Islamic State Beyond Iraq and Syria

An Analysis of ISIS Provinces Outside Iraq and Syria and their Role in the Future of ISIS as the 'Caliphate' Collapses

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Declaration

I certify that the text, research, ideas, analysis and conclusions drawn in this thesis are entirely my own work, expect where acknowledged by citation. I also certify that this thesis has not been previously submitted for any other analysis and assessment.

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Abstract

This thesis argues that that the persistence of ISIS after the collapse of its "caliphate" in Iraq and Syria is unlikely to be achieved through its provinces outside of the Levant. To support this argument this thesis analyzes thirteen Islamic State (ISIS) provinces outside of Iraq and Syria, assessing the threat they pose, the possibility that they will remain affiliated with ISIS, and the prospect that they will continue to persist. The accumulative outcome of these assessments assists in evaluating the likelihood that the ISIS brand will survive when the group's core in Syria and Iraq collapses. The analysis involves an outline of the individual provinces objectives, backgrounds, leadership, membership and activity combined with quantitative data analysis and the use of a metric analytical system. The outcome of the analysis shows that the provinces vary significantly in: the threat that they pose to the country in which they exist in; their bonds with and interests shared with ISIS core; and in their overall likelihood to persist. More broadly, the results demonstrate that ISIS has been unsuccessful in controlling territory outside of Syria and Iraq. It suggests ISIS's relationship with its affiliates is predominantly defined by the value of its jihadist brand and its ability to provide financial support to its affiliates. As ISIS in Syria and Iraq collapses the legitimacy of its brand will become tarnished and its ability to provide fiscal support compromised. This situation will lead to many of the provinces defecting and indicates that the ISIS brand is unlikely to survive through its affiliates.

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AAS	Ansar al-Sharia
ABM	Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
ASG	Abu Sayya Group
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI	al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib
AQIS	al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
ICE	Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus
IED	improvised explosive devices
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISF	Internal Security Forces
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and al-Shama ("the Levant" or "Greater Syria")
JAS	Jamaatu Ahl al-Sunna lil-Dawa wal-Jihad
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
MSC	Mujahdin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background to Thesis and Argument

In 2016 ISIS suffered significant setbacks. The group lost approximately 43 per cent of its territory, 120 of its leaders were killed (including its second in command and chief of external operations, as well as its head of propaganda), propaganda output declined by about 70 per cent, and foreign fighter recruitment declined by over 90 per cent (decreasing from 2000 per month to about 50).[1] The group's headquarters in Iraq and Syria – its self styled Caliphate – is collapsing. Outside of the group's caliphate in the Levant are its provinces, affiliates, terrorist cells and lone wolves – their future, much like the ISIS brand itself in the wake of the caliphate's collapse, remains unknown. This thesis intends to draw together what is known about ISIS's provinces and develop a greater understanding of them and their potential role in the future of ISIS.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Despite extensive analysis on ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been less scrutiny of its provinces beyond the Levant. In the wake of a rapidly changing dynamic (a result of the group losing control of its territories in Iraq and Syria)[2] a greater understanding of the ISIS provinces and the ISIS core in Iraq and Syria are critical to developing strategies to confront the group in a rapidly evolving situation.

1.3. Research Question, Purpose and Significance of the Thesis

The central research questions of this thesis are: What is the future of ISIS provinces beyond Iraq and Syria as the caliphate collapses, and what role will they play in the future of ISIS? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze thirteen ISIS provinces, determine the threat they pose, the likelihood they will remain affiliated with ISIS, and the prospect they will continue to persist. The accumulative outcome of these assessments assists in evaluating the likelihood that the ISIS brand will survive when the group's core in Syria and Iraq collapses. Furthermore, it will provide an insight into the shifting strategic dynamic of ISIS upon losing territory in Iraq and Syria. The insights gleamed from this thesis are important for determining where to focus and construct strategies to combat ISIS as it prepares to enter a new era of its existence.

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[1] A.Gad., "ISIS Preparing for a Difficult 2017," *Intelligence. Unclassified.,"* 31 January 2017, <https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/media/podcast-isis-preparing-for-a-difficult-2017>

[2] For weekly updates and maps of the evolving situation and territorial held by the relevant actors see: the Institute for the Study of War's weekly and monthly situation reports - < http://www.understandingwar.org >

1.4. Thesis Argument

This thesis argues that the persistence of ISIS after the collapse of its "caliphate" in Iraq and Syria is unlikely to be achieved through its provinces outside of the Levant. It will argue that this is due to the group's reliance on holding territory in Iraq and Syria: its impending loss damages the ideological integrity of its brand and ability to provide financial support — the two key aspects which define its relationship with its affiliates.

1.5. Methodology

The analysis of ISIS provinces and affiliates in this thesis involves an outline of the group's objectives, background, leadership, membership and activity, combined with quantitative data analysis and the use of a metric analytical system. The outcome of analysis will indicate the threat a group poses to the country in which it exists; their bonds with and interests shared with ISIS core; and in their overall likelihood to persist. These results inform the judgment about the role of these provinces play in the future of ISIS, and the form and strategy the group will undertake as it loses territory in the Levant.

1.6. Outline of Thesis Structure

This thesis is broken up into nine parts. Part one includes the thesis argument, introduction, and table of contents. Part two details the global jihad phenomena and ISIS's place in it. It then explores the evolution of Jihadist proto-states and how ISIS established a self-declared "Caliphate" with provinces. Part three explores how ISIS's province system works, detailing the group's doctrine, governance system and strategy for expansion through its provinces or "wilayats". Part four describes the methodological analysis used to scrutinize and explore ISIS provinces, which is to be found in Appendix 8. Part five analyses ISIS provinces, comparing each province's threat, likelihood that it will remain affiliated with ISIS after the caliphate collapses, and its likelihood to persist. Section six will highlight emerging trends, explore the role the provinces have in the future of ISIS and ISIS's evolving strategy in the wake of its loss of Iraq and Syria. Part seven lists the references. Appendix A in chapter eight presents an analysis of each of the thirteen Islamic State Province outside of Iraq and Syria. Appendix B in part nine compiles the data spread sheets and metric data.

2. Global Jihad and The Evolution of Proto-States

2.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the ideas of global jihadi salafism, jihadist proto-states and ISIS's place in both phenomena. It will detail the history of global jihad, detailing its emergence in the 1960s to a more recent global concept of jihad that has eventually seen the emergence of ISIS. It will then detail the rise of jihadist proto-states and outline ISIS's version of it. It will argue that the creation of a 'caliphate' in Syria and Iraq by ISIS is so critical for the group's jihad ideology, as well as fiscal capabilities, that a province outside of the region is unlikely to replace or compensate its loss. Moreover, it will show that ISIS's establishment of external provinces is inconsistent with its idea of a central 'caliphate', due to its preference to actively encourage foreign fighters to join the 'caliphate' in Iraq and Syria rather than supporting them to remain in their own home countries and wage jihad there.

2.2. Global Jihad

The modern concept of global jihad originates with Egyptian Sayyid Qutb.[3] Qutb believed the modern state's power and structure made people submissive to man-made laws and governance and prevented them from following god's authority. Qutb believed jihad and its idea of military action was required to liberate people from the servitude of man-made governance and allow them to serve god.[4] Once free, the people could determine the best form of governance that would allow them to live by god's laws. This jihadist salafist Islamic belief (a fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating Muhammad and his earliest followers[5]) aims to abandon politics, political institutions, the nation state and Westphalian geopolitical world order,[6] and replace them with a "Muslim collection" (the Ummah) that would serve as an administrative entity rather than the state.[7]

Jihad is in contrast to political Islam, which aims to capture a nation-state and retain, as well as utilize, its institutions (i.e. schools, police, legislative and judiciary) to campaign for and enforce Islam.[8] Political Islamists have worked within government

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[3] J. Clavert, *Syyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, Columbia University Press, New York 2010, pp. 1-22 and 273-280. For an extensive review of the appropriation and trajectory of 'Outbism' see pp. 273-346.

[4] S. Qutb, *Milestone*, Studies in Islam and the Middle East (SIME) Journal, <http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf>

[5] S. Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, p. 207.

[6] B. Tibi, "Countering Ideological Terrorism," *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2008, p. 112.

[7] A. Armborts, "A Profile of Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorist Activism," *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2009, p. 56.

[8] Ibid. p. 55.

systems, seeking reform to achieve their goals.[9] Global jihadists view political Islam as a futile endeavor and consider these Islamists as either corrupted or marginalized.[10] They see political Islamists inability to create lasting reform indicative as proof of the need to undertake armed action to over throw a government and instate an Islamic state.[11]

Global jihad's aim is to create a new state – a 'caliphate'. A caliphate (derived from the Arabic word "caliph" which means "successor") is a Muslim's state that enables people to live in accordance with god's laws in every aspect of their lives, be it economically, socially and politically.[12] They believe an Islamic state should be a single political entity administered in the same manner that Prophet Mohammed led early Muslims. It is worth noting that Qutb states that the establishment of a religious – and thereby a caliphate – cannot be imposed but has to be accepted by the people:

> a Muslim community can come into existence only when individuals and groups
> of people reject servitude to anyone except God… and come into submission to
> God, Who has no associates, and decide that they will organize their scheme or
> life on the basis of this submission. From this a new community is born.[13]

The creation of a caliphate also necessitates a caliph that must fulfill the criteria of being: of the lineage of the Prophet; derived from the Quarysh ethnic group; pious; and of complete physical capacity.[14]

2.3. Global Jihad's Strategy

At the heart of global jihadist strategy is Qutb's approach of utilizing armed force to destabilize existing regional governance and then reinstate order by instilling Islamic law. The chaos brought about by undertaking activities that focus on destabilizing authority encourages people to welcome the arrival of the stability that the jihadists herald, helping facilitate Qutb's condition that the population accepts their religious governance on their own volition rather than being directly coerced.[15] The method of how global jihadists defeat regional authority and gain territory has been explored

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[9] This includes members of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood organization.
[10] Statement by Ayman al-Zawahiri, 20th December, 2006.
[11] A. Al-Suri, *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance*, trans. CENTRA Technology, Inc, sponsored by the DCIA Counterterrorism Center, Office of Terrorism Analysis (2004), p. 513 and pp. 660-667, <https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_6093_989_0_43/http%3B/
apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6719634/pdffilenov2006.pdf>
[12] For an excellent history and analysis of the idea of a caliphate in Islam see: H. Kennedy, *Caliphate: The History of an Idea*, Basic Books, 2016. Particularly pp. 267-276.
[13] S. Qutb, p. 74.
[14] N. Kazimi, "*The Caliphate Attempted*," *Current trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 7, July 2008, pp. 1-43.*
[15] S. E. Zabel, "The military Strategy of Global Jihad," *United States Air Force*, 30 March 2007, p. 6

by influential Islamist strategist Abu Bakr Naji (thought to be an Egypt al-Qaieda member Muhammed Khalil al-Hakymah) in particular.[16]

In his book 'Management of Savagery: The most critical stage through which the Islamic nation will pass' Naji suggests three-stages to construct and establish "emirates". [17] The first is through "vexation and exhaustion". This involves continuous guerrilla tactics that weaken the state, compelling it to overextend military and economically to protect their extensive resources. This forces it to prioritize its concerns and gather troops at the heart of the state to protect the administration, leaving outlying regions vulnerable to attack. Those in the outlying region are either defeated or join the jihad cause. When the government loses control, chaos in the region ensues. This activity works cumulatively to create a power vacuum where the population will welcome the jihadists as figures who can restore and maintain some kind of stability and control. Successfully undertaking "vexation and exhaustion" enables the group to transition to Naji's second stage: the "administration of savagery" (or barbarism). This stage involves multiple tasks that focus on restoring basic services and instilling governance. Finally, from this a group can then transition to the third stage, which is "Power of establishment – establishing the state." Naji does not detail clearly how the third stage is achieved and has left it up to others to explore its consummation.[18]

2.4. Global Jihad After 9/11

Prior to the September 11 attack in 2001 authoritarian regimes in the Arab world had effectively repressed the security threat of jihadi militancy.[19] It is for this reason that Afghanistan in central Asia had become the safe haven for militant Islamist and from where the 9/11 attacks originated. [20][21]

Statistics since 2003 shows that support for jihadism in the Middle East and North Africa has been significantly high.[22] Of the regions combined 355 million population, data indicates that several million of them are likely to be sympathetic to ISIS as well as al-Qaeda.[23] Interestingly, the numbers have Lebanon as an exception to this rule,

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[16] Loidolt, B., Jackson, B. A., "Considering al-Qa'ida's Innovation Doctrine: From Strategic Texts to "Innovation in Practice," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2013, pp. 284–310.

[17] Naji, A. B., *Management of Savagery: The most critical state through which the Islamic nation will pass*, published online as an ebook. for an English translation see:
http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf

[18] Ibid.

[19] F. Gerges, "The Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt," *Survival*, vol 41, no. 1, 1999, p. 113-125.

[20] Gerges. F. A., *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, pp. 80 – 118.

[21] For insights into the development of militant Islam in Afghanistan see Rubin, B.R., *Afghanistan from the cold War through the War on Terror*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, and Hoffman, B., *The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat from 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014.

[22] Lia, 2015.

[23] B. Lia, "Jihadism in the Arab World After 2011," *Middle East* Policy, vol. 23, no. 4., 2016, p. 75.

suggesting that there may be a connection between Arab-nationalist identity and Sunni Islam and support for jihadism.[24]

Al-Qaeda's affiliate network expanded significantly in this period also, starting in Saudi Arabia with the formation of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2003, the formation in Iraq of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 (which later became ISIS), the creation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) in Algeria in 2006 and the establishment of AQAP in Yemen in 2009.[25] The formation of these groups, as well as the appropriation of the al-Qaeda name, objectives and methods, represented a movement to amalgamating militant Islamism around a global jihad agenda.[26] It has been argued that this trend has been driven by the US-led military occupation of Islamic and Arab countries, that when coupled with new found nationalistic calls for resistance against occupation in a rhetoric peppered with religious language, has helped facilitate youths drifting towards jihadist groups. [27]

2.5. The Proliferation of Jihadism after 2011

In the wake of the Arab popular revolts in 2011 and the civil wars in Libya, Yemen and Syria, the development and growth of jihad groups became evident. There was an increase in political violence, particularly in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Tunisia. [28] During this time jihadist groups emerged out of secretive cells and underground networks, to be openly operating as socially embedded insurgent groups undertaking charity work, religious proselytizing and neighborhood enforcers of sharia to gain popular support.[29] While actively seeking popular support is not something new, the jihadist groups have also sought to gain territorial control. This has seen the emergence of "emirates" or proto-states to an unprecedented level – from 2011 to 2016 there were more jihadist proto-states than in the previous 20 years.[30]

2.6. Proto-States

An 'Emirate" denotes a principality or a territory ruled by an emir, who is a governor, prince, ruler, general or commander.[31] An emirate is used predominantly to describe a military office or political leadership rather than spiritual leadership.[32] Historically emirates were small kingdoms or local Muslim principalities, which were members of

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[24] Ibid.

[25] The original AQAP was a Saudi-based group, consisting of mostly Saudi Afghan veterans fighting against the Saudi kingdom from 2003 to 2006.

[26] Lia, 2016, p. 78.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid, p. 78-79 and the Global Terrorism database.

[29] Ibid, p. 79.

[30] B. Lia, "Understanding Jihadi Proto-States," *Perspectives on Terrorism: Special Issue on the Islamic State*, vol. 9, no. 5, 2015, pp. 31-41.
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/vie w/441/html>

[31] O. Roy, *Globalized Islam: the search for a new Ummah*, Hurst, London, 2002, pp. 284.

[32] Lia, 2015, pp. 31-41.

a larger caliphate. [33] Emirates are traditionally associated as frontline states expanding the territory of the caliphate against non-Islamic powers. [34] In combination with a rebellion against Western state ideas, this may explain the popular use of emirates by modern jihadists.[35] Declaring an emirate doesn't require territorial or political control of an Islamic state or a Caliphate (this will become important when detailing ISIS wilayats and emirates later in this thesis). Indeed, contemporary jihadists often use the term "emirate" to refer to a small group of the faithful who swear obedience to an emir. This demonstrates the scalability of the term "emirate" in both material and territorial criteria.[36] This perception becomes important to groups attempting to establish a caliphate as the scalability ensures that every act they pursue can be justified under the aim of furthering their jihadi state-building project and establishing a Muslim state.[37]

2.7. A History of Proto-States

From the late 1980s a series of jihadist states were created. The extent that the groups controlled land, undertook state-like governance, lifespan, and ability to recruit varied significantly – some were even fictional proto-states created to challenge state authority or other rival Islamist groups. Prior to 2011, there were as many as 11 jihadist states and at least 8 from 2011-2015.

The most successful jihadist proto-states from 1998 to 2015 were the Shabaab in Somalia and the Taliban in Afghanistan.[38] In 2000 the Taliban controlled 90 per cent of Afghanistan after declaring itself "the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" in 1997.[39] Prior to being removed from power in 2001 the group undertook governorship, courts and enforcement activities. In 2007 the Somali Shabaab rebel movement captured most of southern Somalia. The group undertook civilian services and law enforcement with an administrative structure made up of provinces.[40]

After the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions the number of jihadi proto-states flourished.[41] AQAP captured large parts of the Abyan province in Yemen, running multiple Islamic emirates with sharia rule. Being removed from power in the middle of 2012 the group was able to capture areas in Eastern Yemen in 2015. From March

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[33] R. Pankhurst., *The Inevitable Caliphate?: A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013.

[34] A. K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, Routledge, London, 2014, pp. 83-102.

[35] The first use of Emir/Emirate terminology by Salafi-Jihadi groups is disputed. See Roy, O., *The failure of political Islam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1994.

[36] B. Lia, 2015.

[37] Ibid.

[38] A. al-Awlaki, "A question about the method of establishing Caliphate," *Kavkaz Center*, 13 January 2009, <http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/01/13/10562.shtml.>

[39] G. Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present,* Hurst, London, 2005, p. 281.

[40] *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012*, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, Chapter 6.

[41] Lia, 2015.

2012 to January 2013 Northern Malia was governed by AQIM with Ansar al-Dine and MUJAO. It was eventually in Iraq and Syria that ISIS managed to capture territory and establish a self-proclaimed caliphate, where the modern jihadist proto-state reached its apex.[42]

2.8. Characteristics of Jihadi Proto-States

While there are several differences in the origins and the make up of jihadist proto-states they do share several key characteristics. The first, as described by Lia,[43] is that jihadist proto-states are *ideological projects*, their creation justified by the ideological need to instate Sharia law and undertake war against infidels and apostates. Jihadist proto-states publicize their Sharia enforcement activities and their virtuousness to demonstrate their ideological pure goals. This extends to iconoclasm and the destruction of "un-Islamic" figures and lifestyles.[44]

Jihadist proto-states are also *internationalist* in nature. This aspect is seen with their intent on recruiting foreign fighters. It also manifest in their desire to have support not just from local religious entities, but endorsement from foreign clerics and constituencies. This international aspect, resulting in the make up of an organization featuring a large foreign contingent, can lead to many jihadist proto-states being perceived by the local populace as "in, but not of" the country they have based themselves in.[45]

Another feature of jihadist proto-states is their *aggressive behavior* and desire to alter international borders and world order. This behavior is exemplified by the use of international terrorism for territorial expansions. ISIS multiple references to having "frontlines" rather than borders is an example of this.

The final shared characteristic of jihadi proto-states is the *commitment to effective governance*. Jihadist proto-states have attempted to administer governance, with civilian services, a justice and court system, ideological training and teaching, and social councils.[46]

2.9. Jihadist Preference for a Proto-State as a Competitive Element with Other Organizations

The declaration of a proto-state by jihadist groups can be seen as an effort by a group to increase their influence and power against other rival Islamist

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[42] Rich, P., "How revolutionary are Jihadist insurgencies? The case of ISIL," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 27, no. 5, 2016, p.777.
[43] Ibid.
[44] ISIS destruction of the ancient city of Palmyra is an example of this.
[45] This idea of ISIS presence being "in, but not of", in relationship with its affiliates will be explored later in the thesis, in particular in Afghanistan and Yemen.
[46] Lia, 2015.

organizations.[47] It is worth noting though that while many insurgent jihadist groups have declared a province or emirate, they don't all work towards obtaining statehood. [48] Often they are short lived in nature and their increase in uncompromising radicalism appears counter intuitive, despite the pragmatism of moving from an insurgent group to a proto-state.[49] This may have something to do with learning the practicalities of governance (ISIS as IS 2.0 is a good example, where it learnt and developed from its previously unsuccessful attempts at governance)[50] and ultra-radical groups attempting to remain loyal to their convictions at the loss of long-term material gains.[51]

The latter's desire to maintain ideological purity may be explained in relation to a group's reliance on an external constituency and competition with other Islamist rebels.[52] Competing with other jihadist groups in an area forces the group to not compromise its ideological convictions and prevents it from undertaking non-ideological solutions to problems that would otherwise cause it to lose its support base.[53] It is reinforced by the global jihadism's international nature and need to secure an external constituency – those outside of the jihadist territory can choose which jihad they would join as foreign fighters. As Lia explains,

> a jihadi insurgent group whose enforcement of Sharia is halfhearted and whose commitment to jihad is compromised by peace talks with the enemy will not attract ideologically committed foreign fighters… the radical agenda of external constituencies may therefore easily overrule local preference in situations when the prospects of increased territorial control should have encouraged local rebels to adopt a more moderate posture.[54]

The establishment of an ultra radical state is only a part of a greater transnational insurgency with numerous key elements and a significant support base not defined by territory or borders.

It has been suggested that the flow of foreign fighters is indicative of the extent to which a jihadist group is a "market leader" that receives overall greater material

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Campana, A., and Ducol. B., "Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens: Beyond s State-Centric Approach," *Civil Wars*, vol. 13, no. 4., 2011, pp. 396-413.

[49] For an interesting and contentious article on this, arguing that Islamist terror is driven by irrational forces see: Celso. A. N., "Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality," *Obis*, vol. 58, no.2, 2014, pp. 229-247.

[50] Gartenstein-Ross, D., and Magen. A., "The Jihadist Governance Dilemma." *The Washington Post,* 18 July 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/18/the-jihadist-governance-dilemma/>

[51] Libicki. M. C., Chalk. P., Sisson, M., *Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2007.

[52] Lia, 2015.

[53] Watts, C., "Deciphering Competition Between al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State," *Combating Terrorism Center*, 27 July 2016, < https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/deciphering-competition-between-al-qaida-and-the-islamic-state> and Lister, C., "Competition among Violent Islamist Extremists," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 668, no.1, 2016, pp. 53-70.

[54] Lia, 2015.

support.[55] The foreign fighters alone bring material, personnel, and gear to the group that they support.[56] This point has been used as an example of ISIS's successful outbidding of its rival al-Qaeda.

2.10. ISIS as a Jihadist Proto-State

In the late 2000s al-Qaeda's strategic focus shifted from attacking the West as the "Far Enemy", to defending Muslim values from local regimes (the "Near Enemy") in order to be seen as the protector of Muslims. ISIS has taken this strategy and shifted global jihadism from a defensive to an offensive movement seeking to present itself as a form of empowerment.[57] It has brought together the idea of confronting both the Near and Far Enemy. Coupled with the group's inflexible interpretation of Salafi-jihadi doctrine, it has prioritized the establishment of an Islamic state to extract from Muslim societies non-Islamic practices and immortality, leaving operations against the West a lower priority.[58]

ISIS exploited the instability in Syria and Iraq and adopted Naji's strategy of ushering in a caliphate by providing some *relative* stability in a chaotic environment.[59] This has allowed ISIS to effectively consolidate control in the region, seeing the group transition from a terrorist organization to a terrorist state.[60] [61] Its open operation as a proto-state is indicative of the group's ambition for popular legitimacy. It has used its established 'caliphate' to assert itself as the only legitimate jihadist group, to which all Muslims, states and organizations must submit. The extent that ISIS has established a "caliphate" is unprecedented and its state building and governance may serve as a blueprint for future jihadist groups attempting to consolidate power in unstable regions.

Unlike previous "state like" behavior displayed by jihadist movements (i.e. the Taliban in Afghanistan and Shabaab in Somalia) the amount of area claimed, the extent of territorial control, ability to recruit members and fighters, and the overall longevity of ISIS is unprecedented.

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[55] Ibid.

[56] FATF, *Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*, FATF Report, February 2015, < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf>

[57] E. M. Saltman and C. Winter, "Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern jihadism. Quilliam Foundation," 2014, p.27, < http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changing-face-of-modern-jihadism.pdf>

[58] E. Alshech, "The doctrinal crisis within the Salafi-Jihadi ranks and the emergence of neo-Takfirism," *Islamic Law and Society*, vol 21, no. 8, 2014.

[59] A.B. Naji., *The management of savagery; the most critical stage through which the Umma will pass*, trans. William McCants, Harvad, John M Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 May 2016.

[60] Cronin, A., "ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group," *Foreign Affairs*, vol 94, no.2, 2015, p. 88.

[61] ISIS has been labeled as a terrorist organization, however its ontology details something different. While ISIS uses terrorism as a tactic, unlike terrorist networks it holds territory, is able to directly engage with military forces due to its vast military capabilities, is able to self fund, maintains infrastructure and had at its peak over 30,000 fighters who were able to undertake military engagements. As stated by Audrey Cronin ISIS "is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army."

ISIS has initiated a new epoch in state building for jihadist organizations.[62] Though the group failed in its state building ambitions as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, as ISIS it has developed its ideology and methods enough to consolidate territory and power throughout 2014 till the present.

2.11. ISIS's Three Geographic Spheres of Operations and its Caliphate Centric Foreign Policy

ISIS undertakes operational activities across three geographic areas: interior, near abroad and far abroad. The "interior" ring is made up of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and Lebanon, with the group primarily focused on defending the core lands of the 'caliphate'. The "near abroad" ring is made up of land historically in the possession of Arab rule, spanning from Pakistan in the East to Morocco in the West, where ISIS is attempting to expand its influence to offset losses in its Interior. ISIS's "far abroad" ring is extends much further afield, involving the US, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the cyber realm, where the group is attempting to initiate a broader war.

At the heart of ISIS's ambitions and ideology is the control of territory in the "interior" being "in the heart of the Muslim world just a stone's throw away from Makkah (Mecca), al-Madinah (Medina), and Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem)."[63] It is very Middle-East centric in its agenda.

ISIS has prioritized the call for its international follows to perform 'hijrah' (emigration) to the caliphate in Syria and Iraq instead of coordinating attacks remotely or establishing provinces in their home countries.[64] The group's Caliph, Abu Bakr Baghdadhi, stated in an audio address that "O Muslims in all place. Who so is able to emigrate to the Islamic State, let him emigrate. For emigration to the Abode of Islam is obligatory."[65] ISIS has gone so far as to ask all those who cannot undertake *hijrah* to encourage others to emigrate and publicize their pledges to the group as much as possible. [66] A caliphate-centric foreign policy, it works to consolidate all forms of capability to govern and expand its current areas of control in the Levant. Such an approach is very different from other global jihadist groups, in particular al-Qaeda whose central leadership coordinates semi-autonomous cells throughout the globe.

ISIS has been primarily focused on having success in Syria and Iraq prior to pursing contiguous expansion beyond. Moreover, ISIS's relationship to conflicts and grievances in other parts of the world is linked more to consolidate its expansion of

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[62] Ibid.
[63] Dabiq Issue 1
[64] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, "Risāla ilā 'l-mujāhidīn wa'l-umma al-Islamiyya fī shahr Ramaān," Mu'assasat al-Furqān, 1 July 2014. Transcript: <https://archive.org/download/K_R_abubkr/et34.pdf>
[65] Ibid.
[66] Dabiq Issue 2.

its current areas of control (the caliphate in Iraq and Syria). For example, in the second edition of *Dabiq* ISIS discusses Gaza and argues that other Arab nations have been apathetic about the plight of the Palestinians. ISIS claims that it will "do everything within its means to continue striking down every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its path toward Palestine… its actions speak louder than its words and it is only a matter of time and patience before it reaches Palestine."[67] This statement shows how its immediate concerns are about its military activities in Syria and Iraq and its ambitions to Jerusalem are a part of a greater continuum of its immediate ambitions in the Levant and proximate to the territory it already controls. Furthermore, it suggests that for ISIS, military success is prioritized over political pretenses.

2.12. The Collapse of the Central Caliphate

At the conclusion of 2014, ISIS controlled one-third of Iraq and one-third of Syria.[68] By mid 2016 the group had lost twenty two per cent of that territory,[69] and by early 2017 ISIS has incurred significant territorial losses in Iraq and Syria with marginal territorial control. The loss of Mosul will see the group shift from a governing group to a guerrilla style terrorist organization in Iraq.[70] In Syria the group (at time of writing), still holds forces in Raqqa, eastern Homs, and Deir ez Zour provinces where they will still be able to attack Syrian regime forces.[71] ISIS's 'caliphate' in Syria and Iraq is on the verge of collapse. How the group intends to offset the loss of its caliphate in Iraq and Syria is not known.

2.13. Establishing Provinces in Near Abroad and Far Abroad Are Not Consistent with ISIS Ambition of a Central Caliphate.

As shown in 2.11, ISIS has a 'Caliphate Centric Foreign Policy', where involvement in its "near abroad" and "far abroad" comes second to its immediate concerns of consolidating control in the "interior". As such, the establishment of provinces, ideologically and through the allocation of resources, runs counter to the group's ambition for a central caliphate. ISIS's actions reflect this, be it through encouraging potential recruits to migrate to Iraq and Syria rather than undertaking activities in their home country, to having success in Syria and Iraq before pursing contiguous expansion beyond. The group does not see territorial control outside of the heart of

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[67] Dabiq Issue 2.

