretariat of Probolinggo Municipality;
6. The Head of Secretary of Local House of Representative of Probolinggo Municipality;
7. The Head of Local Election Commission of Probolinggo Municipality;
8. The Heads of Sub-district in Probolinggo Municipality;
9. The Chiefs of sub-district police office in Probolinggo Municipality;
10. The Head of Village of Kademangan of Probolinggo Municipality;
11. The Head of Village of [REDACTED] of Probolinggo Municipality;
12. The Head of Village of [REDACTED] of Probolinggo Municipality;
13. Researcher.



Manager,  
  
Prof. Dr. Ir. Lukito Adi Soehono, M.Agr.  
Jl. Galunggung 39 Malang, East Java – Indonesia  
Phone: +62 341 568133  
Fax: +62 341 582124

This translation was done specifically for institutional reference only

## Appendix 6 Letter of Permission from Madiun Municipality



**THE GOVERNMENT OF MADIUN MUNICIPALITY**  
THE NATIONAL UNITY, POLITIC, AND  
COMMUNITY PROTECTION OFFICE  
Jl. UDOWO NO. 1 MADIUN 63116  
Telephone (0351) 462153  
Website <http://www.madiunkota.go.id>

Madiun, 3 May 2012

Number : 072/396/401.203/2012  
Urgency : Ordinary  
Attachment : -  
Concern : Permission of doing  
Research/Survey

To:

1. The Head of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sport Office
  2. The Head of Health Office
  3. The Head Industry, Trade, Cooperative, and Tourism Office
  4. The Secretary of Local Council
  5. The Head of Public Works Office
  6. The Head of Economy and Social Administration Office
  7. The Chair of Local Election Commission
  8. The Head of Taman Sub-district
  9. The Head of Mangunharjo Sub-district
- In -

### MADIUN

In accordance with the Local Regulation of the Municipality of Madiun No. 05 year 2008 and the Major Regulation of Madiun Municipality No. 48 year 2008 concerning Task and Function of The National Unity, Politic, and Community Protection Office, also refer to Introductory letter from Flinders University dated 20 April 2012 concerning the permission of doing research/ survey, hereby state that the below name:

NAME : WAWAN SOBARI  
PLACE/DATE OF BIRTH : BANDUNG, 1 AUGUST 1974  
ADDRESS : PERUM KOTA LAMA INDAH 16 MALANG  
NIM/NPM :  
RESEARCH TITLE : EXPLORING POLICY BEHAVIOUR, "INFORMAL GOVERNANCE" AND THE POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF DISTRICT HEADS IN INDONESIA (A CASE OF FOUR DISTRICTS IN EAST JAVA, INDONESIA)  
PURPOSE : TO CONDUCT RESEARCH FOR DOCTORAL THESIS  
LOCATION OF SURVEY/RESEARCH : EDUCATION, CULTURE, YOUTH, AND SPORT OFFICE, HEALTH OFFICE, INDUSTRY, TRADE, COOPERATIVE, AND TOURISM OFFICE, LOCAL COUNCIL, PUBLIC WORKS OFFICE, ECONOMY AND SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICE, LOCAL ELECTION COMMISSION, THE VILLAGE OF [REDACTED], AND THE VILLAGE OF [REDACTED] OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MADIUN.

DURATION OF SURVEY/RESEARCH : 3 (THREE) MONTHS (Note: Research is conducted from November 2012 to January 2013)  
Other researchers : --

Will conduct research in your office/area with note that researcher is obligated to follow the existing regulations and to make a report after finishing research activity, also to submit 1 (book) of research/survey result to the The National Unity, Politic, and Community Protection Office of the Municipality of Madiun.

This is for your concern and assistance.

HEAD NATIONAL UNITY, POLITIC, AND  
COMMUNITY PROTECTION OFFICE  
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MADIUN

Stamp

**MIDI HARTONO, S.Sos, SH, M.Hum**  
Senior Officer Level I  
NIP. 19571111 198409 1 002

Copy carbon:

1. The Major of Madiun Municipality (as a report)
2. Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia
3. Researcher



Manager,  
  
Prof. Dr. Ir. L. Soehono, M.Agr.  
Jl. Galunggung 30 Malang, East Java – Indonesia  
Phone: +62 341 568133  
Fax: +62 341 582124

This translation was done specifically for institutional reference only

## Appendix 7 The Interview Guide

### **The Interview Guide**

This is the general interview guide. There are two lists of interview guides for two categories of interviewees, namely the government participants and the non-government participants. These two categories are adopted for the specific participants.