[68] H. Johnson, "Mapped: The Islamic State is Losing its territory – and fast," *Foreign Policy*, 16 March 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/>

[69] HIS, Janes, <http://www.janes.com/article/58831/islamic-state-loses-22-per-cent-of-territory>

[70] E. Anagnostos, "Iraq Situational Report," *Institute for the Study of War*, 18 February 2017, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-situation-report-february-17-28-2017>

[71] A. Gutowski, "ISIS Sanctuary Map," *Institute for the Study of War*, 9 March 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-march-9-2017

the Levant as being essential to the group's ideology or future, preferring to concentrate its efforts to the core and from there branch out. This suggests that internally the group does not see its provinces outside of Iraq and Syria as critical to its future, and ideologically the group has not built in any resilience (or shown any observable indication of doing so) for the caliphate to be transferred to them.

2.14. Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the emergence of the global jihadi salafisim phenomena from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s to the recent appearance of ISIS. It has shown that as a part of this journey the idea of an Islamic State has arisen and has been used by jihadists as a competitive tool and a form of legitimacy.

This chapter shows that the creation of a 'caliphate' in Syria and Iraq by ISIS is so critical for the group's jihad ideology, not to mention fiscal capabilities, that a province outside of the region is unlikely to replace or compensate its loss as it stands. This is in part due to the group's 'Caliphate Central Foreign Policy' that includes encouraging foreign fighters to join the 'Caliphate' in Iraq and Syria over staying in their own home countries and waging jihad there, and their need to consolidate military actives in the Levant over further expansion and political posturing abroad. For the group to continue after the loss of its caliphate in Iraq and Syria, its central ideology must mutate its meaning of a 'caliphate' and its ideological and strategic model surrounding it must also change to enable it to shift the location of its caliphate outside of Iraq and Syria, and even possibly online. This issue will be explored in greater detail in chapter six.

In the following chapters this thesis will explore the potential for ISIS to exist in its external provinces and the ability and the possibility that if ISIS changes the meaning of its caliphate – does it have the potential to exist and live on it its provinces and if so where? And what threat are the provinces as the core collapses and will they remain affiliated with the group upon the loss of territory in Iraq and Syria?

3. How Islamic State's Affiliate System Works

3.1. Introduction

Throughout 2016 and 2017 ISIS has rapidly been losing territory. The cities of Ramadi and Fallujah have fallen and Mosul will soon be taken over by Iraqi forces. In Syria the de facto ISIS capital of Raqqah is under siege and areas in northern Syria and Iraq have been reclaimed by Kurdish troops. The extensive territory ISIS held in 2015 has diminished, leaving the 'caliphate' as a series of disaggregate outposts and empty domains.

The heart of ISIS appears to be on the verge of collapsing, but questions remain relating to how or if the group will end and what role will its affiliates outside of Syria and Iraq play in this. In order to investigate this issue an understanding of how ISIS governs and determines its affiliates will be outlined. This chapter will detail several key elements of ISIS doctrine and its governance system as follows: ISIS doctrine and how its salafi-takfiri world-vision has led to an ambition to establish a caliphate beyond the Levant; how this ambition has led to and seen ISIS undertake activities as a proto-state; ISIS organization structure; the group's strategy and method for expansion; and its provinces or 'wilayat' and the method for their governance.

This chapter will also show that ISIS doctrine of "remaining and expanding" was initially intended just for the areas within Iraq and Syria, and that its applications to other provinces outside of the Levant has yet to be scrutinized, allowing for further exploration in chapters five and six. It will argue that the ambiguity in ISIS's outward expansion indicates that there was minimal resilience instilled in the group to live beyond the central caliphate if its core collapsed.

3.2. Foundations of Islamic State

ISIS has its origins with a Sunni Muslim Jordanian named Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. Despite his death in US airstrikes in 2006, his group, the Base of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, better known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), soon became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Made up of local Iraqis and foreign fighters, it had a hierarchical command structure, as well as bureaucratic administration. ISI was the dominant insurgent organization in Iraq by 2006.[72] However at the end of 2010, in part due to the 'Awakening' and the US led 'Surge', ISI was confined to northern Iraq. There is a clear line of progression from ISI of 2006 to the birth of Islamic State in Iraq and al-

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[72] P.B. Johnston, J.N. Shapiro, H. J. Shatz, B. Bahney, D.F. Jung., P. Ryan, and J Wallace, *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq 2005-2010*, RAND Corporation, 2016. p.11 < http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html>

Shama (ISIS). Upon the Iraqi Army's retreat from Mosul and ISIS capture of the city, it proclaimed a caliphate with Abu Bak al-Baghdadi as the caliph of all Muslims.[73]

3.3. ISIS's Brand of Salafi-Jihadism

The ideology of ISIS is not shrouded in mystery. From 2006 to 2010 the group broadcast *ad nauseam* audio addressing theological and political concerns, making clear its ambitions and its views. ISIS adheres to a strict salafi theology, being uncompromising on doctrinal matters and prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of salafi thought.[74] ISIS version of Jihadi-Salafism stems from the group's origins as al-Qaeda in Iraq and its founder Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who studied theology under the auspices of jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. ISIS's salafist vision also integrates takfirist practices. To accuse someone of *takfir*, is to accuse another Muslim of apostasy. These "enemies of Islam" include Shiites, Sufis, Yazadis, and Ba'hai, for whom the punishment of apostasy is death – ISIS is of the belief that violence is divinely ordained.[75]

Scrutiny of ISIS statements and documents gives a greater understanding of its central ideological doctrine. At the heart of this are several key concepts: 'all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow "true" Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow definition; failure to rule in accordance with God's law constitutes unbelief; fighting the Islamic State is tantamount to apostasy; all Shi'a Muslims are apostates deserving of death; and the Muslim Brotherhood and Mahas are traitors against Islam, among many other things.'[76] These concepts are reiterated by ISIS leaders and in their propaganda.

ISIS approach to undertaking jihadi is also distinct. ISIS espouses a "defensive jihad", like other jihadist groups,[77] shaping their militant activity in response to attacks on the Middle East by Western "crusaders" and secular "apostate" rulers. [78]

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[73] C. Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State*, Brookings Institution and the Center for Middle East Public Policy, Washington, D,C., Analysis Paper No. 19, March 2015.

[74] Manne, R., *The Mind of Islamic State*, Black Inc Books, Sydney, 2016, p. 10. And H. Hassan., "Isis: a portrait of the menace that is sweeping my homeland," *The Guardian*, 16 August 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/16/isis-salafi-menace-jihadist-homeland-syria>

[75] E. Husain, "Saudis Must Stop Exporting Extremism," *New York Times*, 22 August 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html>

[76] These were collected and transcribed in *al-Majmūʻ li-qādat Dawlat al-ʻIrāq al-Islāmiyya*, Nukhbat al-Iʻlām al-Jihādī, 2010, <https://archive.org/download/Dwla_Nokhba/mjdawl.doc> The 38 speeches of the group's first two senior leaders, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhājir (both killed in April 2010), run to nearly 17 hours of audio and occupy more than 200 pages transcribed. Majmu, pp. 70-75, 15, 82, 14, 37-38, and 60.

[77] On the traditional classifications of "offensive jihad" (*jihād al-t̩alab*) and "defensive jihad" (*jihād al-daf'*) see Patricia Crone, *God's Rule: Government and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 297–298 and 363–373.

[78] Baghdādī, "Qul innī ʻalā bayyina min Rabbī," Muʼassasat al-Furqān, 13 March 2007. Transcript in *Majmūʻ*, 12–16

Interestingly the group also advocates the idea of an "offensive jihad". Baghdadi defined this, as "going after the apostate unbelieves by attacking in their home territory, in order to make God's word most high and until there is no persecution".[79] The focus of ISIS "offensive jihad" has often been directed against Shiites.

In order to fulfill its Salafi-Takfiri world-vision ISIS's principle aim is to establish and develop an Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Bilad al-Sham ("the Levant" or "Greater Syria").[80] At the group's founding in June 2014 its spokesman, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, stated,

> Without the [caliphate], authority becomes nothing more than kingship, dominance and rule, accompanied with destruction, corruption, oppression, subjugation, fear, and the decadence of the human being and his descent to the level of animals.[81]

This sentiment is reinforced with the group's doctrine *baqiya wa tatamaddad* ("remaining and expanding").

3.4. ISIS's Organization Structure

The beginning of ISIS statehood began in the form of its predecessor ISI and AQI in 2006. It replicated the core al-Qaeda bureaucratic management model, but also at different geographic levels.[82] The extensive information that has been gathered as to how ISI and AQI operated, provides valuable indicators as to how its current manifestation, ISIS, operates. Organization characteristics are slow to change, and it is unlikely that ISIS leadership would acquire completely new models or originations upon entering Syria and expanding its territorial control beyond Iraq. It is doubtful that ISIS would have abandoned organizational doctrines that they had utilized for over a decade and reported evidence suggests that the group has retained many of its organizational principles, procedures and structures.[83]

ISIS, like its predecessor ISI, is a vertically integrated organization with a core management structure and functional departments in a manner similar to an "M-form" (multidivisional form) hierarchy.[84] This structure is replicated at its lower geographical levels across territory in order to implement broad organizational control.[85] The group's provinces (as geographic units) have a degree of autonomy to

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[79] Baghdādī, "Fa-ammā 'l-zabad fa-yadhhab jufā'an," Mu'assasat al-Furqān, 4 December 2007. Transcript in *Majmūʿ*, 43–50.
[80] A.F. March and M. Revkin., "Caliphate of Law: ISIS' Ground Rules," *Foreign Affairs*, 15 April 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-15/caliphate-law>
[81] Alhayat Media, "This is the promise of Allah," *Alhayat Media*, 29 June 2014, <https://ia902505.us.archive.org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf>
[82] Johnston, 2016, p. iii.
[83] Ibid, p. XV-XVI
[84] P. B. Johnston, "The Geography of Insurgent Organization and Its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone," *Security Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1, 2008.
[85] Johnston, 2016, p. XVI

undertake the core's strategic objectives in each region but must inform and report to the core's leadership its operational activities, finance, personnel and material.[86] ISIS core then utilize these reports to assess and develop its strategic operations.

At the heart of ISIS is its *emir* (commander, chieftain, or prince) – the ordained caliph who is currently Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Two chief deputies, with one overseeing Islamic State activities in Syria and the other Iraq, support al-Baghdadi.[87] Al-Baghdadi, his two deputies, and a collective of advisors make up Islamic state's executive branch, the "Al Imara" or "The Emirate".[88]

Outside of the executive branch are the Shariah and Shura Councils. The Shura Council is made up of nine members that relay al-Baghdadi's orders through the organization and work to ensure that councils lower in the hierarchy follow ISIS's religious doctrine.[89] The Shura Council also has the authority to remove al-Baghdadi as the *emir* if they believe he no longer follows Islamic State beliefs.[90] The Shariah Council is made up of six members and is considered ISIS's most powerful collective.[91] The group is responsible for selecting the caliph and enforcing ISIS's version of sharia in its territories. This group is particularly important when ISIS establishes a new territory, as it is responsible for establishing a police force and courts for its brand of sharia law.[92]

There are also councils or *diwans* ("departments") that are responsible for Islamic States day-to-day activities. These governing bodies include:

- Financial Council: This council has responsibility for Islamic State's treasury.
- Leadership Council: This council has responsibility for Islamic States laws and polices, which must be approved by al-Baghdadi. It can also remove al-Baghdadi is he does not adhere to ISIS ideology.
- Military Council: Oversees military operations.
- Legal Council: Oversees recruitment and executions, as well as addressing religious transgressions and family issues.
- Fighters Assistance Council: Oversees the housing and support for foreign fighters.
- Security Council: Oversees security and policing of Islamic State areas.
- Intelligence Council: Intelligence sourcing group.
- Media Council: This council is responsible for its media.

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[86] Ibid.

[87] N. Thompson and A. Shubert, "The anatomy of ISIS: How the Islamic State is run, from oil to beheadings," CNN, 14 January 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/>

[88] J. Day, "The inner workings of ISIS revealed," *Examiner*, 9 September 2014, <http://www.examiner.com/article/the-inner-workings-of-isis-revealed>

[89] N. Thompson and A. Shubert, 2015.

[90] Ibid.

[91] R. Barrett, "The Islamic State," *Soufan Group*, 30 November 2014, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf;

[92] Ibid.

- Provincial Council: Oversees the provinces in Iraq and Syria, as well as beyond those borders

However, not all bureaucratic bodies are *diwans,* Hijra Committees, are responsible for managing new migrants and border crossings. ISIS also has a secret service wing labelled the Emni. The Emni is made up of an internal police and external operations unit, with a focus on undertaking terror outside of ISIS held territory in Iraq and Syria.[93] They are actively involved in deploying operatives in Europe, Asia and further abroad.

3.5. ISIS's Governance System in the Provinces

The governance system in Iraq and Syria is replicated throughout its provinces.[94] However, the extent that this translates and the level of governance in the provinces varies considerably and is at its best fragmented. This governance practice will be explored in greater detail in the analysis of the specific provinces. Each province is assigned an *emir* who oversees a local structure parallel to the core's organization structure but prioritizes the administration of civilian activities.[95] A sharia commander, a military commander and a security commander almost always make up a collective that support the emir.

3.6. ISIS's Strategy of Expansion

After ISIS successfully captured Mosul in 2014, it focused its attention on state-building rather than conflict further abroad. As explained in the previous chapter unlike its *pater familias* al Qaeda, ISIS has needed territory for its legitimacy. To this end the expansion of its caliphate has been essential.

ISIS's strategy for territorial control was elucidated from multiple sources and outlined in an issue of *Dabiq*. The strategy is as follows:

1. "Permanently break down political boundaries in Iraq, Syria, and the region by cultivating conditions for government failure and/or sectarian civil war.
2. Establishing the Islamic Caliphate by controlling terrain across Iraq and Syria, governing the population within and defending against external threats.
3. Bring like-minded people to fight alongside and settle within the Islamic caliphate.

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[93] R. Callimachi, "How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers," *New York Times*, 3 August 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruit-interview.html?_r=0>

[94] A. Aymenn al-Tamimi, "Governance," in K. Bauer (Ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, p. 30-32

[95] R. Barrett, 2014.

4. Expand the territory of the caliphate and connect to the wider Muslim community, or the Ummah."[96]

The last strategic point is the focus of its expansion plan. This plan involves three geographic spheres of operations – interior, near abroad, and far abroad (as explained in the previous chapter).[97]

However, ISIS prioritized the recruitment of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria over bolstering affiliate group numbers abroad. At first this strategy would appear to be inconsistent with the group's doctrine of 'remaining and expanding'. So far, ISIS's strategy for expansion has focused on broadening and strengthening its territorial control in the Levant to the detriment of expansion elsewhere, indicating that the doctrine of 'remaining and expanding' was initially only meant to be applied to its activities in the Levant. It could be argued that the establishment of provinces and affiliates outside of the Levant is not consistent with the ISIS's caliphate centric foreign policy of establishing a caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

This can be seen in how the group's strategy of applying the provincial governance system used in Iraq and Syria to its affiliates and provinces has not lead to territorial control (this will be detailed in greater depth in chapter five). While the legitimacy of ISIS is recognized and many local populations share its desire for the establishment of Islamic principles and Sharia laws in their home country, ISIS has not been able to successfully entrench itself in any territory outside of the Levant, more often they are seen as being "in, but not of" the country. ISIS attempts to remaining and expand, as a transnational insurgency group controlling territory, will be explored in greater detail in chapters five and six.

3.7. Provinces or Wilayats Outside of Iraq and Syria

Instead of creating provinces from the bottom up, ISIS has integrated existing jihadist groups and terrorist networks in a manner similar to multinational corporations. [98]

These groups start out as local terrorist or jihadist groups that pledge their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in what is termed "bay'at". In relation to ISIS pledges, it is imperative to differentiate between support and bay'at. The bay'at to a Caliph is a pledge of allegiance that, when accepted, brings the individual or group formally into the fold and under the authority of the Caliph. The use of bay'at dates back to

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[96] J. D. Lewis, "The Islamic State: a Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State," Understandingwar.org, 1 July 2014, p.11, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state>

[97] H. Gambhir., "Meet ISIL's Most Dangerous Affiliates," *Politico Magazine*, 14 December 2015, < http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Harleen%20Gambhir-ISIS%20Affiliates-Politico%20DEC%202015.pdf>

[98] Bunzel, Cole, *From Paper state to Caliphate*, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, No. 19, March 2015. < https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf>

Islam's prophet Muhammad and is used by ISIS as a way of bolstering their legitimacy.[99] Two types of bay'a have been identified in Islamic law:[100] "Restricted" and "Unrestricted."[101] A restricted bay'a is given to the leader of a militant group with limited terms, obligating obedience only in matters of jihad. In contrast an unrestricted bay'a is given to the head of a political community with unlimited terms demanding obedience in everything.[102] As the ISIS Caliphate collapses the jihadist community will have to confront the meaning of bay'at and what it means for their allegiances – it may cause a shift in the global jihadist community.

In contrast, a group's pledge of support to ISIS does not have the same binding connotations as bay'at. Support for ISIS, or a jihadist group in general, does not mean that a formal relationship exists. Due to interpretations of the Quran relating to *fitna* (sedition), the open criticism of other jihadist groups is rarely undertaken and more often generic words of support are given.

While any group can give Bayat to ISIS, not all groups are accepted by ISIS. The formation of a new wilayat, and/or pledge of allegiance to Islamic State also requires the submission of a proposal by the group detailing their governance and military strategy, as well as selecting a leader to ISIS central command. This process has been detailed in issue seven of *Dabiq*:

> This [approval] process includes documenting their bay'at [pledge of allegiance], unifying the jama'at [assembly] who have given bay'ah, holding consultations to nominate a wali [governor] and members for the regional shura assembly, planning a strategy to achieve consolidation in their region for the Khalafah [caliphate] so as to implement the Shari'ah [Islamic law], and presenting all this to the Islamic State leadership for approval.[103]

Once a wilayat is established ISIS leadership then assist the affiliates by exporting expertise, administration, funding and military training to the group.[104] By doing so ISIS is able to expand its global network, while the affiliate receives funding and support. ISIS systematizing, bureaucratizing, and ratifying of its governance structures enables it to function consistently throughout its various Wilayats.[105]

More broadly Wilayats serve as ISIS vanguard for territorial control, working to undermine the stability of the country they are in and exploit governance vacuums. Wilayats armed operations intensify regional disorder and generate security

[99] Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam,* Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1988, pp. 58–59.
[100] Note this is from Abu Ja'far al-Hattab, a official in ISIS and former member of Ansar al-Shari'a
[101] Abu Ja'far al-Hatab, Bayat al-ams ar lilimam almutar, Mu'assasat al Bavariq, 26th June, 2013.
[102] Bunzel, p.26
[103] Islamic State, "From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone," *DABIQ*, November 2015, p. 35, <http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf>
[104] Gambhir, 2015.
[105] A.Y. Zelin, "Is ISIS good at governing?," *Brooking*s, 9 February 2016, < https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/02/09/experts-weigh-in-part-3-is-isis-good-at-governing/>

breaches to gain control over territory with the aim that they will help ISIS grow beyond Iraq and Syria.[106]

3.8. ISIS's method for Conquering and Controlling Territory

It has been shown that ISIS's form of expansion has multiple phases.[107] While some of these phases occur simultaneously they predominantly develop in a linear manner in the following order: intelligence operations, military operations, da'wa (missionary) activities, hisba activities (consumer protection and moral policing), and governance.

The intelligence phase involves the infiltration of groups and the organizing of sleeper cells. As stated previously, ISIS does not begin in an area from scratch, but incorporates jihadist networks from the local constituency under its banners. The group then undertakes asymmetric military tactics that involve armed assaults, car bombings and hostage taking. Missionary activities, such as the creation and distribution of electronic ID cards and dispersion of propaganda leaflets, CD-ROMs and conversations, are undertaken in order to engage with local groups, and sway individuals and collectives towards their ideology. Hisba activities, such as the destruction of non-Sunni religious symbols is also undertaken. Finally Islamic state then undertakes taxation, administration and produces public goods and services.[108]

ISIS has controlled several wilayats (provinces) in Iraq and Syria that have included Anbar, Kirkuk and Ninawa in Iraq and Hama, Idib, and Raqqa in Syria. These provinces have also extended to Libya, Yemen, and even Nigeria. However, in almost all the locations outside of Iraq and Syria, these provinces have had limited to no control over a territory. The rest of this thesis concerns itself with analyzing these affiliates outside of Iraq and Syria.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined several of the key elements of ISIS doctrine and governance system, placing particular emphasis on how the group acquires and governs its provinces. It shows how the group's use of the Levant strategy of "expanding and remaining" has been transposed to provinces outside that region. This approach to expansion raises questions of its effectiveness and the suitability for areas beyond Iraq and Syria. The absence of a unique strategy for governing and

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[106] Ibid.

[107] A.Y. Zelin., "The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Research Notes No.29, January, 2016, <
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote29-Zelin.pdf>

[108] J. Warrick., W. McCants., and A.Y. Zelin., "The Rise of ISIS: "Remaining and Expanding," *The Washington Institute*, 12 November 2015, < http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-rise-of-isis-remaining-and-expanding>

expanding territory beyond the Levant supports the argument in the previous chapter of ISIS's 'caliphate centric foreign policy' and a broad neglect of the situational and cultural interest of its affiliates in the "near" and "further" abroad geographic spheres. There is a lack of resilience in its provincial system outside of the Levant for holding and maintain ideologically and resource viable territory – upon the groups impending collapse in Iraq and Syria there is no immediate fall back province. This proposition will be scrutinized by an analysis of the provinces and their actions in the following chapters.

The next section will describe the methodology utilized to analyze ISIS's affiliates and provinces. This methodology will be used and the results detailed in Appendix A. In section five these results will be analyzed and several of the questions raised in this chapter, particularly the extent to which a province group has taken upon ISIS ideology and strategies, and how well ISIS strategy of "expanding and remaining" has been transposed beyond the Levant, will be addressed.

4. Methodology of Province Analysis

4.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the quantitative and qualitative methodology used in this research. The first section will detail how the analysis taxonomy of the ISIS provinces is structured and how open source information is utilized to populate the criteria. The second section details the quantitative analysis of affiliate groups' targets, tactics and incidents that are derived from the Global Terrorism Database by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The third section outlines the metric assessment method for determining the bonds, shared interests and likelihood of persistence of ISIS provinces.

4.2. Analysis Taxonomy

The structure of the analysis taxonomy is based upon assessments released by Australian and U.S terrorist national security departments on terrorist groups. This involves detailing information of the organizations relevant to eight sub headings: Objectives, Background, Leadership, Members, Funding, Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016, Activity in 2016, and Assessment. The final subheading 'Assessment' is informed by the details gathered in the previous subheadings and broken down into three parts that are detailed below.

Threat assessment: The designated threat levels are based upon the extent to which several combinations are present: Existence (is the group present or have access to the area), Capability (the capability the group has to carry out an attack or even govern), Intent (evidence of the groups activity, that also includes assessed or stated intent to do so), History (previously established insurgent/terrorist activity), Targeting (information or activity that shows planning for a explicit terrorist action), Security environment (the extent to which the political and security situation of the threatened authority affect the capabilities of the threatening organization to undertake their intent). To gauge a group's threat, the extent is quantified in the following way:

High: Existence, intentions, capability and history are evident.
Moderate: Existence, capability and history are evident but intention may not.
Low: Existence and capability are evident. Intention and history may not.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): The degree to which an affiliate group will maintain its affiliation with ISIS core is assessed by looking at several key factors in the relationship between the principle and agent: bonds, shared interests, and benefits of affiliation for ISIS core and its affiliate (the finer details of the factors is described in greater detail in 2.3 of this section).

High: Bonds, shared interests with the principle and agent, and benefits for affiliate for maintaining connection with principle are present.

Moderate: Shared interests are present but bonds and benefits may not be.

Low: Benefits in terms of principle brand present, but bonds and shared interests absent.

Future Prospects (Survivability): Future Prospects is difficult to assess objectively. Factors considered when determining survivability are detailed in Table 1, which include (but not exclusive to): Group Size, Group Competition, Group Age, Ability to Generate Revenue, State Regime, Likelihood of Principal Bailing out group if needed, and Local Support. Future Prospects is determined on a three-point scale using estimates of the likelihood of persistence detailed above and also in table 1.

High: Large Group Size, Limited Competition, Ability to Self-Generate Revenue, Local Support, Limited State or External interference, and Support from Principle (ISIS Core) are present.

Moderate: Moderate Group Size, Limited Competition, Ability to Self-Generate Revenue, and Limited State or External interference are present. Local Support, and Support from Principle may not be present.

Low: Small group size/diminishing size, high competition, inability to self-finance, high state or external interference, an absence of local support.

4.3. Group Targets, Tactics and Incidents Data

The data used to evaluate affiliate groups targets, tactics and number of incidents is sourced from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The data contains attacks from 1970 to 2015. The data is collected from publicly available, unclassified source materials. For more information about the database, including their definition of terrorist attacks see www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

4.4. Metrics Assessment Method

The metric template and weighting system used for the analysis of ISIS affiliates is derived from researcher Clint Watts who provided the tool to the ISIS research community to undertake their own assessments.[109] The values used to populate the metric are based upon the open source data gathered for the taxonomy assessments.

Bonds

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[109] Clint Watts link to Metric Template - http://goo.gl/WSSX3f

For the bonds metric several key factors have been assessed and weighed. These are: bayat pledged by affiliate, bayat confirmed by IS central, physical distance to travel between affiliate and Raqqa, routine electronic communication, volume of foreign fighters from the region, operative from Iraq and Syria traveling to affiliate, level of coordination in social media, duplication of IS administrative document by affiliate, funding/financial transfer from IS central to affiliate.

Shared Interests and benefits of affiliate for Islamic State Core and its affiliate

Islamic State core interests in relation to the benefits they can extract from the affiliate groups have been assessed and measured. These factors are: expanded pool of potential recruits, create potential future safe havens; demonstrate reach vis-avis al Qaeda; opportunity for success with low investment, low blowback; potential financial support over the horizon, either from state Ops, black market or donations; increased media content and distribution, does the location rally global supporters?; access to specialized skills, recruits, equipment and targets.

The IS core benefits from affiliate of a group are then compared to the affiliate groups benefits from the IS in relation to their interests. These factors are: Opportunity for aggressive middle managers to break away and start their own group; incentivize local manpower to join group at home; reinvigorate local group on the wane; improve affiliate propaganda distribution; increase foreign fighter recruitment to local environment; receive funds and resources from global hub; IS central potential savior upon group's demise.

The subtraction of IS interests from affiliate interests are then used to *assess the extent to which an affiliates interests converge or diverge from Islamic state core.*

Likelihood of Persistence and Future Growth

To assess the likelihood that an affiliate/province would continue to persist or grow as an active organization beyond 2016, an extensive review of literature on factors contributing to the persistence and demise of terrorist and insurgency groups were taken into consideration. These factors can be seen in table 1.

Factors	Conditions/Effect
State Regime	Democratic Institutions = Increase in Likelihood of Group Persistence
State Stability	Group in a Country without Central Government Control = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence
State Location	Group located in Middle East or North Africa = Increase in Likelihood of Group Persistence
Group Size	Large Size = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence
Group Ideology	Religious = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence

Group Tactics	Multiple/Diverse Number of Tactics = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence
Group Tactics	Conducting Transnational Activities = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence
Group Tactics	Greater Number of Kills = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence
Competition	Greater Number of Groups in a Country = Decrease in Likelihood of Group Persistence
Competition	Greater Number of Groups in a Country = Increase in Terrorism Violence
Competition	Group is 'Top Dog' = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence
Group Age/Lifespan	Group is in the First Year of Existence = Decrease in Likelihood of Group Persistence
Generate Revenue	Greater External Resource Dependence = Decrease in Group Persistence
Generate Revenue	Greater Resources = Increase Likelihood of Group Persistence

Table 4.1: Factors contributing to the persistence of terrorist and insurgency groups

Several of these factors have been amalgamated into three distinct factors and weighted accordingly: ability to self-finance (generate revenue), counterterrorism pressure (state factors), and local competition of other jihadi groups (competition). These factors have then been ranked as high, moderate, or low from open source metrics and reports. * Note (a) group age, (b) group tactics, and (c) group size has not been included for the metric, due to (a) each wilayat is often an amalgamation of groups and groups age is difficult to define and most wilayats were formed within one year of each other (b) group tactics are relatively to 2015 leaving actions in 2016 absent (c) group size is difficult to determine and unreliable ascertainable from open sources.

This metric is used as a basis to which other qualitative information (such as the influence of regional geopolitics, the presence or absence of group leadership, domestic factors) and open source material, as detailed in each assessment's taxonomy, is combined. From this judgments are made on the group's persistence and future growth.

4.5. Assumptions and Limitations

A number of limitations exist regarding the analysis of the subject matter. Using a qualitative methodology allows for the possibility of selection bias and result bias because of pre-conceived explanations for groups and trends in their activities.

The majority of the information and data collected is from open sources. Therefore, there will be a limitation to the breadth and depth of information compared to government sources, in the analysis. To this end, some groups have greater exposure and the number of sources and available information is greater for them than others, inducing an inequity between affiliate group taxonomy.

Another limitation of sources centers around many of the primary sources being in Arabic or a language other than English. This is a limitation in the breadth of sources analyzed as the researcher does not adequately comprehend Arabic.

4.6. Credibility

In order to ensure the credibility of this research, all accessible resources were exhausted. Furthermore, other interpretations of the data were sought out in order to provide varying views.

4.7. Transferability

The results of this study are only applicable to the cases analyzed. The results cannot be applied to other insurgent or terrorist groups, as the research design utilizes a structured, case-by-case method.

4.8. Determining and Selecting ISIS Provinces and Affiliates

As stated in section 3, there are conditions that result in an organization's pledge (or bay'at) to ISIS that transform the group into a province (or wilayat). Extensive review of open source material, including scrutiny of ISIS media, has elucidated thirteen organizations (the sub-provinces/groups of these organizations are analyzed, however they not included in the total final number) that are either officially recognized provinces of ISIS or have significantly strong ties to the group that include an acknowledgement of bay'at (see table 4.2). These thirteen provinces and affiliates have been subsequently analyzed, which is to be found in Appendix A. Note: Near the completion of this thesis, it has come to light that ISIS may be further developing its presence in Africa, including countries such as Mali. While the extent of such affiliation is still undetermined, it demands further scrutiny in future studies.

Group	Country Present In
ISIS-Lebanon	Lebanon
Wilayat Sinai	Egypt
Wilayat al-Khurasan	Afghanistan/Pakistan
Wilayat al-Yemeni	Yemen
Wilayat al-Haramayn	Saudi Arabia
ISIS-Libya	Libya
ISIS-Tunisia	Tunisia
Wilayat al-Jaza'ir	Algeria
Boko Haram	Nigeria
Abu Sayyaf Group	Philippines
Wilayat Caucasus	Russia
ISIS-Bangladesh	Bangladesh
ISIS-Indonesia	Indonesia

Table 4.2: ISIS Provinces and Wilayats Outside of Iraq and Syria. Color indicates "interior", "near Abroad", "far abroad" as red, orange, and yellow respectively.

5. Analysis of Islamic State Provinces and Affiliates

5.1. Introduction

An analysis of the ISIS provinces indicates that not all are equal. The thirteen provinces defined in this thesis vary significantly in their capabilities and ability to undertake operations and governance. For example, of the provinces: four control territory to some degree (Aby Sayyaf Group, Wilayat al-Khurasan, Wilayat Sinai, and Boko Haram), two only exist on paper (Algeria and Saudi Arabia), and four operate in countries with unstable governments (Wilayat al-Khurasan, al-Yemeni, Boko Haram, and ISIS-Libya). This chapter will explore several of the key outcomes from the analysis of the individual provinces (to be found in Appendix A), highlighting ISIS provinces that are the greatest threat, those likely to remain affiliates with the core group, and then those that will continue to exist. Utilizing the results from the taxonomy from the last section this chapter will argue that ISIS's relationship with its affiliates is predominately defined by the value of its jihadist brand and its ability to provide financial support to its provinces. As the caliphate collapses so does ISIS ideological brand and its ability to provide funding to affiliates. Only those groups that run largely autonomously, are able to self-finance and/or have taken on the brand comprehensively are likely to persist. It will argue that these are few in number and that the likelihood of ISIS core reestablishing themselves in one of them is slim.

5.2. Which Affiliates Are Currently a Threat?

The majority of ISIS affiliates remain active in some form or another. However, the scale and frequency of their activities varies greatly. Based on their current capabilities over the short term and their immediate incentives to undertake violent operations, the provinces have been ranked as low, moderate or high threats (see Table 5.1).

High	Moderate	Low
ISIS-Tunisia	Wilayat al-Khurasan	Wilayat Caucasus
Abu Sayyaf Group	Wilayat al-Yemeni	ISIS-Libya
	Wilayat Sinai	Wilayat al-Jaza'ir
	Wilayat Boko Haram	ISIS-Bangladesh
	ISIS-Lebanon	ISIS-Indonesia
		Wilayat al-Haramayn

Table 5.1: Immediate and Short Term Threat Level Posed by ISIS Affiliates

Table 5.1 indicates that ISIS-Tunisia and the Abu Sayyaf Group present the most significant threats. While Tunisia lacks an official province, the developing

capabilities of the group, the opportunity for exploiting state instability, the impending experience and man power from cells fleeing Libya, and the group's historical connection to ISIS suggest that it is not only an existential threat to Tunisia but has potential for ISIS to establish a strong hold.[296]

Abu Sayyaf Group, like ISIS-Tunisia, has yet to be declared an official wilayat of ISIS but has been operating under its banners and guidance.[297] However, it is one of the few affiliates that have significant control over territory. Its historical success as an insurgency group, established and broad network to draw recruits from, ability to self-finance and desire to 'prove' itself to ISIS in order to be declared a province is indicative of its immediate threat.[298]

Established groups such as Wilayat Sinai and Boko Haram retain their ability to undertake activities but their capabilities are being significantly reduced by external and internal pressures respectively. Wilayat al-Khurasan, despite facing significant challenges from US, Afghan government forces, and other extremist groups, has continued to undertake lethal attacks in Afghanistan and has recently attracted support in Pakistan.[299] The group's desire to gain a foothold in Pakistan, provides it with an incentive to undertake spectacular and frequent terrorist activities in the short term. The group's evolution, moving in tandem with ISIS core, from an insurgency group to a terrorist organization, is indicative of the group's developing capabilities and adaptability.

Group	Territorial Control	Territorial Forecast
ISIS-Lebanon	None	Negative
Wilayat Sinai	Minimal	Negative
Wilayat al-Khurasan	Minimal	Gains in Pakistan/Losses in Afghanistan
Wilayat al-Yemeni	None	Negative
Wilayat al-Haramayn	None	Negative
ISIS-Libya	Minimal	Negative
ISIS-Tunisia	None	Negative
Wilayat al-Jaza'ir	None	Negative
Boko Haram	Minimal	Negative
Abu Sayyaf Group	Minimal	Negative
Wilayat Caucasus	None	Negative
ISIS-Bangladesh	None	Negative
ISIS-Indonesia	None	Negative

Table 5.2: Affiliate Territory Control and Future Prospects. Color indicates "interior", "near abroad", "far abroad" as red, orange, and yellow respectively.

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[296] See Appendix A: 8.6 ISIS in Libya and 8.7 Isis in Tunisia.

[297] See Appendix A: 8.10. ISIS in the Philippines- Abu Sayyaf Group.

[298] Ibid.

[299] See Appendix A: 8.5. ISIS in Central Asia – Wilayat al-Khorasan.

While ISIS affiliates pose insurgent and terrorist threats, their lack of territorial control and governance at this time does not provide a physical caliphate for the core group to transpose their ideology and propaganda (Table 5.2). The extent that these groups will remain affiliated and continue working for the establishment of a caliphate, draw jihadist to their lands to establish a new caliphate under the ISIS banner or their own, strike out on their own or merge with other jihadists who share their ambition of a salafist society, or abandon the ambition of an immediate Islamic State in the face of the loss of the caliphate, must be elucidated to understand their role in potentially continuing the group in the future. These factors will be explored below.

5.3. Which Groups are likely to remain affiliated with ISIS after the Core Collapses?

While some of ISIS provinces remain a threat, the likelihood that they will remain affiliated with the group once its core collapses is unknown. This is critical to elucidate, as not only does it help to understand if the group will continue to exist elsewhere beyond Iraq and Syria (and as will be explored later if the group's core will move itself to there), but an understanding of the dynamic between jihadist groups alliances transnationally. This section will look at the bonds between ISIS core and its provinces, the shared interests and objectives between them, and the extent that the provinces have adopted ISIS core's tactics and targets. It will argue that while many of the groups have undertaken and have adopted many of ISIS targets and tactics, only a select few have shared interests and bonds to remain connected to the group.

5.3.1. How Physically Present Is ISIS Core in its Provinces

The extent that ISIS has invested manpower into its provinces outside of Iraq and Syria is poorly understood. The group's model of incorporating other groups into their fold as franchises suggests that the provinces are likely to be filled with local members. Table 5.3 utilizes open source material to detail the composition of ISIS provincial group's membership.

Group	Senior Leader	Core Contingent
ISIS-Lebanon	Foreign	Blend
Wilayat Sinai	Domestic	Domestic
Wilayat al-Khurasan	Foreign	Foreign
Wilayat al-Yemeni	Foreign	Foreign
Wilayat al-Haramayn	Domestic	Domestic
ISIS-Libya	Foreign	Domestic
ISIS-Tunisia	Domestic	Domestic
Wilayat al-Jaza'ir	Domestic	Domestic
Boko Haram	Domestic	Domestic
Abu Sayyaf Group	Domestic	Domestic
Wilayat Caucasus	Domestic	Domestic
ISIS-Bangladesh	Domestic	Domestic
ISIS-Indonesia	Domestic	Domestic

Table 5.3: The composition of ISIS provincial group's membership. Color indicates "interior", "near abroad", "far abroad" as red, orange, and yellow respectively.

Table 5.3 shows that the provinces are predominantly led and are made up of domestic members. The extent that these domestic leaders have direct communication with ISIS core, follow orders and official mandates is ambiguous. However, given that ISIS core lines of communication will weaken upon its collapse, how these groups will act without a central leadership will change. Groups where there is a strong adaption of ISIS core values as well as tactics and targets – and by that extension ability to act with little direction from above or autonomously – may continue under the ISIS banner. The extent that the provinces have shared interest and undertake operations in a fashion similar to ISIS core will be explored next.

5.3.2. The Adoption of Targets and Tactics by Affiliates

Figure 5.1 allows for a comparison of province operation activity by showing the per cent of attacks by target type undertaken by provinces when compared to that undertaken within their country of operation, as well by ISIS in Syria and Iraq and globally.

Figure 5.1: Group Attacks by Target Type[300]

ISIS focuses more of its attacks on private citizens, property and security forces than does the aggregate of global terrorist attacks. These targets follow the groups mandate of increasing the sectarian divide in Iraq and Syria, and attacking state security forces to undermine stability.[301] Interestingly, the target priorities of ISIS affiliates are similar to ISIS core more than the overall terrorist targets between 2002 and 2015, and do not follow the main target preferences of terrorism in their country of origin.

ISIS provinces, besides those in Yemen, have an overall increase, though not dramatic, in attacks focused on security forces (both military, militia or terrorist groups, and police) following their pledge of bay'at to ISIS. Wilayat Libya attacks targets mirror ISIS core's target preferences closely, while Wiliayat Sinai increased its attacks on state security forces after joining ISIS. Wilayat Yemen increased its attacks on religious targets, with a particular focus on increasing the sectarian divide in

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[300] Data taken from the GTD, and can be found complied in Appendix B.

[301] For an excellent review regarding the focus of jihadist and non-jihadist attacks, as well as terrorist, guerilla and insurgent tactics see: Moghadam, A., Berger, R., Beliakova, P., "Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terroirst Actors, *Perspectives on* Terrorism, vol. 8. No. 5, 2014, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/374/html>

Yemen, when compared to the group's previous affiliation. Wilayat al-Khurasan attack targets parallel those of one of its predecessors, Tehrik-e Taleban, more closely than the IMU, indicating the formers greater influence on the group.

ISIS core and affiliates target preferences are consistent and follow the trend of most jihadist groups.[302] This is an important recognition as it not only shows that the provinces were made up of established jihadist groups, but also shows that prior to affiliation both groups were attempting to achieve their goals through the same targets.

Figure 5.1 also shows that provinces didn't need to find new targets after affiliation. While they may undertake operations like ISIS, distinct from other local groups, given they had these targets prior to pledging to the group, the loss of the caliphate means these groups will likely continue to attack the same targets regardless of affiliation or not. Whether this will result in the formation of "copy cat" caliphates appearing out of autonomously acting groups is unknown, though evidence suggests that this may already be occurring with Wilayat Sinai that is now labeling itself as 'The Islamic State in Egypt'.[303] If these groups are able to survive the collapse of the caliphate, it is likely that the provinces will not shift targets and the same groups will continued to be assailed with attacks. However, this will only be the case if the provinces have the ability to persist, as well as have the capabilities, and an interest in doing so (while this last point seems odd, as will be explained later, the provinces may have a reason to down grade their organizations into smaller cells in the future). The next section will explore the extent of shared interest between ISIS and its affiliates.

5.3.3. Which Provinces are Likely to Remain Affiliated with ISIS After the Core Collapses? Shared and Divergent Interests and Aims

ISIS provinces are, and were, prior to joining ISIS, salafi-jihadi groups. Their broad aims of establishing a physical Islamic State, asserting unchallenged authority, and winning an apocalyptic war with the West, are unanimously shared. However, in many instances there are political, environmental, cultural and historical differences between the composition of the provinces members and prior affiliations that are significantly different from those in Iraq and Syria. To examine the likelihood of provinces remaining affiliates with ISIS it is critical to investigate the strength of bonds between the two and their shared interests.

ISIS affiliates motivation for pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi differs from group to group. ISIS presented itself as an alternative to many local jihadist organizations. Of

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[302] Ibid.

[303] A video released by the group adopted a new logo reading Islamic State in Egypt, rather than the Sinai Province. Trew, B., "Islamic State vows to increase attacks on Egypt's Christians in new video," *The Australian*, 21 Feburary 2017, < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/the-times/islamic-state-vows-to-increase-attacks-on-egypts-christians-in-new-video/news-story/56c667d0609fba6ad0f082e56b3daaf5>

the ISIS provinces the large majority were preexisting collectives with several previously affiliated with al-Qaeda (see figure 5.2). Some of these groups, Boko Haram and IMU in particular, have become divided as a result of their pledge.

Figure 5.2: Metric estimated strength of bonds between affiliates and ISIS in Syria and Iraq (The closer the bubble is to ISIS HQ the closer ties between groups).

Many of the affiliates pledged to ISIS on the premise that the core would share its wealth and experience. However, the amount of funding, fighters, and other material support from ISIS in Syria and Iraq to affiliates appears limited. As the core declines and the amount of resources distributed to the provinces decreases, "buyer's remorse" may occur and many provinces may return to their previous affiliation.

The loss of provinces or the renunciation of affiliation would undoubtedly damage the ISIS brand. Groups that only "rebranded" themselves as ISIS provinces may promptly defect and reprioritize their original local grievances. Groups that did not originate out of pre-existing groups are more likely to remain loyal to ISIS despite diminishing financial and administrative support.

An understanding of the shared interests, or more appropriately the interests that can be extracted by affiliation of both the core and the affiliate from the other, are critical in determining a future of association. These interests include fighter recruitment, financial resources, media content and distribution, and support under duress, and have been taken into account in creating the metric of shared interest in figure 5.3.

An understanding of shared interests allows for a greater ability to assess if the provinces will remain affiliates with the group upon the core collapsing.

Figure 5.3: Metric results indicating the likelihood of shared interests between affiliates and the ISIS core in Syria and Iraq. A value of 1 indicates a complete alignment of interests with ISIS core in Syria and Iraq.

The shared interests are diverse, though telling. Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf have limited shared interests, indicative that it their affiliation is brand orientated. In contrast, groups such as ISIS-Libya and ISIS-Lebanon have significant mutual interest.

Several conditions and factors, such as fiscal dependency on the ISIS core and ISIS brand value to the affiliate region, have been taken into consideration when analyzing the ISIS affiliates likelihood of remaining affiliated to the group as ISIS in Syria and Iraq collapses. The affiliates have been ranked as having low, moderate or high likelihood of retaining their affiliation (see table 5.4).

High	Moderate	Low
ISIS-Tunisia	Wilayat al-Haramayn	Wilayat Caucasus
Wilayat al-Khurasan	Wilayat al-Yemeni	Wilayat Boko Haram
ISIS-Lebanon	Wilayat Libya	Abu Sayyaf Group
Wilayat Sinai	Wilayat al-Jaza'ir	

Table 5.4: ISIS Affiliates likelihood of remaining affiliated with the group in Syria and Iraq.

Wilayat Sinai has completely embraced ISIS ideology, tactics and targets to the point where the groups foundational aims have been completely eclipsed (see '6.3.3. Wilayat Sinai' for this to be explored in greater detail). This outcome is interesting as the metric analysis shows that Wilayat Sinai has only modest shared interests and bonds with ISIS in Syria and Iraq (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4).

Wilayat al-Khurasan has not only strong interests and bonds as shown by the metric analysis in figures 5.4 and 5.5, but the ISIS brand – in large part because of its anti-Shiite stance which has gained favorable traction in Pakistan, where the group is beginning to make inroads and support from various jihadist groups.

Figure 5.4: Metric results indicating the likelihood of existing bonds between affiliates and ISIS core in Syria and Iraq. A value of 1 indicates an exceptional strong bond between the affiliate and the ISIS core in Syria and Iraq.

Tunisia has a high likelihood of retaining its affiliation with ISIS for the same reason Libya is likely to see a decrease in its ties with ISIS. In Libya the group has been made up predominantly of foreign fighters and has struggled to gain recruits from locals. As many ISIS-Libya fighters flee to Tunisia those that remain and head to Fezzan province will face significant challenges gaining the support of the domestic constituency there.

Figure 5.5: Metric estimated strength of shared interests between affiliates and ISIS in Syria and Iraq (The closer the bubble is to ISIS HQ the more shared interests between groups).

The extent that ISIS provinces will remain affiliated after the collapse of the caliphate is defined by the extent that groups bonds with the core, shared interests, and how much the provinces integrate ISIS targets, tactics and operations into their own. Given that ISIS's center of gravity is the control of a physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria, its erosion is limiting what it can offer its provinces. The ties that bind are rapidly fraying. The results outlined above indicate that ISIS-Tunisia, Wilayat al-Khurasan, ISIS-Lebanon, and Wilayat Sinai and more likely than the other provinces to remain affiliated with the group. How long the rest of the groups remain affiliated to ISIS core its dependent and how quickly the brand diminishes, or how well ISIS manages to keep its brand valuable to these groups. It is becoming apparent that support that ISIS core will get from its provinces upon the collapse of the caliphate is diminishing.

5.4. Which ISIS Affiliates Will Continue to Persist?

Even if ISIS affiliates remain affiliated with the group after the core collapses, it is necessary to know which groups will be able to survive the collapse of the caliphate

when the financial and directional support will be minimal, if at all. Is ISIS actually operationally viable, regardless of doctrinal aspects, without the central caliphate and being run through its provinces?

ISIS provinces often gain funding and resources through extorting the local population rather than active support or governorship. Similarly they maintain control by intimidation rather than active popular support. If there is no viable alternative, populations will remain submissive to the group. The ability of a province to undertake extortion and intimidation activities has often been defined by the group's material support from ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In the wake of declining material support from ISIS core only groups who are able to independently undertake those extortion and intimidating activities, without central direction and material support, are likely to persist.

Several conditions, like those described above as well as factors such as counterterrorism efforts, have been taken into consideration when analyzing the ISIS affiliates likelihood of persisting (see methodology). The affiliates have been ranked as having low, moderate or high likelihood of persisting (see table 5.5).

High	Moderate	Low
ISIS-Tunisia	Wilayat al-Khurasan	Wilayat Caucasus
Wilayat al-Khurasan	Wilayat al-Yemeni	Wilayat al-Haramayn
ISIS-Lebanon	Wilayat Libya	Wilayat al-Jaza'ir
Abu Sayyaf Group	Wilayat Boko Haram	Wilayat al-Haramayn
Wilayat Sinai	ISIS-Bangladesh	ISIS-Lebanon

Table 5.5: ISIS affiliates likely to persist.

The metric analysis of the affiliates future factors also displays that the groups who have the most independence from ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and are able to act independently as well as self fund, are ranked as being more likely to persist (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6: Metric results for ISIS affiliates Future Factors. Strong Negative Outlook = 1.5, Slightly Negative Outlook = 1.9, Slight Positive Outlook = 2.3, Strong Positive Outlook = 2.5.

How well ISIS-Lebanon is able to take advantage of the country's religious menagerie is yet to be seen. ISIS has not been able to effectively exploit sectarian divisions (besides developing conditions in Wilayat al-Khorasan – see section '6.3.3. Wilayat al-Khorasan') to gain support as it had done in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, occasionally the provincial senior leadership is made up of foreigners, as is the case in Libya and Yemen, which has often put local members off side.

Of ISIS affiliate groups, few have a positive outlook for persisting beyond the collapse of the group's core in Iraq and Syria, and as such are unlikely candidates for the future of the caliphate. This is not surprising given most terrorists groups fail to live beyond a year from establishment. Therefore, those that appear to be surviving the collapse are those that are emerging and thus fitting into the category of being close to under a year old, constituting little more than a few cells (such as Lebanon, Tunisia, and Bangladesh). At this stage, these groups are unlikely to inspire a global jihadist phenomenon or live up to the expectation of the successor to ISIS in their immediate infancy. The other groups who are likely to persist are those of Boko Haram and Abu Sayyaf Group, who for all intense purposes are affiliated more for symbolic and propaganda reasons than any material or geographical again and are a likely to be independent upon the caliphate collapsing as it is likely to damage the integrity of their own brand. Of the other groups that are more likely to survive, being Sinai and al-Khurasan, the strong roots of jihadist activity and state instability are aiding their persistence. Sinai has been able to hold a marginal amount of territory for extended periods, extract resources from a local population and operate autonomously. With the group recently changing its name, it is indicate that they may choose to go it alone, retaining the sentimental legacy of its affiliate in name and modus operandi. Wilayat al-Khorsan, has shown resistance and adaptability, taking advantage of regional state-to-state disputes and domestic sectarianism. It also benefits from the legacy of having experienced jihadist campaigners in their fold.

5.5. Conclusion

An examination of ISIS affiliates, as undertaken in this chapter, shows that ISIS's future is unlikely to continue through its affiliates. ISIS has been unsuccessful in 'expanding and remaining' through affiliation. No affiliate has significant control over a territory and is unlikely to do so in the immediate future. They do not control territory for the establishment of a new caliphate, nor can they substitute the group's ideological narrative and brand or generate sufficient revenue. ISIS's relationship with its affiliates is predominately defined by the value of its jihadist brand and its ability to provide support to its affiliates. As ISIS in Syria and Iraq collapses the legitimacy of its brand is becoming weak and its ability to provide support is minimal. This will lead to many of the provinces defecting as the incentives for remaining affiliated are diminishing, and indicates that ISIS is unlikely to survive through its affiliates – the affiliate groups most likely to remain loyal to ISIS are more often those that were established by the group rather than those it adopted. Furthermore, only those groups that run largely autonomously, are able to self-finance and/or have taken on the brand comprehensively are likely to persist. While ISIS's persistence is unlikely to be achieved through its provinces outside of Syria and Iraq, the wilayat's may still have a role to play in the group's future as will be explored in the concluding chapter of this thesis. An influx of foreign fighters returning home (as in the case of Tunisia), spill over from the dissolution in Iraq and Syria (as in Lebanon), or grizzled jihadist veterans returning to Afghanistan, will inadvertently provide the few remaining prospective ISIS provinces an increase in personnel. This increase in ISIS operatives is not likely to be utilized for the purposes of establishing territorial control, but rather, as will be explored in the concluding last chapter, as terrorist cells and lone operatives undertaking ISIS's new strategy of global terrorist activity.

6. Conclusion – The Future of ISIS and its Role in Global Jihad

ISIS finances and brand is almost broken. ISIS's ability to survive through its affiliates is unlikely due to the group's reliance on holding territory in Iraq and Syria: its impending loss damages the ideological integrity of its brand and ability to provide financial support — the two key aspects which define its relationship with its affiliates. In this regard it is worth considering that the ISIS core may never have actually intended to live through its affiliates outside of Iraq and Syria (as explained in chapter two and three). ISIS's ambition for affiliates and provinces outside of greater Syria is inconsistent with the group's central aim of having a core caliphate. This can be seen by the group's focus on recruiting foreign fighters to the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, rather than in external provinces. Furthermore, the governance and operational strategy of transposing governance/leadership structure used in the Levant to provinces abroad, while showing a uniform system inside the group, appears to have not considered the local and cultural governance issues outside of Iraq and Syria, and may have indirectly stifled provincial effectiveness and loyalty.

In the absence of any official documentation or statements, the extent and measures, if at all, taken by ISIS leadership to enable the caliphate to exist in its affiliates in the Muslim world appears minimal – though this is an area worthy of further investigation in the wake of the group's collapse. The locations, in particular Libya, where the group attempted to create a "vanguard" and hinted at some form of future headquarters, are now under siege.

6.1. Provinces Becoming Autonomous, Self Directing, and Independent - the threat of splintering

The observation that ISIS affiliates with the least amount of reliance on ISIS core for financial support and guidance are the most likely to persist (being wilayat's Sinai, Tunisia and Lebanon), brings into the equation the likelihood they will operate with affiliation either autonomously, self directed or if they will splinter off as their own independent group. Evidence of this is already happening with Wilayat Sinai recently changing their name, from identifying as an ISIS province to the "Islamic State in Egypt".[304] While subtle this name change means that they may no longer recognize ISIS in Iraq and Syria as directing their activities, and may be a strategy to dissociate the latter's losses from their own. Given the group in Sinai is thought to have been operating autonomously for some time, this change in name and branding (while retaining the positive history of ISIS in the Levant), works in their favor. To that extent it is apparent that ISIS in Egypt should be viewed as an independent group, only linked rather than affiliated with ISIS in the Levant. For ISIS this means that internally, its ability to control its brand with those closest to them is slipping, and

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[304] Trew, 2017.

other affiliates may soon cut ties (while retaining some of the ideological precepts) to maintain and establish the integrity of their own brand.

6.2. The Future of ISIS

In Syria and Iraq ISIS is likely to go underground, as it had done so previously when ISI was crippled to almost insignificance after the Surge in the 2000s. This will allow the group to consolidate its losses and direct activities abroad covertly – be it from the Levant or from outside through the use of cyber communication. While ISIS's physical caliphate collapses and the future of some of its provinces remain uncertain its historical legacy, media savvy, and its ideology will still resonant with jihadist and the disaffected, and the group is likely to continue on in some form.

6.2.1. Reframing the Narrative and the Meaning of Caliphate

As ISIS's core collapses, in order to survive it must change its own definition of a caliphate and core ideology in order to maintain some kind of legitimacy in the wake of losing territory in the Levant.

ISIS has shown awareness in creating an adaptable and robust ideology that it may draw upon in the future to "restructure" what its caliphate means. For example in an issue of *Dabiq*, the second feature outlines its strategy for establishing a caliphate in five steps: *Hijrah* (emigration), *jama'ah* (congregation), destabilize *taghut* (Idolatry)*, tamkin* (consolidations), and *khalifah* (caliphate). After it describes *hijrah* and *jama'ah* it states that if there is not land available for a base of operations, then "the place can be formed through long campaigns of *nikaya* (injury) attacks carried out by underground *mujahid* cells." The language used is devoid of Iraq and Syria details, indicative that it can be used more generally for other locations, which may lack, for example, a Sunni-Shi'a divide.[305] This adaptability is vital for the group to survive, as its central ideology must mutate its meaning of a 'caliphate' and its ideological and strategic model surrounding it must also change to enable it to shift the location of its caliphate outside of Iraq and Syria, and even possibly online.

6.2.2. A New Strategic and Tactical Approach

For the group to survive it must, and will, change its strategy and its relationship with its affiliates. The group will have to confront the challenge of sustaining itself when the 'state' itself is no longer an entity and its ideological legitimacy is compromised as a result. It will have to secure its brand. This is, in part, likely to occur through terrorist attacks undertaken across the globe.

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[305] H. Gambhir, 2014.

ISIS is likely to go underground instead of confronting adversarial military and security forces directly, particularly in places where it once held territory, adopting a strategy where it will scatter its military forces and put its civilian and administrative departments into hibernation. The group's predecessor employed this to survive the US and Iraq counter terrorism's 'surge' from 2004 to 2009. However, ISIS will find this method a challenge, as unlike Moaist-style insurgencies attempt to win the hearts and minds of its local constituency, ISIS's Focoist model of revolutionary warfare has effectively estranged the population base it requires to go underground.[306]

The group will have to determine if it persists with a centralized militant model or if it pursues a decentralized strategy. This will extend to the tactics it uses, be it "lone wolf" or central planned attacks. At the height of its power ISIS utilized centralized and de-centralized attacks across the globe. The scale of these attacks ranged from the spectacular to less sophisticated attacks. As ISIS loses capabilities it will rely more on smaller attacks that need less coordinated organizational support.[307]

The group is likely to embrace, though not without a new twist, the tactics suggested by a key figure in modern jihadist militancy, Abu Musab al-Suri.[308] Suri argued that militants should undertake frequent smaller attacks through disconnected decentralized cells. Suri's writings come from a pre 9/11 world, and science technology, interconnectedness and capabilities of both the jihadists and their adversaries have developed, suggesting that ISIS will have its own unique adaption and approach to Suri's tactics.

Jihadist strategies adapt to ever changing conditions and as ISIS goes from a proto-state back to an insurgency or terrorist group a novel strategic set of guidelines will be developed. Evidence of this is starting to emerge. There has been a significant increase in the number of controlled and guided foreign terrorist attacks from 2016 (Table 6.1). Due to the extent of the group's international reach it is likely to employ a binary strategy, of both directed and undirected attacks simultaneously.

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[306] C. Clarke, 2016.