The government participants consist of the incumbents and the former of incumbents, the head of local government agencies, the staff of local government agencies, the chair or members of district election commissions, the chair or members of district election inspection committees, and the district legislative (the House of Representatives) members. The non-government participants consist of local observers (Academics and NGO activists), political consultants, local political parties' leaders, local businessmen/women, community based organisation (CBO) leaders or activists, local journalists, and voters.

In the actual interviews, the study proposed more specific questions and moved naturally from one topic to another to enable the interviewees to direct the conversation. It attempted to follow the particular situation while interviewing the participants. The study began the interview with an introduction which addressed the researcher's identity, research project, and the interest in the research.

The study addressed four main groups of questions, namely 1) Questions to explore the incumbents' policy behaviour; 2) Questions to explore informal politics associated with the incumbent; 3) Questions to explore the logic of the incumbent's political survival or failure; 4) Questions to explore voters' explanations for voting or not voting for the incumbents. It divided each group of questions into sub-groups of questions representing the different aspects of the main questions.



## 1) Interview questions – the government participants

### 1. About policy behaviour

#### a. The full picture of the incumbent's policy behaviour

- Please explain your development policies whilst remaining in office?
- Do you have any general mission statements or summaries/symbol of intent of your development policies and programs?
- What are the specific policy and program goals in education and/or health and/or infrastructure and/or micro and small economy and/or social assistance? Could you say that they are the core development policies throughout your leadership period?
- In what way do you implement these core policies and programs?
- What are the factors encouraging you (the incumbents) to initiate these core policies?

#### b. The budget allocation to finance the incumbent's policy choices

- How does the local government allocate the local budget to these policies and programs?
- Is there any implementation of a merit system to prioritise the policies or programs that will be financed? Could you explain the process?
- Who are involved in policy-making process to allocate this budget?

#### c. The policy processes pursued by the incumbent

- Please explain the processes to make local development policies? Do you follow the national government guidance to arrange local development policies?
- Who are the actors involved in these processes? Did you involve non-government actors? Who are they? And what are their roles?
- Are there any specific demands from specific actors to be included in the policy contents?

#### d. The sorts of incentive that can explain the incumbent's policy behaviour

- Do you get any benefits (non-financial) from the implementation of these policies?
- Could you explain the forms of these benefits?

#### e. The determinant factors (and actors) that can endorse the incumbent's policy choices

- Are there any non-normative based incentives that determine the incumbent's policy choice?
- Who are the determinant actors encouraging your (the incumbent) policy choices? Through what mechanism?

### 2. About informal politics associated with the incumbent

#### a. The full picture of informal politics surrounding the incumbent

- Do you have an "informal team" supporting your incumbency prior to *pilkada*? Do they still exist (operate) after *pilkada* or the incumbent's success?
- Who are they? What are their backgrounds? Who is the leader?
- How does this team work prior to and after *pilkada*?
- How does the team relate to you (the incumbent)?

**b. The role of informal politics to shape the incumbent's policy process and policy choices**

- After *pilkada*, who are the “informal team” (non-government and government) actors involved to shape or drive the incumbent's policy-making process and policy choices? What are their backgrounds?
- How do these actors operate to shape the incumbent's policy choices? At which stage of the policy cycle did they started to operate and at what stage did they end their policy cycle?

**c. The factors endorsing informal politics to occur**

- Please explain, why are the “informal team” of actors involved in policy-making process with the incumbent?
- What are the factors endorsing these actors' involvement in the district policy-making process?

**d. The effectiveness of informal politics to support the incumbent's survival**

- Are the involvements of the “informal team” actors effective to support incumbency?
- Please explain, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the “informal team” to support incumbency in the second *pilkada*?
- Why are they effective or ineffective?

**e. The forms of compliance guarantee among informal politics actors**

- What is the form of compliance guarantee among “informal team” actors?
- How do they enforce the compliance guarantee among actors?