[307] C. Clarke., D. Gartenstein-Ross., "How Will Jihadist Strategy evolve as the Islamic State Declines?," *War on the Rocks*, 10 November 2016, < http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/how-will-jihadist-strategy-evolve-as-the-islamic-state-declines/>

[308] B. Lia., "Architect of Global Jihad," *The Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2010, p. 510, < http://www.meforum.org/2952/architect-of-global-jihad>

	Direct Connection to IS			No direct IS Ties			
	Controlled	Guided	Local Wilayat	Networked	Inspired	Unclear	Total
2002	2						2
2003		1					1
2004	1						1
2005	3						3
2006						1	1
2007				1			1
2008						1	1
2012					1		1
2014	2	3	1	1	6		13
2015	14	15	11	4	6		50
2016	22	23	8	11	9		78
	44	42	20	17	22	5	152
	106			39			

Table 6.1: Summary of ISIS external attacks, 2002-16[309]

While the group has the desire to continue its attacks the capabilities available to do so are likely, at first, to be from a decreasing pool of resources. ISIS adoption of terrorist activity using decentralized cells and lone operatives resolves some of the group's financial issues, given their revenue intake is going to be severely limited. Undertaking a terrorist act can cost very little, and when well organized can have significant impact (See Table 6.2).

Attack	Date	Estimated Cost
London Underground/Bus	7 July 2005	8,000 GBP
Madrid Railway Atocha)	11 March 2004	100,000 EURO
Istanbul	15 & 20 November 2003	40,000 US $
Marriot Hotel Jakarta	5 August 2003	30,000 US $
Bali Bombings	12 October 2002	50,000 US $
New York Twin Towers	11 September 2001	400,000-500,000 US $
USS Cole, Aden	12 October 2000	10,000 US $
US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania	7 August 1998	50,000 US $

Table 6.2: Cost of Carrying out Various Terrorist Attacks[310]

[309] Orton, Kyle, *Foreign Terrorist Attacks by Islamic State, 2002 -2016*, The Henry Jackson Society, London, 2017, p. 6.

[310] Juan Miguel del Cid Gomez, "A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of al-Qaeda and its affiliates," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 4. No. 4, 2010.
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/113/html>

Utilizing such tactics for global outreach is much cheaper than establishing and financing governance and administration costs in provinces for the core as well as for the provinces (whose financial activities either rely on an influx from the core, which will be restricted, or a limited amount of revenue extracted from extortion). As such, foreign terrorist attacks are a more viable option for ISIS to remain active and visible rather than attempting to maintain its activities of gaining and holding territory through provinces.

6.2.3. The Role of Provinces in ISIS Potential New Strategy

In light of the increase in the number of foreign terrorist attacks by ISIS since the impending collapse of its core, the future role of ISIS provinces and their affiliates is becoming more apparent. Rather than attempting to consolidate territory in the local countries, the provinces will be used as launching pads for terrorist attacks to harass local state apparatus and heighten social divides. Through the provinces established lines of communication direct to ISIS core they will be able to effectively undertake actions and activities that serve the group's overall interests better (see table 6.2 showing the number of terrorist attacks directed through Wilayats' direct connection to ISIS core). While they may not establish a new caliphate, they will serve as effective conduits to help the group maintain a presence in the jihadist community, the countries they act in, and remain forces of instability globally. It is evident that ISIS is already changing its approach to managing its provinces and its provincial model. This can be seen in the way the group no longer formalizes a province, as has been the case with the Abu Sayyat Group, but instead recognizes and directs groups under its banners.

6.3. Flash points - The Threat of Emerging Groups in Tunisia and Lebanon and the Persistence of ISIS in Egypt and Afghanistan

The analysis of ISIS provinces in chapter six highlighted two recognized provinces, Wilayat's Sinai and Khorasan, and two emerging affiliates, Tunisia and Lebanon, as being likely to persist, retain affiliation and remain threats in the wake of the loss of the caliphate. The roles of these groups, outside of the broader analysis of ISIS province that has been detailed, will be explored below.

6.3.1. Tunisia.

The city of Sirte in Libya was on the verge of becoming Islamic State's third de facto capital outside of Iraq and Syria. After an offensive on the city that began in August 2016 by the Libyan Government of National Accord and assisted by US airstrikes, ISIS presence in the city is nearly eradicated.[311] Despite this ISIS's ambitions for Libya to serve as the vanguard of the caliphate are not at a complete end.

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[311] T. Joscelyn., "Islamic State fighters remain in a few blocks of Sirte, Libya," *FDD's Long War Journal*, 19 November 2016, < http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/islamic-state-fighters-remain-in-few-blocks-of-sirte-libya.php>

Many of ISIS's fighters have already evacuated the city of Sirte and many are likely to join up with fellow members in the little known Fezzan Province in southwestern Libya.[312] In the Fezzan Province there is an opportunity for the group to consolidate its losses and potentially seize a population center, such as Ubari, with little resistance. From there they may continue to attack the Libyan unity government, potentially damaging the state's volatile economy by targeting the region's oil infrastructure, and establish sources of finance. ISIS fighters fleeing Sirte are also likely to cross the border into neighboring Tunisia and join fellow affiliates attempting to establish themselves there. [313]

Tunisia has strong ties to ISIS in Libya.[314] Tunisian jihadists have previously been involved with ISIS founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's networks throughout the Levant, and many ventured to Libya in 2013 to help establish ISIS there. Fighters from the Tunisian group Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) operating in eastern Libya were recruited by ISIS in Libya, despite the group not making a pledge to al-Baghdadi.[315] Reports also indicate that Tunisian jihadists have also been involved in operations and training activities around the town of Sabratha near the Tunisian border.[316]

Tunisia provides a fertile ground for an impending ISIS presence. ISIS cells are already developing their capabilities, undertaking few but deadly terrorist attacks as well as lower level insurgent strikes on Tunisian security forces. Greater coordinated activity and experience, provided by an influx of ISIS members from Libya, could prove a significant threat to Tunisia's security.

ISIS has been successful in appealing to those who feel marginalized and oppressed by their government and there is an opportunity for the group to gain support by exploiting the civilian dissatisfaction that is brewing in Tunisia. Civil unrest cultivating in protests in early 2016 due to the government's inability to protect the population from militants and concerns over President Beji Caid Essebsi citation of Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution allowing the president to take "any measure" in a security crisis, provides plenty of fuel for ISIS propaganda.[317]

The impending loss of the city of Sitre does not necessitate a critical blow to ISIS in Libya or the North African region. The opportunity for ISIS to regroup and strategically pursue its goals of causing regional instability are still available. Efforts to prevent ISIS fighters in Libya fleeing to neighboring Tunisia and gaining a foothold in southwestern Libya should be a priority. If unchecked the group could still thrive.

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[312] See Appendix A: 8.6. ISIS in Libya

[313] Ibid.

[314] See Appendix A: 8.7. ISIS in Tunisia

[315] Ibid.

[316] A.Y. Zelin., "The Role of Tunisians," in Bauer (Ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 18 - 23, 2016.
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>

[317] Ibid.

6.3.2. Lebanon.

Despite the absence of a declared "province" in Lebanon, the potential for ISIS to establish a greater presence in the country has never been greater.

Lebanon is a mess that is barely being held together. The country hasn't had effective governance for decades, and a new president is unlikely to change that. Not only does it lack organized state institutions, but its increasing economic impoverishment, lack of national identity, and Sunni population (who make up 27 per cent of the population— on par with fellow Shiite population) that is increasingly being marginalized by Hezbollah's ever increasing presence in the state's politics, is creating the type of civil unrest that ISIS effectively took advantage of in Iraq.[318]

Astride Lebanon's constituent concerns sits its geographical vulnerability that has placed hundreds of thousands of refugees into the country. The government can barely coordinate household garbage collection for its own citizens, let alone support, secure and screen those pouring into the country. ISIS jihadists are likely to be amongst them, and their camps provide a fertile ground for the recruitment of socially and economically disenfranchised young Sunnis. ISIS-Lebanon familiarity with extracting radicalized refugees is already well established while the group's first emir in Lebanon, Abdel Alam al Ordoni, spent several years in Palestinian refugee camps in the country.[319]

ISIS in Syria and Iraq has designated Lebanon with an emir to oversee operations in the country.[320] While not being established enough to declare a wilayat with administrative capabilities, it has a robust enough underground structure to undertake sporadic yet remarkable attacks.[321] While the extent of this structure is not known, it was from a similar foundation that ISIS predecessor AQI/ISI between 2005 and 2010 began to establish influence and control over regions in Iraq. This process always began with the establishment of a robust underground structure prior to establishing an overt military operational administration. By creating this extensive collection of functional groups, AQI/ISI was able to effectively dominate territory.

Lebanon, being the pearl of the Levant, is ideologically critical for the ISIS brand and the group would be desperate to attain a foothold in the country. ISIS has already attempted to capture territory in Lebanon, albeit unsuccessfully. In August 2014, the group tried to capture the town of Arsal, fighting with Lebanese armed forces for

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[318] See Appendix A: 8.11.4. ISIS in Lebanon
[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.
[321] Ibid.

five days till the latter re-established control and ISIS fighters dispersed over the Syrian border.[322]

While ISIS-Lebanon currently lacks the capacity to control an area, the influx of fighters from Syria and Iraq as the caliphate collapses, will certainly provide the experience and manpower to speed things along. Coupled with its proven ability to capitalize on and recruit the socially and economically disenfranchised, the caliphate may continue on in the Levant.

6.3.3. Wilayat Sinai

Of all ISIS affiliates Wilayat Sinai appears to have adopted the group's strategy, governance and targets the most. Outside of Libya, the wilayat Sinai has also proven to be one of the most active, deadly and capable.

Since becoming an ISIS affiliate the group has shifted its tactics to ever increasingly targeting civilians and undertaking actions in line with the ambitions of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The group has served as ISIS in Syria and Iraq proxy for mainland-based cells, activating them and directing them to undertake activities against foreign nations, tourists and western interests.[323] It is indicative that there is a strong connection between Sinai and the core, however the evidence for this is minimal at best.

Wilayat Sinai's predecessor, ABM, was a local jihadist group focusing its attacks almost exclusively on Israel.[324] The group would undertake its activities and most of its larger bombings early on weekend mornings to reduce the number of civilian causalities. The group did not use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or undertake armed assaults where gunmen indiscriminately shot tourists. Instead the group would undertake cross-border attacks on Israel and frequently sabotage the Egypt-Israel gas pipeline.

When the group pledged to al-Baghdadi, the brutality of its actions dramatically increased. The group's relationship with neighboring clans had diminished and open hostility developed. Its objective's also changed with the influx of resources from ISIS in Syria and Iraq for the purposes of the group to achieve forms of governance. This change was a clear departure from wilayat Sinai's previous activities, not to mention foolhardiness given the group's lack of control of any population center. It was working, or more appropriately being directed, to become a 'bona fide franchise'.[325]

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[322] V. Sonawane., "ISIS in Lebanon: Army Arrests 11 Members Including Local Commander," *IBT*, 25 November 2016, < http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-lebanon-army-arrests-11-members-including-local-commander-2451138>

[323] See Appendix A: 8.2. ISIS in Egypt – Wilayat Sinai

[324] Australian National Security., "Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai)," *Australian Government*, 28 November 2016, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Islamic-state-sinai-province-is-sinai.aspx>

[325] Awad.M., 2016.

These newfound ambitions, from either ISIS in Syria and Iraq or from the Sinai group, culminated in an attempt to capture the town of Sheikh Zuwaid. The group's tactics also changed, with a focus on infiltration and demoralization, and the group have increasingly targeted Egyptian security forces and individuals related to the government.

The exact links between ISIS HQ and Sinai are unknown. Given that travel between the two countries is difficult, the extent to which the original group has been subsumed is indicative that the group can undertake autonomous actions in line with ISIS in Syria and Iraq without direction. It also shows that the group's belief in the ideology, tactics and strategy will persist upon the fall of ISIS core (and as stated earlier, reports indicate that it may be becoming an autonomous entity). However, the likelihood that members of core will flock to the wilayat, given the difficulties in getting there, appear unlikely.

6.3.4. Wilayat al-Khorasan

Established in January 2015 ISIS Wilayat al-Khorasan (ISKP) affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan has had several peaks and troughs in operational capability over the last two years. While establishing territorial control in the Nangarhar province the group has struggled to expand upon this region due to efforts by US and Afghan forces. However, in late 2016 the group has had a resurgence in activity and reports are indicating that the group is shifting its focus from Afghanistan to Pakistan.[326]

Over a three week period preceding mid November 2016 two ISIS linked attacks occurred in the Balochistan province of Pakistan, with the last one culminating in the death of 52 and injury of more than 100.[327] In October ISKP attacked a police training college in Quetta in Western Pakistan that killed 61 and injured 117.[328] The group also claimed an attack that killed 72 at a funeral in August as well as an attack that left 69 dead on Easter Sunday in Lahore.[329][330] Both August and October attacks were undertaken by Jamat-ul-Ahrar who is working with ISKP. Jamat-ul-Ahrar are not the only Pakistani terrorist group working in concert with ISKP – the Baluchistan faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is now thought to be working with group. [331] ISIS links

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[326] See Appendix: 8.3. ISIS in Central Asia – Wilayat al-Khorasan

[327] K.K. Shahid., "An Alliance Between Islamic State and Lashkar—Jhangvi in Pakistan was Inevitable," *The Diplomat*, 15 November 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/an-alliance-between-islamic-state-and-lashkar-e-jhangvi-in-pakistan-was-inevitable/ >

[328] S. Saifi., S. Ali Shah., and J. Perry., "Quetta attack survivor: "We were sleeping when terrorist attacked"," *CNN*, 25 October 2016, <

[329] S. McKenzie., "Pakistan Taliban splinter group claims responsibility for Quetta bombing," *CNN*, 10 August 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/08/asia/pakistan-hospital-blast/>

[330] S. Saifi., "In Pakistan, Taliban's Easter bombing targets, kills scores of Christians," *CNN*, 28 March 2016, < http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/27/asia/pakistan-lahore-deadly-blast/>

[331] R. Gunaratna., "As ISIS suffer in its heartland, South Asia is ripe for its rise," *CNN*, 28 October 2016, < http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/27/opinions/isis-threat-pakistan-afghanistan-south-asia/index.html>

with LeJ is of significant concern. Lej is well-established anti-Shia group with a strong presence in the Punjab province with historical connection to the government.

Mirroring ISIS in Syria and Iraq, ISKP is likely to shift from gaining territory and insurgent activities and undertake low cost urban terrorism targeting civilians. This shift in tactics and targets bring it more into line with the *modus operandi* of groups already established in Pakistan.

It is unknown if ISKP renewed focus on developing networks in Pakistan is being orchestrated from ISIS in Syria and Iraq or if the Pakistani militants are collaborating with ISKP due to their own volition.[332] Nonetheless, the group has been able to recruit educated, middle-class, urban Pakistanis.[333]

ISKP faces competition with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS) as well as many other groups. The Afghan Taliban in particular has been working to destroy ISKP. The group has even created a 1,000 strong task force that's sole purpose is to undermine the group.[334] Coupled with highly targeted US drone attacks and actions by the Afghan and Pakistani government, the group is under pressure.

Regardless ISKP has been able to carve out some appeal in the wake of its progenitor in Iraq and Syria collapsing. With an imminent withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, and the group developing ties with established groups in Pakistan all signs point to the group maintaining an evolving presence in the region.

6.4. Conclusion

This thesis aimed to analyze thirteen ISIS provinces to assess the threat they pose, the likelihood that they will remain affiliated with ISIS, and the prospect that they will continue to persist – it has shown that they vary significantly in all these aspects. The cumulative outcome of these assessments indicates that the ISIS brand is unlikely to survive through affiliate groups in the wake of ISIS's core in Syria and Iraq collapsing.

ISIS established the blue print for future jihadist groups to achieve what jihadist strategist Naji's described (but did not outline its realization) as the last step in establishing an emirate – the "Power of Establishment". The legitimacy lent to it by having territorial control meant that ISIS became the most preeminent jihadist group with global reach and influence. However, the group did not achieve territorial

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[332] Rafiq, A., "What Happened to ISIS's Afghanistan-Pakistan Province?," *The Diplomat*, February 2, 2016, < http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-happened-to-isiss-afghanistan-pakistan-province/>

[333] Ibid.

[334] Azami, D., "Why Taliban special forces are fighting Islamic State," *BBC*, 18 December 2015, < http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35123748>

control or a caliphate beyond the Levant, and as this thesis shows, Global Jihadism has yet to go truly 'global' in terms of international territorial consolidation.

As ISIS in Syria and Iraq disintegrates, the group will transition from a proto-state to a transnational terrorist group. While the group's core may go underground, there may be a 'cyber core' that openly carries the group's ideology and to which the affiliates and lone wolves collectively adhere. Either way ISIS has shown exceptional resilience and adaptability, and its presence as a powerful phenomenon will not disappear quickly or without a fight.

Regardless, the group has altered the landscape of global jihadism and will continue to do so as it mutates into its new form. In its wake the dynamic between jihadist groups will shift, and al-Qaeda stands to gain significantly from ISIS weakening, with affiliates and fighters returning into their fold. For this reason there is now more than ever a great need to understand and closely scrutinize the global jihad phenomena.

6.5. Further Directions

This report only scratches the surface of the dynamic between ISIS and its provinces across the globe. A greater understanding of the internal dynamics of the affiliate groups, their relationship with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and their relationship with local populations is needed in order to effectively combat their presence. Pertaining to this, three key questions still need to be addressed: As the caliphate collapses will affiliate groups become more or less violent in response to a decrease in material and personnel support? What will be the fall out for affiliate groups as foreign fighters return home from Syria and Iraq? And as Islamic State is no longer 'remaining and expanding" how much damage does this do to the brand as the group continues to via for dominance as the most attractive jihadist group?

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8. Appendix A: Analysis of Islamic State Provinces and Affiliates

8.1. Introduction

Islamic State has several provinces outside of Iraq and Syria. More than 35 terrorist groups across the globe have sworn allegiance to the group, however barely more than a dozen have been ordained wilayats or have strong and emerging affiliation with the group.

This chapter will explore nine of the declared wilayats and four of the groups with emerging affiliation with ISIS. The results of each ISIS affiliate's individual taxonomy as well as threat, affiliation, and future prospect's assessments (as explained in section 3 Methodology) will be presented. The chapter will conclude with the summary results of the metric assessment of the provinces and emerging affiliates. The results of this chapter are explored and expanded upon in greater detail in chapter five.

8.2. ISIS in Egypt – Wilayat Sinai

Objectives

Wilayat Sinai is an officially recognized ISIS affiliate that observes ISIS jihadist ideology and an extreme interpretation of Salafi-Islam. The group works to help ISIS in Iraq and Syria establish a caliphate in Egypt's Sinai and historic Palestine.[335] Wilayat Sinai is known for its brutality, ambush tactics and large scale attacks.

Background

Wilayat Sinai progenitor Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) (which translates as "Supporters of the Holy Places" or "Supporters of Jerusalem"), formed in late 2011 in northern Sinai. The group activities focused on Israeli targets and prioritized a war against the Jewish state.

In November 2014 ABM broke its ties with al-Qaeda and swore bay'at to al-Baghdadi. The pledged threaten to splinter the group with several senior members remaining loyal to al-Qaeda. Members of the Gaza-based Mujahdin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) also swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi and merged with ABM.[336] The group soon became known as Wilayat Sinai.[337] As a result of its affiliation with ISIS the group has grown in status and strategically.[338]

Wilayat Sinai objectives are now more in line with ISIS than its previous ABM activities. It has been suggested that ISIS in Syria and Iraq has been successful in subsuming and integrating Wilayat Sinai's local leaders to act as subordinate lieutenants to ISIS to the point where it requires little to no direction or communication with those in Syria and Iraq. [339] The group's targets now include Western interests and have seen the group undertake a series of successful high profile attacks including the bombing of the Sharm el-Sheikh Russian passenger jet in October 2015.[340]

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[335] Australian National Security., "Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai)," *Australian Government*, 28 November 2016,
<https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Islamic-state-sinai-province-is-sinai.aspx>
[336] Ibid.
[337] There is evidence that suggests Sinai province has been collaborating with the military wing of Hamas in Gaza.
[338] T. Wilson., "Egypt, Hamas and Islamic State's Sinai Province," *Centre for the New Middle East*, No.12, October 2016.
[339] M. Awad., "IS in the Sinai," in K. Bauer (Ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, pp.12-17, <
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>
[340] Australian National Security, "Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai)".

Leadership

Wilayat Sinai is likely to have a leadership structure that mirrors that of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, with a central emir and several regional and provincial cells.[341] The individuals who make up Wilayat Sinai's leadership is ambiguous, though it is likely that the senior leadership of the ABM was retained, allowing the group to inherit significant technical and strategic expertise. It was reported that the group's emir, Abu Du'a al-Ansari, was killed in an airstrike in August 2016. It is not known who has replaced him.

Members

Wilayat Sinai is likely to be made up of former ABM members from North Sinai and defectors from MSC in Gaza.[342] ABM was originally based in the village of Al Mahdeyya in Southern Rafah, where local Bedouin constituted its members. The group also had connections to the Menai clan of the Sawarka tribe.[343] Wilayat Sinai has also been able to recruit defectors from the Egyptian military, including members of its special forces.

Wilayat Sinai has worked to develop its profile and jihadist credentials for recruitment purposes, and has capitalized on the high youth unemployment and anti-government sentiment amongst young Muslims in Egypt.[344] Estimates suggest the group has approximately 1000-1500 members,[345] with a smaller core of loyal and experience fighters.[346]

Funding

Wilayat Sinai funds its operations predominantly through criminal activities that include smuggling operations to and from northern Africa and the Gaza Strip. The group is suspected of receiving financial donations from foreign donors, as well as funding from ISIS in Iraq and Syria.[347]

The group's weaponry has largely been acquired through attacks and raids on Egyptian military – in 2016 the group captured a tank.[348] However, the group has also been able to source weapons by smuggling them in from Libya.[349]

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[341] Ibid.

[342] With the group's realignment with ISIS, a faction of former ABM fighters remained loyal to al-Qaeda and continues to operate in the Nile Valley.

[343] E. Dyer., and Kessler.O., "Terror in the Sinai," *INSS Insight*, August 2016.

[344] Australian National Security, "Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai)".

[345] Ibid.

[346] Stanford University, "Islamic State – Sinai Province, Mapping Militant Organisations," <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/577>

[347]Australian National Security, "Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai)".

[348] O. Ashour., "ISIS and Wilayat Sinai: complex networks of insurgency under authoritarian rule," DGAPkompakt, August 2016, <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/28365>

[349] W. Booth., and S. Raghavan, "Israel, Hamas and Egypt for an unlikely alliance against Islamic State affiliate," *The Washington Post*, 30 April 2016, < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-hamas-and-egypt-form-unlikely-

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Overview

From 2014 to the end of 2015 Wilayat Sinai undertook 173 attacks, killing 624 people and wounding 620. Figure 8.1 shows that the group undertook few activities in 2014 – this was due to the group only coming into existence in the last part of 2014.

Figure 8.1: Wilayat Sinai Province Casualties Over Time

Table 8.1. shows that the group was able to undertake large scale attacks with high lethality. The October 31 attack on the Russian air jet that killed 224 civilians is indicative of the groups shift from targeting Israelis to western interests.

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
January 29th, 2015 in Arish, Egypt	25	58
October 31, 2015 Unknown, Egypt	224	0
July 15th, Sheikh Zuweid, Egypt	20	25

Table 8.1: Wilayat Sinai's deadliest attacks from 2014-2015.

alliance-against-islamic-state-affiliate/2016/04/30/cacb99dc-fb79-11e5-813a-90ab563f0dde_story.html>

Targets

Wilayat Sinai has shifted its targets from Israeli government forces and civilian to Egyptian Police and Military forces as shown in figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2: Total Attacks undertaken by Wilayat Sinai's by Victim Type

Tactics

Figure 8.3 shows that the group's primary tactic is bombing which is used for 59% of its attacks.

Figure 8.3: Wilayat Sinai Total Attacks by Tactic

Activity in 2016

The group is not in control of any territory. However, the group has a stronghold in the caves of the Jabal Hillal area. The group is strongest in the Sinai Peninsula and carries out the majority of its attacks in the Rafah, el-Arish, and Sheikh Zuweid provinces.

The group undertook several notable incidents, which include:[350]

- A shooting attack on an Israeli tour bus near the pyramids in Giza, Egypt, on January 7th.
- A bombing in Giza, Egypt on January 22 that targeted Egyptian police, killing nine and injuring 10.
- An ambush at a security checkpoint in North Sinai, Egypt, that killed 15 policemen.
- A bombing (IED) in North Sinai, on April 8th targeting international peacekeepers en route to the Gora airport base, which killed seven and wounded 15.[351]

In 2016 the Egyptian military successful reduced Wilayat Sinai's operational capabilities. The scale and ambition of the group has declined, being replaced with small-scale attacks, mainly in Arish and Rafah.

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Moderate</u>. Despite the Egyptian counter-terrorism operation in early 2016, the group remains a threat to Egyptian security forces, as well as Israeli and Western interests. The group has the ability to regain its lost capabilities and will remain a potential destabilizing threat in the region.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>High</u>. Wilayat Sinai's tactics and targets have shifted dramatically since becoming an ISIS affiliate. IS has successfully subsumed its predecessors and made local members lieutenants. Prior to becoming Wilayat Sinai, ABM had a reputation for being the protector of the population.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Moderate</u>. In 2016 the Egyptian military successfully reduced Wilayat Sinai's operational capabilities. Egyptian air forces undertook strikes on Wilayat Sinai's stronghold in the Jabal Hillal area of the Sinai. It was reported that they had destroyed a significant part of the group's weaponry and killed up to a

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[350]Australian National Security, "Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai)".

[351] Note that US member of the internal forces were injured in a roadside bomb by the group a year before.

hundred militants.[352] Similarly an incursion on a strong hold south of el-Arish destroyed several weapons storehouse and killed 45 Islamic State combatants, including a senior commander.[353]

However, this does not discount the likelihood that the group will not work to regain the lost capacities. The group is deeply intertwined with the local population, and will continue to take advantage of Egypt's difficult economic conditions and disaffected youth. With Islamic State increasing the emphasis of the Wilayat in its media campaigns, there is a chance that as the core in Iraq and Syria collapses the group will focus its energy on supporting the group as a potential safe house for the group's leadership.

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[352] A. Issacharoof., "Sinai attacks decline as Egypt's fight against IS yields results," *The Times of Israel*, 29 August 2016, < http://www.timesofisrael.com/sinai-attacks-decline-as-egypts-fight-against-is-yields-results/>
[353] Ibid.

8.3. ISIS in Central Asia – Wilayat al-Khorasan

Objectives

Wilayat al-Khorasan (Islamic State Khorasan Province or ISKP) is an officially recognized Islamic State affiliate that subscribes to Islamic State's global jihadist ideology. It promotes sectarian violence and directs violent activities towards targets with alternative ideological interpretations, particularly Shiite Muslims in Pakistan. Islamic State has tasked the province with helping establish the caliphate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and areas in South and Central Asia. The ISKP has stated that they seek to combat the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani intelligence service in particular.

Background

On January 10, 2015 six commanders from the terrorist organization Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi via video message. [354] On January 26, ISIS core in Iraq and Syria accepted the group and established the group as a wilayat, choosing Hafiz Saeed Orkazai as its leader. [355]

The ISKP initially clashed with the Talban and reached its peak of territorial control in June 2015. At this time they dominated the Bati Kot, Chaparhar, Deh Bala, Khogyani, Sherzad, Pachir wa Agam, Rodat and Ghanikhel districts. The group has had its greatest presence in the Nagarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. Outside of Nagarhar province the group primarily targeted Afghan military forces. [356] In September 2015 the UN stated that ISKP was present in 25 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. [357]

Leadership

On January 29th 2015, Hafiz Saeed Khan (a mid-level commander in the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, from the Arakazi tribal agency) and Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim pledged allegiance to Islamic State's leader, al-Baghdadi. Khan was made wali of the wilayat and Rauf, his deputy.

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[354] B Roggio., "US military confirms air strike killed Islamic State's emir for Khorasan province," *FDD's Long War Journal*, 12 August 2016, <
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/us-military-confirms-air-strike-killed-islamic-states-emir-for-khorasan-province.php.>
[355] A.,Mir., "Pakistan now has a native Daish Ameer," *The News*, 12 January 2015, <
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/18141-pakistan-now-has-a-native-daish-ameer>
[356] B,Rahmani, and A.Tanco., "ISIS's Growing Caliphate: Profiles of Affiliates," *Wilson Center*, 19 Febuary 2016, < https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isiss-growing-caliphate-profiles-affiliates>
[357] AFP, "Islamic State gaining ground in Afghanistan: UN," *Dawn*, 26 September 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1209279.

Khadim was killed in a NATO airstrike on February 9th 2015 [358]and his replacement, Hafiz Wahidi, was killed by Afghan armed forces a month later. The US military stated on July 26 2016 that it had killed Hafiz Saeed Khan in an airstrike, which had specifically targeted ISKP.[359] Khan's deputy, Molvi Abdul Haseeb, was appointed as the new wali of Khorasan Province in November 2016.[360]

Members

The Khorasan Province founding members derived from Pakistani militants in the southeastern districts of Nangarhar in Afghanistan. [361] Many of these militants operated under the Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistan (TTP), but began operating with more autonomy of the TTP in autumn 2014. Following the death of the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud, the group fractured and many of its Pakistani fighters formed the ISKP. It has been suggested that up to 10 per cent of TTP fighters sympathize with Islamic state. [362]

The majority of ISKP is made up of defectors from TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and al-Qaeda. It is believed that the association of these defectors is a marriage of convenience rather than shared ideology, with a significant factor being the belief that ISIS can provide better funding by their association.[363] ISKP is seen by locals as a foreign force due to many members coming from outside Afghanistan.[364] In 2015 it was believed that only 70 fighters from Syria and Iraq were sent to Afghanistan.[365] It is estimated that there are 1,000-3000 ISIS fighters in eastern Afghanistan, mostly concentrated in Nangarhar province and some in neighboring Kunar province.[366]

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[358] Roggio, B., "US military confirms it killed Islamic State, Shabaab leaders in airstrikes," *FDD's Long War Journal*, 11 February 2015, <
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/us_military_confirms.php>
[359] B. Roggo,. 2016.
[360] A. Qureshi., "Baghdadi Appoints Molvi Abdul Haseed As New Chief of Khorasan Province," *The Fortress*, 9 April 2016, < http://thefortress.com.pk/baghdadi-may-appoints-molvi-abdul-haseeb-as-new-chief-of-khorasan-province/>
[361] B. Osman., "The Islamic State in "Khorasan": How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar," *Afghanistan Analysts* Network, 27 July 2016, < https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/>
[362] AFP, 2015.
[363] M. Zaidi., "IS recruiting thousands in Pakistan, govt warned in 'secret' report," *Dawn*, 8 November 2014, < http://www.dawn.com/news/1143133>
    B. Rahmani, and A. Tanco., 2016
[364]L. McNally., A. Amiral., M. Weinbaum., and A. Issa, "The Islamic State in Afghanistan," *Middle East Institute*, May 2016,
<http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf>
[365] Khamma Press, "Some 70 ISIS militants from Iraq, Syria forming the group's branch in Afghanistan," *Khaama* Press, 26 September 2015, < http://www.khaama.com/some-70-isis-militants-from-iraq-syria-forming-the-groups-branch-in-afghanistan-1565>
[366] L. O'Donnel., "Islamic State group eye a presence in Afghanistan," *Yahoo News*, 9 September 2015, < https://www.yahoo.com/news/islamic-state-group-loyalists-eye-presence-afghanistan-162510254.html?ref=gs>

Funding

ISKP is reported to generate its revenue from the drug trade, and has been competing with the Taliban in this activity. In addition, as a recognized affiliate, ISPK receives funding from Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. However, ISIS in Iraq and Syria's material support to ISKP is minimal [367] despite sending several hundred thousand dollars to ISKP in late 2015.[368]

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Overview: From 2014 to the end of 2015 ISKP undertook 86 separate attacks, killing 390 people and wounding 302 (Figure 8.4). The groups deadliest attacks were undertaken in Afghanistan, expect for the groups most lethal attack which killed 45, and injured 13 in an attack in May 2016 in Karachi, Pakistan (see Table 8.2).

Figure 8.4: ISKP Attacks total number of casualties

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
April 10th, 2015 in Dara-e-Khistak, Afghanistan	42	25
May 13th, 2015 Karachi, Pakistan	45	13
April 18th, 2015 Jalalabad, Afghanistan	34	100
September 29th, 2015 Achin (Kushtal), Afghanistan	26	10
September 26th, 2015 Shadal (and Abdul Khel), Afghanistan	26	9

Table 8.2: ISKP Deadliest Attacks From 2014 -2015

Areas of Operation

70 per cent of ISKP's attacks were conducted in Afghanistan, while the remaining 27 per cent were undertaken in Pakistan. ISKP attacks had the greatest number of casualties with 537, while Pakistan had 119 casualties (Figure 8.5).

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[367]McNally et al.
[368] M. R. Gordon, "ISIS Building 'Little Nests' in Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Secretary Warns," *The New York Times*, 18 December 2015,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/world/asia/afghan-istan-ash-carter.html?_r=0>

Figure 8.5: ISKP Attacks per Country

Targets

ISKP primary target has been the military, followed by businesses and private citizens. It is worth noting that while there have been a greater number of casualties for business targets, the total number of victims killed is far lower than the number of private citizens killed (34 and 92 respectively). See Figure 8.6 for more details.

Figure 8.6: ISKP Casualties by Victim Type

Tactics

From 2014-2015 ISKP primary tactic was armed assault. The group undertook twelve attacks utilizing this tactic. On two occasions the group used hostage taking as a tactic (Figure 8.7).

Figure 8.7: ISKP Attacks by Tactic

2016 Activity

ISKP has been unable to expand beyond Nangarhar province, in part due to US and Afghan forces conducting joint raids and bombing ISKP positions in the region. ISKP has also suffered attacks from the Afghan Taliban.

ISKP missed a chance to gain Taliban defectors after the group's leader, Mullah Omar's, death in May 2016. The death of their own leader, Khan, is likely to affect recruiting efforts and disrupt its operations also. The group's suicide attack against civilians in Kabul on July 23, which killed 80 and injured more than 230, is indicative of the group's desperate need to gain attention and maintain its fighters' morale in Afghanistan. However, in late 2016 ISKP made a resurgence. Villages west of the Durand Line were besieged and ISKP's radio transmissions restarted in multiple languages.[369] Furthermore, on October it was noted that Lej, a Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadi group, admitted to cooperating with ISKP to attack a police college in Quette, Pakistan on October 24th. The attack left 59 security personnel dead, and wounded 100. Lej may be cooperating with ISIS for capabilities and to gain resources.[370] Subsequently there is mounting evidence to suggest that several other anti-Shiite groups in Pakistan are working with ISKP.

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Moderate</u>. ISKP sphere of dominance in Afghanistan is shrinking and its growing number of enemies, from other jihadist groups to government and internal actors, is adding to its demise. The death of the group's leader in 2016 has disrupted the group's activities and recruitment efforts.

In contrast ISKP has expanded into Pakistan by cooperating with local Salafi-jihadi organizations, where it could become a potential threat in the longer term.[371] So far it has been able to undertake devastating and attention grabbing attacks against Shiite groups with little resistance from government forces.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>High</u>. In Afghanistan ISIS appeal and success has been driven by defections from the TTP and Afghan Taliban wanting

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[369] Sarban, K., "Islamic State Khorasan Province: Pakistan's New Foreign Policy Tool?," *The Diplomat*, 15 November, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/islamic-state-khorasan-province-pakistans-new-foreign-policy-tool/>
[370] AEI's Critical Threats Project, "2016-11-01 CTP Update and Assessment," *AEI's Critical Threats project*, 1 November 2016, < http://www.slideshare.net/CriticalThreats/2016-1101-ctp-update-and-assessment>
[371] AEI's Critical Threats Project, "2016-11-30 CTP Update and Assessment," *AEI's Critical Threats Project*, 30 November 2016, < http://www.criticalthreats.org/threat-update/november-30-2016>

to rebrand with a solid brand.[372] The ISKP is in communication with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and despite minimal material support, has been able to undertake operations and gain defectors from other groups. All of which suggests the brand has value to those in the region. The group's anti-shiite brand has value in Pakistan and is likely to see it gain the support of anti-shiite jihadists in the country.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>High</u>. ISKP is struggling to stay relevant in Afghanistan due to losses dealt by US, Afghan and Taliban forces. However the group seems to be reviving itself in Pakistan. [373] Many of ISKP's members have connections and supporters in Pakistan, and if the group can't secure itself in Afghanistan may turn all their efforts towards Pakistan.[374]

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[372] J. Garamone, "Afghan Forces Need to Develop 4 Capabilities, General Says," *The U.S. Department of Defense*, 11 February 2016, <http:// www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/654745/af- ghan-forces-need-to-develop-4-capabilities-general-says>
[373] K. Sarban, 2016.
[374] This includes groups such as Jundallah (Haji Aqkhel group or Allah's Bridge), a splinter group of TTP, which had pledged itself to ISIS. Jundullah has claimed that a delegation from Islamic state visited them to discuss methods to unite Pakistani military groups. While the group has previously been connected to the Taliban, its ambition to create a transnational Islamic caliphate is more ideologically aligned with Islamic State. In February of 2016 a member of Jundallah, Aziz Rehman, was arrested by Pakistan police for recruiting youths and collecting funds for the ISIS in Karachi and Quetta. Another group associated with ISIS in Pakistan is Tehrik-e-Khilafat who where the The first group outside of the Middle East to pledge itself to ISIS, initially pledged in July 2014, and then again in September of that year. In January 2015 the group publically pledge itself to ISKP leader Hafiz Khan Saeed. There has been no recorded incidents associated with the group since the end of 2014, and no available details or statements from the group since 2015.

8.4.ISIS in Yemen – Wilayat al-Yemen

Objectives

Wilayat al-Yemen is an officially recognized Islamic State affiliate that proscribes to Islamic State's global jihadist ideology. It promotes sectarian violence and has directed violent activities towards Yemen's Shiite population, particularly the Houthis. Islamic State has tasked the province with increasing Yemen's instability during its civil war, particularly by exacerbating sectarian tensions – despite the civil unrest being based upon political rather than religious issues. [375] The group has also attacked Saudi forces and the Yemeni government in an attempt to challenge the reconstitution of the Yemeni central government.[376]

Background

Wilayat Yemen was proclaimed on the 13th of November 2014. ISIS has tried to take advantage of the power vacuum created by the country's civil war. There are several sub-wilayats that exist under Wilayat al-Yemen: Sana'a, Lahij, Aden, Shabwa, Hadramawt, al-Bayda and Ibb and Taiz (the "Green Brigade"). Only Aden Abyan and Hadramawt have claimed significant attacks in 2016.

Leadership

Yemen's wali is Saudi Arabian National Nasser al Ghaydani (alias Abu Bilal al Harbi).[377] It is thought that each province has an emir and deputy emir directing their operation, though they have yet to be identified. [378] Wilayats Aden, Lahij, and Hadramat have all release comparable political statements simultaneously suggesting there is some cooperation between groups.[379]

On December 15th 2015 over a dozen senior leaders and a plethora of fighters rebelled against the groups Wali – Ghaydani – suggesting that the province's

[375] Soufan Group, "Capitalizing on Chaos in Yemen," *Soufan Group*, 19 February 2016, < http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-capitalizing-on-chaos-in-yemen/>

[376] K. Zimmerman and J. Diamond., "Challenging the Yemeni State: ISIS in Aden and al Mukalla," *AEI Critical Threats Project*, 9 June 2016, < http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-diamond-challenging-yemeni-state-isis-in-aden-al-mukalla-june-9-2016#_edn7>

[377] G.D. Johnsen., "This Man is the leader in ISIS's Recruiting War Against Al-Qaeda in Yemen," *Buzzfeed News*, 7 July 2015, <https://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/this-man-is-the-leader-in-isis-recruiting-war-against-al-qae?utm_term=.stKP9x1EG#.nfqGoYBbQ>

[378] J. Koontz., "Desknote: The growing threat of ISIS in Yemen," *AEI Critical Threats Project*, 6 May 2015, < http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/koontz-desknote-growing-threat-isis-in-yemen-may-6-2015#_edn7>

[379] Aymenn J.A., "Some Evidence for the Islamic State's Presence in Yemen (Part 2)," 3 March 2015, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/03/some-evidence-for-the-islamic-state-presence-in-1>

leadership had violated sharia law. [380] The dissenting group included the province's military emir Abu Assim al Bika and the chief of general security Sadiq. This collect of 101 individuals stated they no longer considered Ghaydani their emir, but reaffirmed their allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. ISIS in Syria and Iraq issued a response rejecting the request to remove Ghaydani and stated that they had renounced their pledge to Baghdadi by disobeying the wali. It is not known if the group has permanently broken away from the group or returned to the fold.

Members

ISIS has used financial incentives to recruit members, often enticing AQAP fighters to defect. ISIS has had little success in getting support from local tribes, in part due to a lack of familiarity with Yemeni culture and the wilayat's leadership being dominated by foreign Saudi nationals.[381] The coordination of recruitment is believed to be occurring from Syria by an individual named Jamil al-Zahiri.

ISIS presence in Yemen was established with approximately 80 individuals. By mid 2015 it was estimated to have been around 300 militants and as of 2016 that number is believed to have remained roughly the same. [382]

Funding

It is unknown the extent to which ISIS in Syria and Iraq provides funding to its Wilayat in Yemen. The group is known to extract limited self-funding through extortion, kidnapping, and robberies. [383]

Terrorist Activity – An Analysis the Sub-Provinces

Of Wilayat al-Yemen provinces, Ade-Abyan and Hadramawt have been the most active in 2016, with al-Bayda undertaking significantly smaller activity. For this reason the former two provinces will be explored in greater detail below. Province Sana'a, while being the most active in early 2015, has not claimed a major attack in 2016, and it is possible that the group no longer exists, with its members possibly amalgamating with other ISIS provinces in Yemen or returning to AQAP.[384]

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[380] T. Joscelyn, and B. Roggio, "Divisions emerge within the Islamic State's Yemen "province'," *FDD's Long War Journal*, 23 December 2015, < http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/divisions-emerge-within-the-islamic-states-yemen-province.php>
[381] E. Kendal, "Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State in Yemen: A Battle for Local Audiences," *Elizabeth Kendall*, 2015, <https://www.academia.edu/15757466/Al-Qaida_and_Islamic_State_in_Yemen_A_Battle_for_Local_Audiences>
[382] S. Aboudi., "In Yemen Chaos, Islamic State grows to rival al Qaeda," *Reuters*, 30 June 2015, < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-islamicstate-insight-idUSKCN0PA1T920150630>
[383] Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, "ISIS Financing," *Center for the analysis of terrorism*, 2015, < http://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>
[384] Zimmerman, et al June 2016.

Wilayat Adan Abyan

Background

The province initially began as Wilayat Aden in early 2015 and became Wilyat Aden Abyan later in the year as it expanded its reach to include the Abyan Province.[385] An al-Qaeda associated group labeled the Aden Abyan Islamic army was active in Yemen in the 1990's. The group's leader, Zayn al-Abidin al-Mihdar (Abu Hassan) was executed by the Yemeni administration in 1999 in relation to the killing and abduction of Westerners. The group's name is connected to an apocryphal hadith that says that a victorious army will come from Aden Abyan. Islamic state has tried to adopt the al-Qaeda group's origin and tie it in with ISIS's apocalyptic imagery and ideology to garner supporters and dismiss the divide between the competing organizations. [386]

Wilayat Aden-Abyan objectives and targets have shifted since early 2015. In March 2015 to August 2015 Aden militia and Houthi-Saleh forces contested Aden, with ISIS militants undertaking attacks against Houthi-Saleh forces. The region was recaptured by the Saudi-led collation that occupied the area from August to September 2015. During this period ISIS focused its attacks on those deemed 'apostates' and Christian sites. The Yemeni government started to re-establish itself in Aden from September 2015, aiming to stabilize the region and establish a de-facto capital. Since that time Wilayat Aden-Abyan has regularly launched attacks towards government officials and security forces.

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Overview:

Wilayat Aden-Abyan undertook 11 terrorist attacks in 2015 that killed 33 and injured 18. Figure 8.8 shows that the group undertook more than double the number of attacks an average minor terrorist group from Yemen would undertake in a year.

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[385] ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan released a YouTube video on September 30, 2015. The switch from ISIS Wilayat Aden to ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan may have been in recognition of the hadith about the Aden-Abyan army.

[386] Soufan Group, "The Islamic State Exploits Chaos in Yemen," *Soufan Group*, 7 October 2015, <http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-state-exploits-chaos-in-yemen/>

Figure 8.8: Wilayat Aden-Abyan Attacks vs. Other Groups

Targets

Wilayat Aden-Abyan has a diverse number of targets, indicative of its adaptability to its changing strategic environment as seen in Figure 8.9.

Figure 8.9: Wilayat Aden-Abyan Total Attacks by Victim Type

Tactics

Figure 8.10 shows that Wilayat Aden-Abyan mainly uses bombing tactics in its attacks.

Figure 8.10: Wilayat Aden-Abyan Total Attacks by Tactic

Activity in 2016

In 2016 the group has been developing its tactics. The regularity of its attacks has increased as have their effectiveness. It has started to use a combination of suicide attackers that utilize small arms fire. This tactic was first used in an attack on a coalition base in al-Burayqah in western Aden on March 25 2016. The group has also undertaken significant attacks including a suicide bomber attacking an anti-Houthi coalition training camp in Aden on the 17th of February, killing 13 recruits,[387] and an attack on a nursing home in Aden on March 4th, leaving 18 dead. [388]

Assessment

Threat assessment: Moderate. The December 2015 schism between ISIS in Yemen appears to have had only a short-term effect on those in Aden. The number of attacks dipped in November-December 2015, but returned in early 2016. The coalition supported clearing operations in Aden in February-March 2016 aimed at excising AQAP from the region is likely to have affected the Wilyat's members, as seen from a decrease in the number of attacks during that month. However, while the frequency of attacks has decreased their effectiveness and lethality will continue to improve. [389]

Future Prospects (Survivability): Moderate. It is one of the more active ISIS Wilayat's in Yemen (along with Hadramawt), and is likely to be a rallying point for ISIS members should they be removed from their own provinces.

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[387] Soufan Group, February 19 2016
[388] Soufan Group, "The Islamic State's Savagery in Yemen," *Soufan Group*, 10 March 2016, < http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-savagery-in-yemen/>
[389] Zimmerman et al, June 2016.

Wilayat Hadramawt

Background

Based in the Southern end of the Arab peninsular, Hadramawt Province is within the operational heart of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. Despite this, Wilayat Hadramawt has the most apparent strength of all the Yemen Provinces[390] and is reported to have a significant military training camp.[391] Wilayat Haramawt members are likely to be former AQAP members.[392] Wilayat Hadramawt is removed from the Houthi frontline and has instead been actively campaigning against Yemeni security forces.

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Wilayat Haramawt undertook seven attacks in 2015, killing 40 and injuring 30. All bar one attack, which was targeting civilians, were aimed at the military. The wilayat's attacks showed significant diversity in the type of tactic used, as shown in Figure 8.11.

Figure 8.11: Wilayat Haramawt Total Attacks by Tactic

Activity in 2016

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[390] A.Y. Zelin., "The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Research Notes No.29, January, 2016, <
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote29-Zelin.pdf>
[391] Islamic State, "Shaykh Anas al-Nashwan Military Training Camp," Wilayat Hadramawt Media Office, September 15, 2015.
[392] Zimmerman et al, June 2016.

Wilayat Hadramawt has been focusing attacks on the city of al Mukalla in 2016. Compared to the predominant use of armed assault prior to 2016, the group has now been using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) against Yemeni security forces.[393] The group used a suicide bomber with an explosive-laden vest (SVEST) against a recruitment center on May 15th.[394]

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Moderate</u>. ISIS Wilayat Harawmawt's activities in al Mukalla are indicative of the group's perseverance and developing capabilities.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Moderate</u>. The group's campaign in al Mukalla against the Yemeni government is indicative of its capabilities and may help it gather supporters from members of AQAP. Given AQAP withdrew from the city, ISIS may use this opportunity to show that it is willing to work where AQAP does not. The group's attack on soft targets, such as military recruits, may garner backlash from the broader Yemen populace, who may consider the attacks as being against civilians.

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Medium</u>. The group has been unable to take territorial control as it has insufficient military power and material backing. However, as time progresses the group is likely to develop its capabilities, as seen in wilayat Aden-Adayan and Hadramawt activities in Aden and al Mukalla, allowing the group to continue to be a factor in contributing to the countries instability. ISIS's desire to remain relevant on the global stage and attract local Yemeni recruits will likely lead to spectacular attacks against the Yemeni government, coalition forces and the al Houthis.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Medium</u>. ISIS in Yemen is likely to remain in the country, but unlikely to gain popular support, with AQAP contining to be the primary Salafi-jihadi group due to its relationship with the local population. Furthermore it is competing with AQAP who has greater historical and grass roots support. As Yemen expert Elisabeth Kendall has pointed out Islamic State's model for governance relies on central command and tolerates little autonomy, which is poorly suited to Yemen – "In Yemen, the heartlands of al-Qaeda in the east are not places that even responded well in the past to a central government... So what on earth would make

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[393] Zimmerman et al, June 2016.
[394] BBC, "Yemen Conflict: IS Suicide Attack Kills 31 Police Recruits," *BBC*, 15 May 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36295616.

them answerable to caliphate based in Syria or Iraq that's even more remote?"[395] Furthermore, that Islamic State leadership in Yemen are predominantly Saudi Arabian, is a fact poorly received by local members.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Medium</u>. With a weakening IS Core AQAP's strategy of culturally attuned engagement targeting local communities may bring back members into the fold and lead to the group's progressive demise.[396] Unlike Iraq and Syria, where ISIS provided one of the few avenues for individuals to undertake effective resistance to government and social cleavages, Yemen has several groups combating government and Houthis forces. The group's recruitment declined in late 2015 due to ISIS payment of its fighters no longer exceeding that of AQAP, and the discontent of its members with the leadership.

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[395] A. Fitch, and S. Al Batati., "ISIS fails to gain much traction in Yemen," *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 March 2016, < http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-fails-to-gain-much-traction-in-yemen-1459203675>
[396] Interesting to note that AQAP admitted to tactical-level cooperation with ISIS in central Yemen in November 2016.

8.5. ISIS in Saudi Arabia – Wilayat al-Haramayn

Objectives

Wilayat al-Haramayn aims to assist ISIS in Iraq and Syria by establish an Islamic caliphate in Saudi Arabia. The group aspires to do this by enhancing the Sunni and Shia sectarian divide and undermine the Saudi Arabia government. ISIS is a political threat to Saudi Arabia due to its claim that it has founded a caliphate that all Sunni Muslim owe allegiance. This claim is a direct challenge to the Saudi Royal family who consider themselves the custodians of the relics, sites and Salafist interpretations of Sunni Islam. [397]Analysis comparing Saudi Arabia's Wahhabist form of Sunni Islam and Islamic States ideology highlights that they both take from the writings of Mohammed Ibn Abd al Whahhab.

Background

The first mention of a Wilayat in Saudi Arabia occurred in an audio message in November 2014 connected to the killing of Thomas Hoepner in Riyadh.[398] At the same time an attack on a Hussainiyah, a Shia prayer hall in the village of ad-Dawlah, in the east of the country, was linked to the group. Soon after these incidents al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of IS province in Saudi Arabia, which includes the sub-provinces: Wilayat Najd in central Arabia, Wilayat Hijaz (Hejaz) in western Arabia, and Wilayat Bahrain in eastern Arabia (not the island country which shares the same name).

It is worth noting that in al-Baghdadi's audio message released on November 13[h] titled "Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such," he singled out Saudi Arabia as the "lands of al-Haramein" (two holy places – Mecca and Medina) avoiding a direct reference to Saudi Arabia in order to evade recognizing the Saudi royal family's legitimacy.[399] It was in this message that Baghdadi declared an overt military campaign for Wilayat Haramayn that would focus against Shiites first, then the Saudi dynasty and security forces, and finally the 'Crusaders' being Westerns.[400]

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[397] C.M. Blanchard., "Saudi Arabia: Background and US Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, 20 September 2016, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

[398] Tracking Terrorism, 'Islamic State Yemen', *Tracking Terrorism,* < http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-yemen-isy-isisy-and-islamic-state-saudi-arabia-isksa-isisksa>

[399] C. Zambelis, "To Topple the Throne: Islamic State Sets Its Sights on Saudi Arabia," *The Jamestown Foundation*, 6 March 2015, < https://jamestown.org/program/to-topple-the-throne-islamic-state-sets-its-sights-on-saudi-arabia/>

[400] Zelin, A.Y., "The Islamic State's Archipelago of Provinces," *The Washington Institute*, 14 November 2014, < http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-archipelago-of-provinces>

Leadership

Details of Wilayat al-Haramayn's leadership circle are unclear. It is likely that Wilayat al-Haramayn has a similar leadership structure to ISIS in Iraq and Syria, with an overall leader and junior leaders directing the sub-provinces (which act more like regional cells).

Membership

Details are scare on the demographic and numbers of ISIS members in Saudi Arabia. The number can be considering significant, in the 1000s, given that the country has a strong history of foreign fighters supporting the group. In 2014 there were as many as 7,000 Saudi's operating in ISIS in Iraq and Syria, making up as much as 10 per cent of the foreign fighter numbers.

Parallels have been drawn to ISIS in Yemen, with members predominantly gathered in cells, poorly disciplined, and focus on Shia targets.[401] While many of the members come from Najd, the Wahhabi heartland in central Saudi Arabia, a list of 16 suspects involved in the May 2015 bombings detail tribal names from throughout Saudi Arabia. [402] While there was a significant number of Saudis who had fought in Syria in Iraq, this number has dropped significantly since the March 2014 royal decree of long prison sentences for those attempting to leave and support the group in Syria and Iraq. In response Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi urged Saudis to remain and fight for Wilayat Najd. [403]

The capture of an operative in May 2016 believed to be a main medium between ISIS in Syria and Iraq and Saudi Arabia suggests there is some level of communication between Wilayat al-Haramayn and ISIS in Syria and Iraq. However, it is unlikely that ISIS in Syria and Iraq are directing or orchestrating the attacks in Saudi Arabia.

Funding

It has been documented that ISIS in Syria and Iraq has received private donations from Saudi donors (who have sent their money through Kuwait), and it is likely that Wilayat al-Haramayn receives funding from similar sources. [404] The group's connection to ISIS's contingent in Yemen may provide an opportunity for resources and experienced fighters to be smuggled into the country for clandestine activities.

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[401] Tracking Terrorism, "Islamic State Yemen," *Tracking Terrorism,* < http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-yemen-isy-isisy-and-islamic-state-saudi-arabia-isksa-isisksa>
[402] McDowall, A., "Anger over Arab wars fueld jihadi threat in Saudi Arabia," *Reuters*, 16 June 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-idUSKBN0OW15K20150616>
[403] Ibid.
[404] Plotkin Boghardt, L., "Saudi Funding of ISIS," *The Washington Institute*, 23 June 2014, < http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saudi-funding-of-isis>

Terrorist Activity – An Analysis of the Sub-Provinces

Najd Province

Background

Located in Eastern Saudi Arabia the Naij Province released an audio speech in early 2015 declaring war on Shiites and encouraging Saudi Sunni youths to join their cause. [405]

Activity prior to 2016

Najd undertook four attacks in Saudi Arabia and one attack in Kuwait in 2015. The total number of casualties in the single attack in Kuwait exceeded the combined total in Saudi Arabia (Figure 8.12).

Figure 8.12: Najd Province Total Casualties per Country

These attacks were primarily bombings directed at religious figures and institutions (Figure 8.13), killing 58 people and injuring 333 in total.[406]

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[405] SITE Intelligence Group Jihadist Threat, "IS' Najd Province Declares War on Shi'ites in Audio, Urges Youths to Join IS," *SITE*, 29 May 2015, < https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-najd-province-declares-war-on-shi-ites-in-audio-urges-saudi-youths-to-join-is.html>
[406] GTD database.

Figure 8.13: Najd Province Total Attacks by Victim Type

Hijaz Province

Background

Hijaz is at the geographic center of Islam with both Mecca and Medina located in its domain. ISIS presence and activities there serve as a direct administrative challenge to the Saudi's governorship over these invaluable sites to Islam. [407]

The group first appeared in open sources after a suicide bomber attacked a mosque filled with members of special emergency force members based in Abha, Air province. [408]

Activity prior to 2016

In 2015 the group undertook two attacks, both directed at religious institutions with bombing as their primary tactic in both cases. The first attack was on August 6th in Abha, killing 16 and wounding 9, and the second in Najran on October the 26th killing 2 and injuring 12.[409]

Al-Bahrayn Province

Background

In September 2015 the Bahrayn (Bahrain) province claimed the attack on the Saihat Shia mosue in Saudi Arabia.[410] This claim has not been confirmed, and has not been included in the GTD database.

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[407] Moore, J., "Saudi Arabia braces for ISIS," *Intersec - The Journal of International Security*, 23 November 2015, < http://www.intersecmag.co.uk/saudi-arabia-braces-for-isis/>
[408] Ibid.
[409] GTDS data base
[410] C. Winter., Twitter, <https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/655133052222447616>

It is possible that a significant number of the members of this group have been arrested in October 2015. In Manama, Bahrain, 24 people were accused of forming an ISIS branch and plotting attacks against the government. This occurred a week after the group had claimed responsibility for shootings on Shiite's in eastern Saudi Arabia. [411]

Activity prior to 2016

The GTD database confirms a single attack by al-Bahrayn group in 2015. On October 16th the group undertook an armed assault against a religious institution in Dammam, killing 6 and wounding 9.[412]

Activity in 2016

It was reported in May 2016 that Saudi Arabia was sustaining one Islamic State attack every twelve days.[413] The attacks have been constant but low intensity. ISIS capabilities in the country have been disrupted by a crackdown by Saudi security forces, with a raid in May 2016 seeing the arrest of n individual considered the primary liaison between group in Iraq and Syria and in Saudi Arabia.[414]

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Low</u>. Wilayat al-Haramayn activities present a continuing but low level threat to Saudi Arabia. There is the potential for an increase in the group's capabilities if a significant number of trained and experience foreign fighters manage to return to the country when ISIS collapses in Syria and Iraq.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Moderate</u>. The ideological similarities between ISIS and Saudi Arabia's brand of Wahhabism and the number of Saudi Arabia's taking senior position in ISIS in Syria and Iraq suggests that the group has relatively strong bonds which would be boosted with fighters returning from Iraq and Syria.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Low</u>. While there has been a crack down on ISIS by Saudi Arabian security forces, the return of a significant number foreign fighters upon the collapse of the core may add to the number of distinct cells operating in the country. Saudi Arabian counter terrorism forces remain vigilant and appear able to identify and arrest large gatherings of ISIS members.