**f. Other related actors outside informal politics that may support the incumbent**

- Are there other related actors outside informal politics that may support the survival or failure of the incumbent? Who are they?
- What are their contributions or roles?

**g. Comparison of dominant institution to determine the incumbent's policy choices between the formal institution within local government and the informal institution outside the government**

- Empirically, which one is more determined to drive or to shape the incumbent's policy choices between the formal institution within local government and the informal institution outside the government?
- Why are they more determined than the others?
- Is there any compensation of their dominant role in driving the incumbent's policy choices? What are they?

**3. About the logic of incumbent's political survival or failure**

**a. The effectiveness of the incumbent's policy choices to support his/her political survival**

- Do you think the incumbent's policy choices prior to *pilkada* contribute to the incumbent's success to remain in office?

- To what extent are the policy choices effective to contribute to the incumbent's survival?
  - Or, to what extent are the policy choices not effective to support the incumbent's survival?
- b. The effectiveness of the informal politics to support the incumbent's political survival**
- Do you think informal politics prior to *pilkada* contribute to the incumbent's success to remain in office?
  - To what extent are informal politics effective to contribute to the incumbent's survival?
  - Or, to what extent are informal politics not effective to support the incumbent's survival?
- 4. About voters' explanation to vote or not vote for the incumbents**
- a. The voters' knowledge and experience about the incumbent's policy choices**
- Please describe your knowledge and/or experience in the last *pilkada*!
  - Do you get direct benefit from the incumbent's policy choices or programs in education or health or infrastructure or micro and small economy or social assistance?
  - Do you know or get benefit from the core program initiated by the incumbent while remaining in office? In what forms the benefit you get?
  - Do you know the place where the incumbent's programs were implemented? Please tell me, where did the incumbent locate the programs? Please describe the detail of addresses of the locations
- b. The voters' knowledge and experience about informal politics relating to the incumbent**
- Do you know and/or involve in informal politics enclosed to the incumbent? If yes, please describe your knowledge and/or experience?
  - Do you gain benefit (direct or indirect) from these informal politics? When and in what forms?
- c. The relevant rationales of the voters to vote or not vote for the incumbent pertaining to the incumbent's policy choices and/or informal politics**
- Did you vote for the incumbent in the last *pilkada* (2008 Or 2010)? What were your rationales to vote for him or her? If you do not vote for him or her, what were your rationales?
  - Do you consider the incumbent's policy choices in education or health or infrastructure or micro and small economy or social assistance to vote for him or her? If yes or no, why do you arrive at this preference?
  - Do you consider informal politics attached to the incumbent, to vote for him or her? If yes or no, why do you arrive at this preference?

## 2) Interview questions – the non-government participants

### 1. About policy behaviour

#### a. The full picture of the incumbent's policy behaviour

- Please describe the incumbent's development policies while remaining in office?
- Does the incumbent have any general mission statements or summaries/symbol of intent of his development policies and programs?
- What are the specific policy and program goals in education and/or health and/or infrastructure and/or micro and small economy and/or social assistance? Could you say that they are the incumbent core development policies throughout the incumbent's leadership period?
- In what forms does the incumbent implement these core policies and programs?

#### b. The budget allocation to finance the incumbent's policy choices

- How does the local government allocate the local budget to these policies and programs?
- Is there any implementation of a merit system to prioritise the policies or programs that will be financed? Could you explain the process?
- Who are involved in policy-making process to allocate this budget?

#### c. The policy processes pursued by the incumbent

- Please explain the processes to make local development policies? Does the incumbent follow the national government guidance to arrange local development policies?
- Who are actors involved in these processes? Does the incumbent involve non-government actors? Who are they? And what are their roles?
- Is there any specific demand from specific actors to be included in the policy contents?

#### d. The sorts of incentive that can explain the incumbent's policy behaviour

- What are the factors encouraging the incumbents to initiate these core policies?
- Does the incumbent get any benefits (non-financial) from the implementation of these policies?
- Could you explain the forms of these benefits?

#### e. The determinant factors (and actors) that can endorse the incumbent's policy choices

- Are there any non-normative based incentives that determine the incumbent's policy choice?
- Who are the determinant actors encouraging the incumbent's policy choices? Through what mechanism?