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[411] Associated Press, "Bahrain to begin trial of 24 accused of forming Islamic State branch, plotting attacks," *Fox News World*, 21 October 2015, <
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/10/21/bahrain-to-begin-trial-24-accused-forming-islamic-state-branch-plotting-attacks.html>
[412] GTD database
[413] C. Bunzel., "What Makes The Provinces Tick? Ideology," in K. Bauer (ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, pp.34-40, <
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>
[414] C. Bunzel.

8.5. ISIS in Libya

Objectives

ISIS-Libya is an officially recognized ISIS affiliate that adheres to the group's jihadist ideology, extreme interpretation of Islam, and its ambition for creating an Islamic caliphate. ISIS-Libya aim is to serve as the 'vanguard of the Caliphate' by maintaining and consolidating territory for ISIS in Libya, in the form of three provinces (Barqah, Fezzan and Tripolitania), and help establish conditions for ISIS to expand its caliphate into Algeria and Tunisia. This goal is to be achieved, in part, by the dual aim of preventing the reconstruction of a Libyan state and removing the United Nations-backed Transitional Government of National Accord.[415] ISIS-Libya is believed to be in constant communication with ISIS in Syria and Iraq – it is a place to train troops and attack people from sub-Saharan Africa and Tunisia – and potentially establish a political entity. [416]

Background

ISIS-Libya was initiated in Dernah, Libya by members from the Battar Brigade. The group formed the Islamic Youth Shura Council and received a delegation from ISIS in September 2014. In November 2014 al-Baghdadi accepted the groups bay'at and created the ISIS-Libya branch with three subwiliats in Barqa (eastern Libya) with Dernah as its headquarters, Tarablus with Sirte as its headquarters and Fezzan in southern Libya.[417]

Leadership

ISIS in Iraq and Syria has selected intimate advisors of Aby Bakr al-Baghdadi to direct ISIS-Libya.[418] ISIS-Libya emir is Abdul Qadr al-Najdi [419], who replaced Iraqi National Abul-Mughirah al-Qahtani (Abu Nabil al-Anbari) who was killed in the US strikes on Derna in November 2015. [420],[421] ISIS-Libya has an established leadership structure, in a similar fashion to ISIS Syria and Iraq. [422]

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[415] Estelle, E., "ISIS's course of action – Out of Sirte," *AEI Critical Threats*, 29 April 2016, < http://www.criticalthreats.org/libya/estelle-isis-courses-of-action-out-of-sirte-april-29-2016>

[416] J. Seldin., "Islamic State Threat in Libya – "Almost Exaggerated" – for now," *Voanews*, 8 April 2016, < http://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-threat-libya-almost-exaggerated/3276998.html>

[417] Australian National Security., "Islamic State Libya Province (IS-Libya)", *Australian Government*, 28 November 2016, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Islamic-state-in-libya-is-libya.aspx>

[418] Ibid.

[419] Counter Extremism Project, "Abdul Qadr al-Najdi," *Counter Extremism Project*, < http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul-qadr-al-najdi>

[420] Reuters, "New Islamic State leader in Libya says group 'stronger every day'," *Reuters*, 10 March 2016, < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-islamic-state-idUSKCN0WC1EB>

Membership

ISIS-Libya has a homogenous Sunni population making it difficult for ISIS to undermine Sunni/Shiite grievances to foster support. Rather, ISIS-Libya has preyed upon the sentiments of those marginalized or wronged in post-Gaddafi Libya to gather recruits. The group has been able to draw upon defectors from domestic Libyan jihadist groups and has paid fighters, including some from sub-Saharan Africa, to join.[423]

The number of members appears to be decreasing. In March 2016 the US Defense Department stated that there were as many as 6,500 ISIS fighters.[424] In late November 2016 it was estimated that the group's membership was between 3000 and 5000.[425]

Funding

ISIS-Libya is predominantly self-funded. This financing is achieved through taxation of the small territories it is has dominion over, as well as undertaking smuggling, extortion and armed robbery. The group receives minimal funding from ISIS in Syria and Iraq.[426]

Terrorist Activity – An Analysis the Sub-Provinces

Wilayat Barqa / Cyrenaica Province

Background

Located in eastern Libya, and operating in the cities of Derna and Benghazi, Wilaya Barqa province was established predominately from al-Battar Brigade jihadists who had returned from fighting for ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2014.[427] The group is also

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[421] Soufan Group, "The Islamic State's Expansion Strategy in Libya," *Soufan Group*, 3 March 2016, < http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-expansion-strategy-in-libya/>

[422] P. Tucker., "What a war with ISIS in Libya would look like," *Defence One*, 5 May 2016, < http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/05/what-war-isis-libya-would-look/128082/>

[423] Australian National Security., "Islamic State Libya Province (IS-Libya)"

[424] C. Paton, "New Isis leader in Libya – Abdel Qader al-Najdi threatens Daesh invasion of Rome through Africa," *International Business Times*, 10 March 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/new-isis-leader-abdel-qader-al-najdi-threatens-daesh-invasion-rome-through-north-africa-1548697

[425] Australian National Security., "Islamic State Libya Province (IS-Libya)."

[426] Ibid.

[427] F. Wehrey., "Rising out of chaos: The Islamic state in Libya," *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 5 March 2015, < http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59268?lang=en>

constituted with a faction from Ansar al-Sharia in Derna who considered ISIS as a better method of pursing jihad than their previous affiliation.[428]

The group's defeat in Darnah resulted in many of the group's leaders being captured or killed.[429] The loss of Derna in mid 2015,[430] has meant that many ISIS fighters have changed loyalty and joined with Ansar al-Sharia.[431]

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Overview

From 2014 to 2015 Wilayat Barqa undertook 59 attacks in Libya that killed 151 people and injured 233 more (Figure 8.14)

Figure 8.14: Wilayat Barqa Total Casualties From 2014 to 2015

Targets
Wilayat Barqa's primary targets were private citizens and property (Figure 8.15). The number of attacks directed at other entities, such as the government or military, is significantly smaller.

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[428] M. Eljarh., "Islamic State in Libya," in K. Bauer (ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, pp.7-11, <
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>
[429] Ibid.
[430] U. Laessing, U., and A. al-Warfalli., "Expulsion from Derna bastion may show limits for Islamic State in Libya," *Reuters*, 24 July 2015, < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN0PY1A620150724>
[431] M. Eljarh, pp. 7-11.

Figure 8.15: Wilayat Barqa Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Tactics

Wilayat Barqa primarily used bombing as a tactic in its attacks (Figure 8.16). Interestingly the group also undertook more hostage taking actions than it did armed assaults. The extent that the former was for revenue raising is unknown.

Figure 8.16: Wilayat Barqa Total Attacks by Tactic

Activity in 2016

In November 2016 the Libyan National Army gained support from the United Arab Emirates in the form of warplanes and drones as it attempts to have full control of

Benghazi to push Wilayat Barqah out. Wilayat Barqah is attempting to defend its safe havens from the offensive. [432]

Assessment

Threat assessment: Low. The group is in route, and likely to be trying to consolidate its losses elsewhere with other members of ISIS-Libya.

Future Prospects (Survivability): Low. The group's defeat in Darnah resulted in many of the group's leaders to be captured or killed.[433] The loss of Derna in mid 2015,[434] has meant that many ISIS fighters have changed loyalty and joined with Ansar al-Sharia. [435]

Wilayat Tarablus (Tripoli Province)

Objectives

Wilayat Tarablus has jihadist links dating back to Ansar al-Sharia precursor Farouq Brigade from the city of Misratah.[436] On the 19th of February 2015 in Sirte the Wilayat Tarablus (Tripoli Province) was declared. Many of its members are defectors from Ansar al-Sharia from Benghazi, Misrata, and the Furjan tribe.[437] The group also contains foreign recruits, specifically from Tunisia.[438] In February 2015 the group relocated to al-Nawfailyah in the southwest due to government attacks. There are Tarablus cells thought to be located in Sabratha, Tripoli and in the areas south of Sirte. [439]

Wilayat Tarablus emir is thought to be Tunisian, Abu Talha al-Tunisi, with Hassan Karami (also known as Abu Mu'awiya al-Libi) as its spiritual leader.[440]

Sirte was on the verge of becoming ISIS's third de facto capital, outside of Mosul and Raqqa. The city had become a safehouse for ISIS foreign fighters, with reports suggested that 70 per cent of the ISIS fighters in Sirte were made up of foreigners

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[432] AEI's Critical Threats Project, "2016-11-01 CTP Update and Assessment," AEI's Critical Threats Project, 1 November 2016, < http://www.slideshare.net/CriticalThreats/2016-1101-ctp-update-and-assessment>
[433] M. Eljarh, p. 7-11.
[434] U. Laessing, 2015.
[435] M. Eljarh, p. 7-11.
[436] Ibid.
[437] F. Wehrey, 2015.
[438] Ibid.
[439] Ibid.
[440] Pellegrino, C., "A brief history of ISIS "provinces," *Oasis*, 23 November 2015, < http://www.oasiscenter.eu/articles/jihadism-and-violence/2015/12/23/a-brief-history-of-isis-provinces>

from Tunisia, Egyptians, Sudanese and Algerians.[441] However, the group is on the verge of losing its presence in the city (see 'Activity in 2016').

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Overview

Wilayat Tarablus undertook 145 attacks between 2014 and 2015. During this time it killed 184 people and injured another 154. (Figure 8.17)

Figure 8.17: Total Number of Victims from Attacks by Wilayat Tarablus from 2014-2015.

Targets

Wilayat Tarablus, like Wilayat Barqa, has predominantly targeted private citizens and property (Figure 8.18). Interestingly the group has been more effective in its attacks on other terrorist groups, with more casualties attributed to that target than any other (Figure 8.19).

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[441] Chastain, M., "Islamic State leader in Libya: Group grows 'Stronger Every Day'," *Breitbart*, 11 March 2016, < http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/03/11/islamic-state-leader-in-libya-group-grows-stronger-every-day/>

Figure 8.18: Number of Attacks per Target Type by Wilayat Tarablus

Figure 8.19: Wilayat Tarablus Total Casualties by Victim Type

Tactics

Wilayat Tarablus has displayed the use of a diverse number of tactics (Figure 8.20). This would suggest that the group has significant capabilities and skills, possibly due to the extensive number of foreign fighters it has recruited.

Figure 8.20: Wilayat Tarablus Total Attacks by Tactic

Activity in 2016

Wilayat Tarablus has been involved in events in the city of Sirte. An offensive against the group in the city in August 2016 involving US airstrikes and Libyan Government of National Accord forces (as well as confrontations with local militant groups) has weakened the group. At the time of writing this thesis, ISIS remained isolated in a single neighborhood of Sirte. [442]

Assessment

Threat assessment: Low. The group appears to be virtually destroyed after the attacks on its presence in Sirte. Despite this there is likely to be guerilla fighting in the outer Sirte districts that will last for months, as the remaining members attempt to remove themselves from the region.[443]

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): Moderate. The impending loss of this once important province does not necessitate that it is a critical blow to Islamic State in the country or region. The opportunity for it to manage its losses and strategically pursue its goals of causing regional instability are available, though this will likely be pursued in the Fezzan province and in neighboring Tunisia.

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[442] Joscelyn, T., "Islamic State fighters remain in a few blocks of Sirte, Libya," *FDD's Long War Journal*, 19 November 2016, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/islamic-state-fighters-remain-in-few-blocks-of-sirte-libya.php>

[443] AEI's Critical Threats Project, "2016-10-25 CTP Update and Assessment," *AEI's Critical Threats Project*, 25 October 2016, < http://www.slideshare.net/CriticalThreats/2016-1025-ctp-update-and-assessment>

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Moderate</u>. Wilayat Tarablus is likely to remove the majority of its fighters out of the province and meet up with fellow ISIS members in the Fezzan Province in southwestern Libya. It will be able to establish a safe haven there with little resistance, and continue to assail government forces. It is likely to continue asymmetric attacks against the unity government, with a focus on the oil infrastructure to disturbed the state economy. It could use the area in Fezzan to launch attacks into Tunisia and Algeria, which has already been occurring. It may also choose to seize a population center, such as Ubari, as a source of financing. [444]

Wilayat Fezzan

Background

Very little is known about this group that operates in southern-central Libya. The group has no sign of governance and information coming from the group is sporadic.[445] Wilayat Fezzan has perpetrated attacks against oil fields and has kidnapped workers.[446]

Terrorist Activity prior to 2016

In 2015 the group undertook three-recorded attacks, killing 25 and wounding three. The group has used armed assaults coupled with hostage taking, with multiple targets that include military, businesses and private citizens. The group claimed responsibility for an attack that left 14 dead and 1 wounded at a Libyan army checkpoint outside of Sokna on January 2rd 2015.[447]

Activity in 2016

There have been no major attacks attributed to the group in 2016.

Assessment

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[444] E. Estelle, 2016.
[445] C. Bunzel, p. 34.
[446] C. Pellegrino, 2015.
[447] A. Engel., "The Islamic State's Expansion in Libya," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 11 February 2015,
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/POL2371-WithNotes-v2.pdf>

Threat assessment: <u>Low.</u> Very little is known about the province, as it has undertaken few attacks and released little media. In the short term this is unlikely to change. However, the group is likely to have an increase its capabilities and activities as ISIS fighters flee from Sirte and attempt to consolidate their losses and potentially rebuild in the province.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Low</u>. Fezzan Province is likely to received Islamic State militants fleeing Sirte, headed for Sahel.[448]

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Low</u>. The significant loss of manpower and capabilities over the last twelve months will reduce the number and intensity of attacks for the group over the short term. ISIS-Libya now lacks administrative and social services capacity that will be to the detriment of its operational capabilities.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Moderate</u>. The group's senior leadership is made up of members with historical or established ties with ISIS in Syria and Iraq. However, much of the group in Libya has been made up of foreign fighters, indicative of the group's inability to recruit local support. The extent to which it gains members fleeing Iraq and Syria will determine the group's ability to remain affiliated with ISIS core.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Moderate</u>. The impending loss of this once important province does not necessitate that it is a critical blow to Islamic State in the country or region. The opportunity for it to manage its losses and strategically pursue its goals of causing regional instability are available. Absence of a coherent government still allows ISIS to get a foothold. In Fezzan province ISIS could exploit tribal grievances, given they been excluded from power and governance – however jihadism in Libya has typically not been tribal. The group is more likely to enter neighboring Tunisia and help establish a presence there (see TUNISIA).

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[448] Farge, E., "Islamic State fighters head south in Libya, threatening Sahel," *Reuters*, 11 February 2016, < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-us-idUSKCN0VK1ON>

8.7. ISIS in Tunisia

ISIS is intending to direct an insurgency against the Tunisian government, attacking its security infrastructure, attempting to take over sovereign territory and conducting terrorist attacks against tourists to damage its economy. [449] No Wilayat has been declared for Tunisa, but ISIS has several cells operating throughout the country, with members coming in from Libya and surrounding regions as they attempt to escape pursuit from regional security forces. Tunisian jihadist have previously been involved with IS founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's networks throughout the Levant, with some going to Libya in 2013 to assist in the formation of the Wilayat there.[450]

Tunisia has the highest per capita foreign fighter ration of any Arab country, though this does not mean that the country has the greatest overall proportion of ISIS support from its population.[451] ISIS-Libya was able to recruit fighters from the Tunisian group Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) operating in eastern Libya, despite the group not making a pledged to al-Baghdadi (it is worth pointing out that after ISIS-Libya loss of Darnah these fighters have returned to fight for AAS).[452] Tunisians have a strong connection with ISIS-Libya, being involved in operations and training activities, particularly in the town of Sabratha near the Tunisian border. [453]

ISIS terrorist activities first began in Tunisia when ISIS members attacked the Tunisian tourism industry at the Bardo Museum and a Sousse beach resort in 2015.[454] ISIS has been expanding its operations since with pro-ISIS cells active in 17 of Tunisia's 24 governorates, with particular activity in Jendouba, Medenine, Sfax, Sidi Bouzid, Sousse, and Tunis. [455] ISIS cells in Tunisia have undertaken a series of attacks direct against Tunisian security and military forces.[456] The group's failed attempt to take over the Tunisian border town of Ben Guerdane in March of 2016, is

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[449] J. Stutz., "AQIM and ISIS in Tunisia: Competing Campaigns," *AEI Critical Threats*, 28 June 2016, < http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/stutz-aqim-isis-tunisia-competing-campaigns-june-28-2016>

[450] Bauer (Ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. xvii, 2016. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>

[451] Pollock, D., "Public Polling," in Bauer (ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016. pp. 64-65. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>

[452] Bauer, p. xvii.

[453] Zelin, A.Y., "The Role of Tunisians," in Bauer (ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016. p. 20. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>

[454] "IS claims Bardo Museum raid in Tunisian capital, threatens more attacks," SITE Intelligence Group, March 19, 2015, www.siteintelgroup.com; "IS claims attack on Tunisian beach in Sousse, killing citizens of 'crusader coalition,'" SITE Intelligence Group, June 26, 2015.

[455] J. Stutz, 2016.

[456] Zelin, A.Y., "The Role of Tunisians," p. 19.

indicative of its developing ambitions and coordination. The death of senior ISIS figures have degraded ISIS's network in Tunisia for the short term.[457]

Two groups from Tunisia have pledged their support to Islamic State: Okba Ibn Nafa'a Brigade (a previous affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and Jund al-Khilafa (Tunisia). Tunisian security forces claimed that 90 per cent of Okba Ibn Nafaa was destroyed in mid-2015 in response to the Bardo Museum bombings.[458] Jund al-Khilafa (Tunisia) leader, Talal Saidi, from the Sidi Bouzid region, was killed by Tunisian armed units on November the 9th 2016.[459]

Assessment

Threat assessment: High. ISIS is intent on undermining the country's democratic project and carve out a safe haven. ISIS cells in Tunisia are developing in their capacity, being able to undertake few but spectacular and deadly attacks as well as lower level insurgent attacks on Tunisian security forces.[460] In the not too distant future an increase in experience and coordinated activity, provided by an influx of returning foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq as well as ISIS members from Libya, could prove a significant threat to Tunisia's security.

Future Prospects (Survivability): High. Tunisia provides a fertile ground for an impending ISIS presence. As Islamic State Wilyat's in Libya disintegrates the remaining forces may focus their efforts in Tunisia, working to establish a Wilayat in the country. ISIS members from Libya may utilized their experience, networks and resources from their campaign in Libya to bolster insurgency activities in Tunisia. Tunisia has by far been the greatest exporter of foreign fighters to ISIS in Iraq and Syria.[461] With the center of the caliphate collapsing in Iraq and Syria, these fighters are likely to return to their home country and join with groups sympathetic to their cause. Greater coordinated activity could prove a significant threat to Tunisia's security, with ISIS intent to undermine the countries attempt at democracy.[462] With protests in early 2016 regarding the government's inability to protect the population from militants, combined with President Beji Caid Essebsi citation of Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution (which enables the president to take "any measure" in a security crisis), is indicative of the dissatisfied populous.

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[457] Zelin, A.Y., "The Role of Tunisians," p. 22.

[458] Amara, T., "Tunisia says almost wipes out al Qaeda group after attacks," *Yahoo News*, 13 July 2015, < https://www.yahoo.com/news/tunisia-says-almost-wipes-al-qaeda-group-attacks-110020784.html?ref=gs>

[459] Arab Weekly, "Tunisia announces killing of Jund al-Khilafa's leader," *The Arab* Weekly, 9 November 2016, <http://www.thearabweekly.com/Mena-Now/6986/Tunisia-announces-killing-of-Jund-al-Khilafas-leader>

[460] Zelin, A.Y., "The Role of Tunisians," p. 19.

[461] Homeland Security Committee, "Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel," *Homeland Security Committee*, September 2015, < https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf>

[462] Estelle, E., "Desknote: ISIS's Tunisian attack cell in Libya," *AEI Critical Threats Project*, 8 March 2016, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/libya/estelle-desknote-isiss-tunisian-attack-cell-libya-march-7-2016>

8.8. ISIS in Algeria - Wilayat Jaza'ir

Objectives

Wilayat Jaza'ir's objective is to undermine Algerian state stability.[463] The group, for the larger part, exists only on paper and has limited capabilities. Wilayat Jaza'ir appears to serve ISIS more as a symbol, due to it being an historic area of jihad, than for the purpose of territorial control or governance.

Background

Wilayat Jaza'ir is derived from the jihadist group Jund al Khilafah (Soldiers of the Calphate), a splinter group from AQIM, who released a video in August 2014 in which it beheaded a French hostage, Herve Gourdel, and pledge bay'at to al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi officially recognized their pledge on September 14th 2014 and declared them as an ISIS province in Algeria – Wilayat Jaza'ir or el Djazair.

Wilayata Jaza'ir is competing with al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) in northern Algeria, the latter's historical base.[464] The group's ability gain popular support is made even more difficult due to the country's population not being religiously disposed to jihadi ideology and aware that a jihadi presence is likely to damage their limited economic activity.[465]

Leadership

Two months after pledging allegiance to ISIS the group's emir, Abdelmalek Gouri and two of his lieutenants where killed by Algerian military forces. Five months later Gouri's successor, Bachir Kherza was killed in Bouria.[466]

The Algerian Military killed Wilayat Jaza'ir's new emir on the 13th of October 2016 in Oued Zhour, Skikda Province, soon after its first recorded attack since August of the same year. [467] The group has not confirmed the emir's death, and it is unknown who currently leads the group.

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[463] Al-Tamimi, A., "Governance," in Bauer (Ed.), *Beyond Syria and Iraq,* The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, pp. 30-35, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf>
[464] Z. Laub and J. Masters, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 27 March 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717>
[465] G. Porter., '"Is Algeria Next for the Islamic State," *The Cipher Brief*, 1 September 2016, < https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/africa/algeria-next-islamic-state-1089>
[466] D. Ghanem-Yazbeck,. "Obstacles to ISIS Expansion," *The Cipher Brief*, 1 September 2016, < https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/africa/obstacles-isis-expansion-1089>
[467] AEI's Critical Threats Project, "2016-10-18 CTP Update and Assessment," *AEI's Critical Threats Project*, 18 October 2016, < http://www.slideshare.net/CriticalThreats/2016-1018-ctp-update-and-assessment>

Members

Wilayat Jaza'ir has members spread-out through Algeria in northern mountainous Kabilye region and in the cities of Bouria, Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou. Due to ongoing operations from Algeria security forces, the groups operating structure has been disrupted and leaders killed. The remaining militants are believed to be located along Algeria's borders with Tunisia, Mali, and Niger. There have been reports of ISIS cells in the nation's capital in late 2016. Algeria Defense Ministry released statistics in late October 2016 showing that Algeria forces had killed 157 ISIS militants in 2015, and had killed 99 and arrested 50 in the first half of 2016.[468]

Funding

The group is likely to receive financial, technical and operational support from Libya.[469] However, the Algerian government has increased their operations along their Eastern borders in lieu of ISIS–Libya's collapse to prevent fighters and resources entering Algeria.[470]

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

The GTD reports that the group undertook three attacks in Algeria in 2015. The first was an armed assault on the 2nd of February in Laaijba targeting police forces that left two dead. On 6th of March in Tablat another armed assault against police force left two injured. The third reported incident was a bombing targeting the Algerian Military on the 18th of December that left four injured.

Activity in 2016

The group has undertaken a limited number of small-scale attacks in 2016. This includes an attack using explosives that killed several Algerian army soldiers on April 15th near Mount Ouahch. [471] The group also claimed the shooting of a police officer in Costantine, northeastern Algeria, on October 30th.[472]

Reports suggest as of 2016 Wilayata Jaza'ir is active in some capacity in Skikda, Jijel, Constantine, Tipasa, Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia, Boumerdès, Bouira, Mèdèa, Blida, Chlef, Ain Defla, Tebessa, El Oued, and Illizi provinces.[473]

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[468] B. Seftel., "Algeria: A Bulwark Against ISIS," *The Cipher Brief*, 1 September 2016, < https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/africa/algeria-bulwark-against-isis-1089>

[469] Baeur p. xx

[470] D. Ghanem-Yazbeck, 2016.

[471] http://isis.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-august-wilayat-jazair-algeria-make-rare-appearance-in-isis

[472] AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2016-11-01 CTP Update and Assessment, *AEI's Critical Threats Project*, 1 November 2016, < http://www.slideshare.net/CriticalThreats/2016-1101-ctp-update-and-assessment>

[473] E. Estelle, E., and B. Snyder., "AQIM and ISIS in Algeria: Competing Campaigns," *AEI Critical Threats Project*, 2 June 2016, < http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/estelle-synder-aqim-isis-algeria-competing-campaigns-june-2-2016>

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Low</u>. Wilayat Jaza'ir's capabilities are limited to small-scale attacks. Wilayat Jaza'ir is likely to heighten its operation activities and possibly undertake a spectacular attack in order to gather support from domestic Algerians. As ISIS and AQIM compete for dominance the number of small-scale attacks against Algeria security forces is likely to increase, particularly in the north of the country. [474] This activity is unlikely to destabilize the Algerian government in the short term.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Moderate</u>. While the group is unlikely to have direct communication with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, it is probable that it will gain members from ISIS-Libya as the group there collapses. These circumstances will serve to strengthen the group's ties with ISIS central leadership.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Low</u>. Wilayat Jaza'ir has not been able to get a foothold in the country. Unlike Tunisia or Libya, Algeria does not have the political vacuum like the latter nor the political conditions like the formers to be exploited. Coupled with Algeria's high level of security, competition with AQIM and the populaces memories associated with the 'black decade' – the government's brutal civil war against Islamist insurgent in the 1990s – it is unlikely that ISIS will have a significant presence in Algeria.

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[474] Ibid.

8.9. ISIS in Nigeria – Boko Haram

Objectives

Boko Haram's primary aim is to establish an Islamic state under Sharia law in Nigeria, and extend this Islamic rule outside Nigeria. The group became an affiliate to ISIS in March 2015. The group is united in its desire for a sharia-based Islamic state.

Background

The group began as a non-violent organization in 1995 comprised middle-class Nigerians from Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria. The group became Boko Haram in 2002 and was led by Mohammed Yusuf.[475] The group began violent activities in late 2003 and consistently undertook frequent attacks in mid 2010 upon Abdubakar Shekau (alias Imam Abubakar bin Mohammed) ascending to the group's leadership.[476]

In 2014 the group kidnapped over 200 Chibok schoolgirls, selling them into marriage and using them for prisoner exchanges.[477] In the same year the group began seizing towns and in January 2015 had control of several towns and villages in Borno and Adamawa states.

In March 2015, then group leader Shekau pledged bay'at to al-Baghdadi. Shekau is no longer the leader of the group and ISIS has replaced him with Sheik Abu Mossab al Barnawi.

Leadership

Boko Haram's organizational structure is thought to be spilt into several factions with discrete senior leaders that undertake activities under a united banner. These factions share the same ambitions of creating an Islamic state in Nigeria, but don't agree on the way this should come about.

The son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf, Sheik Abu Mossab al Barnawi, was assigned the Wali of Boko Haram in August 2016.[478] Bornawi has taken over from Abubakar Shekau.

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[475] Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, "Boko Haram," Backgrounder, *Council on Foreign Relations*, 5 March 2015, < http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739>

[476] Australian National Security, "Boko Haram," *Australian Government*, 28 November 2016, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Boko-Haram.aspx>

[477] START, "Boko Haram," *START*, March 2015. <http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/boko-haram>

[478] D. Hinshaw., "Islamic State Names New Leader of Boko Haram," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 2016, < http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-newspaper-names-new-leader-of-boko-haram-1470239684>

Members

The characteristics of Boko Haram members are nebulous and poorly understood. The number of members has changed over time and their locations have been dispersed through northeast Nigeria and across the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon (with sleeper cells in the latter two).[479] Boko Haram is known to have used forced coercion to conscript locals into the group.

Funding

Boko Haram gains funds by undertaking robberies on banks and community assets, as well as extorting and conducting kidnap-for-ransom activities against locals and foreigners. Prior to the group joining ISIS the group received addition funding, training and support from AQIM.

Terrorist Activity prior to 2016

Conflict with Boko Haram has claimed 30,000 lives and resulted in the displacement of millions. Almost three-quarters (22,928) of Boko Haram connected deaths have occurred in the Borno State. It has struggled to advance into the rest of Nigeria.[480]

The group has undertaken several attacks against Nigerian and foreign individuals and assets in Nigeria but also in neighboring states. The group targets civilians, military, police and government capabilities. Boko Haram tactics include bombing and small arms assaults. The group has also undertaken kidnapping operations.[481]

Activity in 2016

There are signs that the group is on decline, with the group having killed 244 people in the second quarter of 2016 – the lowest quarterly figure for the group in five years.[482] Nigerian Major General Lucky Irabor stated in August 2016 that the group's control was limited to villages and towns near Lake Chad and in Sambisa forest.

Upon Barnawi's instatement as new wali, Shekau released an audio statement that saw him acknowledging that he was no longer the group's leader and that he would be the imam of Jamaatu Ahl al-Sunna lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS), which was the original title of Boko Haram. Shekau refused to acknowledge al-Barnawi as leader while stating that he remained loyal to al-Baghdadi. It is indicated that there is a schism within Boko Haram, with reported clashes between pro-Barnawi and pro-Shekau groups.[483]

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[479]Australian National Security, 'Boko Haram'.
[480] N. Allen., "Charting Boko Haram's Rapid Decline," *War on the Rocks*, 22 September 2016, < http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/charting-boko-harams-rapid-decline/>
[481]Australian National Security, 'Boko Haram'.
[482]N. Allen, 2016.
[483] Y. Trofimov., "Behind Boko Haram's Split: A Leader Too Radical for Islamic State," 15 September 2016, < http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boko-haram-s-split-a-leader-too-radical-for-islamic-state-1473931827>

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Moderate</u>. The group is no longer the world's most deadly terrorist group, despite being so in 2015. The group's attacks in the last quarter of 2016 have been the lowest in several years.[484] The group still retains its ability to adapt and retains significant capabilities, but it is not as potent.

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Low</u>. While Boko Haram's pledge to ISIS was seen as a defeat for al-Qaeda, the group's affiliation with the latter may have proven a poisoned chalice.[485] Affiliation with the group has already caused internal division. The collapse of ISIS in Syria, will result in less resources and support to be provided to the group, leaving minimal reason for Boko Haram to remain with ISIS.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Moderate</u>. Results from the Johns Hopkins University's Nigeria Social Violence Research Project show that there are four critical factors contributing to Boko Haram declining: "a failure to spread much beyond Nigeria's extreme northeast, a loss of popular support, poor strategic thinking by insurgents, and improved counterinsurgency operations".[486] While the momentum has shifted against the group, the group still is far from dead.

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[484] Business Wire, "Number of Cross-border Boko Haram Attacks Rose Since Islamic State Alliance, HIS Markit Says," *Business Wire*, 15 September 2016, < http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160915005593/en/Number-Cross-border-Boko-Haram-Attacks-Rose-Islamic>

[485] D. Gartenstein-Ross., and J. Zenn., "Boko Haram's Doomed Marriage to the Islamic State," *War on the Rocks*, 26 August 2016, < http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/boko-harams-doomed-marriage-to-the-islamic-state/>

[486] N. Allen, 2016.

8.10. ISIS in the Philippines – Abu Sayyaf Group

Objectives

Abu Sayya Group's (ASG) main objective has been to create an independent Islamic state in Mindanao, which also includes the Sulu Archipelago. The group undertakes attacks to support its extremist ideology and advancing its ideological cause. The group is also motivated by financial gain, use kidnapping as a means of achieving this outcome. The majority of ASG victims have been Filipinos, while Westerners and members from other Southeast Asian nations have also been targets. On July 23 2014 the group's leader, Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi and appointed himself as the emir of the group in the Philippines. ISIS in Syria and Iraq have not declared the country a wilayat but have referred to it as being as part of the *ard al-jihad* ("the land of the jihad").[487]

Background

Filipino national Abdurajak Janjalani formed ASG in 1991 as a separatist militant Islamist movement. The group is based around the Jolo and Basilan islands in southwestern Philippines. The group has been carrying out insurgent activities and terrorist tactics for the purpose of gaining an independent Islamic province in the Philippines.

ASG is responsible for the most devastating terrorist attack in the history of the Philippines, the 2014 bombing of Superferry 14, killing 116.[488]

Leadership

ASG is comprised of loosely-affiliated subgroups instead of a formal hierarchy. These groups are led by prominent and experienced figures, including Isnilon Hapilon (the self-appointed ISIS emir), Radullan Shairon and Yasser Igasan.[489]

It is worth noting that in ISIS media releases Isnilon Hapilon is not referred to as *wali* but as *al-mujahid al-muwakkal li-qiyadat junud ad-dawla al-islamiyya f-il-filibin* ("the mujahid authorized to lead the soldiers of the Islamic State in the Philippines") and *al-amir* ("the emir").[490]

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[487] C. Winter., "Has the Islamic State Abandoned its Provincial Model in the Philippines?," *War on the Rocks*, 22 July 2016, < http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/has-the-islamic-state-abandoned-its-provincial-model-in-the-philippines/>
[488] Banlaoi, R.C., "Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia: the Abu Sayyaf threat," *Naval War College Review,* Autumn 2005, p. 63.
[489]Australian National Security, "Abu Sayyaf Group," *Australian Government* https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AbuSayyafGroup.aspx
[490] C. Winter, July 22, 2016.

Members

ASG members are from poverty-stricken areas of western Mindano and the Sulu archipelago. The group has a reputation for being a safe house for foreign jihadists. As of mid 2016 the group has 400 members.[491]

Funding

Kidnapping for ransom and extortion tactics have been the primary sources of revenue for ASG and serve as the group's main source of funding. ASG gains support from the local population. The group also receives outside funding, which includes support and training from Indonesian's Jemaah Islamiyah.[492] ASG also sourced funding in the 1990s from al-Qaeda.

Terrorist Activity Prior to 2016

Overview

ASG has been responsible for undertaking terrorist attacks and kidnapping on a wide range of targets since it became active in 1991. These have occurred in the Philippines and surrounding areas, including Mindanao, the islands of Basilan, the Sulu Archipelago, and Malaysia's Sabah State.[493] The group's primary tactics has been kidnapping and armed assault.

Since the group pledged its allegiance to ISIS it has been attributed the following incidents:

- May 15 2015, ASG abducted two people from a resort in Sandakan, Malaysia.[494]
- May 2015, ASG abducted two Coast Guards and a barangay captain in Aliguay Island near Dapitan City, the two Coast Guards excape while the captain was found beheaded in Sulu.
- 21st September, ASG kidnapped two Canadians, a Norwegian and a Filipina near the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. The group remains imprisoned.[495]
- 9th November a Malaysian was kidnapped and then released after the ransom was paid.

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[491]Australian National Security, "Abu Sayyaf Group."

[492] CNN, "Ferry bomb terror suspect held in Manila," *CNN*, 30 August 2008, < http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/30/philippines.suspect/index.html?iref=new ssearch>

[493] Australian National Security, "Abu Sayyaf Group."

[494] Borneo Post Online, "Kidnapping incident in Sabah recurs," *Borneo Post Online*, 16 May 2015, <http://www.theborneopost.com/2015/05/16/kidnapping-incident-in-sabah-recurs/>

[495] CNN Philippines, "3 foreigners, Filipina kidnapped on Samal Island," *CNN Philippines*, 25 September 2015, < http://cnnphilippines.com/regional/2015/09/22/3-foreigners-Filipina-kidnapped-Samal-Davao-del-Norte.html>

- 17th November, a Malaysian hostage was beheaded as a result of a ransom not being paid.

According to the GTD ASG has undertaken 118 attacks since joining ISIS in July 2014 to the end of 2015. This has resulted in 81 fatalities and 204 injuries.

Tactics

ASG has used several tactics multiple times since it has joined ISIS (Figure 8.21). The group has predominantly employed the use of bombing.

Figure 8.21: ASG Tactics per Number of Attacks

Targets

ASG has undertaken attacks against a diverse number of targets (Figure 8.22).

Figure 8.22: Number of Attacks per Target

Activity in 2016

Throughout 2016 ASG had been particularly active. Specific acts by the group include:

- 26th March, ten Indonesian sailors were abducted by ASG in waters near Sulu. On 2th May the sailors were released.[496]
- 1 April four Malaysians were kidnapped near Ligitan Island and were released two months later.[497]
- 8th April, a 10 hour firefight between ASG and Philippine Army. 18 Soldiers were killed and another 52 were wounded. Five ASG fighters were killed.[498]
- 13th June, Robert Hall a Canadian hostage was executed.[499]
- 6th November a German tourist was shot dead on a yacht off Tanjong Luuk Pisuk in Sabah.[500]

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>High</u>. Regardless of ASG affiliation with Islamic State, the group has and will continue to be a threat to security in the Philippines and neighboring countries. The group is able to undertake small-scale conventional operations against government forces, with discrete armed units.[501]

Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Low</u>. The group, nor the southeast region to which it belongs, has yet to be declared an official Wilayat of ISIS – "Wilayah Al-Filibin" is yet to come to fruition.[502] ISIS in Syria and Iraq has been cautious in establishing a Wilayat and the gains by strengthening the connection between ASG and ISIS are more likely to be symbolic and for propaganda purposes than any material or geographical gain. For ASG, the weakening of the brand upon the impending collapse of the group in Syria and Iraq is unlikely to provide promotional or recruitment benefits nor financial gains. The group has limited direct communication with ISIS in Syria and Iraq and shares only a selected number of broad ideological interests.

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[496] T. Hume., and K. Quiano., "10 Indonesian hostages released by Islamist militant group, president says," *CNN*, 2 May 2016, < http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/01/asia/indonesia-philippines-abu-sayyaf-hostages/>

[497] Channel News Asia, "4 Malaysians released by Abu Sayyaf: Philippine military," Channel News Asia, 8 June 2016, < http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/4-malaysians-released-by/2854376.html>

[498] A. Macolor., "Philippine Army suffers huge combat loss in firefight with Abu Sayyaf," 10 April 2016, < http://kickerdaily.com/posts/2016/04/philippine-army-suffer-huge-combat-loss-firefight-with-abu-sayyaf/>

[499] J.S Alipala., "Abu Sayyaf kills another Canadian hostage as deadline lapses," *Inquirer.net*, 13 June 2016, < https://globalnation.inquirer.net/140096/140096

[500] "yacht off Sabah waters,' *New Straits Times Online*, 7 November 2016, < http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/11/186536/report-german-kidnapped-girlfriend-killed-abu-sayyaf-storm-yacht-sabah-waters>

[501] B. Singh., and Ramakrishna, K., "Islamic State's Wilayah Philippines: Implications for Southeast Asia," *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, 21 July 2016, < https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/41021/CO16187.pdf;sequence=1>

[502] Ibid.

Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>High</u>. As an independent group ASG is likely to continue for some time, despite new Philippine President Duterte's r ambition to get hard on crime. ASG has territorial control over parts of the southern Philippines. With intense counter terrorism campaign in Indonesia against East Indonesia Mujahideen, the group is becoming the beacon for regional jihadists.

8.11. Emerging Provinces and Affiliates

8.11.1. ISIS in Russia – Wilayat Caucasus

A spokesperson for Islamic State, Abu Monammed al-Adnani, proclaimed the province of the Caucaus on the 23rd of June 2015. The province of the Caucaus is lead by one of the former leaders of the Islamic Emirates of the Caucasus, Rustam Asilderov.[503] The members are from the Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and KBK (Kabarda, Balaria and Karachay) regions. The province is pitted in a power struggle with the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (ICE), an al-Qaeda affiliate active in Southwestern Russia. In 2015 the group carried out one act in Russia by undertaking an armed assault targeting tourists in Derbent on December 29th that killed one and wounded eleven.

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Low</u>. The group's capabilities have been limited to small armed assaults directed at foreigners.
Maintain Islamic State Affiliation (Representation): <u>Low</u>. With a weak brand and limited ground support, the group is likely to merge with other jihadist groups such as the ICE or its members defect.
Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Low</u>. The weakening of the ISIS brand upon the collapse of the group in Iraq and Syria is likely to reduce the group's attractiveness for recruits compared to the ICE. The group could rapidly become irrelevant with its members returning to their previous affiliation.

8.11.2. ISIS in Bangladesh

Despite Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stating that Islamic State does not exist in the country, acts perpetrated by small ISIS cells continue to be carried out on the organization's behalf.[504] In November 2015 ISIS said that it would push its operation into Bangladesh stating "The soldiers of the Khilafah will continue to rise and expand in Bengal and their actions will continue".[505] Subsequently *Dabiq* has been including operative successes in Bengal.[506] ISIS has little Jihadi competition in

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[503] C. Pellegrino, 2015.

[504] Channel News Asia, "New evidence shows deep Islamic State role in Bangladesh massacre," *Channel News Asia*, 1 December 2016, < http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/new-evidence-shows-deep-islamic-state-role-in-bangladesh-massacr/3332522.html>

[505] Asia Times, "Will ISIS Infect Bangladesh," *Asia Times*, December, 2015. <http://atimes.com/2015/12/will-isis-infect-bangladesh/>

[506] T.E. Ricks., "ISIS in Bangladesh: There's still time to stop it, but only if action is taken," *Foreign Policy*, 31 March 2016, < https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/31/isis-in-bangladesh-theres-still-time-to-stop-it-but-only-if-action-is-taken/>

Bangladesh, allowing fertile ground for it to control the majority of the narrative and garner supporters.

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Low</u>. Acts have been undertaken but only by small cells.
Future Prospects (Survivability): <u>Moderate</u>. ISIS ideology has been gaining traction, even if its operatives haven't. ISIS hasn't yet been able to get a foothold in Bangladesh and it would be prudent by security forces to prevent it from doing so.

8.11.3. ISIS in Indonesia

The opportunity for ISIS to tap into Indonesia's history of jihadism is self-evident. ISIS has undertaken aggressive propaganda efforts in the country and accumulated between 1,000 to 2,000 individual pledges of allegiance to the group (though this doesn't necessitate active support).[507] However, it has not translated into large numbers of Indonesians venturing to Syria and Iraq to fight for the caliphate. The Indonesia government in mid 2015 suggested that 700 Indonesians had left to join ISIS – this translates to 1 per million Muslim citizens.[508]

Despite this, the group has been able attract supporters domestically. There are several pro ISIS groups in Indonesia, which include: Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid, Majahidin Indonesia Timur, Jamaa Tauhid wal Jihad, Ring Baten, Gema Salam, Mujahidin Indonesia Barat and FAKSI.[509] ISIS has successfully inspired cell groups to undertake attacks, such as the bombings in Jakarta on January 14th 2016 that killed two and wounded 24 more.[510]

Assessment

Threat assessment: <u>Low</u>. ISIS cells in Indonesia have limited capabilities, with the ability to undertake infrequent terrorist attacks. Furthermore the support for the group is confined to pockets of the Islamic community and is unlikely to expand dramatically.[511] This situation is likely to change only if Indonesia's jihadists fighting in the Middle East return with their skills and ideology to assist in the group's activities domestically.

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[507] Management Systems International, "Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State," *Management Systems International*, 2016, <
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/54664942/indonesian-and-malaysian-support-for-the-islamic-state-final-report/33>
[508] Soufan Group, "Foreign Fighters," Soufan Group, December, 2015, <
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate1.pdf>
[509] Management Systems International, 2016.
[510] G. Botelho., K. Quiano., and I. Watson., "ISIS militant ordered Jakarta attack from abroad, police chief says," *CNN*, 15 January 2016, < http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/14/asia/jakarta-gunfire-explosions/index.html>
[511] Management Systems International, 2016.

Future Prospects: <u>Low</u>. ISIS is unlikely to gain wide spread support in Indonesia. The group has had little appeal to the population at large, except to a limited number of peripheral jihadists. As stated by Sidney Jones "Indonesia is a country that doesn't have a repressive government, is not under occupation, its politically stable, so there's no social unrest or conflict, and the Muslims aren't a persecuted minority".[512] Indonesia's freedom of expression allows radical communities to openly advocate their grievances and ambitions for the state rather than resorting to terrorism to purse them. Indonesia also has public institutions directly challenging ISIS's ideology, such as the 50 million member strong Nahdlatul Ulama. Indonesia's jihadist communities have also criticized and distanced themselves from the group.[513] Despite this, ISIS has effectively divided the jihadist community in Indonesia, as well as more broadly in Southeast Asia. A thorough understanding of the jihadist dynamic in Southeast Asia is necessary to combat the evolving paradigm shift.

8.11.4. ISIS in Lebanon

On June 25th 2014, Saudi Arabian nation Ali bin Ibrahim bin Ali alThuwaini undertook a suicide attack detonating a bomb in the Duroy Hotel in the Rauche neighborhood in Beirut. The event was ordered by ISIS in Iraq and Syria, who have been targeting Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Lebanon since. The group has been attempting to spread to the Syrian conflict into the Lebanon and undermine the legitimacy and capabilities of both the Lebanese government's security forces and Hezbollah. Additional the group aims to enhance the sectarian divide between Shiites and Sunni's in the country.

ISIS has not declared Lebanon a Wilayat. However in 2014 ISIS in Syria and Iraq assigned an emir to the country, Abdel Alam al-Ordoni, a Palestinian who spent several years in Lebanese refugee camps and is believed to have orchestrated the attack on Duroy hotel.[514] Ordoni's fate is unknown, but the group has been recently lead by Ahmad Youssef Amoun who was captured by Lebanese security force in late November 2016.

The group has undertaken a series of attacks against government forces including an attack on a Lebanese Armed Force outpost on January 23rd 2015.[515] The group has also made attacks on civilians, particularly Shiites. This includes the double suicide

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[512] E. Delman., "ISIS in the World's Largest Muslim Country," *The Atlantic*, 3 January 2016, < https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/isis-indonesia-foreign-fighters/422403/>

[513] IPAC, "The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia," *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 24 September 2014, < http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf>

[514] Dettmer, J., "New ISIL Emir Could be Troublesome for Lebanon," *VOA*, 2 July 2014, < http://www.voanews.com/a/new-isil-emir-could-be-troublefor-lebanon/1949658.html>

[515] Yourish, K., Watkins, D., Giratikanon, T., Lee. J.C., "How Many People Have Been Killed in ISIS Attacks Around the World," *The New York Times*, 16 July 2016, < http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html>

bombing in a Shiite residential shopping area that killed 43 people and wounding 200 more on Nov 12 2015[516] and an attack in Beirut in 2016 that killed 40.[517]

The group also has support from jihadist groups in Lebanon. This includes The Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade, a small Lebanese anti-Hezbollah group who has undertaken suicide bombing and assassination against the group, and the Abdullah Azzham Brigades – Ziad al Jarrah battalion.

Assessment

Threat Assessment: <u>Moderate</u>. Currently the group is able to undertake infrequent but spectacular acts. The group's emir, Ahmad Youssef Amoun, was arrested in late November 2016 near the town of Arsal in Al Arnab Valley. This will undoubtedly disrupt the group's activities in the short term.[518] However, the designation of an emir for the country, despite not having an established Wilayat, suggests that ISIS in Syria and Iraq does not consider that a large infrastructure is needed in order to conducting operations and administration in the country because it is able to coordinate them directly from Syria and Iraq.

Future Prospects: <u>High</u>. Lebanon has weak security, inefficiencies and disorganization of state institutions, increasing economic impoverishment, political marginalization of the Sunnis, absence of a cohesive national identity, presence of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees and the formation of alliances among formerly rival terrorists groups are all encouraging factors for ISIS to embed itself and instigate an insurgency in the country. [519]

The Sunni-populated town of Arsal, situated along the Lebanon-Syria border, is a potential location for ISIS to attempt to capture territory. ISIS attempted to take over the town in 2014 but was thwarted by the Lebanese Armed Forces, who have been struggling with adequate capabilities and relying on Hezbollah for support. [520] There is an opportunity for ISIS to exploit and recruit some of the 120,000 economically and socially disenfranchised Syrian refugees who live alongside the town's 30,000 locals.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/world/middleeast/lebanon-explosions-southern-beirut-hezbollah.html>

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8.12. Metric Assessment Results of ISIS Wilayats and Emerging Affiliates

In order to address aspects of bias and incorporate another element of analysis, a metric assessment of ISIS provinces and affiliates has been undertaken. The input of the metric can be found in Appendix B and the methodology for the assessment in Section 3. The results of the metric are detailed in Figure 8.1.

Provinces/Affiliate	Bonds Calculation	Interests Calculation	Future Factors Calculation
Libya	0.726584707	0.793650794	1.5
Algeria	0.214571429	0.381904762	1.17
Caucasus	0.241314286	0.229417989	1.17
Egypt	0.611542857	0.177195767	1.5
Afghanistan	0.707771429	0.43047619	1.83
Nigeria	0.211142857	-0.511587302	2.5
Tunisia	0.487714286	0.452698413	1.84
Yemen	0.567028571	0.461587302	1.83
Saudi Arabia	0.507142857	0.65010582	1.34
Philippines	0.194171429	-0.04005291	2.17
Bangladesh	0.058285714	0.348835979	2.34
Indonesia	0.194171429	0.007566138	2.17
Lebanon	0.2552	0.53968254	2.5
Average	0.382818604	0.301652422	1.835384615

Table 8.1: Metric Assessment of ISIS Wilayat's and Emerging Affiliates

8.13. Conclusion

The results of the Metric assessment indicate that there is significant diversity in the bonds, interests, and persistence of the provinces and affiliates. A comparison and exploration of the metric assessment and the threat, maintenance of affiliation, and future prospects assessment are be found in chapter 5.

9. Appendix B

Please See Attached Excel Spread Sheets for Affiliate Metric Data and GTD DATA Analysis for Affiliate Incidents, Targets and Tactics.

Affiliate Metric Analysis Data

Assessed Affiliate	Bayat Pledged by affiliate (Yes = 1, No = 2)	Bayat confirmed by IS Central (Wilayat Created Yes =1, No = 2)	Physical Distance Travel Between Affiliate and Raqqa (Difficult & Far = 0, Feasible & Challenging = 0.33, Possible & Easier = .66, Proximate & Routine = 1)	Routine Electronic Communication	Volume Of Foreign Fighters From The Region	Operatives From Iraq & Syria Traveling To Affiliate (Evidence =1, No Evidence = 0)	Level of Coordination In Social Media (High =1, Moderate = .66, Sporadic = .33)	Duplication Of IS Administrative Documents By Affiliate	$ Transfer from IS Central to Affiliate (Evidence =1, No Evidence =0)
Weights-->	0.028571429	0.114285714	0.057142857	0.01	0.17142857	0.228571429	0.114285714	0.142857143	0.2
Libya	1	1	0.66	1	0.2934079	1	1	1	0
Algeria	1	1	0.33	1	0.03	0	0.33	0	0
Caucasus	1	1	0.66	1	0.076	0	0.33	0	0
Egypt	1	1	0.66	1	0.039	1	1	0.5	0
Afghanistan	1	1	0.66	1	0.077	1	0.66	0	1
Nigeria	1	1	0.33	1	0.01	0	0.33	0	0
Tunisia	1	1	0.33	1	0.29	1	0.33	0	0
Yemen	1	1	0.66	1	0.006	1	0.66	0.5	0
Saudi Arabia	1	1	1	1	0.18	1	0.33	0	0
Phillippines	1	1	0	1	0.021	0	0.33	0	0
Bangladesh	0	0	0.33	0	0.01	0	0.33	0	0
Indonesia	0	1	0	1	0.021	0	0.33	0	0
Lebanon	1	1	1	0	0.102	0	0.33	0	0

IS Central Interests

Assessed Affiliate	Expanded pool of Potential Recruits (Excellent Source =1, Moderate Source = .66, Light Source = .33, No Source = 0)	Create Potential Future Safe Havens (Good Option =1, Moderate Potential = .5, Little Potential = 0)	Demonstrate Reach vis-à-vis al Qaeda (Challenges AQ Affiliate = 1, Shows Growth AQ Absent = .5, Neither = 0)	Opportunity For Success With Low Investment, Low Blowback (High Chance Success, Good ROI =1, Moderate Chance/investment = .5, All investment, little chance = 0)	Potential $ Support Over The Horizon, Either from State Ops, Black Market or Donations (Estimates Scale - Best Potential =1, No Potential = 0)	Increased Media Content & Distribution (Volume High =1, Medium =.66, Low = .33)	Does the location rally global supporters? (Yes =1, No =0)	Access To Specialized Skills, Recruits, Equipment & Targets (Yes = 1, No =0)
Weights-->	0.074074074	0.111111111	0.259259259	0.222222222	0.111111111	0.037037037	0.185185185	0.095238095
Libya	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	1	1	1
Algeria	0.33	0.25	1	0.5	0	0.33	1	1
Caucasus	0.66	0	1	0.5	0	0.66	0	1
Egypt	0.66	0.5	1	0.5	0.25	1	1	1
Afghanistan	0.66	1	1	0.5	0	0.66	1	1
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0.33	0	0
Tunisia	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.25	0.33	1	1
Yemen	0.33	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.66	1	1
Saudi Arabia	1	0.25	1	0.5	1	0.66	1	1
Phillippines	0.33	0	0.5	1	0	0.33	0	0
Bangladesh	0.33	0.5	0.5	1	0	0.33	0	0
Indonesia	0.33	0	0.5	1	0	0.33	0	1
Lebanon	1	1	0.5	1	0.5	0	1	1

IS Affiliate Interests

Assessed Affiliate	Opportunity For Aggressive Middle Managers Break Away Start Their Own Group - AQ defections (Evidence Yes = 1, No Evidence =0)	Incentivize Local Manpower To Join Group At Home (Affiliate afraid losing fighters =1, Slightly concerned = .5, no concern = 0)	Reinvigorate Local Group On The Wane (If True = 1, If not true = 0)	Improve Affiliate Propaganda Distribution (Group Enjoy Greater promotion =1, Not really concerned about promotion =0)	Increase Foreign Fighter Recruitment To Local Enviornment (FF Might Come in #'s =1, Trickle FF's Come = .5, No FF Show =0)	Receive $ & Resources From Global Hub	IS Central Potential Savior Upon Groups Demise i.e Would IS Central feel compelled to come to group's aid? (Yes = 1, No = 0)
Weights-->	0.095238095	-0.238095238	-0.142857143	0.047619048	-0.285714286	-0.19047619	0.047619048
Libya	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Algeria	1	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	1	1
Caucasus	0	0	0.5	1	0.5	1	1
Egypt	0	0.5	1	1	1	1	1
Afghanistan	1	0.5	0	1	1	1	1
Nigeria	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Yemen	1	0.5	0	1	1	1	1
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Phillippines	0	1	1	1	0	0.5	0
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0
Indonesia	0	1	1	0	0	0.5	0
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	1

Factors for Future Growth / X-Y Chart Calculations

Assessed Affiliate	Ability to Self Finance (Generate Revenue) (High - 3, Moderate - 2, Low - 1)	Counterterrorism Pressure (Light - 3, Moderate - 2, Intense - 1)	Local Competition Other Jihadi Groups (Low - 3, Moderate - 2, High - 1)	Bonds Calculation	Interests Calculation	Future Factors Calculation
Weights-->	0.33	0.5	0.17			
Libya	1	2	1	0.726584707	0.793650794	1.5
Algeria	1	1	2	0.214571429	0.381904762	1.17
Caucasus	1	1	2	0.241314286	0.229417989	1.17
Egypt	2	1	2	0.611542857	0.177195767	1.5
Afghanistan	2	2	1	0.707771429	0.43047619	1.83
Nigeria	3	2	3	0.211142857	-0.511587302	2.5
Tunisia	1	2	3	0.487714286	0.452698413	1.84
Yemen	2	2	1	0.567028571	0.461587302	1.83
Saudi Arabia	1	1	3	0.507142857	0.65010582	1.34
Phillippines	2	2	3	0.194171429	-0.04005291	2.17
Bangladesh	1	3	3	0.058285714	0.348835979	2.34
Indonesia	2	2	3	0.194171429	0.007566138	2.17
Lebanon	2	3	2	0.2552	0.53968254	2.5
			Average	0.382818604	0.301652422	1.835384615

Quartiles for Outllok		
Strong Negatvie	1.46
Slight Negative	1.92
Slight Positive	2.3325
Strong Positive	2.5

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GTD Data Analysis of Affiliates

Abu Sayyaf Group

Number of Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
1994	6
1995	6
1996	8
1997	2
1998	7
1999	12
2000	16
2001	11
2002	17
2003	3
2004	6
2005	9
2006	4
2007	4
2008	21
2009	19
2010	20
2011	16
2012	18
2013	24
2014	47
2015	73

Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
1994	37	60
1995	117	1
1996	2	26
1997	2	0
1998	4	28
1999	11	107
2000	19	76
2001	44	93
2002	42	272
2003	1	7
2004	124	3
2005	10	119
2006	14	28
2007	10	12
2008	3	32
2009	19	58
2010	31	66
2011	13	33
2012	17	98
2013	12	11
2014	27	35
2015	25	149

Deadliest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, Location, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
April 4, 1995 in Ipil, Philippines	114	1
January 2, 1999 in Jolo, Philippines	10	74
October 17, 2002 in Zamboanga City, Philippines	3	75
February 14, 2005 in Makati City, Philippines	3	60
April 21, 2002 in General Santos, Philippines	14	45
October 28, 2001 in Zamboanga City, Philippines	11	48
June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Philippines	16	41
January 23, 2015 in Zamboanga City, Philippines	2	52
May 25, 2000 in Jolo, Philippines	4	39
September 7, 2012 in Basilan, Philippines	1	36

Comparing Abu Sayyaf Group Activity to other Groups

Abu Sayyaf Group Attacks vs Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Abu Sayyaf Group	349
Avg. of Major Groups Founded in Philippines	497
Ave. of All Major Groups	37

Abu Sayaff Group Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Abu Sayyaf Group	1898
Avg. of Major Groups Founded in Philippines	1853
Ave. of All Major Groups	217

Abu Sayyaf Group Attacks Per Country

Country	Number of Attacks
Philippines	340
Malaysia	9

Abu Sayyaf Group Casualties per Country

Country	Total Casualties
Philippines	1892
Malaysia	6

Attacks per Country Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks Philippines	Number of Attacks Malaysia
1994	6	
1995	6	
1996	8	
1997	2	
1998	7	
1999	12	
2000	15	1
2001	11	
2002	17	
2003	3	
2004	6	
2005	9	
2006	4	
2007	4	
2008	21	
2009	19	
2010	20	
2011	16	
2012	17	1
2013	23	1
2014	42	5
2015	72	1