### 2. About informal politics associated with the incumbent

#### a. The full picture of informal politics surrounding the incumbent

- Does the incumbent have an "informal team" supporting his incumbency prior to *pilkada*? Do they still exist (operate) after *pilkada* or the incumbent success?
- Who are they? What are their backgrounds? Who is the leader?

- How does this team work prior to and after *pilkada*?
  - How do they relate to the incumbent?
- b. The role of informal politics to shape the incumbent's policy process and policy choices**
- After *pilkada*, who are the “informal team” (non-government and government) actors involved to shape or drive the incumbent's policy-making process and policy choices? What are their backgrounds?
  - How do these actors operate to shape the incumbent's policy choices? At which stage of the policy cycle did they start to operate and at what stage did they end their policy cycle?
- c. The factors endorsing informal politics to occur**
- Please explain, why are the “informal team” of actors involved in policy-making process with the incumbent?
  - What are the factors endorsing these actors' involvement in the district policy-making process?
- d. The effectiveness of informal politics 's roles to support the incumbent's survival**
- Are the involvements of the “informal team” actors effective to support incumbency?
  - Please explain, the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the “informal team” to support incumbency in the second *pilkada*?
  - Why are they effective (or ineffective)?
- e. The forms of compliance guarantee among informal politics actors**
- What is the form of compliance guarantee among “informal team” actors?
  - How do they enforce the compliance guarantee among actors?
- f. Other related actors outside informal politics that may support the incumbent**
- Are there other related actors outside informal politics that may support the survival or failure of the incumbent? Who are they?
  - What are their contributions or roles?
- g. Comparison of dominant institution to determine the incumbent's policy choices between the formal institution within local government and the informal institution outside the government**
- Empirically, which one is more determined to drive or to shape the incumbent's policy choices between the formal institution within local government and the informal institution outside the government?
  - Why are they more determined than the others?
  - Is there any compensation of their dominant role in driving the incumbent's policy choices? What are they?

**3. About the logic of incumbent's political survival or failure**

**a. The effectiveness of the incumbent's policy choices to support his/her political survival**

- Do you think the incumbent's policy choices prior to *pilkada* contribute to the incumbent's success to remain in office?
- To what extent do the policy choices contribute to the incumbent's survival?
- Or, to what extent are the policy choices not effective to support the incumbent's survival?

**b. The effectiveness of the informal politics to support the incumbent's political survival**

- Do you think informal politics prior to *pilkada* contribute to the incumbent's success to remain in office?
- To what extent are informal politics effective to contribute to the incumbent's survival?
- Or, to what extent are informal politics not effective to support the incumbent's survival?

**4. About voters' explanation to vote or not vote for the incumbents**

**a. The relevant rationales of the voters to vote or not vote for the incumbent pertaining to the incumbent's policy choices and/or informal politics**

- Please describe your knowledge and/or experience in the last *pilkada*!
- Could you explain why do the voters vote (or not vote) for the incumbent in the last *pilkada* (2008 or 2010)? What were their rationales to vote (or not vote) for the incumbent?
- Do the voters consider the incumbent's policy choices in education or health or infrastructure or micro and small economy or social assistance to vote for him? If yes or no, why do the voters arrive at this preference?
- Do the voters consider informal politics attached to the incumbent to vote for him? If yes or no, why do the voters arrive at this preference?

## INFORMATION SHEET

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**Title:**

Exploring Policy Behaviour, Informal Governance, and the Political Survival of District Heads in Indonesia (A Case of Four Districts in East Java, Indonesia)

**Investigator:**

Mr Wawan Sobari  
Department of Politics and Public Policy  
Flinders University  
Ph: +62 81233094817

**Description of the study:**

This study is part of the PhD project entitled ‘Exploring Policy Behaviour, Informal Governance, and the Political Survival of District Heads in Indonesia (A Case of Four Districts in East Java, Indonesia)’

This project will investigate Policy Behaviour and “Informal Governance” practices relating to the districts election in four districts, namely The Regency of Blitar, The Regency of Trenggalek, The Municipality of Probolinggo and The Municipality of Madiun. This project is supported by Flinders University, Department of Politics and Public Policy.