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Abu Sayyaf Group to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Abu Sayyaf Group	2
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups Founded in Philippines	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups	1

ASG Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Private Citizens and Maritime (Includes Ports and Maritime Facilities)	Business	Transportation (other than aviation)	Government (General)	Military	Police	Religious Figures/Institutions	Education Institution	NGO
1994	90			2					
1995	117						5		
1996	5								
1997									
1998		20					3		
1999	25		11		4	7			
2000	89	5			4	9	5		
2001	51	5			9	19	9		
2002	11	116	22	5	6				
2003	192	87			4				
2004	3	3							
2005	1	80	14			2			
2006	3	116		22					
2007	42	30							
2008	3	32		6		13	13		
2009	12	44		29			11		
2010	55	20	6	2		14		8	
2011		93							
2012									
2013		2		4		3	5	5	2
2014	35	2		3	9	14	14		
2015	6	67	33	17	19	11	5	5	2

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Target	Total Casualties Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Private Citizens and Property	276	475
Business	86	499
Maritime (Includes Ports and Maritime Facilities)	117	41
Government (General)	30	70
Transportation (other than aviation)	6	80
Police	22	53
Military	26	45
Religious Figures/Institutions	11	43
Education Institution	6	8
NGO	3	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time*

Year	Private Citizens and Business	Police	
2002	6		
2006	3		
2010	7		
2012		4	2
2014	1		

Total Attacks by Victim Type *

	Number of Attacks
Private Citizens and Property	89
Business	79
Government (General)	42
Police	22
Military	21
Educational Institution	20
Religious Figures/Institutions	19
Transportation (other than aviation)	14
Tourists	8
Journalists and Media	7

ASG Tactics

Casualites by Attack Type Each Year

Year	Bombing/Explosion	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	Armed Assault	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	Assassination
1994	74			23	
1995		115		3	
1996	23		5		
1997				1	1
1998	27		5		
1999	118				
2000	76		6	8	5
2001	59	57	13	8	
2002	284		23	6	1
2003	4		4		
2004	120		1	6	
2005	97		30		2
2006	33		9		
2007	15			7	
2008	32			3	
2009	62		13	2	
2010	44		46	6	1
2011	32		14		
2012	28		86	1	
2013	19		3	1	
2014	6		49	4	3
2015	133		16	7	18

Total Casualties by Attack

Attack Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	250	1036
Armed Assault	121	202
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	130	42
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	71	15
Assassination	12	19
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	0	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time*

Year	Private Citizens and Business	Government (G
1994	4	
2002	6	1
2009	3	
2010	7	
2011	2	

Total Attacks by Tactic

Bombing/Explosion	156
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	129
Armed Assult	45
Assassination	12
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	4
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	2

Overview

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	11

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	33	18

Deadliest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, Location, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
December 6, 2015 in Aden, Yemen	7	3
October 6, 2015 in Aden, Yemen	6	4

Comparing Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Attacks vs. other Groups

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State	11
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	5
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State	51
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	25
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operations

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Attacks per Country

Country	Number of Attacks
Yemen	11

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Casualties per Country

Country	Number of Casualties
Yemen	51

Comparing Number of Countries Attaked by Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State to Other Groups

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Government (C	Military
2015		

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Government (General)	13	7
Military	13	8
Police	1	0
Education Institution	0	0
Religious Figures/Institutions	0	0
Terrorists/Non-state	6	2
Violent Political party	0	1

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Government (g	Military
2015		

	Number of Attacks
Government (General)	2
Military	3
Education Institution	1
Police	1
Religious Figures/Institutions	1
Terrorists/Non-state Militia	2
Violent Political party	1

Adan-Abyan Province of Islamic State Tactics

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year

Year	Bombing/Explosion	Assassination	Armed Assault	Hostage Taking (Kidnappi
2015	38	10	2	1

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
	7	3
	23	15
	2	0
	1	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Government (Gener	Military
2015		

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Assassination	1
Bombing/Explosion	6
Armed Assault	3
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	1

Overview

Pledged	
Group Began	2015
Group Finished	present
Groups Attacks	3
Total Killed	2
Total Wounded	4
Country of Origin	Algeria
Active In	Algeria

Algeria Province of the Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	2

Algeria Province of the Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	2	6

Comparing Algeria Province of the Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Algeria Province of the Islamic State Attacs vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Algeria Province of the Islamic State	3
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Algeria	4
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Algeria Province of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Algeria Province of the Islamic State	8
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Algeria	16
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Algeria Province of the Islamic State Attacks per Country

Algeria	3

Algeria Province of the Islamic State Cascualties per Country

Algeria	8

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Algeria Province Of The Islamic State to Other Groups

Algeria Province of the Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Algeria	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties
2015	8

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Police	2	2
Military	0	4

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	3

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Police	2
Military	1

Tactics

Casualties by Attacks Type Each Year

Year	Total Casualties
2015	8

Total Casualties by Attack Type

Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Armed Assault	2	2
Bombing/Explosion	0	4

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	3

Total Attacks by Tactic

Type	Number of Attacks
Armed Assault	2
Bombing/Explosion	1

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Overview

Summary
Alternative names | Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State
Groups Attacks | 1
Total Killed | 6
Total Wounded | 9
Country of Origin | Saudi Arabia
Active In | Saudia Arabia

Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number Attacks
2015	1

Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	6	9

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, Location, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
October 16, 2015 in Dammam, Saudi Arabia	6	9

Comparing Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	3
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State	15
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	149
Avg, of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Attacks
Saudia Arabia	1

Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Casualties
Saudia Arabia	15

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Bahrain Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties
2015	15

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Religious Figures/Institutions	6	9

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	1

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Relgious Figures/Institutions	1

Tactics

Casualties by Attacks Type Each Year

Year	Total Casualties
2015	15

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Armed Assault	6	9

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

year	Number of Attacks
2015	1

Total Attacks by Tactic

Tactic	Number of Attacks
Armed Assault	1

Overview

Alternative names	Barqa Province Of The Islamic State
Summary	
Group Attacks	59
Total Killed	151
Total Wounded	233
Country of Origin	Libya
Active In	Libya

Barqa Province Of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2014	4
2015	55

Barqa Province Of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2014	5	31
2015	146	202

Deadliest Attacks to Date

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
February 20, 2015 in Al-Qubbah, Libya	17	22
February 20, 2015 in Al-Qubbah, Libya	16	21
June 12, 2015 in Derna, Libya	7	30
August 29, 2015 in Derna, Libya	5	25
February 6, 2015 in Benghazi, Libya	4	20
March 24, 2015 in Benghazi, Libya	8	11
May 14, 2015 in Benghazi, Libya	10	8
May 29, 2015 in Benghazi, Libya	8	8
June 13, 2015 in Derna, Libya	4	5
October 19, 2015 in Benghazi, Libya	4	4

Comparing Barqa Province Of The ISIS Activity to Other Groups

Barqa Province Of The ISIS Attacks vs Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Barqa Province Of The Islamic State	59
Avg. of Major Groups Founded in Libya	79
Avg. of All Major Groups	37

Barqa Province Of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Barqa Province Of The Islamic State	384
Avg. of Major Groups Founded in Libya	308
Avg. of All Major Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Barqa Province Of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

Libya	59

Barqa Province Of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

Libya	384

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Barqa Province Of The Islamic State to Other Groups

Barqa Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups Founded in Libya	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups	1

Targets

	Private Citizens and	Military	Government	Police	Business	Terrorists/No	Religious Figures/Institu
2014	24		12				
2015	159	48	45	42	39	2	2

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Private Citizens and Property	67	119
Government (General)	22	36
Military	18	31
Police	20	22
Business	17	22
Religious Figures/Institutions	3	1
Terrorists/Non-State Militias	1	2
Airports and Aircraft	0	0
Utilities	0	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

year	Private Citizens and	Military	Government	Terrorists/Non-State Militias
2015	12	4	2	1

Total Attacks by Victim Type

	*do as %
Private Citizens and Property	32
Military	6
Government (General)	4
Religious Figures/Institutions	3
Business	3
Police	3
Terroirsts/Non-State Militias	2
Utilities	1
Airports and Aircraft	1

Tactics

Casualities by Attack Type Each Year

	Bombing/Explosion	Armed Assault	Assassinatio	Hostage Taki	Unknown	Facility/Infrastructure Attack
2014	33			3		
2015	253	43	39	7	6	

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	105	181
Armed Assault	13	30
Assassination	18	21
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	9	1
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	0	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

	Private Citizens and	Military	Government	Terrorists/Non-State Militias
2015	12	4	2	1

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks	* Do as %
Bombing/Explosion	37	
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	9	
Armed Assault	8	
Assassination	2	
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	1	

Boko Haram

Overview

Summary

Group Attacks	1700
Total Killed	15551
Total Wounded	6854
Country of Origin	Nigeria
Active In	Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad

Boko Haram Attacks Over Time

	Number of Attacks
2009	10
2010	17
2011	122
2012	389
2013	217
2014	454
2015	491

Boko Haram Casualties Over Time

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2009	304	0
2010	72	130
2011	321	449
2012	1153	791
2013	1579	365
2014	6644	1743
2015	5478	3376

Deadliest Attacks to Date

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
November 28, 2014 in Kano, Nigeria	122	270
April 25, 2015 in Karamga, Niger	230	9
April 14, 2014 in Abuja, Nigeria	71	124
November 25, 2014 in Maiduguri, Nigeria	65	98
November 3, 2014 in Potiskum, Nigeria	31	119
September 4, 2015 in Kirawa, Nigeria	48	101
November 10, 2014 in Potiskum, Nigeria	48	79
July 1, 2014 in Maiduguri, Nigeria	56	69
October 23, 2015 in Yola, Nigeria	28	96
July 3, 2015 in Zabarmari, Nigeria	13	101

Comparing Boko Haram Activity to Other Groups

Boko Haram Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Boko Haram	1700
Avg. of Major Groups Founded in Nigeria	680
Avg. of All Major Groups	37

Boko Haram Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Boko Haram	22405
Avg. of Major Groups Founded in Nigeria	8385
Avg. of All Major Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Boko Haram Attacks Per Country

	Number of Attacks
Burkina Faso	1
Niger	32
Chad	23
Nigeria	1533
Cameroon	111

	Total Casualties
Burkina Faso	2
Niger	748
Chad	622
Nigeria	19549
Cameroon	1484

Attacks per Country Over Time

	Number of Attacks				
Year	Nigeria	Cameroon	Niger	Chad	Burkina Faso
2009	10				
2010	17				
2011	122				
2012	389				
2013	215	2			
2014	407	46		1	
2015	373	63	32	22	1

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Boko Haram to Other Groups

Boko Haram	5
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups Founded in Nigeria	3
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Private Citizens and Property	Religious Figures/Institutions	Military	Police	Transportation	Business	Educational Institution	Government	Other	Government	Terrorists/Non-State Militias	Journalists and Media	Violent Political Parties	Telecommunication	NGO
2009	155	76		153		3	75	5							
2010	189	32	11	115		83	12	11							
2011	399	206	108	527		80	60	131	2						
2012	697	507	115	343	133	208	157	72		105					
2013		120	614	107	418	267	224	153			64	42	2		2
2014	5974	598	623	265	396	411	7	155	114		5		15	4	3
2015	6018	762									53				

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Private Citizens and Property	10114	3358
Religious Figures/Institutions	1111	1211
Police	1049	501
Military	1249	228
Business	571	493
Transportation (other than aviation)	383	566
Government (General)	469	95
Educational Institution	347	192
Terrorists/Non-State Militias	89	34
Other	66	50

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Private Citizens and Property	Police	Religious Figures/Institutions	Military	Government (G	Business	Transportation	Educational I	Journalists and Media
2010	4								
2011	21	15		3					
2012	43	62				22	19	7	2
2013	48	38		8	5		16	9	
2014	227	13		11	14	10			
2015	285		24	23		12		18	1

Total Attacks by Victim Type

	Number of Attacks
Private Citizens and Property	800
Police	235
Religious Figures/Institutions	144
Government (General)	134
Business	94
Educational Institution	76
Military	70
Transportation (other than aviation)	39
Telecommunication	34
Terrorists/Non-State Militias	10

Tactics

Casualities by Attack Type Each Year

Year	Bombing/Explosion	Armed Assault	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	Unknown	Hostage Taking	Assassination	Facility/Infrastr	Hijacking
2009				304				
2010	149	47		1		5		2
2011	619	146				3	2	
2012	1105	738	15	6	1	40	39	
2013	196	1566	105	44		29	4	
2014	2862	4516	561	270	59	80	39	
2015	4771	3128	469	301	92	70	11	12

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Armed Assault	9028	1113
Bombing/Explosion	4266	5436
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	980	170
Assassination	149	78
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	135	17
Facility/Infrastrcture Attack	91	4
Hijacking	12	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Private Citizens and Property	Police	Religious Figures/Institutions	Military	Government (G	Business	Transportation	Educational I	Terrorists/N	Violent Politi
2010					2					
2011	21	15			3	4				
2012	43	62			22	19		7		
2013	48	38		8		16		9	5	
2014	227	13		11	14	10				
2015	285	12	24	23			18			1

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Armed Assault	805
Bombing/Explosion	517
Facility/Infastructure Attack	122
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	117
Assassination	50
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	9
Hijacking	3

Overview

Statistics

Groups Attacks	1
Total Killed	1
Total Wounded	11
Country of Origin	Russia
Active In	Russia

Causcasus Province Of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	1

Causcasus Province Of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	1	11

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
December 29, 2015 in Derbent, Russia	1	11

Comparing Caucasus Province Of The Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Causcasus Province Of The Islamic State Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Causcasus Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Russia	2
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Causcasus Province Of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Causcasus Province Of The Islamic State	12
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Russia	25
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Caucasus Province Of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Russia	1

Caucasus Province Of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Russia	12

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Caucasus Province Of The Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Caucasus Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Russia	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties Tourists
2015	12

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Victim Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Tourists	1	11

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Year	Number of attacks
2015	1

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Tourists	1

Tactics

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year

Year	total Casualties Armed Assualt
2015	12

Total Casualties by Attack type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Armed Assault	1	11

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

	Number of attacks
Tourists	1

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Armed Assault	1

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Overview

Alternative names	Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State
Summary	

Group Attacks

Total Killed	3
Total Wounded	25
Country of Origin	3
Active In	Libya
	Libya

Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number Attacks
2015	3

Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	25	3

Dealiest Attacks to Date

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
January 2, 2015 in Sokna, Libya	14	1
March 6, 2015 in Al-Ghani, Libya	11	2

Comparing Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Fezzan Province Of The Isamic State Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Fezzan Province of The Islamic State	3
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Libya	2
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State	28
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Libya	8
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Libya	3

Fezzan Province Of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Libya	28

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Fezzan Province Of the Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Fezzan Province Of the Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Libya	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

	Number of Casualties		
Year	Military	Business	Private Citizens and Prope
2015	15	13	0

Total Casualties by Victim type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Military	14	1
Business	11	2
Private Citizens and Property	0	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

	Number of Attacks	
Year	Business	
2015		

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Military	1
Business	1
Private Citizens and Property	1

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Tactics

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year

Year	Hostage Taking	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
2015	15	13

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	14	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	11	2

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

year
2015

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	2
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	1

Overview

Alternative name	Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State
Group Attacks	7
Total Killed	40
Total Wounded	30
Country Of Origin	Yemen
Active In	Yemen

Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	7

Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Vicitms Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	40	30

Deadliest Attacks to Date

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
November 20, 2015 is Wadi Sir, Yemen	11	10
November 20, 2015 in Al-Qarah, Yemen	11	10
November 20, 2015 in Shibam district, Yemen	10	10

Comparing Hadrawmawt Province Of The Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State	7
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	5
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State	70
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	25
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Yemen	7

Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Yemen	70

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Hadramawt Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Military	Private Citizens and Property
2015		

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Military	38	30
Private Citizens and property	2	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Military	Private Citizens and Property
2015		

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Military	6
Private Citizens and Property	1

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year

Year	Bombing/Explosion	Unknown	Armed Assau	Hostage Taking (Kidnappin
2015	21	22	25	2

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	11	10
Armed Assault	15	10
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	2	0
Unknown	12	10

year	Military	Private Citizens and Prope
2015		

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Numbers of Attacks
Bombing/Explosion	1
Armed Assault	3
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	1
Unknown	2

Overview

Alternative names	Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State
Groups Attacks	2
Total killed	18
Total Wounded	21
Country of Origin	Saudi Arabia
Active In	Saudi Arabia

Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	2

Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	18	21

Deadliest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, Place, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
August 6, 2015 in Abha, Saudi Arabia	16	9
October 26, 2015 in Najran, Saudi Arabia	2	12

Comparing Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State	2
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	3
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Hijaz Province Province Of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State	39
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	149
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Area of Operation

Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Saudi Arabia	2

Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Saudi Arabia	39

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Hijaz Province Of The Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties
2015	39

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Religious Figures/Institutions	18	21

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Relgious Figures/Institutions
2015	2

158

Total Attacks by Victim Type	
	Number of Attacks
Religious Figures/Institutions	2

Tactics

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year	
Year	Bombing Explosion
2015	39

Total Casualties by Attack Type		
	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	18	21

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time	
Year	Religious Figures/Institutions
2015	2

Total Attakcs by Tactic	
	Number of Attacks
Bombing/Explosion	2

159

Overview

Group Attacks	12
Total Killed	8
Total Wounded	124
Country of Origin	Bangladesh
Active In	Bangladesh

IS in Bangladesh Attacks Over Time

	Number of Attacks
2015	12

IS in Bangladesh Casualties Over Time

	Total Casualties	
Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	8	124

Deadliest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, Location, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
October 24, 2015 in Dhaka, Bangladesh	2	101
November 26, 2015 in Haripur, Bangladesh	1	3
November 4, 2015 in Ashulia, Bangladesh	1	1

Comparing Islamic State In Bangladesh Activity to Other Groups

Islamic State In Bangladesh Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Islamic State in Bangladesh	12
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Bangladesh	12
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Islamic State in Bangladesh Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims]
Islamic State in Bangladesh	132
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Bangladesh	106
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Do Infographic geospatial - Casualties in Each City Attacked by Islamic State in Bangladesh

Islamic State In Bangladesh Attacks per Country

	Number of attacks
Bangladesh	12

Islamic State In Bangladesh Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Bangladesh	132

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Islamic State In Bangladesh to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Islamic State In Bangladesh	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Bangladesh	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Private Citizens and I	Religious Figures/Ir	Police	NGO
2015	104	25	2	1

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Private Citizens and Property	3	101
Religious Figures/Institutions	3	22
Police	1	1
NGO	1	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Religious Figures/Ins	Private Citizens and Property
2015		

Total Attacks by Victim Type

	Number of Attacks	
Religious Figures/Institutions	8	
Private Citizens and Property	2	
Police	1	* %
NGO	1	

160

Tactics

year	Bombing/Explosion	Armed Assault	Assassination
2015	120	11	1

Total Casualties by Attack Type

	Victims killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	3	120
Armed Assault	5	6
Assassination	0	1

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Religious Figures/Ins	Private Citizens and Property
2015		

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Armed Assault	7
Bombing/Explosion	4
Assassination	1

161

Wilayat al- Khorasan

Alternative names	Khorasan Province Of The Islamic State
Group Started	2014
Group Ended	Present
Allegence to IS	
Active in 2016	Yes
Group Attacks	86
Total Killed	390
Total Wounded	302
Country of Origin	Pakistan
Active In	Pakistand, Afghanistan

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2014	2
2015	84

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2014	2	0
2015	388	302

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
April 10th, 2015 in Dara-e-Khistak	42	25
May 13th, 2015 Karachi, Pakistan	45	13
April 18th, 2015 Jalalabad, Afghanistan	34	100
September 29th, 2015 Achin (other event on the same day in Kushtal), Afghanistan	26	10
September 26th, 2015 Shadal (and Abdul Khel), Afghanistan	26	9

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	86
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Afghanistan	?
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	692
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Afghanistan	?
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Afghanistan	63
Pakistan	23

Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Afghanistan	573
Pakistan	119

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by al-Khorasan to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur	2
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Indonesia	?
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Number of Casualties

Year	Police	Private Citizens	Educational	Military	Religious Figures/Transportation	Unknown	Business	Government (General)	Government (Diplomatic)	Journalists	NGO	Terrorists/Non-state Militi
2014	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2015	60	112	1	302	17	15	15	134	17	3	4	4

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Victim Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Police	27	34
Private Citizens and Property	92	20
Educational Institution	1	1
Military	201	101
Religious Figures/Institutions	5	12
Transportation	13	2
Unknown	11	4
Business	34	100
Government (General)	2	15
Government (Diplomatic)	0	3
Journalists and Media	0	4
NGO	2	2
Terrorists/Non-state Militia	1	2

Total Casualties by Attack type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Armed Assualt	15	6
Bombing/Explosion	1	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	2	0
Unknown	1	0
Assassination	1	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

		Number of attacks			
	Armed Assault	Bombing/Explos	Hostage Tak	Unknown	Assassination
2012	2	0	0	0	0
2013	2	1	0	0	1
2014	3	0	1	0	0
2015	5	0	1	1	0

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Armed Assualt	12
Bombing/Explosion	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	2
Unknown	1
Assassination	1

Wilayat Lahij

Overview

Alternative name	Lahij Province of the Islamic State
Pledged	
Group Began	2015
Group Finished	
Groups Attacks	2
Total Killed	20
Total Wounded	40
Country of Origin	Yemen
Active In	Yemen

Lahij Province of the Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	2

Lahij Province of the Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	20	40

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
20th of march, 2015 in Lahij, Yemen	10	20
Same date as above	10	20

Lahij Province of the Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Lahij Province of the Islamic State vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Lahij Province of the Islamic State	2
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	5
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Jamaah Ansharut Daulah Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Lahij Province of the Islamic State	60
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	25
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Lahij Province of the Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Yemen	2

Lahij Province of the Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Yemen	60

	Countries Attacked
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Ye	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties Government (General)
2015	60

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Victim Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Government (General)	20	40

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of attacks
2015	

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Government (General)	2

Tactics

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year

Year	total Casualties Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
2015	60

Total Casualties by Attack type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	20	40

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

	Number of attacks
Government (General)	

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	2

Overview

Alternative names	Najd Province of the Islamic State
Pledged	
Group Began	2015
Group Finished	?
Groups Attacks	5
Total Killed	58
Total Wounded	333
Country of Origin	Saudi Arabia
Active In	Saudi Arabia, Kuwait

Najd Province of the Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	5

Lahij Province of the Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	58	333

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
26th of June, 2015 in Kuwait, Kuwait	28	227
22nd of May, 2015 in Qatif, Saudi Arabia	23	100

Najd Province of the Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem	5
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Saudia Arabia	-
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Najd Province of the Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Najd Province of the Islamic State	391
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	-
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Najd Province of the Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Saudia Arabia	4
Kuwait	1

Najd Province of the Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Saudia Arabia	136
Kuwait	255

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Najd Province of the Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Najd Province of the Islamic State	2
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Saudi Arabia	-
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties Government (Police		Religious Figures/Institutions
2015	1	3	388

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Victim Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Government (General)	1	0
Police	1	2
Religious Figures/Institutions	56	331

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of attacks Government (Police		Religious Figures/Institutions
2015	1	1	3

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Government (General)	1
Police	1
Religious Figures/Institutions	3

Tactics

Year	total Casualties Bombing/Expl	Unknown
2015	390	1

Total Casualties by Attack type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	57	333
Unknown	1	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Number of attacks

Doesn't work with stats and no worth time

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Bombing/Explosion	4
Unknown	1

169

Overview

Alternative Names	Sanaa Province of Islamic State
Pledged	
Group Began	2015
Group Finished	
Groups Attacks	29
Total Killed	304
Total Wounded	679
Country of Origin	Yemen
Active In	Yemen

Sanaa Province of Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	29

Sanaa Province of Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	304	679

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Septmeber 29th, 2015 in Sanaa, Yemen	16	46
September 2nd, 2015 in Sanaa Yemen	17	46
June 29th, 2015, Sanaa	28	20
March 20th, 2015 Sanaa, Yemen	40	88
March 20th, 2015 Sanaa, Yemen	39	87

Sanaa Province of Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Sanaa Province of Islamic State vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Lahij Province of the Islamic State	29
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	5
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Sanaa Province of Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Lahij Province of the Islamic State	983
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	25
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

	Number of Attacks
Yemen	29

	Total Casualties
Yemen	983

	Countries Attacked
Sanaa Province of Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Y	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Victim Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Religious Figures/Institutions	249	601
Violent Political Party	48	59
Journalists and Media	1	2
Police	0	5
Unknown	0	0
Terroists/Non-state Militia	6	12

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of attacks
2015	Same as below

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Religious Figures/Institutions	19
Violent Political Party	5
Journalists and Media	1
Police	1
Unknown	2
Terroists/Non-state Militia	1

Tactics

Casualties by Attack Type Each Year

Year	total Casualties Bombing/Explos	Assassination
2015	939	44

Total Casualties by Attack type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	289	650
Assassination	15	29

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Number of attacks

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Bombing/Explosion	26
Assassination	3

Wilayat Shabwah

Overview

Alternative Names	Shabwah Province of the Islamic State
Pledged	
Group Began	2015
Group Finished	??
Groups Attacks	1
Total Killed	14
Total Wounded	0
Country of Origin	Yemen
Active In	Yemen

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2015	16

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2015	14	0

Dealiest Attacks

Date	Country	City	Fatalities	Injured
14/04/2015	Yemen	Ataq	14	0

Comparing Supporters of the Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Attacks vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Shabwah Province of the Islamic State	1
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	-
Avg. of All Minor Groups	37

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Tehrik-e-Khilafat	14
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Pakistan	-
Avg, of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Attacks per Country

Yemen	14

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State Cascualties per Country

Yemen	14

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Shabwah Province of the Islamic State to Other Groups

Shabwah Province of the Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups Founded in Yemen	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Minor Groups	1

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties
2015	14

Total Casualties by Victim Type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Military	14	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks Military
2015	1

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Military	1

Tactics

Year	Total Casualties
2014	38

Total Casualties by Attack Type

Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	14	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
2015	

Total Attacks by Tactic

Type	Number of Attacks
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	1

175

Overview

Pledged	
Group Began	2014
Group Finished	Present
Groups Attacks	173
Total Killed	624
Total Wounded	620
Country of Origin	Egypt
Active In	Egypt

Sinai Province of The Islamic State Attacks Over Time

Year	Number of Attacks
2014	17
2015	156

Sinai Province of The Islamic State Casualties Over Time

Year	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
2014	19	23
2015	606	596

Dealiest Attacks to Date

Date, Year, City, Country	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
January 29th, 2015 in Arish, Egypt	25	58
October 31, 2015 Unknown, Egypt	224	0
July 15th, Sheikh Zuweid, Egypt	20	25

Sinai Province of The Islamic State Activity to Other Groups

Sinai Province of The Islamic State vs. Other Groups

	Number of Attacks
Sinai Province of The Islamic State	173
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Egypt	?
Avg. of All Major Groups	?

Sinai Province of The Islamic State Casualties vs. Other Groups

	Total Victims
Sinai Province of The Islamic State	1244
Avg. of Minor Groups Founded in Egypt	?
Avg. of All Minor Groups	217

Areas of Operation

Sinai Province of The Islamic State Attacks per Country

	Number of Attacks
Egypt	173

Sinai Province of The Islamic State Casualties per Country

	Total Casualties
Egypt	1244

Comparing Number of Countries Attacked by Sinai Province of The Islamic State to Other Groups

	Countries Attacked
Sinai Province of The Islamic State	1
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups Founded in Egypt	?
Avg. Countries Attacked by Major Groups	?

Targets

Casualties by Victim Type Over Time

Year	Number of Casualties											
	Police	Military	Private Citizens	Business	Airports and Aircraft	Terrorists/Non-State	Government	Unknown	Utilites	Other	Education Institutions	Religious Figures/Institutions
2014	16	12	3	0	0	0	1	0	10	0	0	0
2015	362	466	42	34	224	1	42	11	9	0	3	7

177

Total Casualties by Victim Type

Victim Type	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Police	84	294
Military	247	231
Private Citizens and Property	38	7
Business	13	21
Airports	224	0
Terrorists/Non-state militia	0	1
Government (General)	5	37
Government (Diplomatic)	1	10
Unknown	7	12
Utilities	0	0
Other	2	1
Educational Institutions	1	0
Religious Figures/Institutions	2	5

Total Attacks by Victim Type

Type	Number of Attacks
Police	61
Military	62
Private Citizens and Property	17
Business	7
Airports	1
Terrorists/Non-state militia	2
Government (General)	6
Government (Diplomatic)	2
Unknown	7
Utilities	2
Other	1
Education Insitution	2
Religious Figures/Institutions	3

Total Casualties by Attack type

	Victims Killed	Victims Wounded
Bombing/Explosion	405	500
Armed Assault	126	69
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	28	5
Assassination	13	7
Hijacking	2	1
Unknown	49	38
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	0	0

Attacks per Victim Type Over Time

	Number of attacks	
	2014	2015
Bombing/Explosion	8	93
Armed Assault	1	29
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	6	15
Assassination	2	9
Hijacking	0	2
Unknown	0	7
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	0	1

Total Attacks by Tactic

	Number of Attacks
Bombing/Explosion	101
Armed Assault	30
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	21
Assassination	11
Hijacking	2
Unknown	7
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	1