**Purpose of the study:**

This study aims to achieve the following objectives to:

- Explore critically the policy behaviour of the district heads to distribute resources while remaining in office.
- Compare policy behaviour of the successful and failed incumbents and to arrive at an academic explanation regarding its pathway to their success or failure.
- Assess previous work about the phenomenon of informal governance at district election *level* and to develop a recent framework of informal governance practices relating to the incumbents’ policy behaviour and their success and failure to survive.
- Explore empirical answers of the effect of local liberal democratisation through the local election policy on public benefit or local advancement.
- Explore other factors outside the incumbents’ policy choices and informal governance practices that may contribute to the incumbents’ success or failure to remain in office.
- Develop theory on policy behaviour, political behaviour and policy processes.
- Develop a model of policy choices of the district heads.

**What will I be asked to do?**

You are invited to attend a one-on-one interview with a the investigator who will ask you a few questions about your views about events, experiences, and knowledge prior to and after the 2010 or 2008 district election (*pilkada*). The interview will take no more than one hour. The interview will be recorded using a digital voice recorder (MP3) to help with looking at

the results. Once recorded, the interview will be transcribed (typed-up) and stored as a computer file and then destroyed once the results have been finalised. This is voluntary.

Examples of questions that will be asked during interview are:

- f. The determinant factors (and actors) that can endorse the incumbent's policy choices**
- Are there any non-normative based incentives that determine the incumbent's policy choice?
  - Who are the determinant actors encouraging the incumbent's policy choices? Through what mechanism?
- g. The factors endorsing informal governance to occur**
- Please explain, why are the "informal team" of actors involved in policy-making process with the incumbent?
  - What are the factors endorsing these actors' involvement in the district policy-making process?
- h. The effectiveness of the incumbent's policy choices to support his/her political survival**
- Do you think the incumbent's policy choices prior to *pilkada* contribute to the incumbent's success to remain in office?
  - To what extent are the policy choices effective to contribute to the incumbent's survival?
  - Or, to what extent are the policy choices not effective to support the incumbent's survival?
- i. The effectiveness of the informal governance practices to support the incumbent's political survival**
- Do you think informal governance practices prior to *pilkada* contribute to the incumbent's success to remain in office?
  - To what extent are informal governance practices effective to contribute to the incumbent's survival?
  - Or, to what extent are informal governance practices not effective to support the incumbent's survival?

**What benefit will I gain from being involved in this study?**

The sharing of your experiences and knowledge about the district election in your district will not directly benefit to you.

However, the benefits of this research will contribute to a new and comparative explanation of factors determining the incumbents' success and failure to survive in the district election. For the participants especially people who have concern in the district election, this study will provide information and feedback of their strategies that might be relevant to the future district elections.

For the Indonesian government especially the Ministry of Home Affairs, this study will provide information and feedback of the practices of district election at the grass root and elite level. These information and feedback will be useful to provide an alternative evaluation on the running district election and existing regulations.



**Will I be identifiable by being involved in this study?**

We need your name but you will be anonymous. Once the interview has been typed-up and saved as a file, the voice file will then be destroyed. Any identifying information will be removed and the typed-up file stored on a password protected computer that only the investigator and the principal supervisor will have access to. Your comments will not be linked directly to you.

**Are there any risks or discomforts if I am involved?**

Other group members may be able to identify your contributions even though they will not be directly attributed to you.

The investigator anticipates few risks from your involvement in this study. If you have any concerns regarding anticipated or actual risks or discomforts, please raise them with the investigator. You can contact at his mobile: +6281233094817 or if you receive intentional offences, please report to call centre of the national policy in each district via telephone number 110 (land line) or (regional code number) + 112 (hand phone).

**How do I agree to participate?**

Participation is voluntary. You are welcome to 'no comment' or refuse to answer any questions and you are free to withdraw from the focus group at any time without effect or consequences. A consent form accompanies this information sheet. If you agree to participate please read and sign the form.

**How will I receive feedback?**

Outcomes from the project will be summarised and given to you by the investigator if you would like to see them.

**Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and we hope that you will accept our invitation to be involved.**

*This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project number 5595). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on 8201 3116, by fax on 8201 2035 or by email [human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au](mailto:human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au)*